---

       T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                          E U R O P E

          Tuesday, April 9, 2019, Vol. 20, No. 71

                           Headlines



B E L A R U S

BELARUS: S&P Affirms B/B Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable


F R A N C E

ELIS SA: Fitch Rates Proposed EUR500MM Senior Unsec. Notes 'BB'
ELIS SA: S&P Rates EUR500MM Sr. Unsecured Fixed-Rate Notes 'BB+'


I C E L A N D

WOW AIR: Collapse to Cause Losses in Iceland's Banking System


I T A L Y

ROBERTO CAVALLI: Three Investors Eye Possible Bid for Business
TELECOM ITALIA: Fitch Lowers Ratings to BB+, Outlook Stable
[*] ITALY: Investors to Get Compensation Under New Bail-in Rules


L U X E M B O U R G

BL CONSUMER: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
FAGE INT'L: S&P Cuts ICR to B+ on Declining Credit Metrics


N E T H E R L A N D S

STEINHOFF INT'L: Delays Publication of 2017-2018 Audited Earnings


S P A I N

BBVA CONSUMO 8: Moody's Hikes Class B Notes Rating to 'Ba1'


U K R A I N E

NJSC NAFTOGAZ: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DEBENHAMS PLC: Mike Ashley Accuses Board of "Falsehoods, Denials"
INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL: Fitch Alters Outlook on 'BB' IDR to Stable

                           - - - - -


=============
B E L A R U S
=============

BELARUS: S&P Affirms B/B Sovereign Credit Ratings, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings, on April 5, 2019, affirmed its 'B/B' long- and
short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings on
Belarus. The outlook remains stable.

OUTLOOK

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that
Belarus' external imbalances will not escalate while its fiscal
stance remains comparatively tight over the next 12 months, and
that the government will retain access to international capital
markets and support from Russia to refinance upcoming public debt
redemptions.

"We could consider lowering the ratings if a worsening of relations
with Russia threatened the government's refinancing plans. We could
also lower the ratings if contingent fiscal risks from the banking
or public enterprise sectors were to crystalize on the sovereign
balance sheet at higher levels than we expect.

"We could raise the ratings if Belarus' growth prospects--which we
currently view as modest compared with other countries' at a
similar level of economic development--improved. This could be the
case, for instance, if the authorities implemented a credible
reform program that improved the business environment, facilitated
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, and ultimately fostered
the development of a competitive domestic private sector. We could
also raise our ratings if financial sector's dollarization reduces
further from the presently elevated levels, among the highest in
the Commonwealth of Independent States."

RATIONALE

S&P said, "Our ratings on Belarus remain supported by the financial
assistance it receives from the Russian government, despite
recurring disputes between the two countries. The ratings are also
supported by what we view as improved macroeconomic policymaking in
recent years. We consider that this has helped to slow down the
pace of public debt accumulation and bring persistently high
inflation under control."

The sovereign ratings are constrained by Belarus' low institutional
effectiveness; vulnerable fiscal and balance-of-payments positions;
substantial off-balance-sheet expenditure; and, despite recent
improvements, the still-limited flexibility and effectiveness of
monetary policy.

Although economic performance has strengthened following the
recession in 2015-2016, the country's headline growth rates remain
below those of countries at a comparable level of economic
development.

Institutional and Economic Profile: Moderating economic growth and
risks from Russia's tax maneuver

-- S&P expects Belarus' economic growth to moderate to an average
of 2% over our forecast horizon through 2022.

-- Downside risks to growth remain, particularly if Russia
implements its planned tax maneuver without compensating Belarus
for lost revenues.

-- Domestic institutions remain weak. Power is highly centralized
and there are limited checks and balances between various state
bodies.

Since the beginning of 2017, the economy of Belarus has continued
to recuperate from the recession experienced over 2015-2016.
Estimates by the country's statistical office put full-year 2018
growth at 3%, largely in line with our previous forecasts. S&P
estimates that both domestic demand and favorable external
conditions underpinned this outcome.

However, economic expansion is decelerating. S&P estimates that in
year-on-year terms growth has steadily declined to less than 1% in
fourth-quarter 2018 from over 5% in the first quarter. This dynamic
has continued into 2019, with output increasing by only 0.8% over
the first two months of the year. The outcome is partially
explained by the weak performance of the agricultural sector in the
summer of 2018 due to poor weather conditions as well as base
effects.

S&P said, "More broadly, we believe that growth observed over the
past two years is largely cyclical in nature. We estimate that in
real terms output will this year reach the pre-recession peak
registered in 2014 and then moderate. We forecast that over the
medium term Belarus' expansion will average 2% annually, which
aligns with International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates of the
country's potential growth." S&P's forecast is based on several
assumptions:

-- Although they remain favorable, foreign trade conditions will
likely weaken. S&P expects growth in Russia will moderate to 1.5%
in 2019 from 2.3% in 2018, and slow to 1.5% in the EU from 2.0%.
Russia and EU remain Belarus' key trading partners and together
account for an estimated 70% of exported goods.

-- Several domestic structural factors continue to constrain
Belarus' growth potential. The state maintains a pervasive role in
the economy, with the IMF estimating that close to half of
employment and value-added pertains to the public sector. This
underpins the existence of a multitude of nonviable state entities,
which S&P understands remain loss-making but are difficult to
reform for political reasons.

-- It is unlikely that foreign investment will spur economic
growth in Belarus at this stage, given the perceived risky
operating environment. Although net FDI has consistently exceeded
2% of GDP in recent years, much of it reflects reinvested earnings
rather than the entrance of new overseas players. Absent additional
reform, S&P expects this will remain the case. Belarus' aging
population and weak population growth also limit potential growth.


The domestic IT sector remains a bright spot. High frequency
indicators suggest that value added in information and
communication increased by about 10% over the first three quarters
of 2018, surpassing the developments in all other sectors of the
domestic economy. S&P believes that Belarus' low unit labor costs,
convenient location, and comparatively strong educational outcomes
underpin this trend. Several successful start-ups have emerged in
Belarus in recent years. That said, the sector currently represents
about 5% of the country's GDP and is unlikely to be a growth
locomotive on its own.

At present, S&P sees two main risks to our macroeconomic outlook.
The first one pertains to the cycle of commodity prices, on which
Belarus remains dependent despite diversification in recent years.
Mineral products and chemical industry production account for
almost 50% of exports, directly exposing the sovereign to price
fluctuations. Moreover, many noncommodity export items--such as
agricultural products, machinery and equipment, and transport
vehicles--are sold to the Russian market, where demand remains
sensitive to oil price swings.

The second risk pertains to Belarus' relations with Russia. Over
40% of Belarus' government debt is to Russia, and Russia's past
willingness to extend bilateral financing to Belarus has been an
important factor enabling Belarus to meet its financial obligations
on time and in full. Beyond direct financing, Russia has also
indirectly supported Belarus by supplying oil and gas at
below-the-market prices.  

The future of this subsidized supply of hydrocarbons from Russia to
Belarus is currently uncertain. Russia is implementing the
so-called tax maneuver under which it would effectively replace the
customs duty it places on its oil exports with a tax on extraction,
which would erode some of Belarus' revenue. Previously oil from
Russia was supplied to Belarus free of the export duty. Belarus in
turn refined the oil and exported it further to Europe, imposing
its own export duty and keeping the proceeds. Under the ongoing tax
maneuver in Russia, the Russian oil export duty is set to gradually
decline to 0% by 2024 and be replaced by Russian domestic mineral
extraction tax. The maneuver means that--absent compensation from
Russia--Belarus will de facto be importing oil at world market
prices by 2024.

Officially, the change is not directed against Belarus, which
expects compensation for the adverse impact. However, S&P
understands that the negotiations on the topic are ongoing and a
compensation mechanism is unlikely to be in place in the short
term. The authorities estimate that, without compensation, the
negative impact (directly on the budget as well as accounting for
the losses of domestic refineries) amounts to about 18% of 2019 GDP
(or $10.6 billion based on an oil price of $70 per barrel), but
spread through 2024. Positively, the government's fiscal planning
does not assume any compensation in the short term, and S&P
understands there are some contingency plans in case the
compensation is delayed.

In S&P's current forecast, it assumes that a compensation mechanism
will ultimately be put in place. If that does not happen, Belarus'
economic dynamics will likely be weaker. Under such a scenario,
Belarus' fiscal revenues will come under pressure and a series of
compensatory measures would be needed, including a hike in prices
for domestic consumers. This, in turn, will divert budgetary
resources from other uses, such as investments, as well as pressure
domestic incomes by weighing on consumption.

There are, however, signs that Russia is willing to continue
providing financial support to Belarus. For example, in early April
2019, the Russian Finance Minister announced a new bilateral loan
of $600 million (1% of Belarus' GDP) from Russia to Belarus to help
finance the latter's other upcoming debt maturities.

Belarus' institutional effectiveness remains weak; President
Alexander Lukashenko controls the government's branches of power.
Highly centralized power makes policymaking difficult to predict,
and S&P believes there are only limited checks and balances in
place between various state institutions. Belarus is due to hold
presidential elections in 2020, but it does not anticipate any
major changes in domestic political arrangements in the aftermath.
That said, S&P believes that broad economic policymaking in Belarus
has continued to improve in recent years.

Flexibility and Performance Profile: Monetary and fiscal policies
have improved, but weak balance of payments remains a key risk

-- The monetary policy framework has improved, with inflation
falling below 5% in 2018 for the first time in the country's
post-Soviet history.

-- The authorities have taken steps to reduce fiscal risks, but
these remain elevated.

-- Balance-of-payments vulnerabilities still constrain the
sovereign ratings.

In recent years, Belarus' monetary policy framework has improved.
S&P views the Belarusian ruble as largely floating though still
subject to occasional interventions in the foreign exchange market.
Most of the restrictions on operations with foreign currency,
including the mandatory repatriation of foreign currency earnings,
have been relaxed.

The authorities have reduced directed lending via state-controlled
commercial banks. The National Bank of the Republic of Belarus
(NBRB, the central bank) has also abandoned the monetization of
fiscal expenditures, which led to hyperinflation over 2011-2012.
The central bank's main focus is on the broad money supply, which
is its intermediate monetary target. Its medium-term goal is to
move to full inflation targeting. In our view, it has already made
important progress toward this goal. For example, in 2018,
inflation fell below 5% for the first time in Belarus' post-Soviet
history, against an NBRB target of "no more than 5%."

That said, substantial constraints on monetary policy remain. In
our view, the NBRB lacks the independence to make key decisions
regarding its policy direction. The weak position of the banking
system, very high deposit and loan dollarization (well above 50%),
and underdeveloped domestic capital market in local currency also
inhibit the monetary transmission channel. Even domestic public
debt is predominantly denominated in foreign currencies.

Alongside monetary policy, S&P notes some improvements in Belarus'
fiscal policy. The general government budget has historically been
in surplus, masking below-the-line, off-balance-sheet activities.
These, combined with weakening exchange rates, inflated debt levels
to an estimated 41% of GDP at the end of 2018, from about 25% in
2012. Over the past two years, the authorities have put increasing
emphasis on arresting the continued rise in public leverage.
Specific measures include raising the previously subsidized utility
tariffs to cost recovery levels, limiting the amount of extended
guarantees, and prioritizing investment projects to reduce external
borrowing.

S&P said, "We estimate that last year's general government surplus
amounted to 4.2% of GDP, above our previous 3% forecast. The
outcome has been partially bolstered by favorable oil prices, which
led to a larger transfer from the Russian budget in relation to oil
re-exports. We expect oil prices to weaken and that pressure to
increase spending will intensify, given the presidential elections
due to be held in 2020. Combined with slowing economic growth, we
anticipate budgetary performance will deteriorate, but still expect
Belarus to post a general government surplus of 1.5% of GDP on
average annually in 2019-2022."

However, multiple fiscal risks to the current baseline remain,
specifically:

-- Disagreements between Belarus and Russia on the terms of oil
and gas supplies could hurt Belarus' budget revenues. So far no
decision has been reached between the two countries on compensating
Belarus for the adverse impact of the tax maneuver on revenues.
According to the authorities, the direct budget losses from this
are, on average, close to 1% of GDP a year. Belarus may also have
to use its budget to compensate the oil processing companies for
the higher extraction costs. Belarus is also due to start
negotiations on the terms of future gas supplies from Russia, which
presents risks if the agreed price is higher than the existing
subsidized one.   

-- Off-budget operations continue. For instance, the cost of
construction of the new nuclear power plant has been booked below
the line, so that official statistics on consolidated budgetary
performance exclude this expenditure. The authorities estimate the
plant's total cost at $7 billion (12% of 2018 GDP). It is primarily
financed by a bilateral loan from Russia, which can be drawn on up
to $10 billion. S&P said "Our forecast of Belarus' general
government debt includes the construction cost of the nuclear power
plant; this is why we forecast rising public leverage, even though
Belarus is reporting headline surpluses. We see risks stemming from
the project, given that several EU countries have announced that
they do not intend to buy electricity generated by the plant. This
could make it more difficult to service the underlying loan.
Because there have been some delays in construction on the Russian
side, we understand that the two governments could renegotiate the
loan conditions to prolong its maturity."

-- Contingent liability risks could materialize in the banking
system. During 2015 and 2016, the government cleaned up the balance
sheets of several banks by swapping nonperforming loans in the wood
processing and agricultural sectors for central and local
government bonds. In S&P's view, the strained domestic banking
system still poses a moderate contingent liability for the
government, which may need to clean up the balance sheets of more
banks in the future. Any potential clean-up would most likely be
related to government-owned bank exposure to state-owned
enterprises, many of which are burdened by legacy debt and make
losses.

-- The unfavorable structure of Belarus' public debt exposes the
country to currency risks. S&P estimates that about 95% of debt is
foreign currency-denominated and characterized by a heavy repayment
profile.

Belarus' balance of payments vulnerabilities continue to constrain
the sovereign ratings. Although current account deficits have
moderated over the last four years, averaging about 2% of GDP, the
stock of accumulated external debt remains high at around 65% of
GDP at the end of last year. Moreover, the majority of this debt in
both the public and private sector is characterized by a heavy
repayment profile, and thus remains subject to rollover risks. In
the future, Belarus will remain reliant on lending from Russia to
refinance foreign debt coming due, which presents risks if
bilateral relations deteriorate.

S&P said, "In our view, Belarus' foreign exchange reserves remain
modest in relation to the stock and profile of country's external
debt. We estimate that--excluding the NBRB's foreign exchange (FX)
liabilities to private-sector domestic residents such as reserve
requirements on banks' FX deposits and domestic FX bonds--net
foreign exchange reserves amounted to about $4.5 billion against
estimated total external debt of around $18 billion that needs to
be rolled over in the coming 12 months. We understand that these
reserve levels remain below the IMF recommended levels.

"Positively, we believe that the quality of FX reserves has
continued to improve over the last 12 months. Although the gross
headline level has remained broadly constant at close to $7.1
billion, the central bank's FX liabilities to residents have
reduced. We expect this process to continue over the next two
years.

“In our view, there has also been some diversification in the
structure of Belarus' exports. IT and communication services have
been steadily expanding in recent years. This has provided a new
source of FX revenues contributing about 0.5% of GDP annually.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology
applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that
the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary
analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient
for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the
primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The
views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in
the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating
factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action.


  RATINGS LIST
  Ratings Affirmed

  Belarus
   Sovereign Credit Rating                B/Stable/B
   Transfer & Convertibility Assessment   B
   Senior Unsecured                       B




===========
F R A N C E
===========

ELIS SA: Fitch Rates Proposed EUR500MM Senior Unsec. Notes 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Elis SA's (Elis) 1.75% EUR500 million
notes due 2024 a senior unsecured rating of 'BB'. This follows the
review of the notes' term sheet as well as the prospectus of the
EUR3 billion EMTN programme. Elis intends to use the proceeds from
the new issue to repay part of its 3% EUR800 million notes due
2022.

The notes are rated at the same level as Elis's 'BB' IDR. The notes
are issued under the EUR3 billion EMTN programme, they are
unsecured obligations of Elis and guaranteed by M.A.J., the group's
main operating subsidiary, which owns most of the other operating
subsidiaries and acts as head of the group's cash pooling
structure. The notes rank pari passu with all other unsubordinated,
unsecured indebtedness of Elis.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher-Than-Expected Leverage: Higher cash outflows during the past
18 months, following the acquisition of Berendsen, as well as
pressure on underlying profitability, has led to a delayed
deleveraging path than originally expected. Fitch's previous rating
case had assumed that Elis would deleverage to below 5x funds from
operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage from 2019 (2018: 7.4x
estimated). Fitch now expects that such deleveraging to be delayed
by more than two years. Fitch's leverage computation reflects linen
costs, which are expensed rather than capitalised, given its
relatively short average economic life. This lowers EBITDA and FFO
as captured in its adjustments to financial ratios.

Financial Flexibility Remains Solid: Fitch continues to see
deleveraging capacity over the coming years, with FFO adjusted
gross leverage expected to trend towards 5x by FY22, although the
company has not made any public statement regarding a precise
deleveraging commitment. Despite high leverages, Fitch acknowledges
that financial flexibility, including liquidity profile, access to
diversified funding sources, and projected FFO fixed charge cover
of 4.5x- 5.0x are solid for the rating.

Strong Business Profile: The rating reflects Elis's market
leadership in rental services of flat linen, work clothes, hygiene,
and well-being equipment in most of their markets. The company
shows a geographically diversified profile, and also benefits from
a high visibility of revenue from medium-term contracts with a high
renewal rate (95%). Fitch believes this strong business profile
could be a key success factor when negotiating contract terms with
customers, especially during 2019, when further labor cost
pressures are expected. Furthermore, the integration of bolt-on
acquisitions should lead to improvements in Elis's market position
and pricing power, which are key differentiators to competitors.

High Profitability under Pressure: In recent months, Elis has
improved its profitability, mainly due to the impact of synergies
from the Berendsen acquisition and pricing measures taken in the
UK. However, overall underlying profitability had been under
pressure during 2017 and 2018 and Fitch expects no meaningful
improvement in profitability this year under a tougher cost
environment. The latter is due to significant increase of minimum
wages across Europe as well as higher energy prices.

Lower Execution Risk: Execution risk has declined with the near
completion of full integration of Berendsen. With the acquisition
of Berendsen, Elis has doubled its size and strengthened its
business profile, which has also led Elis to assess certain risks
arising from the integration, especially in countries with overlap.
The company expects 90% of the total synergies to be achieved
during 2019. In addition, Elis's recent M&A activity does not
entail major execution risks as these are mainly bolt-on small
acquisitions in under-penetrated regions to strengthen the
company's position. Elis has not provided guidance on the
possibility of larger acquisitions.

Strong Free Cash Flow Generation: Fitch believes Elis is in a
better position to considerably improve their FCF generation from
2019 onwards due to normalised capex after integrating Berendsen,
and despite cost pressures. Fitch expects that industrial capex
will continue to be high at 7.3% of sales (excluding purchase of
linen) before decreasing towards 5.7% - 6% over the next four years
. Assuming stable operating and market conditions, the company
should be able to continue generating FCF at above 6% of sales from
2020, allowingt swifter deleveraging. Future clarity on further M&A
appetite and its funding will therefore be important to ascertain
Elis's willingness to manage the business with a more conservative
balance sheet that is consistent with a higher rating.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Elis is one of the leading providers of flat linen globally. The
group benefits from a leading position in most of the European
countries, and has also an important market position in Brazil and
other fast-growing countries in Latam. Even though Elis has higher
leverage than Elior SA (BB/Stable), another French business
services provider, it is rated at the same level due to the
former's better business profile with better diversification and
market positions in their respective segments. However, the
business profile is still much weaker than Compass Group plc's
(A-/Stable) and Sodexo S.A.'s, which provide contract catering
services globally, and also have stronger financial profiles.

Fitch views Elior's and Elis's financial profiles as comparable,
with higher leverage for Elis but also higher profitability and
significantly better FFO fixed charge coverage. Fitch also views
geographic diversification as other differentiating characteristic
between Elis and Elior. Elior has a larger concentration in France.
Elis's diversification has improved considerably after the
Berendsen acquisition.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer:

  - Organic growth of 2.6% in 2019, and trending towards 2.4% over
2020-22

  - EBITDA margin (after reclassification of linen investments as
operating costs) improving to over 20% by 2022.

  - Capex intensity in 2019 unchanged at 7.3%, before declining to
5.7% in 2020 following end of Berendsen integration.

  - Dividends stable at roughly EUR81 million per annum for 2019.

  - Some annual outflows of EUR70 million for bolt-on
acquisitions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - Steady operating performance and full integration synergies
resulting in FFO margin above 16% (2018: 13.7%).

  - More clarity on the group's financial policy and goals
including specific deleveraging targets and future acquisition
strategy.

  - FFO adjusted gross leverage (excluding purchase of linen) below
5x or FFO adjusted net leverage below 4.5x on a sustained basis.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - Evidence of increased costs and/or operating underperformance
leading to FFO margin below 14%.

  - FCF margin below 5%, limiting future deleveraging capacity.

  - FFO adjusted gross leverage remaining above 5.5x (excluding
purchase of linen) or FFO adjusted net leverage above 5.0x by
2021.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Healthy Liquidity: At end-2018, Elis had unrestricted cash of
EUR187 million. Additionally, it had access to EUR930 million
undrawn committed bank facilities, EUR30 million of which mature in
2020, EUR500 million in 2022 and EUR400 million in 2023. The
calendar for debt maturities is manageable, with only EUR500
million NEU CP maturing in the short term (EUR413 million drawn as
of December 31, 2018, an instrument which is typically rolled over
on an annual basis, but uncommitted.


ELIS SA: S&P Rates EUR500MM Sr. Unsecured Fixed-Rate Notes 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had assigned its 'BB+' issue rating
to Elis S.A.'s proposed EUR500 million senior unsecured fixed-rate
notes, which will rank pari passu with Elis' other senior unsecured
debt. The notes will be issued out of Elis' EUR3 billion euro
medium-term note program.

Textile and appliance rental services provider Elis S.A.
(BB+/Stable/--) will be the issuing entity. M.A.J., the group's
main French operating subsidiary, will guarantee the notes. S&P
expects the proceeds will be used to refinance existing debt.

S&P's 'BB+' ratings reflect Elis' leading market position in Europe
as a provider of textile and appliance rental services. Elis' S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA was about 3.8x on Dec. 31,
2018 (including its recent acquisitions). The ratings also consider
Elis' relatively weak free cash flow generation over the past two
years. After acquiring textile maintenance services provider
Berendsen in 2017, Elis made sizable capital expenditure
investments in the company. These have weighed on free cash flow,
which was negative in 2017 and less than 5% of adjusted debt in
2018.




=============
I C E L A N D
=============

WOW AIR: Collapse to Cause Losses in Iceland's Banking System
-------------------------------------------------------------
Teis Jensen at Reuters reports that the central bank said in a
Financial Stability report on April 4 the collapse of Iceland's
budget airline WOW Air last month will cause some losses in the
banking system but the direct impact on the country's systemically
important lenders will be limited.

"The shocks that have struck recently are highly unlikely under
current conditions to jeopardize the stability of the financial
system," Reuters quotes the central bank as saying.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 29,
2019, The Scotsman related that WOW Air has grounded all of its
flights on March 28 as the airline announces it is ceasing
operations.  According to The Scotsman, the low-cost Icelandic
carrier has been battling with debts after an attempt to rescue it
fell through.





