/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180830.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, August 30, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 172


                            Headlines


I R E L A N D

ELIZABETH FINANCE 2018: S&P Rates Class E Notes BB+ (sf)


N E T H E R L A N D S

DUTCH 2018-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB+ (sf) Rating to E-Dfrd Notes
EMF-NL PRIME 2008-A: S&P Raises Class D Notes Rating to CCC- (sf)
STEINHOFF INT'L: Financials Corrupted by Third-Party Deals
STEINHOFF INT'L: Has Deal with Creditors to Avert Collapse


R U S S I A

DALACFES INSURANCE: Assets Insufficient to Fulfill Liabilities


T U R K E Y

ISTANBUL: Moody's Cuts Issuer Rating to 'Ba3', Outlook Negative
MERSIN INTL: Moody's Cuts CFR & Sr. Unsecured Rating to 'Ba2'
TURK HAVA: S&P Cuts Issuer Credit Rating to 'B+', Outlook Stable
TURK TELEKOM: S&P Cuts Issuer Rating to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
TURKCELL: S&P Cuts LT Issuer Credit Rating to BB-, Outlook Stable

TURKEY: Germany Says Not Considering Financial Lifeline


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ASHTEAD GROUP: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'BB+' ICR
JOHNSTON PRESS: Racing Against Time to Agree Debt Restructuring
WONGA: On Brink of Administration, Faces Compensation Claims


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I R E L A N D
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ELIZABETH FINANCE 2018: S&P Rates Class E Notes BB+ (sf)
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned credit ratings to Elizabeth Finance
2018 DAC's class A to E notes. At closing, Elizabeth Finance 2018
also issued unrated class X1 and X2 certificates.

S&P said, "Our ratings reflect our assessment of the underlying
loans' credit, cash flow, and legal characteristics, and an
analysis of the transaction's counterparty and operational risks.

"In our analysis, we evaluated the underlying real estate
collateral securing each loan to generate an "expected case"
value. This value constitutes the "S&P Value" that we determine
for each property -- or portfolio of properties -- securing a
loan (or multiple loans) in a securitization. It primarily
results from a calculation that considers each property's net
adjusted cash flows and an applicable capitalization (cap) rate.

"We determined each loan's underlying value, focusing on
sustainable property cash flows and cap rates. We assumed that a
real estate workout would be required throughout the five-year
tail period (the period between the date the last loan matures
and the transaction's final maturity date) needed to repay
noteholders, if the respective borrowers were to default."

The transaction is a securitization of two loans originated by
Goldman Sachs International Bank (Goldman Sachs) to facilitate
the refinancing of commercial real estate in December 2017 (the
Maroon loan) and April 2018 (the MCR loan).

The current balance on the Maroon loan is GBP69.59 million. It is
secured by three regional town-center shopping malls in the U.K.
Two of the properties are in England, and one is in Scotland.

The MCR loan has a current balance of GBP21.12 million, and is
secured on a single office property in Manchester, England.

Goldman Sachs, as original lender for the loans, will retain a
net economic interest of not less than 5% of each class of notes,
in accordance with the EU's risk retention requirements.

  RATINGS LIST

  Ratings Assigned

  Elizabeth Finance 2018 DAC
  GBP90.707 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes

  Class          Rating          Amount
                              (mil. GBP)

  A               AAA (sf)        50.68
  B               AA (sf)         10.97
  C               A (sf)          10.20
  D               BBB (sf)        14.67
  E               BB+ (sf)         4.19
  X1              NR
  X2              NR

  NR--Not rated.


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N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DUTCH 2018-1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB+ (sf) Rating to E-Dfrd Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned preliminary credit ratings to Dutch
Property Finance 2018-1 B.V.'s mortgage-backed floating-rate
class A, B-Dfrd, C-Dfrd, D-Dfrd, and E-Dfrd notes. At closing,
Dutch Property Finance 2018-1 will also issue unrated class F and
G notes.

S&P said, "Our preliminary ratings reflect timely receipt of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal for the class A
notes. The preliminary ratings assigned to the class B-Dfrd to E-
Dfrd notes are interest-deferred ratings and address the ultimate
payment of interest and principal."

The transaction securitizes a pool of owner-occupied and buy-to-
let mortgage loans secured on Dutch residential, mixed-use, and
commercial properties. The majority of the loans (91%) were
originated by FGH Bank N.V., Vesting Finance Servicing B.V., and
RNHB B.V. Unlike in Dutch Property Finance 2017-1 B.V., 9% of the
loans in this transaction are assets purchased from Propertize's
Dome Portfolio, which the seller acquired in October 2017.
Vesting Finance Servicing B.V. will service the portfolio. The
seller of the loans is RNHB B.V.

The preliminary collateral pool of EUR526,887,661 is comprised of
2,472 loans granted to 2,328 borrowers. S&P said, "In our view,
the collateral pool is unique in that borrowers are grouped into
risk groups. All borrowers within a risk group share an
obligation to service the entire debt of the risk group and are
included in the securitized pool (i.e. there is no situations
where within a risk group some borrowers are part of the
securitized portfolio and some borrowers are not)."

S&P said, "In the provisional pool, an excess of 40% in
commercial properties is considered as non-residential, which is
the threshold limit specified under our European residential
loans criteria. To account for this we have applied our ratings
to principles and our covered bond commercial real estate
criteria.
.
"Specifically, we have applied our European residential loans
criteria adjustments for the calculation of the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency. For the weighted-average loss severity
analysis, we have used our ratings to principles and our covered
bond commercial real estate criteria to apply higher market value
decline assumptions to mixed-use and commercial properties. We
considered the risk group exposure when calculating the weighted-
average original loan-to-value (LTV) as opposed to a property
exposure for the purpose of the current LTV. As part of this
ratings to principles approach, we have also considered a largest
obligor analysis to test the structure to withstand the default
of the largest risk groups."

At closing, a reserve fund will be funded to 2.0% of the closing
balance of the class A to F notes. The reserve fund will be
nonamortizing and therefore the required balance will be 2.0% of
the initial balance of the class A to F notes.

S&P said, "Our preliminary ratings reflect our assessment of the
transaction's payment structure, cash flow mechanics, and the
results of our cash flow analysis to assess whether the notes
would be repaid under stress test scenarios. The transaction's
structure relies on a combination of subordination, excess
spread, principal receipts, and a reserve fund. Taking these
factors into account, we consider the available credit
enhancement for the rated notes to be commensurate with the
preliminary ratings that we have assigned."

  RATINGS LIST

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Dutch Property Finance 2018-1 B.V.
  Euro-Denominated Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes (Including
  Unrated Notes)
  Class               Prelim.            Prelim.
                      rating             tranche
                                  percentage (%)

  A                   AAA (sf)             78.95
  B-Dfrd              AA (sf)               9.75
  C-Dfrd              A (sf)                3.95
  D-Dfrd              BBB+ (sf)             3.50
  E-Dfrd              BB+ (sf)              0.85
  F                   NR                    3.00
  G                   NR                    2.00

  NR--Not rated.


EMF-NL PRIME 2008-A: S&P Raises Class D Notes Rating to CCC- (sf)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on EMF-NL Prime
2008-A B.V.'s class B, C, and D notes. At the same time, S&P has
affirmed its ratings on the class A2 and A3 notes.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow our credit and cash flow
analysis of the transaction and the application of our relevant
criteria.

"In January 2017, we were made aware that the issuer had entered
into a settlement agreement with Lehman Brothers Special
Financing Inc. regarding the dispute relating to the early
termination of the ISDA master agreement that governed the swap
contracts in this transaction. As part of this settlement
agreement, the issuer agreed to split the early swap termination
payment between a senior and a junior payment. The senior
payment, which followed the class A interest amounts, amounted to
EUR800,000. On Jan. 23, 2017, due to the senior swap early
termination payment and the lack of liquidity support, we lowered
to 'D (sf)' our ratings on the class B, C, and D notes as
interest on these classes of notes was not being paid."

The senior swap early termination payment was fully paid over
four interest payment dates (IPDs) during 2017. Following these
payments, the issuer, with sufficient funds available in the
transaction, began to repay current interest, including the
accumulated interest shortfalls, on the class B and C notes on
the October 2017 IPD and on the class D notes on the January 2018
IPD.

S&P said, "While the collateral performance has remained stable
since our March 2017 review, the transaction is performing worse
than our Dutch residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
index. However, the number of arrears of more than six months,
for which borrowers have not fully paid their scheduled mortgage
payments in their previous three instalments, has decreased to
1.0% from 3.6% at our previous full review. That said, we have
excluded these loans from our analysis of the collateral pools
and assumed a recovery to be realized after 18 months. As most of
the borrowers for these loans have not been current or paying
full mortgage payments for an extended period of time, we believe
they will not provide immediate cash flow credit to this
transaction until recovery." Following this approach, the current
available credit enhancement in the transaction is as follows:

  Class          Available credit
                  enhancement (%)
  A2                         21.5
  A3                         21.5
  B                           9.8
  C                           1.0
  D                         (7.7)

After applying S&P's European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, its credit analysis results show a decrease in both
the weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and the
weighted-average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level
compared with its previous review.

  Rating      WAFF     WALS
  level        (%)      (%)
  AAA        19.71    49.46
  AA         13.98    44.77
  A          10.83    36.09
  BBB         7.58    30.97
  BB          4.56    27.28
  B           3.57    23.87

The decrease in the WAFF is primarily due to the higher seasoning
credit for performing loans, which was partially offset by an
increase in self-employed borrowers. The decrease in the WALS is
mainly due to the lower current loan-to-value ratios and the
updated market value decline assumptions. The overall effect is a
decrease in the required credit coverage for all rating levels.
Since October 2008, EMF-NL Prime 2008-A no longer benefits from a
liquidity facility, with the reserve fund providing the only
source of external liquidity support to the structure. However,
due to the increase in cumulative losses, the reserve fund has
been fully depleted since the October 2013 IPD, and the principal
deficiency ledger has increased to EUR6.9 million from EUR6.0
million since S&P's previous review.

S&P said, "Taking into account the results of our updated credit
and cash flow analysis, and the application of our relevant
criteria, we consider the available credit enhancement for the
class A2 and A3 notes to be commensurate with their currently
assigned ratings. As such, we have affirmed our 'BB (sf)' ratings
on these classes of notes."

Despite the transaction's overall performance and lack of
liquidity support, the class B notes cured the interest
shortfalls and started to repay interest on the October 2017 IPD.
In S&P's view, the class B notes has sufficient credit
enhancement to prevent a default on the notes in a steady-state
scenario and under the current conditions can meet its financial
commitment on the obligation. As the class B notes reimbursed all
past interest shortfalls and paid interest timely over the last
six months, S&P has raised to 'B- (sf)' from 'D (sf)' its rating
on the class B notes in line with its temporary interest
shortfalls criteria.

The class C and D notes cured the interest shortfalls and started
to repay interest on the October 2017 and January 2018 IPDs,
respectively. The transaction has no available cash reserve or
liquidity support and the available credit enhancement for the
class C notes is only 1.0%. In addition, these classes of notes
are the most junior notes in the interest priority of payment.
S&P said, "In our view, the payment of interest and principal on
the class C and D notes is still vulnerable to nonpayment and is
dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic
conditions to meet its financial commitment. However, as the
class C and D notes reimbursed all past interest shortfalls and
paid interest timely over the last six months, we have raised to
'CCC (sf)' and to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'D (sf)' our ratings on the
class C and D notes, respectively, in line with our temporary
interest shortfalls criteria. The rating differentiation between
these two classes of notes is due to their relative position in
the capital structure, as the class C notes ranks senior to the
class D notes."

EMF-NL Prime 2008-A is a Dutch residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transaction backed by pools of nonconforming
Dutch residential mortgages originated by ELQ Hypotheken N.V.

  RATINGS RAISED

  EMF-NL Prime 2008-A B.V.
  EUR200 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

                        Rating
  Class            To          From
  B                B- (sf)     D (sf)
  C                CCC (sf)    D (sf)
  D                CCC- (sf)   D (sf)

  RATINGS AFFIRMED

  EMF-NL Prime 2008-A B.V.
  EUR200 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Class            Rating
  A2               BB (sf)
  A3               BB (sf)


STEINHOFF INT'L: Financials Corrupted by Third-Party Deals
----------------------------------------------------------
Janice Kew and John Bowker at Bloomberg News report that
Steinhoff International Holdings NV ex-Chief Financial Officer
Ben La Grange blamed departed leader Markus Jooste and auditors
including Deloitte LLP for the retailer's accounting scandal,
saying he became aware of any wrongdoing only days before the
crisis erupted.

In his first public comments since being suspended by the
company, Mr. La Grange said Steinhoff's financials were corrupted
by third-party transactions connected to Mr. Jooste and inflated
profit contributions from various parts of the business,
Bloomberg relates.

Mr. La Grange was speaking alongside current Steinhoff executives
Heather Sonn and Louis du Preez, who were updating parliament on
the ongoing process of rescuing the retailer, Bloomberg notes.

The owner of Conforama in France and Mattress Firm in the U.S.
reported accounting irregularities on Dec. 5, wiping billions of
dollars off its market value, Bloomberg recounts.  Mr. Jooste
quit as chief executive officer the same day, and has been
referred by Steinhoff to a local police unit, Bloomberg relays.

Mr. La Grange, as cited by Bloomberg, said Deloitte had rubber-
stamped accounts for previous years that now have to be restated,
and the firm and Steinhoff's mistake was outsourcing work on
various parts of the business to smaller auditors.

According to Bloomberg, PwC is investigating Steinhoff's
financials and identifying what went wrong and who is
responsible, with a focus on what Mr. La Grange referred to as
"three buckets": off-balance-sheet deals, overpaying for assets
and inflated profits.

Steinhoff International Holdings NV's registered office is
located in Amsterdam, Netherlands


STEINHOFF INT'L: Has Deal with Creditors to Avert Collapse
----------------------------------------------------------
John Bowker at Bloomberg News reports that Steinhoff
International Holdings NV said a three-year deal agreed with
creditors and a series of asset disposals has secured the
immediate future of the global retailer and its 120,000-strong
workforce.

According to Bloomberg, the owner of Conforama in France and
Mattress Firm in the U.S. can now look ahead to the completion of
a PwC probe into the accounting crisis that's wiped more than 95%
off the share price.

The South African company said in a presentation on its website
on Aug. 29 the investigation will be "substantially complete" by
the end of 2018 and those found responsible will be held
accountable, Bloomberg relates.

Steinhoff International Holdings NV's registered office is
located in Amsterdam, Netherlands.


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R U S S I A
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DALACFES INSURANCE: Assets Insufficient to Fulfill Liabilities
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia on Aug. 27 provided an update on DALACFES
Insurance Company, LLC's provisional administration.

The Bank of Russia, pursuant to its Order No. OD-978, dated
April 17, 2018, effective April 18, 2018, appointed a provisional
administration to manage the Company for a term of six months
after it violated the requirements for maintaining financial
sustainability and solvency.

The Company's failure to timely remedy breaches of insurance
regulation entailed the revocation of its insurance licenses, by
virtue of Bank of Russia Order ?D-1120, dated April 27, 2018.

The provisional administration established facts suggesting that
the Company's former owner and officials had conducted
transactions aimed at siphoning off corporate assets through
writing off reporting persons' receivables, while the Company was
insolvent and had significant overdue liabilities to creditors
regarding mandatory payments obligations.

The provisional administration also revealed possible theft of
OSAGO policy forms assigned to the Company, as well as of primary
documents confirming the conclusion of OSAGO contracts with the
use of the said forms.

The provisional administration estimates the value of the
Company's property (assets) to be insufficient to fulfill its
liabilities to creditors and mandatory payments obligations.

The information on the financial transactions bearing the
evidence of criminal offence, conducted by the Company's
executives, was sent to law enforcement authorities for
consideration and procedural decision making.

The current development of the bank's status has been detailed in
a press statement released by the Bank of Russia.


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T U R K E Y
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ISTANBUL: Moody's Cuts Issuer Rating to 'Ba3', Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Public Sector Europe has downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 the
long-term issuer ratings of the Metropolitan Municipalities of
Istanbul and Izmir, as well as the long-term issuer rating of
Turkey's Housing Development Administration. Existing National
Scale Ratings (NSRs) of Aaa.tr on Izmir and TOKI have been
confirmed. The outlook is negative. The action concluded the
review for downgrade initiated on June 5, 2018.

The action follows Moody's decision to downgrade to Ba3 from Ba2
and assign a negative outlook on the Turkish government bond
rating on August 17, 2018.

The rating action reflects Moody's assessment of the heightened
systemic risk for Turkish sub-sovereigns due to their close
operational, financial and institutional linkages with the
Turkish government. Metropolitan Municipalities in Turkey,
including Istanbul and Izmir, cannot act independently of the
sovereign and do not have enough financial flexibility to permit
their credit quality to be stronger than that of the sovereign.

As per the application of Moody's Joint Default Analysis
methodology for regional and local governments, both cities'
assigned baseline credit assessment (BCA) is b1. Moody's lowered
the cities BCA to b1 from ba2 to reflect the increased systemic
risk, as reflected by the lower sovereign rating but also to
reflect their weakening refinancing and liquidity position, a
result of currency devaluation and outstanding foreign currency
debt. The final rating of Ba3 incorporates one notch of
government support uplift.

RATIONALE FOR THE DECISION TO DOWNGRADE THE RATINGS AND ASSIGN
NEGATIVE OUTLOOKS

ISTANBUL AND IZMIR

The decision to downgrade the issuer ratings of Istanbul and
Izmir to Ba3 from Ba2 and assign negative outlooks takes into
account the following: (1) The high reliance on central
government shared taxes and the exposure to potential changes in
legislation, such as tax redistribution. The Metropolitan
Municipalities of Istanbul and Izmir derive between 75%-80% of
their operating revenues from central government shared taxes,
(2) The strong dependence on the sovereign's macroeconomic and
operating environment. Istanbul and Izmir's local economic bases
are heavily integrated with that of the national economy, and (3)
The exposures to increased debt service costs arising from the
depreciation of the Turkish lira, especially for Istanbul, which
has a high proportion of foreign currency-denominated debt. This
could exert additional pressure on both cities' debt service.

Istanbul's rating encompasses a relatively high debt burden which
will remain elevated during 2018-19 and which faces upward
pressure on debt servicing costs due to depreciating Turkish Lira
given the city's large exposure to foreign currency debt. On the
other hand Istanbul's rating also reflects its large and
diversified economy, continuing robust operating performance,
high self-funding capacity and valuable asset base, which
provides fiscal flexibility to accommodate capital expenditures
pressures and a strong likelihood that the Turkish government
would provide support if the city was to face acute liquidity
stress.

Izmir's ratings are constrained by the indirect debt of
municipal-related entities, the city's growing exposure to
foreign currency debt and the limited financial flexibility and
legislative autonomy granted by the Turkish system. At the same
time the ratings reflect its continued trend of very high
operating balances, exceeding 50% of operating revenues, allowing
room for more rapid capital investments. This should enable the
city to avoid excessive debt accumulation and retain its
currently adequate liquidity position. Furthermore, Izmir's
credit profile benefits from the third largest economic base in
the country and a moderate likelihood that the Turkish government
would provide support if the city was to face acute liquidity
stress.

TOPLU KONUT IDARESI BASKANLIGI (TOKI)

The decision to downgrade to Ba3 and assign negative outlooks to
the issuer ratings of TOKI reflects the very strong linkages
between TOKI and its support provider, the Government of Turkey.
It also takes into account (1) the credit profile of TOKI, which
in Moody's view, is closely linked to that of its owner, (2) its
clear public policy mandate and its key role in the development
of the National Urbanization and Social Housing Production Plan,
and (3) Moody's assessment of the very high likelihood that the
central government would provide timely support should the entity
face acute liquidity stress.

TOKI's ratings reflect its status as the central government's
"Housing Development Administration", its strong linkages with
the government, given its strategic role in executing the
government's housing and urbanization policies and a very high
likelihood that the central government would provide timely
support should the entity face acute liquidity stress. The
ratings also benefit from the stable institutional and
operational framework and recent debt assumption by the central
government making TOKI debt free. TOKI's financial performance
has always been influenced by the government's decision on land
allocations and investment targets. As a result, Moody's believes
that TOKI's credit quality ultimately aligns with the Government
of Turkey's credit rating.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

A downgrade of Turkey's sovereign rating would lead to a
downgrade of the three sub-sovereigns' ratings, given their close
institutional, operational and financial linkages. For both
Istanbul and Izmir, a strained liquidity situation could trigger
a downgrade. In addition, for Istanbul, downward ratings pressure
may also arise from a sustained growth in debt and debt servicing
costs.

An upgrade of the sub-sovereigns' ratings is unlikely given the
negative outlook and would require an upgrade to Turkey's
sovereign rating.

The specific economic indicators, as required by EU regulation,
are not available for these entities. The following national
economic indicators are relevant to the sovereign rating, which
was used as an input to this credit rating action.

Sovereign Issuer: Turkey, Government of

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 26,893 (2017 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): 7.4% (2017 Actual) (also known as GDP
Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 11.9% (2017 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -2.6% (2017 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -5.6% (2017 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: [not available]

Level of economic development: Moderate level of economic
resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On August 17, 2018, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of Istanbul, Metropolitan Municipality of; Izmir,
Metropolitan Municipality of; and Toplu Konut Idaresi Baskanligi.
The main points raised during the discussion were: The systemic
risk in which the issuer operates has materially increased. Other
views raised included: The issuer's fiscal or financial strength,
including its debt profile, has materially decreased.

The principal methodology used in rating Izmir, Metropolitan
Municipality of and Istanbul, Metropolitan Municipality of was
Regional and Local Governments published in January 2018. The
principal methodology used in rating Toplu Konut Idaresi
Baskanligi was Government-Related Issuers published in June 2018.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


MERSIN INTL: Moody's Cuts CFR & Sr. Unsecured Rating to 'Ba2'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1 the
corporate family rating of Turkey's second-largest port, Mersin
Uluslararasi Liman Isletmeciligi A.S. (Mersin International Port
or MIP). Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded MIP's senior
unsecured rating to Ba2 from Ba1 and its probability of default
rating to Ba2-PD from Ba1-PD. The outlook on all the ratings is
negative. This concludes the review for downgrade initiated on
June 6, 2018.

This rating action follows Moody's recent decision to downgrade
Turkey's government bond rating to Ba3 from Ba2 and assign a
negative outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects the constraints placed on MIP's
ratings by the sovereign's ratings, given the multiple channels
of exposure and contagion that exist between the sovereign and
local corporate issuers. The continuous weakening of Turkey's
institutional strength and the increased financial stress in the
country could negatively affect MIP's operational and financial
performance. As a result and in spite of its very strong
operating performance and relatively low leverage, Moody's does
not expect MIP to be rated more than one notch higher than the
sovereign rating.

MIP's ratings are one notch higher than the rating of the
Government of Turkey because (1) a significant element of MIP's
revenue is supported by demand in overseas markets; (2) the
company has minimal exposure to local debt markets and financial
system over the short to medium term; and (3) the possibility of
support from its 51% overseas shareholder PSA International Pte.
Ltd. (PSA, Aa1 stable).

Overall, MIP's Ba2 rating is underpinned by (1) the company's
very strong competitive position serving an extensive hinterland;
(2) the supportive long-term concession agreement under which it
operates; (3) the strong operational support from its main
shareholder, PSA; and (4) its track record of prudent financial
policy.

These factors are balanced by (1) its high exposure to container
volume variations; and (2) its capital investment requirements,
which, although modest, are key to enabling the port to adapt to
shipping industry trends.

However, MIP's ratings are constrained by the potential risks
associated with the sovereign, given that (1) MIP operates under
a concession agreement granted by the state, and (2) all its
assets and the services the company provides as a port operator
are within Turkish jurisdiction.

RATIONALE FOR A NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on MIP's rating is in line with the negative
outlook on the sovereign rating, given Moody's view that the
company cannot be rated more than one notch higher than the
rating of the Government of Turkey.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- UP/ DOWN

Given the negative outlook, a positive rating action is currently
highly unlikely. The rating could be stabilized if the outlook on
the sovereign rating is stabilized, provided that the foreign
currency bond ceiling remains at least one notch above the
sovereign rating.

Conversely, any downward migration in the Government of Turkey's
bond rating or foreign currency bond ceiling would likely result
in a corresponding downwards adjustment of MIP's rating. Moody's
could also downgrade the rating in the event that PSA decides to
reduce its ownership interest in MIP or if it is apparent that
MIP's concession agreement is at risk of being terminated for
whatever reason.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Privately
Managed Port Companies published in September 2016.


TURK HAVA: S&P Cuts Issuer Credit Rating to 'B+', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term issuer credit rating on
Turkish airline Turk Hava Yollari A.O. (THY) to 'B+' from 'BB-'.
The outlook is stable.

S&P also lowered its issue ratings on THY's aircraft-backed
enhanced-equipment trust certificates to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'.

S&P said, "The rating action follows the lowering of our
unsolicited long-term local currency rating on Turkey to 'BB-'
from 'BB' and our unsolicited long-term foreign currency rating
to 'B+' from 'BB-', on Aug. 17, 2018. S&P also lowered the
transfer and convertibility assessment to 'BB-' from 'BB+'.

"We believe that the extreme volatility of the Turkish lira and
the resulting projected sharp balance of payments adjustment will
undermine Turkey's economy. We forecast a recession next year.

"We view THY as a government-related entity because it provides
Turkey with an essential service and has strong operational and
ownership links with the government. We therefore link our rating
on THY to that on the sovereign. Furthermore, we do not consider
the airline as protected from extraordinary negative government
intervention and do not rate THY higher than Turkey.

"We maintain our assessment on THY's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) at 'bb-' because we believe that the company's sound
EBITDA performance will continue to be backed by the ongoing
positive trends in the tourism industry in Turkey, as
demonstrated by the strong pre-bookings, indicating a solid year
in 2018.

"We forecast that the company will post resilient reported EBITDA
(as calculated by S&P Global Ratings) of about $2.2 billion-$2.3
billion in 2018, improving to $2.6 billion-$2.7 billion in 2019,
compared with about $2.1 billion in 2017 and about $860 million
in 2016. This is because THY's revenue improvements, owing to
sustained recovery in traffic, load factors, and yields will
counterbalance higher fuel prices, staff costs, and capital
spending. We note THY's material planned fleet expansion and
capital investments for THY's relocation to the new airport in
Istanbul by year-end 2018. We forecast that the associated
increase in adjusted debt as a result of THY's inability to
generate sufficient free cash flow to fully cover capital
expenditure (capex) of $1.5 billion-$1.6 billion in 2018 and $2.9
billion in 2019, will be compensated by profitable growth to
support stable financial metrics, such that adjusted funds from
operations (FFO) to debt remains at about 26%-28%. This is in
line with our guideline for the 'B+' rating of above 12% and
points to existing headroom for financial underperformance versus
our base-case forecast.

"While we recognize that THY's SACP has recently improved and
that tourism is strengthening, the airline remains susceptible to
geopolitical events. Regional security also remains precarious.
In addition to negative geopolitical repercussions, any
deterioration in the area could also substantially impact tourism
flows. This could be the case, for example, if tensions in Syria
escalated or there was an increased domestic terror threat.

"We believe that economic benefit from Turkish lira-denominated
operating costs (opex), which accounted for about 28% of total
opex in 2017, will continue to outweigh the economic disadvantage
resulting from local currency-denominated revenue, which
accounted for about 19% of total revenue in 2017. We also note
that weaker Turkish lira and the resulting lower holiday prices
will likely attract passenger inbound traffic (mainly foreign
tourists and Turkish citizens living abroad; both accounting for
about 80% of THY's revenue) and boost load factors for THY.

"Our assessment of THY's business risk profile reflects its
participation in the cyclical and price-competitive airline
industry. Further business profile constraints are THY's
significant exposure to the local tourism industry and volatile
fuel price as a recurring source of cost pressure and potential
drag on profitability. These weaknesses are partly offset by the
company's strong market position at its primary hub in Istanbul,
where THY is by far the leading operator, its good grip on cost
control, and its young and attractive aircraft fleet. THY
benefits from a sizable home market in Turkey, and Istanbul's
geographic position, which allows the company to connect a large
proportion of Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa.
Furthermore, flying is often the only convenient method of
transportation in Turkey, since the country is mountainous and
the land-based infrastructure is not fully developed.

"The stable outlook reflects that on our ratings on Turkey and
the balanced risks to these ratings over the next 12 months.
It also reflects our expectation that THY will post resilient
earnings in the next 12 months, because revenue improvements from
a sustained recovery in traffic and yields will counterbalance
higher fuel prices and capex. This should support stable
financial metrics, including adjusted FFO to debt of about 25%."

"A downgrade of Turkey, which could stem from an increasing
likelihood of a systemic banking crisis with the potential to
undermine the country's fiscal position, or from Turkey's
economic growth turning out to be materially weaker than we
currently project, could lead to a similar rating action on THY.
We could also lower the rating if we believed that THY's
operating performance and cash flow generation were set to
weaken, either due to an unexpected drop in passenger volumes or
intense competition preventing the company from increasing ticket
prices to compensate for cost inflation. This could result in
adjusted FFO to debt falling below 12% on a prolonged basis.

"We could also lower the rating if THY's liquidity position
deteriorated, for example because it was unable to secure funding
for its upcoming significant capex.

"We would raise the rating on THY if we raised the rating on
Turkey, which could happen if the government successfully devised
and implemented a credible economic adjustment program that
bolstered confidence, stabilized balance-of-payments flows, and
brought inflation under control."

An upgrade would also depend on whether THY's SACP was supportive
of a higher rating.


TURK TELEKOM: S&P Cuts Issuer Rating to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on Turk Telekom to 'BB-' from 'BB+'. The outlook is
stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term issuer
credit rating.

S&P said, "We also lowered the issue rating on Turk Telekom's
senior unsecured debt to 'BB-' from 'BB+'. The recovery rating
remains at '3', indicating our expectation of meaningful (50%-
70%) recovery (rounded estimate: 65%) for noteholders in the case
of a default.

"The rating action on Turk Telekom follows our downgrade (and T&C
revision) of Turkey on Aug. 17, 2018. We cap our rating on Turk
Telekom rating at the level of the T&C assessment on Turkey,
which is now 'BB-', since Turk Telekom is a nonexport company
with over 90% of its revenues coming from the domestic market.

"In addition, we have revised down our assessment of the
company's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to 'bb+' from 'bbb-',
primarily due to the significant recent depreciation of the lira
(year to date as of Aug. 22, the lira has dropped 38% against the
U.S. dollar), which results in our downward revision of credit
ratios in 2018 and 2019. Since about 50% of Turk Telekom's
capital expenditures (capex) are denominated in hard currencies,
we expect to see a material increase in capex. Assuming an
exchange rate of Turkish lira (TRY) 6.9 per U.S. dollar at year-
end 2018, we estimate an increase in annual capex in 2018 of
about TRY1.0 billion, versus our previous base case, to about
TRY4.5 billion-TRY4.6 billion. As a result, we expect our free
operating cash flow (FOCF)-to-debt ratio will weaken to about 6%
in 2018 and 12% in 2019, from about 15%-20% in our previous, May
2018, forecast. In addition, we expect S&P Global Ratings'
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will increase to about 2.9x at
year-end 2018, compared with 1.9x in our previous forecast,
before gradually declining in following years, assuming an
unchanged exchange rate of TRY6.9 per US$1."

S&P's views on the SACP also reflect the company's:

-- Strong position in its domestic fixed-line business (63%
     subscriber market share in retail broadband and 82%
     subscriber market share in wholesale broadband as of
     second-quarter 2018);

-- Improving position, albeit at a slow pace, in mobile market
    (26% subscriber market share as of second-quarter 2018);

-- Extensive network infrastructure (87% LTE [long-term
    evolution] population coverage); and

-- Strong profitability, with our expectation of adjusted EBITDA
    margin at 37%-38% in 2018 and 2019.

Somewhat offsetting these factors is Turk Telekom's exposure to
high country risks in Turkey and exposure to foreign exchange
risk (approximately 43% of debt was hedged against U.S. dollar
and euro as of second-quarter 2018).

S&P said, "Our rating on Turk Telekom can be higher than the
sovereign foreign currency rating because Turk Telekom passes our
hypothetical sovereign default stress test, which, among other
factors, assumes a 50% devaluation of the lira against hard
currencies and a 15%-20% decline in organic EBITDA. Because of
this, we continue to assess that our rating on Turk Telekom can
exceed the sovereign rating by two notches. We believe the
company would pass the hypothetical sovereign default, because we
understand that management targets keeping about 80% of its cash
in hard currencies as of June 30, 2018, and aims to keep
sufficient cash reserves to serve its debt obligations in the
next 12 months. Therefore, in the hypothetical case of further
depreciation of the lira, we think the appreciation of the cash
balance would offset the increase in unhedged short-term debt
maturities and capex.

"The stable outlook on Turk Telekom reflects our stable outlook
on Turkey, and our expectation of continued solid operational
performance. Our current assessment of Turk Telekom's SACP
reflects our expectation that our adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio
will be below 3x in 2019 and FOCF to debt above 5%.

"A negative rating action on the sovereign would trigger the same
action on Turk Telekom. We could also downgrade Turk Telekom if
we revised down our T&C assessment on Turkey, due to
deterioration in Turkish corporations' access to domestic and
external liquidity, or if we believed the business risk of
operating in Turkey had materially increased.

"We could upgrade Turk Telekom if we took the same action on the
sovereign and revised up the T&C assessment."


TURKCELL: S&P Cuts LT Issuer Credit Rating to BB-, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term issuer credit rating on
Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S. (Turkcell) to 'BB-' from 'BB+'.
The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "We also lowered the issue rating on Turkcell's senior
unsecured debt to 'BB-' from 'BB+'. The recovery rating remains
at '3', indicating our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%;
rounded estimate: 65%) recovery for noteholders in the case of a
default.

"The rating action on Turkcell follows our downgrade (and T&C
revision) of Turkey on Aug. 17, 2018. We cap the rating on
Turkcell at the level of our 'BB-' T&C assessment on Turkey,
which reflects our view of the likelihood that Turkey the
government would restrict access to foreign exchange liquidity
for Turkish companies, since Turkcell is a nonexport company with
over 90% of its revenues coming from the domestic market.

"Our downward revision of the company's stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) to 'bbb-' from 'bbb' primarily reflects the recent
depreciation of the Turkish lira (year to date as of Aug. 22, the
lira has dropped 38% against the U.S. dollar), which results in
our downward revision of free cash flows and leverage ratios in
2018 and 2019. Since about 60%-70% of Turkcell's capital
expenditures (capex) are denominated in hard currencies, we
expect a material increase in capex. Assuming an exchange rate of
Turkish lira (TRY) 6.9 per U.S. dollar at year-end 2018, we
estimate an increase in annual capex of about TRY1 billion versus
our previous base case, to about TRY4.9 billion in 2018. As a
result, we now expect our free operating cash flow (FOCF)-to-debt
ratio will only be at break-even levels in 2018 and 5% in 2019,
compared with about 10% and 20% respectively in our previous
forecast. In addition, we expect S&P Global Ratings' adjusted
debt to EBITDA will increase to about 2.1x at year-end 2018,
compared with 1.6x in our previous forecast, followed by a
gradual decline in following years assuming the exchange rate
remains at TRY6.9 per $1.

"Our assessment of Turkcell's SACP also reflects the company's
strong position in the Turkish mobile telephony market (43.9% of
subscriber and 45.6% revenue share), solid growth prospects,
superior mobile network, digital services offering, and brand.
These strengths are partly offset by Turkcell's exposure to
various country risks, a small market share in the fixed market
dominated by Turk Telekom (82% market share in wholesale and 63%
in retail broadband as of second-quarter 2018), and a focus on
Turkey despite a presence in both Ukraine and Belarus (only
contributing about 4% of revenues combined), where Turkcell only
holds a No. 3 position.

"Furthermore, our SACP reflects some risks linked to a long-
standing dispute among its shareholders. Specifically, the
dispute could trigger ownership changes, resulting in a different
financial policy or strategic direction. This is mitigated by
limited exposure to foreign exchange risk (approximately 58% of
debt was hedged against the U.S. dollar and euro as of second-
quarter 2018) and relatively low leverage.

"Our rating on Turkcell can be higher than the unsolicited
sovereign foreign currency rating because Turkcell passes our
hypothetical sovereign default stress test, which, among other
factors, assumes a 50% devaluation of the lira against hard
currencies and a 15%-20% decline in organic EBITDA. We currently
assess that the rating on Turkcell can exceed the sovereign
rating by two notches. This is because we understand that
management keeps almost 78% (as of second-quarter 2018) of its
cash in hard currencies, and aims to keep sufficient cash
reserves to serve its debt obligations in the next 12 months.
Therefore, in the hypothetical case of further depreciation of
the lira, we think the appreciation of the cash balance would
offset the increase in unhedged short-term debt maturities and
capex.

"The stable outlook on Turkcell reflects our stable outlook on
Turkey, and our expectation of continued solid operational
performance. Our SACP assessment reflects our expectation that
Turkcell's leverage ratio will be at or below 2.25x in 2018 and
2019 and that FOCF to debt will recover to about 5% in 2019.

"If we took a negative rating action on the sovereign, we could
downgrade Turkcell. Given that we cap the rating at the level of
the T&C assessment, we would also lower our rating on Turkcell if
we revised down our T&C assessment on Turkey, for example due to
deterioration in Turkish corporations' access to domestic and
external liquidity, or if we believed the business risk of
operating in Turkey had materially increased.

"We could upgrade Turkcell if we took the same action on the
sovereign and revised up the T&C assessment."


TURKEY: Germany Says Not Considering Financial Lifeline
-------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Germany is not considering providing Turkey
with a financial lifeline to help it overcome a crisis sparked by
a fast falling lira, a government official told Reuters on Aug.
28.

"Our position has not changed," the official, as cited by
Reuters, said, pointing to a government statement on Aug. 20 that
financial aid to Turkey was not a question for Germany at the
moment.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ASHTEAD GROUP: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'BB+' ICR
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised to positive from stable its outlook on
U.K.-based plant hire firm Ashtead Group PLC. At the same time,
S&P affirmed its 'BB+' long-term issuer credit rating on the
company.

S&P said, "We also affirmed our 'BBB-' issue rating on the
group's second-lien debt. The recovery rating on this debt is
unchanged at '2', indicating our expectation of substantial
recovery (70%-90%; rounded estimate: 80%) in the event of a
payment default."

The outlook revision reflects the possibility of an upgrade in
the next 12-18 months if Ashtead maintains its sustained and
resilient performance on the back of favorable fundamentals in
the U.S. equipment rental market, resulting in continued growth
and stable profitability.

Reflecting Ashtead's performance, S&P has revised Ashtead's
business risk profile to satisfactory from fair. In the last
eight consecutive years, since the last downturn, Ashtead has
shown double-digit growth, gaining scale. The company has
expanded to almost four times its size, increasing sales to
GBP3.7 billion in fiscal year ending April 30, 2018, from GBP950
million sales in fiscal 2011. This growth was combined with
stable and rising profitability, with adjusted EBITDA margins
improving to 49% in fiscal 2018 from about 33.8% in fiscal 2011.

S&P said, "We expect that Ashtead will continue to benefit from
positive trends in the U.S. and U.K. equipment rental markets. We
also believe that the fundamental trend toward rental versus
purchase of equipment, combined with increasing market
penetration, will help Ashtead achieve more stable earnings. We
believe Ashtead's revenues will increase by 10%-12% in 2019 and
8%-10% in 2020, to GBP4.0 billion-GBP4.2 billion and GBP4.4
billion-GBP4.6 billion respectively. This will enable Ashtead to
maintain above-average adjusted EBITDA margins compared with the
industry average of 30%-40%. We expect Ashtead will continue to
post an adjusted EBITDA margin of 49%-50% on an adjusted basis
over the next few years.

"Our view of Ashtead's business risk profile is supported by the
company's strong market position in the fragmented U.S. market
and the scale of its operations, which enhances its purchasing
power with suppliers and its proximity to the customers. Ashtead
is operating in a very fragmented industry, with the top-3 large
players maintaining about 23% of market share the in U.S. market
(United Rentals, Sunbelt [Ashtead], Herc Rentals). We believe
that Ashtead's scale of business and access to capital provides
competitive strength and the ability to expand its share, in a
market dominated by smaller players. We also view positively
Ashtead's above-average profitability, which is supported by a
competitive average utilization rate of 60%-70% through the
cycle, and a fairly low average fleet age. We also consider that
the company has a flexible business model, allowing it to lower
capital expenditure (capex) during industry downturns. This was
demonstrated by its ability to reduce its exposure to the oil and
gas markets during the recent downturn. The company managed to
dispose of oil and gas assets while further diversifying in
expanding markets, such as event management. However, the high
capital intensity of the equipment rental sector, the cyclicality
of its end-markets -- mainly nonresidential construction -- and
its limited geographic diversity constrain our business risk
assessment.

"Ashtead's capex remains elevated for the purposes of expanding
its business and taking advantage of favorable market conditions.
Due to strong margin expansion, we now think that Ashtead will be
able to generate positive free operating cash flows (FOCF) in
fiscals 2019 and 2020. Additionally, the company is in a two-to-
three year phase where replacement capex is lower because it is
mainly replacing fleet bought in 2009, 2010, and 2011, when capex
was at the bottom of the cycle. Moreover, we expect Ashtead will
continue to manage its balance sheet prudently. Despite our
expectation that Ashtead will continue to make bolt-on
acquisitions, pay dividends, and repurchase shares, we expect the
company's leverage will remain in line with its public guidance
of debt to EBITDA of 1.5x-2.0x.

"The positive outlook reflects the possibility of an upgrade if
Ashtead maintains FFO to debt in line with our expectations in
the next 12-18 months, while adhering to a conservative financial
policy in terms of capital allocation.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if Ashtead's operating
performance deteriorates, with FFO to debt falling below our
expectations of less than 52%, or if we see an unexpected
increase in fleet capex, a dividend payout, or acquisitions."


JOHNSTON PRESS: Racing Against Time to Agree Debt Restructuring
---------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Williams at The Telegraph reports that deep cost
cutting at the troubled newspaper publisher Johnston Press helped
it maintain profits despite a dip in digital revenues as Google
and Facebook tightened their grip on the online advertising
market.

According to The Telegraph, the publisher of the i, the Scotsman
and scores of local titles is in a race against time to agree
debt restructuring with its lenders before a repayment deadline
next summer that threatens to tip it into administration.

First half turnover was down 10% on last year to GBP93 million,
as among the main lines of business only the i registered growth,
The Telegraph discloses.

Overall advertising sales were down 18% to GBP52.7 million,
including a 29% plunge in classifieds, The Telegraph states.


WONGA: On Brink of Administration, Faces Compensation Claims
------------------------------------------------------------
According to The Irish Times' Fiona Walsh, reports of the
impending collapse of the notorious payday lender Wonga, which
fleeced and frightened its vulnerable and desperate customers
throughout the financial crisis, have been greeted with
undisguised glee on social media.

Although Wonga has been forced to clean up its act in recent
years after an outcry over its lending practices, it remains one
of the most hated companies in the Britain, The Irish Times
notes.

For the group's 500 employees, the prospect of administration is
no joke, of course, The Irish Times states.  And there are fears
that if the company does go under, its vulnerable customers will
be forced to turn to loan sharks instead, according to The Irish
Times.

Amid a public outcry -- and intervention from the Archbishop of
Canterbury -- the City regulator imposed a cap on loan rates in
2015 and Wonga's business model collapsed, The Irish Times
relates.  The company has been hit by a flood of compensation
claims for the unscrupulous loans it made before the cap came in,
forcing the company to take out its own emergency loan a few
weeks ago, when shareholders stumped up GBP10 million to keep it
afloat, The Irish Times discloses.

As claims management companies continue to demand Wonga
compensate mis-sold customers, Grant Thornton is understood to be
on standby to move in as administrator, The Irish Times states.
Wonga's directors say they are continuing to "assess all options"
for the business, The Irish Times relays.

If the firm does fall into administration, customers' debts will
live on with whoever takes over the Wonga loan book, The Irish
Times notes.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
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