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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, December 14, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 248


                            Headlines


I R E L A N D

GLENBEIGH SECURITIES 2018-1: DBRS Rates Class E Notes 'BB(high)'
ORANJE DAC 32: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
PERMANENT TSB: DBRS Hikes Long Term Issuer Rating to BB (high)


G R E E C E

FAMAR: Completes EUR174-Mil. Debt Restructuring


I T A L Y

ALITALIA SPA: Help From Get easyJet, Delta Solicited
POPOLARE BARI 2017: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class B Notes


S P A I N

SANTANDER CONSUMO 2: DBRS Raises Class F Notes Rating to BB
TDA SABADELL 4: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class B Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DEBENHAMS PLC: Mike Ashley Expresses Concern Over Biz's Future
HARVARD TECHNOLOGY: Financial Difficulties Prompt Administration
MONARCH AIRLINES: Collapse Puts MAG Earnings at Risk
THRONES PLC 2014-1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Notes


X X X X X X X X

[*] BOOK REVIEW: Crafting Solutions for Troubled Businesses


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I R E L A N D
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GLENBEIGH SECURITIES 2018-1: DBRS Rates Class E Notes 'BB(high)'
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned the following ratings to the notes
(the Rated Notes) issued by Glenbeigh Securities 2018-1 DAC:

-- Class A notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B notes rated AA (sf)
-- Class C notes rated A (high) (sf)
-- Class D notes rated A (low) (sf)
-- Class E notes rated BB (high) (sf)

The rating assigned to the Class A notes addresses the timely
payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal. The rating
assigned to the Class B notes addresses the ultimate payment of
interest while the Class B notes are junior, the timely payment of
interest when the Class B notes are the most senior and the
ultimate payment of principal. The ratings for the Class C, Class
D and Class E notes address the ultimate payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal.

The proceeds of the Rated Notes, along with that of the Class Z
notes, (together the collateralized notes), have been used as
consideration to purchase a residential mortgage portfolio
originated by Permanent TSB plc (PTSB or the Seller). The
aggregate current balance of the mortgage portfolio as of 9
November 2018 stands at EUR 1.31 billion.

The majority of the mortgage portfolio has been restructured in
the last few years to help the borrowers rehabilitate to a healthy
payment rate on a sustainable basis. 32.4% of the loans, which
were originally paying on a capital-plus-interest basis, now pay,
since the date of restructure on a part-capital-and-interest basis
(PCI). Of the loans, 67.1% have been restructured such that the
outstanding of each such loan was split into two (Split Loan), one
portion of which is considered performing (Performing Loan (PL))
and the other portion of which is considered warehoused
(Warehoused Loan (WL)). The proportion of the split between the PL
and the WL varies, and such variance is determined by a thorough
assessment of the borrower's affordability status at the time of
restructuring. While the borrower under a Split Loan, for majority
of the cases, makes monthly payments on the PL on a capital-plus-
interest basis, on the WL no interest is due or payable during the
term of the loan. The borrower is liable to repay the WL
outstanding on the maturity date. The WL proportion comprises
34.5% of the Glenbeigh mortgage portfolio, and that for the PL
comprises 32.6%.

To assess the credit risk of the Split Loans, DBRS applied its
"Master European Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Rating
Methodology and Jurisdictional Addenda." The PLs, in line with the
terms and conditions of this portion of the Split Loans, have been
treated as a repayment loan (repaying on a capital-plus-interest
basis), where the affordability of the PL has been tested by PTSB
at the time of restructuring. The current loan-to-value (indexed;
CLTV (ind.)) of the PL, driving probability of default (PD),
considered the PL balance divided by the pro rata indexed value of
the property or properties securing the Split Loan. The CLTV
(ind.) calculated as above would also be the driver of the loss
given default (LGD) for each PL.

Based on PTSB's assessment of the borrower's income expenditure
and subsequent split of the loan, the WL is considered
unaffordable to the borrower in terms of making regular monthly
repayments. Further, there is no interest burden on the WL for the
borrower, with the WL balance repayable as a bullet at the end of
loan maturity. DBRS thus treats the WL balance to be in default
implying a 100% PD assumption. This is a conservative treatment
relative to the possibility that the borrower may refinance the WL
balance at the end of the loan term. DBRS calculated the CLTV
(ind.) for the WL, which considered the WL balance divided by the
indexed value of the property or properties securing the Split
Loan.

A small proportion (1.8% as of July 2018) of these Split Loans has
been in the greater-than-one-month-of-arrears status and currently
none of these loans is in arrears. Of the PCI loans, 3.5% as of
July 2018 have been in the greater-than-one-month-of-arrears
status, and currently none of these loans is in arrears. This
proves that the restructuring of these loans has worked
sustainably so far and can be expected to continue doing so going
forward.

The other key risk of the mortgage portfolio arises on account of
potential loss from loans where borrowers are currently in
negative equity status (39.6% of the mortgage portfolio).

The cash flow analysis of the Split Loan applied the PD and LGD
for the PL and WL separately given the nature of the restructuring
and repayment conditions. While the ten-year front- and back-ended
default timing curve was applied to the PL subpool, the WL subpool
defaulted only at the end of the loan term (weighted-average
remaining term of 22 years). In comparison, given the terms and
conditions of the restructuring, if a borrower defaults on the PL,
this would imply default for the WL too and trigger the recovery
process of both the PL and the WL outstanding. The recovery of the
WL in such a case would be much earlier than simulated in the DBRS
cash flows analysis, and hence the timing of defaults for a WL is
a relatively conservative treatment.

Another conservative element of the DBRS cash flow analysis was
the assumption of zero prepayments on the WL subpool in comparison
with the terms and conditions of the Split Loan, which allow
prepayments to be applied to the WL in preference over the PL
portion of the Split Loan. Any prepayments of the WL subpool (a
third of the mortgage portfolio by balance) will reduce the
negative carry where no interest payments are made by the borrower
on the WL, but the Issuer will have to pay interest on the same
proportion of notes outstanding. A default of a Split Loan will
also have the same positive effect on the transaction structure,
though to a smaller degree.

The representations and warranties given by PTSB, the Seller, are
comparable to those given for the Fastnet series of transactions.
However, the liability of the Seller in the event of a breach of
any representation and warranty has time and amount limitations.
Any concerns around loss to the Issuer on account of a breach of
any representation and warranty, given these limitations, are
largely mitigated because of the seasoning of the portfolio, the
restructured nature of the loans and the transfer of the legal
title of the loans to Pepper Finance Corporation (Ireland) DAC
(Pepper) from PTSB within three months of closing.

The issuance structure under Glenbeigh offers subordination and
liquidity support for regular payments on the notes met through
separate revenue and principal priority of payments. The Class A
notes have credit enhancement (CE) of 65%, the Class B notes have
CE of 52%, the Class C notes have CE of 41.5%, the Class D notes
have CE of 34% and the Class E notes have CE of 29%. A liquidity
reserve fund (LRF) of EUR 38.94 million, funded at the closing of
the transaction, will provide liquidity support to the Class A,
Class B, Class C and Class D notes. The LRF will amortize and be
maintained at 4.75% of the aggregate outstanding balance of the
Class A, Class B, Class D and Class E notes. The use of the LRF
will only be allowed before the principal receipts have been used
(subject to conditions) to support the liquidity of the Rated
Notes.

Approximately 30% of the loans pay interest linked to a standard
variable rate (SVR; currently at 4.3%) set by PTSB. Of the loans
in the mortgage portfolio, 36.5% pay interest linked to the
European Central Bank (ECB) rate. The remaining 33.7% of the loans
do not pay any interest during the life of the loans (WLs). In
comparison, the interest paid on the notes is linked to three
months' Euribor. This difference in basis gives rise to a risk
that is not hedged in the transaction. The basis risk between the
SVR paying loans and three months' Euribor on the notes is
mitigated by a SVR floor rate of three months' Euribor plus 3.25%
effective six months after the closing of the transaction. DBRS
has stressed for the unhedged basis risk between the ECB and three
months' Euribor.

The interest margin on the notes will step up in November 2024. On
or after such date, the entire mortgage portfolio can be sold or
the sale can be only for part of the mortgage portfolio. In the
case of a partial sale, the notice of such intention will be
provided to DBRS giving the details of the residual mortgage
portfolio (after sale) and the resultant outstanding notes and
structure.

The master servicer for the mortgage portfolio will be Pepper,
with the servicing in the first six months from closing delegated
to PTSB, after which Pepper would service the mortgage portfolio.
The legal title of the loans currently with PTSB is expected to be
transferred to Pepper within three months of closing.

DBRS based the ratings primarily on the following analytical
considerations:

   -- The transaction capital structure, form and sufficiency of
       available CE and liquidity provisions.

   -- The credit quality of the mortgage loan portfolio and the
       ability of the servicer to perform collection activities.
       DBRS calculated PD, LGD and expected loss outputs for the
       mortgage loan portfolio.

   -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
       flow assumptions and repays the Rated Notes according to the
       terms of the transaction documents. The transaction cash
       flows were analyzed using PD and LGD outputs provided by
       DBRS's "Master European Residential Mortgage-Backed
       Securities Rating Methodology and Jurisdictional Addenda"
       methodology. Transaction cash flows were analyzed using
       INTEX DealMaker.

   -- The structural mitigants in place to avoid potential payment
       disruptions caused by operational risk, such as downgrade
       and replacement language in the transaction documents.

   -- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions
       addressing the assignment of the assets to the Issuer and
       its consistency with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European
       Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


ORANJE DAC 32: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its provisional ratings of the
following classes of notes issued by Oranje (European Loan Conduit
No. 32) DAC (the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Oranje (European Loan Conduit No. 32) DAC is a five-loan conduit
securitization arranged by Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc
(Morgan Stanley). The transaction comprises five Dutch commercial
real estate loans (the Cygnet, Cheetah, Phoenix, Desert and Legion
loans) advanced by Morgan Stanley Bank N. A. (the Loan Seller or
Morgan Stanley) and sourced in cooperation with Unifore DMC to the
relevant Dutch borrowers between October 2017 and September 2018.
The Cygnet, Cheetah and Phoenix loans were advanced as refinancing
facilities whereas the Desert and Legion loans were advanced as
acquisition facilities. None of the loans have mezzanine debt or
have been syndicated.

The five loans, totalling EUR 207.3 million at the time of the
securitization and backed by 78 properties with an aggregated
market value (MV) of EUR 343.9 million, can be further divided
into two groups: four loans are five-year partially amortizing
loans with higher margins (over 3.0%) and a higher leverage (over
64.8% loan-to-value, LTV). In contrast, the Phoenix loan has a
lower margin (1.9%) and lower leverage (54.2% LTV), but is
interest only. The Phoenix loan has a three-year loan term with
two one-year extension options.