=========
I T A L Y
=========

ROBERTO CAVALLI: Three Investors Eye Possible Bid for Business
--------------------------------------------------------------
Claudia Cristoferi at Reuters reports that three investors
including Italian fashion entrepreneur Renzo Rosso are eyeing a
possible bid for luxury label Roberto Cavalli, according to a
document filed by the company with a court in Milan as it seeks
breathing space from creditors.

According to Reuters, the fashion company on April 1 filed a
request with a bankruptcy court for 120 days of protection from
creditors to reach an agreement on its debt and find a new
investor, after it struggled to reboot sales and faced a cash
crunch.

Cavalli, a red carpet favorite famed for its animal prints, has
been 90% owned by private equity firm Clessidra since 2015, and the
group attempted to overhaul the label including with a new manager
and designer, Reuters recounts.

But it has posted a string of losses since 2014, with the exception
of 2015, when it was back in profit after the sale of a property in
Paris, Reuters states.

Clessidra hired Rothschild in September to find a new investor to
provide the group "with the needed resources to overcome the
difficult situation and to relaunch the business", and it also
subscribed to a EUR15 million (US$17 million) capital increase in
2018, the document seen by Reuters showed.

But the private equity investor rejected a request by Cavalli's
board in March this year to pump another EUR47 million into the
company, Reuters relays, citing the court filing.

According to a source close to the situation, the fund through
which Clessidra owns Cavalli has reached its statutory limit of
investment, Reuters notes.

The document revealed out of 80 potential investors contacted by
Rothschild, three expressed interest in buying the company as a
whole, Reuters discloses.


TELECOM ITALIA: Fitch Lowers Ratings to BB+, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Telecom Italia S.p.A (TI) to 'BB+'.

The downgrade reflects the breach of Fitch's funds from operations
(FFO)-adjusted net leverage threshold for a 'BBB-' rating with 4.7x
at end-2018 and its view that it is unlikely to fall sufficiently
below the threshold within the next two to three years on an
organic basis alone.

The breach was primarily driven by spectrum costs and
lower-than-expected free cash flow (FCF) generation. TI's funds
from operations (FFO) in 2018 was around 10% lower than expected.
Competitive pressures on EBITDA, ongoing restructuring costs and
negative working capital requirements are likely to constrain the
company's organic deleveraging capacity over the next two to three
years.

Fitch is also revising the FFO adjusted net leverage threshold for
achieving an investment grade rating to 4.0x from 4.2x. The new
level incorporates a more cautious approach to market structure
changes resulting from sustained higher competition in mobile
services and the potential competitive impact from wholesale local
access competition in Italy.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Higher- than- Expected Leverage: TI's FFO adjusted net leverage at
end-2018 was 4.7x and higher than Fitch's expectations of 4.2x. The
largest portion of the variance was driven by lower EBITDA, other
items before FFO and negative changes in working capital. Fitch's
base case forecasts envisage that FFO adjusted net leverage will
decline to 4.3x in 2019 and 4.2x in 2020. The pace of decline over
this period is likely to be constrained by EBITDA weakness,
restructuring costs and further requirements for working capital.
Fitch expects these factors to improve in 2020 and 2021, enabling
TI to improve its FCF generation and prepare for its EUR1.7 billion
final 5G spectrum payment in 2022.

Changing Market Structure: TI has traditionally benefited from a
0.2x higher FFO net adjusted leverage threshold within its rating
compared with its peers as a result of limited alternative local
access infrastructure within its footprint. The continued
deployment of access infrastructure by Open Fiber will gradually
change this while competition from new mobile operator Iliad may
start adding pressure to prices in mobile services again. As a
result, Fitch is tightening the FFO adjusted net leverage threshold
for achieving a 'BBB-' rating to 4.0x from 4.2x to reflect higher
cash flow risk. The new level is broadly in line with that of other
western European incumbent peers with a predominantly domestic
market exposure.

Mobile Competition Phase Two: Iliad entered the Italian mobile
market in 2Q18 and gained 2.8 million subscribers in its first
seven months of operations, representing an estimated market share
of around 3% by end-2018. The pace of Iliad's growth is likely to
slow further this year, after more than halving in 4Q18. However,
the competitive pressures exerted by the new entrant will remain a
structural feature of the market as Iliad is far from achieving a
sufficient level of scale to underpin a sustainable business model.
The process of achieving scale may drive a contraction in total
market mobile service revenue over the next three years and reduce
the opportunities for data monetisation.

TI should be able to manage a scenario where Iliad gradually builds
its market share. This reflects the company's scope to reduce
costs, its limited contribution from domestic mobile services,
which account for 27% of total group revenue (2018), positioning in
higher-value segments and the targeting of more price-sensitive
segments through alternative brands. A more rapid and aggressive
growth profile by Iliad may not provide sufficient time for TI to
reap the results of its cost reduction measures in the interim.

Open Fiber Creates Uncertainty: The deployment of alternative local
access fixed-line infrastructure is a medium-term threat for TI,
which derives around 55% of revenue (2018) from domestic fixed-line
services including wholesale. The gradual pace of Open Fibre's
network deployment, upgrade to fibre-based products and continued
growth in the Italian broadband market maybe shielding the pressure
on TI's financial metrics. Fitch believes this is likely to
continue over the next 12 to 24 months. The medium-term impact on
TI will depend on the extent of retail and wholesale market share
loss, the impact of wholesale competition on retail prices and the
extent to which TI can realign its cost structure.

Cost-Reduction Opportunity Vital: TI has significant scope to
improve its cost structure through a combination of digitalisation
and simplification of its operational processes and the transition
towards a network-as-a-service. Around 60% of TI's 2018 domestic
opex base could be improved in this regard. Fitch's base case
forecasts assume domestic EBITDA margins will decline in 2019 by 1
pp and then gradually improve to around 43% over a two-to-three
year period. This is lower than forecast implied by management
guidance. Fitch's cautious approach reflects uncertainty on the
medium-term competitive dynamics and the extent to which TI will
need to reinvest its cost savings to support revenue.

Strong Domestic Position: TI has a leading position in the Italian
telecoms market with a market share in fixed broadband and mobile
of around 45% and 31% respectively. The company is well-positioned
across business, consumer and wholesale market segments and
provides convergent- based products and services through a premium
strategy approach. Low broadband and pay-TV penetration than other
major market in Europe provides growth opportunities that are
enabling TI to offset some revenue decline in traditional services,
which are subject to long-term structural pressure.

Network-Sharing Operationally Supportive: TI announced that it
intends to enter into a network-sharing partnership with Vodafone
Italia. The partnership would involve combining their passive tower
infrastructure into a single entity while seeking to share active
elements in 5G. If approved, Fitch views the deal as supportive to
TI's operating profile in the medium-term, enabling TI to save
capex while deploying better 5G coverage. The financial impact of
the partnership will depend on the final form of the deal.

Corporate Governance Positive Steps: The conflict between TI's two
key shareholders, Vivendi and funds managed by Elliot Investors has
been a concern for TI's rating to the extent that it detracts from
the deployment of a coherent strategy and impacts the pace at which
the company improves its cost structure. Fitch will continue to
monitor developments, however recent moves by Vivendi to withdraw
its proposal to revoke and replace five of TI's board members at
the last AGM indicates that a more workable relationship between
the two key shareholders is evolving.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

TI has a strong domestic position, which underpins its credit
profile. The company is rated in line with its western European
incumbent telecom peers that have a similar predominant single
market focus such as BT Plc (BBB/Stable) and Royal KPN NV
(BBB/Stable). TI's lower rating reflects the company's higher
leverage and restrained organic deleveraging capacity. Higher rated
peers such as Deutsche Telekom AG (BBB+/Stable) and Orange SA
(BBB+/Stable) have greater diversification, lower leverage and / or
greater organic deleveraging capacity.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  - Revenue decline in Italy of 2% in 2019 and around 1% per year
from 2020;

  - Revenue growth in Brazil of 4% and 2% in 2019 and 2020
respectively. With a gradual EBITDA margin improvement to around
40% over the same period from 38% in 2018;

  - Group EBITDA margins around 42% in 2019 gradually improving to
43% by 2021;

  - Capex-to-sales ratio (excluding spectrum) of 21% in 2019 and
remaining broadly stable thereafter; and

  - EUR286 million dividends per year in 2019-2021, including the
savings shares and Inwit ordinary distribution to minorities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - FFO adjusted net leverage below 4.0x on a sustained basis.

