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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, June 14, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 117


                            Headlines


D E N M A R K

OW BUNKER: Ex-Singapore Unit Manager to Appeal 18-Month Jail Term


G R E E C E

ESTIA MORTGAGE: S&P Raises Class B Notes Rating to B-(sf)


I R E L A N D

MILLTOWN PARK: Fitch Rates EUR12MM Class E Notes 'B-sf'


I T A L Y

CASSA DI RISPARMIO: Moody's Withdraws Ba2 LT Deposit Ratings
DECO 2014-GONDOLA: Fitch Ups EUR21.9MM Cl. E Notes Rating to BB+


N E T H E R L A N D S

SAPPHIRE MIDCO: Moody's Assigns B3 Corporate Family Rating
WEENER PLASTICS: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable


P O L A N D

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: Court Dismisses Bankruptcy Petition


P O R T U G A L

CAIXA GERAL: DBRS Confirms BB Ratings on Dated Sub. Notes


R U S S I A

URALCAPITALBANK LLC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows


S P A I N

BANCAJA 10: S&P Affirms 'D(sf)' Ratings on Three Note Classes
BANCAJA 11: S&P Affirms 'D(sf)' Ratings on Four Note Classes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ADIENT PLC: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB', Outlook Remains Negative
BHS GROUP: PwC, Former Partner Fined Over Audit, FRC Says
CO-OP BANK: Investigator of Collapse Earns GBP1,500 a Day
FOUR SEASONS: Note Issuers Unable to Pay Coupons on GBP525MM Debt
RIBBON FINANCE 2018: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class G Notes

TRINIDAD MORTGAGE 2018-1: S&P Gives (P)BB Rating on Cl. F Notes


U Z B E K I S T A N

ZIRAAT BANK: Moody's Cuts Long-Term LC Deposit Rating to B2


                            *********


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D E N M A R K
=============


OW BUNKER: Ex-Singapore Unit Manager to Appeal 18-Month Jail Term
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Emil Gjerding Nielson at Reuters reports that the former manager
of marine fuel supplier OW Bunker's Singapore subsidiary said on
June 12 he would appeal the 18-month jail term he was sentenced
to last month.

On May 30, a Danish city court found Lars Moller, former head of
Dynamic Oil Trading in Singapore, guilty of granting credit
outside his mandate, contributing to OW Bunker's bankruptcy,
Reuters relates.

According to Reuters, Mr. Moller's defense lawyer said on
June 12 that they would appeal the verdict and aimed for him to
be "fully acquitted".

The 2014 bankruptcy of the firm, then the world's leading
supplier of bunker fuel with a 7% market share, sent shockwaves
through the global shipping industry and left investors and
business partners scrambling to cover their losses, Reuters
discloses.

                      About O.W. Bunker

OW Bunker AS is a global marine fuel (bunker) company founded in
Denmark.

On Nov. 6, 2014, OW Bunker A/S placed OWB Trading and O.W. Bunker
Supply & Trading A/S in an in-court restructuring procedure with
the probate court in Aalborg, Denmark.  By Nov. 7, 2014, the
Danish entities (plus O.W. Bunker Supply & Trading A/S, O.W.
Cargo Denmark A/S, and Dynamic Oil Trading A/S) were placed under
formal Danish bankruptcy (liquidation) proceedings in the Aalborg
probate court.

The company declared bankruptcy following its admission that it
had lost US$275 million through a combination of fraud committed
by senior executives at its Singaporean unit.

The Danish company placed its U.S. subsidiaries -- O.W. Bunker
Holding North America Inc., O.W. Bunker North America Inc. and
O.W. Bunker USA Inc. -- in Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Bankr. D. Conn.
Case Nos. 14-51720 to 14-51722) in Bridgeport, Conn., on Nov. 13,
2014.

The U.S. cases are assigned to Judge Alan H.W. Shiff.  The U.S.
Debtors tapped Patrick M. Birney, Esq., and Michael R. Enright,
Esq., at Robinson & Cole LLP, as counsel.   McCracken, Walker &
Rhoads LLP served as co-counsel.  Alvarez & Marsal acted as the
financial advisor.

The Office of the United States Trustee formed an official
committee of unsecured creditors of the Debtors on Nov. 26, 2014.
The Committee tapped Hunton & Williams LLP as its attorneys.

On Dec. 15, 2015, the U.S. Debtors obtained confirmation of their
First Modified Liquidation Plans.  Under the plan, the Debtors
proposed to create two liquidating trusts, one for each of its
North American units, to hold the estate assets of each company
and make distributions to creditors, while parent OW Bunker
Holding North America Inc. will dissolve.

According to a Bloomberg report, under the First Modified Plan,
administrative claims of $0.94 million, U.S. Trustee Fees, non-
tax priority claims against OWB USA and NA, Priority tax claims
of $0.05 million, secured claims against OWB USA and NA and fee
claims will be paid in full in cash.  Subordinated claims against
OWB USA and NA will not receive any distribution.  Electing OWB
USA unaffiliated trade claims of $13.3 million will have a
recovery of 40% amounting to $5.31 million.  OWB NA affiliated
unsecured claims and non-electing OWB NA unaffiliated trade
claims will have a recovery of 1% in cash.  OWB USA affiliated
unsecured claims will have a recovery of 0.4% in cash.  Electing
OWB NA unaffiliated trade claims will receive pro rata payment of
$2.5 million in cash.

Non-Electing OWB USA unaffiliated trade claims of $18.36 million
will be paid $0.07 million in cash, a recovery of 0.4%.  Equity
interests in OWB USA and NA will be cancelled and will not
receive any distribution.  The plan will be funded by cash in
hand and sale of assets.



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G R E E C E
===========


ESTIA MORTGAGE: S&P Raises Class B Notes Rating to B-(sf)
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on Estia Mortgage
Finance PLC's class A and B notes. At the same time, S&P affirmed
its 'CCC (sf)' rating on the class C notes.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow our credit and cash flow
analysis of the most recent transaction information as of the
April 2018 interest payment date (IPD). Our analysis also
reflects the application of our general criteria for assigning
and monitoring ratings, our structured finance ratings above the
sovereign (RAS) criteria, and our current counterparty criteria.

"Our rating actions also consider Greece's steadily improving
financial and economic conditions, which we reflected in our
upgrade of the sovereign. We forecast that financial and economic
conditions will improve, with real GDP growth increasing to 2.0%
in 2018 and 2.5% in 2019, from -0.2% in 2016 and 1.3% in 2017. We
expect unemployment to increase to 21.5% in 2018 from 21.0% in
2017, before returning to this level in 2019.

"In performing the credit analysis on this pool, we used the
methodology and assumptions for Spanish residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) as stated in our European residential
loans criteria, but with some adjustments."

The foreclosure frequencies and loss severities for the
archetypal Greece residential loan pool, assuming benign starting
conditions, are the following:

  Rating            Foreclosure            Loss
                  Frequency (%)    severity (%)

  AAA                     18.00          100.00
  AA                      12.00          100.00
  A                        9.00           97.41
  BBB                      6.60           92.43
  BB                       4.20           88.78
  B                        2.50           85.23

S&P said, "In our loss severity analysis, we have assumed no
over- or undervaluation, and a current loan-to-value (LTV) ratio
equal to the archetypal original LTV ratio. Our analysis also
includes the negative carry resulting from interest due on the
rated liabilities during the foreclosure period."

In S&P's view, Greece's economic environment is not benign and is
still recovering from the recent severe crisis. Therefore, S&P
has increased its foreclosure assumptions as follows to account
for the current economic condition:

  Rating            Foreclosure            Loss
                  Frequency (%)    severity (%)

  AAA                     30.00          100.00
  AA                      21.00          100.00
  A                       16.00           97.41
  BBB                     13.00           92.43
  BB                       9.00           88.78
  B                        7.50           85.23

S&P has also applied a 1.10x multiple for geographic
concentration if it exceeds the following regional limits:
Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 11%, Central Macedonia 35%, Western
Macedonia 5%, Thessaly 13%, Epirus 6%, Ionian Islands 4%, Western
Greece 13%, Central Greece 10%, Peloponnese 11%, Attica 60%,
North Aegean 4%, South Aegean 6%, and Crete 12%.

S&P has also applied 1.25x multiple for concentration in any
regional units above the following limits:

S&P has also applied a 2.5x adjustment for loans to non-Greek
citizens. For loan seasoning, we have applied the following
adjustment factors:

-- 0.75x for loans with a seasoning of five to six years;
-- 0.70x for loans with a seasoning of six to seven years;
-- 0.65x for loans with a seasoning of seven to eight years;
-- 0.60x for loans with a seasoning of eight to nine years;
-- 0.55x for loans with a seasoning of nine and 10 years; and
-- 0.50x for loans with a seasoning of over 10 years.

S&P adjusted for jumbo valuations by applying a threshold of
EUR315,500.

In S&P's analysis, it has used the same cash-flow assumptions as
defined for all jurisdictions in its European residential loans
criteria. S&P applied cash flow assumptions to prepayment rate
stresses and servicing fees as follows:

-- Prepayment stress during recession (per year): 1%
-- High prepayment stress pre- and post-recession (per year):
    24%
-- Low prepayment stress pre- and post-recession (per year): 1%
-- Stressed servicing fee (yearly): the higher of 2x contractual
    rate and 50 basis points.

S&P has assumed a foreclosure period of 84 months.

Since S&P's previous review, the available credit enhancement for
the class A, B, and C notes has increased to 39.5%, 16.0%, and
4.3%, from 32.8%, 13.3%, and 3.6%, respectively, due to the
portfolio's amortization and the sequential payment structure.

The transaction also features a cash reserve of about EUR4.19
million, which is at its target level and cannot amortize as long
as the cumulative net default ratio exceeds 4.0% (currently at
4.14%). It provides both liquidity support and credit
enhancement, as it can be used to cover interest shortfalls and
defaults.

S&P said, "Arrears in the outstanding portfolio (excluding
defaults) have decreased to 5.4% as of March 2018 from the peak
of 19.0% in September 2015 and from 11.0% in our previous review
(September 2016). We have also added into our analysis an arrears
projection of 13.5%, which factors the loans that were subject to
a restructuring arrangement and the repurchased late arrears
loans. Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days are at 0.5%,
down from 2.9% as of September 2016 and 8.6% in September 2015.
The decrease in total arrears that started in 2016 reflects
Greece's improving economic and financial conditions and the
servicer's (Piraeus Bank S.A.) repurchasing and subsequent
replacing of loans in late arrears.

"Some of the loans (19% of the current pool balance) have a
maturity beyond the notes' legal maturity (April 2040).
Therefore, in our cash flow analysis, we have not given credit to
any installments due on these loans after the notes' legal
maturity."

The cumulative net default ratio has been stable at 4.14% since
the beginning of 2015, as there have been no new defaults since
then. Furthermore, in March 2016, the servicer repurchased almost
all of the defaulted loans for about EUR30 million. Therefore,
the current level of foreclosure is about 0.7% of the outstanding
portfolio.

Prepayment levels are low and have been almost stable at 1%-3%
since 2015.

S&P said, "We have analyzed the credit quality of the assets in
this transaction by conducting a loan-level analysis of the
mortgage pool. For each loan in the pool, our analysis estimated
the foreclosure frequency and the loss severity and, by
multiplying the foreclosure frequency by the loss severity, the
potential loss associated with each loan. To quantify the
potential losses associated with the entire pool, we calculated a
weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and a weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) at each rating level. The product of
these two variables estimates the required loss protection, in
the absence of any additional factors. We assume that the
probability of foreclosure is a function of both borrower and
loan characteristics, and will become more likely (and the
realized loss on a loan more severe) as the economic environment
deteriorates."

After applying S&P's relevant criteria to this transaction,
assuming current conditions, its WAFF and WALS levels are as
follows:

  Rating level    WAFF (%)    WALS (%)

  AAA                41.64       23.04
  AA                 32.88       21.00
  A                  24.62       17.10
  BBB                20.90       15.19
  BB                 15.77       13.90
  B                  13.04       12.73

In June 2010, the Greek parliament introduced a personal
bankruptcy process, which excluded the primary residence of the
borrowers from liquidation if the objective value was below
EUR300,000. From January 2016, further conditions were introduced
to apply for the exclusion of the primary residence from
foreclosure for borrowers who meet certain specific conditions
relating to the household's monthly expenses compared with the
borrower's salary, and the objective value of the house,
depending on the family composition and if borrowers are
cooperative with the mortgage lender. Since S&P has not received
enough information to assess how many borrowers in the current
portfolio would meet those conditions, it has included a
sensitivity run in its cash flow analysis by applying a 100% WALS
assumption.

S&P said, "The application of our RAS criteria caps our ratings
on the notes in this transaction at four notches above our long-
term foreign currency rating on Greece (B/Positive/B). However,
as not all of the conditions in paragraph 48 of the RAS criteria
are met, we cannot assign the two additional notches of uplift to
the ratings in this transaction. Consequently, our RAS criteria
cap our ratings in this transaction at 'BB+ (sf)'.

"We analyzed counterparty risks by applying our current
counterparty criteria. We consider that the transaction's
documented replacement mechanisms adequately mitigate its
counterparty risk exposure through Citibank N.A., London branch
as bank account provider. However, our counterparty criteria
constrain our ratings on the notes at the issuer credit rating
(ICR) on the swap counterparty (UBS Ltd.; A+/Stable/A-1) plus one
notch, because the swap documents are in line with the previous
version of our counterparty criteria.

"Taking into account the results of our credit and cash flow
analysis, and the application of our counterparty criteria and
our RAS criteria, we have raised to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)'
our rating on the class A notes."

The transaction has an interest payment deferral mechanism for
the class B notes to defer interest payments on this class of
notes after principal payments on the class A notes. Similarly,
this mechanism applies to the class C notes to defer interest
payments until principal payments have been made on the class A
and B notes. This mechanism applies if the net cumulative default
ratio exceeds 9.2% for the class B notes, or 5.8% for the class C
notes. Interest on the class B notes is not deferred in S&P's
stressed cash flows at rating levels lower than 'AAA'. The class
C notes' interest deferral mechanism is close to being breached,
even though the cumulative net default ratio has been stable at
4.14% since the beginning of 2015.

S&P said, "The class B notes have sufficient credit enhancement
to withstand our stresses at a higher rating than that assigned.
However, they do not pass our cash flow scenarios at the 'B (sf)'
rating level if we assume a WALS of 100%. In our view, the class
B notes have sufficient credit enhancement to pay timely interest
and principal by maturity in a steady-state scenario, where the
current level of arrears and defaults shows little to no increase
and collateral performance remains steady. Taking into account
the results of our credit and cash flow analysis and the
application of our criteria for assigning 'CCC' ratings, we have
raised to 'B- (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' our rating on the class B
notes (see "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And
'CC' Ratings," published on Oct. 1, 2012).

"The class C notes are still vulnerable and are dependent upon
favorable economic conditions to repay timely interest and
principal at maturity. Taking into account the results of our
credit and cash flow analysis and the application of our criteria
for assigning 'CCC' ratings, we have affirmed our 'CCC (sf)'
rating on the class C notes."

Estia Mortgage Finance is a Greek RMBS transaction backed by
Greek mortgage loans, which Piraeus Bank originated.

  RATINGS LIST

  Class             Rating
            To                 From

  Estia Mortgage Finance PLC
  EUR750 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Ratings Raised

  A          BB+ (sf)           CCC (sf)
  B          B- (sf)            CCC (sf)

  Rating Affirmed

  C          CCC (sf)



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I R E L A N D
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MILLTOWN PARK: Fitch Rates EUR12MM Class E Notes 'B-sf'
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Milltown Park CLO DAC final ratings,
as follows:

EUR1.75 million class X: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR248 million class A-1: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR22 million class A-2A: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR20 million class A-2B: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR26 million class B: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

EUR19 million class C: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR25 million class D: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

EUR12 million class E: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

EUR37.1 million subordinated notes: not rated

Milltown Park CLO DAC is a cash flow collateralised loan
obligation (CLO). Net proceeds from the issuance of the notes are
being used to purchase a portfolio of EUR400 million of mostly
European leveraged loans and bonds. The portfolio is being
actively managed by Blackstone/GSO Debt Funds Management Europe
Limited. The CLO has a 4.1-year reinvestment period and an 8.5-
year weighted average life.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B+'/'B' Portfolio Credit Quality

Fitch places the average credit quality of obligors in the
'B+'/'B' range. The Fitch-weighted average rating factor (WARF)
of the current portfolio is 31.6 compared with an initial maximum
covenant of 33.

High Recovery Expectations

At least 96% of the portfolio comprises senior secured
obligations. Fitch views the recovery prospects for these assets
as more favourable than for second-lien, unsecured and mezzanine
assets. The Fitch-weighted average recovery rate (WARR) of the
current portfolio is 65.3% compared with an initial minimum
covenant of 62.8%.

Limited Interest Rate Exposure

Fixed-rate liabilities represent 5.4% of the target par, while
fixed-rate assets can represent up to 7.5% of the portfolio. The
transaction is therefore partially hedged against rising interest
rates.

Diversified Asset Portfolio

The transaction has a covenant that limits exposure to the top 10
obligors in the portfolio to 20%. This covenant ensures that the
asset portfolio will not be exposed to excessive obligor
concentration.

Hedged Non-Euro Assets Exposure

The transaction is permitted to invest up to 20% of the portfolio
in non-euro assets, provided perfect asset swaps can be entered
into.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 125% default multiplier applied to the portfolio's mean default
rate, and to all rating default levels, would lead to a downgrade
of up to two notches for the rated notes.

A 25% reduction in recovery rates would lead to a downgrade of
four notches for the class D notes and up to two notches for the
other rated notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

The majority of the underlying assets or risk-presenting entities
have ratings or credit opinions from Fitch and/or other
Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisations and/or
European Securities and Markets Authority-registered rating
agencies. Fitch has relied on the practices of the relevant
groups within Fitch and/or other rating agencies to assess the
asset portfolio information.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


CASSA DI RISPARMIO: Moody's Withdraws Ba2 LT Deposit Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn all ratings for Cassa di
Risparmio di Bolzano S.p.A. (CariBolzano).

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has decided to withdraw the ratings for its own business
reasons.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano S.p.A.

