/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180629.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, June 29, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 128


                            Headlines


B E L G I U M

RADISSON HOSPITALITY: Fitch Assigns 'B+(EXP)' IDR, Outlook Stable


F R A N C E

NORIA 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Caa3 (sf) Rating to Class G Notes


G E R M A N Y

H&K AG: Moody's Cuts CFR to Caa1, Outlook Negative


I R E L A N D

ACCUNIA EUROPEAN III: Fitch Rates Class F Notes 'B-(EXP)sf'
BILBAO CLO I: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class E Notes


I T A L Y

BANCA CARIGE: Moody's Assigns B1 LT Counterparty Risk Rating
BANCA MONTE: DBRS Confirms B(high) Issuer Rating, Trend Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

DECO 2015-CHARLEMAGNE: S&P Withdraws BB(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes


N E T H E R L A N D S

BARINGS EURO 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class F-R Notes (P)B2
CREDIT EUROPE: Moody's Assigns Ba1 LT Counterparty Risk Rating


R U S S I A

KAZANORGSINTEZ PAO: Fitch Hikes LT IDR to B+, Outlook Stable


S P A I N

BBVA 2018-1 FT: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class D Notes
BILBAO CLO I: Moody's Assigns B2 (sf) Rating to Class E Notes


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: Egan-Jones Hikes Senior Unsecured Ratings to BB-


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AIR SPACE: Trampoline Park Forced to Close; In Administration
ASSURED GUARANTY: S&P Affirms 'BB' Financial Strength Rating
ATLANTICA YIELD: Fitch Assigns BB LT IDR, Outlook Stable
AZURE FINANCE NO. 1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB+ Rating on Cl. D Notes
CARLUCCIO'S: Closes Harrogate Branch Following CVA

ESCUBED LIMITED: In Administration, 10 Jobs Lost
FINSBURY SQUARE 2017-2: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Cl. D Notes Rating
HOMEBASE: Cuts 300 Jobs at Milton Keynes Amid CVA Rumors
HOUSE OF FRASER: To Close Skipton Store in 2019, 81 Jobs Affected
HOUSE OF FRASER: To Close Hull Store Following CVA Approval

HUMMUS BROS: In Administration On Rising Property Costs
NEWDAY 2018-1 PLC: DBRS Rates Class F Notes B(high)(sf)


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The Financial Giants in United States History


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B E L G I U M
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RADISSON HOSPITALITY: Fitch Assigns 'B+(EXP)' IDR, Outlook Stable
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Fitch Ratings has assigned Radisson Hospitality AB (Radisson) an
expected Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B+(EXP)' with
a Stable Outlook. In addition, Fitch has assigned Radisson's
upcoming senior secured EUR250 million bond an expected rating of
'BB-(EXP)' with a Recovery Rating of 'RR3' (69%).

The 'B+(EXP)' IDR reflects Radisson's solid market position in
the mid-to-upscale hotel segment in EMEA, and a balanced
portfolio structure between leased, managed and franchised
hotels. Despite a limited profitability compared with other rated
peers, the asset-light business model and a high proportion of
variable rents provide some protection in a downturn. This is a
mitigating factor to the inherent revenue cyclicality that the
company is exposed to.

Fitch expects the ongoing repositioning efforts in Radisson's
business plan to reinforce the company's business profile and
improve EBITDA and free cash flow (FCF), while leverage should
remain moderate, hence leading to the Stable Outlook. The track
record and experience of the management team reduces execution
risk and further supports the ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Good Positioning in EMEA Region: Radisson is one of the key
players in the European hotel market, well-positioned as an
upscale operator covering differentiated targets, which is a
risk-mitigating factor. Despite its presence in 66 countries, it
is concentrated in Nordic and western Europe countries. Radisson
belongs to the Radisson Hospitality group, and pays a fee for the
right to use the brands, the loyalty programme and reservation
system among other services outlined in the master franchise
agreement. Its integration within a worldwide group provides
scale and brand awareness, while easing the signing of new
management and franchise contracts with hotels owners.

Balanced Portfolio Structure and Segmentation: Radisson has a
balanced portfolio structure with an asset-light model (20% of
the rooms are leased). This business model with a recurrent fee
nature mitigates revenue and profit volatility in a cyclical
sector, in Fitch's view. Radisson's client base is well-
distributed between 54% business clients with a generally upscale
profile and 46% leisure travellers. Being present in key cities
makes their hotels an appealing destination both for holidays and
for business purposes, which reinforces Radisson's solid business
profile for the ratings.

Limited but Protected Profitability: EBITDA margin is limited
compared with industry peers'. Radisson holds an expensive lease
and staff structure that is partially mitigated by an efficient
cap mechanism to leases. Ninety percent of the leases comprise a
variability component: in case of a downturn in revenue, a large
part of the rents would become fixed and consume an agreed cap
before turning fully variable, offering downside protection. Once
the one-off costs from reorganisation have been absorbed and exit
contracts completed, in Fitch's projections EBITDA margin should
improve towards 12.5% in 2021 from 8.5% currently.

Ambitious Repositioning Plan: Radisson is working on an ambitious
five-year plan that includes a significant repositioning of 33
hotels (roughly 9% of its total portfolio), 25,000 new rooms
(mostly through management and franchise contracts) and an
optimisation plan to gain organisational efficiency. Due to
Radisson's positioning and the track record of management,
execution risk of the business plan is deemed to be limited.

Moderate Leverage: The bulk of Radisson's debt stems from
operating leases, which Fitch capitalises by using a blended
multiple of 5.6x for 2017 to reflect variable leases. Fitch
projects funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage to
decline to 4.1x from 4.5x between 2018 and 2021, due to a
strengthening of FFO. This leverage profile is fully aligned with
Radisson's ratings. Fitch expects FCF to remain slightly negative
over the next two years due to Radisson's capex plans. The
ratings assume that the main shareholder will maintain a
conservative financial policy, reflecting an appropriate balance
between shareholders and creditors' interests.

Experienced Management Team: Radisson has a recently renewed
experienced management team. It combines both solid experience of
managers within the group and of those with a proven track record
in the industry. The management team makes independent decisions
as Directors representing shareholders only hold a minority of
seats on the Board of Directors. Fitch assumes that the
shareholders will continue to support Radisson's repositioning
plan.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Radisson is the fifth-largest hotel chain in Europe, but its
scale and diversification are limited in a hospitality industry
dominated by leaders with a significant consolidation and
presence such as Marriot International Inc. (BBB/Positive), Accor
SA (BBB-/Positive) or Melia. Radisson is comparable with NH Hotel
Group (B+/Positive) in size and urban positioning, although
Radisson is present in a greater number of cities. Being part of
a global group and focused on the attractive upscale segment
provides adequate brand awareness worldwide. This market
recognition and the capability to grow under an asset-light model
acts as a competitive advantage compared with more local and
asset-heavy peers, such as Whitbread PLC (BBB/Stable) or
Travelodge.

Radisson operates with limited EBITDA margins compared with
peers, due to above-average rent expenses, high fees derived from
the master franchise agreement with Radisson Hotel Group, high
salaries in Nordic and western Europe countries and a sub-optimal
pricing strategy. However, a variability mechanism deployed in
their lease contracts establishes a loss limit in case of a
downturn. As a consequence, Radisson's EBITDA, despite being low
relative to immediate rated peers, is more stable in the medium-
term than peers such as NH's.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions within its Rating Case for Issuer
Include:

  - New 12,700 net rooms between 2018 and 2022 with stable
occupancy and higher average room rate (compound annual growth of
5% from 2018 to 2021)

  - Stable management and franchises fee scheme and portfolio
composition

  - EBITDA margin improving towards 12.5% by 2022

  - EUR448 million of capex for 2018 to 2022, including
maintenance capex and M&A

  - New bond issue of EUR250 million with five years of maturity
and revolving credit facility (RCF) of EUR20 million fully drawn

  - One third of net profit in dividends distribution as per the
company's financial policy

Fitch's Key Assumptions within its Recovery Analysis

The recovery analysis is based on a going-concern approach given
Radisson's asset-light model. Fitch uses its estimate for a post-
distress EBITDA of EUR53 million after applying a discount rate
of 35% in a stressed scenario. Fitch applies a distressed
enterprise value (EV)/EBITDA multiple of 4.0x, due to Radisson's
lack of real estate assets and brands' ownership.

After deducting the customary administrative charges of 10% and
the super senior creditors claims, Fitch estimates that the
holders of the senior secured notes, which rank second on
enforcement after a super-senior RCF of EUR20 million that Fitch
assumes would be fully-drawn in distress, will recover up to 69%
of the claims, leading to an instrument rating of 'BB-'/'RR3'
(69%), one notch above the IDR.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - Successful implementation of the transformation plan, leading
to EBIT margin sustainably above 6%.

  - FFO lease adjusted net leverage below 4.0x on a sustained
basis

  - EBITDAR/(gross interest + rents) consistently above 1.8x

  - Sustained positive FCF

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - No evidence of successful implementation of the
transformation plan, or underlying operational weakness leading
to EBIT margin below 1.5%

  - FFO lease adjusted net leverage above 5.0x

  - EBITDAR/(gross interest + rents) below 1.3x

  - Continuing negative FCF

LIQUIDITY

Strong Liquidity Position, Efficient Treasury Management:
Radisson has currently EUR200 million of secured committed
facilities, with a significant undrawn amount of EUR169.6 million
by end-2017. The instrument is expected to be replaced by a new
super senior RCF of EUR20 million maturing end-2022. This amount
is expected to allow Radisson to meet its short-term obligations
and cover its working capital needs. Moreover, Radisson has a
limited cash position on its balance sheet due to a centralised
cash pooling system. Excess liquidity is managed centrally by the
central treasury function to place it where there is a balance
deficit. The central treasury function monitors the cash position
of the different entities daily, to ensure an efficient and
adequate use of cash and overdraft facilities.

Radisson is planning to issue a bond of EUR250 million. Upon
launch of the bond the maturities will be concentrated in 2023
with no significant maturities before that date. The company
intends to keep a sizeable liquidity cash balance on its balance-
sheet (Fitch estimates over EUR100 million), which further
underpins the liquidity profile as it implements its capex plans.


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F R A N C E
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NORIA 2018-1: Moody's Assigns Caa3 (sf) Rating to Class G Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following definitive
ratings to Notes issued by Noria 2018-1:

EUR 1216M Class A Fixed Rate Notes due June 2038, Definitive
Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR 100M Class B Floating Rate Notes due June 2038, Definitive
Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR 88M Class C Floating Rate Notes due June 2038, Definitive
Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR 40M Class D Floating Rate Notes due June 2038, Definitive
Rating Assigned Baa3 (sf)

EUR 48M Class E Floating Rate Notes due June 2038, Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

EUR 40M Class F Floating Rate Notes due June 2038, Definitive
Rating Assigned B3 (sf)

EUR 68M Class G Fixed Rate Notes due June 2038, Definitive Rating
Assigned Caa3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The transaction is a one year revolving cash securitisation of
consumer loan receivables extended by BNP PARIBAS Personal
Finance (BNP PF)(Aa3/P-1/Aa3(cr)) to obligors located in France.
The borrowers use the loans for several purposes, such as
property improvement, equipment sales and other undefined or
general purposes. Some of the loans are granted as part of a debt
consolidation offer. The servicer is also BNP PF.

The initial portfolio consists of personal loans and equipment
sale loans originated by BNP PF through its branches and direct
market activities as well as through point of sales of third
party business with whom BNP PF has commercial arrangements to
provide financing for equipment sale loans (together, consumer
loans). The balance of the portfolio (as of May 2018) corresponds
to approximately EUR1.60 billion, for a total number of 193,912
loans. The tenor of the loans varies (from less than 1 year up to
15 years) depending on the purposes of the loan. The weighted-
average seasoning is 16.4 months. The initial share of debt
consolidation loans is 28.8% of the outstanding loan balance. All
loans are standard French amortising loans.

According to Moody's, the transaction benefits from credit
strengths such as the granularity of the portfolio, the financial
strength of the originator, and the positive performance of past
transactions. However, Moody's Notes that the transaction
features some credit weaknesses such as high concentration to BNP
Group given the number of roles performed by that entities of
that group such as seller, servicer, issuer account bank, cash
manager and custodian. In addition, the transaction structure is
complex including interest deferral triggers for the mezzanine
and junior Notes and pro-rata payments on all classes of Notes
after the end of the revolving period.

Moody's analysis focused, amongst other factors, on (i) an
evaluation of the underlying portfolio of loans; (ii) historical
performance information of the total book and past ABS
transactions; (iii) the credit enhancement provided by
subordination; (iv) the liquidity support available in the
transaction by way of the reserve fund as well as the principal
to pay interest mechanism, and the (v) overall legal and
structural integrity of the transaction.

MAIN MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

Moody's determined the portfolio lifetime expected defaults of
6.50%, expected recoveries of 30.00% and Aaa portfolio credit
enhancement ("PCE") of 19.0%. The expected defaults and
recoveries capture its expectations of performance considering
the current economic outlook, while the PCE captures the loss
Moody's expects the portfolio to suffer in the event of a severe
recession scenario. Expected defaults and PCE are parameters used
by Moody's to calibrate its lognormal portfolio loss distribution
curve and to associate a probability with each potential future
loss scenario in its ABSCORE cash flow model to rate Auto and
Consumer ABS.

Portfolio expected defaults of 6.50% are higher than the French
Consumer ABS average and are based on Moody's assessment of the
lifetime expectation for the pool taking into account (i)
historic performance of the book of the originator, (ii) other
similar transactions used as a benchmark, and (iii) other
qualitative considerations.

Portfolio expected recoveries of 30.00% are in line with the
French Consumer ABS average and are based on Moody's assessment
of the lifetime expectation for the pool taking into account (i)
historic performance of the book of the originator, (ii)
benchmark transactions, and (iii) other qualitative
considerations.

PCE of 19.0% is higher than the French Consumer ABS average and
is based on Moody's assessment of the pool taking into account
(i) the unsecured nature of the loans, and (ii) the relative
ranking to the originators peers in the French and EMEA consumer
ABS market. The PCE level of 19.0% results in an implied
coefficient of variation ("CoV") of approximately 38%.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was 'Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan-Backed ABS' published in
September 2015.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Factors that may cause an upgrade of the ratings include a
performance of the pool which is significantly better than
expected.

Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include a
significant decline in the overall performance of the pool and a
significant deterioration of the credit profile of the
originator.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the Notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal with respect to the Class A Notes. Moody's
ratings address only the credit risks associated with the
transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been addressed but
may have a significant effect on yield to investors.

LOSS AND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS:

Moody's used its cash-flow model Moody's ABSCORE as part of its
quantitative analysis of the transaction. Moody's ABSCORE model
enables users to model various features of a standard European
ABS transaction - including the specifics of the loss
distribution of the assets, their portfolio amortisation profile,
yield as well as the specific priority of payments, swaps and
reserve funds on the liability side of the ABS structure.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

In rating consumer loan ABS, loss rate and loss volatility
measured as coefficient of variation are two key inputs that
determine the transaction cash flows in the cash flow model.
Parameter sensitivities for this transaction have been tested in
the following manner: Moody's tested nine scenarios derived from
a combination of mean default rate: 6.50% (base case), 6.75%
(base case + 0.25%), 7.00% (base case + 0.50%) and recovery rate:
30.0% (base case), 25.0% (base case - 5%), 20.0% (base case -
10%). The model output results for Class A Notes under these
scenarios vary from Aaa (sf) (base case) to Aa1 (sf) assuming the
mean default rate is 7.00% and the recovery rate is 20.0% all
else being equal. Parameter sensitivities provide a
quantitative/model indicated calculation of the number of notches
that a Moody's rated structured finance security may vary if
certain input parameters used in the initial rating process
differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged. It is
not intended to measure how the rating of the security might
migrate over time, but rather how the initial model output for
Class A Notes might have differed if the two parameters within a
given sector that have the greatest impact were varied.