  - Sustained improvement in domestic and fixed and mobile
operations driving a stabilisation in EBITDA and improvement in
organic deleveraging capacity.

  - Demonstrated ability to manage the impact from increasing
competition in its domestic market.

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - FFO adjusted net leverage above 4.5x on a sustained basis.

  - Tangible worsening of operating conditions or the regulatory
environment leading to expectations of materially weaker FCF
generation.

  - Sustained pressure from an aggressive entry of Iliad to the
mobile market or signs of a tangibly more competitive fixed-line or
convergent environment.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Strong Liquidity: TI has a strong liquidity profile with EUR3
billion of cash and equivalents at end-2018 and EUR5 billion of an
available undrawn revolving credit facility due in 2023. The
company's debt maturity is well spread out with existing liquidity
covering refinancing needs to 2021.

SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ADJUSTMENTS

  - Fitch applies a weighted multiple of 6.9x in relation to its
lease-adjusted debt calculation. The multiple is derived from
estimates that roughly 62% of operating leases support assets with
a long-term economic benefit and the use of a 5x multiple in
relation to the group's Brazilian operating leases. Italian leases
are treated using a standard 8x multiple.


[*] ITALY: Investors to Get Compensation Under New Bail-in Rules
----------------------------------------------------------------
Francesco Guarascio at Reuters reports that the Italian government
and the European Commission have reached a provisional agreement to
reimburse some investors who bought shares in failed banks, an
Italian official said, in an unprecedented move that would soften
EU rules on bank rescues.

The bail-in rules devised after the last decade's financial crisis
were designed to make any given bank and its creditors -- instead
of taxpayers -- financially responsible if it went bust, with
shareholders first in line to pay up, Reuters discloses.

Since the regulations came into force in 2016, shareholders have
been all but wiped out in all bank collapses, including Banca Monte
dei Paschi di Siena and two smaller north-eastern banks that
Italian authorities intervened to save in 2017, Reuters notes.

Losses have also been inflicted on bondholders in some cases, while
depositors have always been spared, Reuters states.

But under the new provisional deal between Brussels and Rome,
bondholders and shareholders of failed Italian banks could claim
their money back, Reuters relays, citing the official from the
Italian finance ministry.

According to Reuters, the official said under the agreement,
shareholders with annual incomes below EUR35,000 (US$39,280) and
assets worth less than 100,000 euros would be automatically
compensated for their losses in past bank rescues.

The deal would notably benefit Italian savers forced to buy bank
shares in exchange for mortgages in what appears to have been
fraudulent transactions, but its critics say it is unlikely that
all those entitled to claim compensation under the wealth criterion
were victims of swindling, Reuters relates.




===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================

BL CONSUMER: DBRS Confirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited took the following rating actions on the notes
issued by BL Consumer Issuance Platform S.A., acting in respect of
its compartment BL Cards 2018 (the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at A (high) (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes confirmed at BB (sf)
-- Class F Notes upgraded to BB (sf) from B (sf)

The ratings address the timely repayment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal on or before the legal final maturity date.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

-- Portfolio performance, in terms of charge-off rates, principal
payment rates, yield rates and delinquencies;

-- The ability to withstand stressed cash flow assumptions;

-- No revolving termination events have occurred;

-- Current available credit enhancement to the Rated Notes to
cover the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

The upgrade of the Class F Notes also reflects the partial
amortization of the Class F Notes through excess spread to 44.0% of
its original balance.

The Issuer is a securitization of revolving credit receivables,
originated and serviced by Buy Way Personal Finance SA in Belgium
and Luxembourg. The transaction has a pass-through, two-step
special-purchase-vehicle structure, differentiated between
purchaser and Issuer level. The transaction is currently in its
three-year revolving period, scheduled to end in March 2021,
providing no early amortization events occur.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE AND ASSUMPTIONS

As of January 2019, the monthly principal payment rate (MPPR) was
10.5%, the annualized charge-off rate was 0.2% and the annualized
yield rate was 11.2%. While the MPPR and charge-off rates have
exhibited stable trends since closing, the yield has periodically
been trending below the initial base case assumption. DBRS has
maintained its base case MPPR and charge-off rates at 7.6% and
4.4%, respectively, and has reduced its base case yield assumption
to 10.9% from 11.2%.

Delinquencies have remained relatively low since the DBRS initial
rating. As of January 2019, loans that were two- to three-months in
arrears represented 0.3% of the outstanding portfolio balance and
loans that were 90+ days in arrears represented 0.1% of the
outstanding balance, both up from 0.0% at closing.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT AND RESERVES

Credit enhancement consists of subordination of the junior notes.
Subordination to the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E
Notes is currently 25.1%, 19.6%, 13.7%, 5.7% and 3.4%,
respectively, down from 25.7%, 20.3%, 14.4%, 6.5% and 4.3% at the
DBRS initial rating. The decrease reflects the partial amortization
of the Class F Notes through excess spread. Subordination to the
Class F Notes is currently 2.7%, stable since the DBRS initial
rating.

The transaction benefits from a Reserve Fund that covers Issuer
senior expenses, swap payments and interest shortfall on Class A,
Class B and Class C Notes, subject to certain triggers. The Reserve
Fund is currently at its target level of EUR 2.2 million. The
transaction also has a Senior Expense Reserve Fund that covers
purchaser senior expenses and servicing fees; it is currently at
its target level of EUR 1.1 million.

Citibank Europe plc, Brussels branch acts as the Purchaser Account
Bank and Citibank Europe plc, Luxembourg branch acts as the Issuer
Account Bank for the transaction. Based on the account bank
reference rating of the parent company, Citibank Europe plc, at AA
(low), the downgrade provisions outlined in the transaction
documents, and other mitigating factors inherent in the transaction
structure, DBRS considers the risk arising from the exposure to the
account banks to be consistent with the rating assigned to the
Class A Notes, as described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

BNP Paribas SA acts as the swap counterparty for the transaction.
DBRS's Long-Term Critical Obligations Rating of BNP Paribas SA at
AA (high) is above the First Rating Threshold as described in
DBRS's "Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology.

FAGE INT'L: S&P Cuts ICR to B+ on Declining Credit Metrics
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered the long-term issuer credit rating on
FAGE International S.A. to 'B+' from 'BB-' and the issue rating on
its $420 million senior notes to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  

The downgrade follows the ongoing fall in the global demand for
yogurt, which contributed to a 6% contraction in FAGE's yogurt
sales in 2018. FAGE's EBITDA declined by about 40%, but the group
continued to generate positive free operating cash flow (FOCF) of
$34 million and adjusted debt was largely unchanged. S&P now
expects FAGE's S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA will
remain sustainably above 4x, after the group posted 4.6x at
year-end 2018, up from 2.9x in 2017.

FAGE is preparing for new product launches, but the uncertainty
regarding the timing of a potential recovery in sales and operating
results drives our negative outlook.

The group operates in a highly competitive industry. In addition,
the U.S. yogurt industry (representing 60% of FAGE's sales) has
experienced declining volumes every quarter since 2016. In the
U.S., yogurt retail sales declined by 4.6% in 2018, and by 4% in
volume. In both the U.S. and Europe, consumers are turning away
from sugar-containing products and are increasingly intolerant to
dairy products, leading to industry-wide declining volumes in the
last quarters. Bigger players such as Danone are not immune to
these developments, but FAGE is particularly affected because it
has a narrow product range focused on Greek yogurt. In 2018, the
group's total sales volumes dropped by 6%, and 9.4% just in the
U.S. In Europe, the situation is slightly better, with FAGE
reporting volume growth in the U.K. and Italy in 2018 (2.3% and
3.1%, respectively), compared with industry volume declines of 1.2%
in the U.K. and 1.7% in Italy. However, FAGE reported falling value
of sales in these two markets (declines of 2.3% in the U.K. and
3.1% in Italy), due to fierce competition and a negative product
mix evolution.

FAGE continues to benefit from strong brand recognition in its
niche segment of plain Greek yogurt, but is experiencing declining
average net selling prices due to its product mix evolution. The
company discontinued about a third of its underperforming SKUs
(products) in the second half of 2018, mostly its non-plain
offerings from the Crossover and Split-Cup ranges. This contributed
to the decrease in the group's average net selling prices of about
6.4% in 2018, as non-plain products carry higher prices than plain
Greek yogurt. This explains the sharp fall in profits in the last
part of the year, when the full effect of the SKU reduction
appeared. As result, S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA at year-end
2018 fell to 16.5% from 23.8% at year-end 2017.

The group is also facing rising raw material costs, which erode
gross profit (decreasing from about 47% in 2017 to about 42% in
2018). FAGE USA switched to non-genetically modified (GMO) milk at
the end of 2017, which led to a sustained increase in its cost
base. In addition, the price of milk in the U.S. increased by 18%
in 2018. In Europe, milk prices were relatively low in 2018 but we
expect them to rise in the next year. S&P believes the group has
limited ability to pass on price increases to its customers given
the weak demand. In addition, the group must continually invest in
advertising in order to sustain its brand awareness and its new
products.

FAGE is now aiming to launch new products at the beginning of
third-quarter 2019. The group believes it can progressively recover
volumes lost and increase average net selling prices by introducing
new products in the Greek yogurt segment and in adjacent
categories. S&P said, "Considering the harsh competitive
environment and consumers turning away from the category, we
believe that the success of the new products cannot be taken for
granted, especially in the short term. We do not envisage a return
to volume growth in the coming 12-24 months, but we factor in a
moderate improvement in the average net selling price from 2020
thanks to a positive contribution from these new products. The
group also plans to increase its capacity in Europe by developing a
new Luxembourg facility that would allow it to produce up to 40,000
additional tons of yogurt. However, we understand construction may
only start in 2020, with operations launching in the beginning of
2022 at the earliest. Therefore, we do not forecast any increase in
volumes sold before that time."

Notwithstanding the very difficult conditions experienced in 2018,
in line with previous years, FAGE was able to generate about $34
million of positive FOCF in 2018. This was thanks to a positive
contribution from working capital ($9 million) linked to decrease
in sales, and tight control of capital expenditure (capex; $38
million). FAGE paid a $20 million dividend with available cash, its
reported debt amount remains unchanged ($420 million), and the
group maintains a comfortable level of liquidity.

S&P said, "The negative outlook reflects our expectation that FAGE
may continue to experience declining sales volumes, depending on
its ability to launch successful new products in the second half of
2019. There is significant uncertainty regarding the timing of a
potential recovery in volumes and EBITDA. Therefore FAGE's
operating results could underperform our revised base-case forecast
of debt to EBITDA remaining about 4.5x in the next 12 months.

"We could lower the rating if we believed FAGE's adjusted debt to
EBITDA could approach 5x. This could result from a further
reduction in the EBITDA base, for example if the new product
launches did not generate expected volumes and increases in average
selling prices, and if sales volumes on the existing products
continued to decline. It could also result from further increases
in the price of non-GMO milk that the group could not pass through.
We could also lower our rating if adjusted EBITDA interest coverage
fell below 2.5x.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if we became more confident
that FAGE's leverage would remain close to 4.5x in 2019 and 2020.
This would result from the EBITDA margin improving from the 16.5%
posted in 2018. This would most likely result from positive volume
and EBITDA contribution coming from new products, and better
performance of the group's existing product offering."




=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================

STEINHOFF INT'L: Delays Publication of 2017-2018 Audited Earnings
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Janice Kew at Bloomberg News reports that Steinhoff International
Holdings NV pushed back the dates for the publication of audited
earnings for 2017 and 2018 after the findings of a forensic probe
by PwC made the process more time consuming and complex.

The South African retailer, which almost collapsed amid an
accounting scandal in late 2017, said in a statement on April 5 it
is working toward ensuring that all appropriate adjustments are
made to valuations and profitability at various subsidiaries,
Bloomberg relates.  That has slowed down the process considerably,
Bloomberg notes.

Steinhoff last month said PwC found that a small group of former
executives -- with the help of some outsiders -- structured dubious
deals that substantially inflated earnings and asset values,
Bloomberg recounts.  The owner of Conforama in France and Mattress
Firm in the U.S. has been battling to stay afloat, with asset sales
and a debt restructuring at the forefront of its survival plan,
Bloomberg states.

Full-year results for the year through September 2017 are now due
to be published in May 7, while the following year's financials
will be released on June 18, Bloomberg discloses.

Chief Executive Officer Louis du Preez said last month the
cumulative effect of all prior year restatements will be disclosed
in the as-yet-unpublished 2017 annual report, Bloomberg relays.
The restated 2016 income statement can therefore be used as
comparative numbers in that report, according to Bloomberg.

Steinhoff International Holdings NV's registered office is located
in Amsterdam, Netherlands.




=========
S P A I N
=========

BBVA CONSUMO 8: Moody's Hikes Class B Notes Rating to 'Ba1'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of two Notes in
two European Auto ABS transactions.

Issuer: BBVA Consumo 8, FT

EUR612. million Class A Notes, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on Apr
25, 2018 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

EUR87.5 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
Jul 19, 2016 Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

Issuer: Bumper 9 (NL) Finance B.V.

EUR542.5 million Class A Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on
Jul 13, 2017 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR31.5 million Class B Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on
Jul 13, 2017 Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings of the senior Notes in the
two transactions.

BBVA Consumo 8, FT is a cash securitisation of auto loans extended
to obligors in Spain by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.
(BBVA) (A2/P-1; A3(cr)/P-2(cr); A2 LT Bank Deposits).

Bumper 9 (NL) Finance B.V. (Bumper 9) is a securitisation of auto
lease installment receivables and residual value (RV) cash flows.
These auto leases are extended to corporate, small and medium
enterprise ("SME") and government lessees in the Netherlands by
LeasePlan Nederland N.V. ("LPNL") owned by LeasePlan Corporation
N.V. ("LPC") (Baa1/P-2, A3(cr).)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade actions are prompted by an increase in credit
enhancement for the affected Notes, especially following the end of
the initial revolving period in BBVA Consumo 8, FT (January 2018)
and Bumper 9 (August 2018). The upgrade action in BBVA Consumo 8,
FT is also prompted by the decrease of key collateral assumptions,
as a result of better than expected collateral performance. Moody's
affirmed the ratings of the senior tranches that had sufficient
credit enhancement to maintain their current ratings.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions:

As part of the rating action, Moody's reassessed its assumptions
for the securitized portfolios reflecting the collateral
performance to date.

In BBVA Consumo 8, FT, the collateral performance is better than
the previous expectations. The 90 days plus arrears stand at 2.3%
of the current pool balance. As of January 2019, cumulative
defaults were 0.52% of the original pool balance plus
replenishments, with pool factor of 71.6%. Moody's assumed expected
mean default rate of 5.0% of the current portfolio balance. This
corresponds to 3.6% as of the original pool balance plus
replenishments, down from the initially assumed 6.25% at closing.
Moody's also lowered the assumption of the portfolio credit
enhancement to 16.0% from 17.5% and left the recovery rate
assumption unchanged at 32.5%.

In Bumper 9, the collateral performance is in line with the
previous expectations. The delinquency levels are broadly stable,
with 60 days plus arrears standing at 0.03% of the current pool
balance. As of March 2019, cumulative defaults were 0.47% of the
original pool balance plus replenishments, with pool factor of
78.4%. Moody's left the assumptions for this transaction
unchanged.

Increase in Available Credit Enhancement:

Considerable deleveraging, resulting from the end of revolving
periods and subsequent sequential amortization, led to the increase
in the credit enhancement ("CE") available to all rated tranches in
these transactions.

In BBVA Consumo 8, FT the CE available under classes A and B has
increased to 23.99% and 6.35% versus the closing CE levels of
17.00% and 4.50% respectively. In Bumper 9, the CE available under
classes A and B has increased to 29.10% and 23.36% versus the
closing CE levels of 22.91% and 18.41% respectively.

Class B in BBVA Consumo 8 is subject to some structural weaknesses,
such as the tight interest deferral trigger at 5% of cumulative
loans more than 90 days in arrears versus a current level of 3.5%.
The structure also includes a clean-up call option which does not
require the Class B Notes to be fully redeemed as a condition for
exercise. Moody's has taken into consideration these challenges for
Class B in its analysis.

Principle Methodology:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was 'Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Auto Loan- and Lease-Backed ABS' published in
March 2019.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade and downgrade of the
ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings include (1) performance of the underlying collateral that
is better than Moody's expected; (2) deleveraging of the capital
structure; (3) improvements in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties; or (4) in the case of BBVA Consumo 8,
FT, a lowering of Spain's sovereign risk leading to the removal of
the local currency ceiling cap, currently set at Aa1.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk; (2) performance
of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's expected;
(3) deterioration in the Notes' available credit enhancement; and
(4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.




=============
U K R A I N E
=============

NJSC NAFTOGAZ: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LongTerm IDRs, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine's (Naftogaz)
Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR)
at 'B-'. The Outlooks are Stable.

The affirmation reflects Naftogaz's strong links with its sole
shareholder Ukraine (B-/Stable) under Fitch's Government-Related
Entities (GRE) rating criteria and the assessment of the company's
standalone credit profile (SCP) at 'B-', which is at the same level
as the sovereign's IDR. The rating also takes into account
Naftogaz's weak liquidity profile but overall relatively low
leverage and also some uncertainty related to domestic gas prices,
the unbundling of the international transit business and political
risk.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Ratings In-Line with Sovereign: While Fitch views the links between
Naftogaz and Ukraine as strong, Naftogaz's rating is driven by its
SCP of 'B-' because it is at the same level as the sovereign's
under Fitch's GRE rating criteria. The assessment of the ties
reflects the view of status, ownership and control, support track
record and expectations and financial implications of a potential
default of Naftogaz as strong under the criteria. Fitch views the
socio-political implications of a potential default of Naftogaz as
very strong.

Naftogaz is 100% state-owned and is strategically important to
Ukraine as it is the country's largest natural gas production,
wholesale, transmission and trading company. The state still
guarantees a significant part of Naftogaz's debt (the guarantees
covered 30% of the company's gross debt at end-2018). In 2012-2015,
the government provided direct support to Naftogaz of about UAH141
billion. Naftogaz's financial performance is closely monitored by
the IMF, Ukraine's major lender, which incentivises the government
to ensure that Naftogaz is adequately funded.

Ukraine Affirmed at 'B-': On 8 March 2019, Fitch affirmed Ukraine's
Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B-' with a Stable Outlook. In
Fitch's view, Ukraine's IDR balances weak external liquidity, high
external financing needs driven by sovereign external debt
repayments, a weak banking sector, institutional constraints and
political risks in relation to peers, against improved policy
credibility and consistency, improving macroeconomic stability,
declining government debt and a record of bilateral and
multilateral support.

Standalone Credit Profile of 'B-': Naftogaz's 'B-' SCP captures its
gas transit and domestic transportation by main pipelines monopoly
in Ukraine and improved financial profile and liquidity, albeit the
latter remains weak. It also reflects uncertainties and potential
volatility in its operating and financial profile after 2019. In
its view, Naftogaz's stronger financial performance in 2016-2018
may not be sustainable in the long term, as it depends on external
factors for which Fitch has limited visibility, such as future
domestic gas prices and increasing accounts receivable from
distribution intermediaries, but also the unbundling of the transit
division.

Regulatory Risks Lessen: The recent decree by the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine provides for a 26% increase in household gas
prices from November 1, 2018, further increases in 2019 and then
the move to full market pricing from January 1, 2020. Until May 1,
2020, Naftogaz is obliged to supply gas to municipal heat utilities
and distribution intermediaries under the public service obligation
(PSO) regime. Naftogaz is legally required to continue supply to
some of its non-paying customers under certain conditions, which
may negatively affect the collectability of receivables as long as
the PSO regime is in operation.

Although Naftogaz estimates that the state owes it significant
compensation under the PSO for supplying gas to customers at below
market prices, Fitch conservatively excludes any compensation in
its forecasts.

Planned Gas Transit Unbundling: Ukraine's government has committed
to reform the energy sector, in line with the EU's third package.
This implies market liberalisation and unbundling of the gas
transmission function (TSO) from gas production and supply.
Naftogaz expects this unbundling to take place in 2020, which is
also its assumption, after the current gas transit contract with
Gazprom expires. Naftogaz expects that Ukrtransgaz PJSC, which
handles gas transit, will remain its subsidiary until then and will
pay dividends to the parent, but going forward, Fitch assumes no
revenue from transit or any compensation for the unbundled assets.


Focus on Domestic Markets: Post-2020 Naftogaz will focus on
domestic gas sales, storage, domestic petrol products and LNG sales
and gas production and service legal agreements with the newly
unbundled gas transit company. Fitch expects leverage to gradually
increase to about 1.8x FFO gross adjusted leverage by 2021, in
order to reflect lower earnings due to unbundling, but also
increased capex for boosting domestic gas production to about 18bcm
by 2021 both through greenfield and brownfield investments.
Naftogaz is currently responsible for about 80% of Ukraine's
domestic gas production.

Favourable Arbitration Ruling: In 2017 and 2018, the Arbitration
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce effectively ruled in
favour of Naftogaz in two multi-billion dollar cases involving
Gazprom PJSC (BBB-/Positive). As a result of these positive
rulings, Fitch believes that the risks to Naftogaz's financial
position stemming from the arbitration are eliminated. Fitch
conservatively does not incorporate in its forecasts the USD2.8
billion net award in favour of Naftogaz since its timing is
uncertain. Gazprom has appealed the arbitral award in the Gas
Transit Arbitration, and Naftogaz has proceeded with enforcing the
arbitration ruling and is currently assessing available
alternatives to recover the award from Gazprom.

Disputes with Gazprom Continue: Naftogaz does not currently
purchase natural gas from Gazprom following the latter's refusal to
resume supplies in March 2018. Fitch believes that Naftogaz should
be able to buy the required volumes of gas from European suppliers
as in 2016-2018. Gazprom depends on Naftogaz for gas transit to
Europe and Fitch expects it to honour its obligations under the
transit agreement until 2020. However, this dependency will be
significantly reduced if the Nord Stream II and TurkStream
alternative pipelines are built and fully operational.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Naftogaz operates in a weaker operating environment than other
Fitch-rated EMEA gas transmission and distribution companies, eg
eustream, a.s. (A-/Stable), KazTransGas JSC (BBB-/Stable) and
KazTransGas Aimak JSC (BBB-/Stable). While Naftogaz's projected
financial metrics for 2018-2019 are strong relative to peers, its
SCP of 'B-' reflects potential cash flow volatility as the
forecasts are sensitive to the continued indexation of domestic gas
prices in Ukraine, collectability of accounts receivable and the
impact of unbundling of the company's gas transit business expected
post-2019. The rating of Naftogaz is at the same level as Ukraine
under the GRE rating criteria.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  - USD/UAH exchange rate of 28.86 in 2019 and 30.60 for 2020

  - No gas transit and transportation revenue post-2020 due to
unbundling and expiry of contract with Gazprom

  - Domestic gas sales volumes of about 18.5bcm per year

  - Declining profitability across most segments from 2019

  - 2019 dividends of USD251 million

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - A positive rating action on Ukraine would lead to Naftogaz's
rating being equalised with the sovereign's assuming that
Naftogaz's SCP remains up to three notches away from the
sovereign's and the links with the state do not weaken

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - A negative rating action on Ukraine would be replicated for
Naftogaz

  - Significant deterioration of Naftogaz's financial profile or
liquidity following the planned reorganisation with simultaneous
weakening of the linkage with the state

Sensitivities for Ukraine

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - Increased foreign-currency reserves and external financing
flexibility

  - Improved macroeconomic performance

  - Sustained decline in public debt to GDP

Developments that May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - Re-emergence of external financing pressures and increased
macroeconomic instability, for example stemming from delays to
disbursements from, or the collapse of, the IMF programme

  - External or political/geopolitical shock that weakens
macroeconomic performance and Ukraine's fiscal and external
position

LIQUIDITY

Short-Term Maturities, Secured Debt: At January 1, 2019, Naftogaz
had UAH37 billion in short-term debt, with cash on hand of only
UAH14 billion. A UAH12.5 billion loan guaranteed by the Ukrainian
government from the World Bank is maturing at May 31, 2019. The
remainder of its total indebtedness UAH35.7 billion out of UAH48.2
billion is situated with JSC State Savings Bank of Ukraine
(Oschadbank; B-/Stable), Public Joint-Stock Company Joint Stock
Bank Ukrgasbank (B-/Stable) and JSC The State Export-Import Bank of
Ukraine (Ukreximbank; B-/Stable), which are owned by the Ukrainian
state.




===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================

DEBENHAMS PLC: Mike Ashley Accuses Board of "Falsehoods, Denials"
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Angus Howarth at The Scotsman reports that Sports Direct tycoon
Mike Ashley has torn into Debenhams plc executives, accusing the
board "falsehoods and denials" after tabling a GBP150 million
rescue offer.

The maverick billionaire called on April 7 for the board of the
high street chain to be investigated, two members to undergo lie
detector tests, and trading in its shares to be suspended, The
Scotsman relates.

According to The Scotsman, as well as accusing Debenhams bosses of
"a sustained programme of falsehoods and denials", the sportswear
chain founder added that in a meeting "misrepresentations were made
to induce Sports Direct into signing a non-disclosure agreement,
locking them out of any ability to trade in the bonds or equity of
Debenhams for a period of time".

In an extraordinary outburst, Mr. Ashley claimed that he and two
colleagues subsequently took lie detector tests, with the results
showing "without any doubt" that they were telling the truth in
their recollection of the meeting, The Scotsman discloses.

Sports Direct has now called for Debenhams interim chairman Terry
Duddy and non-executive director David Adams to take their own lie
detector tests to "clarify their recollection of this meeting", The
Scotsman relays.

Mr. Ashley has a near-30% stake in the department store group but
faces wipeout if it presses ahead with a GBP200 million refinancing
plan announced in March, The Scotsman notes.

Under the proposal, GBP101 million is to be drawn down immediately,
in order to allow restructuring, which will include store closures
and rent reductions, The Scotsman states.

The other GBP99 million would have been made available if Sports
Direct -- or any other shareholder with a stake of more than 25% --
fulfilled one of two conditions by April 8, according to The
Scotsman.

One option allowed Mr. Ashley to make a takeover offer which
included arrangements to refinance the group's debt, The Scotsman
says.

He tabled a last-minute rescue package on April 5, which still
depends on him being made chief executive, The Scotsman recounts.
In it, the Newcastle United owner offered to underwrite a GBP150
million rights issue for Debenhams, The Scotsman discloses.

If Mr. Ashley's overtures are rebuffed, Debenhams could go into
administration this week with its lenders seizing control,
according to The Scotsman.

Debenhams plc is a British multinational retailer operating under a
department store format in the United Kingdom and Ireland with
franchise stores in other countries.


INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL: Fitch Alters Outlook on 'BB' IDR to Stable
------------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on International Personal
Finance plc's (IPF) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to Stable
from Negative. Fitch has also affirmed the Long-Term IDR and senior
debt ratings at 'BB' and the Short-Term IDR at 'B'.

The revision of the Outlook reflects a lower likelihood of more
severe consumer loan rate cap in Poland that would damage the
business model and increasing geographical diversification of the
operations outside Poland. While the tax challenge by the Polish
authorities remains a risk and exposes IPF to potential material
cash outflows, Fitch believes this would not pose significant risks
to the sustainability of IPF's business model.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

IPF's IDRs reflect low balance-sheet leverage by conventional
finance company standards, robust profitability despite high
impairment charges, adequate liquidity underpinned by short-term
portfolio and its management's experience in conducting unsecured
consumer lending in emerging markets.

The rating also captures IPF's high-risk lending, concentration of
its funding within confidence-sensitive wholesale sources, evolving
digital business and its vulnerability to regulatory risks.

In February 2019, the Polish Ministry of Justice published a draft
bill containing a modified set of proposals about the caps on costs
that may be charged by lenders in connection with consumer loans.
These caps are significantly less punitive than those initially
proposed in 2016.

Fitch would still expect enactment of the new proposal into law to
have a negative impact on IPF's business, but the risk to the
sustainability of the business model as a whole appears noticeably
lighter than that of the original proposal, which had been factored
into Fitch's rating downgrade and Negative Outlook on IPF in June
2017.

IPF is also challenged by Polish tax authorities. There are
significant uncertainties on the timing and amount of potential
cash outflows related to this. Fitch estimates that the worst-case
scenario would have a material impact on IPF's capital, but the
business model in Poland would remain viable, in Fitch's view. The
strength of profitability means that a less severe outcome could be
absorbed by annual profits (2018 pre-tax profit: GBP109 million).

IPF's funding is spread across a range of bonds and bank
facilities, but each is subject to the inherent associated
refinancing risks. At end-2018, the group had substantial committed
undrawn bank facilities totalling GBP186 million (end-2017: GBP189
million). The group's funding and liquidity metrics are underpinned
by the business model based on short-term lending and longer-term
borrowing.

The short duration of its loan portfolio enables IPF to run down
its loan book relatively quickly if required. At end-2018, average
period to maturity of the loan portfolio was 11.5 months (end-2017:
9.1 months), while the average period to maturity on borrowings was
25 months (end-2017: 31 months).

Fitch notes a gradual lengthening of the loan portfolio maturity
profile as products change mostly in response to interest rate
caps. A material shift could lead to different behavioural
characteristics and increased risk profile. Significant impairment
risk is a feature of IPF's business model, but this risk is
compensated by high margins.

The management monitors credit quality primarily via impairment
charges as a percentage of revenue - 26.2% in 2018 and in line with
the previous five-year average. Impairment metrics have been stable
with limited susceptibility to credit cycles.

The net interest margin (consistently at around 80%) is
sufficiently strong to cover rising funding costs and high
impairment and operational costs associated with the business
model. Bottom-line profitability ratios were robust with pre-tax
income to average assets at 8.2% in 2018 (2017: 7.6%).

IPF's leverage remains adequate for a lending business focused on
high-risk customers and significant impairment risks. The ratio of
debt to tangible equity weakened in 2018 to 2.1x (2017: 1.7x)
largely driven by IFRS 9 impact on equity of GBP107 million.

The rating of IPF's senior unsecured notes is in line with the
group's Long-Term IDR, reflecting Fitch's expectation for average
recovery prospects given that all of IPF's funding is unsecured.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

An upgrade is unlikely given the evolving business model and
operations in emerging markets.

The ratings would be downgraded if materially tighter caps than
those proposed in February 2019 were enacted in Poland.

A notable deterioration of solvency with leverage measured as debt
to tangible equity rising above 4x (e.g. due to tax case
implications) would also lead to a downgrade.

The inability to maintain headroom on funding lines ahead of their
refinancing dates, thereby restricting management's capacity to
execute its business plan, could also have a negative impact on the
ratings.

In the normal course of its business, IPF's ratings also remain
sensitive to material deterioration of profitability or asset
quality as its product mix evolves, for example as the digital
proportion of the loan book grows or loan maturities are extended.

The senior debt rating is sensitive to a change in IPF's Long-Term
IDR.



                           *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2019.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                * * * End of Transmission * * *