Withdrawals:

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment , Withdrawn , previously
rated b1

Baseline Credit Assessment, Withdrawn , previously rated b1

Counterparty Risk Assessment, Withdrawn , previously rated NP(cr)

Counterparty Risk Assessment, Withdrawn , previously rated
Ba1(cr)

LT Deposit Ratings, Withdrawn RWR, previously rated Ba2 NEG

LT Issuer Ratings, Withdrawn RWR, previously rated B1 NEG

ST Deposit Ratings, Withdrawn , previously rated NP

Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn (RWR) From Negative (NEG)


DECO 2014-GONDOLA: Fitch Ups EUR21.9MM Cl. E Notes Rating to BB+
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded DECO 2014 - GONDOLA S.r.l. notes due
2026 as follows:

  EUR19.2 million Class C (IT0005030801) upgraded to 'A+sf' from
  'Asf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR52 million Class D (IT0005030827) upgraded to 'A+sf' from
  'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR21.9 million Class E (IT0005030835) upgraded to 'BB+sf' from
  'BBsf'; Outlook Stable

DECO 2014 - GONDOLA S.R.L. closed in 2014 as a securitisation of
three commercial mortgage loans with an original balance of
EUR355 million. The loans were granted by Deutsche Bank AG (A-
/Negative) to two Italian closed-end real estate funds and two
cross-collateralised Italian limited-liability companies to
acquire/ refinance 13 logistics centres, two shopping-centres,
two office buildings and one hotel. All assets are located in
Italy and ultimately owned by the borrowers' common sponsor,
Blackstone. Two loans have been redeemed, leaving only the
Delphine loan.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The upgrade reflects the de-risking of the notes following
repayment of the EUR124.1 million Mazer loan on November 29,
2017, leading to full repayment of the class A and B notes and
EUR10.7 million repayment of the class C notes.

The Delphine loan is secured on two offices, one in Milan (RCS),
comprising three buildings, and another in Rome (Parco dei
Medici). According to the November 2017 valuation of the RCS
property, following the letting of vacant space the market value
of Block 2 increased by 39%. Three new tenants have been signed
up, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (BBB/Stable), UBI Banca (BBB-
/Negative) and Loro Piana.

The Parco dei Medici property could be facing the prospect of
vacancy, since the sole occupier (Telecom Italia or TI, BBB-
/Stable) is nearing the end of its lease (having exercised its
break option). Unless it signs up to a new lease, it is expected
to vacate on July 20, 2018. Lease renewal negotiations are still
ongoing, with uncertainty around the lettability of the property
in case TI leaves.

While the loan remains secured on both properties, it is on track
to repay by maturity in 2019. Fitch's analysis assumes Block 2 of
the RCS property (with only a 10% release premium) is disposed
of, leaving proportionally greater issuer exposure to the
potentially vacant Parco dei Medici. Nevertheless, this scenario
is consistent with Fitch's upgrade given the low loan leverage.

If the other RCS properties are also disposed of, the class E
note balance then remaining would represent very low leverage
against even a fully vacant office, and Fitch would expect the
borrower to repay the loan. Therefore the risk of negative excess
spread that could be triggered by higher issuer costs upon a loan
default in this particular scenario is considered negligible (the
class E does not have an available funds cap).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch expects a full repayment of all loans in a 'Bsf' scenario.

Success securing replacement contracted income in Parco de Medici
could warrant an upgrade of the class E notes.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third-party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


SAPPHIRE MIDCO: Moody's Assigns B3 Corporate Family Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a corporate family rating
("CFR") of B3 and probability of default rating ("PDR") of B3-PD
to Sapphire Midco B.V. ("TMF" or "the company"). Concurrently,
Moody's has assigned definitive ratings to Sapphire Bidco B.V.'s
provisional instruments including: a B2 rating on the EUR950
million senior secured 1st lien term loan, a B2 rating on the
EUR150 million senior secured 1st lien revolving credit facility
("RCF"), and a Caa2 rating on the EUR200 million senior secured
2nd lien term loan. Sapphire Midco B.V. is the new top entity in
the company's restricted group following completion of the
company's acquisition by CVC Capital Partners ("CVC") and the
debt is issued by Sapphire Bidco B.V., a new wholly owned
subsidiary of Sapphire Midco B.V. Concurrently Moody's has
withdrawn the CFR, PDR and instrument ratings of TMF's previous
holdco, TMF Group Holding B.V.

The rating outlook is stable, and this concludes the review for
downgrade initiated on November 30, 2017.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's action reflects the completion of TMF's EUR1.75 billion
acquisition by CVC and the new capital structure that has been
put in place.

The ratings benefit from (i) TMF's strong position as a corporate
services provider complemented by a global network of over 120
offices that enables growth for clients into new regions and
offers cost-efficient outsourcing of corporate functions; (ii)
the high switching costs as TMF's services are sometimes deeply
embedded in the clients' processes; (iii) the good organic growth
in revenue and EBITDA; and (iv) the stable performance throughout
the cycle, good margins and cash flow generation.

The ratings are constrained by (i) the increase in Moody's
adjusted leverage to 7.3x for 2017, pro forma for the CVC
acquisition; (ii) the limited size and reliance on Europe - in
particular the Benelux region - for a large part of revenues and
EBITDA; (iii) the need for strong compliance and know-your-
customer (KYC) procedures given the complexity of regulation, tax
and reporting requirements across the world and elevated legal
risks inherent in the industry, particularly related to
situations where TMF provides trustee, director, or proxy
management representative services for clients; and (iv) the
significant restructuring and integration costs, primarily
related to acquisitions, that have historically pressured
operating cash flow generation.

Liquidity Profile

TMF's liquidity is considered good supported by c. EUR45 million
cash balances at present and by the new EUR150 million-equivalent
undrawn RCF as at the date of this press release. Moody's
anticipates that free cash flow - calculated after capex, taxes
and interests payments but before acquisitions - will remain
above EUR15 million in the next 12-18 months, and that the
company will not retain significant cash on balance sheet,
applying residual cash flow toward acquisitions.

The RCF has one springing covenant (first lien net leverage -
maximum of 9.50x - as calculated by management) that is tested
when the facility is drawn by more than 40%.

The loan agreement includes a cash sweep mechanism -- the amount
of mandatory prepayment depending on the level of leverage - for
excess cash measured as the greater of EUR30 million and 20% LTM
consolidated EBITDA. The next debt maturity will be the revolving
credit facility in February 2025.

Structure

The B2 rating on the pari passu ranked 1st lien term loan and RCF
is one notch above the new CFR of B3 assigned to Sapphire Midco
B.V. which reflects the seniority of these facilities in relation
to the Caa2 second-lien term loan and the unsecured lease
rejection claims under Moody's loss given default methodology
(LGD). The company's facilities benefit from guarantees from a
number of guarantors which together represent no less than 70% of
TMF's consolidated adjusted EBITDA.

Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the
company's leverage will decrease toward 6.5x in the next 18
months, that there will not be any substantial adverse effects
due to regulation, litigation or tax, and that the company will
not embark on any material debt-funded acquisitions or
shareholder distributions.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

While unlikely in the near term, positive pressure could arise if
the company continues to successfully execute its growth plans,
diversifying the business into APAC and Americas regions and
improves the financial metrics so that Moody's adjusted Net
Debt/EBITDA falls sustainably below 6.0x and RCF/ Net Debt
increases sustainably towards 10%, taking into account Moody's
expectations that sustained deleveraging may be constrained by
the continuing strategy of potential debt-funded acquisitions.

Negative pressure on the rating could arise if any concerns
around the resilience of the business materializes, for example
from changes in the appeal of the Netherlands or Luxembourg as
tax-efficient regions. Negative pressure could also arise if any
material legal dispute becomes more substantiated. In any case,
the rating would come under pressure if the ratio of Moody's
adjusted Debt/EBITDA moves substantially above 7.5x or free cash
flow generation turns negative.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Sapphire Midco B.V.

Assignments:

Probability of Default Rating, Assigned B3-PD

Corporate Family Rating, Assigned B3

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Assigned Stable

Issuer: Sapphire Bidco B.V.

Assigned definitive:

BACKED Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B2 from
(P)B2

BACKED Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned Caa2 from
(P)Caa2

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: TMF Group Holding B.V.

Withdrawals:

Probability of Default Rating, Withdrawn , previously rated B2-PD
(on review for downgrade)

Corporate Family Rating, Withdrawn , previously rated B2 (on
review for downgrade)

BACKED Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Withdrawn, previously
rated B2

Outlook Actions:

Outlook, Changed To Rating Withdrawn From Rating Under Review

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

CORPORATE PROFILE

TMF is a global provider of business process services mainly for
companies but also for individuals, funds and structured finance
vehicles with 59% of revenue generated in EMEA including 24.5% in
the Benelux region in 2017. Global Business Services ("GBS")
represents 58% of revenue and provides integrated legal, tax,
administrative (including payroll) and accounting services for
companies. Trust & Corporate Services ("TCS") generates 42% of
revenue and provides services associated with the creation and
administration of financial vehicles, administration of corporate
structures for high net worth individuals and for the
administration of alternative investments especially for Private
Equity and Real Estate sectors. The group operates more than
39,000 client entities across 83 jurisdictions.

In 2017, TMF reported revenue of EUR564 million (EUR529 million
in 2016) and company adjusted EBITDA of EUR148 million (EUR136
million).


WEENER PLASTICS: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B1 corporate family
rating (CFR) and B1-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to
Weener Plastics Holding BV (Weener Plastics, company).
Concurrently, Moody's has also assigned B1 instrument ratings to
the EUR335 million senior secured term loan B due 2025 and EUR75
million senior secured revolving credit facility due 2024 to
Weener Plastics Group BV. The outlook on all ratings is stable.

The proceeds will be used to refinance existing debt from the
company's acquisition by funds advised by 3i Group PLC and co-
investors in 2015, and to fund the acquisition of Productores de
Envases Farmaceuticos (Proenfar), a Latin American producer of
pharma and personal care plastic packaging.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings reflect in the first instance the meaningful leverage
with a Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA of 4.9x at the end of 2017,
pro-forma for acquisitions, and relatively small scale in terms
of revenues, which positions the ratings weakly at B1. However,
Moody's expects gradual EBITDA growth and deleveraging in 2018
and 2019 so that leverage reduces towards 4.5x.

The B1 ratings also reflect (i) the highly fragmented and
competitive nature of the plastic packaging markets with both
cost discipline and a focus on innovation important to protect
EBITDA margin and grow volumes; (ii) exposure to volatile and
rising raw material prices (ie polypropylene); (iii) in Moody's
view a degree of cyclicality for some of the company's end
markets such as personal care (compared with food and beverage
end markets); and (iv) some customer concentration, with top 5
customers accounting for 30% of revenues, including high single-
digit percentage revenue exposure to two customers. Weener
Plastics has also been acquisitive and, for example, has funded
the Proenfar acquisition with debt.

However, the B1 ratings also reflect the company's positive
performance trajectory with good organic EBITDA growth in the
past three years given its targeted selection of strategic
product categories and focus on innovation. It also reflects (i)
the company's solid EBITDA margin in the context of a competitive
market environment; (ii) the company's contractual pass through
arrangements for raw materials covering 95% of its 2017 pro-forma
revenue, with 75% carrying a lag of up to 3 months and the
remainder less than 3 months; and (iii) benefits from a
diversified geographic profile with no other country than
Germany, the Netherlands and Colombia, which represent 20%, 14%
and 11% of 2017 pro-forma revenues, accounting for more than 8%
of revenues and significant exposure to markets such as Mexico,
India, Brazil or Russia. Moody's also expects the company to
generate some positive free cash flow, after capex and interest
payments, in 2018 and thereafter.

Weener Plastics focuses on certain strategic product categories
in the personal care and pharma plastic packaging industry, which
account for a significant share of the business. The largest
strategic categories are dispensing closures (26% of 2017 pro-
forma revenues), deodorant packaging (20%) and pharma (10%, ie
capsules, bottles and containers), but also includes a relatively
large other category (28%) that includes jars, coffee capsules
and lids on pouch or PET bottles, amongst others. Weener Plastics
has focused on these strategic categories, and while Moody's
would consider some of the markets that Weener Plastic serves as
relatively commoditised, Moody's also understands that the
company is very much focused on innovation and strategic niche
markets where it has a good market position, with volume and new
product wins from this strategy contributing to recent growth and
a solid EBITDA margin. Moody's also considers the company's
geographic footprint as relatively diverse in the context of its
scale and rated peer group. Exposure to markets such as Mexico,
India, Brazil or Russia can be positive as they may present
higher growth opportunities than more mature European markets,
but there may also be an element of pressure by large global
customers to offer a global footprint. Exposure to markets
outside Europe and the US can also cause greater performance
volatility, for example from currency effects.

The plastic packaging market remains highly competitive and
Weener Plastic competes with sometimes larger and more
diversified businesses including RPC Group PLC (Baa3 stable),
Berry Global Group Inc. (Ba3 stable) and Aptar (unrated) as well
as a number of smaller players. While the company does not
operate in the beauty/cosmetics segment, Moody's also considers
Weener Plastic's largest market personal care, accounting for 56%
of 2017 pro-forma revenues, as cyclical. Moody's views this
market as more cyclical than, for example, food and beverage end
markets in which the company generated 26% of revenues or pharma
which accounts for 10%. The remaining revenues are categorized as
others (5%) and home care (3%). As a result, both cost discipline
and a focus on innovation are important to protect EBITDA margin
and grow volumes. The degree of concentration in Weener Plastic's
customer base, while not uncommon in the industry and
particularly for personal care, can also lead to continued price
pressure that needs to be offset by this focus on innovation,
volume growth or of course new product wins, with a degree of
dependence on the commercial success of customers' products.

Weener Plastics has grown revenues steadily both in 2016 and
2017, a trend which Moody's expects to continue in 2018. While
the company undertook some smaller acquisitions prior to
Proenfar, revenue growth was predominantly the result of growth
in its main strategic product categories and with existing key
accounts, partly through geographic expansion or innovation.
While this also required meaningful investments, Moody's
understands that capex has peaked in 2017 (including some one-off
investments at Proenfar as well as growth capex related to new
customer projects) and should be much lower in 2018. While these
past investments will support growth in 2018 and 2019 as
production ramps up, it appears likely that the company may
choose to undertake further additional growth investments if
opportunities arise. However, Moody's currently expects the
company to generate some free cash flow after capex and interest
payments in 2018.

Raw material price volatility across different polymers also
remains a challenge for the plastic packaging industry. Weener
Plastics uses mostly polypropylene and a number of other polymers
and Moody's considers the level of quarterly pass through
arrangements with customers, covering 95% of 2017 pro-forma
revenue with 75% at a lag of up to 3 months, as above average in
the context of rated peers. Polymer prices have also risen in
2017 and remain volatile in 2018. Price volatility can still have
some effects on EBITDA, for example from these lag effects.

Moody's believes the company to be in a position to continue to
grow organically resulting in some gradual deleveraging from the
current Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA of 4.9x as of December 2017.
However, Moody's also believes the company may embark on further
debt-funded acquisitions in the future if opportunities present
themselves to, for example expand geographically or grow in
strategic product categories, which poses a degree of event risk.
However, Moody's has not considered any acquisition capacity in
the rating at this stage and a material increase in leverage
could have negative rating implications.

The instrument ratings for the EUR335 million senior secured term
loan B due 2025 and EUR75 million senior secured revolving credit
facility due 2024 are aligned with the CFR at B1 given that they
represent the main part of the debt capital structure. The
borrowing remains supported by guarantees reflecting at least 80%
of consolidated EBITDA, tested annually, and some security beyond
share pledges, for example on certain trade receivables, moveable
assets or intellectual property. However, fixed asset security
such as plants is more limited.

Moody's views the company's liquidity profile as good. Pro-forma
for the transaction, the company has EUR24 million of cash as of
May 2018 and access to the EUR75 million fully undrawn and
committed revolving credit facility due 2024. Moody's also
expects the company to generate some positive free cash flow
after capex and interest in 2018. There is one financial
maintenance covenant, which is tested if cash drawings exceed
40%, under which Moody's expects the company to have ample
headroom.

Rating Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation of continued
organic growth and gradual deleveraging absent any acquisitions.
No acquisitions are factored into the rating or outlook.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Positive rating pressure is unlikely to develop over the next 12-
24 months in the context of the company's scale as well as the
degree of event risk from acquisitions. However, positive
pressure could emerge over time if the company diversifies
further and increases its scale either from organic growth or
through acquisitions. In any case, and particularly in the
context of acquisitions, positive pressure would require Moody's-
adjusted debt/EBITDA falling comfortably and sustainably below
3.5x while achieving Moody's-adjusted free cash flow/debt well
above 5%. Conversely, negative rating pressure could develop if
Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA fails to fall towards 4.5x by 2019
or free cash flow (after capex and interest) turns negative. Any
debt-funded acquisitions or shareholder-friendly actions such as
dividends could also weigh on the rating in this context.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Packaging
Manufacturers: Metal, Glass, and Plastic Containers published in
May 2018.

Weener Plastics Holding BV is a plastic packaging manufacturer
mostly for personal care end markets, but also to a lesser extent
for food/beverage as well as pharma end markets. The company
generated circa EUR400 million of revenue in 2017 on a pro-forma
basis for acquisitions and is owned by funds advised by 3i Group
PLC and co-investors since 2015.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: Court Dismisses Bankruptcy Petition
------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Artificial Intelligence SA on June 11 said
the district court in Warsaw dismissed the company's bankruptcy
petition.

Artificial Intelligence SA, formerly Carlson Gaudi Investments
SA, is a Poland-based travel management company (TMC).



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


CAIXA GERAL: DBRS Confirms BB Ratings on Dated Sub. Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed the ratings of Caixa Geral de
Depositos, S.A. (CGD or the Group), including its Long-Term
Issuer Rating of BBB (low), the Short-Term Issuer Rating of R-2
(middle), the BBB (high) / R-1 (low) Critical Obligations Ratings
(COR), and the Dated Subordinated Notes of BB. The trend on all
ratings has been changed to Positive from Negative, except for
the trend on the R 1 (low) COR, which has been changed to Stable
from Negative. The Intrinsic Assessment (IA) for the Group is BBB
(low), while its Support Assessment remains SA3. A full list of
the rating actions is included at the end of this press release.

KEY RATING CONSIDERATIONS

The confirmation of CGD's Issuer Rating at BBB (low) reflects
DBRS's view that the significant challenges faced by the Group
have materially reduced and management is on track in
implementing the strategic plan. Over the last year the Group has
demonstrated a significant improvement in relation to its risk
profile and profitability, including returning to profitability
in FY17, and showing good progress with regard to domestic core
revenues. In addition, Non-Performing loans (NPLs), which were a
key consideration for the previous Negative trend, have
materially reduced. CGD's ratings continue to reflect its leading
franchise position in Portugal, where it has significant market
shares for loans and deposits. The ratings also consider the
Group's sound capital and liquidity and funding position, largely
underpinned by its strong customer retail deposit base.

The Positive trend reflects DBRS's view, that boosted by the
improved economic conditions in Portugal, the Group's good NPL
coverage and its improving ability to generate capital through
retained earnings, the Group should be able to further accelerate
the reduction of NPLs in coming quarters to levels more in line
with European peers. Moreover, the Positive trend incorporates
DBRS's expectations that the Group will improve its domestic
profitability to levels close to its franchise potential as the
leading bank in Portugal, where it has predominant market shares
for loans and deposits.

RATING DRIVERS

Positive rating pressure would require a track record of
continued progress in domestic profitability together with
continued reduction of Non-Performing loans (NPLs). Negative
rating pressure would arise if domestic profitability and capital
weakens significantly as a result of net operating losses and
asset quality deterioration.

RATING RATIONALE

DBRS considers CGD has achieved a key milestone in 2017 when it
returned to profitability at the Group level after 6 years of
continued net losses. The improvement continued in 1Q18, when the
Group posted net positive results in its domestic operations,
following several quarters with net losses. After many years of
profitability negatively affected by significant loan impairment
charges, and helped by the significant level of provisions made
in 2016, the Group reported net attributable income of EUR 51.9
million in 2017, and EUR 68.0 million in 1Q18. In 2017, results
were boosted by a significant improvement in domestic
performance, although the group reported a net loss in Portugal,
mostly affected by one-off costs of around EUR 564 million (net
of tax) related mainly to staff reduction programs in Portugal
and provisions to cover the potential sale of some international
operations. The Group's international operations from Macau and
France helped to offset the domestic net loss. In 1Q18, further
progress was seen in domestic profitability, with results driven
by significantly lower provisions and core revenue growth.

CGD has significantly reduced its NPLs in the last 15 months,
however, despite this progress; DBRS continues to view the NPL
ratio as high and above most European peers. The stock of NPLs
(as defined by the European Banking Authority, EBA and calculated
by DBRS) was down by a material 31% on an accumulated basis since
end-2016 to 1Q18 to EUR 7.3 billion. Around 25% reduction of the
stock of NPLs was achieved in 2017. The NPL ratio was 12.6% of
gross loans to customers at end-March 2018, down from the 15.4%
at end-2016.

CGD's capital position has significantly improved since 2016.
This is largely due to the capital injection received in 2017 but
DBRS also recognizes that the Group has strengthened its capital
levels thanks to the significant progress in de-risking the
balance sheet and the return to profitability in 2017 and 1Q18.
As a result, DBRS views CGD as maintaining solid buffers over
minimum regulatory requirements of around 473 bps for CET1
(phased-in) and 293 bps for total capital (phased-in) at end-
March 2018. CGD's phased-in Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) (phased-
in) ratio was 13.6% and the total capital ratio (phased- in) was
15.3% at end-1Q18.

The Group maintains a strong funding and liquidity position,
partly supported by its predominant franchise position in
customer deposits in Portugal. At end-March 2018 the net loan to
deposit ratio was a sound 87%. The Group also accessed the market
for capital instruments in 2017 with a EUR 500 million Additional
Tier 1 issuance. A further EUR 430 million issuance of capital
instruments is expected in 2018, as part of the conditions agreed
upon the recapitalization.

DBRS has also discontinued the ratings on CGD London branch as
the branch was closed in 2017 and the notes have been repaid.

The Grid Summary Grades for Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A. are as
follows: Franchise Strength - Good; Earnings - Moderate/Weak;
Risk Profile - Moderate; Funding & Liquidity - Good/Moderate;
Capitalization - Moderate.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


URALCAPITALBANK LLC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
----------------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration to manage the credit institution
UralCapitalBank LLC (hereinafter, the Bank) appointed by Bank of
Russia Order No. OD-373, dated February 15, 2018, following the
revocation of its banking license, in the course of examination
of the bank's financial standing has revealed actions performed
by its former management and owners bearing the evidence of the
theft of the Bank's assets and of masking previous operations
aimed at withdrawal of its assets by issuing loans to a group of
borrowers, which were invariably not able to fulfill their
obligations.  The resulting damage totaled RUR2.1 billion.

According to the estimate by the provisional administration, the
assets of UralCapitalBank LLC do not exceed RUR3 billion, whereas
the bank's liabilities to its creditors exceed RUR6.5 billion.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on financial
transactions bearing the evidence of the criminal offence
conducted by the officials of UralCapitalBank LLC to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for
consideration and procedural decision making.

The current development of the bank's status has been detailed in
a press statement released by the Bank of Russia.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANCAJA 10: S&P Affirms 'D(sf)' Ratings on Three Note Classes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised and removed from CreditWatch positive
its credit ratings on Bancaja 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de
Activos' class A2 and A3 notes. At the same time, S&P affirmed
its ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow the application of our
relevant criteria and our full analysis of the most recent
transaction information that we have received, and reflect the
transaction's current structural features. We have also
considered our updated outlook assumptions for the Spanish
residential mortgage market.

"Our structured finance ratings above the sovereign (RAS)
criteria classify the sensitivity of this transaction as
moderate. Therefore, after our March 23, 2018 upgrade of Spain to
'A-' from 'BBB+', the highest rating that we can assign to the
senior-most tranche in this transaction is six notches above the
Spanish sovereign rating, or 'AAA (sf)', if certain conditions
are met. For all the other tranches, the highest rating that we
can assign is four notches above the sovereign rating.

"Under our current counterparty criteria, JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., as the swap provider, cannot support a rating on the notes
that is higher than 'AA-', which is our long-term issuer credit
rating on JP Morgan Chase Bank plus one notch. We have therefore
performed our credit and cash flow analysis without giving
benefit to the swap provider, to determine if the class A2 and A3
notes could achieve a higher rating when giving no benefit to the
swap provider.

"Our European residential loans criteria, as applicable to
Spanish residential loans, establish how our loan-level analysis
incorporates our current opinion of the local market outlook. Our
current outlook for the Spanish housing and mortgage markets, as
well as for the overall economy in Spain, is benign. Therefore,
we revised our expected level of losses for an archetypal Spanish
residential pool at the 'B' rating level to 0.9% from 1.6%, in
line with table 87 of our European residential loans criteria, by
lowering our foreclosure frequency assumption to 2.00% from 3.33%
for the archetypal pool at the 'B' rating level.

"After applying our European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, the overall effect in our credit analysis results is
a decrease in the required credit coverage for each rating level
compared with our previous review, mainly driven by our revised
foreclosure frequency assumptions."

  Rating level     WAFF (%)    WALS (%)

  AAA                 17.51       33.81
  AA                  12.30       28.57
  A                    9.48       20.07
  BBB                  7.19       15.60
  BB                   4.98       12.63
  B                    3.28       10.07

S&P said, "Since our previous review, the class A2 and A3 notes'
credit enhancement has increased to 64.2% and 15.0%,
respectively, from 62.8% and 14.8% due to the amortization of the
notes, which is sequential as the reserve fund has been fully
depleted since 2013. The class B, C, and D notes' credit
enhancement has decreased to 8.4%, 3.1%, and 0.5% respectively,
from 8.4%, 3.2%, and 0.7%. The class E notes were never
collateralized as they were issued to fund the cash reserve at
closing.

"Following the application of our criteria, we have determined
that our assigned ratings on the classes of notes in this
transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped by
our RAS criteria, (ii) the rating as capped by our counterparty
criteria, or (iii) the rating that the class of notes can attain
under our European residential loans criteria.

"The application of our European residential loans criteria and
related credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the
available credit enhancement for the class A2 notes is
commensurate with a 'AAA (sf)' rating. Furthermore, under our RAS
criteria, this class of notes can be rated up to six notches
above our unsolicited 'A-' long-term sovereign rating on Spain.
We have therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' and
removed from CreditWatch positive our rating on this class of
notes.

"The application of our European residential loans criteria and
related credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the class A3
notes can achieve a 'AAA (sf)' rating. Because of the pro rata
trigger between the class A2 and A3 notes, which is based on the
ratio between the outstanding balance of performing assets up to
90 days in arrears and the outstanding balance of the class A
notes being lower than or equal to one, we expect the class A3
payments to remain subordinated to the class A2 notes for the
rest of the transaction's life. As such, the application of our
RAS criteria caps our rating on these classes of notes at four
notches above our unsolicited 'A-' long-term sovereign rating on
Spain. We have therefore raised to 'AA (sf)' from 'AA- (sf)' and
removed from CreditWatch positive our rating on the class A3
notes.

"Under the transaction documents, the class B notes' interest
deferral trigger is based on the level of cumulative defaults
over the original securitized balance. Due to the increase in the
level of defaults on the Feb. 22, 2018 interest payment date
(IPD), the class B notes breached their 10.90% interest deferral
trigger. However, due to the negative three-month Euro Interbank
Offered Rate (EURIBOR) rate (the index to which the notes are
referenced), no interest was due for this class of notes on the
latest IPD, and the class B notes did not default based on our
ratings definitions. Our ratings in this transaction address
timely interest and ultimate principal payments. The affirmation
of our 'CC (sf)' rating on the class B notes reflects the
application of our "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-',
And 'CC' Ratings," published on Oct. 1, 2012. We expect the
default of this class of notes to be a virtual certainty within
the next 12 months if the three-month EURIBOR rate starts to
increase. Moreover, in our view, this class of notes is likely to
default even under the most optimistic collateral performance
scenario due to the interest deferral trigger breach.

"We have affirmed our 'D (sf)' ratings on the class C, D, and E
notes as they continue to miss interest payments."

Bancaja 10 is a Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transaction that closed in January 2007 and securitizes
residential mortgage loans. Caja de Ahorros de Valencia,
Castellon y Alicante (Bancaja; now Bankia S.A.) originated the
pools, which are mainly located in the Valencia region.

  RATINGS LIST

  Class             Rating
              To               From

  Bancaja 10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
  EUR2.631 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes


  Ratings Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

  A2          AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
  A3          AA (sf)          AA- (sf)/Watch Pos

  Ratings Affirmed

  B           CC (sf)
  C           D (sf)
  D           D (sf)
  E           D (sf)


BANCAJA 11: S&P Affirms 'D(sf)' Ratings on Four Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised and removed from CreditWatch positive
its credit ratings on Bancaja 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de
Activos' class A2 and A3 notes. At the same time, S&P affirmed
its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow the application of our
relevant criteria and our full analysis of the most recent
transaction information that we have received, and reflect the
transaction's current structural features. We have also
considered our updated outlook assumptions for the Spanish
residential mortgage market.

"Our structured finance ratings above the sovereign (RAS)
criteria classify the sensitivity of this transaction as
moderate. Therefore, after our March 23, 2018 upgrade of Spain to
'A-' from 'BBB+', the highest rating that we can assign to the
senior-most tranche in this transaction is six notches above the
Spanish sovereign rating, or 'AAA (sf)', if certain conditions
are met. For all the other tranches, the highest rating that we
can assign is four notches above the sovereign rating.

"Under our current counterparty criteria, HSBC Bank PLC, as the
swap provider, cannot support a rating on the notes that is
higher than 'AA', which is our long-term issuer credit rating on
HSBC Bank plus one notch. We have therefore performed our credit
and cash flow analysis without giving benefit to the swap
provider, to determine if the class A2 and A3 notes could achieve
a higher rating when giving no benefit to the swap provider.

"Our European residential loans criteria, as applicable to
Spanish residential loans, establish how our loan-level analysis
incorporates our current opinion of the local market outlook. Our
current outlook for the Spanish housing and mortgage markets, as
well as for the overall economy in Spain, is benign. Therefore,
we revised our expected level of losses for an archetypal Spanish
residential pool at the 'B' rating level to 0.9% from 1.6%, in
line with table 87 of our European residential loans criteria, by
lowering our foreclosure frequency assumption to 2.00% from 3.33%
for the archetypal pool at the 'B' rating level.

"After applying our European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, the overall effect in our credit analysis results is
a decrease in the required credit coverage for each rating level
compared with our previous review, mainly driven by our revised
foreclosure frequency assumptions."

  Rating level     WAFF (%)    WALS (%)

  AAA                 16.84       38.77
  AA                  11.88       33.65
  A                    9.15       25.18
  BBB                  6.92       20.58
  BB                   4.82       17.42
  B                    3.16       14.60

S&P said, "Since our previous review, the class A2, A3, B, and C
notes' credit enhancement has increased to 59.8%, 12.0%, 4.6%,
and 1.7% respectively, from 53.1%, 9.9%, 3.2%, and 0.6% due to
the amortization of the notes, which is sequential as the reserve
fund has been fully depleted since 2010. The class D notes are
currently undercollateralized and the class E notes were never
collateralized as they were issued to fund the cash reserve at
closing.

"Following the application of our criteria, we have determined
that our assigned ratings on the classes of notes in this
transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped by
our RAS criteria, (ii) the rating as capped by our counterparty
criteria, or (iii) the rating that the class of notes can attain
under our European residential loans criteria.

The application of our European residential loans criteria and
related credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the
available credit enhancement for the class A2 notes is
commensurate with a 'AAA (sf)' rating. Furthermore, under our RAS
criteria, this class of notes can be rated up to six notches
above our unsolicited 'A-' long-term sovereign rating on Spain.
We have therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' and
removed from CreditWatch positive our rating on this class of
notes.

"The application of our European residential loans criteria and
related credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the class A3
notes can achieve a 'AAA (sf)' rating. Because of the pro rata
trigger between the class A2 and A3 notes, which is based on the
ratio between the outstanding balance of performing assets up to
90 days in arrears and the outstanding balance of the class A
notes being lower than or equal to one, we expect the class A3
payments to remain subordinated to the class A2 notes for the
rest of the transaction's life. As such, the application of our
RAS criteria caps our rating on this class of notes at four
notches above our unsolicited 'A-' long-term sovereign rating on
Spain. We have therefore raised to 'AA (sf)' from 'AA- (sf)' and
removed from CreditWatch positive our rating on the class A3
notes. We have affirmed our 'D (sf)' ratings on the class B, C,
D, and E notes as they continue to miss interest payments."

Bancaja 11 is a Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transaction backed by a pool of first-ranking mortgages
secured over owner-occupied residential properties in Spain,
which closed in July 2007. Caja de Ahorros de Valencia Castellon
y Alicante (Bancaja; now Bankia S.A.) originated the underlying
collateral.

  RATINGS LIST

  Class             Rating
              To               From

  Bancaja 11, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
  EUR2.023 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Ratings Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

  A2          AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)/Watch Pos
  A3          AA (sf)          AA- (sf)/Watch Pos

  Ratings Affirmed

  B           D (sf)
  C           D (sf)
  D           D (sf)
  E           D (sf)


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ADIENT PLC: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB', Outlook Remains Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its corporate credit rating on Adient
plc to 'BB' from 'BB+'. The outlook stays negative.

S&P said, "We also affirmed our issue-level rating of 'BBB-' on
Adient's senior secured debt. The recovery rating remains '1',
indicating a very high recovery (90%-100%; rounded estimate: 90%)
in the event of a default.

"We also lowered the issue-level ratings on the company's senior
unsecured debt to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The recovery rating remains
'5', indicating a modest recovery (10%-30%; rounded estimate:
25%) in the event of a default.

"Our downgrade reflects the ongoing operational challenges at its
Seat Structures and Mechanisms (SS&M) division and the Seating
business overall.

"The negative outlook on Adient reflects our view that we could
lower the rating if debt-to-EBITDA moves above 3.0x and FOCF-to-
debt ratio remains below 10% over the next 12 months.

"We could lower our ratings on Adient if management is not able
to improve the profitability of its SS&M business, or global
vehicle demand begins to decline, or the OEMs decide to pursue a
components-sourcing strategy that leads to a significant increase
in pricing pressure for their suppliers, causing Adient's debt-
to-EBITDA metric to exceed 3.0x and its FOCF-to-debt ratio to
stay significantly below 10% on a sustained basis. We could also
lower the rating if a lack of consistent operational execution
cast the company in an unfavorable light when compared with
similarly-rated global peers.

"We could revise our outlook to stable if the company improves
its operational problems in its SS&M segment and its Seating
business overall. The company would also need to expand its
EBITDA margins to reflect its strengthening operating efficiency
and consistent program-launch execution before we would revise
the outlook to stable. Moreover, we would expect to see FOCF-to-
debt above 10% on a sustained basis."


BHS GROUP: PwC, Former Partner Fined Over Audit, FRC Says
---------------------------------------------------------
Kirstin Ridley at Reuters reports that the UK's Financial
Reporting Council (FRC) said on June 13 PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PwC), which audited the accounts of collapsed British retail
chain BHS, has been fined GBP10 million (US$13.4 million) and
ordered to review all policies for handling high-risk firms after
a two-year inquiry in which it admitted misconduct.

According to Reuters, the FRC said the fine is to be reduced by
35% to GBP6.5 million for agreeing to an early settlement.

In addition, Steve Denison, one of the company's former partners,
has been fined GBP500,000, reduced to GBP325,000 in return for
his cooperation with the inquiry, Reuters discloses.

Mr. Denison, who was also banned from audit work for 15 years,
left PwC this month after a nearly 33-year career there,
according to his LinkedIn profile, Reuters notes.

The FRC launched an investigation into the PwC audit in 2016, a
year after it signed off BHS as a "going concern" and billionaire
retailer Philip Green sold the loss-making group for one pound,
Reuters recounts.

The FRC also ordered PwC to supply detailed annual reports about
its audit practice in Leeds to the FRC for the next three years
and to review and amend its broader policies to ensure audits of
all non-listed high-risk or high-profile companies were subject
to an engagement quality control review, Reuters states.

The failure of BHS, a 180-store chain, was the biggest collapse
in the British retail industry since the demise of Woolworths in
2008, Reuters notes.  It prompted intense scrutiny, Reuters says.

BHS's pension deficit had ballooned to GBP571 million by the time
the retailer went into administration in April 2016, a figure
based on what an insurance company would pay if it were to buy
out the funds, Reuters relays.  About 11,000 jobs were lost,
Reuters discloses.

                            About BHS

BHS Group was a high street retailer offering fashion for the
whole family, furniture and home accessories.

BHS was put into administration in April 2016 in one of the
U.K.'s largest ever corporate failures, according to The Am Law
Daily.  More than 11,000 jobs were lost and 20,000 pensions (the
U.K. equivalent of a 401k) put at risk after it emerged that the
company, which had more than 160 stores across the U.K., had a
pension deficit of GBP571 million (US$703 million), The Am Law
Daily disclosed.

Sir Philip Green, a retail magnate with a net worth of more than
US$5 billion, has been heavily criticized for his role in the
collapse of BHS, The Am Law Daily said.  Mr. Green and other
shareholders had taken around GBP580 million (US$714 million) out
of the business before selling it for just GBP1 (US$1.23), The Am
Law Daily noted.

Linklaters acted for Green's Arcadia Group on the sale of the
company to Retail Acquisitions, which was advised by London-based
technology, media and telecoms specialist Olswang, The Am Law
Daily added.

Weil Gotshal & Manges and DLA then took the lead roles on the
administration, acting for the company and administrators Duff &
Phelps, respectively, while Jones Day was appointed by the
administrators to investigate the actions of the company's former
directors, The Am Law Daily related.


CO-OP BANK: Investigator of Collapse Earns GBP1,500 a Day
---------------------------------------------------------
Iain Withers at The Telegraph reports that the regulator hired to
investigate the near-collapse of Co-op Bank will be paid GBP1,500
a day plus expenses.

According to The Telegraph, Mark Zelmer, a former Bank of Canada
boss, will probe what led to the Co-op Bank flirting with failure
in 2013 when it uncovered a GBP1.5 billion accounting black hole.
The lender limped on before eventually being rescued by US hedge
funds last year, The Telegraph relates.

The investigator's pay package was confirmed by the Bank of
England on June 12, The Telegraph discloses.  If he works a
normal five-day working week, he stands to earn almost GBP33,000
a month, The Telegraph states.  He has been given up to a year to
complete the investigation, meaning he could be paid around
GBP400,000, The Telegraph notes.

                    About Co-operative Bank

The Co-operative Bank plc is a retail and commercial bank in the
United Kingdom, with its headquarters in Balloon Street,
Manchester.

In 2013-2014, the Bank was the subject of a rescue plan to
address a capital shortfall of about GBP1.9 billion.  The Bank
mostly raised equity to cover the shortfall from hedge funds.

In February 2017, the Bank's board announced that they were
commencing a sale process for the Bank and were "inviting
offers."

The Troubled Company Reporter-Europe reported on Sept. 12, 2017,
that Moody's Investors Service upgraded the standalone baseline
credit assessment (BCA) of the Co-operative Bank Plc (the Co-op
Bank) to caa2 from ca in light of its improved credit profile and
capital position given the implementation of the bank's capital
increase.

Moody's upgraded the bank's long-term senior unsecured debt
rating to Caa2 from Ca, reflecting the completion of the bank's
capital raising plan without the imposition of any losses on this
class of creditors.

Moody's confirmed the long-term deposit ratings at Caa2, at the
same level as its standalone BCA, given the reduced amount of
subordination benefiting this class of liabilities due to the
cancellation of Tier 2 capital as part of the restructuring. The
short-term deposit ratings were affirmed at Not Prime.


FOUR SEASONS: Note Issuers Unable to Pay Coupons on GBP525MM Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Jessop at Reuters reports that coupons on GBP525 million
(US$701.40 million) of debt underpinned by retirement home
operator Four Seasons will not be paid, the issuers of the notes
said on June 13.

The owners of Four Seasons recently agreed a deal with investment
firm H/2 Capital Partners to restructure the group, transferring
ownership to a new owner controlled by its creditors, Reuters
relates.

According to Reuters, the boards of Elli Finance (UK) Plc and
Elli Investments, the issuers of the notes, said their respective
boards "have concluded that they will not be in a position to pay
the coupons due under the Notes on June 15, 2018".

The issuers said in a statement the notes affected are GBP350
million in 8.750% senior secured notes due 2019, and GBP175
million in 12.250% senior notes due 2020, Reuters relays.

Related to the announcement, the issuers, as cited by Reuters,
said that Four Seasons and H/2 Capital Partners had also agreed
an amendment and waiver to the terms of an existing GBP70 million
super senior facility agreement.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 3,
2018, the FT related that Britain's second-largest care home
chain is fighting for survival after finishing 2017 with just
GBP26 million of cash and net debt that rose GBP7 million to
GBP539 million in the year to December 31, leaving it unable to
make interest payments.  The chain remains in the formal control
of Terra Firma Capital Partners, run by the veteran investor Guy
Hands, after it was bought in an GBP825 million debt-fuelled deal
in 2012, the FT noted.  But H/2 Capital Partners, the
Connecticut-based hedge fund that owns most of its debt, in
effect took control in December, when it agreed to defer a GBP26
million interest payment within hours of it being due, the FT
stated.  Four Seasons is dependent on a further GBP70 million of
emergency funding agreed in March by H/2 Capital to keep it
operating, according to the FT.  H/2 is understood to be willing
to take on Four Seasons, which it believes could be turned into a
profitable business if it did not have the pressure of having to
pay debt interest, the FT said.  A deadline for agreement between
the parties has been extended six times and is now set for
July 31, the FT disclosed.


RIBBON FINANCE 2018: DBRS Finalizes BB Rating on Class G Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its provisional ratings on the
following classes of notes issued by Ribbon Finance 2018 Plc.
(the Issuer):

-- Class A at AAA (sf)
-- Class B at AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C at A (sf)
-- Class D at BBB (high) (sf)
-- Class E at BBB (low) (sf)
-- Class F at BB (high) (sf)
-- Class G at BB (sf)

All trends are Stable.

Ribbon Finance 2018 Plc. (the Issuer) is the securitization of a
GBP 449.8 million senior loan advanced to Ribbon Bidco Limited
(the Borrower) to provide partial acquisition financing for the
Dayan family (the sponsor) to acquire Lapithus Hotels Management
UK (LHM) and 20 hotels (the Transaction). The initial lender is
Goldman Sachs Bank USA and the Transaction was arranged by
Goldman Sachs International (together, Goldman Sachs). Goldman
Sachs Bank USA also advanced a mezzanine loan of GBP 69.2 million
to Ribbon Mezzco Limited, which was later sold to funds advised
and/or managed by Apollo Global Management LLC. The mezzanine
loan is structurally and contractually subordinated to the senior
loan and is not part of the Transaction. DBRS understands that
the sponsor has paid a total GBP 742 million for the acquisition
and will fund an additional GBP 38 million capex planned in 2018.

The senior loan is secured by 20 hotels located in the U.K.:
three hotels operate under the Crowne Plaza brand and 17 hotels
are flagged by Holiday Inn (the Portfolio). LHM also manages the
Holiday Inn Mayfair hotel, which is not included in the
Portfolio. The valuer, HVS - London Office (HVS), has estimated
the total market value (MV) net of 6.8% purchaser's cost to be
GBP 692.2 million, or GBP 143,017 per room based on the 4,840
rooms in the Portfolio. The resulting senior loan-to-value ratio
(LTV) of the senior loan is 65.0%. Southeast England and London
are the two regions where the majority of the Portfolio is
located, comprising 11 hotels, 1,435 rooms, 62.2% MV and 60.0% of
the 12-month trailing (T-12) EBITDA ending February 2018. DBRS's
value assumption for the Portfolio is GBP 561 million (19%
haircut), resulting in an 80% stressed LTV.

The Portfolio benefits from a high occupancy rate of 84.6% as at
the end of 2017 with a revenue per available room (RevPAR) of GBP
72.2 per night and an average daily rate (ADR) of GBP 85.3 per
night. According to the STR data dated YE2017, the Portfolio's
overall performance is slightly better than its competition set.
Nevertheless, LHM plans to further improve the occupancy and net
operating income (NOI) by implementing a capex plan of GBP 38
million to be funded by the sponsor. The Portfolio also
demonstrated a strong operating performance in the recent past.
For the T-12 ending February 2018, the Portfolio generated GBP
181.0 million revenue, after deducting costs and expenses, the
EBITDA for the same period was GBP 57.8 million and the NOI was
GBP 50.6 million after removing GBP 7.2 million for furniture,
fixture and equipment (FF&E). DBRS's net cash flow assumption is
GBP 43.8 million.

The Portfolio is concentrated by property type, as all properties
are full-service hotels. Hotels have the highest cash flow
volatility of all property types because of their relatively
short leases (i.e., lengths of stay) compared with commercial
properties and their higher operating leverage. These dynamics
can lead to rapidly deteriorating cash flows in a declining
market. The borrower group was recently restructured so that 20
companies own one hotel each in the Transaction. DBRS notes that
the property-owning companies are trading companies that have on
aggregate approximately 2,200 employees. DBRS incorporated
potential redundancy costs or compensation claims into its
analysis, and factored potential trade liabilities into its LTV-
sizing parameters. In addition, the analysis accounted for
potentially longer enforcement timing and higher enforcement
costs compared with other commercial real estate asset classes.

Some of the properties are held on leaseholds with a relatively
short remaining term (approximately 50 years). This was factored
into the valuation, as were potential ground lease increases
following upcoming rent reviews. DBRS notes that the franchise
fee will increase considerably in coming years as well, so that
to maintain the current level of net cash flow generated by the
Portfolio, turnover and gross operating profit will have to
increase.

The senior loan bears interest at a floating rate equal to three-
month LIBOR (subject to zero floor) plus a margin of 3.19% per
annum. If the mezzanine loan is voluntarily prepaid on 3 April
2020 or later, the margin on the senior loan would step down to
3.00% per annum. The expected maturity date is 2 April 2023 with
no extension option available. The notes issued by the Issuer
bear a final maturity date falling in April 2028, thereby
providing a tail period of five years. The interest on the
defaulted amount will be 1% higher and the note share of default
interest will be distributed to note holders pro rata.

During the loan term, the Borrower is required to amortize the
senior loan by GBP 1,124,500 per interest payment date (IPD) or
GBP 4,498,000 per annum, which is 1% of the senior loan amount at
issuance. However, from April 2019 onwards, the Borrower is
required to double the amortization payment on each IPD should
the NOI debt yield (DY) for that period fall below 11.54%. The T-
12 ending February 2018 NOI DY was 11.25%, implying that the
Portfolio must improve NOI by GBP 783,841 by April 2019 to avoid
double amortization. Scheduled amortization proceeds will be
distributed pro rata to the note holders unless a sequential
payment trigger is continuing, in which case, the proceeds will
be distributed sequentially. Before a sequential payment trigger
event, in case of mandatory prepayment after property disposals,
the senior allocated loan amount (ALA) will be allocated pro rata
to the notes and the issuer loan, whereas the release premium
will be applied sequentially. The senior release price for the
corresponding property is set at 5-20% above the ALA of the
disposed property. Voluntary prepayment funded by equity would be
applied reverse sequentially, unless a sequential payment trigger
event is continuing.

The senior loan has tightening LTV covenants for cash trap and
event of default. The LTV cash trap covenant is set at 71.5% for
the first two years; the covenant will decrease by 1.08% to
70.42% in year three and will decrease by a further 1.08% to
69.33% for the last two years of the senior loan. The LTV default
covenants are set 4.33% higher at 75.83% and will decrease in
parallel to cash trap covenants to 73.67% for years four and
five. The other two covenants, NOI DY and interest coverage ratio
(ICR), are set at 10.10% and 1.95x for cash trap and 9.26% and
1.78x for event of default.

The interest rate risk is fully hedged over the life of the
senior loan by way of a prepaid cap provided by Goldman Sachs
Bank USA. Classes F and G are subjected to an available funds cap
where the shortfall is attributable to an increase in the
weighted-average margin of the notes.

The liquidity provider, Goldman Sachs Bank USA, will provide a
liquidity facility (LF) for the transaction which is initially
set at GBP 27.8 million or 6.2% of the total outstanding balance
of the notes. DBRS understands that the LF will cover the
interest payments of all classes and will amortize in line with
their outstanding balance. However, classes F and G are subjected
to available fund caps and will not be covered by LF once their
total drawings have reached 20% of the total LF commitment,
unless these classes are then most senior class. Based on a cap
strike of 2.0% and Libor cap of 5%, DBRS estimated the liquidity
facility will cover 18 months' and 13 months' interest payment,
respectively, assuming the Issuer does not receive any revenue.
DBRS rates the LF provider privately and, as at closing, the
counterparty's rating and replacement triggers are commensurate
with the highest rating level assigned to the notes per DBRS's
"Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions"
methodology.

The Transaction also features class X interest diversion
triggers. During the life of the transaction, should the loan's
financial covenants be breached, the class X interest will be
diverted to the Issuer's transaction account. Such amount will be
held by the Issuer until the interest payment date after the
class X interest diversion trigger ceases to continue and be
released to class X note holders, or until the expected note
maturity date on 20 April 2023 or, if earlier, delivery of note
acceleration notice, when it would form part of the Issuer's
available funds and be distributed according to the then relevant
priority of payments.

To maintain compliance with applicable regulatory requirements,
Goldman Sachs will retain an ongoing material economic interest
of not less than 5% of the securitization via an issuer loan
which was advanced by Goldman Sachs Bank USA.

Notes: All figures are in British pound sterling unless otherwise
noted.


TRINIDAD MORTGAGE 2018-1: S&P Gives (P)BB Rating on Cl. F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has assigned preliminary credit ratings to
Trinidad Mortgage Securities 2018-1 PLC's class A to F-Dfrd
notes. At closing, the issuer will also issue unrated class G-
Dfrd, H-Dfrd, X, and Z notes.

S&P said, "We based our credit analysis on the preliminary pool,
which totals GBP273.7 million. The pool comprises nonconforming
U.K. buy-to-let mortgage loans originated by Magellan Homeloans,
Cyprus Popular Bank (Camael portfolio), and Heritable Bank PLC
(Thrones 2013 portfolio). Heritable Bank is in administration.
Mars Capital acquired the Camael and Thrones 2013 portfolios in
2014 and 2013, respectively. The loans are secured on properties
in England and Wales.

The balance of the class A to H-Dfrd note issuance will be higher
than the initial portfolio's balance, with the excess being equal
to the prefunding amount and the Thrones 2013 portfolio. The
issuer will use part of the note issuance proceeds to acquire the
Thrones 2013 portfolio on July 13, 2018. Up to and including the
first interest payment date on Oct. 31, 2018, the issuer can buy
from Magellan Homeloans an additional portfolio that has a
balance that is up to the prefunding amount. This portfolio will
be subject to certain prefunding conditions, based on which S&P
has made conservative assumptions relating to the prefunding
pool's credit and cash flow characteristics.

On the closing date, the issuer will purchase the beneficial
interest in the portfolio from the seller (Magellan Funding No. 2
DAC), using the notes' issuance proceeds. The legal title of each
loan will remain with Mars Capital (Camael and Thrones 2013) and
Magellan Homeloans (Magellan pool). Mars Capital will also be the
servicer of the loans in the pool.

S&P said, "Our preliminary ratings address the timely receipt of
interest and ultimate repayment of principal to the class A
notes. The preliminary ratings on the class B-Dfrd to F-Dfrd
notes will initially be interest-deferred and address the
ultimate repayment of principal and interest. As each class of
these notes becomes the most senior class, our rating on it will
address the ultimate repayment of principal and timely payment of
interest. For the most senior class of notes, a deferral of
interest would constitute an event of default under the notes'
terms and conditions.

"Our preliminary ratings reflect our assessment of the
transaction's payment structure, cash flow mechanics, and the
results of our cash flow analysis to assess whether the notes
would be repaid under stress test scenarios. Subordination, the
general reserve, and excess spread will provide credit
enhancement to the rated notes. Taking these factors into
account, we consider that the available credit enhancement for
the rated notes is commensurate with the preliminary ratings
assigned."

  RATINGS LIST

  Trinidad Mortgage Securities 2018-1 PLC
  Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating Rate Notes (Unrated Notes)

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Class              Rating        Amount
                                 (mil. GBP)
  A                  AAA (sf)         TBD
  B-Dfrd             AA (sf)          TBD
  C-Dfrd             A+ (sf)          TBD
  D-Dfrd             A- (sf)          TBD
  E-Dfrd             BBB (sf)         TBD
  F-Dfrd             BB (sf)          TBD
  G-Dfrd             NR               TBD
  H-Dfrd             NR               TBD
  X                  NR               TBD
  Z                  NR               TBD

  NR--Not rated. TBD--To be determined.



===================
U Z B E K I S T A N
===================


ZIRAAT BANK: Moody's Cuts Long-Term LC Deposit Rating to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B2 from B1 the long-
term local currency deposit rating of Ziraat Bank Uzbekistan JSC,
the Uzbek subsidiary of Turkish T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, the largest
Turkish banking group, and placed it on review for further
downgrade.

The bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b3 was not
affected, while its adjusted BCA was downgraded to b2 from b1 and
placed on review for further downgrade. The rating agency has
also downgraded Ziraat Bank Uzbekistan JSC's long-term
Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR Assessment) to B1(cr) from
Ba3(cr) and placed it on review for further downgrade. The long-
term foreign-currency deposit rating of B2 was placed on review
for downgrade and the short-term deposit ratings of Not Prime as
well as the short-term CR Assessment of Not Prime (cr) were
affirmed.

The rating action was prompted by the corresponding action on the
Turkish parent bank T.C. Ziraat Bankasi (local currency deposit
Ba3 rating under review ; BCA b1), whose local currency long-term
deposit ratings and BCA were downgraded and placed on review for
further downgrade on June 7, 2018.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of Ziraat Bank Uzbekistan JSC's supported local
currency deposit rating to B2 from B1 and review for further
downgrade, was prompted by the corresponding action on T.C.
Ziraat Bankasi, whose BCA was downgraded to b1 from ba3 and
placed on review for further downgrade, indicating the parent's
reduced capacity to provide support.

Moody's continues to incorporate a high probability of support
from the parent in Ziraat Bank Uzbekistan's long-term deposit
ratings, which results in one-notch of rating uplift from the
bank's standalone BCA of b3. During the review period, Moody's
will assess the extent to which the deterioration of operating
conditions in Turkey may lead T.C. Ziraat Bankasi to having a
lower incentive to provide support to its subsidiaries outside of
Turkey, which could result in a reduction of uplift for Ziraat
Bank Uzbekistan's deposit ratings from affiliate support.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN / UP

Ziraat Bank Uzbekistan's supported long- term deposit ratings
could be downgraded if 1) the parent's BCA is downgraded by more
than one notch or 2) if the affiliate support assumptions are
reduced. Given that Ziraat Bank Uzbekistan's ratings are on
review for downgrade any positive rating actions are unlikely.
However, Moody's could confirm Ziraat Bank Uzbekistan's ratings
if its parent's BCA is confirmed. Moody's could also upgrade
Ziraat Bank Uzbekistan's standalone BCA if the bank pursues
prudent development strategy, maintains sustainable good
financial fundamentals, improves its business diversification and
customer funding base.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Ziraat Bank Uzbekistan JSC

Downgraded and placed on review for further downgrade:

Long-term Bank Deposits (Local Currency), downgraded to B2 Rating
under Review from B1 Stable

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, downgraded to b2 from b1

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, downgraded to B1(cr) from
Ba3(cr)

Placed on review for downgrade:

Long-term Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency), currently B2, outlook
changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Affirmations:

Short-term Bank Deposits, affirmed NP

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed NP(cr)

Outlook Action:

Outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in June 2018.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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