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G E R M A N Y
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H&K AG: Moody's Cuts CFR to Caa1, Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the corporate family
rating (CFR) of the German defense manufacturing company H&K AG
(Heckler & Koch) to Caa1 from B3 and the probability of default
rating (PDR) to Caa1-PD from B3-PD. The rating outlook has been
changed to negative from stable.

"Moody's decisions to downgrade Heckler & Koch's rating reflects
the company's weak liquidity profile and very high leverage. The
group's liquidity has deteriorated markedly in the first five
months of the year despite shareholders contributing EUR 30
million to the company in the form of a shareholder loan early
2018. As of May 2018 Heckler & Koch had EUR 27.8 million
unrestricted cash on balance, a reduction of around EUR 20
million YTD May 2018 (excluding the EUR 30 million shareholder
loan). The group's weak liquidity profile is further exacerbated
by the material risk of breaching the SFA covenant at the end of
June 2018. The group's Moody's adjusted leverage ratio
deteriorated to 9.4x at the end of 2017 (6.2x in 2016) as a
result of a 37.9% decline in EBITDA and despite EUR 50 million
equity increase and successful debt refinancing in 2017. While
the company expects EBITDA this year to recover, in the first
four months of 2018 it was down 60% compared to the same period
last year" says Vitali Morgovski, a Moody's Assistant Vice
President-Analyst and lead analyst for Heckler & Koch.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's downgrade reflects a significant deterioration in Heckler
& Koch's liquidity profile. By the end of Q1 2018 liquidity was
down to EUR 10.9 million and in April 2018 the company was
supported by a EUR 30 million interest-free loan from its
shareholders. While this has improved the amount of unrestricted
cash available, Moody's sees a risk of a further decline to below
EUR 20 million in the coming few months, which in Moody's view
represents a minimum required amount to run the company's day-to-
day business. In light of the company's weak performance Moody's
sees a risk of further covenant breach at the end of Q2 2018,
which would require further support from the shareholders to
obtain an equity cure or similar.

Moody's actions also reflects the weakness in earnings and cash
generation in the second half of 2017 that continued in the first
few months of 2018. Revenue and EBITDA last year were down 10%
and 37.9%, respectively, due to delays in product deliveries
caused by the implementation of a new concept for production and
assembly lines in Oberndorf, Germany. This led to an increase in
Moody's adjusted leverage ratio to 9.4x at the end of 2017 from
6.2x in 2016. Moody's expects that the company's leverage will
deteriorate further during 2018 to more than 10x. The new product
introduction (VP9SK pistols) for the US commercial market also
occurred later than expected and the overall demand in the US
commercial market was weaker in 2017. At the same time the
company is bearing additional costs of construction of a new
manufacturing facility in the US. Furthermore, problems with SAP
system for order processing additionally delayed product
deliveries.

These issues have not been completely resolved this year. While
revenue is starting to show an improving trend and is currently
up year-on-year, EBITDA is yet to recover and was down 60% in the
first four months of 2018 compared to the same period last year.
Operating cash flow was negative so far this year and free cash
flow was naturally more so. Moody's views a material risk that
Heckler & Koch will not be able to achieve its budget in 2018,
even assuming a recovery in the second half of the year.

While the company is obviously facing some serious operating
challenges at present, its competitive position on the market
remains strong, reflected in solid order backlog and increasing
order intake. In 2017 Heckler & Koch's order intake increased by
1.6% y-o-y and given the delayed deliveries its order backlog
(excluding orders for which export licenses are not expected to
be granted) rose by 25% by the end of the year to EUR 156
million, which corresponds to around 3/4 of H&K's annual sales.
Year-to-date order intake developed even better, rising 40% y-o-y
through May.

Moody's positively acknowledged a successful refinancing of H&K's
EUR 220 million notes with EUR 130 million SFA due 2022 and EUR
60 million Senior Notes due 2023 complemented by a EUR 50 million
equity injection in 2017. As a result group's reported gross debt
declined from EUR 220 million in 2016 to EUR 182 million in 2017
and its interest expense should be approximately EUR 8 million
lower in 2018 compared to the previous year. Additionally, the
company was able to agree a covenant amendment (on leverage ratio
and minimum cash level) with lenders in its SFA facility that it
otherwise would breach given a substantial decline in EBITDA.

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that there is a
material risk of leverage ratio (Moody's adjusted) remaining at
the current elevated level, well in excess of 8x, even in case of
recovery in the second half of 2018. Furthermore, Moody's
understands that the covenant headroom in SFA facilities in Q2
and Q3 this year will be very low and the amount of unrestricted
cash on the balance sheet could continue to decline as Moody's
does not expect H&K to generate positive FCF this year.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS - UP

  - Positive FCF generation supporting company's liquidity such
that it increases to in excess of EUR 25 million on a sustainable
basis

  - Expectations that Moody's adjusted gross debt/EBITDA will
remain sustainably below 6.5x

  - Tender wins and no material contract losses, to ensure the
company's earnings sustainability.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS -- DOWN

  - Eroding liquidity such that the amount of unrestricted cash
trends towards EUR 10 million,

  - Moody's adjusted gross debt/EBITDA sustainably above 8x

Liquidity

Moody's views Heckler & Koch's liquidity as weak. Operating
issues also affected company's unrestricted cash position on the
balance sheet that declined to EUR 18.7 million at the end of
2017 (EUR 20.8 million in 2016). By the end of Q1 2018 liquidity
was down to EUR 10.9 million and the company was supported by an
interest-free loan from its shareholders. While this has improved
the amount of unrestricted cash to EUR 27.8 million at the end of
May 2018, Moody's sees a risk of a further decline to below EUR
20 million in the coming few months, which in Moody's view
represents a minimum required amount to run company's day-to-day
business. While EUR 30 million revolving credit facility was
available to Heckler & Koch in the past, the company no longer
has access to this RCF, as it was not extended last year.
Furthermore, Moody's sees a material risk of breaching the
covenant at the end of June and September 2018. While H&K has an
equity cure option, it would require further liquidity injection
from its shareholders.

PROFILE

Headquartered in Oberndorf, Germany, Heckler & Koch is a leading,
privately-owned defense contractor in the small arms sector.
Heckler & Koch predominantly supplies the armed forces of NATO
and NATO equivalent countries, European and US Special Forces,
European police forces and US federal law enforcement agencies.
The company also serves the commercial market. It designs,
produces and distributes small arms, including rifles, side arms,
sub-machine guns, machine guns and grenade launchers, as well as
a variety of other related products & services. In 2017 Heckler &
Koch generated sales of EUR 182 million and reported EBITDA of
EUR 30 million.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Aerospace and
Defense Industry published in March 2018.


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ACCUNIA EUROPEAN III: Fitch Rates Class F Notes 'B-(EXP)sf'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Accunia European CLO III D.A.C.
expected ratings, as follows:

EUR216 million Class A: 'AAA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR20 million Class B-1: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR12 million Class B-2: 'AA(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR25 million Class C: 'A(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR19.5 million Class D: 'BBB(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR21.75 million Class E: 'BB-(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR10.2 million Class F: 'B-(EXP)sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR37.3 million subordinated notes: not rated

The assignment of the final ratings is contingent on the receipt
of final documents conforming to information already reviewed.

Accunia European CLO III D.A.C. (the issuer) is a securitisation
of mainly senior secured loans and bonds (at least 90%) with a
component of senior unsecured, mezzanine, and second-lien assets.
A total expected note issuance of EUR361.75 million will be used
to fund a portfolio with a target par of EUR350 million. The
portfolio will be managed by Accunia Fondsmaeglerselskab A/S. The
CLO envisages a four-year reinvestment period and an 8.5-year
weighted average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch considers the average credit quality of obligors to be in
the 'B' range. The Fitch weighted average rating factor (WARF) of
the identified portfolio is 32.3.

High Recovery Expectations

At least 90% of the portfolio comprises senior secured
obligations. Recovery prospects for these assets are typically
more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets. The Fitch weighted average recovery rating (WARR) of the
identified portfolio is 64.8%.

Diversified Asset Portfolio

The covenanted maximum exposure to the top 10 obligors for
assigning the expected ratings is 20% of the portfolio balance.
The transaction also includes limits on maximum industry exposure
based on Fitch industry definitions. The maximum exposure to the
three largest (Fitch-defined) industries in the portfolio is
covenanted at 40%. These covenants ensure that the asset
portfolio will not be exposed to excessive concentration.

Portfolio Management

The transaction features a four-year reinvestment period and
includes reinvestment criteria similar to other European
transactions. Fitch's analysis is based on a stressed-case
portfolio with the aim of testing the robustness of the
transaction structure against its covenants and portfolio
guidelines.

Cash Flow Analysis

Fitch used a customised proprietary cash flow model to replicate
the principal and interest waterfalls and the various structural
features of the transaction, and to assess their effectiveness,
including the structural protection provided by excess spread
diverted through the par value and interest coverage tests.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of up to two notches for the rated
notes. A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to four notches for the rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other
Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations and/or
European Securities and Markets Authority-registered rating
agencies. Fitch has relied on the practices of the relevant
groups within Fitch and/or other rating agencies to assess the
asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The information here was used in the analysis.

  - Current portfolio asset-by-asset data provided by Citigroup
Global Markets Limited as at May 30, 2018

  - Draft offering circular provided by Citigroup Global Markets
Limited as at June 21, 2018


BILBAO CLO I: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Bilbao CLO I DAC notes final ratings,
as follows:

EUR2 million Class X: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR206 million Class A-1A: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR30 million Class A-1B: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR9 million Class A-1C: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR28.5 million Class A-2A: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR10 million Class A-2B: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR27 million Class B: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

EUR21 million Class C: 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR28.5 million Class D: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR12 million Class E: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR38.2 million subordinated notes: not rated

Bilbao CLO I DAC is a cash flow collateralised loan obligation
(CLO). Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes are being used
to purchase a EUR400 million portfolio of mostly European
leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio is actively managed by
Guggenheim Partners Europe Limited. The CLO envisages an
approximately 4.25-year reinvestment period and an 8.5-year
weighted average life (WAL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B+'/'B' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch places the average credit quality of obligors in the
'B+'/'B' range. The Fitch-weighted average rating factor (WARF)
of the current portfolio is 31 versus a maximum covenant of 34.

High Recovery Expectations

At least 96% of the portfolio comprises senior secured
obligations. Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets
as more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets. The Fitch-weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of the
current portfolio is 67% versus a minimum covenant of 65.2%.

Diversified Asset Portfolio

For the analysis, Fitch created a stress portfolio based on the
transaction's portfolio profile tests and collateral quality
tests. These included a top 10 obligor limit at 20%, an 8.5 year
weighted average life, a top industry limit at 17.5% with the top
three industries at 40%, and a maximum 'CCC' bucket at 7.5%.

Limited Interest Rate Exposure

Up to 10% of the portfolio can be invested in fixed-rate assets,
while fixed-rate liabilities represent 10% of the target par.
Fitch modelled both 0% and 10% fixed-rate buckets and found that
the rated notes can withstand the interest rate mismatch
associated with each scenario.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and with this increase added to all rating default levels,
would lead to a downgrade of up to two notches for the rated
notes. A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of five notches for the class D notes and up to two
notches for all other rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other
Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations and/or
European Securities and Markets Authority-registered rating
agencies. Fitch has relied on the practices of the relevantgroups
within Fitch and/or other rating agencies to assess the asset
portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA CARIGE: Moody's Assigns B1 LT Counterparty Risk Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned Counterparty Risk Ratings
(CRRs) to the following rated 18 banking groups: UniCredit S.p.A.
and its branches in New York and London, Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.,
its branches in New York, London, and Hong Kong, and its
subsidiary Banca IMI S.p.A., Banco BPM S.p.A., Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena S.p.A., its London branch, and its subsidiary MPS
Capital Services S.p.A., Unione di Banche Italiane S.p.A., Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro S.p.A., Mediobanca S.p.A., BPER Banca
S.p.A., Credit Agricole Cariparma S.p.A., Credito Emiliano
S.p.A., Banca Carige S.p.A., Credito Valtellinese S.p.A., Banca
Sella Holding S.p.A., Unipol Banca S.p.A., Banca del Mezzogiorno
-- MCC S.p.A., Mediocredito Trentino-Alto Adige S.p.A.

Moody's Counterparty Risk Ratings (CRRs) are opinions of the
ability of entities to honour the uncollateralized portion of
non-debt counterparty financial liabilities (CRR liabilities) and
also reflect the expected financial losses in the event such
liabilities are not honoured. CRR liabilities typically relate to
transactions with unrelated parties. Examples of CRR liabilities
include the uncollateralized portion of payables arising from
derivatives transactions and the uncollateralized portion of
liabilities under sale and repurchase agreements. CRRs are not
applicable to funding commitments or other obligations associated
with covered bonds, letters of credit, guarantees, servicer and
trustee obligations, and other similar obligations that arise
from a bank performing its essential operating functions.

RATINGS RATIONALE

In assigning CRRs to the Italian banks subject to this rating
action, Moody's starts with the banks' adjusted Baseline Credit
Assessments (BCAs) and uses the agency's existing advanced Loss
Given Failure (LGF) analysis that takes into account the level of
subordination to CRR liabilities in the bank's balance sheet, and
assumes a nominal volume of such liabilities.

The CRRs on these Italian banks do not include any further uplift
resulting from Moody's expectations for government support: a
moderate probability for UniCredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca IMI
and Banca del Mezzogiorno -- MCC; low for all the others.

  - For 15 banks, the CRRs are three notches above their
respective adjusted BCAs, which is the maximum under Moody's
advanced LGF analysis: UniCredit, Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca IMI,
Banco BPM, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, MPS Capital Services,
Unione di Banche Italiane, Mediobanca, BPER Banca, Banca Carige,
Credito Valtellinese, Banca Sella Holding, Unipol Banca, Banca
del Mezzogiorno -- MCC, and Mediocredito Trentino-Alto Adige.

Although some of these banks are likely to have more than a
nominal volume of CRR liabilities at failure, this has no impact
on the CRRs because the significant level of subordination below
the CRR liabilities at each of the banks already provides the
maximum amount of uplift under Moody's rating methodology.

  - For three banks, the CRRs are two notches above their
respective adjusted BCAs: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Credit
Agricole Cariparma, Credito Emiliano.

In all cases, the CRRs assigned are equal to or higher than the
rated senior debt and deposit ratings, where applicable . This
reflects Moody's view that secured counterparties to banks
typically benefit from greater protections under insolvency laws
and bank resolution regimes than do senior unsecured creditors,
and that this benefit is likely to extend to the unsecured
portion of such secured transactions in most bank resolution
regimes. Moody's believes that in many cases regulators will use
their discretion to allow a bank in resolution to continue to
honour its CRR liabilities or to transfer those liabilities to
another party who will honour them, in part because of the
greater complexity of bailing in obligations that fluctuate with
market prices, and also because the regulator will typically seek
to preserve much of the bank's operations as a going concern in
order to maximize the value of the bank in resolution, stabilize
the bank quickly, and avoid contagion within the banking system.
CRR liabilities at these banking groups therefore benefit from
the subordination provided by more junior liabilities, with the
extent of the uplift of the CRR from the adjusted BCA depending
on the amount of subordination.

For 13 banks, the CRR is in line with the banks' respective
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CRA): UniCredit, Banco BPM, Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena, MPS Capital Services, Unione di Banche
Italiane, BPER Banca, Credito Emiliano, Banca Carige, Credito
Valtellinese, Banca Sella Holding, Unipol Banca, Banca del
Mezzogiorno -- MCC, Mediocredito Trentino-Alto Adige.

For UniCredit the Baa1 long-term CRR is in line with the Baa1(cr)
long-term CRA; however, the long-term CRA is on review for
downgrade, whilst the CRR is not, reflecting different
constraints. While CRAs, as a default measure, are typically
constrained at one notch above the sovereign debt rating (Italy,
Baa2 on review for downgrade), CRRs as an expected loss measure
are typically constrained at two notches above the sovereign debt
rating, given the potential for greater recoveries in default.