The EUR 96.0 million (EUR 99.5 million at origination then the
borrower voluntarily prepaid EUR 3.5 million) Phoenix loan is the
largest loan in the transaction, representing 51.5% of the MV and,
because of the relatively lower LTV ratio, 46.3% of the
securitized debt amount. The Phoenix portfolio comprises 18 office
properties across 11 towns and cities in the Netherlands.
Approximately 49.4% of the MV is concentrated in Amsterdam
(including Hoofddorp), the Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht. Note
worthily, two of the three office buildings in Rotterdam -- one
located in the Rotterdam city center and another located east of
the city -- are barely occupied, bringing the overall occupancy
down to 82.8%. The sponsor of the Phoenix loan is Marathon Asset
Management; the company has planned to lease up the portfolio
following the completion of some capital expenditure investments
in two Rotterdam assets.

The Cheetah loan is the second-largest loan in the transaction,
with a EUR 48.2 million initial loan balance (22.6% of the
securitized debt) and EUR 70.1 million MV (20.4% of the
transaction MV). The Cheetah portfolio comprises 43 properties, 26
of which are retail properties and 17 are multifamily residential
properties. The properties are geographically diversified across
the Netherlands and have a historical occupancy rate averaging
over 90% for the past ten years. However, DBRS noted that several
out-of-town retail assets have remained vacant for a prolonged
period of time, and as such DBRS has underwritten a higher vacancy
rate for the retail assets (13.2%). The sponsor for the Cheetah
loan is Woon Winkel Fonds, a real estate fund with a team of
seven. The fund solely focuses on managing the Cheetah properties.

The Cygnet loan is secured by 12 assets (eight office and four
office/industrial mixed-use assets) representing 11.7% debt
balance and 10.8% MV of the transaction. The assets were 83.0%
occupied, as of 30 June 2018 (the cut-off date), slightly above
the historical average of roughly 80%. The sponsor of the loan is
Annexum Beheer B.V., the largest retail fund in the Netherlands
with about EUR 500 million in office assets. The asset manager has
adopted the flexible office concept to effectively lease up the
vacant spaces with shorter leases, which were discounted when
calculating occupancy. This strategy was successful in converting
one large short-term lease to a long-term lease. DBRS was informed
that a property disposal has taken place prior to the closing of
the securitization and the net proceeds have been used to prepay
the loan.

The fourth-largest loan of the transaction, the Desert loan, makes
up 11.5% of the securitized balance and 10.2% of the total MV. The
acquisition financing was provided to assist Highbrook's purchase
of the Le Mirage office building in Utrecht from Rockspring. Since
the cut-off date, the new sponsor has successfully completed some
new leases, taking the current overall occupancy up to 89% from
80%. The property is located in the southwest of Utrecht where
rental demand is increasing. Highbrook's business plan involves
increasing rental income through a combination of leasing up the
existing vacant space and adjusting existing rents to market
levels, which are currently approximately 20% above the current
in-place levels.

The smallest loan in the transaction is the Legion loan, which
makes up the remaining 8.0% of securitized balance and 7.1% of the
transaction MV. The EUR 16.5 million loans were advanced to
Aventicum in connection with their acquisition of four office
assets all located in the Randstad region. The Utrecht asset is
completely vacant. The sponsor is planning to convert the building
into a multi-let building, which is different from the strategy
adopted by the previous owner. As such, the loan features a
leasing trigger set at 65% occupancy of the current vacant
building. If the targeted occupancy were not met, more
conservative loan covenants will apply: such as (1) if the trigger
is not met after by the fifth interest payment date, a 1.0%
increase in annual amortization after 12 months from utilization;
(2) if the trigger is not met by 18 months after utilization, a
cash trap if a weighted-average-lease-to-break falls below two
years and (3) an increased 35% release premium based on allocated
loan amount. The loan will amortize from the second year after
utilization.

All five loans feature tightening LTV and debt yield (DY)
covenants for cash trap and event of default. Each borrower has
procured hedging facilities with Cygnet covering 70.0% of the loan
amount and the remaining loans covering the full loan amount with
various cap strike rates. The weighted-average cap strike rate is
approximately 1.8%. For the Cygnet, Cheetah and Desert loans, a
step-down amortization rate would apply should the LTV and DY
improve significantly, i.e. if the loan's LTV falls below 60%. The
proceeds from scheduled amortization, partial prepayment or
repayment will be distributed to the note holders pro rata for all
loans except for the Phoenix loan. As the Phoenix loan represents
nearly half of the securitized debt, has a lower leverage and is a
shorter loan term with extension options, the repayment proceeds
of the loan will be distributed 70% pro rata and then 30%
sequentially to the note holders in order to offset the likely
increased average LTV of the transaction following the Phoenix
loan pre/repayment. Finally, for the Cygnet and Cheetah loans, the
facility agreement also requires the borrowers to use all property
disposal proceeds to prepay the respective loan.

To originate the securitized loans, Morgan Stanley has worked
together with Unifore DMC, which is a specialized Dutch real
estate investment and asset management company. Unifore DMC helps
Morgan Stanley source commercial real estate loans.

All investment-grade notes benefits from a liquidity facility of
EUR 9.0 million, which equals to 4.4 % of the total outstanding
balance of the covered notes and vertical risk retention loan
interest and is provided by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., London Branch.
The liquidity facility can be used to cover interest shortfalls on
the Class A, B, C and D. According to DBRS's analysis, the
commitment amount, as at closing, could provide interest payment
on the covered notes up to 16 months and nine months based on the
interest rate cap strike rate of circa 1.8% and the Euribor cap of
5% (in respect of the pro rata share of any loan which has passed
its maturity), respectively. DBRS has analyzed several scenarios
where a particular loan pre/repays and the impact of scheduled
amortization on the assigned ratings. DBRS concluded the assigned
ratings would still apply in such scenarios.

The transaction is expected to repay on or before November 22,
2023, seven days after the latest senior loan maturity. Should a
loan default before the expected note maturity, a special
servicing transfer event will occur in respect of the defaulted
loan and the proceeds from the defaulted loan will be applied
sequentially to the notes. Should the notes fail to be redeemed in
full by the expected note maturity; the issuer will make principal
payments on a sequential basis. The transaction will be structured
with a five-year tail period to allow the special servicer to work
out loans not repaid at maturity by November 15, 2028 at the
latest, which is the final legal maturity of the notes.

The Class E notes are subject to an available funds cap where the
shortfall is attributable to an increase in the weighted-average
margin of the notes.

The transaction includes a Class X diversion trigger event over
two levels, which are depending on the percentage of defaulted
outstanding loan amount in the transaction. If between 25% and 50%
of the outstanding loan balance is in default, 25% of the excess
spread will be diverted into the Issuer transaction account and
credited to the Class X diversion ledger. Should the defaulted
loan amount increase to over 50% of the then total outstanding
loan amount, all excess spreads will be diverted and credited to
Class X diversion ledger. No excess spread will be diverted after
expected note maturity, as excess spread will then be fully
subordinated to principal due on the notes on a sequential basis.
However, if the trigger is cured for two consecutive interest
payment dates, the held amount will be released back to the Class
X note holders. Should the Class X diversion trigger event
continue for two consecutive note payment dates (excluding the
note payment day on which the trigger was activated), any amount
standing to the credit of the Class X diversion ledger for the
same period will be swept to form part of the principal available
funds.

Morgan Stanley retained a 5% material interest in the transaction
through the vertical risk retention loan interest.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


PERMANENT TSB: DBRS Hikes Long Term Issuer Rating to BB (high)
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited upgraded the Long-Term Issuer Rating of
Permanent tsb p.l.c (the Bank) to BB (high) from BB and the Long-
Term Issuer Rating of Permanent TSB Group Holdings p.l.c (PTSB or
the Group), the top-level holding company, to BB from BB (low).
All Long-Term ratings remain on a Positive trend. Concurrently,
the Bank's Short-Term Issuer Rating was also upgraded to R-3 from
R-4. The trend on the Bank's Short-Term ratings remains Positive.
PTSB's R-4 Short-Term Issuer Rating was confirmed with a Stable
Trend. The Bank's Intrinsic Assessment (IA) was raised to BB
(high) from BB and the Support Assessment remains at SA1. The
Group's Support Assessment is SA3. See the full list of ratings in
the table at the end of this press release.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The upgrade of the Long-Term Issuer Rating considers the Group's
expected significant reduction of Non-Performing loans (NPLs)
after the announcement of two major NPL transactions in 2018 year-
to-date (YTD). The Positive trend reflects DBRS's expectations
that with significantly lower NPLs, PTSB should be able to grow
profitability. This is supported by the sound economic environment
in Ireland and the Group's recent strong growth of mortgage market
share in its domestic market. The Group has meaningful market
shares of around 17% for mortgage loans and 12% for retail
deposits in Ireland.

PTSB's Long-Term Issuer Rating is positioned one notch below the
Bank's IA reflecting the structural subordination of the holding
company.

RATING DRIVERS

The Long-Term ratings have a Positive trend. Further positive
pressure on the ratings would require a longer track record of
revenue growth and cost discipline as well as further progress in
asset quality.

Given the Positive trend, a negative rating action is unlikely in
the short to medium term. However, it could arise if the announced
NPL transactions are not successfully completed or if asset
quality deteriorates dramatically reflecting high risk undertaking
in their new lending activity. The trend could also return to
Stable if the Bank does not demonstrate further improvement in
core profitability.

RATING RATIONALE

A key consideration for the rating upgrade was the significant
reduction in the Group's Non-performing loans (NPLs) since end-
2017, primarily driven by the agreement to sell EUR 2.1 billion of
NPLs to Lone Star and the deconsolidation of a securitization
consisting of EUR 1.3 billion of treated NPLs. After these
transactions, gross NPLs are expected to reduce to around EUR 1.6
billion, significantly down from EUR 5.3 billion at end-2017. As a
result, the pro-forma NPL ratio is expected to be below 10% at
end-2018, a material improvement from a very high 25.6% at end-
2017. PTSB expects to continue to work out these NPLs over the
medium term to meet a normalized NPL ratio.

Improving core profitability remains a key rating driver. The
Group returned to net profits in 2017, and in 1H18, net income was
EUR 56 million, around 56% up Year-on-Year (YoY), largely
supported by some one-offs and cost discipline. Net interest
income (NII); however, was down around 5% YoY primarily affected
by revenue pressure from low interest rates and the repayment of
some government bonds. Some one-off gains from the sale of debt
securities and the sale of a derivative position helped to offset
some of the NII pressure and as well as the need to build
additional provisions related to the cost of redress of legacy
tracker mortgages. The Group continued to focus on cost
containment and this was more apparent in 1H18 with total
operating expenses flat YoY. PTSB's adjusted cost to income ratio
(which excludes the Bank Levy and other regulatory costs) was 61%
in 1H18, improved from 65% in 2017.

PTSB's funding profile remains moderate, underpinned by a stable
customer deposit base. At end-1H18, customer accounts totalled EUR
17.0 billion representing 83% of total non-equity funding. The
loan to deposit ratio further improved to 105% at end-1H18.
Monetary authority funding reduced significantly to EUR 0.2
billion at end-2017 from very high historical levels and EUR 1.4
billion at end-2016. The Group also reported a satisfactory Net
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) of 112% and a Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(LCR) of 156% at end-1H18.

PTSB has a sound capital position and it has strengthened
following the significant progress in de-risking. Moreover, DBRS
recognizes that PTSB is improving its ability to reinforce capital
through retained earnings after 18 months of positive results. All
these should, in DBRS's view, help offset the negative impact
arising from the Targeted Review of Internal Models (TRIM),
(expected to lead to an increase of EUR 1.7 billion of risk
weighted assets in 2H18). PTSB has a sound cushion over its
minimum capital requirements. The phased-in CET1 (phased-in) ratio
was 16.2% and the total capital ratio was 17.5% at end-June 2018.
These compare to a minimum Overall Capital requirement (OCR) for
CET1 (phased-in) ratio of 9.825% and a total capital ratio
(phased-in) of 13.325% according to the Supervisory Review and
Evaluation Process (SREP).

The Grid Summary Grades for PTSB are as follows: Franchise
Strength - Good/Moderate; Earnings - Moderate/Weak; Risk
Profile - Moderate; Funding/Liquidity - Moderate;
Capitalization - Moderate.

Notes: All figures are in EUR unless otherwise noted.



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G R E E C E
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FAMAR: Completes EUR174-Mil. Debt Restructuring
-----------------------------------------------
George Georgiopoulos at Reuters reports that Famar, a contract
manufacturer to pharmaceutical industries, has completed a
EUR174 million (US$197 million) debt restructuring, and secured
new funds from private equity-backed Pillarstone to strengthen its
capital position.

Pillarstone is a platform set up by private equity firm KKR and
John Davison in 2015 to partner with European banks to create
value by managing their on-balance sheet non-core assets, Reuters
discloses.

According to Reuters, under the restructuring deal, Famar's EUR234
million pre-existing debt obligations will be reduced by EUR116
million, with maturities on all significant facilities extended by
six years.

Pillarstone will underwrite a new senior facility of EUR58 million
to fund Famar's long-term development plan and working capital
needs, Reuters notes.

Pillarstone's CEO John Davison told Reuters Pillarstone will fully
own Famar's equity with Greek banks retaining a 39% economic
intertest to benefit from upside potential.

"All four Greek banks are supporting Pillarstone in the firm's
restructuring and the turning around of the business," Reuters
quotes Mr. Davison as saying.

Greek banks -- Piraeus, National, Eurobank and Alpha -- remain
focused on reducing their bad debt portfolios and meeting targets
on so-called non-performing exposures agreed with European Central
Bank regulators, Reuters states.



=========
I T A L Y
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ALITALIA SPA: Help From Get easyJet, Delta Solicited
----------------------------------------------------
Alberto Sisto at Reuters reports that Italy's rail company
Ferrovie dello Stato is working to get airlines easyJet or Delta
involved in the rescue of ailing carrier Alitalia, Industry
Minister Luigi Di Maio was quoted as saying by union sources on
Dec. 12.

Last month, state-appointed commissioners running Alitalia
accepted a binding purchase offer by FS, Reuters relates.  The
flagship airline had been put on sale after being in special
administration since early last year, Reuters recounts.

According to Reuters, the sources said that Mr. Di Maio had told
labor groups in a meeting on Dec. 12 that the government aimed to
own 15% of Alitalia, and that FS's due diligence would be
completed by the end of the year.


POPOLARE BARI 2017: DBRS Confirms B(low) Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed the following ratings of the Class
A and Class B notes (the Notes) issued by Popolare Bari NPLs 2017
S.r.l. (the Issuer):

-- Class A at BBB (low)
-- Class B at B (low)

The notes were backed by a EUR 319.9 million portfolio by gross
book value (GBV) consisting of unsecured and secured non-
performing loans originated by Banca Popolare di Bari s.c.p.a.
(BPB), Cassa di Risparmio di Orvieto S.p.A. (CRO), Banca Caripe
S.p.A. (Banca Caripe) and Banca Tercas S.p.A. (Banca Tercas).

In July 2016, Banca Caripe and Banca Tercas were fully
consolidated into BPB. All loans in the portfolio defaulted
between 2000 and 2016 and are in various stages of resolution. The
portfolio is serviced by Prelios Credit Servicing S.p.A.
(Prelios). A backup servicer, Securitization Services S.p.A., has
also been appointed and will act as the servicer in case Prelios'
appointment is terminated.

As a result of the disposal of residential and commercial
properties as well as unsecured loans, the total GBV of the
portfolio has reduced by EUR 10.8 million or 3.4% compared with
the initial GBV at closing. The most recent reported GBV as of
September 2018 was equal to EUR 308.8 million compared with EUR
319.6 million at issuance.

As of the October 2018 investor report, the outstanding principal
amount of the Class A, Class B and Class J notes was EUR 72.3
million, EUR 10.1 million and EUR 13.4 million, respectively. The
balance of the Class A notes has amortized by approximately 10.6%
since issuance. The current transaction balance is EUR 95.6
million.

The portfolio continues to be mainly concentrated in the Abruzzo
region of Italy with 22.9% of the portfolio by GBV located there
in comparison with 23.4% at issuance.

As reported in the semi-annual servicer report from September 2018
(the servicer report), the net present value cumulative
profitability ratio is 102.29%. A subordination event would occur
if the ratio drops lower than 90%.

The transaction benefits from a EUR 3.2 million cash reserve that
was fully funded at closing through a limited recourse loan and a
EUR 100,000 recovery expense reserve funded with collections. As
per the Investor Report of June 2018, the target cash reserve
totalled EUR 2.89 million. The amount of the cash reserve has been
reduced in proportion with the transaction's collateral reduction
as the cash reserve target amount accounts for 4% of the Class A
notes' outstanding principal amount.

The Class B Notes, which represent mezzanine debt, may not be
repaid until the Class A Notes are repaid in full.

The ratings are based on DBRS's analysis of the following
analytical considerations:

   -- The projected recoveries of the underlying collateral;

   -- The historical performance and expertise of the servicer,
       Prelios;

   -- The availability of liquidity to fund interest shortfalls
       and special-purpose vehicle expenses;

   -- The cap agreement with J.P. Morgan AG; and

   -- The transaction's legal and structural features.

At issuance, DBRS's BBB (low) and B (low) ratings assumed a
haircut of 18.1% and 8.7%, respectively, to Prelios's business
plan for the portfolio.

According to the servicer report, an updated business plan
estimates less cumulative Gross Disposition Proceeds (GDP)
collections compared with the initial business plan. Prelios'
updated business plan has an optimistic view on the expected GPD
compared with the actual collections to date. As of September
2018, the Prelios's updated business plan estimated a EUR 13.3
million GDP collection since closing, which is 9.04% lower than
the EUR 14.6 million GDP collection amount the initial business
plan estimated at closing.

The servicer report stated that the actual cumulative GDP
collections accounted for EUR 10.1 million during the first ten-
month period after closing. The servicer's initial business plan
assumed a cumulative GDP collections of EUR 14.6 million, which is
EUR 4.4 million higher than the actual amount collected so far.
The servicer's updated business plan assumed cumulative GDP
collections of EUR 13.3 million, which is EUR 3.2 million higher
than the actual amount collected as of today. During the same time
period, DBRS estimated collections at BBB (low) equal to EUR 10.8
million, which is approximately 9% higher than the actual amount
collected so far.

DBRS was informed by the servicer that the business plan's current
underperformance is mainly to the result of the delayed auction of
certain large positions to the first quarter of 2019. DBRS will
continue to monitor the transaction in order to verify the actual
collection of those exposures.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.



=========
S P A I N
=========


SANTANDER CONSUMO 2: DBRS Raises Class F Notes Rating to BB
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited took the following rating actions on the
notes issued by FT Santander Consumo 2 (the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Class B Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Class C Notes confirmed at BBB (sf)
-- Class D Notes confirmed at BB (sf)
-- Class E Notes confirmed at B (sf)
-- Class F Notes upgraded to BB (sf) from CCC (high) (sf)
     (together, the Notes)

The ratings on the Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E
Notes address the timely payment of interest and ultimate payment
of principal payable on or before the Final Maturity Date in April
2031. The rating on the Class F Notes addresses the ultimate
payment of interest and principal payable on or before the Final
Maturity Date.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations, as described
more fully below:

   -- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies and
       defaults, as of the October 2018 payment date.

   -- No revolving termination events have occurred.

   -- Probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and
       expected loss assumptions on the receivables.

   -- Current available credit enhancement (CE) to the Notes to
       cover the expected losses at their respected rating levels.

The Issuer is a securitization transaction that closed on 9
December 2016. The Notes are backed by receivables related to
consumer loan contracts granted by Banco Santander S.A.
(Santander) to individuals residing in Spain. Santander is also
the servicer of the transaction, which is managed by Santander de
Titulizacion S.G.F.T. S.A. It envisages a 28-month revolving
period - scheduled to terminate on the April 2019 payment date
(inclusive) if no termination events occur - during which
Santander may offer additional receivables that the Issuer
purchase with collections deriving from the amortization of the
portfolio, subject to eligibility criteria, performance targets
and other provisions of the transaction documents.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of October 2018, loans that were two to three months in arrears
represented 0.3% of the outstanding portfolio balance whereas the
90+ delinquency ratio was 1.4%, up from 1.2% in October 2017. As
of October 2018, the net cumulative default ratio was 0.8%.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis on the outstanding
portfolio of receivables. Given that the transaction is in its
revolving period, the base case PD is still derived by applying
the worst portfolio composition. PD and LGD assumptions after
applying sovereign stresses are 8.4% and 54.3%, respectively.

The Class F Notes were issued for the purpose of funding the
reserve fund, and its rating is based upon DBRS's review of the
following considerations:

   -- Given the characteristics of the Class F Notes and due to
       good asset performance, they have been repaying during the
       revolving period with excess spread, as defined in the
       transaction documents, following a specific amortization
       plan.

   -- During the amortization period, if the Class F Notes are
       still outstanding, they will be in the first loss position.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

CE to the Notes is provided by the portfolio overcollateralization
and includes the reserve fund. As of October 2018, CE to the Notes
was:

    -- 16.2% for the Class A Notes (up from 15.0% as at Closing)
    -- 11.3% for the Class B Notes (up from 10.0%),
    -- 6.4% for the Class C Notes (up from 5.0%)
    -- 4.4% for the Class D Notes (up from 3.0%)
    -- 2.9% for the Class E Notes (up from 1.5%)

The CE increase is the result of the overcollateralization derived
from some excess spread being used during the revolving period to
buy additional receivables.

The reserve fund, which is currently at its target level of EUR
15.0 million (1.5% of the outstanding balance of the Class A to
Class E Notes), is available to pay senior fees, expenses, missed
interest on the Class A to Class E Notes, and principal shortfall
on the Class A to Class E Notes.

Santander acts as the account bank for the transaction. Based on
the reference rating of Santander at A (high), one notch below its
DBRS Long-Term Critical Obligations Rating of AA (low), the
downgrade provisions outlined in the transaction documents, and
structural mitigants, DBRS considers the risk arising from the
exposure to Santander to be consistent with the ratings assigned
to the Notes, as described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


TDA SABADELL 4: DBRS Confirms B(high) Rating on Class B Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed the following ratings on the bonds
issued by TDA Sabadell RMBS 4, Fondo de Titulizacion (the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes at A (high) (sf)
-- Class B Notes at B (high) (sf)

The rating on the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and ultimate payment of principal on or before the legal
final maturity date. The rating on the Class B Notes addresses the
ultimate payment of interest and principal on or before the legal
final maturity date.

The confirmations follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

   -- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults
       and losses.

   -- Portfolio default rate (PD), loss given default (LGD) and
       expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables.

   -- Current available credit enhancement to the notes to cover
       the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

The Issuer is a securitization of Spanish residential mortgage
loans originated and serviced by Banco de Sabadell S.A. (Banco
Sabadell) in Spain. The Issuer used the proceeds of the Class A
and Class B Notes to fund the purchase of the mortgage portfolio
from the Seller. In addition, Banco Sabadell provided separate
additional subordinated loans to fund both the initial expenses
and the reserve fund (RF).

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of the end of October 2018, loans that were two- to three-month
arrears represented 2.0% of the outstanding portfolio balance, up
from 0.1% in February 2018, and the 90+ delinquency ratio was
2.5%, up from 0.0% in February 2018. As of August 2018, there were
no cumulative defaults reported.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis on the remaining pool and
updated its PD and LGD assumptions on the remaining portfolio
collateral pool to 22.6% and 46.8%, respectively, at the A (high)
(sf) rating level, and to 8.9% and 36.1%, respectively, at the B
(high) (sf) rating level.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

As of the August 2018 payment date, credit enhancement to the
Class A Notes was 15.4%, up from 14.4% at the DBRS initial rating.
Credit enhancement to the Class B Notes was 5.2%, up from 4.9% at
the DBRS initial rating.

The Class A Notes benefit from EUR 570 million subordination of
the Class B Notes and from a RF, currently at its target level of
EUR 294 million, which is available to cover senior expenses as
well as the interest and principal of the Class A Notes until the
notes are paid in full. The RF amortizes in line with the Class A
and Class B Notes and will become available for the Class B Notes
once the Class A Notes has been fully amortized. The RF does not
amortize if certain performance triggers are breached. The Class A
Notes' principal is senior to the Class B Notes' interest payments
in the priority of payments.

Banco Sabadell acts as the account bank for the transaction. Based
on the account bank reference rating of A (low), which is one
notch below the DBRS Long-Term Critical Obligations Rating (COR)
of Banco Sabadell of "A", the downgrade provisions outlined in the
transaction documents, and structural mitigants, DBRS considers
the risk arising from the exposure to Banco Sabadell to be
consistent with the rating assigned to the Class A Notes, as
described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology.

The interest rate risk is covered by a swap contract with Banco
Sabadell. The DBRS Long-Term COR of Banco Sabadell is above the
First Rating Threshold as described in DBRS's "Derivative Criteria
for European Structured Finance Transactions" methodology, given
the A (high) (sf) rating of the Class A Notes.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


DEBENHAMS PLC: Mike Ashley Expresses Concern Over Biz's Future
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Armstrong and LaToya Harding at The Telegraph report that
Sports Direct's Mike Ashley has sounded the alarm over the future
of Debenhams after revealing he offered the embattled retailer a
GBP40 million loan to "save" the business in exchange for 10% of
the retailer's shares.

In an explosive rant about the health of the company, Mr. Ashley
accused Debenham's board of refusing to talk to him, The Telegraph
relates.

"There's no need for that business to fail and wipe out
shareholder value -- I find it 'blow-your-brains-out' stuff," The
Telegraph quotes Mr. Ashley as saying.

According to The Telegraph, the sportswear tycoon said that he had
urged the Debenhams board to stop paying dividends that he feared
would mean "they're going to run themselves out of money".


HARVARD TECHNOLOGY: Financial Difficulties Prompt Administration
----------------------------------------------------------------
Business Sale reports that Harvard Technology Limited, a lighting
company based in Normanton, has been forced to engage
administrators after citing financial difficulties as the reason
for its downfall.

The company, a smart wireless lighting specialised, called in
Grant Thornton UK on Dec. 10 to handle the administration
processes, and have appointed partners Sarah O'Toole --
Sarah.A.OToole@uk.gt.com -- and Chris Petts --
chris.petts@uk.gt.com -- as joint administrators, Business Sale
relates.

In the financial year ending October 31, 2017, Harvard Technology
Limited reported a turnover of GBP21.1 million with a pre-tax loss
of GBP4.2 million, Business Sale discloses.

According to Business Sale, in a statement, however, the joint
administrators said that although "significant progress" had been
made in the past two years in an attempt to turnaround the
business, difficult trading conditions and cash flow pressures
were the fundamental reasons for calling in administrators.

They further commented that the business had been exploring the
possibility of a sale for a handful of weeks now, Business Sale
notes.


MONARCH AIRLINES: Collapse Puts MAG Earnings at Risk
----------------------------------------------------
Josh Spero at The Financial Times reports that Monarch Airlines'
collapse last year put at risk GBP30 million of Manchester
Airports Group's earnings, as it hurried to find airlines to fill
slots that had brought 2 million passengers a year through the
UK's third-busiest airport.

According to the Financial Times, MAG has since replaced -- or
"backfilled" -- the 2 million passenger capacity previously used
by Monarch, chief executive Charlie Cornish said on Dec. 6.

But filling the slots took time, Mr. Cornish said, and left the
group facing a tricky trading situation, the FT relates.

"Monarch was 2 million passengers in Manchester, so we've
backfilled [replaced] that capacity but it doesn't come in the
first six months, it takes time for that capacity to come in."
In its half-year results to the end of September 2018, the group
reported adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and
amortisation of GBP245 million, up 3.7 per cent on the previous
year.

The backfilling -- where other airlines utilise the slots --
"helped to stabilise what would have otherwise been a difficult
trading position.  It was worth just under GBP30 million EBITDA to
us," the FT quotes Mr. Cornish as saying.

Monarch Airlines, also known as and trading as Monarch, was a
British airline based at Luton Airport, operating scheduled
flights to destinations in the Mediterranean, Canary Islands,
Cyprus, Egypt, Greece and Turkey.


THRONES PLC 2014-1: DBRS Confirms B Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed the following ratings on the Notes
issued by Thrones 2014-1 Plc:

-- Class A Notes at AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes at AA (high) (sf)
-- Class C Notes at A (sf)
-- Class D Notes at BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes at BB (sf)
-- Class F Notes at B (sf)

The ratings of the Class A, Class B, Class C and Class F Notes
address the timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of
principal on or before the legal final maturity date. The ratings
of the Class D and Class E Notes address the ultimate payment of
interest and principal on or before the legal final maturity date.
The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following considerations:

   -- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults
       and losses as of the November 2018 payment date.

   -- Portfolio default rate (PD), loss given default (LGD) and
       expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables.

   -- Current available credit enhancement (CE) to the Notes to
       cover the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

Thrones 2014-1 Plc is a securitization of first-ranking U.K. non-
conforming residential mortgages originated by Edeus Mortgages
Creators Limited and Victoria Mortgage Funding Limited. The
mortgage portfolio is serviced by Mars Capital Finance Limited;
with Home loan Management Limited acting as the backup servicer.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of November 2018, loans that were two- to three-month in
arrears represented 1.3% of the outstanding portfolio balance. The
90+ delinquency ratio was 3.8% and the cumulative loss ratio was
0.7%.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining pool of
receivables and has updated its base case PD and LGD assumptions
to 22.7% and 23.9% from 21.5% and 22.7%, respectively.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

As of the November 2018 payment date, Class A CE was 62.5%, up
from 41.0% at the DBRS initial rating; Class B CE was 47.2%, up
from 30.5%; Class C CE was 33.3%, up from 21.0%; Class D CE was
22.3%, up from 13.5%; Class E CE was 14.2%, up from 8.0% and Class
F CE was 12.1%, up from 6.5%. CE is provided by subordination of
the junior notes and the general reserve fund.

A non-amortizing general reserve fund was funded at closing to GBP
4.6 million using half of the proceeds from a subordinated loan -
equal to 1.5% of the initial portfolio balance. It was topped up
using excess spread to its non-amortising target of GBP 9.8
million at which it has remained. A non-amortising liquidity
reserve was funded at closing to GBP 4.6 million using the other
half of the proceeds from the subordinated loan. It is available
to cover shortfalls in senior fees and interest on the most senior
class of notes and has remained at this non-amortising target
since closing.

Citibank N.A./London Branch acts as the account bank for the
transaction. Based on the DBRS private rating of Citibank
N.A./London Branch, the downgrade provisions outlined in the
transaction documents, and structural mitigants, DBRS considers
the risk arising from the exposure to Citibank N.A./London Branch
to be consistent with the ratings assigned to the Notes, as
described in DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


[*] BOOK REVIEW: Crafting Solutions for Troubled Businesses
-----------------------------------------------------------
Authors: Stephen J. Hopkins and S. Douglas Hopkins
Publisher: Beard Books
Hardcover: 316 pages
List Price: US$74.95

Own your personal copy at
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Crafting Solutions for Troubled Businesses: A Disciplined Approach
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The book will be of great value to turnaround management
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and private equity firm management facing problems with portfolio
companies or seeking to identify turnaround investment
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                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *