/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/181114.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Wednesday, November 14, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 226


                            Headlines


B E L G I U M

NYRSTAR NV: Analyst Says Debt Restructuring Process Inevitable


C R O A T I A

TEHNIKA: Zagreb Court OKs Request for Pre-Insolvency Proceedings


G E R M A N Y

* GERMANY: Business Insolvencies Down 5.6% in August 2018


I R E L A N D

ORANJE NO. 32: DBRS Assigns Provisional BB Rating to Cl. E Notes


I T A L Y

BANCA CARIGE: Italian Banks to Inject Funds to Boost Capital


K A Z A K H S T A N

NOMAD LIFE: A.M. Best Affirms B- (Fair) Financial Strength Rating


P O R T U G A L

HEFESTO STC: DBRS Confirms B (low) Rating on Class B Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: WPC Chairman to Continue Probe Into 2016 Collapse
FLOWGROUP PLC: Board Appoints Joint Administrators
MOCA 2017-1: DBRS Hikes Class E Notes Rating to B (high)
NEWDAY FUNDING 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class F Notes


                            *********



=============
B E L G I U M
=============


NYRSTAR NV: Analyst Says Debt Restructuring Process Inevitable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Neil Hume at The Financial Times reports that shares in Europe's
biggest zinc smelting company Nyrstar crashed to a record low on
Nov. 12 after ABN Amro said they were virtually worthless and
advised clients to "abandon ship".

"Given Nyrstar's liquidity position and the company's large debt
and interest burden, we believe a debt restructuring process is
inevitable," the FT quotes ABN analyst Philip Ngotho in a report
as saying, reiterating his sell rating and setting a 1 cent
target price, down from EUR1.

"In our view, the most likely scenario is a debt-for-equity swap,
possibly in combination with a private share placement to
Trafigura, which would come at the cost of a full wipeout of the
current equity".

Nyrstar slumped almost 50% to 63 cents, leaving the Swiss-
headquartered company valued at just EUR85 million -- a fraction
of EUR1.2 billion net debt pile, the FT discloses.

Its EUR340 million 2019 bond dropped 59 cents on the dollar, down
10 cents, a level that traders said was pricing in a debt
restructuring, the FT states.

Analysts and investors are increasingly worried about Nyrstar's
ability to repay or refinance the 2019 bond when it matures
September, the FT notes.

According to the FT, the company has been battling tough market
conditions in zinc markets as well as record low processing fees
and issued a huge profits warning at the end of September.

Headquartered in Belgium, Nyrstar N.V. is a global multi-metals
business, with a market leading position in zinc and lead and
growing positions in other base and precious metals, such as
copper, gold and silver.


=============
C R O A T I A
=============


TEHNIKA: Zagreb Court OKs Request for Pre-Insolvency Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Croatian construction company Tehnika said
the commercial court in Zagreb on Nov. 9 approved its request for
the launch of pre-insolvency proceedings.

Tehnika filed for the launch of pre-insolvency proceedings last
month after the previous bankruptcy request submitted by Tehnika
in August was rejected, SeeNews relates.

The commercial court in Zagreb said at the time it rejected the
request because it was yet to rule on a similar application filed
by local company Zagorje-Tehnobeton, SeeNews notes.  On Sept. 28,
Zagorje-Tehnobeton, however, withdrew its request, SeeNews
recounts.

Tehnika said in August it meets the preconditions for the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings after an Algerian investor
cancelled a project on which it had partnered with the Croatian
company, as a result of which Tehnika's bank accounts were
frozen, SeeNews discloses.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


* GERMANY: Business Insolvencies Down 5.6% in August 2018
---------------------------------------------------------
The Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) on Nov. 13 disclosed
that in August 2018, German local courts reported 1,616 business
insolvencies.  Destatis reports that this was a decline of 5.6%
on August 2017.

The local courts reported that, in relation to the business
insolvency requests, the prospective debts owed to creditors
amounted to approximately EUR2.3 billion in August 2018.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ORANJE NO. 32: DBRS Assigns Provisional BB Rating to Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the
following classes of notes to be issued by Oranje (European Loan
Conduit No. 32) DAC (the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

The Issuer is a five-loan conduit securitization arranged by
Morgan Stanley & Co. International plc (Morgan Stanley). The
transaction comprises five Dutch commercial real estate loans
(the Cygnet, Cheetah, Phoenix, Desert and Legion loans) advanced
by Morgan Stanley Principal Funding, Inc. (the Loan Seller or
Morgan Stanley) and sourced in cooperation with Unifore DMC to
the relevant Dutch borrowers between October 2017 and September
2018. The Cygnet, Cheetah and Phoenix loans were advanced as
refinancing facilities whereas the Desert and Legion loans were
advanced as acquisition facilities. None of the loans have
mezzanine debt or have been syndicated.

The five loans, totalling EUR [210.8]million at the time of the
securitization (excluding one Cygnet property that is in the
process of being sold) and backed by [78] properties with an
aggregated market value (MV) of EUR [344.0] million, can be
further divided into two groups: four loans are five-year
partially amortizing loans with higher margins (over 3.0%) and a
higher leverage (over 64.8% loan-to-value, LTV). In contrast, the
Phoenix loan has a lower margin (1.9%), lower leverage (56.1%
LTV), but is interest only. The Phoenix loan has a three-year
loan term with two one-year extension options.

The EUR 99.5 million Phoenix loan is the largest loan in the
transaction, representing [51.5]% of the MV and, because of the
relatively lower LTV ratio, [47.2]% of the securitized debt
amount. The Phoenix portfolio comprises 18 office properties
across 11 towns and cities in the Netherlands. Approximately
49.4% of the MV is concentrated in Amsterdam (including
Hoofddorp), the Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht. Note worthily, two
of the three office buildings in Rotterdam -- one located in
the Rotterdam city center and the second one located east of the
city -- are barely occupied, thus bringing the overall occupancy
down to 82.8%. The sponsor of the Phoenix loan is Marathon Asset
Management; the company has planned to lease up the portfolio
following some capital expenditure investments in one of the
vacant Rotterdam assets.

The Cheetah loan is the second largest loan in the transaction,
with a EUR 48.2 million initial loan balance ([22.2]% of the
securitized debt) and EUR 70.1 million MV ([20.4]% of the
transaction MV). The Cheetah portfolio comprises 43 properties,
of which 26 are retail properties and 17 are multi-family
residential properties. The properties are geographically
diversified across the Netherlands and have a historical
occupancy rate averaging over 90% for the past ten years.
However, DBRS noted that several out-of-town retail assets have
remained vacant for a prolonged period of time, and as such DBRS
has underwritten a higher vacancy rate for the retail assets
(13.2%). The sponsor for the Cheetah loan is Woon Winkel Fonds, a
real estate fund with a team of seven. The fund solely focuses on
managing the Cheetah properties.

The Cygnet loan is secured by [12] assets (excluding the asset to
be disposed, eight office and four industrial assets)
representing [11.5]% debt balance and [10.8]% MV of the
transaction. The assets are, as of 30 June 2018 (the Cut-Off
Date), 83.0% occupied, slightly above the historical average of
roughly 80%. The sponsor of the loan is Annexum Beheer B.V., the
largest retail fund in the Netherlands with about EUR 500 million
in office assets. The asset manager has adopted the flexible
office concept to effectively lease up the vacant spaces with
shorter leases. This strategy was successful in converting one
large short-term lease to a long-term lease. DBRS was informed
that a property disposal is currently underway and that, if
completed, the whole sales proceeds would be used to pay down the
loan.

The fourth-largest loan of the transaction, the Desert loan,
makes up [11.3]% of the securitized balance and [10.2]% of the
total MV. The acquisition financing was provided to assist
Highbrook's purchase of the Le Mirage office building in Utrecht
from Rockspring. Since the cut-off date, the new sponsor has
successfully completed some new leases, taking the current
overall occupancy up to 89% from 80%. The property is located in
the southwest of Utrecht where rental demand is increasing.
Highbrook's business plan involves increasing rental income
through a combination of leasing up the existing vacant space and
adjusting existing rents to market levels, which are currently
approximately 20% above the current in-place levels.

The smallest loan in the transaction is the Legion loan, which
makes up the remaining [7.8]% of securitized balance and [7.1]%
of the transaction MV. The EUR 16.5 million loans were advanced
to Aventicum in connection with their acquisition of four office
assets all located in the Randstad region. The Utrecht asset is
completely vacant. The sponsor is planning to convert the
building into a multi-let building, which is different from the
strategy adopted by the previous owner. As such, the loan
features a leasing trigger set at 65% occupancy of the current
vacant building. If the targeted occupancy were not met by the
first interest payment date, more conservative loan covenants
will apply: (1) such as a 1.0% increase in annual amortization
after 12 months from utilization; (2) a cash trap if a weighted-
average-lease-to-break falls below two years and (3) an increased
35% release premium based on allocated loan amount. The loan will
amortize from the second year after utilization.

All five loans feature tightening LTV and debt yield (DY)
covenants for cash trap and event of default. Each borrower has
procured hedging facilities with Cygnet covering 70.0% of the
loan amount and the remaining loans covering the full loan amount
with various cap strike rates. The weighted-average cap strike
rate is approximately 1.8%. For the Cygnet, Cheetah and Desert
loans, a step-down amortization rate would apply should the LTV
and DY improve significantly, i.e. if the loan's LTV falls below
60%. The proceeds from scheduled amortization, partial prepayment
or repayment will be distributed to the note holders pro rata for
all loans except for the Phoenix loan. As the Phoenix loan
represents nearly half of the securitized debt, has a lower
leverage and is a shorter loan term with extension options, the
repayment proceeds of the loan will be distributed 70% pro rata
and then 30% sequentially to the note holders in order to offset
the likely increased average LTV of the transaction following the
Phoenix loan pre/repayment. Finally, for the Cygnet and Cheetah
loans, the facility agreement also requires the borrowers to use
all property disposal proceeds to prepay the respective loan.

To originate the securitized loans, Morgan Stanley has worked
together with Unifore DMC, which is a specialized Dutch real
estate investment and asset management company. Unifore DMC helps
Morgan Stanley source commercial real estate loans.

All investment-grade notes will benefit from a liquidity facility
of EUR [9.0] million, which equals to [4.4] % of the total
outstanding balance of the covered notes and vertical risk
retention loan interest and will be provided by [Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., London Branch]. The liquidity facility can be used to
cover interest shortfalls on the Class A, B, C and D. According
to DBRS's analysis, the commitment amount, as at closing, could
provide interest payment on the covered notes up to [16] months
and [8] months based on the interest rate cap strike rate of
circa 1.8% and the Euribor cap of 5% (in respect of the pro rata
share of any loan which has passed its maturity), respectively.
DBRS has analyzed several scenarios where a particular loan
pre/repays and the impact of scheduled amortization on the
assigned ratings. DBRS concluded the assigned ratings would still
apply in such scenarios.

The transaction is expected to repay on or before [15 November
2023], [seven] days after the latest senior loan maturity. Should
a loan default before the expected note maturity, a special
servicing transfer event will occur in respect of the defaulted
loan and the proceeds from the defaulted loan will be applied
sequentially to the notes. Should the notes fail to be redeemed
in full by the expected note maturity, the issuer will make
principal payments on a sequential basis. The transaction will be
structured with a five-year tail period to allow the special
servicer to work out loans not repaid at maturity by [15 November
2028] at the latest, which is the final legal maturity of the
notes.

The Class E notes are subject to an available funds cap where the
shortfall is attributable to an increase in the weighted-average
margin of the notes.

The transaction includes a Class X diversion trigger event over
two levels, which are depending on the percentage of defaulted
outstanding loan amount in the transaction. If between 25% and
50% of the outstanding loan balance is in default, 25% of the
excess spread will be diverted into the Issuer transaction
account and credited to the Class X diversion ledger. Should the
defaulted loan amount increase to over 50% of the then total
outstanding loan amount, all excess spreads will be diverted and
credited to Class X diversion ledger. No excess spread will be
diverted after expected note maturity, as excess spread will then
be fully subordinated to principal due on the notes on a
sequential basis. However, if the trigger is cured for two
consecutive interest payment dates, the held amount will be
released back to the Class X note holders. Should the Class X
diversion trigger event continue for two consecutive note payment
dates (excluding the note payment day on which the trigger was
activated), any amount standing to the credit of the Class X
diversion ledger for the same period will be swept to form part
of the principal available funds.

Morgan Stanley will retain a 5% material interest in the
transaction through the vertical risk retention loan interest.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA CARIGE: Italian Banks to Inject Funds to Boost Capital
------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Italy's Banca Carige confirmed on Nov. 12 it
will get up to EUR400 million (US$451 million) from the country's
biggest banks and private investors to meet a European Central
Bank year-end deadline to boost its capital.

Carige, which has fallen behind in the clean-up that has seen
rivals shed bad debts, said in a statement that it would issue a
subordinated convertible bond for between EUR320 million and
EUR400 million, Reuters relates.

According to Reuters, Carige said Italian banks had guaranteed
they would buy bonds worth EUR320 million, with a further EUR80
million earmarked for private investors, possibly including
existing shareholders.

The Genoa-based bank, which is heavily exposed to the economy of
the northwestern Liguria region, has twice this year failed to
issue subordinated debt due to the high yields demanded by
investors, Reuters discloses.

The ECB has given it until Nov. 30 to detail how it will fill its
capital gap, Reuters notes.

The process will be carried out through a section of Italy's
depositors' guarantee fund dubbed "Voluntary Scheme", to which
all the main banks contribute to avoid falling foul of European
state aid rules, Reuters states.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Oct. 12,
2018, Fitch Ratings downgraded Banca Carige's Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating to 'CCC+' from 'B-' and the bank's Viability
Rating to 'ccc+' from 'b-'. The ratings have been placed on
Rating Watch Negative.  The downgrade reflects Fitch's view that
the bank's failure is a real possibility because Fitch believes
that it will be challenging for the bank to strengthen its
capital, which could ultimately lead to regulatory intervention.
The bank currently does not meet its Pillar 2 requirement for
total capital and plans to issue Tier 2 debt to reach it, which
is likely to be difficult in the changed market conditions for
Italian banks. Carige's largest shareholder has stated it would
support the bank but has not made a firm commitment to subscribe
to the entire EUR200 million of Tier 2 debt the bank plans to
issue.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


NOMAD LIFE: A.M. Best Affirms B- (Fair) Financial Strength Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
A.M. Best has affirmed the Financial Strength Rating of B- (Fair)
and the Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating of "bb-" of Nomad Life
Insurance Company JSC (Nomad Life) (Kazakhstan). The outlook of
these Credit Ratings (ratings) remains stable.

The ratings reflect Nomad Life's balance sheet strength, which
A.M. Best categorizes as strong, as well as its strong operating
performance, limited business profile and weak enterprise risk
management.

Nomad Life's balance sheet strength benefits from risk-adjusted
capitalization being at the strong level, as measured by Best's
Capital Adequacy Ratio. However, risk-adjusted capitalisation is
subject to volatility due to reserve movements in the company's
workers' compensation account (approximately 40% of the net
premium written). Furthermore, the company's asset base is highly
exposed to the high financial system risk in Kazakhstan.

Nomad Life's operating performance is strong, albeit volatile, as
demonstrated by a weighted five-year average return on equity of
70.7% (2013-2017), which has ranged between 13.4% and 158.1% over
this period. The company's performance generally benefits from a
high level of investment income, reflective of the high interest
and inflation rate environment in Kazakhstan. Prospective
performance is likely to remain volatile due to fluctuating
levels of reserves and investment earnings, as well as
uncertainty regarding the profitability of the company's
expanding life book.

Nomad Life has an established business profile in Kazakhstan,
with a 23% share of the local life market, measured by gross
written premium in 2017. A.M. Best expects moderate growth going
forward, driven by savings business and pension annuities
following changes in regulation that will create opportunities
for these products. An offsetting factor for business profile is
the company's exposure to sudden changes in the operating or
regulatory environment, which are typical in the Kazakh insurance
market. In addition, the principal line of business written is
compulsory workers' compensation business, which A.M. Best
considers high risk.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


HEFESTO STC: DBRS Confirms B (low) Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed its ratings assigned of Hefesto,
STC, S.A. (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A at BBB (sf)
-- Class B at B (low) (sf)

The notes are backed by a portfolio of secured and unsecured
Portuguese non-performing loans originated by Caixa Economica
Montepio Geral (CEMG). The CEMG Group is part of the Montepio
Group. The majority of loans in the portfolio defaulted between
2011 and 2017 and is in various stages of the resolution process.
The secured loans are serviced by Whitestar Asset Solutions S.A.
(Whitestar). The unsecured loans are serviced by HG PT,
Unipessoal, Lda (Hipoges). Where a borrower has both secured and
unsecured loans, the servicing is undertaken by Whitestar.

Given the nature of the collateral and the defaulted status of
all loans included in the portfolio, the collections received
will be the primary source of payment under the notes. As a
result, there is a significant reliance on Whitestar and Hipoges'
ability and performance as servicers in executing their
respective business plans. DBRS views the granularity of the
portfolio, the presence of a cash reserve and the experience of
the servicers as mitigating factors with regard to this risk.

The ratings are based on DBRS's analysis of the projected
recoveries of the underlying collateral, the historical
performance, expertise of the servicers, the availability of
liquidity to fund interest shortfalls and special-purpose vehicle
expenses, the cap agreement with J.P. Morgan AG and the
transaction's legal and structural features. In its analysis,
DBRS assumed that all loans are disposed through both a judicial
and an extra-judicial resolution strategy. Both DBRS's timing and
value stresses are based on the historical repossessions data of
the servicers, Whitestar and Hipoges. DBRS's BBB and B (low)
initial ratings assumed a haircut of 23.6% and of 4.9%,
respectively, to the servicer's business plans for the portfolio.

As of the May 2018 investor report, the principal amount
outstanding of the Class A and Class B notes was equal to EUR
104.1 million and EUR 19.5 million, respectively. The balance of
the Class A notes amortized by approximately 16% since issuance.
The Class B notes will not be repaid until the Class A notes are
repaid in full. The Class J notes do not receive any issuer
available funds until the Class A and Class B notes are repaid in
full. The current aggregated transaction balance is equal to EUR
157.4 million.

As per the investor report of May 2018, the actual cumulative
gross disposition proceeds (GDP) accounted for EUR 22.6 million
in the first seven months after closing. The servicers' initial
business plan assumed cumulative net GDP equal to EUR 6.5
million, which is lower than the actual amount collected to date.

The transaction cash flow structure was analyzed in Intex
DealMaker.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: WPC Chairman to Continue Probe Into 2016 Collapse
------------------------------------------------------------
Holly Roach at Professional Pensions reports that Work and
Pensions Committee chairman Frank Field will continue his probe
of former BHS owner Sir Philip Green as he prepares to meet
Insolvency Service chief executive Sarah Albon later this month.

According to Professional Pensions, Mr. Field is seeking to
obtain, in private, "further details" of the Insolvency Service's
investigation around the 2016 collapse of BHS, including learning
more about a pre-sale audit of the high street giant.

It comes after details emerged in June of a GBP6.5 million fine
levied by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) against auditor
PwC for its 2014 audit of Green's Taveta Group accounts,
Professional Pensions relates.

The accounts, which included BHS, were signed off as a "going
concern" five days prior to the GBP1 sale of the high street
store in 2015 -- and a year before the company's collapse, which
saw thousands of members' pension benefits facing cuts,
Professional Pensions discloses.

PwC accepted the FRC's initial findings and the penalty levied
against it, Professional Pensions recounts.  In correspondence
published on Nov. 11 by the WPC, Mr. Field, as cited by
Professional Pensions, said it was "difficult to believe" that
the incident was an "isolated case".


FLOWGROUP PLC: Board Appoints Joint Administrators
--------------------------------------------------
Further to its previous announcements regarding ongoing
negotiation with creditors, Flowgroup plc on Nov. 9 provided the
following update:

Flowgroup sold its principal subsidiary Flow Energy Limited on
May 1, 2018.  Since that time, the Company has explored the
possibility of a reverse takeover but has been unable to identify
any viable opportunities.

The board on Nov. 9 appointed Geoff Rowley --
geoff.rowley@frpadvisory.com -- and Philip Armstrong --
phil.armstrong@frpadvisory.com -- of FRP Advisory LLP as joint
administrators of the Company.

Cenkos Securities plc, the Company's nominated adviser, has
resigned with immediate effect.

Trading in the Company's shares is currently suspended. In
accordance with AIM Rule 1, unless the Company appoints another
nominated adviser within one month from Nov. 9, the admission of
its securities to trading on AIM will be cancelled
("Cancellation").  Given the circumstances, the Company believes
that it is unlikely to appoint another nominated adviser and
therefore expects that Cancellation will occur.

The joint administrators will correspond with the Company's
creditors and shareholders regarding the administration process
in accordance with their duties.  The Company reiterates that it
does not expect any value to be distributed to shareholders in
any event.


MOCA 2017-1: DBRS Hikes Class E Notes Rating to B (high)
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited upgraded the ratings of the following bonds
issued by Marketplace Originated Consumer Assets 2017-1 PLC (MOCA
or the Issuer):

    -- Class A Notes upgraded to AA (sf) from AA (low) (sf)
    -- Class B Notes upgraded to A (high) (sf) from A (sf)
    -- Class C Notes upgraded to A (sf) from BBB (sf)
    -- Class D Notes upgraded to BBB (low) (sf) from BB (sf)
    -- Class E Notes upgraded to B (high) (sf) from B (sf)

The ratings address the timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal on or before the legal final maturity date.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

   -- Portfolio performance, in terms of delinquencies, defaults
and losses as of the October 2018 payment date.

   -- Probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD) and
expected loss assumptions on the remaining receivables.

   -- Current available credit enhancement (CE) to the notes to
cover the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

MOCA is a securitization of receivables related to unsecured
consumers loans granted by P2P Global Investments PLC via a
marketplace lending platform operated by Zopa Limited (Zopa) to
borrowers in the United Kingdom. Zopa acts as the platform
servicer with Target Servicing Limited appointed as a backup
servicer. The loans are all amortizing, unsecured in nature, pay
fixed installments, and are assigned to specific risk markets.
The loans are typically used for home improvements, debt
consolidation or for the purchase of a vehicle.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

As of October 2018 payment date, loans that were one- to two-
months in arrears represented 0.6% of the outstanding portfolio
balance, whereas the two- to three-month arrear ratio was 0.4%.
The cumulative default ratio was 2.5%.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis of the remaining pool of
receivables and has maintained its base case PD and LGD
assumptions at 6.2% and 85.0% respectively.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

As of the October 2018 payment date, credit enhancement increased
since the DBRS initial rating:

-- For the Class A Notes, CE was 36.7%, up from 20.2%
-- For the Class B Notes, CE was 30.2%, up from 16.2%
-- For the Class C Notes, CE was 23.7%, up from 12.2%
-- For the Class D Notes, CE was 17.2%, up from 8.2%
-- For the Class E Notes, CE was 12.3%, up from 5.2%

The transaction benefits from a liquidity reserve of currently
GBP 1.2 million, equal to 1% of the outstanding balance of the
rated notes. It is available to cover senior fees, expenses and
interest shortfall on the most senior class of notes. The
transaction benefits also from a cash reserve of currently GBP
1.2 million, equal to 1% of the outstanding balance of the rated
notes. It is available to cover senior fees, expenses and
interest shortfall on any class of notes, top up the liquidity
reserve and clear the principal deficiency ledgers.

Citibank, N.A. London Branch acts as the account bank for the
transaction. The DBRS private rating of Citibank, N.A. London
Branch is consistent with the Minimum Institution Rating, given
the rating assigned to the Class A Notes, as described in DBRS's
"Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology.

The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS) acts as the interest rate
cap counterparty for the transaction. The DBRS Long Term Critical
Obligations Rating of RBS stands at "A" and the transaction
downgrade provisions are consistent with DBRS's "Derivative
Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


NEWDAY FUNDING 2018-2: DBRS Finalizes B Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized provisional ratings of the Class
A1, Class A2, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F
Notes (collectively, the Notes) issued by NewDay Funding 2018-2
plc (the Issuer) as follows:

-- AAA (sf) of the Class A1 Notes
-- AAA (sf) of the Class A2 Notes
-- AA (high) (sf) of the Class B Notes
-- A (sf) of the Class C Notes
-- BBB (sf) of the Class D Notes
-- BB (low) (sf) of the Class E Notes
-- B (high) (sf) of the Class F Notes

The ratings of the Notes address the timely payment of interest
and ultimate repayment of principal by the legal maturity date.

The ratings are based on the considerations listed below:

   -- The transaction capital structure including the form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support DBRS's
expected charge-off, payment and yield rates under various stress
scenarios.

   -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repays the Notes according to the terms
under which the Notes have been issued.

   -- NewDay Ltd (the Seller) and its delegates' capabilities
with respect to originations, underwriting, servicing, data
processing and cash management.

   -- DBRS conducted an operational risk review of the Seller and
deems it to be an acceptable servicer.

   -- The transaction parties' financial strength with regard to
their respective roles.

   -- The credit quality of the collateral and diversification of
the collateral and historical and projected performance of the
Seller's portfolio.

   -- The sovereign rating of the United Kingdom, currently rated
AAA by DBRS.

   -- The general consistency of the transaction's legal
structure with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology, and the presence of legal
opinions that address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer
and non-consolidation of the Issuer with the Seller or
transferor.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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