For the other five banks, the CRR is one notch higher than their
respective CRAs: Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca IMI, Banca Nazionale del
Lavoro, Mediobanca, Credit Agricole Cariparma. Their long-term
CRRs are A3 on review for downgrade, one notch above the long-
term CRAs of Baa1(cr) on review for downgrade.

OUTLOOK

CRRs do not carry outlooks. The A3 long-term CRRs of five banks
(Intesa Sanpaolo, Banca IMI, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro,
Mediobanca, Credit Agricole Cariparma) are on review for
downgrade reflecting the review for downgrade on Italy's Baa2
sovereign debt rating; CRRs are typically constrained at two
notches above the sovereign debt rating.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE

The CRRs could be upgraded following an upgrade of their
respective BCAs; for banks whose CRR benefits from less than
three notches of uplift from Moody's advanced LGF approach,
higher subordination could also lead to an upgrade of the CRR.
However potential upgrades could be constrained by the two-notch
difference between the bank's CRR and Italy's sovereign debt
rating.

Conversely, the CRRs could be downgraded following a downgrade of
their respective BCA, or by a reduction in the stock of bail-in-
able debt and deposits.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- UniCredit
S.p.A.

The upgrade of UniCredit's long-term CRR could be triggered by an
upgrade of the bank's ba1 standalone baseline credit assessment
(BCA). UniCredit's ba1 standalone BCA could be upgraded if the
rating agency judged that, based on further progress in the
bank's restructuring, the bank will meet its 2019 targets in
terms of problem loans reduction, capitalisation, and
profitability. UniCredit's CRR already benefits from three
notches of uplift from Moody's advanced LGF approach, which is
the maximum amount of uplift under the rating agency's rating
methodology.

The CRR of UniCredit could be downgraded following a downgrade of
the bank's BCA, which is unlikely given the bank's positive
outlook. Furthermore, UniCredit's CRR could be downgraded
following a material reduction in the bank's stock of bail-in-
able debt and junior deposits.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Intesa
Sanpaolo S.p.A.

An upgrade of Intesa Sanpaolo's long-term CRR is unlikely given
the current review for downgrade.

The CRR of Intesa Sanpaolo could be downgraded following a
downgrade of Italy's sovereign debt rating, a downgrade of the
bank's BCA, or a material reduction in the bank's stock of bail-
in-able debt and junior deposits. Intesa Sanpaolo's BCA of baa3
could be downgraded following a material deterioration of Italy's
operating environment, an increase in the stock of problem loans,
or a material reduction in profit or capital.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Banca IMI
S.p.A.

An upgrade of Banca IMI's long-term CRR is unlikely given the
current review for downgrade.

The CRR of Banca IMI could be downgraded following a downgrade of
Italy's sovereign debt rating, a downgrade of the baa3 BCA of
Banca IMI's parent Intesa Sanpaolo, or a material reduction in
the bank's stock of bail-in-able debt and junior deposits of
Intesa Sanpaolo.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Banco BPM
S.p.A.

The CRR of Banco BPM could be upgraded following an upgrade of
the bank's b1 BCA. The standalone BCA of Banco BPM could be
upgraded if the group were to make material progress in meeting
the targets of its strategic plan, which assumes a substantial
reduction in the stock of problem loans while preserving profit
generation capacity and capital.

A downgrade of the bank's BCA could prompt a downgrade of its
CRR. This could be triggered by the group's failure to meet its
targeted improvement in key financial fundamentals or a
deterioration from current levels. Any deterioration in the
bank's liquidity profile could also exert negative pressure on
the BCA.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Banca Monte
dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.

The upgrade of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena's long-term CRR
could be triggered by an upgrade of the bank's caa1 baseline
credit assessment (BCA). Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena's BCA
could be upgraded following tangible and sustainable progress
towards MPS' targets under its business plan (2021), in
particular: (i) a return on assets above 0.4%; (ii) a problem
loan ratio below 15% of loans; and (iii) increased deposit
funding or demonstrated access to the senior and subordinated
debt markets, without the benefit of a government guarantee.
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena's CRR already benefits from three
notches of uplift from Moody's advanced LGF approach, which is
the maximum amount of uplift under the rating agency's rating
methodology.

The CRR of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena could be downgraded
following a downgrade of the bank's BCA or a material reduction
in the bank's stock of bail-in-able debt and junior deposits.
Moody's could downgrade the BCA if (i) the bank fails to return
to sustainable profit generation; (ii) the CET1 ratio falls below
12%; (iii) problem loans increase materially ; or (iv) the bank
is not able to increase deposits and remains reliant on
government guaranteed funding.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Unione di
Banche Italiane S.p.A.

The CRR of Unione di Banche Italiane could be upgraded following
an upgrade of the bank's ba2 BCA. An upgrade of Unione di Banche
Italiane's BCA could be driven by: (i) a substantial increase in
capitalization; (ii) a material improvement in the bank's asset
risk profile; and/or (iii) a sustainable recovery in the bank's
recurring earnings.

A downgrade of the bank's BCA could prompt a downgrade of its
CRR. A downgrade of the bank's BCA could result from: (i) a
reversal in current asset risk trends with an increase in the
stock of problem loans; (ii) a weakening of Unione di Banche
Italiane's risk-absorption capacity as a result of deteriorating
profitability or capital levels; and/or (iii) a significant
deterioration of the bank's liquidity profile.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro S.p.A.

An upgrade of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro's CRR is unlikely given
the current review for downgrade.

Conversely, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro's CRR could be downgraded
if (i) Italy's sovereign debt rating were downgraded; (ii) Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro's baa2 adjusted BCA were downgraded
following a material deterioration of capital and asset risk or
Moody's reduced the probability of support from BNP Paribas (Aa3
stable, baa1); or (iii) following a material reduction in the
stock of bail-in-able debt and junior deposits.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Mediobanca
S.p.A.

An upgrade of Mediobanca's long-term CRR is unlikely given the
current review for downgrade. Moreover Mediobanca's CRR already
benefits from three notches of uplift from Moody's advanced LGF
approach, which is the maximum amount of uplift under the rating
agency's rating methodology.

The CRR of Mediobanca could be downgraded following a downgrade
of Italy's sovereign debt rating, a downgrade of the bank's BCA,
or a material reduction in the bank's stock of bail-in-able debt
and junior deposits. Mediobanca's BCA of baa3 could be downgraded
if reliance on capital market activities were to increase; if
capital ratios were to decrease materially; or if its dependence
on short-term wholesale funding were to rise.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- BPER Banca
S.p.A.

The upgrade of BPER Banca's long-term CRR could be triggered by
an upgrade of the bank's ba3 baseline credit assessment (BCA).
BPER Banca's BCA could be upgraded if the bank were to (i)
significantly reduce problem loans while maintaining strong
levels of capitalisation; and (ii) show a sustained increase in
profitability. BPER Banca's CRR already benefits from three
notches of uplift from Moody's advanced LGF approach, which is
the maximum amount of uplift under the rating agency's rating
methodology.

The CRR of BPER Banca could be downgraded following a downgrade
of the bank's BCA or a material reduction in the bank's stock of
bail-in-able debt and junior deposits. The BCA could be
downgraded if: (i) problem loans were to fail to decline
materially; (ii) capital were to fall further than expected; or
(iii) there were a structural decline in profitability.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Credit
Agricole Cariparma S.p.A.

An upgrade of Credit Agricole Cariparma's long-term CRR is
unlikely given the current review for downgrade.

The CRR of Credit Agricole Cariparma could be downgraded
following a downgrade of Italy's sovereign debt rating, a
downgrade of the bank's parent Credit Agricole S.A. (A1 stable,
baa3), evidence of reduced support from Credit Agricole, or a
substantial reduction in Credit Agricole Cariparma's stock of
bail-in-able debt.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Credito
Emiliano S.p.A.

An upgrade of Credito Emiliano's long-term CRR could be triggered
by an upgrade of the bank's baa3 baseline credit assessment
(BCA). Credito Emiliano's BCA could be upgraded following an
improvement in its operating environment.

The CRR of Credito Emiliano could be downgraded following a
downgrade of the bank's BCA or a material reduction in the bank's
stock of bail-in-able debt and junior deposits. The BCA could be
downgraded following a material increase in the stock of problem
loans, a reduction of capital or profitability, or a
deterioration of Italy's operating environment.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Banca Carige
S.p.A.

The upgrade of Banca Carige's long-term CRR could be triggered by
an upgrade of the bank's caa1 baseline credit assessment (BCA).
Moody's could upgrade Banca Carige's BCA if the bank makes
significant progress in its restructuring plan, in particular a
material improvement in profitability and further significant de-
risking, without compromising its target capital levels. Banca
Carige's CRR already benefits from three notches of uplift from
Moody's advanced LGF approach, which is the maximum amount of
uplift under the rating agency's rating methodology.

The CRR of Banca Carige could be downgraded following a downgrade
of the bank's BCA or a material reduction in the bank's stock of
bail-in-able debt and junior deposits. Moody's could downgrade
the BCA if further losses were to reduce Banca Carige's capital
headroom over its prudential requirement.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Credito
Valtellinese S.p.A.

Credito Valtellinese's CRR could be upgraded if its adjusted BCA
of b2 were upgraded, following significant progress towards its
business plan targets, in particular profitability.

Conversely, Credito Valtellinese's CRR could be downgraded (i) if
the bank failed to return to adequate profitability, or were
unable to execute the planned sale of loans; or (ii) following a
material reduction in the stock of bail-in-able debt and junior
deposits.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Banca Sella
Holding S.p.A.

Banca Sella's CRR could be upgraded if its adjusted BCA of ba2
were upgraded, following further improvements in capital, a
larger than-expected reduction in the stock of problem loans and
an improvement in profitability.

Conversely, Banca Sella's CRR could be downgraded (i) if its
adjusted BCA were downgraded following a material increase in the
stock of problem loans or net losses reducing capital; or (ii)
following a material reduction in the stock of bail-in-able debt
and junior deposits.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Unipol Banca
S.p.A.

Unipol Banca's CRR could be upgraded if its adjusted BCA of b1
were to be upgraded, following achievement of a sustained
improvement in profitability and resolution of the current
strategic uncertainty.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade Unipol Banca's CRR if (i)
continuing losses eroded the CET1 ratio below 9%; (ii) the parent
Unipol Gruppo S.p.A. were to be downgraded; (iii) Moody's were to
consider that the likelihood of support from the parent had
fallen further; or (iv) following a material reduction in the
stock of bail-in-able debt and junior deposits.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Banca del
Mezzogiorno -- MCC S.p.A.

The CRR of Banca del Mezzogiorno - MCC could be upgraded
following an upgrade of the bank's ba3 BCA, or by an upgrade of
Italy's sovereign debt rating, which is however unlikely given
the current review for downgrade on the latter. Banca del
Mezzogiorno - MCC's BCA could be upgraded following a track
record of low cost of risk and greater diversification of funding
sources.

Banca del Mezzogiorno - MCC's CRR already benefits from three
notches of uplift from Moody's advanced LGF approach, which is
the maximum amount of uplift under the rating agency's rating
methodology.

Banca del Mezzogiorno - MCC's CRR could be downgraded following a
downgrade of the bank's BCA, or following a material reduction in
the bank's stock of bail-in-able debt and junior deposit. Banca
del Mezzogiorno - MCC's BCA could be downgraded following a
considerable deterioration in the bank's loan book or a material
reduction in capital.

FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE/DOWNGRADE -- Mediocredito
Trentino-Alto Adige S.p.A.

The upgrade of Mediocredito Trentino-Alto Adige's long-term CRR
could be triggered by an upgrade of the bank's ba3 baseline
credit assessment (BCA). Mediocredito Trentino-Alto Adige's BCA
could be upgraded following a material further reduction in
problem loans, improved profitability, and a significantly
reduced reliance on wholesale funding. Mediocredito Trentino-Alto
Adige's CRR already benefits from three notches of uplift from
Moody's advanced LGF approach, which is the maximum amount of
uplift under the rating agency's rating methodology.

The CRR of Mediocredito Trentino-Alto Adige could be downgraded
following a downgrade of the bank's BCA or a material reduction
in the bank's stock of bail-in-able debt and junior deposits. The
BCA could be downgraded following a deterioration in asset
quality or profitability, which could exert pressure on capital.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Banca Carige S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned B1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned NP

Issuer: Banca del Mezzogiorno - MCC S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Baa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-3

Issuer: Banca IMI S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned A3; placed on review for downgrade

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned B1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned NP

Issuer: Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, London

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned B1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned NP

Issuer: Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned A3; placed on review for downgrade

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Banca Sella Holding S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Baa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Banco BPM S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Ba1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned NP

Issuer: BPER Banca S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Baa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-3

Issuer: Credit Agricole Cariparma S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned A3; placed on review for downgrade

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Credito Emiliano S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Baa1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Credito Valtellinese S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Ba2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned NP

Issuer: Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned A3; placed on review for downgrade

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A., Hong Kong Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned A3; placed on review for downgrade

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A., London Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned A3; placed on review for downgrade

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A., New York Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned A3; placed on review for downgrade

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Mediobanca S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned A3; placed on review for downgrade

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Mediocredito Trentino-Alto Adige S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Baa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-3

Issuer: MPS Capital Services S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned B1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned NP

Issuer: UniCredit S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Baa1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: UniCredit S.p.A., London Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Baa1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: UniCredit S.p.A., New York Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Baa1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Unione di Banche Italiane S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Baa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned P-2

Issuer: Unipol Banca S.p.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned Ba1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
assigned NP

PRINCPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in June 2018.


BANCA MONTE: DBRS Confirms B(high) Issuer Rating, Trend Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed the ratings of Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena SpA (BMPS or the Bank), including the Long-Term
Issuer Rating of B (high) and the Short-Term Issuer Rating of R-
4. The trend on all ratings remains Stable. Concurrently, DBRS
maintained the Bank's Intrinsic Assessment at B (high) and
support assessment at SA3.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The confirmation of BMPS's ratings with a Stable trend takes into
account the Bank's progress with its restructuring plan supported
by: i) the completion of a Non-Performing Exposure (NPE)
securitization of EUR 24.1 billion and further investments in
risk management, ii) improvement in efficiency from the exit of
1,800 employees and rationalization of the branch network, iii)
stabilization in the funding position coupled with lower funding
costs.

The ratings, however, continue to reflect the Bank's still high
stock of NPEs and the resulting negative impact on capital, as
well as the challenges faced by the Bank in improving
profitability.

RATING DRIVERS

Positive rating pressure would require further improvements in
asset quality and efficiency, progress with the NPE disposal plan
and improvements in revenue generation. Negative rating
implications could result from a deterioration in investor
sentiment, material weakening of the capital position and
challenges in reducing NPEs.

RATING RATIONALE

BMPS is Italy's fourth largest bank by total assets. The Bank has
a nationwide retail and commercial banking franchise with a
significant market share in the home region of Tuscany. The Bank
is 68% controlled by the Italian Ministry of Finance following a
precautionary recapitalization completed in August 2017.

As a result of State Aid procedures, the Bank agreed with the
European Commission to undertake a substantial restructuring plan
over the period 2017-2021. Key achievements to date include the
closure of 435 branches, the exit of 1,800 employees, as well as
the reorganization of the credit risk structure and reduction in
NPEs. In addition, the Bank has taken steps to strengthen its
commercial structure and improve controls. After repeated periods
of stress, the Bank was able to recover deposits and reduce
funding costs. Stability in the Bank's customer franchise and
investor confidence remains a key component of a successful
restructuring plan. Any renewed headline risk and deterioration
in market sentiment could contribute to increase in execution
risks.

In 1Q 2018, the Bank reported net income of EUR 188 million
following a net loss of EUR 169 million in the same period of
2017 and a loss of EUR 502 million in 4Q17. The results were
supported by higher Net Interest Income (NII) thanks to lower
funding costs and higher lending volumes, as well as gains in
efficiency and lower cost of risk. Nonetheless, the Bank's
profitably will continue to be impacted by the ongoing
restructuring and challenging operating environment.

The Bank's risk profile is affected by its high stock of NPEs,
large holding of Italian sovereign bonds and high litigation
risks. The Bank is making progress in reducing its stock of NPEs.
At 1Q18, total NPEs decreased to EUR 42.6 billion, corresponding
to 34.2% of the Bank's total gross loans, from EUR 42.9 billion
at YE 2017. As part of the NPE plan, in May 2018, BMPS completed
a NPE securitization for EUR 24.1 billion. The senior notes
issued by the securitization vehicle for EUR 2.9 billion will
benefit from the government guarantee scheme (GACS), and will be
initially retained by BMPS. After the deconsolidation of the NPE
portfolio, which is expected in 1H 2018, BMPS' pro-forma gross
NPE ratio would improve to 19.7% (or 9.9% net of provisions).

With the IFRS 9 first-time adoption (FTA), the Bank aims to
reduce its gross NPE target for 2021 to 10% from 12.9% set in
July 2017. In 1Q 2018, BMPS's coverage levels strengthened to
68.8% from 65.5% at YE 2017. The higher provisioning levels are
expected to support NPE disposals for approximately EUR 4 billion
in 2H 2018. Improving default rates and a lower stock of unlikely
to pay (UTP) loans should also contribute to further improvements
in asset quality.

The Bank's funding and liquidity stabilized in 2017 supported by
improved depositor confidence following the completion of the
precautionary recapitalization. In January 2018, the Bank repaid
EUR 3 billion in bonds with the government guarantee and regained
access to the wholesale market with the issuance of subordinated
Tier 2 notes of EUR 750 million. At March 2018, Bank reported an
LCR of 195.7%, NSFR of 106%, and total unencumbered assets of EUR
19.6 billion, corresponding to 14.3% of the Bank's total assets.

BMPS' capital position strengthened with the precautionary
recapitalization and the burden sharing with the holders of the
Bank's subordinated bonds. At March 2018, the Bank reported a
CET1 ratio (phased-in) of 14.4%, down by 41bps QoQ, mainly due to
the increase in RWAs for market risk. On a fully loaded basis,
including the impact of the IFRS 9 FTA for EUR 1.4 billion, the
Bank's CET1 ratio decreased to 11.7% from 14.2% at YE 2017.

In 2H 2018, the Bank's capital ratios are expected to be impacted
by an add-on on RWAs of approximately EUR 4-5 billion, due to the
ongoing ECB revision of the capital treatment of NPEs. Additional
negative impact may also arise from the recent increase in
Italian sovereign bonds yields.

The Grid Summary Grades for Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA
is as follows: Franchise Strength - Moderate; Earnings - Weak;
Risk Profile - Weak; Funding & Liquidity - Weak/Moderate;
Capitalization - Weak.

Notes: All figures are in Euro unless otherwise noted.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


DECO 2015-CHARLEMAGNE: S&P Withdraws BB(sf) Rating on Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings withdrew its rating on the class E notes in
DECO 2015-Charlemagne S.A.

The withdrawal follows the full repayment of the Windmill loan,
which was the remaining loan in the transaction.

S&P said, "Given the loan's full repayment, including accrued
interest, we expected that the note principal would have been
fully repaid on the April 2018 interest payment date (IPD).
However, as per the latest cash manager report, the class E notes
have a principal balance outstanding of EUR239,950.

"The weighted-average note margin increased above the margin on
the underlying loan, following previous loan prepayments, and we
expected this to lead to a reduced interest amount on the class E
notes. Instead, interest was paid at the notes' stated coupon.
Consequently, the class E noteholders received the expected
amount, but it consisted of too little principal and too much
interest, based on our interpretation of the transaction
documents.

"Following our conversations with Deutsche Bank AG, the arranger
and cash manager for this transaction, we established that the
discrepancy results from a different interpretation of the note
waterfall and definitions. In the transaction documentation,
there are two conflicting items: the available funds cap (AFC)
definition and the application of principal proceeds. In
practice, if there have been loan prepayments and the remaining
loans' weighted-average margin is less than the outstanding
notes' weighted-average margin, then the AFC would apply and
interest in excess of the weighted-average loan margin minus
expenses would not become due or would be subordinated. Because
the interest wouldn't be due, the liquidity facility would not be
drawn upon to pay any interest shortfalls."

In this transaction, the cash manager interpreted the documents
such that the AFC was not applied. On the April 2018 IPD, the
class E noteholders received principal proceeds from the
repayment of the Windmill loan as interest rather than as
principal. This has led to the principal outstanding on this
class of notes, which will not be repaid as the cash manager has
confirmed that there are no other funds to be received. This was
the last interest payment date and the issuer is in the process
of winding up the transaction.

S&P said, "We have not lowered our rating on the class E notes to
'D (sf)' as we believe that even though the cash manager report
shows that there is a principal amount outstanding, the investors
received the full amount due. The amount of EUR239,950 reported
as principal represents 2% of the original principal balance.
Therefore, the investors were compensated by a correspondingly
higher amount of interest paid. We have therefore withdrawn our
rating on the class E notes."

DECO 2015-Charlemagne is a northern European commercial mortgage-
backed securities (CMBS) transaction originally backed by three
loans secured on commercial properties in Germany, the
Netherlands, and Belgium.

  RATINGS LIST

  Class             Rating
              To               From

  DECO 2015-Charlemagne S.A. EUR316.19 Million Commercial
  Mortgage-Backed Floating Rate Notes

  Ratings Withdrawn

  E           NR               BB (sf)

  NR--Not rated.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BARINGS EURO 2016-1: Moody's Rates Class F-R Notes (P)B2
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to refinancing notes to be issued
by Barings Euro CLO 2016-1 B.V.:

EUR 228,000,000 Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 12,000,000 Class A-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2030, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 38,500,000 Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR 7,300,000 Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2030, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR 22,000,000 Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

EUR 20,500,000 Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

EUR 27,300,000 Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

EUR 12,800,000 Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2030, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of financial instruments, but these ratings only represent
Moody's preliminary credit opinions. Upon a conclusive review of
a transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings. A definitive rating (if any) may
differ from a provisional rating.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the notes address the expected
loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of the
notes in 2030. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's
legal structure, and the characteristics of the underlying
assets. Furthermore, Moody's is of the opinion that the
collateral manager, Barings (U.K.) Limited, has sufficient
experience and operational capacity and is capable of managing
this CLO.

The Issuer will issue the Refinancing Notes in connection with
the refinancing of the following classes of notes: Class A-1
Notes, Class A-2 Notes, Class B-1 Notes, Class B-2 Notes, Class C
Notes, Class D Notes, Class E Notes and Class F Notes due 2030
(the "Original Notes"), previously issued July 2016 (the
"Original Closing Date"). On the Refinancing Date, the Issuer
will use the proceeds from the issuance of the Refinancing Notes
to redeem in full the Original Notes. On the Original Closing
Date the Issuer also issued Subordinated Notes, which will remain
outstanding.

The main changes to the terms and conditions occurring in
connection to the refinancing involve (1) extension of the
Weighted Average Life Test by 18 months to a total of 7.5 years
from refinancing date and (2) the use of excess par to skew the
Minimum Weighted Average Spread Test. Furthermore, the Manager is
expected to be able to choose from a new set of collateral
quality test covenants (the "Matrix").

Barings Euro CLO 2016-1 B.V. (previously known as Babson Euro CLO
2016-1 B.V.) is a managed cash flow CLO with a target portfolio
made up of EUR 400,000,000 par value of mainly European corporate
leveraged loans. At least 90% of the portfolio must consist of
senior secured loans and senior secured bonds and up to 10% of
the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior loans, second-lien
loans or, mezzanine loans. The portfolio is expected to be 100%
ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised
predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western
Europe.

Barings will actively manage the collateral pool of the CLO. It
will direct the selection, acquisition and disposition of
collateral on behalf of the Issuer and may engage in trading
activity, including discretionary trading, during the
transaction's remaining 2-year reinvestment period. Thereafter,
purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from unscheduled
principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit risk and
credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The performance of the notes is subject to uncertainty. The
performance of the notes is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. The Manager's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
performance of the notes.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in August 2017. The
cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the binomial
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

The key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Performing par and principal proceeds balance: EUR400,000,000

Defaulted par: EUR 0

Diversity Score: 50

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3100

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 41.0%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 7.5 years

As part of its analysis, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with a local currency
country risk ceiling of A1 or below. Given the portfolio
constraints and the current sovereign ratings in Europe, such
exposure may not exceed 10% of the total portfolio with exposures
to countries with local currency country risk ceiling of Baa1 to
Baa3 further limited to 5%. As a worst case scenario, a maximum
5% of the pool would be domiciled in countries with A3 and a
maximum of 5% of the pool would be domiciled in countries with
Baa3 local currency country ceiling each. The remainder of the
pool will be domiciled in countries which currently have a local
currency country ceiling of Aaa or Aa1 to Aa3. Given this
portfolio composition, the model was run with different target
par amounts depending on the target rating of each class as
further described in the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are
a function of the exposure size to peripheral countries and the
target ratings of the rated notes and amount to 0.75% for the
Class A-1 Notes and Class A-2 Notes, 0.50% for the Class B-1
Notes and Class B-2 Notes, 0.38% for the Class C Notes and 0% for
classes D, E and F.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
an additional sensitivity analysis, which was a component in
determining the provisional ratings assigned to the rated notes.
This sensitivity analysis includes increased default probability
relative to the base case. Here is a summary of the impact of an
increase in default probability (expressed in terms of WARF
level) on the notes (shown in terms of the number of notch
difference versus the current model output, whereby a negative
difference corresponds to higher expected losses), assuming that
all other factors are held equal.

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 15% (from 3100 to 3565)

Rating Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes : -2

Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes : -2

Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF -- increase of 30% (from 2800 to 4030)

Class A-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes : -4

Class B-2-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes : -4

Class C-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F-R Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2


CREDIT EUROPE: Moody's Assigns Ba1 LT Counterparty Risk Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned Counterparty Risk Ratings to
19 banks and their branches and subsidiaries in the Benelux
region: ABN AMRO Bank N.V. (ABN AMRO), Axa Bank Belgium (ABB),
Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat (BCEE), Belfius Bank SA/NV
(Belfius), BGL BNP Paribas (BGL), Banque Internationale a
Luxembourg (BIL), BNP Paribas Fortis SA/NV (BNPPF), China
Construction Bank (Europe) S.A. (CCB Europe), Credit Europe Bank
N.V. (CEB NV), De Volksbank N.V. (De Volksbank), Demir-Halk Bank
(Nederland) N.V. (DHB), GarantiBank International N.V. (GBI), ING
Bank N.V. (ING), ING Belgium SA/NV (ING Belgium), LeasePlan
Corporation N.V. (LeasePlan), N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten
(BNG Bank), Nederlandse Waterschapsbank N.V. (NWB Bank), NIBC
Bank N.V. (NIBC) and Rabobank.

Moody's Counterparty Risk Ratings (CRRs) are opinions of the
ability of entities to honor the uncollateralized portion of non-
debt counterparty financial liabilities (CRR liabilities) and
also reflect the expected financial losses in the event such
liabilities are not honored. CRR liabilities typically relate to
transactions with unrelated parties. Examples of CRR liabilities
include the uncollateralized portion of payables arising from
derivatives transactions and the uncollateralized portion of
liabilities under sale and repurchase agreements. CRRs are not
applicable to funding commitments or other obligations associated
with covered bonds, letters of credit, guarantees, servicer and
trustee obligations, and other similar obligations that arise
from a bank performing its essential operating functions.

RATINGS RATIONALE

In assigning CRRs to the banks subject to this rating action,
Moody's starts with the banks' adjusted Baseline Credit
Assessments (BCAs) and uses the agency's existing advanced Loss
Given Failure (LGF) approach that takes into account the level of
subordination to CRR liabilities in the bank's balance sheet, and
assumes a nominal volume of such liabilities. In addition, where
applicable, Moody's has incorporated the likelihood of government
support for CRR liabilities.

As a result, of the CRRs assigned to the 19 banks, the CRRs of 12
banks (ABN AMRO, BCEE, Belfius, BGL, BIL, BNPPF, CCB Europe, ING,
ING Belgium, BNG Bank, NWB Bank, Rabobank) are four notches
higher than their respective adjusted BCAs, the CRRs of five
banks (CEB NV, De Volksbank, GBI, LeasePlan, NIBC) are three
notches higher, the CRR of one bank (ABB) is two notches higher
and the CRR of one bank (DHB) is one notch higher.

Although most if not all of the 17 banks whose CRRs receive four
or three notches of uplift from their adjusted BCAs are likely to
have more than a nominal volume of CRR liabilities at failure,
this has no impact on the ratings because the significant level
of subordination below the CRR liabilities at each of the 17
banks already provides the maximum amount of uplift allowed under
Moody's rating methodology.

In all cases the CRRs assigned are equal to or higher than the
rated banks' senior debt and deposit ratings. This reflects
Moody's view that secured counterparties to banks typically
benefit from greater protections under insolvency laws and bank
resolution regimes than do senior unsecured creditors, and that
this benefit is likely to extend to the unsecured portion of such
secured transactions in most bank resolution regimes. Moody's
believes that in many cases regulators will use their discretion
to allow a bank in resolution to continue to honor its CRR
liabilities or to transfer those liabilities to another party who
will honor them, in part because of the greater complexity of
bailing in obligations that fluctuate with market prices, and
also because the regulator will typically seek to preserve much
of the bank's operations as a going concern in order to maximize
the value of the bank in resolution, stabilize the bank quickly,
and avoid contagion within the banking system. CRR liabilities at
these banks therefore benefit from the subordination provided by
more junior liabilities, with the extent of the uplift of the CRR
from the adjusted BCA depending on the amount of subordination.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

ABN AMRO Bank N.V.

An upgrade of ABN AMRO's CRR could occur if the bank's adjusted
BCA were upgraded as a result of a material improvement in its
leverage ratio (regulatory leverage ratio of 4.3% at year-end
2017).

The bank's CRR could be downgraded if its adjusted BCA were
downgraded as a result of (1) a significant deterioration in the
bank's asset quality and profitability; or (2) a negative
development in its liquidity; or (3) if Moody's assessment of the
bank's capital adequacy relative to its risks deteriorated.

Axa Bank Belgium

An upgrade of ABB's CRR is unlikely given the negative pressure
on its adjusted BCA resulting from the negative outlook assigned
to the senior unsecured debt rating of its parent AXA (LT senior
unsecured A2 negative).

ABB's CRR could be downgraded if its adjusted BCA were downgraded
in the event of a downgrade of AXA's senior unsecured debt rating
or if Moody's were to consider a lower probability of parental
support to be extended to the bank in case of need.

Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat

As BCEE's CRR already benefits from the maximum LGF uplift under
Moody's rating methodology, it could only be upgraded as a result
of an upgrade of its adjusted BCA, which is unlikely at present.

A downgrade of the bank's CRR could result from (1) a downgrade
of the BCA and (2) higher loss-given-failure for CRR obligations
due to lower subordination protecting these liabilities. A
downgrade of the bank's BCA could result from (1) a deterioration
in the quality of BCEE's loan portfolio and securities
investments, notably through an increase in riskier investments;
or (2) a decrease in net profitability, owing to lower net
interest margins in a prolonged low interest rate environment and
higher operating costs. More generally, the BCA could be
downgraded following a weakening of the bank's franchise in
Luxembourg or a substantial increase in borrower concentrations.

Belfius Bank SA/NV

Belfius' CRR could be upgraded as a result of an upgrade of its
adjusted BCA. The bank's adjusted BCA would likely be upgraded if
risk concentrations in its loan and investment portfolios were to
be further reduced, its profit growth acceleration were confirmed
or its capital position continues to strengthen above the current
expectations.

A downgrade of Belfius' CRR is unlikely over the outlook horizon,
as reflected in the positive outlook on its long-term deposit and
senior unsecured debt ratings. However, Belfius' adjusted BCA,
and hence its CRR, could be downgraded as a result of unexpected
losses arising from its investment or loan book.

BGL BNP Paribas

BGL's CRR could be upgraded if its adjusted BCA were upgraded.
BGL's BCA and adjusted BCA are already one notch above those of
its parent BNP Paribas (BNPP; LT deposit Aa3 stable, LT senior
unsecured Aa3 stable, BCA baa1) and it is therefore unlikely to
further increase absent any improvement in BNPP's own BCA. In
such a scenario, BGL's adjusted BCA could be upgraded as a result
of a strengthening of its asset quality and/or an improvement of
its profitability.

BGL's CRR could be downgraded if its adjusted BCA were downgraded
in the event the bank suffers significant asset-quality
deterioration or if its parent were to transfer activities that
would alter the risk profile of BGL. The bank's CRR could also be
downgraded as a result of higher loss-given-failure due to a
material reduction in liabilities subordinated to the CRR
obligations.

N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten

An upgrade of the BNG Bank's BCA will not trigger any upgrade of
the bank's CRR which is already Aaa.

A multi-notch downgrade of the bank's BCA could result in a
downgrade of its CRR. The CRR will likely not be affected by a
one notch downgrade of the BCA, because this would likely be
offset by government support.

Downward pressure on BNG Bank's BCA could result from (1) a
deterioration in the creditworthiness of the Dutch public sector;
(2) a significant increase in the bank's risk weighted assets;
(3) a significant increase in its funding gaps; or (4) a
deterioration in its solvency.

Banque Internationale a Luxembourg

BIL's CRR could be upgraded if its adjusted BCA were upgraded.
The bank's adjusted BCA could be upgraded if it improved its
profitability or asset risk, or both, while maintaining its
capital base, or if the uncertainties stemming from the bank's
recent acquisition by a new shareholder abated.

BIL's CRR could be downgraded if its adjusted BCA were
downgraded. BIL's adjusted BCA could be downgraded as a result of
(1) a deterioration in its profitability that may result from
difficulties in implementing its commercial strategy; or (2)
material losses stemming from the bank's investment portfolio and
loan book in a less benign macroeconomic environment.

Credit Europe Bank N.V.

CEB NV's CRR is on review for upgrade as a result of the current
review for upgrade on the bank's BCA. The bank's BCA and
consequently its long-term deposit rating and CRR, all currently
on review for upgrade, could be upgraded on the sale of Credit
Europe Bank Limited (CEBL) to CEB NV's parent Fiba Group, which
is still contingent upon the approval of local regulators. The
upgrade would be underpinned by stronger operating conditions in
jurisdictions where CEB NV does business, which will affect the
bank's asset quality and profitability.

Although unlikely at present, a downgrade of CEB NV's CRR could
result from a downgrade of the bank's BCA due to higher asset
risks, lower capitalisation or reduced profitability.

Demir-Halk Bank (Nederland) N.V.

DHB's CRR could be upgraded if the bank's BCA were upgraded,
which could be triggered by a decrease in emerging market
exposures and a sustainable improvement in profitability. In
addition, DHB's CRR could be upgraded if the subordination
benefiting CRR obligations were to increase, resulting in lower
loss-given-failure.

DHB's CRR could be downgraded if the bank's BCA were downgraded,
which could be triggered notably by (1) reduced profitability and
increased earnings volatility; (2) a deterioration in operating
conditions in Turkey, impacting asset quality; (3) weakening
capital; or (4) an increase in related party lending.

China Construction Bank (Europe) S.A.

CCB Europe's CRR could be upgraded if its adjusted BCA were
upgraded. Unless the BCA of its parent China Construction Bank
Corporation's (CCB, LT deposit A1 stable, BCA baa1) BCA itself
were upgraded, an upgrade of CCB Europe's ba2 BCA would be
unlikely to result in an upgrade of the bank's CRR.

CCB's CRR could be downgraded if its adjusted BCA were
downgraded. The bank's adjusted BCA could be downgraded as a
result of a downgrade in CCB's BCA or a downgrade of its own BCA.
Factors that may lead to a downgrade of CCB Europe's standalone
BCA include (1) difficulties in implementing the bank's business
development plan, which would result in lower-than-expected
volumes of loans granted and a protracted period of negative
profitability; (2) increasing asset risk resulting from higher
delinquencies; and (3) a failure to attract new deposits and so
diversify the bank's funding profile.

CCB's CRR could also be downgraded if Moody's were to consider
that the Chinese government's support to CCB Europe would be less
likely than currently expected.

De Volksbank N.V.

De Volksbank's CRR could be upgraded if (1) its adjusted BCA were
upgraded owing to further strengthening of its profitability and
asset risk; or (2) as a result of a decrease in loss-given-
failure implied by a higher volume of subordinated liabilities to
the CRR obligations.

De Volksbank's CRR could be downgraded in the event its adjusted
BCA were downgraded as a result of a material deterioration of
the bank's asset quality and solvency driven by an unexpected
downturn in the domestic economy, or a deterioration of its
liquidity profile.

GarantiBank International N.V.

An upgrade of GBI's CRR is unlikely at present as it is on review
for downgrade, along with the review for downgrade on the bank's
BCA caused by increased asset risks due to the bank's Turkish
exposures.

A downgrade of GBI's BCA, long-term deposit ratings and CRR could
result from (1) increased asset risks in relation to the bank's
Turkish exposures and/or declining profitability; (2) contagion
risk from Turkiye Garanti Bankasi (TGB); and/or (3) a lower
probability of support from BBVA.

A downgrade of GBI's CRR could also result from a decrease in the
subordination benefiting CRR obligations, resulting in higher
loss-given-failure for these liabilities.

ING Bank N.V.

ING Bank's CRR could be upgraded if its adjusted BCA were
upgraded as a result of (1) a material improvement in the
operating environment in the EU countries to which the bank is
mostly exposed, leading to substantially improved asset risk and
a higher profitability level; (2) a strengthening capital
position; or (3) a lower reliance on confidence-sensitive
wholesale funding.

ING Bank's CRR could be downgraded if its adjusted BCA were
downgraded as a result of (1) an unexpected deterioration in
asset risk and profitability; or (2) a weaker-than expected
capital position.

ING Belgium SA/NV

ING Belgium's CRR could be upgraded if its adjusted BCA were
upgraded as a result of (1) a substantial decrease in the bank's
net exposure to its parent, ING Bank, N.V. (LT deposit Aa3
stable, LT senior unsecured Aa3 stable, BCA baa1); or (2) an
improvement in its parent's BCA, which currently constrains that
of ING Belgium.

ING Belgium's CRR could be downgraded if its adjusted BCA is
downgraded as a result of a weakening in the bank's credit
profile, due for instance to (1) an unexpected deterioration of
the operating environment in Belgium; or (2) a decline in
profitability if the bank fails to implement its restructuring
plan. ING Belgium's adjusted BCA could also be downgraded if ING
Bank's BCA is downgraded.

LeasePlan Corporation N.V.

An upgrade of LeasePlan's CRR is unlikely at present because the
CRR already benefits from three notches of LGF uplift, which is
the maximum under Moody's rating methodology. An upgrade of
LeasePlan's BCA would likely trigger a similar upgrade of the
CRR, but is unlikely at present, considering that LeasePlan's
owners are private equity investors who are expected to constrain
capital accrual at the bank.

LeasePlan's BCA and consequently its CRR could be downgraded if
the shareholders implemented a more aggressive financial policy
at the bank. In addition, its ratings could be downgraded as a
result of (1) the failure of risk-mitigation techniques,
recurring earnings or capital resources to adequately cover
higher residual value risk; (2) evidence of deterioration in the
bank's liquidity and funding profiles, resulting from increased
reliance on wholesale funding or worse-than-expected liquidity
gaps; or (3) a structural deterioration in profitability or the
diversity of income streams.

NIBC Bank N.V.

NIBC's CRR could be upgraded if its adjusted BCA were upgraded as
a result of improved asset risk and profitability.

A downgrade of NIBC's CRR could result from a downgrade of its
adjusted BCA driven by a deterioration in its asset quality in
light of weaker credit exposures, notably to cyclical corporate
sectors (for example, commercial real estate, shipping, and oil
and gas). The bank's BCA could also be lowered if the liquidity
or funding mix deteriorates.

Nederlandse Waterschapsbank N.V.

An upgrade of the NWB Bank's BCA would not trigger any upgrade of
the bank's CRR which is already Aaa.

A multi-notch downgrade of the bank's BCA could result in a
downgrade of its CRR. The CRR will likely not be affected by a
one notch downgrade of the BCA, because this would likely be
offset by government support.

Downward pressure on NWB Bank's BCA could result from (1) a
deterioration in the creditworthiness of the Dutch public sector;
(2) a significant increase in the bank's risk-weighted assets;
(3) a significant increase in its funding gaps; or (4) a
significant deterioration in its solvency.

Rabobank

An upgrade of Rabobank's BCA, and consequently of the long-term
CRR, could occur if (1) Rabobank improved its structural
profitability beyond its current plans; (2) its capital continued
to steadily increase; and (3) asset risks remained very low.

A downgrade of the bank's BCA, and consequently of the long-term
CRR, could occur if (1) the bank's profitability were
significantly impaired; or (2) the cost of risk in the bank's
loan portfolio were to increase materially.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: BGL BNP Paribas

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: BNP Paribas Fortis SA/NV

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: BNP Paribas Fortis, New York Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: LeasePlan Corporation N.V.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned A3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-2

Issuer: LeasePlan Finance N.V. (DUBLIN BRANCH)

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned A3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-2

Issuer: N.V. Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aaa

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Nederlandse Waterschapsbank N.V.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aaa

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Banque et Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: ABN AMRO Bank N.V.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: ING Bank N.V.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: ING Bank N.V. (Singapore)

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: ING Bank N.V., Sydney Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: ING Bank N.V., Tokyo Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: ING Groenbank N.V.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: ING Belgium SA/NV

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Belfius Bank SA/NV

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned A1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: AXA Bank Belgium

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: GarantiBank International N.V.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned A2, Placed Under Review for Downgrade

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1, Placed Under Review for Downgrade

Issuer: Demir-Halk Bank (Nederland) N.V.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Baa3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-3

Issuer: De Volksbank N.V.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned A1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Banque Internationale a Luxembourg

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned A1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: China Construction Bank (Europe) S.A.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned A1

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Rabobank

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Rabobank, Australia Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Rabobank, Hong Kong Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Rabobank, New York Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Rabobank, New Zealand Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Rabobank, Paris Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Rabobank, Singapore Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: Rabobank, The Netherlands Branch

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Aa2

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-1

Issuer: NIBC Bank N.V.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned A3

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned P-2

Issuer: Credit Europe Bank N.V.

Assignments:

Long-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned Ba1, Placed Under Review for Upgrade

Short-term Counterparty Risk Rating (Local and Foreign Currency),
Assigned NP, Placed Under Review for Upgrade

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in June 2018.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


KAZANORGSINTEZ PAO: Fitch Hikes LT IDR to B+, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded PAO Kazanorgsintez's (KOS) Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating to 'B+' from 'B'. The Outlook is Stable.
Fitch has also affirmed KOS's Short-Term IDR at 'B'.

The upgrade follows clarity on the scale of KOS's planned
expansion projects over the next three years. It reflects Fitch's
view that KOS will maintain a conservative financial profile,
with funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage
comfortably below its negative guideline of 3x in 2018-2021 even
as the company resumes expansionary investments. KOS has
benefitted from the weakening of the Russian rouble against the
US dollar while maintaining modest capex and dividends, which
translated into consistently positive free cash flow (FCF)
generation and full debt repayment in 2017.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Projected Low Leverage: KOS's gradual deleveraging has resulted
in repayment of all outstanding debt in 2017, leaving the company
with RUB15 billion of cash at end-2017. Fitch views KOS's credit
metrics as comfortable for the current rating and expect the
company to remain net cash positive in the medium term. This
assumes some pricing pressure, higher dividend distributions and
the start of the next investment cycle later this year.

More Clarity on Future Capex: KOS is well-positioned for the next
investment cycle. According to the recent announcements from the
TAIF group, KOS's controlling shareholder, the RUB29 billion
expansion capex planned for 2019-2021 will boost propane intake
for a small increase in KOS's ethylene production, provide
partial self-sufficiency in energy, and result in around a 35%
polyethylene output increase. The latter is expected over the
next four years through an upgrade of KOS's existing polyethylene
capacities concurrently with TAIF's Nizhnekamskneftekhim's
expansion of production of ethylene, which will be used as
feedstock at KOS. Fitch believes that following the completion of
these projects KOS's business profile will improve moderately.

Limited Impact on Leverage: Fitch conservatively forecasts that
KOS will spend around RUB40 billion in total on expansion and
maintenance projects over 2018-2021 or RUB10 billion per annum.
Fitch also assumes that KOS will distribute to shareholders all
previous-year profits reported under IFRS starting from 2019, up
from its 30%-50% historical payout ratio. Coupled with mid-
single-digit polyethylene price decline, the new project capex
and higher dividends translate into FFO adjusted net leverage of
around 1x at end-2021, a comfortable level for 'B+'. This
forecast does not incorporate any positive FFO impact from the
new projects as higher polyethylene output is not expected before
2022 and the economic effects of energy self-sufficiency have yet
to be assessed.

Medium-Term Pricing Pressure: Polymer prices in Russia are
correlated with prices on the European and Asian markets. Export
markets for polyethylene have been resilient due to stable demand
from retail and transportation end-users. However, Fitch expects
cheap gas-driven capacity additions in the US and the Middle East
will create a supply glut in 2018-2019, pushing polyethylene
prices 5%-7% lower annually, before the market absorbs oversupply
from 2020 and product prices recover by 5% thereafter.

Fitch expects KOS's margins on polyethylene to moderate, despite
slightly weakening RUB-USD exchange rates. This should result in
revenue slightly over RUB70 billion and EBITDA margin dilution to
18%-20% after 2019.

Low Key Supplier Risk: In 4Q15 KOS renewed its ethane purchase
contract with its principal supplier PJSC Gazprom (BBB-/Positive)
for 10 years. Gazprom has historically supplied over 60% of KOS's
ethane feedstock. The contract secures KOS's supply of ethane,
for which it has no immediately available and sufficient
alternatives. The contract links the ethane purchase price with
the polyethylene sale price, supporting KOS's margins, which is
credit- positive as Fitch expects a period of falling
polyethylene prices in the medium term.

Rating Constraints: The rating is constrained by KOS's exposure
to commodity chemicals, small size relative to larger and more
diversified EMEA peers, single-site operations, limited feedstock
flexibility and insufficient information on the company's
ultimate beneficiaries. While KOS's geographical diversification
is limited, this is mitigated in Fitch's view by domestic sales
being higher-margin due to higher prices and/or cheaper
logistics, than export sales.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Kazanorgsintez is comparable to its EMEA peers Nitrogenmuvek Zrt
(B+/Negative) and Petkim Petrokimya Holdings A.S. (B/Stable) on
most aspects of its business profile such as single site
operations and modest portfolio diversification while having
larger scale, a higher domestic market share and a more
advantageous cost position. These factors also differentiate KOS
from higher-rated EMEA players such as PAO SIBUR Holding
(BB+/Positive).

KOS's financial profile remains the strongest peers with no debt
at end-2017. This follows the multi-year debt repayments while
maintaining modest capex and adequate dividend distributions.
Fitch forecasts some re-leveraging from 2018 on the back of
increased capex but KOS's financial metrics should remain
conservative and comfortably below its negative rating guideline.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions within its Rating Case for the Issuer

  - Polyethylene prices to fall by mid-to-high single-digit in
percentage terms in 2018-2019 with recovery after 2020

  - Production and sales volumes conservatively flat at 2017
levels

  - Capex and dividend outflow to average RUB20 billion per annum
from 2018 and until 2021

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - Substantial improvement in business profile, with better
vertical integration, scale and/or product diversification
Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  - Aggressive capex leading to FFO adjusted net leverage
sustainably above 3x (2017: -0.7x) and FFO fixed charge cover
falling below 3x

  - Increasing reliance on FX debt leading to material FX
mismatch between debt and earnings

LIQUIDITY

Strong Liquidity: KOS had no outstanding debt at end-2017.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BBVA 2018-1 FT: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class D Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its provisional ratings on the
Class A Notes, Class B Notes, Class C Notes and Class D Notes
(together with the unrated Class E Notes and Class Z Notes, the
Notes) issued by BBVA Consumer Auto 2018-1 FT (the Issuer):

-- Class A Notes: AA (low) (sf)
-- Class B Notes: A (sf)
-- Class C Notes: BBB (sf)
-- Class D Notes: BB (sf)

The rating of the Class A Notes addresses the timely payment of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final
maturity date. The ratings of the Class B Notes, the Class C
Notes and the Class D Notes address the ultimate payment of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal by the legal final
maturity date.

The ratings are based on a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

   -- Transaction capital structure, including form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

   -- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
which they have invested.

   -- The Originator/Servicer's capabilities with respect to
originations, underwriting and servicing.

   -- DBRS conducted an operation risk review on Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria SA (BBVA) premises and deems it to be an
acceptable servicer.

   -- The transaction parties' financial strength with regard to
their respective roles.

   -- The sovereign rating of the Kingdom of Spain, currently at
"A".

   -- The consistency of the transaction's legal structure with
DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology, the presence of legal opinions that
address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer and non-
consolidation of the Issuer with the seller.

The transaction cash flow structure was analyzed in Intex
DealMaker.

Notes: All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.


BILBAO CLO I: Moody's Assigns B2 (sf) Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by Bilbao CLO I
Designated Activity Company:

EUR 2,000,000 Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR 206,000,000 Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR 30,000,000 Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR 9,000,000 Class A-1C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR 28,500,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR 10,000,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

EUR 27,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR 21,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

EUR 28,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

EUR 12,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings of the rated notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2031. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager Guggenheim Partners
Europe Limited ("Guggenheim"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Bilbao CLO I is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
floating rate notes and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and
high yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be approximately
60-70% ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised
predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western
Europe.

Guggenheim will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the ten classes of notes rated by Moody's,
including the Class A-1C which is a junior Aaa(sf) tranche and
subordinated to the Class X, Class A-1A and A-1B, the senior
Aaa(sf) tranches, the Issuer issued EUR 38.2 m of subordinated
notes, which will not be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Guggenheim's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
August 2017. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 400,000,000

Diversity Score: 37

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2770

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.30%

Weighted Average Coupon: 3.75%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.6%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years

Moody's has analysed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries. As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling (LCC) of A1 or below. As per the portfolio constraints,
exposures to countries with a LCC of A1 or below cannot exceed
10%, with exposures to countries with a LCC of below A3 further
limited to 5%. Given the current composition of qualifying
countries, Moody's has assumed a maximum 5% of the pool would be
domiciled in countries with LCC of Baa1 to Baa3. The remainder of
the pool will be domiciled in countries which currently have a
LCC of Aa3 and above. Given this portfolio composition, the model
was run with different target par amounts depending on the target
rating of each class of notes as further described in the
methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure size to peripheral countries and the target ratings of
the rated notes and amount to 0.375% for the Class X and A-1
notes, 0.25% for the Class A-2 notes, 0.1875% for the Class B
notes and 0% for Classes C, D and E.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions, Moody's conducted
additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important component
in determining the definitive ratings assigned to the rated
notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Here is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3186 from 2770)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3601 from 2770)

Class X Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-1B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class A-1C Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINE: Egan-Jones Hikes Senior Unsecured Ratings to BB-
---------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, on June 18, 2018, upgraded the
foreign currency and local currency senior unsecured ratings on
debt issued by Ukraine to BB- from B+.

Ukraine is a large country in Eastern Europe known for its
Orthodox churches, Black Sea coastline and forested mountains.
Its capital, Kiev, features the gold-domed St. Sophia's
Cathedral, with 11th-century mosaics and frescoes. Overlooking
the Dnieper River is the Kiev Pechersk Lavra monastery complex, a
Christian pilgrimage site housing Scythian tomb relics and
catacombs containing mummified Orthodox monks.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AIR SPACE: Trampoline Park Forced to Close; In Administration
-------------------------------------------------------------
stv.tv reports that Scotland's first trampoline park has closed
its doors with immediate effect after a drop in profits meant it
was put into administration.

Air Space Glasgow in East Kilbride opened its doors in 2017 after
being acquired by Oxygen Freejumping, the firm that also owns
Oxygen trampoline park in Manchester which will also be closed.

The firm say that all future bookings at the park will be
refunded in full, according to stv.tv.

The report notes that in a statement the firm said: "We regret to
inform customers that we have been forced to close our Manchester
and Air Space Glasgow trampoline parks.

"Despite encouraging early performance, the competitive local
leisure markets caused a downturn in trading.

"We were unable to rejuvenate our product and as a result our
trading performance has become unsustainable and we have no
choice but to close and place the respective sites into
administration.

"Decisions relating to the Manchester and Air Space Glasgow parks
will now be taken by the administrator and we cannot comment on
individual cases.

"We will refund all future bookings and customers will shortly be
contacted by our Customer Hub team. Alternatively, you can
contact 0333 2000 349.

"This has been a very difficult decision as we have thoroughly
enjoyed being a part of the Manchester and Glasgow communities,
and we leave behind an excellent team of leisure professionals
who we wish the very best success.

"Oxygen Freejumping is now under new ownership and we look
forward to continuing to grow and support more and more people to
get active and get Freejumping."

It is not yet known how many jobs will be affected by the
closure, the report relays.


ASSURED GUARANTY: S&P Affirms 'BB' Financial Strength Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said affirmed its 'A' long-term issuer credit
rating on Assured Guaranty Ltd. (AGL) and its 'AA' financial
strength ratings on AGL's bond insurance subsidiaries
(collectively Assured). With the exception of Assured Guaranty
(London) plc (AG London), the outlook is stable.

S&P said, "We affirmed our 'BB' financial strength rating on AG
London and removed the rating from CreditWatch Positive where we
placed it on Jan. 12, 2017. The outlook is positive.

"The affirmation reflects our view of Assured's strong
competitive position built on a proven track record of credit
discipline and market leadership in terms of par insured and
premiums written. Although much of the company's business has
been in the U.S. public finance market, it has a diverse
underwriting strategy that includes the global structured finance
and international markets. Management's approach to writing
business in these markets is well-thought-out and measured. We
believe this strategy provides flexibility to capitalize on
growth trends and pricing opportunities in one sector while
others see less-favorable trends. Assured's capital adequacy is
very strong with a capital adequacy ratio in excess of 1.0x.
Assured

"The stable outlook on Assured reflects our view of the company's
strong competitive profile and very strong capital adequacy, as
well as its leadership position in the U.S public finance market.
The outlook also considers Assured's measured approach to insure
international infrastructure and global structured finance
transactions to capitalize on positive trends in those markets.
The maintenance of a capital adequacy ratio of more than 1.0x is
essential for rating stability.

"We may lower our ratings if Assured exhibits significant
volatility in earnings, its non-U.S. public finance business
meaningfully alters the risk profile of the insured portfolio, or
its capital adequacy falls below 1x and we believe the company
will not be able to improve its capital position.

"Based on our view of the insurable new-issue U.S. public finance
and global markets, we don't believe the company's competitive
position or earnings will dramatically change, so we don't expect
to raise our ratings in the next two years."

AG London

S&P said, "The positive outlook is based on our expectation that
AG London will be folded into AGL's affiliated European insurance
companies and the insured obligations of AG London will become
obligations of the entity surviving the business combination and
carry the same rating of that entity. We would maintain the
rating on AG London if the company were not combined with
Assured's affiliated European insurance companies or there were
no reinsurance or support agreements that benefit AG London.

"We may lower our rating if the company exhibits losses that
reduce capital from a very strong level and diminish liquidity.

"Given AG London's run-off state, we do not expect to raise our
rating in the next 12 months."


ATLANTICA YIELD: Fitch Assigns BB LT IDR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a first-time 'BB' Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) to Atlantica Yield plc (AY) with a Stable
Rating Outlook. Fitch has also assigned a 'BBB-/RR1' rating to
AY's senior secured debt that includes the new $215 million
revolving credit facility due December 2021 and the EUR 275
million notes Issuance facility due 2022-2024. The 'RR1' Recovery
Rating denotes outstanding recovery in the event of default.
Fitch has also assigned a 'BB+/RR2' rating to the $255 million
senior unsecured notes due 2019. The 'RR2' denotes superior
recovery in the event of default.

The 'BB' IDR for AY reflects the relatively stable and
predictable nature of cash flows generated from a portfolio of 22
assets that are diversified with respect to geographical exposure
and asset class. The projected cash distributions to the Holdco
from the project subsidiaries are split as ~73% from renewable
assets, 16% from an efficient natural gas plant, 8% from
transmission lines and the remaining 3% from water assets, based
upon projections over the next three years and assuming no
acquisitions.

Geographically, the projected cash distributions from the
projects are split as 35% from North America, 45% from Europe, 9%
from South America and 11% from rest of the world. All of AY's
assets are either long-term contracted with creditworthy
counterparties or regulated (in the case of the Spanish solar
assets) with minimal commodity risk. AY's ratings also take into
account the structural subordination of the Holdco debt to the
substantial amount of project debt at the non-recourse project
subsidiaries and management's commitment to maintain the net
Holdco leverage ratio at 3.0x or below. The amortizing nature of
debt at AY's project subsidiaries allows for accretion of
residual value to the Holdco in a 'run-off' scenario.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Contractual Cash Flows and Asset Diversity: AY's existing
portfolio of assets produce stable cash flows underpinned by
long-term contracts (weighted average contract life of 19 years
remaining as of Dec. 31, 2017) with creditworthy counterparties.
A majority of the counterparties have strong investment-grade
ratings based on Fitch's and other publically available ratings.
The contracts are typically fixed price with annual escalation
mechanisms. AY's portfolio does not bear material resource
availability risk. Approximately 70% of project distributions to
the Holdco are generated from solar projects; solar resource
availability has typically been strong and predictable. Fitch
views AY's low exposure to wind favorably as wind resource
typically exhibits high resource variability. With the exception
of the Solana and Kaxu solar projects, which have experienced
equipment related and other issues, the rest of the portfolio has
been performing well.

Conservative Financial Policy: A majority of debt at AY consists
of non-recourse project debt held at ring-fenced project
subsidiaries. The distribution test in project finance agreements
is typically set at a Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of
1.10x-1.25x. As of Dec. 31, 2017, all the projects were
performing well in excess of their required DSCRs, with the
exception of Solana and Kaxu solar projects. The project debt is
typically long-term and self-amortizing with a term that is
shorter than the duration of the contracts. More than 90% of the
long-term interest exposure is either fixed or hedged mitigating
any impact in a rising interest rate environment. Approximately
90% of the cash available for distribution (CAFD) is in USD or
Euros and AY typically hedges its Euro exposure on a rolling
basis. At the Holdco level, the net leverage ratio (Net Corporate
Debt/CAFD pre corporate debt service) stood at 2.3x as of Dec.
31, 2017, well within management's stated target of less than
3.0x. Management's commitment to maintain the net leverage ratio
to below 3.0x is a key factor underpinning AY's 'BB' rating and
Stable Rating Outlook. AY is performing well within its
maintenance covenants under its revolver and note issuance
facility that require a leverage ratio of 5.00x (maintenance
covenant for the note issuance facility steps down to 4.75x on
and after Jan. 1, 2020) and interest coverage ratio of 2.00x.

Ownership Uncertainty Resolved: AY's ownership change to
Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. (Algonquin, Not Rated) from
Abengoa is a significant positive development, in Fitch's
opinion. Algonquin completed the acquisition of 25% ownership
interest in AY from Abengoa in March and its purchase of an
additional 16.47% ownership interest in AY is pending approvals,
including approval from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).
Abengoa has obtained consents from its creditors to close the
sale of the remaining 16.47% ownership interest in AY. Ownership
by an investment-grade sponsor with proven asset development
expertise eases Fitch's concern surrounding access to capital for
new projects and lends greater visibility to AY's growth plan.
Under a new joint venture between Abengoa and Algonquin called
AAGES, contracted assets will be developed and offered to AY
under a new Right of First Offer (ROFO) agreement. AY expects
$600 million-$800 million of projects to be offered over the next
two years-three years through a ROFO agreement with Abengoa and
subsequently $200 million of assets to be offered through AAGES
ROFO annually. In addition, Algonquin has agreed to invest $100
million of incremental equity in AY for the acquisition of new
assets in 2018 and 2019 and could participate in future equity
offerings with potentially increasing its ownership interest in
AY to 46% on a temporary basis.

Pending Change to Spanish Regulatory Framework a Key Risk: AY has
a large portfolio of solar assets in Spain that represent
approximately 40% of its total power generation portfolio. Fitch
views Spain's regulatory framework for solar plants as relatively
supportive since a majority of project revenues come from a
return on investment component or capacity payments (70%-75%),
with the remaining components being a regulated return on
operations and sale of electricity at market prices. The capacity
payments in addition to the other two components are designed to
guarantee a 7.4% pre-tax IRR on investment. The framework limits
a power provider's volumetric and commodity risks and provides
cash flow visibility since the adjustments to the IRR takes place
every six years. It is likely that the regulatory IRR currently
set at 7.4% will be reduced at the end of 2019 for the next six-
year regulatory period due to its linkage to the Spanish bond
yield, which has been steadily declining since the financial
crisis. The lack of regulatory track record and absence of an
independent regulator in Spain are also credit concerns. The
cumulative tariff deficit continues to be large, although
declining, which could sustain political pressure on reducing
support for renewables. The risk of a reduction in the regulatory
IRR has diminished somewhat with the new minority government in
place in Spain, which is pro renewables. However, it is not
certain if the current government will last until the end of
2019, when the new tariffs will need to be implemented. Every
100-basis-point reduction in the IRR negatively affects the cash
distribution from AY's Spanish solar assets by EUR18 million.
While Fitch has incorporated a modest cut to the IRR in its
financial projections, management's commitment to maintain net
Holdco leverage to below 3.0x mitigates the credit impact of a
steeper than expected cut.

Operating Issues with Two Assets: AY has faced technical issues
with Kaxu and Solana solar projects, a credit concern. Kaxu had a
reduced production during 2017 due to technical problems with
water pumps and heat exchangers. However, the plant has operated
well in 4Q17 as well as in 1Q18. It will be key for the plant to
hit the guaranteed production level, the term for which has been
extended to October 2018. The term of the approximately $45
million letter of credit facility posted by Abengoa subsidiaries
has been extended as well. Separately, Solana has still not
reached its initial production volumes. There were interruptions
to operations in 2017 due to transformer failure following
interruptions in 2016 from a wind event. Fitch's projections
assume modest CAFD contribution from Solana over the forecast
period.

Flexibility to Grow Distributions: AY's public guidance of
achieving 8%-10% distribution per share growth rate over 2017-
2022 is dependent on a variety of levers, which include
increasing the distribution payout ratio to 80%, improved
operational performance at Kaxu and Solana solar projects,
pricing indexation built in contractual agreements, refinancing
of debt at potentially lower interest rates and potential
acquisitions of contracted assets. Corporate cash on hand of
$151.4 million as of March 31, 2018, available debt capacity
(2.3x net leverage ratio as of March 31, 2018 versus management
target of less than 3.0x), 20% of retained CAFD, and $100 million
equity commitment from Algonquin for new projects in 2018 and
2019 provides financial flexibility to AY to finance any
potential asset acquisitions without the need to issue any other
incremental equity for at least two years, in Fitch's opinion.

Sustainability of the Yieldco Model: Fitch believes the Yieldco
model is sustainable despite their short but turbulent history.
Yieldcos are well positioned to offer stable and predictable
distribution yield through their ownership of long-term
contracted assets (mostly renewables) with strong counterparties
as well as growth in distributions through acquisitions in the
fast growing renewable distribution sector. Over time, Yieldcos
could become more autonomous and independent of their sponsors
but currently the reliance upon sponsor support for equity access
and acquisition pipeline continues to be significant. Even if the
Yieldco vehicles fail to grow, Fitch believes the creditors are
well protected in a 'run-off' scenario as the underlying projects
continue to deleverage and Holdcos' equity value continues to
grow.

Recovery Ratings: Fitch does not undertake a bespoke recovery
analysis for issuers with IDRs in the 'BB' rating category.
Nevertheless, using market transaction multiples of 9.0x-11.0x
Enterprise value to EBITDA or a CAFD yield of 7%-9% for
contracted renewable assets, Fitch has assigned RR1 recovery
rating or an outstanding recovery (91%-100%) for the senior
secured debt at AY that results in two notch uplift from the IDR.
Per Fitch's Corporates Notching and Recovery Ratings Criteria,
the senior secured debt for issuers with IDRs in the 'BB' rating
category is capped at 'BBB-'. Hence, further upgrades to the
senior secured debt will be contingent on the IDR being upgraded
to investment grade. Fitch has assigned RR2 recovery rating or
superior recovery (71%-90%) for the senior unsecured debt given
the modest amount of secured debt at the Holdco level and Fitch's
expectation that management will continue to move toward an
unsecured capital structure. The recovery rating for senior
unsecured debt is capped at RR2 for issuers with IDRs in the 'BB'
rating category. Hence, further upgrade to the senior unsecured
debt rating is contingent upon the IDR being upgraded to
investment grade.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Fitch views AY's portfolio of assets to be favorably positioned
compared to those of NextEra Energy Partners (NEP, BB+/Stable)
and Terraform Power (TERP, BB-/Stable), owing to its large
concentration of solar generation assets (approximately 77% of
power generation capacity) that exhibit less resource
variability. In comparison, NEP's portfolio consists of a large
proportion of wind projects (approximately 84% of total MWs).
NEP's high concentration in wind is mitigated to a certain extent
by its diverse geographic footprint in the U.S. Pro forma for the
Saeta Yield acquisition, TERP's portfolio will consist of 36%
solar and 64% wind projects. Fitch views NEP's geographic
exposure in the U.S. (100% of MWs) favorably as compared to
TERP's (64%) and AY's (35%). Both AY and TERP have exposure to
potential adverse changes to Spanish regulatory framework for
renewable assets. In terms of total MWs, approximately 40% of
AY's power generation portfolio is in Spain compared to 29% for
TERP.

AY's credit metrics are significantly stronger than that of TERP
and NEP. AY's willingness to maintain its creditworthiness was
demonstrated in 2016 when it suspended distributions for two
consecutive quarters following the financial restructuring of its
prior parent, Abengoa. Fitch forecasts AY's gross leverage ratio
(Holdco debt to CAFD) to be low 3x compared to high 4.0x for NEP
and mid to high 5.0x for TERP.

NEP's ratings benefit from a strong sponsor, NextEra Energy, Inc.
(NextEra, A-/Stable), which owns approximately 65% of the limited
partner interest in NEP. NextEra has demonstrated sponsor support
in various forms including structural modification of the
Incentive Distribution Rights fee structure, financial management
services agreement and other services agreements and access to
its development pipeline through a ROFO agreement. This provides
visibility to NEP's distribution per share growth targets, which
at 12%-15% are more aggressive than those of AY (8%-10%) and TERP
(5%-8%). TERP's sponsor, Brookfield Asset Management (BAM, Not
Rated), has also demonstrated strong support for TERP by
providing $650 million equity to finance the acquisition of Saeta
Yield, thereby taking its ownership interest to 65%. In addition,
BAM has committed to support TERP through key agreements
including management services agreement, access to a 3,500 MW
ROFO portfolio consisting of operating wind and solar assets, and
a $500 million four-year secured credit facility at TERP for
acquisitions. The support of AY's new sponsor, Algonquin, is
currently untested.

Fitch rates AY, NEP and TERP based on a deconsolidated approach
since their portfolio comprises assets financed using non-
recourse project debt or with tax equity. Fitch's Renewable
Energy Project Rating Criteria uses one-year P90 as the starting
point in determining its rating case production assumption.
However, Fitch has used P50 to determine its rating case
production assumption for AY, NEP and TERP since they own a
diversified portfolio of operational wind and solar generation
assets. Fitch believes asset and geographic diversity reduces the
impact that a poor wind or solar resource could have on the
distribution from a single project. Fitch has used P90 to
determine its stress case production assumption. If volatility of
natural resources and uncertainty in the production forecast is
high based on operational history and observable factors, a more
conservative probability of exceedance scenario may be applied in
the future.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  -- P50 scenario used for rating case solar and wind production
assumption;

  -- Acquisition of operational, contracted assets over 2018-2022
to meet 8%-10% distribution per share growth;

  -- Acquisition CAFD yield of 8%;

  -- Target payout ratio 80% of CAFD reached by 4Q18;

  -- Acquisitions financed with cash on hand, debt and equity
such that target capital structure is maintained;

  -- Reduction in IRR for Spanish renewable assets beginning Jan.
1, 2020.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  -- Regulatory return in Spain maintained at or close to current
levels;

  -- Stabilization of operating performance at the Kaxu and
Solana projects;

  -- Visibility on acquisitions and distribution per share
growth.


Fitch typically caps the IDRs of Yieldcos at 'BB+' given the
structural subordination of the Holdco debt to the project debt
that is sized for a low- to mid-'BBB' rating and distribution of
a substantial portion of cash available for distribution to its
equity holders.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  -- Material reduction to the IRR for the Spanish renewable
assets that cause the projects to curtail or stop the
distributions to the Holdco;

  -- Growth strategy underpinned by aggressive acquisitions
and/or addition of assets in the portfolio that bear material
volumetric, commodity, counterparty or interest rate risks;

  -- Material underperformance in the underlying assets that
lends variability or shortfall to expected project distributions;

  -- Lack of access to equity markets to fund growth that may
lead AY to deviate from its target capital structure;

  -- Holdco leverage ratio exceeding 4.0x on a sustainable basis.

LIQUIDITY

Fitch views AY's liquidity has adequate. AY has recently
refinanced its $125 million revolving credit facility (due
December 2018) into a new $215 million facility that will mature
in December 2021. An expanded revolver provides financial
flexibility to AY to finance acquisitions of assets before
permanent financing is put in place. As of March 31, 2018,
corporate cash on hand was $151.4 million. AY plans to refinance
its $255 million 7.00% senior unsecured notes maturing Nov. 15,
2019 prior to maturity. Other debt maturities are staggered; the
senior secured note issuance facility will mature over 2022-2024.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has assigned the following ratings with a Stable Outlook:
Atlantica Yield

  -- Long-term IDR at 'BB';

  -- Senior Secured Debt at 'BBB-'/'RR1';

  -- Senior Unsecured Debt at 'BB+'/RR2.


AZURE FINANCE NO. 1: S&P Assigns Prelim BB+ Rating on Cl. D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary credit ratings to
Azure Finance No.1 PLC's class A, B, C, and D notes. At closing,
the issuer will also issue unrated subordinated class E and X
notes.

Azure 1 is the first public securitization of U.K. auto loans
originated by Blue Motor Finance Ltd. Blue Motor is an
independent auto lender in the U.K., with a focus on used car
financing for prime and near-prime customers.

The collateral backing the notes will comprise U.K. fully
amortizing fixed-rate auto loan receivables arising under hire
purchase (HP) agreements granted to borrowers resident in the
U.K. for the purchase of used and new vehicles (including light
commercial vehicles and motorcycles). There will be no personal
contract purchase (PCP) agreements in the pool, therefore the
transaction will not be exposed to residual value risk.

The transaction will have separate waterfalls for interest and
principal collections, and the notes will amortize fully
sequentially.

A combination of note subordination, cash reserves, and any
available excess spread will provide credit enhancement for the
rated notes.

Blue Motor will remain the initial servicer of the portfolio.
Following a servicer termination event, including insolvency of
the servicer, the back-up servicer, Equiniti Credit Services,
will assume servicing responsibility for the portfolio.

The issuer will be exposed to counterparty risk through Citibank
N.A., London Branch, as bank account provider, and an interest
rate cap provider that will be identified prior to closing.

RATING RATIONALE

Economic Outlook

S&P said, "In our base-case scenario, we forecast that the U.K.
will record GDP growth of 1.3% in 2018 and 1.5% in 2019, down
from 1.7% in 2017. At the same time, we expect the unemployment
rate to increase to 4.5% in 2018 and 4.6% in 2019 from 4.4% in
2017. In our view, changes in GDP growth and the unemployment
rate are key determinants of portfolio performance. Brexit
remains a live issue, although we see less risk of a disorderly
exit in March 2019 now that the European Council has approved the
political agreement about the transition.

"In our base-case forecasts through the end of 2020, we assume
that during the agreed transition period, the legal text
supporting the withdrawal will be ratified and an outline
political agreement on the future relationship will be agreed.
If, for any reason, negotiations reach an impasse or fail
entirely, we would expect the economy to perform considerably
worse than we currently forecast.

"Based on our forecast for modest economic growth, slightly
rising unemployment, and increasing real wages in the U.K., we
expect U.K. auto asset-backed securities (ABS) performance will
generally remain stable over the next 12-24 months. However, high
growth rates in consumer credit in recent years could result in a
moderate performance deterioration."

Operational Risk

Blue Motor is an independent auto lender in the U.K., with a
focus on used car financing for prime and near-prime customers.
The company came under the control of the current directors and
senior management in 2012, and it began originating hire purchase
agreements in 2015 with backing from Cabot Square Capital, a U.K.
based private equity firm. Significant investment has been made
to the information technology (IT) systems, which S&P believes is
a relative strength for the company. In addition, the senior
management team has an established track record in developing
financial sector and technology businesses.

S&P said, "Under our operational risk criteria, we view the
portability and severity risk of the portfolio as moderate, and
the disruption risk of the servicer, initially Blue Motor, as
high. A "cold" backup servicer, Equiniti Credit Services, will be
appointed at closing. Consequently, our operational risk criteria
constrain the maximum potential rating assignable to the
transaction at 'AA'."

Credit Risk The collateral backing the notes will comprise U.K.
fully amortizing fixed-rate auto loan receivables arising under
HP agreements granted to borrowers resident in the U.K. for the
purchase of used and new vehicles (including light commercial
vehicles and motorcycles). There will be no PCP agreements in the
pool, so the transaction will not be exposed to residual value
risk.

S&P said, "We analyzed performance data provided by the
originator at the subpool level, based on credit risk tier,
examining separate gross credit loss, and voluntary termination
loss data, as well as recoveries. We have analyzed credit risk by
applying our European auto ABS criteria.

"Blue Motor only started originating loan in 2015, so there is
less than three years of meaningful performance data available.
Given this data limitation, we used performance data and loss
timing curves from comparable auto ABS transactions in the U.K.
and U.S. to extrapolate losses for the portfolio and benchmark
our base-case and stress performance assumptions. However, the
transaction includes receivables with relatively long original
maturities of up to 85 months and also high loan-to-value (LTV)
ratios. We believe this creates additional uncertainty in the
loss forecast, given that origination volumes have been growing
significantly and the performance data that is available is over
a relatively benign economic environment. As a result, we do not
believe the assumptions required to establish our base-case
assumptions are commensurate with our 'AAA' rating definition,
and have applied a ratings cap of 'AA'.

"Based on the credit tier composition, we expect to see
approximately 14.05% of gross losses from hostile terminations as
our base case in the securitized pool. In addition, we expect to
see approximately 2.5% of gross losses from voluntary
terminations. We have sized the applicable multiple at the 'AA'
rating level at 3.25x for hostile terminations, and 2.75x for
voluntary terminations. We have also sized our cash flow
modelling assumptions for the recovery rate at 27.5% for
investment-grade rating categories, and 35% for speculative-grade
rating categories, after applying a discount over historical
recovery rates, based on our assessment of the volatility of past
performance, the collateral pool characteristics, and our outlook
for the U.K. used car market."

Payment Structure And Cash Flow Analysis

S&P said, "We assessed the ability of expected stressed cash
flows, commensurate with the assigned ratings for each class, to
make timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the rated
notes according to the transaction's documented payment
structure, which uses a split waterfall for interest and
principal collections.

"Interest due on the class B, C, D, and E notes is deferrable
under the transaction documents. However, once a class becomes
the most senior note outstanding, interest is due on a timely
basis. Nevertheless, our preliminary ratings address timely
payment of interest on all rated classes of notes.

The transaction pays principal fully sequentially, meaning
principal on the class B, C, D, and E notes is not paid until the
class A notes are fully redeemed. The class X notes may be repaid
subordinated in the interest waterfall to the extent there is any
excess spread.

There will be dedicated reserve amounts for each class of notes
available to pay interest shortfalls for the respective class
over the life of the transaction. In addition, the reserves for
all classes will be available to cover any senior expense
shortfalls. The required reserve amount for each class will
amortize in line with the outstanding note balance. Amounts
released due to the decrease of the target level will be treated
as available revenue receipts. In addition, once the collateral
balance is zero or at legal final maturity, all reserve amounts
will be applied in the interest waterfall and would be available
to cure any principal deficiencies.

S&P said, "Our analysis indicates that the available credit
enhancement for the class A, B, C, and D notes is sufficient to
withstand our credit and cash flow stresses at the 'AA', 'A-',
'BBB', and 'BB+' rating levels, respectively."

Counterparty Risk The transaction is exposed to counterparty risk
in relation to Citibank N.A., London Branch, as account bank
provider, and to the interest rate cap provider, which will be
identified prior to closing and rated at least 'BBB+'. In S&P's
view, the documented replacement framework and the remedy
provisions adequately mitigate counterparty risk in line with our
current counterparty criteria. S&P anticipates that the final
swap agreements will be in line with its current counterparty
criteria.

Legal Risk

S&P said, "The issuer is an English special-purpose entity, which
we consider to be bankruptcy remote under our legal criteria.
Commingling risk will be mitigated by a declaration of trust over
the servicer's collection accounts, and we believe the cash
reserve is sufficient to cover the liquidity stress that could
arise following the servicer's insolvency. We anticipate that the
legal opinion at closing will confirm that the sale of the assets
would survive the seller's insolvency. We also expect that tax
opinions will address the issuer's tax liabilities under the
current tax legislation and believe that the issuer's cash flows
will be sufficient to meet all the tax liabilities identified.

"In our view, the transaction is not exposed to setoff risk
because the originator is not a deposit-taking institution and
has not underwritten any insurance policies for the borrowers.
Furthermore, there are eligibility criteria regarding loans to
employees of Blue Motor."

The issuer does not have any rights to the vehicles themselves,
but only in connection with the sale proceeds of the vehicles.
Accordingly, in case of the seller's insolvency, the issuer is
reliant on any insolvency official taking appropriate steps to
sell the assets. Because the sale proceeds have been assigned to
the issuer, the insolvency official will not have any financial
incentive to take these steps as it will not benefit the
bankruptcy estate's creditors. The inclusion of an insolvency
administrator's incentive fee at a senior level in the priority
of payments mitigates this risk, in S&P's view. In S&P's
analysis, to account for this risk, it considered that 5% of
recovery proceeds will have to be paid to the insolvency's
administrator.

Ratings Stability

S&P said, "We analyzed the effect of a moderate stress on the
credit variables and its ultimate effect on our preliminary
ratings on the notes. We ran two scenarios to test the rating's
stability, and the results are in line with our credit stability
criteria."

Sovereign Risk

S&P's long-term unsolicited credit rating on the U.K. is 'AA'.
Therefore, our preliminary ratings in this transaction are not
constrained by our structured finance ratings above the sovereign
criteria.

  RATINGS LIST

  Azure Finance No. 1 PLC
  Asset-Backed Floating- And Fixed-Rate Notes

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Class                      Prelim.      Prelim.
                             rating        amount
                                         (mil. GBP)

  A                          AA (sf)          TBD
  B                          A- (sf)          TBD
  C                          BBB (sf)         TBD
  D                          BB+ (sf)         TBD
  E                          NR               TBD
  X                          NR               TBD

  TBD--To be determined. NR--Not rated.


CARLUCCIO'S: Closes Harrogate Branch Following CVA
--------------------------------------------------
StrayFM reports that Carluccio's is the latest restaurant to
close its doors in Harrogate.

The Italian chain has confirmed the Harrogate branch will close
on Sunday, July 1, at 9:00 p.m., StrayFM relates.

The Ilkley branch also closed on June 24, StrayFM discloses.

According to StrayFM, a spokesperson for Carluccio's said:
"Following the announcement that Carluccio's has entered a CVA
(Company Voluntary Arrangement), the Ilkley restaurant closed on
June 24 and the Harrogate restaurant will close on July 1.  This
is due to rising business costs and unsustainable rental levels
and in no way reflects the passion and commitment displayed by
our team.  We thank them for their hard work along with all our
loyal customers who have supported their local Carluccio's."


ESCUBED LIMITED: In Administration, 10 Jobs Lost
------------------------------------------------
bdaily.co.uk reports that Escubed Limited, a contract R&D and
analytical laboratory, has been placed into administration which
has resulted in the loss of ten jobs.

On June 19, 2018, Rob Adamson and Mark Ranson, insolvency
practitioners at Armstrong Watson LLP, were appointed as joint
administrators of Escubed, according to bdaily.co.uk.

The report notes that Rob Adamson said: "Immediately prior to our
appointment, but in conjunction with ourselves, the Directors
made the difficult decision that the Company should cease trading
due to its inability to meet its ongoing financial obligations.

"Regrettably this has resulted in the redundancy of all 10
employees.  We are working with an employment specialist to
ensure that the employees are able to claim what is due to them
as swiftly as possible from the Redundancy Payments Service.

"It is too early to comment upon the likelihood of the return to
creditors as this will depend upon the level of realisations
achieved and the extent of claims received.

"We have engaged Pinder Asset Solutions to assist with the
marketing and sale of the tangible assets however we have not
ruled out a potential sale of the business in some form given its
bespoke nature. Any expressions of interest should be directed to
the Joint Administrators in the first instance."

Escubed Limited provided research and development services in
material and powder technology across a wide range of sectors
from premises in Wetherby, North Yorkshire.


FINSBURY SQUARE 2017-2: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Cl. D Notes Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed three classes of Finsbury Square 2017-
2 plc notes and placed the rest on Rating Watch Positive (RWP),
as follows:

Class A: affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

Class B: 'AAsf'; placed on RWP

Class C: affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

Class D: affirmed at 'CCCsf', Recovery Estimate (RE) 100%

Class X: 'BB+sf'; placed on RWP

This is an RMBS securitisation of near-prime owner-occupied and
buy-to-let (BTL) residential mortgages originated by Kensington
Mortgage Company in the UK under both its Kensington and New
Street brands.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Credit Enhancement

Since closing in July 2017 credit enhancement available to the
class A, B and C notes has increased modestly as the result of
the partial amortisation of the class A notes. Since closing the
uncollateralised class X note has also amortised.

Stable Asset Performance

The balance of loans with arrears over one month stood at 1.2% as
of February 2018 while the balance of loans with arrears over
three months was below 0.1%. None of the arrears have turned into
repossessions, with cumulative repossessions being currently at
0%. The pool includes mainly fixed-rate loans (99.3%), most of
which will revert to floating-rate in the next 18 months. While
prepayments have been low since close, they are expected to
increase in the next 18 months as the fixed-rate loans approach
the reversion date.

Counterparty Criteria Exposure Draft

The RWP on class B and X notes indicates the possibility of
rating change as a result of the application of the proposed
Structured Finance and Covered Bonds Counterparty Rating Criteria
with an exposure draft published on May 31, 2018. Fitch will
resolve the RWP by undertaking a full review of the transaction
with the final criteria. The review will be completed within six
months of the publication of the final criteria.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Notes on RWP may be upgraded following the conclusion of the
exposure draft period of the Structured Finance and Covered Bonds
Counterparty Rating Criteria.

All notes may be upgrade in case of sustained increases in credit
enhancement and ongoing stable performance of the assets.

The notes may be downgraded should asset performance deteriorate
in excess of Fitch's current expectations. The notes may also be
downgraded if the issuer account bank (Citibank N.A.
(A+/Stable/F1)) and/or the derivative counterparty (BNP Paribas
SA (A+/stable/F1)) are downgraded below certain documented
threshold levels with no documented remedial actions being
implemented on a timely basis.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Prior to the transaction closing, Fitch reviewed the results of a
third-party assessment conducted on the asset portfolio
information and concluded that there were no findings that
affected the rating analysis.

Prior to the transaction closing, Fitch conducted a review of a
small targeted sample of Kensignton's origination files and found
the information contained in the reviewed files to be adequately
consistent with the originator's policies and practices and the
other information provided to the agency about the asset
portfolio.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


HOMEBASE: Cuts 300 Jobs at Milton Keynes Amid CVA Rumors
--------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Butler and Zoe Wood at The Guardian report that Homebase is
cutting 300 jobs at its Milton Keynes head office amid
speculation that up to 80 stores will close after its takeover by
the restructuring specialist Hilco.

The loss-making DIY chain was bought by the owner of HMV for GBP1
in a deal agreed in May after its previous Australian owner,
Wesfarmers, pulled the plug on a "disastrous" venture into the
UK, The Guardian relates.

Wesfarmers, which bought the business for GBP340 million two
years ago, offloaded the entire 250-store Homebase chain, which
has a workforce of just over 11,000 people, ditching a plan to
convert them to its Bunnings brand, The Guardian discloses.

According to The Guardian, Homebase said a third of its head
office staff would leave by November as it focused on its DIY
brand.  All 24 of the stores rebranded to Bunnings will become
Homebase outlets again, The Guardian states.

The job cuts come amid speculation that Homebase is considering a
company voluntary arrangement, a form of insolvency, which would
enable it to close up to 80 stores and renegotiate leases with
landlords, The Guardian notes.

The company has already shut 17 unprofitable stores and confirmed
plans to close at least 23 more, The Guardian relays.  Industry
insiders say that a CVA involving between 60 and 80 stores is one
of a number of options being considered by Homebase's new owner,
according to The Guardian.


HOUSE OF FRASER: To Close Skipton Store in 2019, 81 Jobs Affected
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Viv Mason at Telegraph & Argus reports that eighty-one members of
staff at the Skipton 'Rackhams' store have learned their jobs are
likely to go early next year after House of Fraser creditors
backed a move to close the store.

According to Telegraph & Argus, the struggling department store
chain is closing 31 of its 59 outlets through a Company Voluntary
Arrangement (CVA), which will also allow it to secure rent
reductions on its remaining shops.

More than 75% of creditors voted in support of the plans on
June 22 which will affect up to 6,000 staff nationally, Telegraph
& Argus discloses.

Chief executive Alex Williamson said it was the "last viable"
option to save the retailer which was at risk of collapse if the
CVA had been rejected, Telegraph & Argus relates.

House of Fraser leases the Skipton High Street building from
Royal London Asset Management, Telegraph & Argus states.

Eighty-one members of staff work at the store either directly
with House of Fraser or through a number of concessions on site,
Telegraph & Argus notes.

The current store will remain "business as usual" until it is due
to close in early 2019, Telegraph & Argus says.


HOUSE OF FRASER: To Close Hull Store Following CVA Approval
-----------------------------------------------------------
Phil Winter at HullLive reports that Hull's House of Fraser store
will close in early 2019, with talks set to continue over a more
exact date.

According to HullLive, a rescue deal which will see the high
street giant close 31 of its stores nationally was approved by
creditors on June 22, as fears surrounding the future of the
Ferensway store were realized.

A spokeswoman at Newgate Communications, who are handling
requests on the closures, said House of Fraser bosses would have
talks over the closing dates for individual stores, HullLive
relates.

"In terms of where House of Fraser is at, the CVA (company
voluntary arrangement) was passed on Friday, June 22, which
confirmed proposals outlined about store closures," HullLive
quotes the spokeswoman as saying.

"Now that has been put in place, there are lengthy talks that
need to happen in terms of closing dates.

"At the moment House of Fraser is saying the stores will close in
early 2019, but we have not had any more details on when exactly
that is."

The department store, in Ferensway, has been earmarked for
closure since early June, but now its future has been confirmed,
HullLive notes.

In the vote over the future of its 31 stores, House of Fraser
secured the backing of more than 75% of creditors, including
landlords, HullLive relates.


HUMMUS BROS: In Administration On Rising Property Costs
-------------------------------------------------------
itv.com reports that restaurant chain Hummus Bros has become the
latest casual dining firm to fall into administration.

The Mediterranean food chain had six outlets in London, but
collapsed due to rising property costs and a fall in sales,
according to itv.com.

In a statement posted on Twitter, Hummus Bros said: "The
combination of the pound falling after the Brexit vote, which
pushed up the costs of our raw ingredients, as well as property
rents and business rates going up ever higher, make the high
street a very difficult place to operate in at this time," the
report notes

Ben Woodthorpe and Simon Harris of ReSolve Partners have now been
brought in as administrators to the business.

The company, which has been running for 13 years, said it had
tried to find sources of revenue outside of its high street
stores, the report relays.

It tried to set up in canteens of large companies, launched a
supermarket product and started a street food business, the
report notes.  However, these efforts failed to keep the business
afloat.

The restaurant and retail industries have been under intense
pressure this year due to rising costs and a squeeze on consumer
spending, leading to several high street names closing outlets,
the report relates.

The report discloses that upmarket restaurant chain Prescott &
Conran, founded by Sir Terence Conran, went into administration,
putting more than 168 jobs at risk.

Carluccio's was also recently given approval for a restructuring
programme that could see it close dozens of restaurants, putting
500 jobs in doubt, the report says.

Other restaurant chains which have been shutting stores include
Byron, Prezzo and Jamie's Italian, the report adds.


NEWDAY 2018-1 PLC: DBRS Rates Class F Notes B(high)(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the Class
A1, Class A2, Class B, Class C, Class D, Class E and Class F
Notes (collectively, the Notes) to be issued by NewDay Funding
2018-1 plc (the Issuer) as follows:

-- AAA (sf) to the Class A1 Notes
-- AAA (sf) to the Class A2 Notes
-- AA (high) (sf) to the Class B Notes
-- A (high) (sf) to the Class C Notes
-- BBB (low) (sf) to the Class D Notes
-- BB (low) (sf) to the Class E Notes
-- B (high) (sf) to the Class F Notes

The ratings of the Notes address the timely payment of interest
and ultimate payment of principal by the final maturity date.

The ratings will be finalized upon receipt of an execution
version of the governing transaction documents. To the extent
that the documents and information provided to DBRS as of this
date differ from the executed version of the governing
transaction documents, DBRS may assign different final ratings to
the Notes.

The ratings are based on the considerations listed below:

-- The transaction capital structure including the form and
sufficiency of available credit enhancement.

-- Credit enhancement levels are sufficient to support DBRS's
expected charge-off, payment and yield rates under various stress
scenarios.

-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
flow assumptions and repay investors according to the terms under
which they have invested.

-- NewDay Ltd (the Seller) and its delegates' capabilities with
respect to originations, underwriting, servicing, data processing
and cash management.

-- DBRS conducted an operational risk review of the Seller and
deems it to be an acceptable servicer.

-- The transaction parties' financial strength with regard to
their respective roles.

-- The credit quality of the collateral and diversification of
the collateral and historical and projected performance of the
Seller's portfolio.

-- The sovereign rating of the United Kingdom, currently rated
AAA by DBRS.

-- The expected consistency of the transaction's legal structure
with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
Transactions" methodology, the presence of legal opinions that
are expected to address the true sale of the assets to the Issuer
and non-consolidation of the Issuer with the Seller or
transferor.

The transaction cash flow structure was analyzed in DBRS's
proprietary Excel-based tool.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The Financial Giants in United States History
------------------------------------------------------------
Author: Meade Minnigerode
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 260 pages
List Price: $34.95

Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/tJWvs2
The financial giants were Stephen Girard, John Jacob Astor, Jay
Cooke, Daniel Drew, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jay Gould, and Jim
Fisk.

The accomplishments of some have made them household names today.
But all were active in the mid 1800s. This was a time when the
United States, having freed itself from Great Britain only a few
decades earlier, was gaining its stride as an independent nation.
The country was expanding westward, starting to engage in
significant international trade, and laying the foundations for
becoming a major industrial power. Astor, Vanderbilt, Gould, and
the others played major parts in all these areas. During the
Civil War in the first half of the 1860s, some became leading
suppliers of goods or financiers to the Federal government.

Minnigerode's focus is the highlights of the life of each of the
seven. Along with this, he identifies each one's prime
characteristics contributing to his road to fortune and how his
life turned out in the end. Not all of the men managed to keep
and pass on the fortunes they amassed. They are seen a "financial
giants" not only because they made fortunes in the early days of
American business and industry, but also for their place in
laying out the groundwork for American business enterprise,
innovation, and leadership, and for the notoriety they had in
their day.

Minnigerode summarizes the style or achievement of each man in a
single word or short phrase. Stephan Girard is "The Merchant
Banker"; Cornelius Vanderbilt, "The Commodore." "The Old Man of
the Street" summarizes Daniel Drew"; with "The Wizard of Wall
Street" summarizing Jay Gould. Jim Fisk is "The Mountebank."

Jay Cooke, "The Tycoon," was to be "known throughout the country
for his astonishingly successful handling of the great Federal
loans which financed the Civil War." After the War, one of the
leaders of the Confederacy remarked that the South was really
defeated in the Federal Treasury Department thus, even on the
enemy side, giving recognition to Cooke's invaluable work of
enabling the Federal government to meet the huge costs of the
War. After the War, having earned the reputation as "the foremost
financier in the country," Cooke became involved in many large
financial ventures, including the building of a railroad to link
the East and West coasts of America. In this railroad venture,
however, Cooke and his banking firm made a fatal misstep in
investing in the Northern Pacific railway. The Northern Pacific
turned out to be a house of cards. When Cooke's firm was unable
to meet interest payments it owed because of money it had put
into the Northern Pacific, the firm went bankrupt; and this
caused alarm in the stock market and financial circles.

The roads to wealth of the "financial giants" were not smooth.
Like others amassing great wealth, they had to take risks. The
tales Minnigerode tells are not only instructive on how
individuals have historically made fortunes in business and the
characteristics they had for this, but are also cautionary tales
on the contingency of great wealth in some circumstances. Jim
Fisk, for instance, a larger-than life character "jovial and
quick witted [who was also] a swindler and a bandit, a destroyer
of law and an apostle of fraud," was presumably killed by a
former business partner. Unlike Cooke and Fisk, Cornelius
Vanderbilt and John Jacob Astor built fortunes that lasted
generations. Vanderbilt -- nicknamed Commodore -- starting in the
New York City area, built ships and established domestic and
international merchant and passenger lines. With the
government coming to depend on these with the rapid growth of
commerce of the period and the Civil War for a time, Vanderbilt
practically had monopolistic control of private shipping in the
U.S. Astor made his fortune by developing trade and other
business in the upper Midwest, which was at the time the
sparsely-populated frontier of America, rich in natural resources
and other potential with the Great Lakes and regional rivers as a
means for transportation.

Although the social and business conditions in the early and mid
1800s when the U.S. was in the early stages of its development
were unique to that period, by concentrating on the
characteristics, personalities, strategies, and activities of the
seven outstanding businessmen of this period, Minnigerode
highlights business traits and acumen that are timeless. His
sharply-focused, short biographies are colorful and memorable.
This author has written many other books and worked in the
military and government.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *