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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Friday, September 25, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 193

                           Headlines



F R A N C E

BABAR BIDCO: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
BABAR BIDCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B-' Rating, Outlook Stable
LOUVRE BIDCO: S&P Affirms B+ Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
TECHNICOLOR SA: S&P Lowers ICR to 'SD' on Debt-To-Equity Swap


G E R M A N Y

REBECCA BIDCO: S&P Assigns B Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


I T A L Y

MONTE DEI PASCHI: Italian Gov't. Seeks Investors After Bailouts


K A Z A K H S T A N

TENGRI BANK: Moody's Lowers LongTerm Deposit Ratings to 'C'


N E T H E R L A N D S

TMF SAPPHIRE: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable, Affirms 'B-' ICR


P O L A N D

PLAY COMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Alters Outlook on CFR to Developing


S P A I N

IBERCAJA BANCO: Fitch Affirms BB+ LongTerm IDR, Outlook Negative


S W I T Z E R L A N D

GARRETT MOTION: Moody's Cuts LT CFR to Caa1 on Chapter 11 Filing


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AURIUM CLO III: Moody's Confirms B2 Rating on Class F Notes
BELL POTTINGER: Ex-Chief Executive to Fight Potential Boardroom Ban
CINEWORLD GROUP: Posts US$1.6BB Loss, Raises Going Concern Doubt
IONA PLC: Signs Binding Documentation to Refinance Entire Debt
ITHACA ENERGY: Fitch Maintains 'B' LT IDR on Watch Negative

LONDON CAPITAL: FCA Chair Says Investors Want Action Not Sympathy
TRAVELPORT WORLDWIDE: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CC' on Debt Restructuring


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Mentor X

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F R A N C E
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BABAR BIDCO: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
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Moody's Investors Service assigned a first-time B2 corporate family
rating (CFR) and a B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to
Babar Bidco SAS, the top holding company within the restricted
group that will own Babilou Group S.A.S., a leading French-based
international provider of childcare and early education.
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned B2 ratings to the EUR487 million
first lien senior secured term loan B (TLB) due September 2027 and
the EUR90 million first lien senior secured revolving credit
facility (RCF) due March 2027, both borrowed by Babar Bidco SAS.
The outlook is stable.

On August 6, 2020, funds advised by Antin Infrastructure Partners
(Antin) signed an agreement to acquire Babilou. The acquisition
will have a sizeable equity contribution from Antin along with
significant reinvestment from most of the existing shareholders.
The equity, together with proceeds from the TLB, will be used to
(1) refinance EUR502 million of existing debt (EUR23 million of
existing debt is being rolled over); (2) fund the equity
consideration of EUR740 million; (3) provide a cash over-funding of
EUR12 million; and (4) pay transaction fees of EUR43 million.

"The B2 ratings reflect Babilou's resilient business model and good
industry demand dynamics supported by a favorable regulatory
environment and tax regime mainly in France, its largest market,"
says Victor Garcia Capdevila, a Moody's Assistant Vice President --
Analyst and lead analyst for Babilou.

"However, the rating also factors in Babilou's high leverage, the
execution risks associated with its rapid and ambitious inorganic
growth strategy, and its relatively weak free cash flow
generation," adds Mr. Garcia.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Babilou's B2 CFR reflects (1) the positive industry dynamics in
childcare and early education; (2) its solid business model
supported by a degree of revenue visibility from long term
contracts with large corporates in the business-to-business
segment; (3) the favorable regulatory environment in the form of
large tax incentives and subsidies to both corporates and parents;
(4) its resilient operating performance in economic downturns and
during the lockdown caused by the coronavirus outbreak; and (5) its
growing international diversification and limited customer
concentration.

However, the rating is constrained by (1) its high leverage
post-transaction, with Moody's-adjusted gross leverage of 5.6x in
2020, on a proforma basis; (2) the risks of potential adverse
changes in the regulatory landscape, particularly in France,
although this is mitigated by the long track record of the current
regulatory and tax incentives framework; (3) pricing pressures in
the business-to-business segment led by an intensification of the
competitive environment; (4) the execution risks associated with a
rapid and ambitious inorganic growth strategy and the expansion
into new countries where the operating environment might not be as
favourable as in France; and (5) its limited free cash flow
generation owing to large capital spending in maintenance,
information technology and digitalization and new nursery
openings.

Moody's base case scenario assumes slightly negative free cash flow
generation in 2020 and only modest positive FCF in 2021. Given the
highly fragmented nature of the early childcare education industry
coupled with Babilou's proven appetite and track record of
inorganic growth, Moody's expects that deleveraging will be fairly
slow, with Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA at around 5.5x to 5.0x over
the next 2 to 3 years.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) CONSIDERATIONS

Moody's has factored into its assessment the following social and
governance considerations.

Social considerations are related to demographic and societal
trends, as well as human capital. These are characterized mainly by
increased female participation in the workforce, changes in
demographics and changes in parents' preferences towards early
education as opposed to pure care. These trends support the
positive industry dynamics of the childcare and early education
segment.

Human capital is also a social consideration in Babilou's rating
because one of its biggest challenges is the shortage of staff.
Personnel expenses represent around 65% of the company's total
operating costs. High personnel turnover rates or salary inflation
could negatively affect the company's operating and financial
performance.

From a corporate governance perspective, Moody's highlights the
high leverage of the company, which is consistent with its majority
private equity ownership structure. Private equity firms tend to
have more tolerance for leverage and risk and comparatively are
less transparent than publicly listed companies. In addition, the
company has a track record of rapid inorganic growth. Moody's also
positively notes that the founders remain in the shareholding
structure with a 23% equity stake and a lock-up period of 3 years.

LIQUIDITY

Moody's views Babilou's liquidity as adequate. Cash balances at
closing are expected to be around EUR12 million, further supported
by the availability under the undrawn EUR90 million revolving
credit facility (RCF). The RCF is subject to a consolidated senior
secured net leverage springing covenant of 9.5x when drawings
exceed 40%. Moody's expects comfortable headroom under this
covenant over the next 12-18 months.

Moody's expects limited FCF generation in 2020 and 2021, although
intra-year working capital swings of around EUR15 million, owing to
the payment profile of municipalities, may lead to temporary
drawings under the RCF.

The company will have a long debt maturity profile with the RCF
maturing in March 2027 and the TLB in September 2027.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Babilou's probability of default rating of B2-PD reflects the use
of an expected family recovery rate of 50%, as is consistent with
all first lien covenant-lite capital structures. The EUR487 million
TLB and the EUR90 million RCF are rated B2, in line with the
company's CFR. All facilities are guaranteed by the company's
subsidiaries and benefit from a guarantor coverage of not less than
80% of the group's consolidated EBITDA. The security package
includes shares, bank accounts and intercompany receivables of
material subsidiaries.

The EUR86 million shareholder loan provided by Antin and due 6
months after the final debt maturity of the TLB has received equity
credit under Moody's methodologies.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

With starting leverage of 5.6x, Babilou is initially weakly
positioned in the rating category. The stable outlook reflects the
resiliency of the business model, the positive industry dynamics
and Moody's expectation of a slight reduction in leverage to 5.5x
in 2021 and towards 5.0x thereafter.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Upward pressure on the ratings could develop over time if
Moody's-adjusted gross debt to EBITDA declines well below 4.5x and
the company demonstrates a track record of generating material
positive free cash flows.

Conversely, downward pressure on the ratings could arise if
earnings deteriorate or the company engages in debt financed
acquisitions leading to Moody's-adjusted gross debt to EBITDA
sustainably above 5.5x. Downward rating pressure could also arise
if the company's free cash flows are sustainably negative or its
liquidity profile deteriorates.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Babar Bidco SAS

Assignments:

Long-term Corporate Family Rating, Assigned B2

Probability of Default Rating, Assigned B2-PD

BACKED Senior Secured Term Loan B, Assigned B2

BACKED Senior secured RCF, Assigned B2

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Assigned Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

COMPANY PROFILE

Headquartered in France, Babilou Family is a leading international
provider of childcare and early education for infants and children
under the age of six with around 39,000 seats and 800 centers
across 12 different countries. The group has operations in France
(56% of revenue in 2019, 445 nurseries), Germany (15%, 78), USA
(11%, 42), Luxembourg (6%, 28), Singapore (5%, 35), UAE (3%, 12)
and in Switzerland, Belgium, Argentina, Colombia and India (rest of
the world, 5%, 68). In 2019, the group generated revenue and
Moody's-adjusted EBITDA of EUR470 million and EUR116 million,
respectively. Following the transaction, the group will be owned by
Antin Infrastructure Partners (53%), the founders (23%), TA
Associates (19%), Raise Investment (4%) and the management team
(1%).


BABAR BIDCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B-' Rating, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary 'B-' ratings to Babar
BidCo, French childcare provider Babilou's new intermediate holding
company, and the group's senior secured debt.

Babar BidCo's appetite for expansion and equity-sponsor ownership
limit the case for pronounced deleveraging.   Antin IP announced on
Aug. 6, 2020, that it had agreed to acquire a 52.6% stake in
Babilou from the founders and some minority shareholders. To
support the transaction and refinance existing debt, Babar BidCo,
Babilou's new intermediate holding company, is set to issue a new
EUR487 million term-loan B and a EUR90 million revolving credit
facility (RCF). S&P said, "We project these issuances will lead to
S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 6.5x in 2020,
and estimate adjusted debt will amount to about EUR700 million,
including EUR154 million of lease liabilities and EUR17 million of
put/call options on minority stakes. We exclude the shareholder
loans from our debt metrics since we view them as nondebt like. We
typically believe that the private equity-owned sponsors' interest
in deleveraging is low."

S&P said, "Although we anticipate sizable EBITDA growth in the next
few years, we expect it will translate into meaningfully positive
cash flow generation only in 2022.   Under our base case, we
forecast reported EBITDA growth for Babilou of about 25% in 2020
and 5%-10% in 2021 and 2022. This growth is mainly thanks to the
ramp-up of newly opened centers and recent acquisitions, and
despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic
consequences, which we anticipate will be limited. However, we
expect FOCF after lease payments will remain negative to neutral in
2020 and 2021, turning meaningfully positive only in 2022. The
company's FOCF is constrained by working capital outflows coming
from the timing of payment of French subsidies (30% are paid the
following year), our conservative assumption of EUR5 million
refunds to small and medium enterprise (SME) customers in 2021 due
to COVID-19-related nursery closures, and significant digital
development capital expenditure (capex). We note, however, that
this capex is discretionary. In addition, we cannot exclude further
merger and acquisition transactions, which would also hamper cash
flow generation.

"Babilou's modest scale of operations in very fragmented markets
constrains the group's creditworthiness, in our view.  Despite
being the leader in France, Germany, and Luxembourg (which
altogether represent more than 75% of the group's revenue),
Babilou's market share in its core French market is only about 4%
(about 22% of the private nursery market by number of seats),
reflecting fragmented nature of the sector. The group reported
total revenue of about EUR415 million in 2019, four times lower
than that of its U.S. peers Bright Horizons Family Solutions and
KUEHG Corp. We believe scale supports profitability and is
beneficial in fragmented markets, where it constitutes a barrier to
entry." In particular, having a nationwide footprint is a key
competitive advantage for large corporate clients who book seats
for their employees. To that extent, Babilou's brokerage platform
in France ("1001 creches") is a capex-efficient way to expand
coverage.

Babilou's employer-sponsored model in France supports revenue
stability, in S&P's view.   The company derives about one quarter
of revenue from three-to-five-year contractual arrangements with
corporates that pay fixed annual fees. This comes on top of the
parents' contribution and state subsidies that are based on
occupancy levels. Corporate-client retention is high, with the
company having lost only one customer in the history of its
operations.

Babilou operates in regulated and subsidized markets, further
supporting business resiliency.  Although operating in such markets
exposes the company to regulatory risks, S&P believes Babilou
operates in countries where governments are generally supportive.
During the COVID-19-related lockdowns, total financial support from
European governments remained consistent with pre-COVID levels, but
was distributed via partial unemployment schemes as well as
subsidies. This limited the impact of the lockdowns on the group's
EBITDA to almost zero in European countries. In Singapore, the
government also introduced measures to mitigate the economic impact
of COVID-19. Overall, Babilou's operations in the U.S. and United
Arab Emirates are the most exposed to economic risks, because they
are mainly retail-based childcare centers and receive less state
subsidies. However, these represent less than 15% of the group's
revenue.

Revenue stability is important given Babilou's high operating
leverage.   About 90% of Babilou's operating expenses are fixed,
providing limited flexibility to the company in a downturn. The
bulk of expenses are personnel expenses, especially in countries
where the labor market is relatively inflexible and it takes time
to lay people off in a downturn, and rent. The group's
profitability somewhat lags that of peers, although it should
improve in the coming years with the ramp-up of recently opened
childcare centers, with EBITDA margin reaching 22%-24% from 2020.
Furthermore, capex levels are also meaningful, including about EUR9
million of maintenance capex and EUR10 million of information
technology (IT) capex per year.

The childcare market's long-term growth trends are favorable.   The
market is supported by economic and demographic trends, such as an
increasing number of dual-earner households that require childcare
services. The increasing recognition of the importance of early
education is also driving demand for high-quality care.
Furthermore, there is a significant supply/demand imbalance in the
countries where Babilou operates.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic. Renewed surges are
apparent in countries where infection rates had been relatively
controlled over the summer, including France. The approaching
Northern Hemisphere winter will bring heightened risks of
transmissions and might necessitate renewed containment measures.
The hunt for a vaccine remains critical and the most likely route
back to normalcy. S&P said, "We are using this assumption in
assessing the economic and credit implications associated with the
pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions
and estimates accordingly."

S&P said, "The final ratings will depend on our receipt and
satisfactory review of all final documentation and final terms of
the transaction. The preliminary ratings should therefore not be
construed as evidence of final ratings. If we do not receive final
documentation within a reasonable time, or if the final
documentation and final terms of the transaction depart from the
materials and terms reviewed, we reserve the right to withdraw or
revise the ratings. Potential changes include, but are not limited
to, utilization of the proceeds, maturity, size and conditions of
the facilities, financial and other covenants, security, and
ranking.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Babilou will
continue to report strong EBITDA growth of about 25% in 2020 and
10% in 2021, driven mostly by the ramp-up of newly opened centers
and recent acquisitions. We forecast that the company's S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA will remain at 6.5x-6.0x over this
period. We also anticipate that FOCF after lease payments will
remain negative to neutral in both years, hampered by center
openings and digital transformation capex, as well as structural
working capital outflows and likely refunds to SME corporate
clients due to COVID-19-related lockdowns.

"We could raise our ratings over the medium term if the company met
its operational targets and increased profitability, translating
into sustainably positive FOCF (after lease payments) close to
EUR20 million in 2021 and EUR50 million in 2022. We would also need
to see the company and its owners' financial policy supporting
deleveraging to below 5.5x.

"We could lower our ratings if Babilou proved to be less resilient
to adverse conditions than we currently expect, for instance if it
faced corporate contracts cancellations or refund requests, such
that its FOCF remained negative and its liquidity weakened, or its
leverage became unsustainably high."


LOUVRE BIDCO: S&P Affirms B+ Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B+' issuer credit rating on Louvre
Bidco (LB), the non-operating holding company of the iQera Group.
The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we assigned our 'B+' issue credit
rating to LB's proposed senior secured notes. We also affirmed at
'B+' our issue rating on LB's existing senior secured debt.

"The rating on the proposed notes is subject to our review of the
notes' final documentation.

"Although LB's plan to issue EUR200 million of senior secured notes
will temporarily increase the group's leverage, our view of the
group's financial risk profile remains fundamentally the same.

"We understand the group intends to use the proceeds to refinance
its fully drawn EUR50 million revolving credit facility (RCF) and
EUR75 million of existing senior secured floating rate notes. The
transaction would also increase the group's cash position by EUR75
million.

"Following the proposed transaction, debt to cash EBITDA will
increase to 4.9x from 4.3x, according to the company based on data
as of mid-2020 (total debt excluding co-investors). Given the
private-equity ownership of the group, we do not net debt against
cash, which is why this issuance affects our leverage
calculation."

That said, S&P's view of LB's financial risk profile is broadly
unchanged, because:

-- S&P believes that the EUR75 million of additional net debt will
be used to purchase cash-flow-generating assets in the coming
quarters, supported by a likely inflow of nonperforming loans next
year;

-- S&P believes the company's appetite for leverage, selective
investment approach, and prudent liquidity management have not
changed following this transaction; and

-- S&P sees better business momentum for debt-servicing and
debt-purchasing activities than it expected just a few months ago,
supporting its cash-flow leverage metrics.

-- S&P said, "We continue to expect that debt to EBITDA will peak
in 2020 at above 5.0x before improving next year toward 4.5x. We
now expect EBITDA interest coverage to improve in 2021 toward
pre-crisis level (5.0x at end-2019), after a moderate dip this year
to the 4.0x-4.5x range. Our EBITDA calculation includes the
add-back for portfolio amortization and is therefore a
cash-adjusted metric." Without this add-back, on a statutory basis,
debt to EBITDA is much higher, likely to exceed 10x at end-2020 and
trend back toward 10x at end-2021.

-- S&P said, "Our assessment of the group's financial risk profile
captures the risk that financial sponsor-owned institutions tend to
have more aggressive financial policies that can reduce the
predictability of long-term credit ratios. This is why we view the
group's financial risk profile as slightly weaker than most peers'.
That said, the group's cash-flow leverage metrics are not worse
than peers'. This supports our one-notch positive adjustment in the
rating."

-- S&P said, "We continue to view the group's liquidity as
adequate, based on our assessment of likely sources of liquidity
over likely uses of liquidity of at least 1.2x in the coming 12
months. Our assessment is supported by bonds not maturing until
2024 (EUR370 million of senior secured notes)."

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among
health experts is that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its
peak in some regions but will remain a threat until a vaccine or
effective treatment is widely available, which may not occur until
the second half of 2021. S&P said, "We are using this assumption in
assessing the economic and credit implications associated with the
pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions
and estimates accordingly."

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation of LB's
leverage remaining high, and the likelihood that the group will
maintain its investment discipline and prudent liquidity management
over 2020-2021, despite its financial-sponsor ownership and amid a
more buoyant French distressed debt market.

"We estimate the group's debt to EBITDA to peak above 5x in 2020
before improving toward 4.5x in 2021.

"We could consider a positive rating action on LB if its leverage
and coverage metrics strengthen beyond pre-COVID-19 levels (2019),
most likely on the back of a normalization in the operating
environment. A positive rating action would also hinge on the
private equity owners having firm deleveraging plans.

"We could consider lowering our rating on LB in the next 12 months
if renewed strain on revenue pushes EBITDA interest coverage
durably and significantly below 5x. This could stem from a second
wave of COVID-19 infections and a return of lockdown measures,
which could impede portfolio collections.

"We could also lower our rating should the company depart from its
investment discipline and prudent liquidity management, or be
side-lined in the French distressed debt market because of stronger
competition."

Key analytical factors

-- The new and existing senior secured notes have an issue rating
of 'B+', with a recovery rating of '4', based on S&P's unchanged
expectation of average recovery prospects (30%-50%; rounded
estimate of 40%).

-- In S&P's hypothetical default scenario, it assumes a default in
2024. In its view, a default on the group's debt obligations would
most likely occur because of adverse operational issues, lost
clients, difficult collection conditions, or greater competitive
pressures leading to mispricing of portfolio purchases.

-- S&P said, "In such a scenario, we assume the group's debt
portfolio would be liquidated and debt-servicing activities sold
given the group's long-term contracts and established relationships
with customers."

-- In S&P's estimate of the servicing business' enterprise value
at default available to LB's senior secured noteholders, it
excludes Sistemia because it believes its enterprise value at
default would be below the claims of Sistemia's creditors.

Simulated default assumptions

-- Year of default: 2024
-- Jurisdiction: France

Simplified waterfall

-- Estimates as of June 30, 2020:

-- Net portfolio value on liquidation: EUR238 million (adjusted
    for co-investors)

-- Servicing business enterprise value at default: EUR46 million
    Bankruptcy costs: EUR14 million

-- Priority claims*: EUR44 million

-- Collateral value available to senior secured creditors:
    EUR226 million

-- Total senior secured debt at default*: EUR586 million

-- Recovery expectation on the senior secured note: 30%-50%
    (rounded estimate: 40%)

* All debt amounts include six months of prepetition interest.


TECHNICOLOR SA: S&P Lowers ICR to 'SD' on Debt-To-Equity Swap
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S&P Global Ratings downgraded Technicolor S.A. to 'SD' from 'CC',
and lowered the ratings on its existing and now reinstated debt to
'D' (default).

S&P said, "We are affirming our 'CCC' issue rating on the EUR457
million of new debt, and it remains on CreditWatch with positive
implications, since the debt is insulated from the debt-to-equity
swap. We will raise our issue-level rating likely by more than one
notch, once we raise the issuer credit rating from 'SD'."

S&P Global Ratings views Technicolor's completed debt-to-equity
swap as equivalent to a default.

S&P said, "We downgraded Technicolor to 'SD' in light of the group
completing its financial restructuring plan, which included two
main components. First, the conversion of about EUR1,234 million of
debt into a new EUR574 million facility and EUR660 million of
equity on Sept. 22, 2020. Second, the issuance of EUR457 million of
new debt to repay the $110 million J.P. Morgan bridge facility and
to support Technicolor's liquidity needs, undertaken in July and
September 2020.

"We consider the debt-to-equity swap a distressed exchange, and
thus tantamount to default, because investors received less value
than the promise of the original securities. We believe the lower
priority ranking of the reinstated debt and the new shares
corresponds to weaker value prospects, even if the conversion leads
to a similar combined nominal value of EUR1,234 million.

"We also lowered the issue-level ratings on the reinstated EUR574
million debt to 'D'.

"We affirmed our 'CCC' issue-level rating on Technicolor's new
debt, given its insulation from the debt-to-equity swap.  Because
the new EUR457 million of debt issued by Tech 6 and Technicolor
USA, Inc. - two subsidiaries of Technicolor S.A. - was not part of
the debt-to-equity swap, we affirmed our rating on it at 'CCC'.

"The positive CreditWatch on the new EUR457 million financing
indicates that we will raise our issue-level rating likely by more
than one notch, once we raise the issuer credit rating from 'SD'."




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REBECCA BIDCO: S&P Assigns B Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' long-term issuer credit and
issue ratings to Germany-based manufacturer Rebecca Bidco GmbH
(RENK) and its EUR320 million secured senior notes. The recovery
rating on the notes is '3'.

RENK is a leading niche manufacturer of high-quality automatic
transmissions, gear units, slide bearings, suspension systems,
couplings, and test systems, with established customer
relationships with many prime contractors, original equipment
manufacturers, and government defense agencies.


The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that RENK will
increase its revenue and gradually improve profitability, with
adjusted EBITDA margins of 13% or more in 2020-2021, and adjusted
debt to EBITDA of about 4.7x.

The acquisition of RENK by Triton is debt- and equity-financed and
will result in higher leverage.  As part of the acquisition
financing, Rebecca Bidco issued: EUR320 million of new senior
secured notes; a EUR50 million revolving credit facility (RCF;
super senior to the notes); and a new EUR167.5 million super senior
guarantee facility. The proceeds, together with a EUR241 million
equity contribution by the new owner Triton, will be used to
purchase 76% of RENK (EUR520 million) and the related fees. As of
June 30, 2020, RENK had about EUR115 million of cash on its balance
sheet. The EUR50 million RCF, which ranks super senior to the
notes, will be undrawn at closing. Triton launched a public
takeover offer for the 21% minority stake of RENK, which will be
financed via an equity contribution in the coming months.

RENK's leverage will increase post transaction.  S&P said, "We
forecast S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA for 2020 will
be about 4.7x. We include as debt a EUR40 million shareholder loan
with a two-year maturity that we expect will be repaid in 2021. At
the same time, we forecast funds from operations (FFO) to debt of
about 11%-12%. We forecast that the company will exhibit adjusted
margins of about 13%, positive free operating cash flow (FOCF),
with good cash interest coverage and adequate liquidity." FOCF
should remain positive in 2020 and 2021, since RENK plans to
gradually reduce capital expenditure (capex) but also to materially
improve working capital, with an expected working capital-related
cash inflow of up to EUR25 million in 2020 versus a cash outflow of
about EUR65 million-EUR70 million in 2019. This assumption of a
material improvement in working capital is key to our base case.

The defense business generates approximately half of group revenue,
has a high profit share, a strong order book, and long lead times.
The defense business mainly comprises vehicle transmissions and
navy gearboxes, which benefit from exposure to end markets that are
exhibiting robust demand and growth prospects, coupled with good
contract visibility and longevity. S&P said, "We view barriers to
entry as high once RENK is on a platform and has won a contract.
Design and certification of products can last multiple years.
Therefore, given the high qualification costs, switching entrenched
suppliers is expensive and unappealing for many end customers. The
group generates approximately one-third of total revenue from
aftermarket and services activities, leading to recurring earnings
at higher margins than the rest of the business. Despite
COVID-19-related setbacks, RENK generated EUR246 million sales
revenue in the first half of 2020, outperforming the same period
last year by around 15%. We see positively that the group did not
register important delivery delays. As such, the projections in our
previous forecast continue to hold for the full year 2020."

S&P said, "We consider high customer and geographic concentration,
coupled with potential warranty claims, as a risk for
profitability.  We consider RENK as a tier 2 or 3 supplier, with
high customer and geographic concentration and a recent history of
pressured profitability. Despite producing and distributing in many
countries and regions globally, nearly 30% of group revenue is
generated in Germany, which together with the rest of Europe (33%),
accounts for nearly two-thirds of sales." At the same time, the
top-10 customers have contributed about 40%-45% of revenue since
2014, with annual fluctuations because of RENK's project-driven
business model. Given the nature of RENK's business model, warranty
claims can arise in the ordinary course of business. The annual
impact on RENK's bottom line of previous warranty claims has ranged
between EUR5 million and EUR11 million annually since 2017.
Although there are currently no claims of this size, new claims
could hinder profitability. The decline in profitability exhibited
since 2017 is partly explained by one warranty claim, the phase-out
of gear unit activities in the wind sector, and the increasing
price pressure observed in commercial end-markets.

Conversely, the nondefense business has more challenging end
markets.   RENK operates in civil marine, oil and gas, power,
cement, plastics, steel, wind, and mechanical/plant engineering.
S&P thinks demand in some of these markets will be subdued or
choppy, especially because of measures taken by governments in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the recent volatility in oil
and gas markets.

S&P said, "We assess RENK as a financial sponsor-related owned
entity, given its acquisition by Triton.  RENK's new capital
structure includes preference shares and shareholder loans that sit
outside the restricted group. We consider these instruments as
equity-like, except for the EUR40 million shareholder loan, which
we view as debt-like. This is because this instrument has a
two-year maturity, and Triton and RENK plan to repay it by 2021. We
also note that there are no transfer restrictions (to third parties
of the shareholder loan). When calculating adjusted debt, we
consider RENK's new debt facilities and then adjust for about EUR6
million of operating leases, about EUR10 million of pension-related
obligations, and the EUR40 million shareholder loan. We apply a
100% cash haircut, and we consider that RENK may follow a
shareholder-friendly dividend policy.

"We view RENK's management and governance as fair."   The group has
clear strategic planning processes and good depth and breadth of
management. However, RENK is now under new ownership by a
private-equity sponsor. Management will need to steer the business
through a period of transformation under the new ownership and
navigate uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, establishing
a new track record in the process.

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the rate of spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak.  S&P said,
"Some government authorities estimate the pandemic has peaked about
midyear, and we are using this assumption in assessing the economic
and credit implications. We believe the measures adopted to contain
COVID-19 have pushed the global economy into recession. As the
situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and estimates
accordingly."

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that RENK
will continue to deliver its business strategy, increasing its
revenue and gradually improving profitability. We expect that RENK
will maintain adjusted EBITDA margins of 13% or more in 2020-2021,
but that adjusted debt to EBITDA will remain at about 4.7x
including the shareholder loan that we treat as debt. We expect
RENK will exhibit positive FOCF and FFO cash interest coverage of
more than 2.5x over our 12-month rating horizon.

"We could lower the rating if FFO cash interest coverage decreases
below 2.5x because of operational setbacks or a debt-financed
financial policy or acquisitions. We could also take a negative
rating action if adjusted FOCF were to materially weaken, because
in our view this would lead to a more highly leveraged capital
structure, specifically with debt to EBITDA exceeding 6.0x. We
could also lower the rating if the ratio of liquidity sources to
uses were to decrease to less than 1.2x.

"We consider a positive rating action as unlikely over our 12-month
outlook horizon, but we could raise the rating if RENK were to
improve debt to EBITDA sustainably below 4.5x, supported by
positive FOCF and positive industry trends and robust operating
performance."




=========
I T A L Y
=========

MONTE DEI PASCHI: Italian Gov't. Seeks Investors After Bailouts
---------------------------------------------------------------
Elisa Martinuzzi at Bloomberg News reports that after a decade of
scandals and multiple bailouts, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA
is back in the spotlight.

According to Bloomberg, this time, the Italian government is
shopping around the EUR1.5 billion (US$1.7 billion) lender ahead of
a European Union deadline for Rome to exit the bank next year.

Loaded with legal risks that dwarf its market value, any investor
will be loathe to buy Monte Paschi with those liabilities -- not
least in the midst of a pandemic, Bloomberg states.

The risk to Italian taxpayers is that Rome offloads its majority
stake in the world's oldest bank at any cost, Bloomberg notes.
According to Bloomberg, a sale to UniCredit SpA, as is being
discussed, might solve Italy's immediate problem of meeting the EU
deadline, but the bigger bank would demand strong financial
guarantees.  A Paschi merger would also make it harder for
UniCredit to pursue more compelling deals, Bloomberg says.

It's no surprise that Italy has restarted talks with UniCredit to
sound it out on Monte Paschi, Bloomberg relays.  Foreign banks
haven't shown much interest and Intesa Sanpaolo SpA, UniCredit's
main rival, is busy buying UBI, another lender that might have made
a good merger partner for Paschi, according to Bloomberg.

A merger in Germany, UniCredit's second-biggest market, would be
even more compelling, Bloomberg says.  According to Bloomberg,
while cross-border deals remain difficult in Europe, if Germany's
Commerzbank AG were to come up for sale, UniCredit would be better
off pursuing that purchase.

A combination with Popolare di Bari, which Italy is in the process
of rescuing, wouldn't return Monte Paschi to private hands,
Bloomberg says.

Adding to Rome's urgency, Monte Paschi is close to selling EUR8
billion of bad loans to another state-owned entity later this year,
a key milestone in its rehabilitation, Bloomberg states.  The sale
will erode Paschi's capital, which the European Central Bank wants
the lender to strengthen, Bloomberg notes.  A merger with a
stronger bank would solve that problem, according to Bloomberg.

A greater risk is that Monte Paschi loses some of the EUR10 billion
of legal claims against it, forcing it to set aside more funds and
further eroding capital, Bloomberg discloses.  The pandemic could
also lead to a fresh avalanche of bad loans, Bloomberg says.
Should it need to raise more capital, even with the backing of the
state, the costs would be prohibitive and eat into already weak
profitability, Bloomberg relays.  Analysts expect the bank to make
just EUR76 million next year, which could be wiped out by higher
interest costs, Bloomberg states.

It's arguable that Monte Paschi should have been wound down years
ago -- it was probably insolvent at the time of its last state
rescue -- but more visibility on the potential legal liabilities
would at least strengthen Italy's negotiating hand, Bloomberg
says.




===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================

TENGRI BANK: Moody's Lowers LongTerm Deposit Ratings to 'C'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded Tengri Bank's long-term local
and foreign-currency deposit ratings to C from Caa3. The C ratings
do not carry outlooks. Concurrently, Moody's downgraded the bank's
baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA to c from ca; its
long-term counterparty risk assessment (CR Assessment) to C(cr)
from Caa2(cr) and its long-term counterparty risk ratings (CRRs) to
C from Caa2. Moody's has also downgraded the bank's national scale
long-term deposit rating to C.kz from Caa3.kz and its national
scale long-term CRR to C.kz from Caa2.kz. The bank's short-term
deposit ratings and CRRs of Not Prime (NP) as well as short-term
CRA of Not Prime(cr) were affirmed by this action.

Moody's will withdraw all the bank's ratings following the
withdrawal of its banking license by the Agency of the Republic of
Kazakhstan for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade and Moody's subsequent ratings withdrawal follow the
Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Regulation and Development
of the Financial Market's announcement on 18 September 2020 that it
had revoked Tengri Bank's banking license as a result of the bank's
systematic improper performance of contractual obligations on
payment and transfer transactions, its violation of prudential
standards and other mandatory norms and limits [1].

The downgrade of Tengri Bank's ratings reflects Moody's
expectations of heavy losses that the bank's creditors are likely
to incur as a result of liquidation, given the bank's poor asset
quality and its low share of liquid assets.

The rating action was driven by governance risk considerations,
namely, high related-party lending, as confirmed by the regulator,
and a prolonged conflict among the bank's key stakeholders, which
has resulted in a severe deterioration of its financials, frequent
changes in management and the bank's inability to promptly react to
challenges or to secure external support.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Tengri Bank

Downgrades:

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgraded to c from ca

Baseline Credit Assessment, Downgraded to c from ca

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Downgraded to C(cr) from
Caa2(cr)

Long-term Counterparty Risk Ratings, Downgraded to C from Caa2

NSR Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating, Downgraded to C.kz from
Caa2.kz

Long-term Bank Deposits, Downgraded to C from Caa3

NSR Long-term Bank Deposits, Downgraded to C.kz from Caa3.kz

Affirmations:

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating, Affirmed NP

Short-term Bank Deposits, Affirmed NP

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Changed to No Outlook from Ratings Under Review

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
Methodology published in November 2019.




=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================

TMF SAPPHIRE: S&P Alters Outlook to Stable, Affirms 'B-' ICR
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised the outlook on TMF Sapphire Midco B.V.,
the parent of TMF Group, to stable from negative, and affirmed the
'B-' ratings on TMF Sapphire Midco, its financing subsidiary
Sapphire Bidco B.V., and the group's senior secured first-lien
debt. S&P also affirmed the 'CCC' rating on the group's second-lien
term loan.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that the group will
gradually deleverage while generating positive FOCF and maintaining
funds from operations (FFO) interest coverage above 2.0x.

Netherlands-based corporate services provider TMF Group reported
like-for-like revenue growth of 6% and EBITDA growth of close to
12% in first-half 2020, despite challenging market conditions.

S&P said, "We have revised our forecasts for 2020 and now expect
total revenue will increase by about 6%, and that TMP Group's
adjusted EBITDA margin will improve to 21.0%-21.5%, which should
enable the group to generate positive, albeit weak free operating
cash flow (FOCF).

"TMF Group's revenue growth outperformed our expectations in
first-half 2020, reflecting the group's resilience in the
challenging operating environment resulting from the COVID-19
pandemic." Despite difficult market conditions in its key markets,
in particular in the Netherlands, TMF Group was able to increase
revenue by 9% in first-half 2020, 6% organically. Revenue decline
in the Netherlands due to regulatory changes introduced by the
Dutch government in 2019, which have reduced the volume of new
corporate structures, was offset by strong growth in almost all
other markets. The group's strategic focus on customer service
improvement enabled it to improve client retention, which
compensated for the slowdown in new business wins in the context of
COVID-19-related economic uncertainties.

S&P said, "Supported by improved profitability in first-half 2020,
we anticipate that TMF Group's EBITDA margins will moderately
improve compared with our previous forecasts. TMF Group increased
EBITDA by 12% in first-half 2020 as productivity gains from
previous years' investments in cost efficiency started to realize.
Despite a decline in revenue from its higher margins geographies
(Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg [Benelux]), and some
additional exceptional costs relating to restructuring and
strategic initiatives in 2020, we anticipate TMF Group's adjusted
EBITDA margins will gradually improve in 2020 and 2021. As a
result, we also expect FOCF will remain positive and will
marginally improve in the next 12 months, supported by good working
capital management and despite relatively high capital expenditure
of 5%-6% of sales." The group has improved its billing and
receivables collection processes and benefits from the ability to
defer tax and social security payments in some countries where it
operates, on the back of government support to corporates during
the COVID-19 pandemic.

S&P said, "Although uncertainty remains with regards to the global
macroeconomic environment as the COVID-19 pandemic continues to
weigh on general economic sentiment, we now expects TMF Group will
gradually improve its credit metrics. The group's debt structure
remains highly leveraged, with S&P Global Ratings adjusted debt to
EBITDA expected to improve to 11.0x-11.5x in 2020 from 12.0x in
2019, further reducing to below 11.0x in 2021. High interest costs
will continue to burden the interest coverage ratio, but we now
expect the group will maintain FFO cash interest coverage above
2.0x. Despite the high adjusted debt burden, we no longer believe
there is a high risk that the capital structure will become
unsustainable in the next 12-18 months, and have therefore revised
the outlook on TMF Sapphire to stable from negative.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that TMF Group's
revenue and EBITDA will increase moderately despite challenging
market conditions, enabling the group to deleverage, generate
positive FOCF, and maintain FFO cash interest coverage above 2.0x.

"We could lower the rating on Sapphire Midco if the group
experienced significant operating underperformance due to increased
customer attrition and an inability to win new business in the
context of a global economic recession due to COVID-19." In
particular, S&P could lower the rating if:

-- FOCF turned negative on a prolonged basis.
-- FFO cash interest coverage deteriorated to below 1.5x.
-- The group faced liquidity issues such as reduced headroom under
covenants.

S&P could raise the rating on Sapphire Midco if the group's
operating performance remained solid over the coming 12 months,
resulting in:

-- Gradual deleveraging such that S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt
to EBITDA, excluding bank overdraft facilities, declined toward
8.0x.

-- Continued positive and sound FOCF generation.




===========
P O L A N D
===========

PLAY COMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Alters Outlook on CFR to Developing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Ba3 corporate family rating
(CFR) of Play Communications S.A. and changed the outlook on the
rating to developing from stable.

The change in outlook to developing follows Iliad SA's announcement
on September 21, 2020 of its intention to acquire 100% of Play's
share capital through a combination of debt and cash.

"We have changed the outlook on Play to developing to reflect that
while the company is being acquired by a larger and more
diversified group, leverage of the combined entity will be higher
than that of Play on a standalone basis," says Victor Garcia
Capdevila, a Moody's Assistant Vice President -- Analyst and lead
analyst for Play.

"In addition, it remains uncertain what will be the strategic
direction and financial policies of Play under the new ownership,"
adds Mr. Garcia.

RATINGS RATIONALE

On September 21, 2020, Iliad announced a public tender offer for
100% of the shares of Play for a cash amount of PLN39 per share,
representing a 38.8% premium over the most recent closing share
price. Iliad has already signed a binding agreement to purchase the
40% controlling interest from Kenbourne Invest II S.a.r.l. (20.1%)
and Tollerton Investments Limited (20.1%), subject to EU Commission
approval. The offer amounts to a total cash consideration of around
EUR2.2 billion for 100% of Play's share capital and an enterprise
value of about EUR3.5 billion.

While the transaction is subject to shareholder and regulatory
approvals, Moody's believes there is a relatively high likelihood
that the transaction will go ahead as announced.

Prior to this transaction, Play's rating was strongly positioned in
the Ba3 rating category with further positive rating pressure
building up owing to its proven resiliency during the coronavirus
outbreak and the strengthening of its key credit metrics, with
Moody's adjusted leverage of 2.9x in the last 12 months to June
2020.

Following the acquisition by Iliad, Play will be part of a larger
and more geographically diversified group, but also with a more
levered capital structure. Moody's estimates that on a proforma
basis, Moody's adjusted leverage for the combined group could be
around 4.5x at the closing of the transaction.

Iliad confirmed that it will continue the process launched by
Play's existing management and shareholders of spinning off and
selling its passive infrastructure.

On a standalone basis, Play's credit quality reflects the company's
leading position in the Polish mobile market by number of
subscribers, solid growth prospects compared with its European
telecom peers, network enhancement and de-risking strategy to
reduce its reliance on network roaming agreements, positive free
cash flow (FCF) generation, good liquidity, moderate leverage, and
public commitment to reach a net leverage ratio of 2.5x over the
medium term.

Play's credit quality also reflects the company's mobile-centric
business model, which could be challenged by converged business
models and its geographical concentration in Poland.

RATIONALE FOR DEVELOPING OUTLOOK

The developing outlook reflects Moody's consideration about (1)
Play being part of a group with more appetite for higher leverage;
(2) the uncertainty around the future strategic direction of the
company under new the ownership; (3) the financial policy of the
enlarged group; (4) and the unknowns around Iliad's plan for Play's
fixed line growth strategy in Poland.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATING

Upward pressure on the rating could develop in the event that the
transaction does not close as planned and Play remains a standalone
operator. Metrics that could support upward pressure on the rating
are Moody's-adjusted gross leverage remaining below 3.0x and
retained cash flow/gross debt exceeding 25% on a sustained basis.

Conversely, downward pressure on the rating could develop if the
combined group fails to reduce leverage.

In the event that the transaction does not close as planned, Play's
rating could be downgraded if its Moody's-adjusted gross leverage
were to rise above 3.5x and retained cash flow/gross debt were to
decline below 17% on a sustained basis. Negative rating pressure
could also arise if the company's liquidity weakened significantly;
or the company materially increased its dividend payout, thereby
limiting its financial flexibility and ability to reduce debt if
operating trends were to deteriorate materially.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Play Communications S.A.

Affirmation:

Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed Ba3

Outlook Action:

Outlook, Changed to Developing from Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

COMPANY PROFILE

Play Communications S.A. is the parent company of P4 Sp. z o.o.,
Poland's leading mobile network operator in terms of number of
subscribers. The company operates under the commercial name PLAY
and offers voice, non-voice and mobile broadband products and
services to residential and business customers. In the 12 months
ended June 30, 2020, Play reported revenue of PLN7.1 billion
(EUR1.6 billion) and adjusted EBITDA of PLN2.5 billion (EUR570
million).




=========
S P A I N
=========

IBERCAJA BANCO: Fitch Affirms BB+ LongTerm IDR, Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ibercaja Banco S.A.'s Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' and Viability Rating at 'bb+' and
removed them from Rating Watch Negative. The Outlook is Negative.

The affirmation primarily reflects its view that Ibercaja is not
immediately at risk from the impact of the economic downturn from
the pandemic. Its view is supported by improved capital levels just
ahead of the outbreak of the crisis providing it with headroom to
absorb moderate deterioration of profitability and asset quality.

The Negative Outlook reflects its view that risks remain tilted to
the downside in the medium term, especially if the recession in
Spain proves deeper or the recovery weaker than its forecasts. In
this case, intensified asset quality pressures and weaker earnings
generation could negatively impact capital, including capital at
risk from unreserved problem assets, exerting downward rating
risks.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND VR

Ibercaja's ratings are primarily driven by improved capital levels,
which are now more in line with peers, a stable funding mainly
based on a stable customer deposits base, and accelerated
de-risking in the past few years. Profitability is a relative
rating weakness, despite a more diversified revenue profile than
most of its peers and Fitch expects this to deteriorate during the
economic downturn.

Fitch expects Spain's GDP to contract by a sizeable 13.2% in 2020
followed by a recovery in 2021. The unemployment rate, already at
an above-average rate of 14.1%, is forecast to increase to 18.3% in
2020 and 19.3% in 2021. Furthermore, Fitch sees downside risks to
these economic forecasts, including the risk that further
containment measures or lockdowns are implemented, causing
additional shocks to the economy. While the Spanish authorities
have provided several fiscal-support measures for the private
sector, which should be positive for Spanish banks including
Ibercaja, these measures are due to be lifted over time. Fitch
therefore expects the implications for the financial sector to
become more apparent only from 2021.

Ibercaja's operating profitability is weighed down by a large share
of low-risk, low-margin retail mortgage lending, although the bank
benefits from a meaningful insurance and asset management business
that provide some revenue diversification and resilience. In 1H20,
operating profit/risk-weighted assets (RWAs) remained fairly stable
(0.9% compared with 1% in 2019) as the one-off gains related to a
renewal agreement with a Spanish insurance company (Caser) offset
higher loan impairment charges (LICs) linked to the coronavirus
crisis. This brought the annualised LICs and other
impairments/gross loans and foreclosed assets to about 60bp in 1H20
(as reported by the bank), which is in line with Ibercaja's
guidance for the full year but lower than its expectations for the
Spanish banking sector given the higher proportion of retail
mortgage loans.

Its assessment assumes that operating profitability will remain
under pressure from the deteriorated operating environment although
it should be maintained at a level that still corresponds to a
score of 'bb', supported by increased economic activity,
lower-than-sector LICs and cost containment measures.

Ibercaja improved its asset quality after completing a significant
clean-up in recent years, although the bank's problem asset ratio
(which includes impaired loans and net foreclosed assets) was still
relatively high by international standards at 4.7% at end-June
2020. The large proportion of secured loans and the impaired loans
coverage ratio that recently increased to 56% (50% at end-2019)
provide some protection in the current environment. Also, the
relatively small amount of loan moratoriums approved to date (3% of
loans to individuals compared with about 7% for the sector) signals
that borrowers' repayment capacity remains adequate and therefore
asset quality deterioration for the stock of loans to individuals
should be contained in the near term.

Fitch expects inflows of new impaired loans to increase towards
end-2020 and more significantly in 2021 as borrower support
measures are lifted and asset quality pressures arise as the effect
of the crisis becomes more apparent. However, its asset quality
assessment considers Ibercaja's share of retail mortgages (about
60% of loans at end-June 2020) and other secured lending, which is
above the average for peers and should partially shield the bank
from asset quality deterioration. Nonetheless, Ibercaja remains
sensitive to the unemployment level and real estate prices.

Ibercaja's capitalisation is maintained with satisfactory buffers
over regulatory minimum requirements. The regulatory Common Equity
Tier 1 (CET1) ratio increased in the six months to end-June 2020 to
13.3% (12.3% on a fully loaded basis) supported by organic capital
generation, the agreement with Caser and the new capital
regulations for the SME supporting factor. The capital ratios also
benefited from a meaningful decline in RWAs as the bank increased
state-guaranteed lending in 1H20. Capital remains sensitive to
asset-quality shocks as encumbrance from unreserved problem assets
still represented a relatively high, albeit significantly reduced,
36% of fully loaded CET1 capital at end-June 2020.

The bank's main funding source is a stable and granular retail
deposit base that fully funds the loan book (loan/deposit ratio of
85% at end-June 2020). Wholesale funding is mostly in the form of
covered bonds and ECB funding, which has increased as the bank has
fully taken up the new TLTRO 3 facilities to strengthen its
liquidity (liquidity coverage ratio of 437% at end-June 2020
excluding the insurance business) and to increase sovereign debt
investments, mainly Spanish.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

Ibercaja's Support Rating (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floor
(SRF) of 'No Floor' reflect Fitch's belief that senior creditors of
the bank can no longer rely on receiving full extraordinary support
from the sovereign in the event that the bank becomes non-viable.
The EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single
Resolution Mechanism for eurozone banks provide a framework for
resolving banks that is likely to require senior creditors to
participate in losses, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving
sovereign support.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Ibercaja's Tier 2 subordinated debt is rated two notches below the
bank's VR to reflect the notes' poor recovery prospects arising
from subordination in case the bank becomes non-viable.

The rating of the bank's additional Tier 1 notes is four notches
below Ibercaja's VR, in accordance with Fitch's criteria for rating
hybrid instruments. This notching comprises two notches for loss
severity in light of the notes' deep subordination, and two notches
for additional non-performance risk relative to the VR given fully
discretionary coupon payments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs AND VR

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

The most immediate downside sensitivity for Ibercaja's ratings is
the economic fallout arising from the coronavirus outbreak.
Triggers for a downgrade would be structural deterioration in
profitability as a result of more permanently subdued business
activity or larger-than-expected credit losses, resulting in a
decline in the bank's fully loaded CET1 ratio below the current
levels with no prospect to restore it in the near to medium term.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

The Outlook could be revised to Stable if the operating environment
in Spain stabilises and the bank manages the challenges arising
from the economic downturn successfully, limiting any negative
impact on its asset quality and profitability, while maintaining
current capital levels.

An upgrade of Ibercaja's ratings is currently unlikely as reflected
by the Negative Outlook. Positive rating action would require a
stronger operating environment, combined with better asset quality
metrics, thus reducing capital vulnerability to asset-quality
shocks, and a meaningful and sustained improvement in its
medium-term profitability prospects.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

An upgrade of the SR and upward revision of the SRF would be
contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's propensity to
support Ibercaja. While not impossible, this is highly unlikely, in
Fitch's view.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The ratings of the subordinated and AT1 notes are primarily
sensitive to changes in Ibercaja's VR. The ratings are also
sensitive to a change in notching should Fitch change its
assessment of loss severity or relative non-performance risk.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).




=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================

GARRETT MOTION: Moody's Cuts LT CFR to Caa1 on Chapter 11 Filing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the long-term corporate family
rating (CFR) of Garrett Motion Inc. to Caa1 from B2 and the
probability of default rating (PDR) to Ca-PD/LD from B2-PD,
following the company's announcement that it has filed for
protection under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code.

Moody's has also downgraded the senior unsecured rating of Garrett
LX I SARL to Caa2 from Caa1. Concurrently, Moody's has confirmed
the B2 the senior secured bank credit facilities ratings of the
company's subsidiaries Garrett LX III SARL, and Garrett Motion
Sarl. The outlook on all entities has been changed to stable from
ratings under review for downgrade.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade, which was
initiated on September 02, 2020.

Downgrades:

Issuer: Garrett LX I SARL

Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa2
from Caa1

Issuer: Garrett Motion Inc.

Probability of Default Rating, Downgraded to Ca-PD /LD from B2-PD

Corporate Family Rating, Downgraded to Caa1 from B2

Confirmations:

Issuer: Garrett LX III SARL

Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Confirmed at B2

Issuer: Garrett Motion Sarl

Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Confirmed at B2

Backed Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Confirmed at B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Garrett LX I SARL

Outlook, Changed to Stable from Rating Under Review

Issuer: Garrett LX III SARL

Outlook, Changed to Stable from Rating Under Review

Issuer: Garrett Motion Inc.

Outlook, Changed to Stable from Rating Under Review

Issuer: Garrett Motion Sarl

Outlook, Changed to Stable from Rating Under Review

RATINGS RATIONALE

On September 20, 2020, Garrett Motion announced an agreement to be
acquired by the private equity firm KPS and initiated a voluntary
Chapter 11 filing to restructure its balance sheet. The filing
constitutes an event of default under Moody's criteria. According
to the announcement, Garrett will receive $250 million
debtor-in-possession financing (DIP) to bolster liquidity. Senior
secured lenders will receive 100% of their principal amount plus
interest in cash after closing. Approximately 61% of senior secured
lenders are supporting the filing. Senior unsecured bondholders
will receive 90% of the principal amount plus accrued interest,
with cash interest payments to be suspended during Chapter 11. The
Chapter 11 process is expected to be finalized during 1Q2021.

The company's announcement follows its previous announcement on
August 26, 2020, that it is exploring alternatives to address its
balance sheet concerns.

Subsequent to the actions, Moody's will withdraw all of its ratings
for Garrett given the company's bankruptcy filing.

Garrett Motion Inc. (Garrett), headquartered in Rolle, Switzerland,
is the spinoff of Honeywell's Transportation Systems business.
Garrett designs, manufactures and sells highly engineered
turbocharger and electric-boosting technologies for light and
commercial vehicle OEMs and the aftermarket. The completion of the
spin-off occurred October 1, 2018. For 2019, the company reported
revenue of $3.2 billion and EBITDA of $480 million.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Automotive
Supplier Methodology published in January 2020.




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

AURIUM CLO III: Moody's Confirms B2 Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") has confirmed the ratings on
the following notes issued by Aurium CLO III Designated Activity
Company:

EUR18,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030, Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2020 Baa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR22,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2020 Ba2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR10,500,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030, Confirmed at B2 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2020 B2 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

EUR220,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2019 Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR41,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2019 Assigned Aa2
(sf)

EUR10,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2030,
Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2019 Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR25,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2030, Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2019 Affirmed A2
(sf)

Aurium CLO III Designated Activity Company, issued in May 2017, is
a collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Spire Management Limited. The transaction's reinvestment
period will end in April 2021.

The action concludes the rating review on the Class D, E and F
notes initiated on June 03, 2020 as a result of the deterioration
of the credit quality and/or the reduction of the par amount of the
portfolio following from the coronavirus outbreak.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating confirmations on the Class D, E and F notes and rating
affirmations on the Class A, B-1, B-2 and C notes reflect the
expected losses continuing to remain consistent with their current
ratings despite the risks posed by credit deterioration, which have
been primarily prompted by economic shocks stemming from the
coronavirus outbreak. Moody's analysed the CLO's latest portfolio
and took into account the recent trading activities as well as the
full set of structural features.

Since the coronavirus outbreak widened in March, the decline in
corporate credit has resulted in a significant number of
downgrades, other negative rating actions, or defaults on the
assets collateralising the CLO.

The deterioration in credit quality of the portfolio is reflected
in an increase in Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF) and of the
proportion of securities from issuers with ratings of Caa1 or
lower. According to the trustee report dated July 31, 2020[1], the
WARF was 3272, compared to value of 2821 as per the February
2020[2] report. Securities with ratings of Caa1 or lower currently
make up approximately 5.12% of the underlying portfolio. Moody's
notes that none of the OC tests are currently in breach and the
transaction remains in compliance with the following collateral
quality tests: Diversity Score, Weighted Average Recovery Rate
(WARR), Weighted Average Spread (WAS) and Weighted Average Life
(WAL).

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 374.4 million,
after considering a negative cash exposure of around EUR 2.1
million, a weighted average default probability of 25.5%
(consistent with a WARF of 3295 over a weighted average life of 5.0
years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.7% for
a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 51 and a
weighted average spread of 3.75%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analysing.

Moody's notes that August 2020 trustee report was published at the
time it was completing its analysis of the July 2020 data. Key
portfolio metrics such as WARF, diversity score, weighted average
spread and life, and OC ratios exhibit little or no change between
these dates.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the global economy gradually recovers
in the second half of the year and future corporate credit
conditions generally stabilize.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
corporate assets from the current weak global economic activity and
a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high.

Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety.

BELL POTTINGER: Ex-Chief Executive to Fight Potential Boardroom Ban
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Poppy Wood at City A.M. reports that former Bell Pottinger chief
executive James Henderson has vowed to fight a potential boardroom
ban looming over him in the wake of the PR firm's high-profile
collapse in 2017.

Mr. Henderson faces a director disqualification hearing alongside
former Bell Pottinger colleagues Victoria Geoghegan and Nick
Lambert, City A.M. relays, citing court documents.

The public relations firm fell into administration in 2017 after
running a racially charged PR campaign for the billionaire Gupta
family in South Africa that emphasized the power of white-owned
businesses in the country, City A.M. recounts.

Bell Pottinger was struck off from the UK's industry body following
the campaign, after a swathe of major clients including HSBC and
Investec cut ties with the firm, City A.M. discloses.

Mr. Henderson, who resigned from the company shortly before its
collapse, faces a boardroom ban of up to 15 years under the Company
Directors Disqualification Act, City A.M. states.

According to City A.M., in a statement, Mr. Henderson on Sept. 24
said he intends to "fight this matter in court in order to preserve
my good name", adding that he was "confident" the court would rule
in his favor.

Accounting firm BDO, who acted as administrators following Bell
Pottinger's collapse, said it was still owed hundreds of thousands
of pounds from the PR firm's executives, after it was "heavily
financially impacted" by the scandal, City A.M. notes.


CINEWORLD GROUP: Posts US$1.6BB Loss, Raises Going Concern Doubt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alice Hancock at The Financial Times reports that Cineworld Group
plc has reported a US$1.6 billion loss for the first six months of
the year and warned that a worsening of the coronavirus crisis
could cast doubt on its ability to survive.

According to the FT, PwC, the cinema chain's auditor, said it was
unable to determine whether it was appropriate to present the
company as a going concern.

The group said its directors believed it had enough cash to see it
through its assumptions that some cinemas would remain shut until
October and that admission levels this year would be 62% of last
year's at most, the FT relates.

But under worse circumstances -- including if a second wave of
coronavirus infections next year affects "several of the group's
territories to the extent that further prolonged, partial shut
downs are required" -- it would face more acute pressure on its
balance sheet, the FT discloses.

It said that under both its base and "severe but plausible downside
scenario", it would breach loan covenants in December this year and
June 2021, the FT notes.

According to the FT, Mooky Greidinger, Cineworld's chief executive,
said the cinema chain was looking at "every kind of possibility"
for raising capital and that it had made progress in negotiations
with lenders over covenant waivers.

It is also expecting a tax rebate from the US government that could
amount to more than US$150 million, the FT relays, citing a person
with knowledge of the position.

Cineworld came into the crisis carrying large amounts of debt as a
result of pursuing two major acquisitions in recent years, the FT
recounts.  It had a total of US$3.6 billion in loans at the end of
June as well as a US$573 million revolving credit facility and said
that as of June 30 it had net debt of US$8.2 billion, the FT
discloses.

Revenues fell 67%, to US$712.4 million, in the six months to June
compared with the same period last year, the FT notes.  Cineworld
sunk to a US$1.6 billion pre-tax loss, from a US$139.7 million
profit during the same period last year, the FT states.

Of its 778 cinemas, Cineworld, as cited by the FT, said 561 had
reopened since lockdowns had eased.

Cineworld is a British cinema company and is the world's
second-largest cinema chain, with 9,518 screens across 790 sites in
11 countries: the UK, the US, Canada, Ireland, Poland, Romania,
Israel, Hungary, Czechia, Bulgaria and Slovakia.


IONA PLC: Signs Binding Documentation to Refinance Entire Debt
--------------------------------------------------------------
Iofina Plc ("Iofina", the "Company" or the "Group"), specialists in
the exploration and production of iodine and manufacturers of
specialty chemical products, has announced that it has signed
binding documentation to refinance its entire debt, with support
from finnCap Debt Advisory, by entering into a new loan agreement
(the "Facility") with First Financial Bank, (NASDAQ: FFBC), a
Cincinnati-headquartered, US regional bank ("First Financial").
The Facility provides Iofina with new debt facilities of up to
US$18 million, with the proceeds used to pay off existing debt and
to provide working capital for the Group going forward.

The Facility comprises two parts:

   * A 7-year term loan for US$10m that is fully amortizing over
the term.

   * A 2-year asset based revolving line of credit for up to US$8m.


The Facility will be fully secured against the assets of the Group
and contains customary financial covenants, as well as affirmative
and negative covenants customary for transactions of this type.  

Iofina were advised and supported by finnCap Debt Advisory on this
transaction.

Commenting, President and CEO of Iofina Dr. Tom Becker, stated:
"The conclusion of the debt refinancing, with the support of
finnCap Debt Advisory, is a significant and positive step for
Iofina and is the culmination of many months of hard work.  The
favourable terms of this refinance demonstrate how far Iofina has
progressed in recent years, given that the Company has
significantly reduced debt, lowered debt interest rates, and
secured a strong lending bank partner.  With the Company's balance
sheet significantly strengthened by the 7-year term loan in place
coupled with the revolving line of credit for future growth, Iofina
is focused on operational developments and expanding its production
and chemicals product portfolio."

Commenting, Partner of finnCap Debt Advisory Graham Cooke, stated:
"After many months of hard work by all parties, it is great to see
the conclusion of this debt refinancing.  The transaction was an
extremely important project for Iofina and we are delighted to have
been able to support them and help them secure this new facility.
I know in First Financial they have found the ideal financing and
relationship partner for the future."

                       About finnCap Group

finnCap provides an unrivalled range of financial services and
growth financing options to the UK's most ambitious growth
companies, ranging from ECM, IPO, debt advisory and PLC strategic
advisory.  finnCap also houses a market-leading strategic M&A firm,
Cavendish Corporate Finance, that specialises in selling mid-sized
businesses with a global reach, as well as offering buy side
advisory services. finnCap serves 127 companies on AIM and on the
LSE Main Board, as well as a range of private businesses, helping
them find the right investment for growth.  Founded in 2007,
finnCap merged with Cavendish Corporate Finance and listed on the
AIM market in 2018, and the company has helped raise over GBP2.8
billion to support its corporate clients and sold over 600
businesses.  finnCap is the largest Nomad and AIM company financial
adviser and No.1 broker on AIM, and has a global reach through its
membership of Oaklins, with 60 offices in 45 countries, including
key M&A markets in the UK, Asia and Europe.


ITHACA ENERGY: Fitch Maintains 'B' LT IDR on Watch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained Ithaca Energy Ltd.'s Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'B' on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).
Simultaneously, Fitch has upgraded the USD500 million notes issued
by Ithaca Energy (North Sea) Plc and guaranteed by Ithaca Energy to
'B'/'RR4' from 'B-'/'RR5', and placed the instrument rating on
RWN.

The RWN reflects the potential pressure Ithaca may face due to
ongoing liquidity issues experienced by its 100% parent, Delek
Group. Ithaca's ring-fencing mechanism should provide protection to
its creditors, but Fitch believes there is a risk that decisions
taken by the parent or its failure to complete its financial
restructuring, which provides for disposals, could have negative
consequences for Ithaca's creditworthiness. Ithaca's debt is
subject to a change-of-control provision.

Fitch has upgraded the USD500 million notes due to the decreased
availability under the prior-ranking reserve-based lending (RBL)
following the redetermination in April. The redetermination
resulted in the amount available to draw for Ithaca under the RBL
decreasing from USD1.22 billion to USD1.1 billion. This underpins
the Recovery Rating of 'RR4' compared with 'RR5' previously.

Ithaca's 'B' rating reflects the company's low leverage, strong
hedging position and sound standalone liquidity. At the same time,
Ithaca's reserves are low, and it may need to resort to
acquisitions to replenish reserves and maintain a stable production
profile. Consistently low oil prices could have negative
implications for Ithaca's financial and business profiles, given
its low proved reserve life and high cost of production.

Fitch will resolve the RWN once Fitch haves more clarity on Delek's
ability to complete the financial restructuring and its
implications for Ithaca.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Delek's Financial Restructuring: Ithaca's sole parent,
Israel-focused Delek Group, is undergoing a financial
restructuring, which includes selective disposals aimed at repaying
most of the bank debt and raising equity, as agreed with
creditors.

Delek has made significant progress in addressing those
requirements, including non-core asset disposals totalling NIS2
billion, and raising NIS310 million in equity, which helped reduce
Delek's parent company loans (excluding bonds) from NIS2.5 billion
at end-2019 to NIS1.1 billion at end-August 2020. However, the
restructuring strategy remains subject to material execution risk,
as Delek will need to complete more disposals and raise more equity
later this year to be in line with the agreements reached with its
creditors.

Ring-Fencing Mechanism: Fitch believes that Ithaca's credit
documentation limits Delek's ability to extract high dividends and
other distributions from the company. Based on the recently
published cash flow forecast by Delek the parent expects Ithaca to
pay USD50 million in dividends in 2020 (of which USD20 million was
paid in 1H2020) and USD85 million in 2021. Subsequent distributions
would be subject to the 1.3x incurrence net debt covenant test
(defined broadly in line with net debt-to-EBITDAX), and other
tests.

Ithaca is not allowed to provide intra-group loans or guarantee
external debt based on its RBL and bond documentation, or attract
material new debt.

Weaker Parent: Fitch haves-maintained Ithaca's rating on RWN as it
is difficult to foresee what actions will be taken that may affect
Ithaca's credit profile if Delek fails to adhere to the
restructuring plan. Ithaca's debt is subject to a change-of-control
clause under the RBL and bond documentation, which may trigger an
earlier repayment if Delek disposes of Ithaca.

COVID-19 Response: Ithaca has responded to falling oil prices by
cutting capex and opex budgets (by 50% and 16%, respectively). In
particular, in cooperation with partners, the company minimised
offshore manning, and delayed some infill drilling activity. These
steps are positive for Ithaca's liquidity and should have only a
moderate impact on production in the short term. Fitch expects
capex to normalise in 2021 and beyond.

Strong Hedging Position: In 2020, Ithaca's cash flow generation
will be additionally supported by hedging arrangements. At June 30,
2020, 80% of Ithaca's projected 2H20 production was hedged from
currently producing fields, with oil hedges having an average
swap/strike price of USD58/bbl, net of premiums. Ithaca has hedged
50% and 15% of its projected production in 2021 and 2022 at an
average swap/strike price of USD42/bbl and USD43/bbl, respectively,
net of premiums. This will protect it in a stress case scenario.

Low Proved Reserves: Ithaca's low proved (1P) reserve life ratio of
four years is somewhat mitigated by the proved and probable (2P)
reserve life of seven years and strong financial profile. This is
not unusual in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS) given
the basin's ageing characteristics. Fitch expects Ithaca to
replenish reserves organically and through acquisitions.

Stabilising Production, High Costs: Because many of Ithaca's assets
are beyond their mid-life point the company's medium-term
production profile will largely depend on its capex programme and
potential acquisitions. Fitch assumes production to moderately fall
in 2021 due to lower capex in 2020, and to stabilise at around
65kboepd in 2022-23. Ithaca's cost position with an operating
expenditure of USD15/boe in 2020 is fairly high though typical for
the UKCS, and could put the company at a disadvantage if low oil
prices persist.

Decommissioning Obligations High but Long-Term: Ithaca's
decommissioning liabilities are high at USD993 million (net of the
decommissioning reimbursement from Chevron), or USD5.2/boe per 2P
reserves (Aker BP - USD3.1/boe; Neptune Energy - USD2.4/boe). The
majority of the decommissioning-related cash outflows are expected
after 2026 and are tax-deductible. It is not added to debt, but
deducted from projected operating cash flows as they are being
incurred.

Low Leverage: Fitch expects the absolute amount of net debt to fall
as Ithaca is planning to gradually repay its committed RBL
facility. Its base case expects Ithaca's funds from operations
(FFO) net leverage to increase from 1.4x in 2020 to 1.7x in 2021
before dropping to 1.2x in 2022. It has no maturities in 2020-2021
and its RBL will start amortising in 2022.

Moderately Diversified Asset Base: Ithaca's asset base is
moderately diversified. The company produces from 18 fields located
predominantly in the Central North Sea area, with the largest asset
(the Captain field) accounting for around 30% of 2019 total
production, and its three largest assets accounting for around 63%.
The largest part of the company's 2019 production is operated,
which means more capex flexibility, and it is exposed to both
liquids (63%) and natural gas (37%).

ESG Influence: Ithaca has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Waste and
Hazardous Materials Management; Ecological Impacts due to high
decommissioning liabilities. Because of the high decommissioning
obligations, Fitch applies a 3.5x multiple in its recovery
analysis, which is lower than the 4x-5x multiple Fitch normally
applies for the natural resources sector. This has a negative
impact on the Recovery Rating and the senior unsecured rating, and
is relevant to the rating in conjunction with other factors.

Fitch haves revised Ithaca's ESG Relevance Score for Group
Structure to 4 from 3 due to the weak liquidity situation at Delek
Group, which led to the maintained RWN. This has a negative impact
on the credit profile, and is relevant to the rating in conjunction
with other factors.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Ithaca's 'B'/RWN rating reflects Delek's liquidity issues and
deterioration of the financial profile, although Ithaca's
standalone liquidity remains strong for the rating. Ithaca's scale,
measured by the level of production (2020F: 67kboepd), compares
well with peers in the 'B' rating category, such as Kosmos Energy
Ltd. (B/Negative, 2020F: 62kboepd) and Seplat Petroleum Development
Company (B-/Positive, 2019: 46kboepd). However, Ithaca's absolute
level of proved reserves is lower than that of Kosmos and Seplat,
which results in a weaker 1P reserve life of four years. This is
mitigated by Ithaca's forecast low leverage and strong FCF
generation capacity over its four-year rating horizon, as well as
adequate 2P reserve life of seven years.

Ithaca's operations are focused on the UK North Sea, a more stable
operating environment compared with that of Kosmos, which still
derives the majority of its production in Ghana, and of Seplat,
which only focuses on Nigeria.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

  - Base-case assumptions for Brent: USD41/bbl in 2020, USD45/bbl
in 2021, USD50/bbl in 2022, and USD53/bbl thereafter

  - Stress-case assumptions for Brent: USD37/bbl in 2020, USD35/bbl
in 2021, USD40/bbl in 2022, and USD45/bbl in 2023.

  - Upstream production of 67kboepd in 2020, declining slightly in
2021 due to lower capex in 2020, before stabilising around 65kboepd
thereafter

  - Capex of USD110 million in 2020, increasing to around USD220
million-USD230 million thereafter

  - USD50 million dividend in 2020, and USD85 million in 2021,
USD60 million in 2022, before increasing from 2023, assuming they
do not breach Ithaca's incurrence 1.3x leverage covenant.

  - No cash taxes over 2020 - 2023

Key Recovery Rating Assumptions:

Its recovery analysis is based on a going-concern approach, which
implies that Ithaca will be reorganised rather than liquidated in a
bankruptcy.

Ithaca's going-concern EBITDA is based on Fitch's base-case 2020
EBITDA of around USD420 million, excluding hedges, forecast under
its current price deck.

Fitch believes that a 3.5x multiple reflects a conservative view of
the going-concern enterprise value (EV) of the business. This is
below the 4x-5x average multiple employed by Fitch for the natural
resources sector to reflect the declining profile of production
assets and the decommissioning obligation associated with them.

In line with Fitch's criteria, Fitch assumes the availability under
the RBL is fully utilised upon default and treat it as senior to
notes in the waterfall.

After deduction of 10% for administrative claims, its waterfall
analysis generated a ranked recovery in the RR4 band, indicating a
'B' instrument rating. The waterfall analysis output percentage on
current metrics and assumptions was 45%. The improvement in
recovery is explained by the lower availability under the RBL
following the redetermination in April.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

  - The RWN reflects that positive rating action is unlikely in the
short term. However, improved liquidity or a stabilised financial
position at the parent level, or evidence of limited parent
influence on Ithaca could lead to removal of RWN and a Stable
Outlook.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

  - Adverse change in financial policies or practices, including
the parent successfully upstreaming significant amounts of cash, or
taking other measures that negatively affect Ithaca

  - Ithaca's worsened standalone credit position, e.g. material
reduction of the borrowing base under the RBL

  - Inability to replenish proved reserves and/or production
falling consistently below 50kboepd

  - FFO net leverage consistently above 3.5x

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Strong Standalone Liquidity: Ithaca's standalone liquidity is
strong. The company is well-hedged, particularly for the rest of
2020, and has substantial liquidity buffers for both 2020 and
2021.

RBL Redetermination Risks Moderate: The borrowing base availability
on the RBL is re-assessed as part of bi-annual re-determination,
and the next one is due end of October. Fitch views the
redetermination risk as moderate, given the RBL is not fully
utilised.

ESG Considerations

Ithaca has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Waste and Hazardous
Materials Management; Ecological Impacts due to high
decommissioning liabilities. Fitch haves revised Ithaca's ESG
Relevance Score for Group Structure to 4 from 3 due to the weak
liquidity situation at Delek Group. These have a negative impact on
the credit profile, and are relevant to the rating in conjunction
with other factors.

Except for the matters discussed, the highest level of ESG credit
relevance, if present, is a score of 3 - ESG issues are credit
neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity(ies),
either due to their nature or the way in which they are being
managed by the entity(ies).

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF
RATING

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

LONDON CAPITAL: FCA Chair Says Investors Want Action Not Sympathy
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Mortimer at FTAdviser reports that the chairman of the
financial regulator has admitted investors in the scandal-embroiled
London Capital & Finance want action, not his sympathy.

It came as Charles Randell warned the Financial Conduct Authority
would face "a great deal of very difficult food for thought" as a
result of an independent investigation into its actions surrounding
the mini-bond provider's collapse, FTAdviser relates.

According to FTAdviser, speaking at the FCA's annual public meeting
on Sept. 24 Mr. Randell said the investigation led by Elizabeth
Gloster into the regulator's handling of the scandal was nearing an
end.

When asked if he was ashamed of the FCA's actions in the case, Mr.
Randell, as cited by FTAdviser, said: "The huge distress felt by
investors in LCF is something that I try as hard as I can to
understand, but I know that you will feel that I can't fully
understand the distress you are suffering.

"What you want from me is not sympathy, you want action."

London Capital & Finance entered into administration in 2019 owing
more than GBP230 million and putting the funds of some 14,000
bondholders at risk, FTAdviser recounts.

The FCA found itself in hot water earlier this month when it
emerged the independent investigation into its supervision of the
collapse had once again been delayed by two months, FTAdviser
discloses.

Dame Elizabeth said the latest delay followed the regulator
disclosing a further 3,500 documents related to the case in
mid-July, which she warned should have been flagged to her team
earlier, FTAdviser notes.


TRAVELPORT WORLDWIDE: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CC' on Debt Restructuring
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its issuer credit ratings on Travelport
Worldwide Ltd.'s parent Toro Private Holdings I and its finance
subsidiary Travelport Finance (Luxembourg) S.A.R.L. to 'CC' from
'CCC'.

S&P is also lowering its issue ratings on Travelport's outstanding
first-lien facilities to 'CC' from 'CCC' and on its second-lien
term loan to 'C' from 'CC'. Additionally, S&P is placing all
ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The negative CreditWatch indicates that S&P will downgrade
Travelport to 'SD' (selective default) and its outstanding debt to
'D' (default) once the debt restructuring is completed, which is
expected to occur by Sept. 24, 2020.

The downgrade follows Travelport's announcement of a debt
restructuring plan.  U.K.-based Travelport announced on Sept. 17,
2020, that it has agreed with an ad hoc lender group on a debt
exchange and restructuring, which includes a new $500 million
priority lien facility. The restructuring plan will also release
the parties from all related litigation and claims against each
another. This is because Travelport recently transferred over $1
billion in intellectual property rights to a new unrestricted
subsidiary, Travelport Technologies LLC, and used it as collateral
to raise up to $500 million of new secured financing from its
financial sponsors Siris Capital Group LLC and Evergreen Coast
Capital Corp.

S&P said, "We view the debt exchange and restructuring as
distressed.  The planned transaction will result in the current
lenders receiving less than originally promised under the terms of
the agreements for the outstanding first- and second-lien debt
instruments. In our view, the transaction would be tantamount to
default upon completion. We expect to lower our issuer credit
ratings to 'SD' and the issue ratings on the debt instruments to
'D' once the restructuring is completed. Subsequently, we will
reassess our ratings on Travelport after reviewing the group's new
capital structure."

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) credit factors for this
credit rating change:

-- Health and safety

The negative CreditWatch indicates that S&P will downgrade
Travelport to 'SD' (selective default) and its outstanding debt to
'D' (default) upon completion of the debt restructuring. Travelport
expects to close the transaction by Sept. 24, 2020.




===============
X X X X X X X X
===============

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Mentor X
-------------------------
The Life-Changing Power of Extraordinary Mentors
Author: Stephanie Wickouski
Publisher: Beard Books
Hard cover: 156 pages
ISBN: 978-1-58798-700-7
List Price: $24.75

Order this Book: https://is.gd/EIPwnq

Long-time bankruptcy lawyer Stephanie Wickouski at Bryan Cave
impressively tackles a soft problem of modern professionals in an
era of hard data and scientific intervention in her third published
book entitled Mentor X. In an age where employee productivity is
measured by artificial intelligence and resumes are prescreened by
computers, Stephanie Wickouski adds spirit and humanity to the
professional journey.

The title is disarmingly deceptive and book browsers could be
excused for assuming this work is just another in a long line of
homogeneous efforts on mentorship. Don't be fooled; Mentor X is
practical, articulate and lively. Most refreshingly, the book
acknowledges the most important element of human development: our
intuition.

Mrs. Wickouski starts by describing what a mentor is and
distinguishes that role from a teacher, coach, role model, buddy or
boss. Younger professionals may be skeptical of the need for a
mentor, but Mrs. Wickouski deftly disabuses that notion by relating
how a mentor may do nothing less than change the course of a
protege's life. Newbies to this genre need little convincing
afterwards.

One of the book's worthiest contributions is a definition of mentor
that will surprise most readers. Mentors are not teachers, the
latter of which impart practical knowledge. Instead, according to
Mrs. Wickouski, her mentors "showed me secrets that I could learn
nowhere else. They showed me how doors are opened. They showed me
how to be an agent of change and advance innovative and
controversial ideas." What ambitious professional doesn't want more
of that in their life?

The practicality of the book continues as Mrs. Wickouski outlines
the qualities to look for in a mentor and classifies the various
types of mentors, including bold mentors, charismatic mentors, cold
and distant mentors, dissolute mentors, personally bonded mentors,
younger mentors, and unexpected mentors. Mentor X includes charts
and workbooks which aid the reader in getting the most out of a
mentor relationship. In a later chapter, Mrs. Wickouski provides an
enormously helpful suggestion about adopting a mentor: keep an open
mind. Often, mentors will come in packages that differ from our
expectations. They may be outside of our profession, younger, less
educated, etc . . . but the world works in mysterious ways and Mrs.
Wickouski encourages readers to think about mentors broadly.  In
this modern era of heightened workplace ethics, Mrs. Wickouski
articulates the dark side of mentors. She warns about "dementors"
and "tormentors" -- false mentors providing dubious and sometimes
self-destructive advice, and those who abuse a mentor relationship
to further self-interested, malign ends, respectively. She
describes other mentor dysfunctions, namely boundary-crossing,
rivalry, corruption, and a few others. When a mentor manifests such
behaviors, Mrs. Wickouski counsels it's time to end the
relationship.

Mrs. Wickouski tells readers how to discern when the mentor
relationship is changing and when it is effectively over. Those
changes can be precipitated by romantic boundaries crossed,
emergence of rivalrous sentiment, or encouragement of unethical
behavior or corruption. Mrs. Wickouski aptly notes that once
insidious energies emerge, the mentorship is effectively over. At
this point, certain readers may say to themselves, "Okay, I've got
it. Now I can move on." Or, "My workplace has a formal mentorship
program. I don't need this book anymore." Or even, "Can't modern
technology handle my mentor needs, a Tinder of mentorship, so to
speak?"

Mrs. Wickouski refutes that notion. She analyzes how many mentoring
programs miss the mark. In one of the best passages in the book,
Mrs. Wickouski writes, "Assigning or brokering mentors negates the
most critical components of a true mentor–protege relationship:
the individual process of self-awareness which leads a person to
recognize another individual who will give the advice singularly
needed. That very process is undermined by having a mentor assigned
or by going to a mentoring party." She does not just criticize; she
offers a solution with three valuable tips for choosing the right
mentor and five qualities to ascertain a true mentor in the
unlimited sea of possibilities.

Next, Mrs. Wickouski distinguishes between good advice and bad
advice. She punctuates that discussion with many relevant and
relatable examples that are easy to read and colorfully enjoyable.
This section includes interviews with proteges who have had
successful mentorships. The punchline: in the best mentorships, the
parties harmoniously share personal beliefs and values. Also
important, the protege draws inspiration and motivation from the
mentor. The book winds down as usefully as it started: Mrs.
Wickouski interviews proteges, asking them what they would have
done differently with their mentors if they could turn back the
clock. A common thread seems to be that the proteges would have
gone deeper with their mentors -- they would have asked more
questions, spent more time, delved into their mentors' thinking in
greater depth.

The book wraps up lightly by sharing useful and practical
suggestions for maintenance of the mentor relationship. She answers
questions such as, "Do I invite my mentor to my wedding?" and "Who
pays for lunch?"

Mentor X is an enjoyable read and a useful book for any
professional in any industry at, frankly, any point in time.
Advanced individuals will learn much from the other side, i.e., how
to be more effective mentors. Mrs. Wickouski does a wonderful job
of encouraging use of that all knowing aspect of human existence
which never fails us: proper use of our intuition.

                         About The Author

Stephanie Wickouski is widely regarded as an innovator and
strategic advisor. A nationally recognized lawyer, she has been
named as one of the 12 Outstanding Restructuring Lawyers in the US
by Turnarounds & Workouts and as one of US News' Best Lawyers in
America. She is the author of two other books: Indenture Trustee
Bankruptcy Powers & Duties, an essential guide to the legal role of
the bond trustee, and Bankruptcy Crimes, an authoritative resource
on bankruptcy fraud. She also writes the Corporate Restructuring
blog.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
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Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
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Editors.

Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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