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       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Tuesday, September 15, 2020, Vol. 21, No. 185

                           Headlines



B E L A R U S

BELARUS: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Neg.
BELARUSBANK: S&P Puts 'B' ICR on CreditWatch Negative


G R E E C E

[*] GREECE: Government Drafts Bill to Overhaul Insolvency Code


I R E L A N D

BAIN CAPITAL 2019-1: Fitch Downgrades Class E Notes to BB-sf
CVC CORDATUS IX: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to B3


N E T H E R L A N D S

BHARTI AIRTEL: Moody's Affirms Sr. Unsec. Notes Rating at Ba1


S P A I N

PARQUES REUNIDOS: S&P Cuts ICR on Parent to CCC+', Outlook Neg.


T U R K E Y

TURKEY: Moody's Cuts Issuer & Senior Unsecured Ratings to B2


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: S&P Affirms B/B Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable
UKRAINIAN RAILWAY: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CASTELL PLC 2020-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on Class X Notes
GUSTO: Seeks Company Voluntary Arrangement to Help Pay Off Debts
INTU (SGS) FINANCE: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on 3 Note Series
QUIZ: Reveals Locations of 11 Store Closures Under Pre-pack Deal
RED ENSIGN: Rules Out Liquidation, Explores Various Options

ROLLS-ROYCE PLC: S&P Lowers ICR to 'BB-', On Watch Negative
TATA STEEL: European Arm Expresses Going Concern Doubt Amid Covid19
WILD BY TART: Seeks CVA to Alleviate Cashflow Pressures

                           - - - - -


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B E L A R U S
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BELARUS: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Sept. 11, 2020, revised its outlook on the
long-term foreign- and local-currency sovereign credit ratings on
Belarus to negative from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed the
long- and short-term foreign- and local-currency sovereign credit
ratings at 'B/B'.

As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009
"EU CRA Regulation"), the ratings on Belarus are subject to certain
publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA
Regulation, including publication in accordance with a
pre-established calendar. Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations
from the announced calendar are allowed only in limited
circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of
the reasons for the deviation. In this case, the reason for the
deviation is an increase of downside risks to Belarus' economic
growth, balance of payments, and financial stability in the
aftermath of the disputed presidential election held in August. The
next scheduled publication on the sovereign ratings on Belarus will
be on Oct. 2, 2020.

Outlook

The negative outlook reflects rising risks to financial stability
of the domestic banking system, much of which is publically
controlled, as underlined by residents' conversion of savings to
foreign currency and partial deposit withdrawals that have
accelerated through August in the aftermath of the disputed
presidential election. In a downside case, this could deplete the
Belarus central bank's available foreign exchange reserves and
present contingent liability risks for the government. Since the
beginning of August, gross reserves have declined by $1.4 billion
to an equivalent of 2.6 months of import cover.

More broadly, S&P also considers that the elevated uncertainty in
the aftermath of the disputed presidential election may become more
protracted. This, in turn, could weigh on Belarus' economic growth
and ability to access foreign capital markets over the next 12-18
months, putting pressure on the ratings.

Downside scenario

S&P could lower the ratings on Belarus if the government's access
to foreign capital markets was not assured while additional credit
lines from bilateral lenders, such as Russia and China, proved
insufficient to comfortably meet upcoming public debt redemptions.
S&P could also lower the ratings if resident deposit withdrawals
and conversions to foreign currency continued unchecked and
depleted the central bank's foreign currency reserves, while
presenting financial stability and contingent liability risks.

Upside scenario

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if lingering political
uncertainty subsided with a clear way forward that contributed to
Belarus' economic, fiscal, and financial sector stability.

Rationale

The outlook revision primarily stems from S&P's view of rising
economic, financial stability, and balance-of-payment risks in the
aftermath of the disputed presidential election.

Belarus held presidential elections on Aug. 9, 2020. According to
the official results, the incumbent president Alexander Lukashenko
won by a large margin, securing over 80% of the vote, while the
main opposition candidate Svetlana Tikhanovskaya got 10%. However,
electoral violations have been reported and the EU has not
recognized the election results.

Subsequently, large demonstrations emerged across the country with
protests in Minsk alone reportedly drawing several hundreds of
thousands, a substantial number for a country with a population of
9.5 million. The protests have at times being met with a heavy
response from the security services, drawing international
condemnation. The EU announced sanctions against a number of
individuals in Belarus deemed responsible for the electoral
violations and subsequent violence.

The president has so far rejected opposition demands for
negotiations to resolve the lingering deadlock. S&P said, "We
consider that the impasse may be particularly difficult to overcome
given the absence in Belarus of independent institutions that could
credibly arbitrate and aid an effective resolution. For many years,
power has been concentrated in the hands of the president with
limited checks and balances between various government bodies, and
no track record of power transfers through elections. We view
Belarus' institutional arrangements as weak, as we have highlighted
in the past."

S&P considers that the current elevated uncertainty risks becoming
more protracted, presenting a number of short- and medium-term
risks for Belarus.

S&P said, "We consider that, over the short term, risks to the
stability of the domestic banking system have increased. We note
that deposit conversions to foreign currency and subsequent partial
withdrawals from the banking system have accelerated through
August. Largely reflective of that, the central bank's foreign
currency reserves plunged by $1.4 billion or 15% in August alone.
In our view, continued withdrawals and foreign currency conversions
could quickly deplete the foreign currency reserves available to
the government, if left unchecked. Were such a scenario to
materialize and absent other options, we believe the authorities
might ultimately be forced to choose between continuing to satisfy
the elevated domestic demand for foreign currency, or effectively
ring-fencing central bank funds for use by the central government."
The latter could then undermine the banking system's stability and
present contingent liability risks.

Deposit conversions have also pressured the local currency, which
has depreciated by close to 20% so far this year. This, in turn,
has inflated general government debt, since more than 95% of the
public debt stock is denominated in foreign currency. S&P said, "We
now forecast that Belarus' net general government debt will rise to
35% of GDP at end-2020 from 24% at end-2019. We still consider this
debt level moderate and lower than public sector leverage in many
other emerging market sovereigns."

S&P said, "However, we note that Belarus' public debt redemption
profile remains heavy, despite improvements in recent years.
Sanctions announced by the EU, volatile sentiment toward emerging
markets this year, and Belarus' comparatively weak economic
performance even before the COVID-19 pandemic indicate that it may
not be able to easily tap foreign capital markets in the coming
months. We acknowledge Belarus' historically strong debt payment
culture and note that the major part of government borrowing
requirements for 2020 has already been met, removing immediate
refinancing risks through year-end 2020 and early 2021."
Nevertheless, foreign currency debt repayments will remain
elevated, at close to $3 billion (5.5% of GDP) annually in
2021-2022. This compares to the $7.5 billion (13.8% of GDP) stock
of central bank foreign exchange reserves as of Sept. 1, following
a 15% decline in August.

S&P said, "We understand that Russia intends to provide Belarus
with a new loan supporting foreign exchange reserves as well as
refinance previous obligations coming due up to $1 billion.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear if this will fully materialize. In
the past, disagreements have regularly surfaced between the two
countries on a variety of topics, including Russia's credit lines
to Belarus and the terms at which hydrocarbons are supplied. We
consider that future financial support from Russia to Belarus may
be dependent on Belarus making political concessions, some of which
the government may be unwilling to concede to. Positively, the two
countries recently reached an agreement to amend the terms of a
Russian bilateral loan extended to Belarus to finance a
construction of a nuclear power plant; the start of repayments has
effectively being shifted by two years, while the interest rate is
also reduced, providing some relief.

"Absent Russian support, we consider that Belarus has limited
options to secure alternative credit lines, at least in the near
term. Specifically, given the current political situation, we
believe that new lines from international financial institutions,
including the International Monetary Fund, are likely off the
table.

"Lastly, beyond the immediate implications, we also consider that
risks to medium-term economic outlook have increased. Sporadic
strikes have previously taken place at several state-owned
enterprises, although we understand these have now subsided and the
economic impact will likely be contained. More significantly,
however, we expect that Belarus technology sector's prospects will
be dampened by the ongoing developments. In the aftermath of the
election, the internet was shut for several days in Belarus, which
will likely dent foreign and domestic business confidence in the IT
sector, which has been an important impetus of growth in recent
years."

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) credit factors for this
credit rating change:

-- Transparency
-- Governance factors

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Action

                                   To          From
  Belarus
   Sovereign Credit Rating     B/Negative/B  B/Stable/B

  Ratings Affirmed

  Belarus
   Transfer & Convertibility
     Assessment                    B
   Senior Unsecured                B


BELARUSBANK: S&P Puts 'B' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B' long- and short-term issuer
credit ratings on Belarus-based financial institutions Belarusbank,
Belagroprombank JSC, and Bank BelVEB OJSC on CreditWatch with
negative implications.

Belarusian banks are experiencing rising liquidity pressures
because the deposit erosion and increased demand for foreign
currency that started in the first half of 2020 has recently
intensified.   The heightened political uncertainty following the
disputed presidential election in August 2020 has contributed to an
increase in residents' demand for foreign currency and intensified
the depreciation of the Belarusian ruble against foreign currencies
(the Belarusian ruble has depreciated against the U.S. dollar by
more than 20% since the end of 2019), exacerbating the risks in the
banking system.

Belarusian banks had sufficient liquidity to manage deposit
outflows in the first eight months of 2020.   According to the
National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB), the systemwide
liquidity coverage ratio (the ratio of highly liquid assets to net
expected cash outflow over the next 30 days) exceeded 155% as of
Jan. 1, 2020, and 133% as of Aug. 1, 2020, against a minimum
requirement of 80%. In addition, a high share of irrevocable
deposits to some extent mitigates the risk of deposit outflows in
the system. Such deposits accounted for about two-thirds of
term-retail deposits as of July 1, 2020. In S&P's view, there is a
risk that large deposit outflows could persist over the rest of
2020, if political uncertainty and volatility remain and trust in
the banking system deteriorates further.

About 60% ($12.9 billion) of banks' customer funds were denominated
in foreign currency as of July 1, 2020, reflecting currency risk
for the banking sector.   S&P believes that existing level and
negative dynamics of foreign currency reserves ($7.5 billion as of
Sept. 1, 2020) may have a curbing effect on the NBRB's ability to
provide banks with foreign currency liquidity. Additionally, on
Aug. 24, the NBRB stopped providing overnight loans in local
currency to banks until Sept. 15, 2020, to contain speculative
demand for foreign currency. S&P believes that available mechanisms
to support liquidity in local currency, such as weekly auctions,
are not sufficient to cover increased liquidity needs, while
liquidity support in foreign currency is lacking. These factors
have led many banks operating in Belarus to start preserving their
liquidity and limiting their retail lending operations.

S&P believes that the challenging macroeconomic environment
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, the local currency's
volatility, and potential for a protracted period of political
uncertainty and public protests will put additional pressure on the
debt-servicing capacity of Belarusian companies and households.  
Average problem assets of the 10 largest banks, which comprise
Stage 3 and purchased or originated credit-impaired loans under
International Financial Reporting Standards, stood at 11% of these
banks' total loans in 2019. Stage 2 loans, which are also
potentially vulnerable to rating transition due to the challenging
operating environment, accounted for an additional 15% of the
loans. S&P thinks problem loans and credit losses will be elevated
in 2020-2021, exacerbated by the depreciation of the Belarusian
ruble by more than 20% since 2019 and a large share of foreign
currency lending, which accounts for more than 47% of total loans
as of July 1, 2020. This will likely further hamper the banking
sector's already modest capitalization.

S&P said, "We expect our projected risk-adjusted capital ratio for
the three banks to decline closer to 4.0%-4.8% in 2020-2021
compared with 5.1%-5.6% as of year-end 2019.   We consider the
banks' capital buffers weak by international standards. We are
therefore revising our capital and earning assessment on
Belarusbank and Belagroprombank to weak from moderate, while our
weak assessment on Bank BelVEB remains unchanged. Our view of
capital and earnings is neutral to our assessments of the banks'
stand-alone credit profiles (SACPs), however."

Although the ratings on the three banks are currently at 'B' and
capped by S&P's sovereign long-term rating, Belarusbank's SACP is
one notch higher than the other rated banks.   This reflects its
superior business position in its domestic market with a
diversified market franchise and a market share exceeding 40% of
total assets, total loans, and customer deposits. Nevertheless, as
did the rest of the banking system, Belarusbank experienced deposit
outflows, which have intensified since the 2020 presidential
elections, similar to the levels observed in the entire banking
sector. S&P has therefore revised our assessment of Belarusbank's
funding to average from above average.

CreditWatch

S&P said, "We aim to resolve the CreditWatch within the next three
months when there is more clarity on the evolution of depositors'
behavior, both as regards local and foreign currency, as well the
regulatory and government response to the current crisis.

"We could lower the ratings on all three banks by more than one
notch if deposit outflows accelerated and if their liquidity
cushion and NBRB support are not sufficient to meet their
obligations in full and in time. We would also lower the ratings on
the banks if the government imposed tight foreign exchange or
capital controls."

A negative rating action on Belarus would also trigger a similar
action on the three banks.

S&P could affirm the ratings on the banks if the current liquidity
tensions receded and we no longer consider that there is
uncertainty regarding whether they will be able to meet their
obligations in full and on time. This could materialize if customer
confidence returns following stabilization of political tensions in
Belarus.

  Ratings Score Snapshot
                                    To            From
  Belarusbank
   Issuer Credit Rating         B/Watch Neg/B   B/Stable/B
   SACP                             b+              b+
   Anchor                           b               b
   Business Position            Strong (+1)     Strong (+1)
   Capital and Earnings         Weak (0)        Moderate (0)
   Risk Position                Adequate (0)    Adequate (0)
   Funding                      Average &       Above Average &
   and Liquidity                 Adequate (0)    Adequate (0)
   Support                          0               0
   ALAC Support                     0               0
   GRE Support                      0               0
   Group Support                    0               0
   Sovereign Support                0               0
   Additional Factors               0               0

  Belagroprombank JSC
   Issuer Credit Rating        B/Watch Neg/B   B/Stable/B
   SACP                             b               b
   Anchor                           b               b
   Business Position           Adequate (0)    Adequate (0)
   Capital and Earnings        Weak (0)        Moderate (0)
   Risk Position               Adequate (0)    Adequate (0)
   Funding                     Average &       Average &
    and Liquidity               Adequate (0)    Adequate (0)
   Support                          0               0
   ALAC Support                     0               0
   GRE Support                      0               0
   Group Support                    0               0
   Sovereign Support                0               0
   Additional Factors               0               0

  Bank BelVEB OJSC
   Issuer Credit Rating        B/Watch Neg/B    B/Stable/B
   SACP                             b               b
   Anchor                           b               b
   Business Position           Adequate (0)    Adequate (0)
   Capital and Earnings        Weak (0)        Weak (0)
   Risk Position               Adequate (0)    Adequate (0)
   Funding                     Average &         Average
    and Liquidity               Adequate (0) and Adequate (0)
   Support                           0               0
   ALAC Support                      0               0
   GRE Support                       0               0
   Group Support                     0               0
   Sovereign Support                 0               0
   Additional Factors                0               0




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G R E E C E
===========

[*] GREECE: Government Drafts Bill to Overhaul Insolvency Code
--------------------------------------------------------------
Lefteris Papadimas at Reuters reports that Greece's conservative
government has drafted a bill which overhauls its insolvency code,
seeking to help over-indebted households and businesses make a
fresh start after a crippling decade-long debt crisis.

More than 1 million individuals and 300,000 businesses owe money to
banks and the state, legacy of a decade-long financial crisis that
shrank the country's economy by a quarter, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, officials said the bill, which was submitted
for public consultation on Aug. 27, replaces existing fragmented
rules for restructuring and bankruptcy of individual and corporate
debt with a single framework and speeds up debt write-offs.

"They (debtors) can have a new start without the burdens of the
past, just only one year after the relevant court decisions on
bankruptcy," a senior official who helped draft the bill told
Reuters.  Under the current rules, debtors have to wait for decades
before their debts are written off, Reuters notes.

"(The bill) fights the phenomenon of 'zombie' businesses created in
the past years due to the continuous accumulation of debts,"
Reuters quotes government spokesman Stelios Petsas as saying.

The bill is expected to be submitted to parliament in coming months
and, once approved, will take effect in 2021, Reuters states.




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I R E L A N D
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BAIN CAPITAL 2019-1: Fitch Downgrades Class E Notes to BB-sf
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken multiple rating actions on Bain Capital
Euro CLO 2019-1 DAC, including a downgrade of the class E notes and
their removal from Rating Watch Negative (RWN).


RATING ACTIONS

Bain Capital Euro CLO 2019-1 DAC

Class A XS2075846811; LT AAAsf Affirmed; previously at AAAsf

Class B XS2075847462; LT AAsf Affirmed; previously at AAsf

Class C XS2075848940; LT Asf Affirmed; previously at Asf

Class D XS2075849674; LT BBB-sf Affirmed; previously at BBB-sf

Class E XS2075850094; LT BB-sf Downgrade; previously at BBsf

Class F XS2075850250; LT B-sf Affirmed; previously at B-sf

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The transaction is in its reinvestment period and the portfolio is
actively managed by Bain Capital Credit U.S. CLO Manager, LLC.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Portfolio Performance Deterioration

The downgrade of the class E notes and the revision of Outlook on
the class D notes reflect the deterioration of the portfolio's
performance as a consequence of the economic fallout from the
pandemic. The transaction sold a few distressed assets at a
discount during the months of March to May 2020 to address the
negative portfolio migration as exposure to 'CCC' assets had
increased since the beginning of the pandemic. This has resulted in
the portfolio being 0.4% below target par. In addition, the
transaction now has exposure to defaulted asset of EUR1.2million.

The Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) test was reported
at 34.79 in the August 6, 2020 trustee report against a maximum of
35.5. Fitch's updated calculation as of 5 September 2020 shows a
WARF of 35.28 (including unrated names which the agency
conservatively assumes a 'CCC' rating in line with its methodology
while the manager may classify up to 10% of the portfolio at 'B-').
The 'CCC' category or below assets represented 5.2% (or 7.1%
including unrated names) as of 5 September 2020, compared with its
7.5% limit.

All tests, including the over-collateralisation and interest
coverage tests, were reported as passing.

Coronavirus Baseline Scenario Impact

Fitch carried out a sensitivity analysis on the current portfolio
for its coronavirus baseline scenario. The agency notched down the
ratings for all assets with corporate issuers on Negative Outlook
regardless of sector, which represent 32.9% of the portfolio
balance. This scenario shows sizeable shortfalls for the class D, E
and F notes. For the class D notes the Outlook was revised to
Negative from Stable while the class E and F notes are assigned a
Negative Outlook after resolving the rating watch negative to
reflect the risk of credit deterioration over the long term, due to
the economic fallout from the pandemic. For the other notes, this
scenario demonstrates the resilience of their ratings.

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch assesses the average credit quality of obligors in the
'B'/'B-' category. The Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF)
calculated by Fitch as of 5 September 2020 of the current portfolio
is 35.28. Under the coronavirus baseline scenario, the
Fitch-calculated WARF would increase to 39.24.

High Recovery Expectations

Nearly 100% of the portfolio comprises senior secured obligations.
Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets as more
favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine assets.
The Fitch weighted recovery rate is 63.6%.

Diversified Portfolio

The portfolio is well-diversified across obligors, countries and
industries. The top-10 obligor exposure is 11.4% of the portfolio
balance and no obligor represent more than 1.25%. The Fitch-defined
largest industry is business services at 16.4%.

Cash Flow Analysis

Fitch used a customised proprietary cash flow model to replicate
the principal and interest waterfalls and the various structural
features of the transaction, as well as to assess their
effectiveness, including the structural protection provided by
excess spread diverted through the par value and interest coverage
tests. The transaction was modelled using the current portfolio
based on both the stable and rising interest-rate scenarios and the
front-, mid-, and back-loaded default timing scenarios, as outlined
in Fitch's criteria.

Fitch also tested the current portfolio with a coronavirus
sensitivity analysis to estimate the resilience of the notes'
ratings. The coronavirus sensitivity analysis was only based on the
stable interest-rate scenario but included all default timing
scenarios.

Deviation from Model-Implied Ratings

The model-implied ratings for the class E and F notes are 'B+sf'
and 'CCCsf' below their respective current ratings of 'BBsf' and
'B-sf'. Fitch decided to deviate from the class E model-implied
rating because the model-implied rating was only driven by the
back-loaded default timing scenario, which is unlikely given the
current economic environment associated with the COVID crisis.
Also, Fitch views class E notes' rating at 'BB-sf's as appropriate
and in line with a majority of European CLOs. For the class F
notes, the deviation from the 'CCCsf' model-implied rating reflects
the presence of a limited margin of safety before a default on the
notes. This means a 'B-sf' rating is deemed more appropriate, based
on its rating definitions, whereas 'CCCsf' indicates that default
is a real possibility.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

At closing, Fitch used a standardised stress portfolio (Fitch's
Stressed Portfolio) that was customised to the portfolio limits as
specified in the transaction documents. Even if the actual
portfolio shows lower defaults and smaller losses (at all rating
levels) than Fitch's Stressed Portfolio assumed at closing, an
upgrade of the notes during the reinvestment period is unlikely as
the portfolio credit quality may still deteriorate, not only
through natural credit migration, but also through reinvestments.

Upgrades may occur after the end of the reinvestment period on
better-than-expected portfolio credit quality and deal performance,
leading to higher credit enhancement and excess spread available to
cover for losses in the remaining portfolio.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

Downgrades may occur if the build-up of credit enhancement
following amortisation does not compensate for a larger loss
expectation than initially assumed due to unexpected high levels of
defaults and portfolio deterioration. As the disruptions to supply
and demand due to COVID-19 become apparent for other sectors, loan
ratings in those sectors would also come under pressure. Fitch will
update the sensitivity scenarios in line with the view of its
Leveraged Finance team.

Coronavirus Downside Sensitivity

Fitch has added a sensitivity analysis that contemplates a more
severe and prolonged economic stress caused by a re-emergence of
infections in the major economies, before halting recovery begins
in 2Q21. The downside sensitivity incorporates a single-notch
downgrade to all Fitch-derived ratings in the 'B' rating category
and a 0.85 recovery rate multiplier to all other assets in the
portfolio. For typical European CLOs this scenario results in a
category-rating change for all ratings.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO SEC RULE 17G -10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other Nationally
Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations and/or European
Securities and Markets Authority-registered rating agencies. Fitch
has relied on the practices of the relevant groups within Fitch
and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset portfolio
information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

CVC CORDATUS IX: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to B3
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by CVC Cordatus Loan Fund IX Designated Activity
Company:

EUR12,800,000 Class F Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030,
Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2020 B2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's has also confirmed the ratings on the following notes:

EUR20,800,000 Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030,
Confirmed at Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2020 Baa2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR23,200,000 Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030,
Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 3, 2020 Ba2 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

EUR235,200,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030,
Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2017 Definitive Rating
Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR56,400,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2030,
Affirmed Aa2 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2017 Definitive Rating
Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR22,800,000 Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2030,
Affirmed A2 (sf); previously on Aug 31, 2017 Definitive Rating
Assigned A2 (sf)

CVC Cordatus Loan Fund IX Designated Activity Company, issued in
August 2017, is a collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a
portfolio of mostly high-yield senior secured European loans. The
portfolio is managed by CVC Credit Partners European CLO Mmgt LLP.
The transaction's reinvestment period will end in August 2021.

The action concludes the rating review on the Class D, E and F
notes initiated on June 3, 2020 as a result of the deterioration of
the credit quality and/or the reduction of the par amount of the
portfolio following from the coronavirus outbreak.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating downgrade on the Class F is primarily a result of risks
posed by credit deterioration, which have been primarily prompted
by economic shocks stemming from the coronavirus outbreak. The
rating confirmations on Classes D and E and rating affirmations on
Classes A, B and C, reflect the expected losses of the notes
continuing to remain consistent with their current ratings despite
the risks posed by credit deterioration and loss of collateral
coverage observed in the underlying CLO portfolio.

Since the coronavirus outbreak widened in March, the decline in
corporate credit has resulted in a significant number of
downgrades, other negative rating actions, or defaults on the
assets collateralising the CLO.

The deterioration in credit quality of the portfolio is reflected
in an increase in Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF) and of the
proportion of securities from issuers with ratings of Caa1 or
lower. According to the trustee report dated August 2020 [1], the
WARF was 3162, compared to value of 2892 in February 2020 [2].
Securities with ratings of Caa1 or lower currently make up
approximately 6.6% [1] of the underlying portfolio. In addition,
the over-collateralisation (OC) levels have weakened across the
capital structure. According to the trustee report of August 2020
the Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E OC ratios are reported
at 135.4% [1], 125.6% [1], 117.8% [1] and 110.2% [1] compared to
February 2020 levels of 136.6% [2], 126.7% [2], 118.8% [2] and
111.1% [2] respectively. Moody's notes that none of the OC tests
are currently in breach and the transaction remains in compliance
with the following collateral quality tests: Diversity Score,
Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR), Weighted Average Spread
(WAS) and Weighted Average Life (WAL).

Moody's analysed the CLO's latest portfolio and took into account
the recent trading activities as well as the full set of structural
features of the transaction.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 395.9 million
after considering a negative cash exposure of around EUR 2.3
million, a weighted average default probability of 23.6%
(consistent with a WARF of 3197 over a weighted average life of 4.6
years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 45.2% for
a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 45 and a
weighted average spread of 3.6%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future
defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the
collateral pool. In each case, historical and market performance
and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery
characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model
analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability it is analysing.

In consideration of the current high uncertainties around the
global economy and the ultimate performance of the CLO portfolio,
Moody's conducted a number of additional sensitivity analyses
representing a range of outcomes that could diverge, both to the
downside and the upside, from its base case. Some of the additional
scenarios that Moody's considered in its analysis of the
transaction include, among others: additional near-term defaults of
companies facing liquidity pressure; additional OC par haircuts to
account for potential future downgrades and defaults resulting in
an increased likelihood of cash flow diversion to senior notes; and
some improvement in WARF as the global economy gradually recovers
in the second half of the year and future corporate credit
conditions generally stabilize.

The coronavirus outbreak, the government measures put in place to
contain it, and the weak global economic outlook continue to
disrupt economies and credit markets across sectors and regions.
Its analysis has considered the effect on the performance of
corporate assets from the current weak global economic activity and
a gradual recovery for the coming months. Although an economic
recovery is underway, it is tenuous and its continuation will be
closely tied to containment of the virus. As a result, the degree
of uncertainty around its forecasts is unusually high. Moody's
regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its ESG
framework, given the substantial implications for public health and
safety.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
August 2020.

Counterparty Exposure:

The rating action took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as account bank using the methodology
"Moody's Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in Structured
Finance" published in June 2020. Moody's concluded the ratings of
the notes are not constrained by these risks.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the note,
in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the general
economy. In particular, the length and severity of the economic and
credit shock precipitated by the global coronavirus pandemic will
have a significant impact on the performance of the securities. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted either positively or
negatively by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behaviour
and 2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO documentation
by different transactional parties because of embedded
ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

  -- Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which could
lengthen as a result of the manager's decision to reinvest in new
issue loans or other loans with longer maturities, or participate
in amend-to-extend offerings. The effect on the ratings of
extending the portfolio's weighted average life can be positive or
negative depending on the notes' seniority.

  -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's
over-collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Recoveries higher
than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on the
notes' ratings.

  -- Other collateral quality metrics: Because the deal can
reinvest, the manager can erode the collateral quality metrics'
buffers against the covenant levels.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.




=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================

BHARTI AIRTEL: Moody's Affirms Sr. Unsec. Notes Rating at Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed Bharti Airtel Ltd.'s (Bharti)
Ba1 corporate family rating and senior unsecured rating as well as
the backed senior unsecured notes issued by Bharti's subsidiary,
Bharti Airtel Int'l (Netherlands) B.V.

At the same time, Moody's has changed the rating outlook to stable
from negative.

"The ratings affirmation and change in outlook to stable reflect
improving profitability at Bharti's core Indian mobile business,
because of a moderation in industry competition, an increase in its
4G customer base, and a tariff hike from December 2019," says
Annalisa DiChiara, a Moody's Senior Vice President.

"The staggered payment resolution related to Adjusted Gross Revenue
(AGR) liabilities is also a positive development," says DiChiara.
"Overall, the company's operating flexibility is improving and will
benefit from a gradual expansion of profitability, which will
provide a buffer against any material deterioration in credit
measures and support a steady deleveraging."

RATINGS RATIONALE

Bharti's Ba1 CFR considers its position as one of the largest
telecom service operators globally in terms of subscribers (420
million), its solid market position in India's (Baa3 negative)
high-growth mobile market and its large spectrum holdings. These
factors are offset by the company's elevated leverage, and
relatively low, although improving, profitability and cash flow.

The competition in the Indian mobile segment has moderated over the
last nine months as the price war following Reliance Jio Infocomm
Ltd's (Jio) entry in September 2016 has subsided. But the pandemic
has resulted in some subscriber contraction (1%-2%) over the last
few months, which has amplified the impact of a natural attrition
of subscribers due to SIM card consolidation in India following the
tariff hikes implement in December 2019.

However, an increase in the composition of its 4G customers, which
comprised nearly 50% of its Indian mobile subscriber base in June
2020, is helping to stabilize profitability.

Moody's expects Bharti's consolidated EBITDA to gradually increase
into the INR425 billion range, which will keep its consolidated
leverage, as measured by debt/EBITDA, elevated at around 4.0x-4.25x
in March 2021. That said, Moody's also recognizes that around
30%-35% of Bharti's reported debt levels are spectrum liabilities,
which are not exposed to refinancing risks.

On September 1, 2020, the Supreme Court of India announced the
verdict on AGR, allowing staggered payments over a 10-year period
to telecom operators. Moody's views the resolution positively,
crystallizing Bharti's AGR dues at INR439 billion and providing a
much-awaited resolution stemming from the court's October 2019
judgement.

The staggered AGR payment plan will help alleviate pressure on the
company's cash flow. It also means that some of the proceeds Bharti
raised earlier this year to fund the AGR liability, can instead be
applied to debt reduction. And according to management, this is
actually already underway.

The outlook is stable and reflects Moody's expectations that
Bharti's consolidated leverage will steadily trend towards
3.5x-4.0x over the next 6-12 months, a level more appropriate for
its Ba1 rating.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

Moody's could upgrade Bharti's ratings if its operating performance
improves such that its consolidated leverage is sustained below
2.5x, which needs to be achieved in conjunction with a material
expansion in profitability at its core Indian mobile business.

But downward ratings pressure would arise if its debt reduction
fails to materialize, its earnings and cash flow deteriorate
further, or its market share (on a revenue basis) contracts
materially. Credit metrics indicative of a downgrade include (1)
adjusted consolidated debt/EBITDA remaining above 4.5x, or (2)
adjusted EBITDA margins falling below 35% on a sustained basis.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was
Telecommunications Service Providers published in January 2017.

Founded in 1994, Bharti Airtel Ltd. is the third largest
telecommunications service provider globally, based on total number
of subscribers. At June 30, 2020 it had 420 million customers
across operations in 18 countries across South Asia and Africa.



=========
S P A I N
=========

PARQUES REUNIDOS: S&P Cuts ICR on Parent to CCC+', Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term issuer and issue ratings
on theme park operator Parques Reunidos' parent entity, Piolin
Bidco S.A.U., to 'CCC+' from 'B-', and removed them from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on
March 31, 2020.

The negative outlook demonstrates the downside risks to the current
rating in the next 12 months, if Parques Reunidos underperforms
against S&P's current base case. This would strain the group's
capital structure and its ability to return to generating
sustainable free cash flows. This could occur if the effect of the
pandemic lasts longer and further weighs on the macroeconomic
environment; consumer sentiment; or demand for leisure,
entertainment, and travel.

Although Parques Reunidos has reopened most of its theme parks
globally, S&P's anticipate a full recovery in attendance could take
several years.

As governments globally relaxed some of the restrictions aimed at
curing the spread of COVID-19, Parques Reunidos was able to start
reopening its theme parks from June, when the high season usually
starts (the company generates about 90% of EBITDA during the summer
months). The reopening was facilitated by its offering mainly
consisting of outdoor parks, in which social distancing measures
could more easily be implemented. S&P said, "However, we think a
full recovery in park attendance could take several years. The
consensus among health experts is that the pandemic may now be at,
or near, its peak in some regions. It will remain a threat until a
vaccine or effective treatment is widely available, which may not
occur until second-half 2021. We are using this assumption in
assessing the economic and credit implications associated with the
pandemic. We forecast that revenue could decline by 60% in 2020
from the EUR696 million the company reported in 2019, and remain
down 20% in 2021, compared with 2019. As the situation evolves, we
will update our assumptions and estimates accordingly."

S&P anticipates that Parques Reunidos' already-high financial
leverage will likely further deteriorate and it will not return to
positive cash flows in the medium term.  Parques Reunidos has a
high fixed-cost structure and its business is capital-intensive.
Although S&P acknowledges that during the lockdown it made
significant cost savings, reduced capital expenditure (capex), and
benefitted from government support schemes, this only limited the
pandemic's effect on earnings and cash flow. S&P said, "We forecast
EBITDA will still turn significantly negative and FOCF after lease
payments could be negative by up to EUR240 million in 2020. We
anticipate that Parques Reunidos will gradually recover through
2021, but its earnings will still be more than 30% lower in 2021
than in 2019 and FOCF will remain negative. In our base case,
leverage will stay very high at above 10x, compared with 6.3x in
2019, and FOCF will remain negative, at least until the end of
2021." This places pressure on the group's capital structure and
leaves it reliant on favorable macroeconomic and business
conditions.

S&P said, "Parques Reunidos' recent additional new financings have
improved its liquidity position, but we view its financial position
as highly dependent on a swift recovery in operating activity for
the 2021 season.   Parques Reunidos recently raised an additional
EUR200 million through an add-on to its existing EUR970 million
term loan, due 2026. It also obtained about EUR56 million of
government-backed loans--in Spain, France, and Norway--over the
past weeks. We view these facilities as positive in the near term
because they have strengthened Parques Reunidos' liquidity,
enabling the group to withstand headwinds this year, but they will
contribute to gross leverage remaining elevated in 2021 and beyond.
Parques Reunidos has now fully drawn under the EUR200 million
revolving credit facility (RCF) due in 2025. We understand that, as
of the end of July 2020, the group held cash balances of about
EUR289 million. Under our current base case, we assume that the
group will have sufficient cash available to cover its liquidity
needs for the next 12 months. That said, our assumptions and
forecasting are subject to the current trading and macroeconomic
conditions, and the path to recovery for recreational park
operators is highly fragile and uncertain."

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) credit factors for this
credit rating change:

-- Health and safety.

The negative outlook demonstrates the downside risks to the current
rating in the next 12 months, if Parques Reunidos underperforms
against S&P's base-case forecasts. This would increase the pressure
on the group's capital structure and test its ability to return to
generating sustainable free cash flows. The group could
underperform if its operating environment worsened. For example, if
the COVID-19 pandemic has a more-prolonged impact, it could lead to
downside risks to the macroeconomic environment and weigh on
consumer sentiment and demand for leisure, entertainment, and
travel.

S&P could lower the ratings if it seesz an increased risk of
default in the next 12 months. This could occur if:

-- The magnitude and length of disruption caused by COVID-19
exceeds S&P's current base case, resulting in a heightened risk of
liquidity stress, covenant breach, or material deterioration in the
financial positon and performance of the group; or

-- S&P was to view specific default events as an increasing
possibility, such as the likelihood of interest forbearance, a
broader debt restructuring, or debt purchases below par.
Ratings upside could build if, in S&P's view:

-- A sufficient track record of stable macroeconomic and operating
environment offered greater certainty of business performance,
recovery in demand, and consumer confidence;

-- The capital structure proved sustainable in the longer term,
with leverage more likely to return to 2019 levels and positive
free operating cash flow generation, after lease payments.

There was no risk of default events occurring, such as a purchase
of the group's debt below par, a debt restructuring, or interest
forbearance.




===========
T U R K E Y
===========

TURKEY: Moody's Cuts Issuer & Senior Unsecured Ratings to B2
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the government of Turkey's
issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings to B2 from B1 and
downgraded its senior unsecured shelf rating to (P)B2 from (P)B1.
The negative outlook has been maintained. Moody's has also
downgraded the senior unsecured backed debt rating of Hazine
Mustesarligi Varlik Kiralama A.S. to B2 from B1, a special purpose
vehicle wholly owned by the Republic of Turkey from which the
Treasury issues sukuk certificates. The negative outlook has been
maintained for this issuer.

The three key drivers for the downgrade are:

1. Turkey's external vulnerabilities are increasingly likely to
crystallise in a balance of payments crisis.

2. As the risks to Turkey's credit profile increase, the country's
institutions appear to be unwilling or unable to effectively
address these challenges.

3. Turkey's fiscal buffers, which have been a source of credit
strength for many years, are eroding.

The maintenance of the negative outlook reflects the view that
fiscal metrics could deteriorate at a faster pace than currently
anticipated in the coming years. It also reflects the downside
risks associated with the authorities' inadequate reaction
function, which makes Turkey more likely to suffer a full-blown
balance of payments crisis in the coming years. Finally, it
reflects elevated levels of geopolitical risk on several
fronts—the relationship with the United States (US, Aaa stable),
the relationship with the European Union (EU, Aaa stable), and
tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean—that could be an accelerant
for any crisis.

In a related decision, Moody's lowered Turkey's long-term country
ceilings: the foreign currency bond ceiling to B2 from B1; its
foreign currency deposit ceiling to Caa1 from B3; and its local
currency bond and deposit ceilings to Ba3 from Ba2. The short-term
foreign currency bond ceiling and short-term foreign currency
deposit ceiling remain unchanged at Not Prime (NP). Ceilings
generally act as the maximum ratings that can be assigned to a
domestic issuer in Turkey, including structured finance securities
backed by Turkish receivables. The alignment of the foreign
currency bond ceiling and the government bond ratings reflects
Moody's view that exposure to a single, common threat—loss of
external confidence and capital—means that the fortunes of public
and private sector entities in Turkey are, from a credit
perspective, increasingly intertwined.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR DOWNGRADE TO B2 FROM B1

FIRST DRIVER: TURKEY'S EXTERNAL VULNERABILITIES ARE INCREASINGLY
LIKELY TO CRYSTALLISE IN A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISIS

Turkey's foreign-currency reserves have been drifting downward for
years on both a gross and a net basis but are now at a multi-decade
low as a percentage of GDP because of the central bank's
unsuccessful attempts to defend the lira since the beginning of
2020. Gross foreign-exchange reserves (excluding gold, in line with
Moody's methodology) are currently at $44.9 billion (as of 4
September), over a 40% decline since the beginning of the year.
Turkey has tried a number of measures to increase gross
reserves—including a tripling of the country's swap line with
Qatar to $15 billion and increasing banks' reserve
requirements—but by any measure this is an exceptionally low
buffer when measured against upcoming external debt payments.
Moody's forecasts that the country's external vulnerability
indicator (EVI), an indicator of the adequacy of foreign currency
reserves to cover external debt repayments and nonresident
deposits, will rise from 263% in 2019 to 409% in 2021, which
represents heightened exposure to changes in international investor
sentiment. In a crisis, the authorities could use the commercial
banks' reserves of US$44 billion deposited at the central bank to
repay maturing external debt, which is why Moody's uses gross
reserves in its EVI calculation. However, such a situation would
increase the risk that the government impose restrictions to
safeguard its scarce FX assets.

In fact, if banks' required reserves for TL and FX liabilities are
netted out, net foreign-exchange reserves are now close to zero.
Moreover, the reliance on swaps has grown at a very rapid pace in
2020. As of the end of July, the Turkish central bank had a $53
billion net short position in the swap market, up from $30 billion
in March. In other words, all the commercial banks' reserves at the
central bank are insufficient to cover this short position if these
swaps were not rolled over. Turkey does hold substantial gold
reserves, and due to both increases in the gold price and an
increase in gold volumes held, gold holdings are now broadly equal
to FX reserves ($42.7 billion at the beginning of September).

The lower gross and net reserves go, the more likely it is that
Turkey experiences a severe BoP crisis, causing acute disruptions
to economic activity and further deterioration in the government's
balance sheet. In the past, when the economy came under pressure,
Turkey's flexible exchange rate acted as a shock absorber that has
insulated the real economy from macroeconomic shocks and allowed
the country to muddle through without addressing its structural
imbalances. More recently, the authorities have been unwilling to
allow the lira to float freely because of the economic consequences
of a weaker currency.

Turkey's weaker exchange rate does not have as much of an impact on
growth and export competitiveness of goods as it does in many other
countries because of the high import content of exports in some
exporting industries. That said, the tourism industry is highly
responsive to a more competitive exchange rate, and periods of
exchange rate weakness often coincide with tourist arrivals hitting
record levels. This was certainly the case in 2019, when import
compression and a very strong tourism season helped to shift
Turkey's current-account deficit into surplus. However, in light of
the pandemic's impact on the tourism industry, Turkey will not reap
this benefit next year, and Moody's base case is that globally the
industry will only make a partial recovery to pre-pandemic levels
in 2021. While recent gas finds could provide some support to the
current account balance, in Moody's view they will not come on
stream quickly enough to mitigate these broader risks to Turkey's
external accounts.

Dollarisation is a significant issue for Turkey that heightens the
risk of a balance of payments crisis; it has the second-highest
dollarisation vulnerability indicator in the single B-rated
universe. The country had de-dollarised in the early 2000s because
of growing confidence in the domestic economy. However, in recent
years Moody's has observed progressively higher levels of
dollarisation, and since 2018 the share of deposits that are
denominated in hard currencies such as US dollars or euros have
accounted for over 50% of the total deposits in the banking
system.

SECOND DRIVER: AS THE RISKS TO TURKEY'S CREDIT PROFILE INCREASE,
THE COUNTRY'S INSTITUTIONS APPEAR TO BE UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THESE CHALLENGES

The second factor informing the rating action is Moody's view that
Turkey's policy credibility and effectiveness, elements that the
rating agency considers a governance factor under its ESG
framework, have weakened.

At the moment, political pressures and limited central bank
independence, a slow reaction function of the monetary authorities,
and a lack of predictability in their reaction function increases
the probability of a disorderly exchange rate and economic
adjustment. The policy rate is now negative in real terms,
inflation remains well above target, and inflation expectations are
rising. However, the central bank has taken only modest action to
tighten monetary policy. The longer this goes on, the more likely
it is that there will be continued downward pressure on the
currency.

Moreover, Turkey's longstanding commitment to a floating exchange
rate since 2001 was an important institutional source of insulation
from a balance of payments crisis because the exchange rate could
act as a shock absorber. Given the scale and number of
interventions and regulatory actions in the FX market this year, it
is difficult to see the lira as being governed by a floating
currency regime.

Turkey's structural economic challenges are clear, and Moody's
believes that the Turkish authorities understand that the economy's
chronic shortfall in domestic savings generates significant
imbalances and an over-dependence on foreign sources of capital.
Turkey also suffers from labour-market rigidities that inhibit job
creation. Productivity is also weak, which in some sectors
underpins structurally high inflation. International observers such
as the EU, IMF, and OECD point to weak educational outcomes as a
key driver of weak productivity and employment outcomes. Making
structural changes that address these fundamental challenges can
inflict short-term pain on the economy and the benefits of reform
could take years to materialise.

Policy initiatives in recent years have come short in terms of
addressing the structural underpinnings of Turkey's macroeconomic
problems, pointing to a lack of willingness or capacity to tackle
these economic vulnerabilities. Moreover, growth-supporting
measures have gone in the opposite direction and have relied on
credit growth (and fiscal or quasi-fiscal stimulus). Starting in
the second half of 2019, state-owned banks were encouraged to
expand credit creation to counter the economic downturn. They
adopted special programmes to assume and restructure credit card
and other consumer debt at extended maturities and below market
rates. Credit growth has remained high in 2020 due to measures
taken by the banking regulator to support domestic demand during
the pandemic. Some of those measures are being withdrawn now, but
credit growth will remain high through the end of the year.

THIRD DRIVER: TURKEY'S FISCAL BUFFERS, WHICH HAVE BEEN A SOURCE OF
CREDIT STRENGTH FOR MANY YEARS, ARE ERODING

Earlier this summer, Moody's reduced Turkey's fiscal strength
factor score by two notches to "ba1" as debt affordability weakened
markedly due to rising government debt levels, as well as a weaker
debt structure that renders the government's finances more
vulnerable to high inflation and currency depreciation than was the
case only a few years ago. The fact that Turkey has had to contend
with two crises since 2018 has taken a toll on the public finances
even though the government's fiscal response to the pandemic has
been relatively modest. The weak growth performance and fiscal
measures to manage the economic effects of the coronavirus will
have a meaningful impact on the deficit in 2020, and Moody's
forecasts that it will rise to 7.5% of GDP (using the IMF
definition, which excludes one-off revenue sources).

In addition to the widening primary balance, the depreciation of
the lira and high inflation will contribute to an increase in the
debt burden and higher interest payments on account of an increased
reliance on domestic and floating-rate borrowing which comes at the
expense of higher yields. As a result, Moody's forecasts the
government debt burden to increase from 32.5% in 2019 to 42.9% in
2020 and the debt affordability ratio (the ratio of general
government interest payments to general government revenues) will
deteriorate to 8.8% in 2020, up from 7.3% in 2019 and 5.8% in 2018.
Under its baseline scenario, the return to growth after the
economic shock of 2020 will not suffice to offset the impact on the
upward debt trajectory of primary deficits of around 2% and an
increasing interest burden. Therefore, Moody's expects Turkey's
debt burden to increase to above 46% of GDP in the coming years.
While Turkey's debt metrics are still more favourable—sometimes
by a significant margin—than those of similarly rated peers, in
Moody's view the deterioration in debt metrics outlined means that
Turkey's fiscal strength no longer offsets the country's other
credit challenges to the same degree that it has in the past.

This situation could be exacerbated if, for example, the
government's desire to revive growth were to lead to even larger
budget deficits than expected and if it needed to cover obligations
on public-private partnerships (PPPs) or guaranteed debts.

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The maintenance of the negative outlook reflects the view that
fiscal metrics could deteriorate at a faster pace than currently
anticipated in the coming years. It also reflects the downside
risks associated with the authorities' inadequate reaction
function, which makes Turkey more likely to suffer a full-blown
balance of payments crisis in the coming years. Finally, it
reflects elevated levels of geopolitical risk on a number of
fronts—the relationship with the US, the relationship with the
EU, and tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean—that could be an
accelerant for any crisis.

ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, GOVERNANCE CONSIDERATIONS

Moody's takes account of the impact of environmental (E), social
(S), and governance (G) factors when assessing sovereign issuers'
economic, institutional, and fiscal strength and their
susceptibility to event risk. In the case of Turkey, the
materiality of ESG to the credit profile is as follows.

Environmental considerations are not material to Turkey's credit
profile, and the country has not been identified as being one of
the sovereigns materially exposed to physical climate change risks.
Turkey experiences some environmental pressures because of rapid
population growth, which translated into industrialisation and
rapid urbanisation. While this results into increased pollution and
some degree of environmental degradation, these considerations are
not material to Turkey's credit profile.

Regarding social considerations, while Turkey is faced with labor
market rigidities and low female participation rate, these credit
features are mitigated by Turkey's youthful population, which
underpins its positive but slowing growth potential. In addition,
Moody's regards the coronavirus outbreak as a social risk under its
ESG framework, given the substantial implications for public health
and safety as well as the economic fiscal implications of the
pandemic.

Its assessment of Turkey's week and deteriorating governance has
been an important credit feature, which underpinned its decision to
downgrade Turkey's rating by multiple notches since the
introduction of the presidential system in mid-2018. Since then, it
has become frequent practice in Turkey for official decrees
ordering sometimes significant changes in laws and practices to be
no longer required to go through parliament to gain approval. These
interventions have become more frequent since the 2018 market
pressures. Moreover, the executive continues to undermine the
independence of key institutions that meaningfully undermines those
institutions' credibility and effectiveness.

This action was prompted by the recent deterioration in Turkey's
external fundamentals that make a balance of payments crisis more
likely and therefore pressured the previous rating of B1.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 28,268 (2019 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 0.9% (2019 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 13.5% (2019 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -4.5% (2019 Actual) (also known as
Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: 1.2% (2019 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 57.4% (2019 Actual)

Economic resiliency: ba2

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans)
has been recorded since 1983.

On September 08, 2020, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Turkey, Government of. The main points raised during
the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including
its economic strength, have materially decreased. The issuer's
institutions and governance strength, have materially decreased.
The issuer has become increasingly susceptible to event risks.
Other views raised included: The issuer's fiscal or financial
strength, including its debt profile, has not materially changed.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS

WHAT WOULD CHANGE THE RATING UP

Given the negative outlook, a positive outlook or an upgrade is
highly unlikely. However, the rating outlook could stabilise if
fiscal and monetary policies become more coherent in preventing
further exposure to a balance of payment crisis near term. External
financial support could also be credit supportive, as would
diminished tensions with the US and the EU. A determined set of
economic reforms that address the economy's structural imbalances
while capitalising on the country's inherent strengths could lead
to upward rating pressure over the medium term.

WHAT WOULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN

Turkey's rating would likely be downgraded if there was an
increasing likelihood that the current balance of payments
pressures was going to deteriorate into a full-blown crisis. In
such an event, the government could try to conserve scarce FX
assets by imposing restrictions on foreign-currency outflows that
affect sovereign creditors as well.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Ratings Methodology published in November 2019.




=============
U K R A I N E
=============

UKRAINE: S&P Affirms B/B Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on Sept. 11, 2020, affirmed its global scale
long-term foreign and local currency sovereign ratings on Ukraine
at 'B' and its Ukraine national scale ratings at 'uaA'. S&P also
affirmed the short-term ratings at 'B'. The outlook is stable.

Outlook

The stable outlook balances the risks to Ukraine's economy from the
weak external environment and the potential for a reversal of past
reforms, against the country's external buffers.

S&P said, "We could lower the ratings if disruptions to funding
from concessional programs or capital markets over the next year
call into question the government's ability to meet debt service
obligations. Such disruptions could happen if the government were
to backtrack on key reforms, such as ensuring the independence of
the NBU, which acts as both the monetary authority and financial
system regulator.

"On the other hand, we could consider raising the ratings over the
next year if we anticipated that public finances would consolidate
faster than we currently forecast. This could result from a
stronger economic recovery and discretionary policies. The rating
could also benefit should Ukraine's external liquidity outperform
our projections."

Rationale

The ratings on Ukraine are constrained by its low per capita income
and difficult institutional and political environment.

Stronger macroeconomic management since 2015 and augmented FX
reserves support our sovereign ratings on Ukraine. The ongoing
implementation of reforms helps the government access commercial
debt markets and receive concessional funding from international
financial institutions (IFIs).

Institutional and economic profile: The preservation of previously
implemented reforms will be critical to maintaining access to
official and commercial creditors amid external uncertainties

-- Ukraine's economy will contract by 6% in 2020 before staging a
domestic demand-led recovery in 2021.

-- Although Ukraine does not face imminent external funding
pressures, a prolonged discord with its official creditors could
restrict access to commercial financing at reasonable rates.

-- The NBU's ability to act in accordance with its price stability
mandate, despite political pressures and as inflationary pressures
build, will be an important signal of its continuing independence.

S&P expects Ukraine's real GDP to contract by 6% in 2020 after
authorities imposed stringent containment measures in March,
closing down large parts of the economy to limit the spread of
infection. Domestic demand has since rebounded with the easing of
restrictions and will be the main driver of the economic recovery
through 2021. While industrial and agricultural production
continued throughout the lockdown, smaller businesses and employees
in the informal sector appear to have borne the brunt of the
fallout so far.

The NBU has moved to an accommodative monetary policy stance to
support the economy, cutting the key policy rate by a cumulative
750 basis points this year. Moreover, the government announced a
Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) 65 billion fund (1.5% of GDP) to limit the
economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic by increasing spending on
health care and unemployment benefits. When expenditure on health
proved lower than targeted, the government diverted part of the
fund toward road infrastructure. Other fiscal measures include
various tax exemptions, pension hikes, wage increases for medical
personnel, a furlough scheme, and higher social benefits.

Half of 2020's sizable budgetary gap will be financed by
concessional borrowing from IFIs. This includes assistance from the
EU and the World Bank, and disbursements under an 18-month, $5
billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, which is
Ukraine's fifth in the past 10 years.

Unlike some previous IMF programs, the conditions associated with
disbursements from the current arrangement are relatively light.
However, any reversal of previously implemented reforms is likely
to endanger relations with the IMF, and possibly other creditors.

In this context, S&P notes the resignation of former NBU governor,
Yakiv Smoliy, citing political pressures, and subsequent personnel
changes to the NBU board. These events raise questions regarding
the potential impairment of the central bank's independent
judgement. The independence of the NBU, and its success in taming
double-digit inflation, dismantling capital controls, and restoring
financial stability, have been key achievements of Ukraine's
reforms over the past half-decade.

How the NBU will balance political demands for low interest rates
and a weaker hryvnia as inflationary pressures--currently
muted--build will send an important signal to Ukraine's creditors.
S&P said, "Bigger concerns would be raised if we saw amendments to
the law governing the NBU or a change in the NBU's stance on
Privatbank (the country's largest lender, which was nationalized in
2016). However, we do not view either of these scenarios as
likely."

The government does not face immediate funding pressures. It
retains access to local and international markets and has received
disbursements from some of the concessional loans available to it
over the past few months. However, a prolonged discord with its
official creditors could have a knock-on effect on its access to
commercial markets at reasonable rates. A recent constitutional
court ruling regarding the 2015 appointment of the head of the
National Anti-Corruption Bureau could therefore be of concern. That
said, Ukrainian authorities have managed to circumnavigate such
challenges previously, by tightening legislative loopholes.

Flexibility and performance profile: Government external debt
issuance, engagement with IFIs, and favorable current account
dynamics have continued to support FX reserves through 2020

-- S&P expects a sharp, short-term, COVID-19-related deterioration
in Ukraine's fiscal balance to result in a long-term increase in
the government's debt burden.

-- Import compression, continued external demand for Ukraine's
agricultural exports, and favorable terms of trade have supported a
record current account surplus, alongside a change in accounting
methodology.

-- External buffers against balance-of-payment risks have
strengthened and S&P project that FX reserves, net of required
reserves, will cover four months of current account payments on
average through 2023.

After several years of contained fiscal deficits and declining
government debt-to-GDP, Ukraine's budgetary gap will widen to 7.5%
of GDP in 2020 from 2.1% in 2019 owing to the COVID-19 policy
response and revenue losses. About half of the shortfall will be
met via concessional borrowing from IFIs and the remainder will be
met through local and international commercial debt issuance.

Discretionary measures to narrow the deficit have not been spelled
out, but S&P believes the underlying economic recovery will aid the
process. A proposed 30% hike in the minimum wage in 2021, following
a 6% increase this year, would slow the pace of consolidation.

Although fiscal balances will gradually recover, we project that
the pandemic will have a longer-lasting impact on the government
debt burden. Net general government debt will remain elevated for
the next three years, peaking at 66% of GDP in 2021. This compares
with a ratio just below 50% at the end of 2019. Given that nearly
60% of government debt is FX-denominated, the forecast is sensitive
to exchange rate developments.

Nonresidents' holdings of hryvnia-denominated government bonds
(excluding NBU holdings) have reduced to 20% of total
local-currency government debt, from a peak of nearly a third in
February this year. Relative to 2019 and 2020, the government faces
a lighter FX-denominated amortization schedule in 2021, totaling
$5.5 billion (nearly 4% of GDP). Of this, S&P expects nearly $3
billion of domestically issued FX bonds, mostly held by domestic
banks, to be fully rolled over.

There is a residual risk for Ukraine's government balance sheet
related to the 2013 $3 billion Eurobond, which was not restructured
in 2015 and is held by Russia. In the event of a court ruling
against Ukraine and its refusal to pay in full, legal or technical
constraints on Ukraine's commercial debt service to other creditors
could potentially apply.

In 2020, Ukraine has been running a record current account surplus,
which S&P attributes in part to a change in the accounting
treatment of losses on foreign investment. Stripping this effect
out, the current account remains in surplus thanks to import
compression; continued external demand for Ukrainian agricultural
exports (which account for more than a fifth of the export basket);
and favorable terms of trade. Demand for agricultural exports held
up, although production was affected by the late start of the
harvest in some areas.

S&P expects the current account balance to return to deficit as
domestic demand and import growth revive. Moreover, the volume of
Russian gas transiting through Ukraine will continue to decline
over the forecast period.

In S&P's view, Ukraine has strengthened its external buffers
against balance-of-payment risks. The NBU's FX reserves have been
increasing since 2015, via borrowings and outright FX purchases. FX
reserves stood at $29 billion at the end of August. Moreover, the
proportion of the central bank's own reserves has increased to
about 60% of overall FX reserves, from about 45% in 2015. S&P
projects that the NBU's FX reserves (net of the reserves commercial
banks are required to maintain with it against their FX
liabilities) will cover about four months of current account
payments on average through 2023. The central bank intervenes to
avoid excessive volatility and to augment reserves. So far in 2020,
the NBU has made net FX purchases of $1.2 billion, despite some
sales in March and July to stabilize the hryvnia.

Ever since its independence, the NBU has successfully pursued its
inflation-targeting mandate and improved financial stability. Since
2016, it has gradually brought inflation under control and toward
its target and has dismantled numerous capital controls. The NBU
has also pushed through reforms to strengthen financial stability,
in its role as a supervisor.

At 49%, banks' nonperforming loans (NPLs) remain high, but are
almost fully provisioned. Nearly half of the system's NPLs are held
by the four state-owned banks: Oschadbank, Ukreximbank, Ukrgasbank,
and PrivatBank. In particular, PrivatBank's NPLs amount to nearly
80% of its loan portfolio because of legacy related-party lending
before it was nationalized. S&P anticipates that there will be some
deterioration in asset quality over the next year, especially in
consumer loans.

The government's strategy for these state-owned banks includes the
appointment of independent supervisory boards, and a gradual
clean-up and eventual part-privatization of at least Oschadbank and
PrivatBank. With reforms at all four state-owned banks
progressing--albeit more slowly at Ukreximbank and Oschadbank—S&P
does not expect any of them to need additional recapitalization
from the central government during the next year.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating
action.

  Ratings List

  Rating Withdrawn
                                 To       From
  Ukraine
   Senior Unsecured              NR        D

  Ratings Affirmed

  Ukraine
   Sovereign Credit Rating               B/Stable/B
   Ukraine National Scale                uaA/--/--
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment      B
   Senior Unsecured                          B
   Senior Unsecured                          D


UKRAINIAN RAILWAY: Fitch Affirms 'B' LT IDR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed JSC Ukrainian Railway's (UR) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' and removed it from Rating Watch
Negative (RWN). The Outlook is Stable.

The removal of RWN reflects the improvement of UR's immediate
liquidity, following the maturity extension of a bank loan from
Sberbank (USD200 million) by three years to July 2023. This will
allow UR meet projected debt servicing needs in 2H20 and in 2021.
However, Fitch views UR's liquidity as structurally weak and
volatile, which together with potential uncertainty on the capital
markets, has led us to revise lower UR's Standalone Credit Profile
(SCP) to 'b-' from 'b'.

The affirmation of ratings reflects its unchanged view on UR's
strong linkage to Ukraine (B/Stable) and the latter's ability and
willingness to provide support to the company under Fitch's
Government Related Entities (GRE) Criteria. Using a top-down
approach, which combined with UR's 'b-' SCP, leads to rating
equalisation with the Ukrainian sovereign's IDR.

UR is Ukraine's integrated railway group with core operations in
domestic freight. While UR's most recently available data may not
have indicated performance impairment, material changes in revenue
and cost profiles are occurring across the sector and likely to
worsen in the coming months as economic activity suffers and
government restrictions related to the pandemic are maintained or
broadened. Fitch's ratings are forward-looking in nature, and Fitch
will monitor developments in the sector for their severity and
duration, and incorporate revised base- and rating-case qualitative
and quantitative inputs based on performance expectations and
assessment of key risks.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The removal of RWN reflects the resolution of a near-term liquidity
crisis. UR's next repayment peaks will be in May and September
2021, for which the company has ample time to prepare. Fitch
therefore views liquidity sources (available cash and undrawn lines
of credit) as sufficient to meet scheduled debt servicing for 2020
and 2021.

Government-Related Entity

UR's score under its GRE Criteria is unchanged at 27.5 and reflects
the combination of a 'Very Strong' assessment of the company's
legal status, ownership and support due to full state ownership and
control, 'Moderate' support track record expectations and
socio-political implications of default, and 'Strong' financial
implications of default.

Status, Ownership, and Control - 'Very Strong'

UR is a national integrated railway group, 100%-owned by Ukraine;
it consists of six regional railways along with other units linked
to servicing the national rail system. UR operates under strict
control from the Ukrainian state and Fitch considers an implicit
liability transfer to the latter in the event of financial
distress. The national government approves the company's strategic
objectives, including tariff-setting, debt and investment planning
and appoints members of the company's management and supervisory
boards. Its supervisory board includes top-ranking government
officials and independent directors.

Support Track Record and Expectations - 'Moderate'

Fitch assesses Ukraine's ability to provide support to UR as
'Moderate'. The company receives modest annual transfers from the
national and local budgets, which do not fully cover costs of
transporting passengers. This results in losses for the passenger
segment, which are cross-subsidised by profit from freight
transportation. Ukraine guarantees part of UR's external debt
contracted from international financial institutions (IFIs, 7.5% of
2019 total debt).

Socio-political Implications of Default - 'Moderate'

Its 'Moderate' assessment reflects its view that UR, as a
strategically important transportation company for Ukraine, will
continue to manage the national railway infrastructure, and provide
dispatch services, passenger transportation, and dominant freight
services even under financial distress. Nonetheless, a default of
UR could lead to some service disruptions, but not of an
irreparable nature. In this case company's hard assets will still
be operational and alternative modes of transportation remain
available.

Financial Implications of Default - 'Strong'

Fitch considers a default of UR on external obligations as
potentially detrimental to Ukraine, as it could lead to
reputational risk for the state. Both UR and the national treasury
tap international capital markets for debt funding, as well as
loans and financial aid from IFIs. In particular, UR plans to issue
Eurobonds in 2020 as a prime source of funding for maturing debt in
2021, implying an uninterrupted access to debt capital markets.
Therefore, a default of UR could to some extent influence the cost
of external funds for future debt financing of other GREs or the
state itself.

SCP Assessment

The revised 'b-' SCP reflects heightened risks of structurally weak
liquidity to UR's financial profile. It is in particular exposed to
foreign-exchange fluctuations and uncertainty over the availability
and timely access to domestic and international capital markets.
Fitch applies this as a negative qualitative assessment to UR's
financial profile, unless the company's liquidity cushion improves
on a sustained basis above its minimum threshold of 0.33x. The SCP
also factors in a 'Weaker' assessment for revenue defensibility and
'Midrange' assessment for operating risk, leading to a 'Weaker'
financial profile.

Revenue Defensibility: 'Weaker'

The 'Weaker' assessment reflects 'Midrange' demand and 'Weaker'
pricing. Demand for UR's services is supported by the company's
position as the monopolistic owner and operator of the rail
infrastructure, with sizeable freight operations being the key
revenue driver. UR is exposed to commodity markets dynamics,
foreign-currency fluctuations, and macro-economic and geo-political
developments, particularly in Russia, which affects its demand
assessment.

Operating Risk: 'Midrange'

UR's operating costs and resource management are assessed as
'Midrange', based on fairly well-defined costs with predictable
expected changes. Its cost structure is fairly stable and dominated
by staff costs averaging at 47% of operating spending in 2015-2019,
followed by maintenance costs and goods and services at 30%.

Financial Profile: 'Weaker'

UR's financial profile remains exposed to commodity-market and
foreign-exchange risks, along with the geo-political risks
associated with Ukraine's bilateral relations with Russia. UR is
moderately exposed to domestic competition in passenger
transportation, while its financial profile is supported by
sizeable operations in freight, where it benefits from its
monopolistic position.

Its net adjusted debt/Fitch-calculated EBITDA - a key financial
metric - averaged 1.8x in 2015-2019. Its revised rating case
envisages deterioration in net adjusted debt/EBITDA, but on a
lesser scale than projected in April 2020, to an average of 6.5x
for 2020-2024. This scenario assumes substantial stress on both
operating revenue and operating expenditure due to disruptions from
the coronavirus pandemic.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

UR's 'b-' SCP and GRE 27.5 score lead to rating equalisation with
the Ukraine sovereign IDR at 'B' with Stable Outlook

DEBT RATINGS

The ratings of senior debt instruments are aligned with UR's Long-
and Short-Term IDRs, including the senior unsecured debt of special
financial vehicle (SPV) companies - Shortline Plc. and Rail Capital
Markets Plc. This is because Fitch views the SPVs' debt as direct,
unconditional senior unsecured obligations of UR and as ranking
pari passu with all of its other present and future unsecured and
unsubordinated obligations.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's rating case is a "through-the-cycle" scenario, which
incorporates a combination of revenue, cost and financial risk
stresses. It is based on 2015-2019 figures and 2020-2024 projected
ratios.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to positive
rating action/upgrade:

  - An upgrade of Ukraine's sovereign rating, provided there is no
deterioration in UR's SCP and score under GRE Criteria.

Factors that could, individually or collectively, lead to negative
rating action/downgrade:

  - A downgrade of Ukraine's sovereign rating.

  - Dilution of linkage with the sovereign resulting in the ratings
being notched down from the sovereign.

  - Downward reassessment of the SCP, resulting from deterioration
of the financial profile with net debt/EBITDA sustainably above 12x
as per its rating case.

The debt ratings are likely to move in tandem with UR's IDRs.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

SCP's immediate liquidity improved at end-July 2020, after the
maturity of the Sberbank bank loan (USD200 million) was extended to
2023. As of end-August 2020 UR's combined liquidity (cash and
undrawn lines of credit) was UAH9.1 billion, while the next
repayment peaks are in May and September 2021.

UR's total debt at end-2019 was stable at UAH32,648.5 million
(2018: UAH32,005.3 million). Its 2019 debt was 55.8% Eurobonds, and
is 91.2% in foreign currency (2018: 92.1%). UR's exposure to
foreign-exchange risk is material, as its revenue stream is mostly
in domestic currency.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The principal sources of information used in the analysis are
described in the Applicable Criteria.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

The highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score
of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a
minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their
nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the
entity(ies).




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

CASTELL PLC 2020-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. B- Rating on Class X Notes
------------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary ratings to Castell
2020-1 PLC's class A, B, C-Dfrd, D-Dfrd, E-Dfrd, F-Dfrd, and X-Dfrd
notes. At closing, Castell 2020-1 will also issue unrated class G
and H notes.

The assets backing the notes are U.K. second-ranking mortgage
loans. Most of the pool is considered to be prime, with 96.2%
originated under Optimum's prime product range 3.8% categorized as
"near prime." These are categorized by lower credit scores and
potentially adverse credit markers such as county court judgments.

The loans and their related security will take effect in equity
only in England and Wales or via a Scottish declaration of trust in
Scotland on the issue date and on subsequent relevant further
purchase dates during the prefunding period. The issuer will grant
a first fixed equitable charge in England or a first-ranking
standard security over its beneficial interest in Scotland in favor
of the trustee over its interests in the loans and related
security.

S&P said, "The issuer will be an English special-purpose entity,
which we consider to be bankruptcy remote for our credit analysis.
We expect to assign credit ratings on the closing date subject to
an ongoing satisfactory review of the transaction documents and
legal opinions."

Interest will be paid monthly on the interest payment dates
beginning in October 2020. The rated notes pay interest equal to
daily Sterling Overnight Index Average plus a class-specific margin
with a further step up in margin following the optional call date
in October 2023. All of the notes reach legal final maturity in
September 2052. In S&P's analysis, it assumes that the call option
is not made.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's view of Optimum's
underwriting standards as well as the prior performance of its
originated loans, its assessment of the transaction's payment
structure and cash flow mechanics, and the results of our cash flow
analysis to assess whether the notes would be repaid under stressed
scenarios, among other factors. The preliminary ratings on the
class A and B notes address the timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal by legal final maturity and ultimate
payment of interest and principal on all other rated notes.

S&P said, "There are no rating constraints in the transaction under
our counterparty, operational risk, or structured finance sovereign
risk criteria. We consider the issuer to be bankruptcy remote.

"In our analysis, the class X-Dfrd notes are unable to withstand
the stresses that we apply at our 'B' rating level. However, we do
not consider that meeting the obligations of this class of notes is
reliant on favorable business, financial, and economic conditions.
Consequently, we have assigned a 'B- (sf)' rating to these notes in
line with our criteria."

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among
health experts is that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its
peak in some regions but will remain a threat until a vaccine or
effective treatment is widely available, which may not occur until
the second half of 2021. S&P said, "We are using this assumption in
assessing the economic and credit implications associated with the
pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions
and estimates accordingly."

  Ratings List

  Class     Prelim. rating
  A         AAA (sf)
  B         AA (sf)
  C-Dfrd    A+ (sf)
  D-Dfrd    BBB (sf)
  E-Dfrd    BB (sf)
  F-Dfrd    B (sf)
  G         NR
  H         NR
  X-Dfrd    B- (sf)

  NR--Not rated.
  TBD--To be determined.


GUSTO: Seeks Company Voluntary Arrangement to Help Pay Off Debts
----------------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Millard and Laura Onita at The Telegraph report that after
being hammered by the pandemic, Gusto Restaurants, which has 18
sites in the north and the Midlands, including in Liverpool,
Manchester and Birmingham, is applying for a creditors' voluntary
arrangement (CVA) to help it pay off debts.

The specifics of what Gusto is seeking through its CVA has not been
disclosed, The Telegraph notes.

According to The Telegraph, a spokesman for Gusto Italian said:
"The Covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on our
business, like many others in the hospitality sector.

"Following extensive consultation with advisors, it is clear that a
CVA offers the best solution for all of our stakeholders and would
secure the future of the business."

Gusto, whose high-profile clients have included Liverpool manager
Jurgen Klopp and footballer Wayne Rooney's wife Coleen, has been
owned since 2014 by the Manchester-based private equity group
Palatine.


INTU (SGS) FINANCE: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating on 3 Note Series
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its credit rating on Intu (SGS) Finance
PLC's series 1, 2, And 3 notes to 'D (sf)', following which S&P
assigned a 'B- (sf)' rating to the same notes based on their new
terms.

On Aug. 26, 2020, Intu (SGS) Finance received consent from the
noteholders in relation to some amendments to the notes. In
particular, on the payment date falling in September 2020, all
amounts of interest that would otherwise be payable on each series
of notes will be compounded with the outstanding principal amount
of the series of notes and, from that date, will form part of the
outstanding principal amount of that series of notes. Such amount
of interest will constitute a payment-in-kind (PIK) amount.

Under the notes' new terms, each PIK amount bears interest at the
notes' original interest rate plus 1%. Each PIK amount will be due
at maturity, unless an early termination date occurs before Dec.
31, 2020, in which case the PIK amount will be payable in March
2021.

S&P said, "We understand from the borrower that proceeds were
insufficient to make interest payment in full on the September 2020
payment date due to a spike in operational expenses (largely
resulting from the effects of COVID-19 on the shopping centers) and
insufficient rental collection.

"Following the breach of the rateable promise, and in application
of our "S&P Global Ratings Definitions," published Aug. 7, 2020, we
have lowered our ratings on the notes to 'D (sf)'."

In June 2020, the total market value of the four underlying
properties had fallen to GBP1,275.6 million, or a 29% decline
compared to the level in December 2019. As a result, the
loan-to-value ratio increased to approximately 100%.

Therefore, in S&P's analysis, the notes did not pass its 'B' rating
level stresses.

S&P said, "We applied our 'CCC' criteria to assess if either a
rating in the 'B-' or 'CCC' category would be appropriate. While we
recognize that the shopping center sector has faced an extreme
decline due to COVID-19, we have taken into consideration the legal
final maturity date of the notes, which is not before 2028 (for the
series 1 notes). We also believe that future liquidity risk is
mitigated by an additional liquidity facility of GBP30 million,
which will be available to support the transaction moving forward.
Therefore we do not believe that the notes are in immediate risk of
default, and we have assigned a 'B- (sf)' rating to the three
series of notes, based on their new terms."

Counterparty, operational, and legal risks are commensurate with
the ratings on the notes under our relevant criteria.

Intu (SGS) Finance is a debt platform with the flexibility to raise
various debt types secured on ring-fenced collateral. Intu (SGS)
Finco Ltd. (the borrower in the transaction) uses the proceeds of
its financing activities (whether through borrowing from the issuer
or through other forms of third-party debt) to make loans to
asset-owning companies within the security group (consisting of the
obligors and the borrower). The notes are secured by four shopping
centers located throughout the U.K.: intu Lakeside, intu Braehead,
intu Watford, and intu Victoria Centre. S&P's ratings on this
transaction address the timely payment of interest, payable
semiannually, and the payment of principal no later than the legal
final maturity dates, which are between March 2028 (series 1) and
September 2035 (series 3).

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic. The consensus among
health experts is that the pandemic may now be at, or near, its
peak in some regions, but will remain a threat until a vaccine or
effective treatment is widely available, which may not occur until
the second half of 2021. S&P said, "We are using this assumption in
assessing the economic and credit implications associated with the
pandemic. As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions
and estimates accordingly."

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors relevant to the
rating action:

-- Health and safety.


QUIZ: Reveals Locations of 11 Store Closures Under Pre-pack Deal
----------------------------------------------------------------
Kristy Dorsey at The Herald reports that fast fashion retailer Quiz
is set to close a further fifth of its bricks-and-mortar stores for
good after sales during the five months to the end of August
crashed by 77% amid the coronavirus pandemic.

According to The Herald, following a pre-pack administration in
June that resulted in the closure of 11 stores and more than 90 job
losses, AIM-listed Quiz said on Sept. 8 that it intends to close
around 15 more outlets.  It has confirmed the sites of 11 of the
new store closures, one of which is in Scotland, The Herald notes.

The 11 latest stores confirmed for closure are: Antrim, Ashton,
Ballymena, Bradford, Chester, Cork, Ipswich, Kirkcaldy, Oxford,
Taunton and Yeovil, The Herald discloses.

A spokesman for the company said Quiz averages about six employees
per shop, implying a further 90 job losses if the full lot of 15
closures takes place, The Herald relates.

The company has GBP6.1 million of available cash and GBP3.5 million
of bank facilities scheduled to expire on October 31, the latter of
which Quiz has said it intends to renew, The Herald notes.


RED ENSIGN: Rules Out Liquidation, Explores Various Options
-----------------------------------------------------------
Lucy Morgan at Isle of Wright County Press reports that Cowes-based
maritime training firm Red Ensign insists it has not fallen into
liquidation "at this time", however it says its directors are
"exploring various options".

The County Press has been told that one customer, who booked two
courses and paid in full, was advised to approach an insolvency
firm and stood to more than a thousand pounds.

In 2019, the firm entered into a Corporate Voluntary Arrangement
(CVA), which can be used to help manage debt and other financial
problems, The County Press recounts.

In a statement to the County Press -- also posted on its website --
Red Ensign said: "The company has not gone into liquidation.

"As is the case with many businesses the impact of Covid-19 has
been significant.  The cruise industry in particular has stalled
(the company's biggest clients) so this has resulted in a
significant loss of income.

"The directors are actively exploring various options and will
issue another statement in due course about the future of the
company."


ROLLS-ROYCE PLC: S&P Lowers ICR to 'BB-', On Watch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long- and short-term issuer credit
ratings on Rolls-Royce PLC to 'BB-/B' from 'BB/B' and placed them
on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic materially impacted
Rolls-Royce PLC's results in the six months to June 2020, and the
group's profitability and cash flows are materially weaker than our
previous expectations.   With the civil aerospace sector outlook
bleaker than it was at the time of S&P's last publication on
Rolls-Royce in May 2020, we have lowered our expectations for the
group in 2020 and 2021. The COVID-19 pandemic continues to
materially affect the group's civil aerospace business (51% of 2019
revenue), with flying hours and large engine deliveries down about
50% in the first half of the year, including a 75% reduction in
flying hours in the second quarter.

S&P said, "We recently updated our global air passenger traffic
forecasts to reflect the weaker outlook for the civil aerospace
sector. We now expect air passenger traffic to fall by as much as
60%-70% in 2020 versus 2019. This is weaker than the 50%-55% drop
we forecast at the end of May 2020. We also expect air passenger
traffic to decline 30%-40% in 2021 compared with the 2019 base, and
foresee a gradual recovery to pre-pandemic levels by 2024. We
expect that regional travel will recover more quickly than
international and long-haul travel, and that future demand for new
aircraft will be weighted toward narrow-body and single-aisle
aircraft, a subsegment in which Rolls-Royce is not present.
Rolls-Royce's management guides that the group is currently
outperforming the International Air Transport Association's
forecasts for revenue passenger kilometers, given the group's
favorable geographical mix, with a strong share in Asia, which has
recovered more quickly than Europe, and its relatively young and
efficient installed engine fleet. The latter reflects the attempts
by many airlines to prioritize the operation of their most
efficient aircraft. We note that Rolls-Royce is more sensitive to
flying hours than to how full the plane is, but the two are highly
correlated."

Airlines are in the process of restructuring and downsizing their
fleets to cope with the lower demand, and aircraft original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) Airbus and Boeing have cut their
aircraft production rates, with the deepest cuts made to wide-body
production. S&P said, "We forecast that Rolls-Royce will receive
less cash from flying hour invoices, exhibit lower engine sales,
and see subdued demand for aftermarket services through 2020 and
2021 at least. We note that there is a high correlation between the
performance of Rolls-Royce's civil aerospace business and its
aero-engine subsidiary ITP Aero, which has been affected by the
same adverse industry trends."

Rolls-Royce's management recently announced the group's financial
results for the six months ending June 2020. In S&P's previous base
case, it assumed very little in the way of write-downs,
impairments, one-off charges, or exceptional costs for the fiscal
year ending Dec. 31, 2020. However, in the six months to June 2020,
the group posted a number of impairments and write-downs (GBP1.1
billion), one-off charges in the civil aerospace division (GBP1.2
billion), and restructuring charges (GBP366 million), partly offset
by a GBP498 million exceptional credit on the Trent 1000 engine.
These charges--coupled with a GBP2.6 billion non-cash loss from the
revaluation of the group's foreign-exchange book--resulted in an
overall loss before tax of about GBP5.4 billion. As its
profitability came under pressure, the group also exhibited a
higher working capital-related cash outflow than we expected,
including a one-off GBP1.1 billion outflow from the cessation of
invoice discounting. This resulted in negative free cash flows of
about GBP2.8 billion for the first half of 2020.

Management's guidance is that Rolls-Royce will post negative free
cash flows of about GBP4 billion for the full-year 2020. Despite
ongoing progress in restructuring the business, lowering headcount
by approximately 9,000 employees, cutting capital expenditure
(capex), and consolidating production sites, this collapse in cash
flows and profitability (negative EBITDA in 2020) means that our
S&P Global Ratings-adjusted credit metrics for Rolls-Royce will be
effectively non-meaningful this fiscal year and severely depressed
in fiscal 2021. This underpins both the downgrade and our downward
revision of Rolls-Royce's financial risk profile to highly
leveraged from significant. S&P notes that management aims to
return the group to positive free cash flows in the second half of
2021, albeit with negative free cash flows for fiscal 2021 overall,
given the expectation of a tough first half of the year.

S&P said, "Proactive treasury management and new debt issuance
means that Rolls-Royce has bolstered its liquidity, but adjusted
debt is rising materially, and given the rate of cash burn we
expect through 2021, the group's deleveraging prospects are weaker
than we previously expected over our 12-month rating horizon.  
Since our last publication in May 2020, Rolls-Royce's adjusted debt
has risen steeply as management has sought and secured new sources
of funding." Rolls-Royce has issued about GBP4.8 billion of new
debt in the year to date, including fully drawing down its GBP2.5
billion revolving credit facility (RCF); securing GBP300 million of
Covid Corporate Financing Facility (CCFF) funding, maturing in
March 2021; and signing a new GBP2 billion term loan (80% backed by
the U.K. government), maturing in 2025, which the group plans to
draw down later in 2020. S&P said, "We forecast that Rolls-Royce's
adjusted debt will rise to about GBP6.6 billion by Dec. 31, 2020,
and rise again in 2021 as the group continues to burn cash. We net
almost all of Rolls-Royce's cash to arrive at our adjusted debt
figure, except for about GBP250 million that we consider
restricted."

The group also signed a new GBP1.9 billion RCF during the first
half of the year. This RCF is currently undrawn and matures in
October 2021. Rolls-Royce's adoption of International Financial
Reporting Standard 16 means that we add about GBP2.3 billion of
operating lease liabilities to arrive at our adjusted debt figure.
S&P said, "We previously added about GBP1.1 billion of factoring to
our adjusted debt figure, which Rolls-Royce disclosed in its 2019
results, but we will no longer make this adjustment in future as
Rolls-Royce has ceased using the facility. We also add modest
pension obligations of about GBP168 million on Dec. 31, 2019, and
the remaining balance of the Serious Fraud Office fines to be paid
in 2021."

S&P said, "We view Rolls-Royce's good cash balance of about GBP4.2
billion on June. 30, 2020, and extended debt maturity profile, as
supportive for the ratings. We expect that management will continue
to take proactive measures to reduce financial risk, including the
pre-financing of debt maturities well in advance. In our base case,
we believe that if Rolls-Royce does not seek to refinance the
GBP300 million CCFF and two bonds maturing within the next 12
months, it would likely draw on its GBP1.9 billion RCF during 2021.
As such, we consider it paramount that management continues to
refinance debt maturities proactively and extends or replaces the
GBP1.9 billion RCF. In our base case, we do not consider potential
disposal proceeds of up to GBP2 billion that the group is
envisaging in the near-to-medium term, as none of the disposals are
contracted yet. However, we note management's clear commitment to
proceeding with the disposals it announced at the time of the
first-half 2020 results.

"On the other hand, Rolls-Royce has good cash balances and a
proactive treasury policy, and our working assumption is that the
group will continue to refinance maturing debt and secure new
sources of funding. This, coupled with management's ongoing efforts
to right-size the business and return it to positive free cash
flows by the second half of 2021, is why we apply a positive
comparable ratings analysis modifier. We note positively that
Rolls-Royce's management is already adept at operating in adverse
conditions because it has had to prepare to navigate the business
through a potential no-deal Brexit and remediate problems with the
Trent 1000 engine."

Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors relevant to the
rating action:

-- Health and safety

S&P Global Ratings acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty about
the rate of spread and peak of the coronavirus outbreak. Some
government authorities estimate the pandemic will peak about
midyear, and we are using this assumption in assessing the economic
and credit implications. S&P said, "We believe the measures adopted
to contain COVID-19 have pushed the global economy into recession.
As the situation evolves, we will update our assumptions and
estimates accordingly."


TATA STEEL: European Arm Expresses Going Concern Doubt Amid Covid19
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Pooler at The Financial Times reports that Tata Steel's
European arm has warned that the coronavirus crisis could threaten
its ability to carry on operating, after sinking deeper into the
red even before the full impact of the viral outbreak.

According to the FT, accounts for the continent's third-largest
steelmaker published at Companies House showed a pre-tax loss of
GBP857 million before one-off items in the 12 months ending on
March 31, compared with a deficit of GBP146 million the previous
year.

The Indian-owned manufacturer's annual report said it was confident
it had access to adequate liquidity and resources to keep operating
"for the foreseeable future", the FT relates.

But it cautioned there was "material uncertainty" from the pandemic
on its future funding requirements, which "may cast significant
doubt" on its ability to continue as a going concern, the FT
notes.

The stark message will fuel concern among the 20,000-strong
workforce at Tata Steel Europe, which runs the UK's biggest
steelworks at Port Talbot and a handful of smaller factories across
the country, as well as a large plant in the Netherlands, the FT
states.

Rescue talks that may have led to British taxpayers owning stakes
in both Tata's UK steel operations, which have failed to break even
for a decade, and its carmaking unit Jaguar Land Rover recently
stalled, the FT relays.

However, both businesses have remained in discussions over other
potential forms of assistance, according to the FT.

Europe's steel producers were already buckling under a market
downturn before the arrival of coronavirus, which further sapped
demand as car factories and building sites temporarily closed, the
FT recounts.

Tata Steel, as cited by the FT, said that its accounts were "signed
by its directors and confirmed by its independent auditors, PWC".


WILD BY TART: Seeks CVA to Alleviate Cashflow Pressures
-------------------------------------------------------
Rachel Millard and Laura Onita at The Telegraph report that two
restaurant outlets favoured by footballers and celebrities are the
latest to start restructuring proceedings after being hammered by
the pandemic.  They are Wild by Tart and Gusto.

London-based restaurant Wild by Tart, set up by friends Jemima
Jones and Lucy Carr-Ellison, is seeking a creditors' voluntary
arrangement (CVA) to alleviate cashflow pressures.  The founders
set up their own catering business in 2012, and were employed by
the likes of Kate Moss, Sienna Miller, Cara Delevingne, Gisele
Bundchen and Eddie Redmayne.

On the other hand, for the year ending March 31, 2019, the latest
accounts available, Gusto made a profit of GBP138,000 on turnover
of GBP32.3 million, despite costs pressures from wage increases and
business rates, The Telegraph discloses.

Like others restaurants, it has struggled to recover from the
coronavirus lockdown which saw restaurants forced to close for more
than three months from late March, The Telegraph states.

The specifics of what Wild by Tart is seeking through its CVA has
not been disclosed, The Telegraph notes.

According to The Telegraph, Wild by Tart said: "The CVA has been
proposed as a consequence of Covid 19, and is part of a wider plan
which will allow us to bring fresh funding into the business,
alleviate cashflow pressures, protect jobs and ensure we are in a
strong position to meet the challenges ahead in these uncertain
times."     



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2020.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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