/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180710.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, July 6, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 133


                            Headlines


C R O A T I A

AGROKOR DD: Creditors Back Debt Settlement Deal


F R A N C E

NORIA 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes C(sf) Rating on Class G Notes


G E R M A N Y

DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEFBANK: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Sub. Debt Rating
FELDMUEHLE UETERSEN: To be Transferred to Subsidiary of Kairos
REVOCAR 2017: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class D Notes
ZANDERS GMBH: Restructuring Process Continues


G R E E C E

ALPHA BANK: S&P Raises Issuer Credit Ratings to 'B-/B'


I R E L A N D

BAMS CMBS 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB(low) Rating on E Notes


I T A L Y

2WORLDS SRL: DBRS Assigns B(low) Rating to Class B Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

AI ALABAMA: S&P Puts 'B' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Negative
IGNITION TOPCO: Moody's Assigns B3 CFR, Outlook Stable
STEINHOFF INT'L: Mulls Sale of Pepco Amid Restructuring Talks


R O M A N I A

TRANSELECTRICA SA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 CFR, Outlook Positive


R U S S I A

MOSURALBANK JSCB: Put on Provisional Administration
RUBLEV JSC: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
TAATTA BANK: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked


S P A I N

CAIXABANK PYMES 8: DBRS Confirms CC Rating on Series B Notes
EDREAMS ODIGEO: Moody's Hikes CFR to B1, Outlook Stable
IM PASTOR 3: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to CCC-
SABADELL PYME 10: DBRS Hikes Series B Notes Rating to BB(high)


U K R A I N E

OMEGA PJSC: Gets Extension of Liquidation Terms
UKRAINE: DFG Sells Insolvent Banks' Assets Worth UAH101.38MM


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CABOT FINANCIAL: Moody's Raises CFR to B1, Outlook Stable
CELESTE MORTGAGE 2015-1: DBRS Discontinues BB on Cl. F Notes
LEGACY GLOBAL: Egan-Jones Lowers Debt Ratings to B
OLD BOOT: Appoint UHY Hacker Young as Liquidator
QUANTUMA: Enters Administration, No Jobs Cut Yet

* Scottish IT Firms at Higher Risk of Insolvency


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The Story of The Bank of America


                            *********



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C R O A T I A
=============


AGROKOR DD: Creditors Back Debt Settlement Deal
-----------------------------------------------
Ivana Sekularac at Reuters reports that creditors of Agrokor,
Croatia's indebted food producer and retailer, on July 4 voted to
approve a debt settlement deal that will help to resolve the
company's troubles.

Agrokor, the largest private company in the Balkans with 60,000
staff, was put under state-run administration in April 2017,
crippled by debts built up during an ambitious expansion drive,
Reuters recounts.

Its creditors include local and foreign banks, bondholders and
suppliers, Reuters discloses.

According to Reuters, holders of 80% of HRK33.8 billion (US$5.32
billion) in debts, including Russia's Sberbank, voted in favor of
the deal that will put the company in hands of creditors and
bondholders.  The vote took place in the Commercial court in
Zagreb, Reuters relays.

The deal includes a debt-to-equity swap and some loan write-offs
to avert bankruptcy, Reuters states.

Agrokor's biggest single creditor, Russia's Sberbank with loans
worth EUR1.1 billion (US$1.28 billion), will become the company's
largest shareholder with a 39.2% stake, Reuters says.

The current management will hand the company over to shareholders
during a transitional period, which is expected to last a few
months, Reuters discloses.  After that shareholders will appoint
new management and agree on new strategy for the company,
according to Reuters.

                          About Agrokor DD

Founded in 1976 and based in Zagreb, Crotia, Agrokor DD is the
biggest food producer and retailer in the Balkans, employing
almost 60,000 people across the region with annual revenue of
some HRK50 billion (US$7 billion).

On April 10, 2017, the Zagreb Commercial Court allowed the
initiation of the procedure for extraordinary administration over
Agrokor and some of its affiliated or subsidiary companies.  This
comes on the heels of an April 7, 2017 proposal submitted by the
management board of Agrokor Group for the administration
proceedings for the Company pursuant to the Law of Extraordinary
Administration for Companies with Systemic Importance for the
Republic of Croatia.

Mr. Ante Ramljak was simultaneously appointed extraordinary
commissioner/trustee for Agrokor on April 10.

In May 2017, Agrokor dd, in close cooperation with its advisors,
established that as of March 31, 2017, it had total liabilities
of HRK40.409 billion.  The company racked up debts during a rapid
expansion, notably in Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Serbia, a
Reuters report noted.



===========
F R A N C E
===========


NORIA 2018-1: DBRS Finalizes C(sf) Rating on Class G Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized provisional ratings of the Class A
Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes, Class D Notes, Class E
Notes, Class F Notes and the Class G Notes (collectively, the
Notes) issued by Noria 2018-1 (the Issuer) as follows:

-- AAA (sf) to the Class A Notes
-- AA (sf) to the Class B Notes
-- A (sf) to the Class C Notes
-- BBB (sf) to the Class D Notes
-- BB (sf) to the Class E Notes
-- B (sf) to the Class F Notes
-- C (sf) to the Class G Notes

The rating of the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final
maturity date. The ratings of the Class B Notes, the Class C
Notes, the Class D Notes, the Class E Notes, the Class F Notes
and the Class G Notes address the ultimate payment of interest
and ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final maturity
date.

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- Transaction capital structure, including form and sufficiency
of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support DBRS-
projected expected cumulative net losses under various stress
scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay the Notes according to the terms of
the transaction documents.

-- DBRS conducted an operational risk review of the BNP Paribas
Personal Finance S.A. (the Seller) and deems it to be an
acceptable Servicer.

-- The Seller's capabilities with regard to originations,
underwriting, servicing and its financial strength.

-- The transaction parties' financial strength with regard to
their respective roles.

-- The credit quality, diversification of the collateral and
historical and projected performance of the Seller's portfolio.

-- The sovereign rating of the Republic of France, currently
rated AAA by DBRS.

-- The consistency of the transaction's legal structure with
DBRS' "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology, the presence of legal opinions that
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer and non-
consolidation of the Issuer with the Seller.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEFBANK: DBRS Confirms BB(high) Sub. Debt Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed the Long-Term Issuer Rating of
Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG (pbb or the Bank) at BBB and the
Short-Term Issuer Rating at R-2 (high). pbb's intrinsic
assessment (IA) remains BBB and Subordinated Debt has been
confirmed at BB (high). The support assessment for the Bank is
SA3. The trend on all ratings was changed to Positive from
Stable.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The change in the trend to Positive reflects DBRS's view that the
Bank continues to demonstrate a well-managed risk profile and
that the Bank's capitalization levels are now exposed to lower
uncertainty from changes of the wider regulatory framework. In
particular the Bank has successfully absorbed the recalibration
of asset risk weights under the ECB's 'harmonization of risk
models' initiative. The change in trend also reflects DBRS's view
that pbb's regulatory capital ratios have shown resilience and
compare well against BBB-rated peers, whilst also taking into
account the Bank's more cyclical business model.

pbb's ratings continue to reflect that the Bank has a steady but
concentrated core franchise which is a cyclical, monoline
business model, its solid new business generation and its
importance as a prominent Pfandbrief issuer.

RATING DRIVERS

Maintaining strong Bank capitalization levels in the face of
ongoing regulatory changes, strengthening of the Bank's earning
power, accompanied by the maintenance of strict credit
discipline, could lead to further positive rating pressure.

The ratings could be negatively impacted by factors such as i)
deterioration in credit quality and underwriting standards, and
ii) credit negative alterations in the business model.

RATING RATIONALE

DBRS considers that pbb has a strong core franchise in European
commercial real estate financing whilst also noting that it
retains a cyclical monoline business model. DBRS notes positively
pbb's cautious re-entry into the US market in the second half of
2016, promoting an expanded geographical footprint and increased
diversification.

In DBRS's view, the Bank's overall adequate financial performance
reflects its solid new business generation against the background
of high competition, margin pressure and the scheduled run-off of
its value-portfolio (legacy). pbb's earnings power continues to
benefit from very low impairment levels and tight cost
management. The Bank reported 1Q18 net income of EUR 39 million
(1Q17: EUR 38 million) based on consolidated IFRS figures. The
1Q18 underlying result was mainly driven by i) stronger net
interest income (NII) in 1Q18 of EUR 108 million (1Q17: 100
million) helped by reduced funding costs, an increased financing
volume in pbb's core portfolios and changes in pbb's regional and
business mix, ii) a positive net result from risk provisioning of
EUR 4 million (neutral result in 1Q17) reflecting the benign
point of the credit cycle in pbb's core markets in Germany and
Northern Europe and iii) stable operating expenses in 1Q18 of EUR
44 million (1Q17: 45 million) reflecting ongoing cost discipline.

The Bank's risk profile has, in DBRS's view, remained stable.
pbb's problem loan ratio stands at a low of 0.4% at 1Q18,
unchanged from FY2017. Credit concentration risk, arising
inevitably from its monoline CRE business model, is, in DBRS's
view, balanced by sound credit performance and strict credit
discipline. Loan to value ratios (LTVs) of new loans in pbb's
Commercial Real Estate lending portfolio remained at an average
LTV of 62%. We note positively pbb's alterations to its regional
lending footprint, with a lower allocation of new business in the
UK offset by an increasing US lending share and some changes in
product mix, with a higher proportion of new lending to the
Office sector and a lower proportion to the Retail/Shopping
sector.

DBRS considers the Bank's funding and liquidity profile as good.
The balance sheet is predominantly wholesale funded via secured
mortgage and public sector Pfandbriefe which DBRS considers as a
more stable form of market funding. In 1Q18 the trend of a
significant reduction in funding costs in both its mortgage
Pfandbrief and its unsecured issuances continued from the
previous year, benefitting the Bank. In addition, pbb
successfully completed in April 2018 an inaugural EUR 300 million
issuance of Additional Tier 1 capital, further enhancing its
capital structure.

DBRS views pbb's capitalization as good, supported by a fully
loaded Basel III Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) of 18.8% in 1Q18
(17.6% at end-2017), and a fully loaded leverage ratio of 4.8%
(4.5% at end-2017). Regulatory ratios have been strengthened over
the previous years, despite a substantial 12% increase (or EUR
1.5 billion) in risk-weighted assets (RWA), which was driven by
the ECB's ongoing asset risk weight recalibration exercise.
Looking ahead, DBRS expects a gradual easing of the Bank's
regulatory capital ratios over the medium-term, driven by rising
RWA, reflecting business growth and further internal model
adjustments. The Bank's fully loaded CET1 SREP requirement for
2018 is 9.95% CET1 (phase-in: 9.325%), implying a strong SREP
buffer of 885 bps at 1Q18. This, in DBRS' view, leaves the Bank
well positioned with regards to its capital levels going forward.

The Grid Summary Grades for Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG are as
follows: Franchise Strength ? Good/Moderate; Earnings ?
Good/Moderate; Risk Profile ? Good; Funding & Liquidity ? Good;
Capitalization ? Good.


FELDMUEHLE UETERSEN: To be Transferred to Subsidiary of Kairos
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Schleswig-Holstein paper mill Feldmuehle Uetersen GmbH will
be transferred to a subsidiary of the Berlin-based investment
company Kairos Industries AG with effect from June 15, 2018 and
will be continued in full. The company "Feldmuehle GmbH" was
founded especially for the transfer.

As a result of the refurbishment, 400 and thus more than 95
percent of the 420 jobs were received. The insolvency
administrator and restructuring expert Tjark Thies from the
Hamburg law firm Reimer Rechtsanwalte had concluded an
acquisition agreement with Kairos in May 2018.

Kairos Industries AG is a specialist for the takeover and
operational support of German medium-sized companies in special
situations, as well as for Group edge activities and business
units with potential for increased earnings. Kairos was assisted
in the current transaction by lawyers from the law firm Morrison
& Foerster LLP and the auditing firm Crowe Kleeberg from Munich.
The takeover of Feldmuehle Uetersen GmbH is geared to a long-term
entrepreneurial commitment, and the strategic, successful
realignment begun at the end of 2017 will be continued.

Founded in 1904, Feldmuehle produces around 250,000 tons of paper
annually. The company filed for insolvency on Jan. 24, 2018, at
the district court of Pinneberg.


REVOCAR 2017: Fitch Affirms 'BBsf' Rating on Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed RevoCar 2017 UG (RevoCar 2017) notes
following the amendments implemented in the transaction as
follows:

EUR387.1 million class A notes 'AAAsf', Outlook Stable

EUR32.2 million class B notes: 'Asf', Outlook Stable

EUR8.1 million class C notes: 'BBB+sf', Outlook Stable

EUR9.5 million class D notes: 'BBsf', Outlook Stable

RevoCar 2017 is a true-sale securitisation of a pool of German
auto loan receivables originated by Bank11 fuer Privatkunden und
Handel GmbH (Bank11). The loans are granted primarily to private
individuals. The notes pay a fixed interest rate and amortise
sequentially after the end of a two-year revolving period

The pool consists of amortising loans (EvoClassic), balloon loans
(EvoSmart) and balloon loans with special features
(EvoSupersmart). In case of EvoSupersmart loans, the customers
pay monthly instalments with a fixed interest rate during the
initial promotion period. Thereafter, the customers may either
repay the balloon amount or continue to pay monthly instalments
with a variable interest rate, subject to the servicer's
subsequent credit decision.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Servicing Continuity Adequate

The back-up servicer was removed from the transaction as a result
of the amendment. Instead, a substitute servicing facilitator
entered the transaction, responsible for appointing a substitute
servicer within three months in case of a servicer termination.
Further, the liquidity reserve was upsized to provide liquidity
to cover for at least three months of senior fees and class A
interest. Fitch therefore views servicing discontinuity risk as
sufficiently addressed.

Balloon Risk Treatment Unchanged

Fitch confirms its view on the balloon risk present in
EvoSupersmart loans. At closing, the agency did not consider the
repurchase of EvoSupersmart balloon amounts by the originator in
a stressed scenario and assumed all such loans to be terminated
by the back-up servicer upon servicer default. The amended
documents outline transaction parties that are responsible for
EvoSupersmart loan termination in the absence of the back-up
servicer. As a result, Fitch's initial approach assuming that all
EvoSupermart loans will be terminated at the end of the promotion
period with the resulting balloon risk has remained unchanged.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The transaction's rating may change following an increase of the
default rate and/or a decrease to the recovery rate for the
portfolio. Please refer to Fitch's New Issue report for the
rating sensitivity to the changes in default and recovery rates,
as determined at closing.

No updated rating sensitivities have been determined for this
rating action, as no modelling was conducted.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has not conducted any checks on the consistency and
plausibility of the information it has received about the
performance of the asset pool and the transaction. Fitch has not
reviewed the results of any third-party assessment of the asset
portfolio information or conducted a review of origination files
as part of its ongoing monitoring.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


ZANDERS GMBH: Restructuring Process Continues
---------------------------------------------
The Cologne District Court appointed lawyer Dr. Marc d'Avoine to
be the appraiser of Zanders GmbH on June 22, 2018 at the
Company's request for opening of insolvency proceedings.  Mr.
d'Avoine was subsequently appointed as provisional insolvency
administrator in the Company's proceedings. In addition,
enforcement measures are prohibited.

The restructuring process continues. Restructuring Director Igor
Ferlan and external consultants are managing Zanders in
collaboration with lawyer d'Avoine and his team. Everyone
involved is optimistic that they will be able to create a stable
future for Zanders.

In 1829, Johann Wilhelm Zanders founded the company in Bergisch
Gladbach, Germany. Zanders still operates the Gohrsmuhle paper
mill there today. The company was exclusively a supplier of
special papers until the end of the 1980s. As of 2012, it began
offering graphic mass papers. Over capacity in the paper market
and progressive digitization led to a considerable fall in the
price of paper products. In addition, the one-product strategy
under-utilized machinery, over-dimensioned infrastructure and
decrease in human capital have been major causes of the company's
crisis.

Following the acquisition of the company by the current
shareholder Mutares AG in May 2015, with support of the
employees, important restructuring successes were achieved,
bottlenecks were eliminated and processes were significantly
improved. Despite sales growth of an average of 12% between 2015
and 2017, price increases for the required raw materials (pulp,
chemicals and coal for the company's own power plant) had a
negative impact on the way to restructuring. In the past 12
months, the cost of these raw materials has risen by more than
40%.

The assets of the capital assets of the Zanders company are
currently being collected and evaluated in an objective manner.
At the same time, an inventory is being carried out. Claims are
recorded, examined and evaluated, which will take weeks to
complete. The work on the business plan and the restructuring
concept is underway, with an initial interim result expected by
the end of July 2018. Mutares AG continues to support the
restructuring in the interests of all involved.

                    Wages and Salaries Secured

Zanders currently employs about 500 employees and 22 apprentices.
The business operations are fully continued in order to obtain
the possibilities for a reorganization. The management and the
workforce as well as key suppliers and customers have already
signaled support for the continuation and reorganization. Wages
and salaries are secured through the insolvency payments up to
and including August 2018.

Zanders GmbH is a Ber?gisch Glad?bach, Germany-based paper
manufacturer.



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G R E E C E
===========


ALPHA BANK: S&P Raises Issuer Credit Ratings to 'B-/B'
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long- and short-term issuer credit
ratings on four Greek banks, Alpha Bank A.E. (Alpha), Eurobank
Ergasias S.A. (Eurobank), National Bank of Greece S.A. (NBG), and
Piraeus Bank S.A. (Piraeus) to 'B-/B' from 'CCC+/C'. The outlooks
are stable.

At the same time, S&P raised its issue ratings on the banks'
subordinated debt to 'CCC' from 'CC'.

S&P affirmed its rating on Alpha Bank's preferred shares at 'D'.
S&P also assigned 'B-/B' long- and short-term resolution
counterparty ratings (RCRs) to Alpha, Eurobank, NBG, and Piraeus.

RATIONALE

S&P said, "The upgrades follow Greece successfully completing the
fourth review of the ESM program and our expectation that the
sovereign will exit the program in August 2018.

"The upgrades also reflect our view that improved liquidity and a
growing economy will support Greek banks' capacity to sustain
financial commitments and gradually improve their balance sheets
over the long term.

"Specifically, we expect depositors' and investors' confidence in
the banking sector will improve following the recent successful
completion of the fourth review."

Also, the government recently announced a further relaxation of
capital control, thereby increasing:

-- The monthly cash withdrawal limit per person per bank to
    EUR5,000 from EUR2,300;

-- The limit for business payments abroad to EUR40,000 from
    EUR20,000 per client per day; and

-- The limit for transfers abroad to EUR4,000 every two months
    from EUR2,000 every two months.

S&P said, "We anticipate that increasing confidence and declining
capital controls will pave the way for a steadier inflow of
deposits and improve banks' access to capital markets. We
calculate that about EUR13 billion, or 9% of deposits, has
returned to Greek banks between end-May 2017 and end-May 2018 and
banks have reduced their reliance on liquidity facilities
provided by the European Central Bank by 63% or EUR36 billion. We
expect these trends to continue, thereby improving the banks'
liquidity positions.

"That said, we expect the recovery to be very gradual given how
badly the private sector has been hit by the long and deep
economic crisis in Greece. Therefore, we do not anticipate the
full return of the about EUR49 billion of deposits lost between
end-November 2014 and end-July 2015."

S&P said, "Improving confidence coupled with sustained and stable
economic growth will also translate into more favorable
conditions for banks to pursue ambitious nonperforming exposure
(NPE) reductions. We calculated that Greek banks planned to
reduce NPEs by an additional EUR27.8 billion or a 30% decline by
end-2019. We consider such a meaningful reduction in NPEs to be a
challenge for the Greek banks.

"We anticipate that over the next two-to-three years Greek banks
will need to accumulate additional credit losses of about 6.5%-
7.0% of loans (as of December 2017) to recognize losses embedded
in their NPEs. This is in addition to losses of about 2% of loans
recognized with the first-time adoption of IFRS 9. Such a high
level of provision, coupled with subdued operating profitability,
will continue to undermine banks' capitalization. We anticipate
that the Greek banks' risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratios will
remain low over the next two years at 3%-5% by end-2020.

"We have assigned RCRs to Alpha, Eurobank, NBG, and Piraeus. An
RCR is a forward-looking opinion of the relative default risk of
certain senior liabilities that may be protected from default
with an effective bail-in resolution process for the issuing
financial institution."

Greece has implemented a resolution regime based on the EU Bank
Recovery and Resolution Directive, a regime we view as effective.
The four-largest Greek banks are likely to be subject to a
resolution that entails a bail-in if they reach nonviability. S&P
has published a detailed jurisdiction assessment that identifies
the categories of liabilities that it views as protected from
default risk under the Greek bank resolution framework because
they are identified in the regulation as exempt from bail-in.

S&P said, "We typically position a long-term RCR up to two
notches above the issuer credit rating (ICR) when the ICR falls
in the 'B-' to 'BB+' range. We have applied no uplift for Greek
banks. This is because we have little visibility at this stage on
the resolution authorities' ability to carry out an orderly
resolution plan through a bail-in. Specifically, the banks' have
not yet agreed on resolution plans. Although they will have to
comply with the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible
liabilities (MREL), they hold a marginal amount of such
instruments on their balance sheet. We believe issuing such new
instruments in the very short term may be complicated, given
banks' limited capital market access.

"We also raised to 'CCC' from 'CC' our issue rating on the
subordinated debt to be issued under the banks' programs. We rate
Greek banks' subordinated debt two notches below the senior notes
to indicate their degree of subordination and our view that the
default risk is lower than specified in the 'CCC+' scenario."

Alpha Bank's preferred shares remain rated 'D' because the bank
has still not paid the coupon.

OUTLOOKS

The stable outlooks balance Greek banks' improving liquidity and
economic conditions with still-high risks that will continue to
weigh on their financial profiles over the next 12 months.

S&P said, "We could raise the ratings if the macroeconomic
environment and asset quality improve. A positive rating action
would require Greek banks to considerably reduce their NPE stocks
while preserving coverage through provisions and capitalization.
Also, we could raise the ratings if liquidity further improves,
resulting in customer deposits steadily returning to the Greek
banks and banks gaining stable access to unsecured funding.

"We could lower the ratings if macroeconomic conditions and
Greece's relationship with European authorities materially
worsens, resulting in a deterioration of banks' financial and
business profiles such that their financial commitments become
unsustainable and dependent solely on favorable external
conditions."

  RATING SCORE SNAPSHOTS

  ALPHA BANK
  Economic Risk 10
  Industry Risk 8

  Issuer Credit Rating          B-/Stable/B
  SACP                          b-
  Anchor                        b
  Business Position             Adequate (0)
  Capital and Earnings          Moderate (0)
  Risk Position                 Adequate (0)
  Funding and Liquidity         Average and Moderate (-1)
  Support                       0
  ALAC Support                  0
  GRE Support                   0
  Group Support                 0
  Sovereign Support             0
  Additional Factors            0

  EUROBANK
  Economic Risk 10
  Industry Risk 8

  Issuer Credit Rating          B-/Stable/B
  SACP                          b-
  Anchor                        b
  Business Position             Adequate (0)
  Capital and Earnings          Weak (0)
  Risk Position                 Adequate (0)
  Funding and Liquidity         Average and    Moderate (-1)
  Support                       0
  ALAC Support                  0
  GRE Support                   0
  Group Support                 0
  Sovereign Support             0
  Additional Factors            0

  NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE
  Economic Risk 10
  Industry Risk 8

  Issuer Credit Rating          B-/Stable/B
  SACP                          b-
  Anchor                        b
  Business Position             Adequate (0)
  Capital and Earnings          Weak (0)
  Risk Position                 Adequate (0)
  Funding and Liquidity         Average and Moderate (-1)
  Support                       0
  ALAC Support                  0
  GRE Support                   0
  Group Support                 0
  Sovereign Support             0
  Additional Factors            0

  PIRAEUS BANK
  Economic Risk 10
  Industry Risk 8

  Issuer Credit Rating          B-/Stable/B
  SACP                          b-
  Anchor                        b
  Business Position             Adequate (0)
  Capital and Earnings          Weak (0)
  Risk Position                 Adequate (0)
  Funding and Liquidity         Average and   Moderate (-1)
  Support                       0
  ALAC Support                  0
  GRE Support                   0
  Group Support                 0
  Sovereign Support             0
  Additional Factors            0

  RATINGS LIST

  Upgraded
                                   To                 From
  Alpha Bank A.E.
  Eurobank Ergasias S.A
  National Bank of Greece S.A.
  Piraeus Bank S.A.
   Issuer Credit Rating             B-/Stable/B    CCC+/Stable/C

  Piraeus Group Finance PLC
   Commercial Paper                 B                  C

  New Ratings

  Alpha Bank A.E.
  Eurobank Ergasias S.A
  National Bank of Greece S.A.
  Piraeus Bank S.A.
   Resolution Counterparty Rating         B-/--/B

  Ratings Affirmed

  Alpha Group Jersey Ltd.
   Preference Stock                       D



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I R E L A N D
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BAMS CMBS 2018-1: DBRS Assigns Prov. BB(low) Rating on E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the
following classes of notes to be issued by BAMS CMBS 2018-1 DAC
(the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (low) (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class E at BB (low) (sf)

All trends are Stable.

BAMS CMBS 2018-1 DAC (the Issuer) is the securitization of a GBP
315.3 million (67.5% loan-to-value (LTV)) floating-rate senior
commercial real estate loan (the senior loan) advanced by Morgan
Stanley Principal Funding, Inc. (novated from Morgan Stanley Bank
N.A.) and Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Limited
(together, the Loan Sellers) to borrowers sponsored by Blackstone
Group L.P. (Blackstone or the Sponsor). The acquisition financing
was also accompanied by a GBP 58.4 million (80% LTV) mezzanine
loan granted by LaSalle Investment Management and Blackstone Real
Estate Debt Strategies (BREDS), each holding 51% and 49% interest
of the mezzanine loan, respectively. BREDS, however, would be
disenfranchised and thus cannot exercise any voting rights so
long as Blackstone Group LP holds equity interest in the
portfolio. The mezzanine loan is structurally and contractually
subordinated to the senior facility and is not part of the
transaction.

The senior loan is backed by 59 urban logistic and multi-let
industrial properties (the portfolio). Blackstone purchased the
portfolio from Infrared Capital Partners (Infrared) and Helical
Plc. (Helical) in two off-market deals. Infrared has provided a
GBP 4.7 million rental guarantee for the vacant spaces of six
assets until 28 February 2020. The guarantee can be drawn
quarterly by the Sponsor and will cover specific vacant unit's
rental loss, service charge loss, empty rates and market-level
tenant incentives. The data tape provided to DBRS shows a current
rental guarantee income of GBP 1.8 million per annum.
Nevertheless, DBRS did not consider such rental guarantee as part
of long-term stabilized cash flow and thus did not reflect this
in its quantitative analysis (all the numbers quoted in this
report are net of the rental guarantee unless otherwise noted).

As of the cut-off date on 6 April 2018, 92.2% of the portfolio's
net lettable area was occupied by approximately 300 tenants with
some long-term leasehold interests in some estates. The top ten
tenants contribute 28.4% of the gross rental income (GRI) and the
largest tenant, Sainsbury's, is paying rent but not occupying the
space. DBRS underwrote a higher vacancy to reflect such vacancy
risk.

The majority of the assets are located along the M6 motorway
between Birmingham and Manchester, just outside of the "Golden
Triangle" of the U.K. logistics market. The assets' locations are
a good addition to those of Taurus 2017-2 UK Designated Activity
Company, which was securitized in 2017 and were also part of the
pan-European logistics platform envisaged by Blackstone, given
that the latter has a weak presence in this area. Two assets,
Simon side and Coniston, were not able to perfect the acquisition
process as of April 6, 2018 (the utilization date); therefore,
the allocated loan amount (ALA) of Simon side asset has been held
back in the prepayment account whereas the Coniston asset's ALA
has been released to the borrowers with an obligation to repay if
the relevant conditions are not met by 18 October 2018.
Similarly, the Simon side held back amount will be used to repay
the loan by the same date if certain conditions were not
satisfied.

In DBRS' view, the senior facilities represent moderate leverage
financing with a 67.5% LTV. The relatively high DBRS LTV is
mitigated by the increasing cash trap covenants set at 8.0% for
the initial loan term and 8.5% for year three to four and 9.0%
for year five. The debt yield (DY) at the cut-off date excluding
the rental guarantees is 8.21% (or 8.8% including rental
guarantee), which means the Sponsor has to improve the net
operating income (NOI) of the portfolio after the expiration of
rental guarantees to avoid breaching the cash trap covenant on
year three if extended. Meanwhile, the portfolio is 7.3% under-
rented vis-a-vis the market rent provided by Jones Lang LaSalle
Incorporated (the Value), thus providing room for the Sponsor to
increase the rent. The loan is interest-only and has a two-year
maturity with three one-year extension options subject to certain
conditions including hedging.

The loan structure does not include financial default covenants
prior to a permitted change of control, but provides other
standard events of default including the following: (1) any
missing payment, including failure to repay the loan at maturity
date; (2) borrower insolvency; and (3) a loan default arising as
a result of any creditors' process or cross-default. In DBRS'
view, potential performance deteriorations would be captured and
mitigated by the presence of cash trap covenants: (1) an LTV cash
trap covenant set at 75% applicable from second year and (2) a DY
cash trap covenant as detailed above.

The transaction is supported by a GBP 6.5 million liquidity
facility, which is provided by Bank of America N.A., London
Branch. The liquidity facility can be used by the Issuer to fund
expense shortfalls (including any amounts owing to third-party
creditors and service providers that rank senior to the notes),
property protection shortfalls and interest shortfalls (including
with respect to deferred interest, but excluding default interest
and exit payment amounts) in connection with interest due on the
Class A and Class B notes in accordance with the relevant
waterfall. The liquidity facility cannot be used to fund
shortfalls due to the Class X notes. As of closing, DBRS
estimated that the commitment amount was equivalent to
approximately 12 months of coverage on the covered notes based on
a weighted-average stressed LIBOR rate of 2.32% or seven months
based on a LIBOR margin cap of 5.0%.

The final legal maturity of the notes is in May 2028, five years
after the fully extended loan term. The latest expected note
maturity date is May 17, 2023, two days after the fully extended
senior loan term. Given the security structure and jurisdiction
of the underlying loan, DBRS believes this provides sufficient
time to enforce, if necessary, on the loan collateral and repay
the bondholders.

The Class E notes are subject to an available funds cap where the
shortfall is attributable to an increase in the weighted-average
margin of the notes.

The transaction includes a Class X diversion trigger event,
meaning that if the Class X diversion triggers, set at [7.4]% for
DY and [77.5]% for LTV, were breached, any interest and
prepayment fees due to the Class X note holders will instead be
paid directly to the Issuer transaction account and credited to
the Class X diversion ledger. However, any amount retained in the
Class X diversion ledger shall be available to be paid to the
Class X note holders in accordance with the relevant priority of
payments if (i) no Class X interest diversion trigger event is
continuing or (ii) following a loan failure event or the
acceleration of the notes, be used to potentially amortize the
notes.

To maintain compliance with applicable regulatory requirements,
the Loan Sellers will retain an ongoing material economic
interest of no less than 5% of the securitization via an issuer
loan that is to be advanced by the Loan Sellers to the Issuer at
closing. Thereafter, Morgan Stanley Bank N.A., as Issuer lender,
will transfer, by way of novation, its share of GBP 7,903,000 to
Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Limited.

The ratings will be finalized upon receipt of execution version
of the governing transaction documents. To the extent that the
documents and information provided to DBRS as of this date differ
from the executed version of the governing transaction documents,
DBRS may assign a different final rating to the rated notes.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


2WORLDS SRL: DBRS Assigns B(low) Rating to Class B Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned the following ratings to the notes
issued by 2Worlds S.r.l. (the Issuer):

-- EUR 288,500,000 Class A notes at BBB (low) (sf)
-- EUR 30,200,000 Class B notes at B (low) (sf)

The notes are backed by a EUR 1.0 billion by gross book value
(GBV) portfolio consisting of unsecured and secured non-
performing loans originated by Banco di Desio e della Brianza
S.p.A. and Banca Popolare di Spoleto S.p.A. (the Originators).
The majority of loans in terms of GBV in the portfolio defaulted
between 2014 and 2017 and are in various stages of resolution.
The receivables are serviced by Cerved Credit Management S.p.A.
as Special Servicer and Cerved Master Services S.p.A. as Master
Servicer. Securitization Services S.p.A. also operates as the
Back-Up Servicer in the transaction.

Approximately 72% of the pool by GBV is secured and 58.0% (by
GBV) of the pool benefits from a first-ranking lien. The secured
loans included in the portfolio are backed by properties
distributed across Italy, with concentrations in the regions of
Umbria, Lombardy and Lazio. In its analysis, DBRS assumed that
all loans are worked out through an auction process, which
generally has the longest resolution timeline.

Interest on the Class B notes, which represent mezzanine debt,
may be paid prior to the principal of the Class A notes unless
certain performance related triggers are breached.

The securitization includes the possibility to implement a Recook
structure.

The ratings are based on DBRS's analysis of the projected
recoveries of the underlying collateral, the historical
performance and expertise of the Special Servicers, the
availability of liquidity to fund interest shortfalls and
special-purpose vehicle expenses, the cap agreement and the
transaction's legal and structural features. DBRS's BBB (low) and
B (low) rating stresses assume a haircut of approximately 21.9%
and 10.6%, respectively, to the Special Servicers' business plan
for the portfolio.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


AI ALABAMA: S&P Puts 'B' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'B' long-term issuer credit rating
on Dutch belting producer AI Alabama Midco B.V. (Ammeraal
Beltech) on CreditWatch with negative implications.

S&P said, "At the same time, we placed our 'B' issue ratings on
the group's senior secured debt on CreditWatch negative. The
recovery rating remains at '3', indicating our expectation of
recovery prospects in the 50%-70% range (rounded estimate: 55%)
in the event of a default.

"We also placed our 'CCC+' issue rating on the secured
subordinated debt on CreditWatch negative, with the recovery
rating remaining at '6' (negligible)."

The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement that the
group's financial sponsor, Advent, has entered into exclusive
negotiations to sell Ammeraal Beltech to Partners Group. The
transaction details, including purchase price, refinancing plans,
and any changes in capital structure are still unknown. S&P said,
"We believe, however, that the change of ownership and the
following refinancing could lead to increased leverage and
further acquisitions, which the new sponsor appears to be
supportive of. We therefore see a risk of higher debt and
pressure on AI Alabama's credit ratios. Although we notice that
profitability improved over the last year, with the EBITDA margin
at 16.2% in 2017, up from 13.1% in 2016, in line with our
expectations, there is still limited headroom for increased
leverage under the rating. We believe leverage could reach levels
that are no longer commensurate with the current rating. AI
Alabama's funds from operations (FFO) cash interest coverage of
2.4x at year-end 2017 is already relatively weak for the rating."

S&P said, "We view Ammeraal Beltech's business risk profile as
constrained by the group's limited size and scope, which result
in inherently greater vulnerability to external changes compared
with larger and more diversified capital goods companies, in our
view. We think that the fragmented nature of the global light-
weight belt market poses challenges to Ammeraal Beltech's
competitive position. With a share of about 10%, the group does
not have a dominant position in this niche market, and strong
competition could lead to weaker bargaining power and pronounced
pricing pressure. The group's product offering has relatively
limited technological content, leading to lower barriers to
market entry than we see for some other rated peers in the
capital goods industry.

"However, we believe that these factors are partly mitigated by
the group's broad end-market and customer diversity. The large
proportion of recurring replacement sales and fairly high share
of revenues from stable end markets, such as food, provide some
stability, in our opinion. We also view as positive Ammeraal
Beltech's good relationships with customers as a result of its
direct-selling strategy and international manufacturing and
distribution footprint. The group has some exposure to raw
material prices, which could affect its year-on-year
profitability. However, we understand the group has historically
been able to pass these costs on to its customers."

The acquisition is subject to customary closing conditions.

S&P said, "We will resolve the CreditWatch once the acquisition
of Ammeraal Beltech closes, which we expect will happen in the
third quarter of 2018. By then, we would expect to have enough
information to determine the extent to which the ownership change
would affect the company's capital structure, financial policy,
and business plan, and ascertain its impact on the rating.

"We could lower the ratings if the transaction results in FFO
cash interest coverage staying below 2.5x. We also expect the
company will continue generating positive free cash flow and
maintain an adequate liquidity position for the current rating."


IGNITION TOPCO: Moody's Assigns B3 CFR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B3 corporate family rating
(CFR) and a B3-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to Ignition
Topco BV (Ignition). Moody's also assigned a B2 rating to the
EUR260 million term loan B (TLB) and the EUR50 million revolving
credit facility (RCF) borrowed by Ignition Midco BV. The outlook
is stable. This is the first time that Moody's rates Ignition.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has assigned a B3 CFR to Ignition, the parent company of
operating companies that trade under the name of IGM Resins. The
rating is constrained by 1) the highly levered capital structure
with debt/EBITDA of 6.4x FYE18e and 2) Ignition's low absolute
EBITDA base that is susceptible to volatility depending on the
future trajectory of the company's operating performance. For
Ignition to meaningfully deleverage, the company would have to
grow its revenues and prices over the next years. Management
expects revenue from underlying market growth, growth of existing
products into new applications and from new products.

Whilst the strong position in a niche market and high EBITDA
margins of nearly 20% suggest that Ignition has the ability to
increase prices, Moody's has assumed more conservative growth
rates than management to account for potential volatility.
Amongst Ignition's end markets are cyclical sectors such as
electronics and various coating applications (wood, paper,
plastic and optical) and the less cyclical food & beverage
industry. Moody's expects some deleveraging with debt/EBITDA
falling to 5.8x by 2020e, absent any debt-funded acquisitions.

Ignition offers a full range of ultraviolet curable material
solutions: photoinitiators (PI), acrylates, additives and
specialty intermediates. PI generated revenues account for the
majority of pro-forma annual sales of about EUR252 million in
2017 (FY17). Under previous ownership Ignition consolidated the
PI market by acquiring other PI companies between 2014 and 2017.
This has resulted in Ignition controlling nearly half of the
global PI market. Whilst the risk of further transforming
acquisitions in Ignition's core markets is moderate, Moody's
nevertheless expects Ignition to either make bolt-on acquisitions
or buy into adjacent technologies via debt-funding. The senior
facilities agreement allows the additional borrowing under an
incremental facility.

Ignition's liquidity is solid. Annual EBITDA of at least EUR50
million coupled with (1) moderate seasonal working capital
swings; (2) low maintenance capital expenditure requirements and;
(3) moderate growth related capex support free cash flow
generation in the EUR10 million to EUR20 million range. In
addition, the company will have access to a EUR50 million RCF
that is split between a EUR25 million working capital facility
and a EUR25 million capex/acquisition facility. Moody's assumes
drawings of around EUR5 million under the RCF to cover intra-year
working swings and working cash requirements.

Moody's views the TLB and RCF as essentially unsecured given the
security package provided (such as shares, intra-group
receivables and bank accounts other than dedicated to cash
pooling accounts). Consequently, the assumed family recovery rate
is 50%, also reflecting the covenant lite structure with senior
secured net leverage covenant of maximum 7.7x applicable tested
when the RCF is drawn by 40% or more. The instrument ratings at
B2 are one notch above the CFR because of the significant
presence of structurally subordinated debt in form of a EUR65
million second-lien facility (unrated).

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The outlook is stable and assumes that Ignition keeps leverage
within a band of 5.5x-7.0x debt/EBITDA, including debt-funded
acquisitions. The outlook also assumes that EBITDA margins remain
between 15%-20% and that the company maintains a solid liquidity.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP / DOWN

Moody's could upgrade ratings if (1) Debt/EBITDA were sustainably
below 5.5x; (2) EBITDA margins remained around 20%; and (3)
positive FCF generation.

Moody's could downgrade ratings if (1) Debt/EBITDA were
sustainably above 7.0x; and (2) negative FCF coupled with
deteriorating liquidity.

Ignition Topco BV is the parent company of operating companies
that trade under the name IGM Resins (IGM), with head offices in
Waalwijk/The Netherlands. Ignition is a leading supplier of UV
curing materials. These products are high-value add
photoinitiators, acrylates and are used for a variety of coating
applications for wood and paper, plastic, electronics, 3D
printing and optical products. IGM also sells specialty
intermediates.

Astorg has signed a sale and purchase agreement to buy the
company and expects to close the transaction in early July 2018.
Previous shareholders have transformed the group from a
trading/distribution company with around EUR100 million of annual
revenues in 2012 to a leading photoinitiators manufacturer with a
revenue base of more than EUR250 million. The largest acquisition
to date was the purchase of BASF (SE)'s photoinitiators business.


STEINHOFF INT'L: Mulls Sale of Pepco Amid Restructuring Talks
-------------------------------------------------------------
Loni Prinsloo, Janice Kew and Sarah Syed at Bloomberg News report
that Steinhoff International Holdings NV is gauging takeover
interest in businesses including clothing chain Pepco as the
scandal-hit retailer prepares for the next phase of a recovery
plan.

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the matter said
the company has informally sounded out potential buyers for Pepco
including private equity firms.

The profitable chain, with more than 1,300 stores in Eastern
European countries such as Poland and Romania, has emerged as one
of the jewels in Steinhoff's crown as the retailer battles to
survive an accounting scandal, Bloomberg notes.

A formal auction of Pepco could come if or when Steinhoff agrees
to a EUR9.4 billion (US$11 billion) debt-restructuring deal with
bondholders and other lenders, seen by the company as a crucial
step toward avoiding insolvency, Bloomberg discloses.

The retailer is negotiating a two-year payment delay, people
familiar with the matter said last week, and the company said on
June 29 it has enough backing to extend the talks through
July 20, Bloomberg relates.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


TRANSELECTRICA SA: Moody's Affirms Ba1 CFR, Outlook Positive
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba1 corporate family
rating (CFR) and Ba1-PD probability of default rating of the
Romanian electricity transmission system operator Transelectrica
S.A. The outlook has been changed to positive from stable.

A CFR is an opinion of the Transelectrica group's ability to
honour its financial obligations and is assigned to
Transelectrica as if it had a single class of debt and a
consolidated legal structure.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR POSITIVE OUTLOOK

The change in outlook to positive from stable reflects
Transelectrica's very strong financial metrics, a developing
regulatory track record with consistent implementation of
regulatory principles, and an expectation that this trend will
continue.

Transelectrica carries low levels of net debt, which is reflected
in robust financial metrics, including net debt to EBITDA of 0.1x
as at end 2017, with significant leeway against financial
covenants of 3.5x. Nevertheless, assuming investments increase
from current low levels, Moody's would expect the current
financial headroom to be gradually absorbed.

Under the current regulatory framework, now in its third
regulatory period, Transelectrica benefits from a fair and rather
transparent regime under a revenue cap model, which entitles the
company to a 7.7% return on the Regulatory Asset Base and
reasonable and timely recovery of costs incurred. The Regulator
has also made in-period adjustments to reflect higher-than-
expected electricity demand and inflation. New investments can
now be added to the Regulatory Asset Base within the regulatory
period, rather than waiting for the end. This should help smooth
Transelectrica's revenues as investments have been lower than
those initially incorporated into the Regulator's assumptions,
which is likely to lead to a reduction of revenues in future
years.

The fourth regulatory period starts in July 2019 and the draft
proposal for Transelectrica is expected towards the end of the
year, which does create some uncertainty. The Regulator has
indicated for the rather comparable electricity distribution
companies, that the current return on capital could drop from
7.7% to 5.07% for their new regulatory period starting 1 January
2019, so may propose a similar change for Transelectrica. These
proposals are likely to be the subject of further discussion and
additional clarity is expected in forthcoming months.

AFFIRMATION OF Ba1 RATING

The Ba1 continues to reflect (1) a low business risk profile
given Transelectrica's strategic importance and natural monopoly
as Romania's fully regulated electricity transmission grid owner
and operator, in addition to (2) its strong financial metrics and
improving regulatory regime, which has still to establish the
length of track record of a number of Western European countries.

The rating is constrained by a number of factors. These include
(1) governmental decisions over the past couple of years to
extract higher dividends from state-owned companies to meet the
government's own budgetary requirements and a lack of clarity as
to the size of future dividend payouts, which could affect the
company's liquidity; (2) slow progress on the implementation of
the company's strategic plan to upgrade and improve the domestic
grid and cross border connections which has been hampered by
difficulties in obtaining the necessary land rights and
construction permits; and (3) frequent changes in the Management
and Supervisory Board structure which could contribute to delays
in achieving the company's long term strategic objectives. Slow
progress on investments and large dividends could lead to a
gradual reduction in the value of the company.

Transelectrica falls under Moody's rating methodology for
Government-Related Issuers given its 58.7% ownership by the
Government of Romania (Baa3 stable). The Ba1 CFR incorporates a
one-notch uplift from the group's Baseline Credit Assessment of
ba2. The uplift applied to the BCA is explained by the strategic
importance of the company to the country of Romania. Considering
the majority ownership by the state and the credit quality of
Romania, Moody's expects there to be strong likelihood of
extraordinary support from the government in case of financial
distress at the company.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Further positive rating pressure could develop if Transelectrica
were able to continue to demonstrate (1) a track record of a
stable operating and cash flow profile, which would likely
reflect a fair return on assets in the next regulatory period and
further consistent application of regulatory principles; (2) a
dividend policy that is not unduly onerous; and (3) the
maintenance of strong financial metrics with limited exposure to
more volatile foreign currency debt; assuming all in an
environment where the credit quality of the Government of Romania
and its assessment of support remain unchanged.

The rating outlook could return to stable if (1) the evolution of
regulation were to result in an unduly harsh or inconsistent
outcome in the next regulatory period; (2) the government were to
apply for very high dividends leading to a significant
decapitalisation or weakening of the company's financial profile;
(3) the liquidity profile of the company were to significantly
deteriorate; or (4) there were a weakening in the credit quality
of the Government of Romania and/or a reduction in the support
assumptions currently incorporated into Moody's assessment of
Transelectrica's rating.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Regulated Electric
and Gas Networks published in March 2017 and Government-Related
Issuers published in June 2018.

Headquartered in Bucharest, Transelectrica S.A. is the Romanian
high-voltage power transmission grid operator. As of the end of
December 2017, the company's reported revenues were RON3.1
billion (approximately EUR 670 million). Transelectrica is a
publicly traded company, listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange,
and the Romanian Government is the majority shareholder with a
stake of 58.7%.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


MOSURALBANK JSCB: Put on Provisional Administration
---------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-1555, dated
June 22, 2018, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit
institution Moscowsko-Uralsky Joint-stock Commercial Bank, or
JSCB Mosuralbank (JSC).  According to its financial statements,
as of June 1, 2018, the credit institution ranked 269th by assets
in the Russian banking system.

The credit institution's business model was of a strongly captive
nature and focused on serving the interests of its shareholders
and their affiliated parties.  Its lending operations and the
conduct of transactions with entities related to the credit
institution's beneficiaries resulted in the considerable amount
of non-performing assets in the credit institution's balance
sheet.

In contempt of the regulator's requirements that the real
financial position be reflected in its statements, the credit
institution submitted to the Bank of Russia essentially
unreliable financial statements which concealed its operating
problems involving the need to take action to prevent its
insolvency (bankruptcy) and to revoke its banking license.  The
Bank of Russia will submit the information about these facts
bearing signs of a criminal offence to law enforcement agencies.

The Bank of Russia repeatedly applied supervisory measures
against the credit institution, including the imposition of
restrictions on household deposit taking.  The credit
institution's management and owners failed to take effective
measures to normalize its activities.  As it stands, the Bank of
Russia has taken the decision to withdraw JSCB Mosuralbank (JSC)
from the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia takes this measure following the credit
institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws and
Bank of Russia regulations, in view of essentially unreliable
reporting data submitted and taking into account that within a
year measures were applied as envisaged by the Federal Law "On
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)",
considering a real threat to the creditors' and depositors'
interests.

The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-1556, dated
June 22, 2018, appointed a provisional administration to JSCB
Mosuralbank (JSC) for the period until the appointment of a
receiver pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency
(Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal
Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".  In accordance with
federal laws, the powers of the credit institution's executive
bodies were suspended.

JSCB Mosuralbank (JSC) is a member of the deposit insurance
system.  The revocation of the banking licence is an insured
event as stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance
of Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the
bank's retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said
Federal Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of RUR1.4
million per depositor.


RUBLEV JSC: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-1594, dated
June 27, 2018, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit
institution Joint-stock Commercial Bank RUBLEV or Bank RUBLEV
from June 27, 2018.

The business model of Bank RUBLEV was focused on raising
household funds and their placement into inferior quality assets.
The bank lost its capital after it created provisions adequate to
the risks assumed as required by the supervisory authority.
Under these circumstances, the Bank of Russia performed its duty
on the revocation of the banking license from Bank RUBLEV in
accordance with Article 20 of Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".

The Bank of Russia had repeatedly applied supervisory measures
against Bank RUBLEV, which included a restriction and a ban on
household deposit taking.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure because of the
credit institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws
and Bank of Russia regulations, equity capital adequacy ratios
below two per cent, decrease in the bank's equity capital below
the minimum value of the authorized capital established as of the
date of the state registration of the credit institution, and
given the repeated application within a year of measures
envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian
Federation (Bank of Russia)".

Following banking license revocation, in accordance with Bank of
Russia Order No. ?D-1594, dated June 27, 2018, Bank RUBLEV
professional securities market participant license was revoked.

The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-1595, dated
June 27, 2018, has appointed a provisional administration to Bank
RUBLEV for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies were suspended.

Bank RUBLEV is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of RUR1.4
million per depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of June 1, 2018, the
credit institution ranked 176th by assets in the Russian banking
system.


TAATTA BANK: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-1683, dated
July 5, 2018, revoked the banking license of Yakutsk-based credit
institution Joint-stock Company Taatta Bank, further also
referred to as the credit institution.  According to financial
statements, as of June 1, 2018, the credit institution ranked
220th by assets in the Russian banking system; not a socially
important lender, its impact on aggregate indexes of the banking
sector of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) was unsubstantial.

Problems in the credit institution's operations owe its origin to
the use of a risky business model, which resulted in multiple
low-quality assets having built up on its balance sheet.  The due
diligence check of credit risk conducted at the regulator's
request established a substantial loss of capital, while the
nature of its operations was found to call for action to prevent
the credit institution's insolvency (bankruptcy), which created a
real threat to its creditors' and depositors' interests.  Also,
the credit institution conducted "scheme" transactions and deals
intended to artificially sustain the amount of capital to create
the appearance of being formally compliant with prudential
regulations.

The Bank of Russia had twice submitted to law enforcement
agencies information about these transactions bearing signs of a
criminal offence.

The Bank of Russia repeatedly applied supervisory measures to the
credit institution, including a restriction and ban on attracting
private individuals' funds.

The management and owners of the bank failed to take any
effective measures to normalize its activities.  Moreover, their
actions in the run-up the license revocation date suggested fraud
as multiple assets were being withdrawn to the detriment of
creditors' and depositors' interests. The Bank of Russia will
submit the information about these facts bearing signs of a
criminal offence to law enforcement agencies.

Under these circumstances, the Bank of Russia took the decision
to withdraw JSC Taatta Bank from the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia took this measure following the credit
institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws and
Bank of Russia regulations, due to repeated application within a
year of measures envisaged by the Federal Law ?On the Central
Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)', considering a
real threat to the creditors' and depositors' interests.

Following banking license revocation, in accordance with Bank of
Russia Order No. ?D-1683, dated July 5, 2018, JSC Taatta Bank's
professional securities market participant license was revoked.

The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-1684, dated
July 5, 2018, appointed a provisional administration to JSC
Taatta Bank for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies were suspended.

JSC Taatta Bank is a member of the deposit insurance system. The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of RUR1.4
million per depositor.



=========
S P A I N
=========


CAIXABANK PYMES 8: DBRS Confirms CC Rating on Series B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited took rating actions on three SME
transactions originated by CaixaBank, S.A. as follows:

CaixaBank PYMES 8, FT (CaixaBank 8):

-- Series A Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Series B Notes confirmed at CC (sf)

Foncaixa PYMES 6, FT (Foncaixa 6):

-- Series A Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Series B Notes confirmed at CCC (high) (sf)

Foncaixa PYMES 7, FT (Foncaixa 7):

-- Series A Notes confirmed at A (sf)
-- Series B Notes upgraded to BB (high) (sf) from B (sf)

The ratings of the Series A Notes of the three transactions
address the timely payment of interest and ultimate payment of
principal on or before the legal final maturity date of each
transaction.

The ratings of the Series B Notes of the three transactions
address the ultimate payment of interest and principal on or
before the legal maturity date of each transaction.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transactions
and are based on the following analytical considerations:

  -- Portfolio performance in terms of delinquencies and
defaults, as of the April 2018 payment date for CaixaBank 8 and
Foncaixa 6, and the June 2018 payment date for Foncaixa 7.

  -- Updated portfolio default rates, recovery rates and expected
losses for the remaining collateral pools.

  -- The credit enhancement (CE) available to the rated notes to
cover the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

The transactions are cash flow securitizations collateralized by
a portfolio of bank loans originated and serviced by CaixaBank to
self-employed individuals and SMEs based in Spain.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

The portfolios of all transactions are performing within DBRS'
expectations. For CaixaBank 8, the 90+ delinquency ratio was at
1.4% as of April 2018, and the cumulative default ratio was 0.2%.
For Foncaixa 6, the 90+ delinquency ratio was at 2.0% as of April
2018, and the cumulative default ratio was 0.6%. For Foncaixa 7,
the 90+ delinquency ratio was at 1.1% as of June 2018, and the
cumulative default ratio was 0.8%.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis on the remaining pools and
updated its portfolio default and recovery rate assumptions on
the remaining collateral pools for the three transactions. The
base case probability of default (PD) was maintained at 2.1% for
CaixaBank 8, 2.3% for Foncaixa 6 and 2.2% for Foncaixa 7.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

The CE available to all rated notes has continued to increase as
the transactions deleverage. The CE available to each of the
rated notes was 24.7% and 5.9% for the CaixaBank 8 Series A and B
Notes, respectively, as of the April 2018 payment date, 46.1% and
8.4% for the Foncaixa 6 Series A and B Notes, respectively, as of
the April 2018 payment date, and 59.4% and 9.1% for the Foncaixa
7 Series A and B Notes, respectively, as of the June 2018 payment
date. The increase in CE prompted today's confirmation and
upgrade rating actions.

CaixaBank acts as the Account Bank provider for the three
transactions. The account bank reference rating of A (high) ?
being one notch below the DBRS public Long-Term Critical
Obligations Rating of CaixaBank of AA (low) ? is consistent with
the Minimum Institution Rating, given the rating assigned to the
most senior class of rated notes in each transaction, as
described in DBRS' "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology.


EDREAMS ODIGEO: Moody's Hikes CFR to B1, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, has upgraded the corporate family
rating of eDreams ODIGEO S.A. to B1 from B2 and upgraded the
company's probability of default rating (PDR) to B1-PD from B2-
PD. Concurrently Moody's has upgraded the rating on the company's
EUR425 million Senior Secured Global Notes due 2021 to B2 from
B3. The outlook on all the ratings has been changed to stable
from positive.

The rating action reflects:

  The company's continued deleveraging profile with Moody's-
  adjusted debt at 3.8x at 31 March 2018

  Strong EBITDA growth in the fiscal year 2018, ended March 31,
  2018

  The company's position as the leading European flight-centric
  online travel agency (OTA)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B1 CFR takes into consideration: 1) eDreams' strong
competitive positioning within the OTA industry in Europe,
particularly within the flight segment and in its key markets of
France, Spain, Italy and Germany; 2) continued migration from
high-street travel agencies to the online travel market; 3)
growth in the airline passenger market; 4) reduced leverage in
fiscal 2018, and conservative financial policies expected to
drive further deleveraging.

The ratings also reflect: 1) a geographic concentration in
Southern Europe and France; 2) industry risks, including value
chain disintermediation from airlines or other intermediaries and
risks of exogenous shocks; 3) exposure to paid search costs and
overall sensitivity to variable costs per booking; 4) execution
risks related to the company's price transparency strategy,
albeit with solid results of this strategy to date.

In fiscal 2018, eDreams grew underlying bookings by 3% and
revenue margin by 5%, with company-adjusted EBITDA increasing by
10% to EUR118 million from EUR107 million. During this period the
company has continued to implement its price transparency
strategy across its business, which aims to present an initial
price on search closer to the final booking price, with fewer
additional fees and charges as customers complete a booking. This
has had an adverse effect on booking and revenue margin growth in
fiscal 2018 but with improved margins as customer loyalty
improves resulting in lower marketing and overall customer
acquisition costs. In addition EBITDA growth has been supported
by cost saving initiatives carried out in the year. As a result
Moody's-adjusted leverage reduced to 3.8x as at 31 March 2018,
from 4.3x as at 31 March 2017. Leverage is expected to reduce
further over the next 12-18 months from earnings growth and a
conservative financial policy targeting debt repayments and
deleveraging.

LIQUIDITY

The company retains adequate liquidity with cash balances of
EUR172 million and availability of EUR127 million under its super
senior revolving credit facility at March 31, 2018. This is
expected to provide solid headroom to support seasonal working
capital variations and the company is expected to continue to
generate strong cash flows on an annual basis.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The company's capital structure consists of (1) a super-senior
revolving credit facility of EUR127 million maturing in 2021; (2)
a super-senior guarantee facility of EUR30 million maturing in
2021; and (3) EUR425 million of Senior Secured Notes maturing in
2021. The Senior Secured Global Notes are rated B2 which reflects
their ranking behind the super-senior facilities and their
security which is limited largely to share pledges.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook assumes that the company will continue to
deliver earnings and EBITDA growth in the mid-single digits after
the completion of its transparency strategy, and that this
strategy will be rolled out without significant adverse effects
on trading results. It also assumes that the company will
maintain conservative financial policies and that there will no
material debt funded acquisitions or dividends in the near to
medium term, with liquidity remaining satisfactory.

WHAT WOULD CHANGE THE RATING UP / DOWN

Upward pressure on the rating could occur if the company achieves
a further period of solid revenue and EBITDA growth following the
completion of its new pricing strategies. Quantitatively the
ratings could be upgraded if Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA were to
trend substantially below 3.0x on a sustainable basis, with
Moody's-adjusted free cash flow (FCF) to debt above 15%, and with
liquidity remaining satisfactory.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - DOWN

Negative rating pressure could develop if Moody's-adjusted
debt/EBITDA were to exceed 4.0x, if Moody's-adjusted FCF to debt
were to reduce below 5%, or if the company's liquidity profile
were to weaken. Negative pressure could also develop if there is
significant disruption to the market or distribution chain
resulting in reducing revenue margin or profitability.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: eDreams ODIGEO S.A.

Upgrades:

  Corporate Family Rating, Upgraded to B1 from B2

  Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to B1-PD from B2-PD

  BACKED Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Upgraded to B2
  from B3

Outlook Actions:

  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Positive

COMPANY PROFILE

eDreams is the largest OTA in Europe in the flights segment. It
was formed in 2011 when Axa (now Ardian) and Permira acquired
Opodo and merged it with their existing portfolio travel
companies to create a European rival to Expedia. eDreams' parent,
eDreams ODIGEO S.A., was listed in Spain in 2014. Approximately
53% of the total shares are free float while the sponsors Permira
and Ardian retain around 47% of the total shares. In fiscal 2018
eDreams reported revenue margin and company-adjusted EBITDA of
EUR509 million and EUR118 million respectively.


IM PASTOR 3: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to CCC-
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed and removed from CreditWatch positive
its credit ratings on the class A notes in IM PASTOR 3, Fondo de
Titulizacion Hipotecaria and IM PASTOR 4, Fondo de Titulizacion
de Activos. At the same time, S&P lowered its ratings on the
class B and C notes and affirmed its ratings on the class D notes
in both transactions.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow the application of our
relevant criteria and our full analysis of the most recent
transaction information that we have received, and reflect the
transaction's current structural features. We have also
considered our updated outlook assumptions for the Spanish
residential mortgage market.

"Our European residential loans criteria, as applicable to
Spanish residential loans, establish how our loan-level analysis
incorporates our current opinion of the local market outlook. Our
current outlook for the Spanish housing and mortgage markets, as
well as for the overall economy in Spain, is benign. Therefore,
we revised our expected level of losses for an archetypal Spanish
residential pool at the 'B' rating level to 0.9% from 1.6%, in
line with table 87 of our European residential loans criteria, by
lowering our foreclosure frequency assumption to 2.00% from 3.33%
for the archetypal pool at the 'B' rating level.

"After applying our European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, the overall effect in our credit analysis results is
a decrease in the weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF)
at all rating levels in both transactions compared with our
previous review. This is mainly driven by the increase in
seasoning, the decrease in arrears, and our revised foreclosure
frequency assumptions. Additionally, our weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) assumptions have decreased at all rating levels
compared with our previous review, mainly driven by the decrease
in weighted-average current loan-to-value ratio following the
portfolios' amortization."

  IM PASTOR 3

  Rating level      WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
  AAA                  12.99        8.34
  AA                    9.06        4.87
  A                     6.78        2.00
  BBB                   5.10        2.00
  BB                    3.42        2.00
  B                     2.06        2.00

  IM PASTOR 4

  Rating level      WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
  AAA                  11.86       16.30
  AA                    8.30       11.93
  A                     6.22        5.94
  BBB                   4.67        3.51
  BB                    3.12        2.22
  B                     1.87        2.00

S&P said, "Since our previous review, the available credit
enhancement for all classes of notes in both transactions has
decreased and remains negative. This is explained by the
amortization deficit of the notes in both transactions. As of
June 2018, the amortization deficits of the notes are EUR50.35
million in IM Pastor 3 and EUR39.50 million in IM Pastor 4.

"Following the application of our criteria, we have determined
that our assigned ratings on the classes of notes in these
transactions should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped by
our structured finance ratings above the sovereign (RAS)
criteria, (ii) the rating as capped by our counterparty criteria,
or (iii) the rating that the class of notes can attain under our
European residential loans criteria.

"Our European residential loans criteria, reflecting our updated
credit figures, indicates that the available credit enhancement
for the class A notes in both transactions does not pass our cash
flow stress test at the 'B' rating level. Although we consider
these notes to be vulnerable to ultimate principal nonpayments
(at legal maturity) given their undercollateralization, we do not
expect this to happen in the short term. Given their seniority in
the capital structure, they could benefit faster than other
classes of notes from any collateral improvement. In line with
our European residential loans criteria and our 'CCC' criteria,
we have affirmed and removed from CreditWatch positive our 'B-
(sf)' ratings on the class A notes in both transactions. Our RAS
criteria do not constrain the ratings on the notes.

"We consider the class B and C notes to be vulnerable to interest
shortfalls and ultimate principal nonpayments. They also depend
on favorable business and economic conditions (for example, an
improvement in the observed recoveries over defaulted loans to
meet their obligations). However, we do not consider the interest
shortfalls under these classes of notes to be a virtual
certainty. Given the decrease in credit enhancement since our
previous review and in line with our 'CCC' criteria, we have
lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' our ratings on the class B
and C notes in both transactions. Our RAS criteria do not
constrain the ratings on these classes of notes.

"We consider the ongoing liquidity shortfalls for the class D
notes in both transactions to be commensurate with our currently
assigned ratings. We have therefore affirmed our 'D (sf)' ratings
on the class D notes in both transactions."

IM PASTOR 3 and IM PASTOR 4 are Spanish residential mortgage-
backed security (RMBS) transactions, which closed in June 2005
and June 2006, respectively, and securitize first-ranking
mortgage loans. Banco Pastor (now Banco Popular Espanol, part of
Banco Santander) originated both pools, which comprise loans
granted to prime borrowers, mainly in Catalonia.

  RATINGS LIST
  Class             Rating
              To               From

  IM PASTOR 3, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
  EUR1 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Rating Affirmed And Removed From Credit Watch Positive

  A           B- (sf)           B- (sf)/Watch Pos

  Ratings Lowered

  B           CCC- (sf)         CCC (sf)
  C           CCC- (sf)         CCC (sf)

  Rating Affirmed

  D           D (sf)

  IM PASTOR 4, Fondo de Titulizaci¢n de Activos
  EUR920 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Rating Affirmed And Removed From Credit Watch Positive

  A           B- (sf)           B- (sf)/Watch Pos

  Ratings Lowered

  B           CCC- (sf)         CCC (sf)
  C           CCC- (sf)         CCC (sf)

  Rating Affirmed

  D           D (sf)


SABADELL PYME 10: DBRS Hikes Series B Notes Rating to BB(high)
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited took rating actions on IM Sabadell PYME 10,
FT (the Issuer) as follows:

-- Series A Notes confirmed at AA (sf)
-- Series B Notes upgraded to BB (high) (sf) from
    CCC (high) (sf)

The rating of the Series A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal on or before the
legal final maturity date. The rating of the Series B Notes
addresses the ultimate payment of interest and principal on or
before the legal final maturity date.

The rating actions follow an annual review of the transaction and
are based on the following analytical considerations:

  -- Portfolio performance in terms of delinquencies and defaults
as of the May 2018 payment date.

  -- Updated portfolio default rate, recovery rate and expected
loss assumptions for the remaining collateral pools.

  -- The credit enhancement (CE) available to the rated notes to
cover the expected losses at their respective rating levels.

The Issuer is a cash flow securitization collateralized by a
portfolio of bank loans originated and serviced by Banco de
Sabadell, S.A. (Sabadell), to self-employed individuals and SMEs
based in Spain.

PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

The portfolio is performing within DBRS' expectations. As of May
2018, the 90+ delinquency ratio was at 0.9% and the cumulative
default ratio was at 0.5%.

PORTFOLIO ASSUMPTIONS

DBRS conducted a loan-by-loan analysis on the remaining pool and
updated its portfolio default and recovery assumptions. The base
case Probability of Default (PD) maintained at 2.1%.

CREDIT ENHANCEMENT

The CE available to all the rated notes continued to increase as
the transaction continued to deleverage. As of the May 2018
payment date, the CE available to the Series A Notes and Series B
Notes was 47.0% and 10.2%, respectively. The increase in the CE
prompted the confirmation and upgrade of the ratings.

Sabadell acts as an Account Bank provider for the transaction.
The account bank reference rating of A (low) ? being one notch
below the DBRS public Long-Term Critical Obligations Rating of
Sabadell of "A" ? is consistent with the Minimum Institution
Rating, given the rating assigned to the Series A Notes, as
described in DBRS' "Legal Criteria for European Structured
Finance Transactions" methodology.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


OMEGA PJSC: Gets Extension of Liquidation Terms
-----------------------------------------------
ukrinform.net reports that the Deposit Guarantee Fund of Ukraine
has extended the terms of liquidation of two banks - PJSC Omega
Bank and PJSC Zakhidimkombank, the Fund's press service reports.

"The Executive Directorate of the Deposit Guarantee Fund approved
a decision as of June 25, 2018, No.1791, to extend the term of
liquidation of PJSC Omega Bank for one year, from July 6, 2018
until July 5, 2019 inclusive," reads the report, according to
ukrinform.net.

Also, the Executive Directorate of the Deposit Guarantee Fund
approved another decision to extend the term of liquidation of
PJSC Zakhidimkombank for one year, from July 23, 2018 until July
22, 2019 inclusive, ukrinform.net says.


UKRAINE: DFG Sells Insolvent Banks' Assets Worth UAH101.38MM
------------------------------------------------------------
Ukrinform reports that the Deposit Guarantee Fund has sold
insolvent banks' assets worth UAH101.38 million, the fund's press
service said.

"The sale of assets of 27 banks, which are in the management of
the fund, for the sum of UAH101.38 million was held last week,"
the fund said.

In particular, UAH69.00 million was received from the sale of
main banks' assets; UAH32.09 million was obtained in repayment of
the fund creditors' claims, UAH0.24 million - from the direct
sale of banks property, and UAH0.06 million - from the sale of
other assets (pictures, coins etc), Ukrinform relates.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CABOT FINANCIAL: Moody's Raises CFR to B1, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the long-term corporate family
rating (CFR) of Cabot Financial Ltd (Cabot) to B1 from B2. The
rating agency also upgraded the senior secured bond ratings of
Cabot Financial (Luxembourg) II S.A and Cabot Financial
(Luxembourg) S.A to B1 from B2. The outlook on all ratings has
been changed to stable from positive.

The upgrade of Cabot's CFR was driven by:

  (i) Cabot's competitive edge supported by its leading position
      in the UK debt purchasing industry; and

(ii) the firm's enhanced operating diversification, particularly
      in terms of sources of revenue, which the agency expects to
      create cost synergies and improve the firm's ability to
      generate stable earnings streams.

On May 8, 2018, Encore Capital Group Inc, which currently owns
43% of Cabot Credit Management Limited, announced an agreement to
purchase the remaining interest held by J.C. Flowers & Co and
company management. Following the latter, Cabot will become a
wholly owned subsidiary of Encore. Moody's considers that the
acquisition will lift the uncertainties which had stemmed from
the failed IPO in November 2017 regarding J.C. Flowers' exit
strategy.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE CFR

The upgrade of the CFR to B1 is driven by Cabot's leading market
position and increasingly diversified business model.

With GBP1.65 billion in total reported assets as of end-March
2018, Cabot is one of the largest rated debt purchasing companies
in the UK. The firm has strong cash generating capability with an
adjusted EBITDA of GBP297 million in 2017, which has increased by
20% annually on average since 2012. The 120-month estimated
remaining collections (ERC) stood at GBP2.4 billion as of end-
March 2018, higher than all other UK competitors. Cabot's scale
supports its ability to absorb compliance costs and investments
in technological innovation, while its strong track-record of
regulatory compliance is attractive to vendors facing regulatory
scrutiny and conduct-related costs. Moody's expects that such a
dominant franchise, combined with Cabot's track record of
adequately pricing purchased portfolios, will support Cabot's
cash flow generation capacity, and in turn keep its leverage
metric well under 5x. As of the end of March 2018, Moody's
calculates Cabot's debt at 4.2x EBITDA.

The acquisition, in 2017, of Wescot Credit Services Limited and
Orbit Services, two debt service providers for the UK retail
banking sector, has supported the company's ambition to grow its
third-party debt-servicing business further diversifying its
revenues. Moody's believes that the company's increased focus on
the more asset light segment should help to mitigate the risk,
inherent to the debt purchasing business, of mispricing acquired
portfolios, and support Cabot's ability to generate stable
earnings streams. This greater diversification also creates
synergies, as the debt servicing business creates new business
opportunities for the purchasing segment, while leveraging on
shared IT platforms and a common set of credit data on debtors.

RATIONALE FOR THE OUTLOOK

The outlook on all ratings is stable, reflecting Moody's view
that Cabot's credit worthiness driven by its leading market
position and increasingly diversified franchise will be
consistent with a B1 CFR over the outlook period.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

An expectation that Cabot's long-term strategy will lead to an
improvement of its credit fundamentals -- such as at a minimum a
combination of a decrease of the leverage metric (gross debt-to-
adjusted EBITDA) at under 4x, and of an increase of the interest
coverage (adjusted EBITDA-to-interest expense) at around or above
3x, while maintaining other financial metrics and ratios at
current levels - could lead to an upgrade of Cabot's ratings.

Cabot's rating could be downgraded due to (i) significant
deterioration in profitability metrics; or (ii) a further
increase in leverage or sustained decline in operating
performance, leading to a debt ratio which is higher than 5x
adjusted EBITDA; or (iii) a significant decline in interest
coverage, with an adjusted EBITDA-to-interest expense ratio
around or below 2.0x.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Cabot Financial Ltd

Upgrades:

Corporate Family Rating, upgraded to B1 Stable from B2 Positive

Outlook Action:

Outlook changed to Stable from Positive


Issuer: Cabot Financial (Luxembourg) S.A

Upgrades:

Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B1
Stable from B2 Positive

Outlook Action:

Outlook changed to Stable from Positive


Issuer: Cabot Financial (Luxembourg) II S.A

Upgrades:

Backed Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B1
Stable from B2 Positive

Outlook Action:

Outlook changed to Stable from Positive


CELESTE MORTGAGE 2015-1: DBRS Discontinues BB on Cl. F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited discontinued its ratings on the Class A,
Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F Notes (the Notes)
issued by Celeste Mortgage Funding 2015-1 PLC (the Issuer).

The discontinuation reflects the full repayment of the Notes as
at the payment date on June 15, 2018. Prior to their repayment in
full, the outstanding principals and ratings were as follows:

-- Class A Notes: GBP 110,387,642.0, rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes: GBP 29,275,000.0, rated AAA (sf)
-- Class C Notes: GBP 23,929,000.0, rated AA (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes: GBP 10,692,000.0, rated A (low) (sf)
-- Class E Notes: GBP 9,164,000.0, rated BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F Notes: GBP 3,819,000.0, rated BB (high) (sf)


LEGACY GLOBAL: Egan-Jones Lowers Debt Ratings to B
--------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on June 28, 2018, downgraded the
foreign commercial paper and local commercial paper on debt
issued by Liberty Global plc to B from A3.

Liberty Global plc was founded in 2004 and is based in London,
the United Kingdom. The company together with its subsidiaries,
provides video, broadband Internet, fixed-line telephony, mobile,
and other communications services to residential customers and
businesses in Europe.


OLD BOOT: Appoint UHY Hacker Young as Liquidator
------------------------------------------------
Mel Hill at thebiguknewsroom.co.uk reports that Nick Hancock,
Insolvency Partner at UHY Hacker Young, was appointed Liquidator
of Old Boot Limited trading as Old Boot Sofas on Thursday, June
28, 2018.

In 2016/17, the business lost money, causing an issue with the
merchant service provider, according to thebiguknewsroom.co.uk.

The reports notes that the issue could not be resolved and
alternative provider could not be found, leading the business to
cease trading on May 29, 2018 leaving numerous customers left
without goods that that had paid for.  Those that paid by credit
card have been able to reclaim their money back from card
providers. Those that paid by debit card have been able to
reclaim their money back via the claw back scheme, the report
relays.

Where furniture has been made to a specific order, customers have
been given the option to collect the item, the report says.

The business had two showrooms; one in central London and one in
Leicester, as well as a distribution hub in Leicester, with the
manufacturing and storage of goods taking place in Bolton, the
report notes.

The report discloses that Nick Hancock of UHY Hacker Young
comments on the appointment: "Old Boot was born from a passion
for furniture and a commitment to deliver excellence at a
sensible price.  After enjoying an extremely successful first 3
years of trading the firm unfortunately incurred issues with
their merchant service provider that has severely restricted
their options, giving them no choice but close the company with
immediate effect."

Old Boot Sofas, an online based business selling quality leather
seating, commenced trading in March 2013. It quickly built up a
strong reputation of providing a quality product with a quick
lead time.


QUANTUMA: Enters Administration, No Jobs Cut Yet
------------------------------------------------
accountancydaily.co reports that the Quantuma administrators were
brought in by the holder of a qualifying floating charge after
negotiations on refinancing the project broke down.

The company was established in May 2013 and Herculaneum Quay had
an estimated gross development value of GBP20 million, according
to accountancydaily.co.

The report notes that Simon Campbell, Quantuma director and joint
administrator, said: "These are early days yet and we are in the
process of assessing the saleability of the property or the
build-out options available to us."

The company only listed one employee and no redundancies have as
yet been made, he said, the report relays.


* Scottish IT Firms at Higher Risk of Insolvency
------------------------------------------------
Herald Scotland reports that Scottish technology firms are at a
higher risk of insolvency than those across the UK, new research
has warned.

Just over half of all technology and IT companies in Scotland are
at a higher than average risk of insolvency in the next 12
months, Herald Scotland relates citing research from insolvency
and restructuring trade body R3.

It found that 50.1%, or 5,600, of IT companies in Scotland are in
the negative band, the report says. This is a steep rise from
June last year, when a third were judged to be at higher than
average risk. It is also higher than the UK overall where 47.9%
of companies in the tech sector fell into the negative band this
year, up from 33.6% last June, Herald Scotland relates.

Herald Scotland notes that nearly 79,000 of all the 232,000
businesses registered in Scotland fell into the negative band in
June, meaning one in three are judged to be at greater than usual
risk of insolvency within the next year. But this is better than
the UK as a whole where two in five companies fall into the high
risk category.

According to the Herald Scotland, R3 said the picture was
brighter for transport and haulage businesses in Scotland, where
35.1% of companies fell into the negative band, and for
construction on 40.8%. It said that for both those notoriously
volatile sectors, Scotland's proportion of companies deemed at
greater than usual risk was lower than for the UK overall.

"Although R3's research indicates that a high proportion of
Scottish tech firms are at greater than normal risk, there's no
need for panic in the Silicon Glen," the report quotes Tim
Cooper, chair of R3 in Scotland and a partner at Addleshaw
Goddard in Edinburgh, as saying.

He said Scotland's tech scene is supported by a network of world-
class universities, providing a ready supply of qualified and
talented graduates, Herald Scotland relays. He added that the
country's strength in financial services means entrepreneurs need
not uproot themselves to access funding.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The Story of The Bank of America
-----------------------------------------------
Author: Marquis James and Bessie R. James
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 592 pages
List Price: $31.80

Order your personal copy today at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1587981459/internetbankrup
t

The Bank of America began as the Bank of Italy in 1904. A. P.
Giannini was motivated to found the Bank out of his indignation
over the neglect by other banks of the Italian community in San
Francisco's North Beach area. Local residents were quickly drawn
to Giannini's new type of bank suited for their social
circumstances, financial needs, and plans and aspirations. Before
Giannini's Bank of Italy, the field was dominated by large, well-
connected, and politically influential banks typified by the
magnate J. P. Morgan's House of Morgan catering to corporations
and the wealthy industrialists and their families of the Gilded
Age. Giannini's Bank proved to be a timely enterprise with great
potential far beyond its founder's original aims. The early 1900s
following the Gilded Age was a time of spreading democratization
in American society with large numbers of immigrants being
assimilated. It was also a time of considerable industrial growth
after the heyday of the tycoons such as Morgan, Rockefeller, and
Carnegie in the latter 1800s. Giannini's idea was also helped by
the growth of California in its early stages of becoming one of
the most prosperous and most populous states. As California grew,
so did the Bank of America.

A. P. Giannini was the perfect type of individual to oversee the
growth of a bank that stood in sharp contrast to the House of
Morgan and which reflected broad changes in American society and
business. Giannini followed the quick success of his North Beach
bank with Bank of Italy branches elsewhere in San Francisco. With
the success of these followed branches throughout California's
agricultural valleys and Los Angeles as Giannini reached out to
populations of other average persons generally ignored by the
traditional banks. Throughout the rapid growth of his bank,
Giannini never lost touch with his original motive for creating a
bank suited for the average individual. When he died at 80 years
of age in 1949, he lived in the same house as he did when he
opened the original Bank of Italy; and his estate was less than
half a million dollars.

Throughout all the stages of the Bank of America's growth,
business recessions and depressions, and changes in American
society, including increased government regulation, the Bank
continued to reflect its founder's purposes for it. In the 1920s,
the Bank of Italy became a part of the corporation Transamerica.
In 1930, the Bank was merged with the Bank of America of
California. The newly formed bank was given the name the Bank of
America National Trust and Savings Association, with Giannini
appointed as chairman of the committee to work out the details of
the merger. In 1930, he selected Elisha Walker to head
Transamerica so he could be free to pursue his interest of
establishing a national bank with the same goals and nature as
his original Bank of Italy. But becoming alarmed over Walker's
proposed measures for dealing with the pressures of the
Depression, Giannini waged a battle involving board members,
stockholders, and allies he had worked with in the past to regain
control of Transamerica. In 1936, A. P. Giannini's son, Lawrence
Mario, succeeded his father as president of Bank of America, with
A. P. remaining as chairman of the board.

The story of Bank of America is largely the story of A. P.
Giannini: his ideas, his values, his ambitions, his goals, his
personality. The co-authors follow the stages of the Bank's
growth by focusing on the genteel, yet driven and innovative, A.
P. Giannini. There's a balance of basic business material such as
stock prices, rationale of momentous business decisions, and
balance-sheet data, with portrayals of outsized characters of the
time. Among these, besides Giannini, are the federal government
official Henry Morgenthau and Charles Stern, California's
superintendent of banks in the early 1900s. With this balance,
The Story of the Bank of America is an engaging and informative
work for readers of more technical business books and human-
interest business stories alike.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *