/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180601.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Friday, June 1, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 108


                            Headlines


G E R M A N Y

DEMIRE AG: S&P Affirms 'BB' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


I R E L A N D

CADOGAN SQUARE XI: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZAKHSTAN ELECTRICITY: S&P Raises ICR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

FLINT GROUP: $31MM Bank Debt Trades at 5% Off
FLINT GROUP: $794MM Bank Debt Trades at 5% Off


N E T H E R L A N D S

CIMPRESS NV: S&P Alters Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'BB' CCR
GREEN STORM 2018: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Class E Notes
SPECIALTY CHEMICALS: S&P Raises ICR to 'B+', Outlook Stable


P O L A N D

GETIN NOBLE: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Deposit Ratings, Outlook Neg.


R O M A N I A

ROMANIA: Commercial Insolvency Rises in First Four Months


R U S S I A

BANK URALSIB: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'B-/B' ICRs
CB ACCENT: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
CB USSURI: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
OK BANK: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
RIB JSC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows


S P A I N

CAIXABANK CONSUMO 4: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to Series B Notes
HIPOTOTTA NO. 5: S&P Affirms CCC- (sf) Rating on Class F Notes
INSTITUTO VALENCIANO: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' ICRs, Outlook Positive
JOYE MEDIA: S&P Assigns Prelim 'BB-' ICR, On Watch Negative
MADRID RMBS IV: S&P Raises Class E Notes Rating to B- (sf)


S W E D E N

SAMHALLSBYGGNADSBOLAGET I: Fitch Assigns 'BB' IDR, Outlook Pos.


U K R A I N E

CREDIT AGRICOLE: Fitch Affirms IDR at 'B-', Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AIR PARTNER: Suspends Share Trading, Delays Financial Results
VIVO ENERGY: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Inside Investment Banking, Second Edition


                            *********



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G E R M A N Y
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DEMIRE AG: S&P Affirms 'BB' Issuer Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' long-term issuer credit
rating on German-based real estate company DEMIRE AG. The outlook
remains stable.

S&P said, "We also affirmed our 'BB+' issue rating on the
company's senior unsecured debt. The '2' recovery rating
continues to indicate our expectation of 70%-90% (rounded
estimate: 85%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment
default."

The affirmation follows the recent change of DEMIRE's ownership.
S&P continues to believe that there is only a limited risk of a
major shift in the company's strategy.

In March 2018, AEPF III 26 S.a.r.l., an affiliate of Apollo
Global Management LLC, subscribed to a 10% stake in the company's
shareholding capital through a capital increase. Since then,
Apollo has further increased its stake in DEMIRE as a result of
the mandatory tender offer to DEMIRE's shareholders that ended on
May 14, 2018.

S&P said, "We understand that Apollo, through AEPF III 26, now
owns approximately 39.5% of voting rights of DEMIRE, while Wecken
Group owns about 37%. Together, the entities own 76.5% of
DEMIRE's share capital.

"Our belief that there is a limited risk of a substantial change
in the company's strategy, including its midterm objective to
reduce leverage, is supported by the strategic partnership signed
between Apollo and Wecken Group. We will observe the situation,
since a change in the financial policy could result in our
reassessment of Apollo's role as a joint shareholder in DEMIRE
and constrain our view of the company's financial profile.

"Therefore, we assume DEMIRE will continue to grow its portfolio
toward EUR2 billion of property value and reduce its reported net
loan-to-value ratio to close to 50% in the near term, in line
with the company's publicly announced midterm objectives.

"In addition, we acknowledge the announcement of its change of
control offer to the outstanding EUR400 million, 2.875%, senior
unsecured notes, maturing 2023.

"We will monitor the acceptance level of the change of control
offer regarding its issued bonds and the progression of the
implementation of the company's strategy. We will update our
analysis if we believe the recovery on the senior unsecured bonds
have changed, for example, due to the funding of the tendered
amounts with secured debt, or if the company deviates from its
stated financial policy."


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I R E L A N D
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CADOGAN SQUARE XI: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following provisional ratings to notes to be issued by Cadogan
Square CLO XI D.A.C.

EUR 265,500,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 11,500,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)

EUR 3,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR 40,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
2031, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

EUR 31,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)A2 (sf)

EUR 24,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)Baa2 (sf)

EUR 30,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)Ba2 (sf)

EUR 12,500,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2031, Assigned (P)B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's provisional ratings of the rated notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2031. The provisional ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Credit Suisse
Asset Management Limited ("CSAM"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Cadogan Square CLO XI D.A.C. is a managed cash flow CLO. At least
90% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and
senior secured bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist
of unsecured senior loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine
obligations and high yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be
at least 90% ramped up as of the closing date and to be comprised
predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western
Europe.

CSAM will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer will issue EUR40.5M of subordinated notes which will not
be rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in August 2017.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. CSAM's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modelled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
August 2017. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.

Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modelling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 450,000,000

Diversity Score: 44

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2850

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.5%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 4.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.5 years

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the provisional ratings assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3278 from 2850)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3705 from 2850)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -3

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3


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K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZAKHSTAN ELECTRICITY: S&P Raises ICR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had raised its long-term issuer
credit rating on Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Co. to
'BB+' from 'BB'. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "We also raised our issue ratings on KEGOC's senior
unsecured bank loans from the European Bank For Reconstruction
And Development to 'BB+' from 'BB'.

"The upgrade reflects our expectation that the recent improvement
in KEGOC's financial metrics will be sustainable, resulting in
stronger stand-alone performance. We now assess KEGOC's stand-
alone credit profile (SACP) at 'bb-', up from 'b+'. We forecast
funds from operations (FFO) to debt of 35%-40% in 2018, compared
with 35% in 2017 and 26% in 2016. We view such improvement as
sustainable, thanks to the favorable tariffs set for 2016-2020,
efficient cost management, and early debt repayments ahead of
maturities. The company's capital spending (capex) program is
still large, but manageable."

As expected, KEGOC is gradually changing the structure of its
debt portfolio by repaying old U.S. dollar- and euro-denominated
loans with Kazakhstan tenge instruments issued in the local
market. As of Jan. 1, 2018, 46% of the debt portfolio was
denominated in dollars and euros, versus 70% at the end of 2016.
S&P views this as a positive trend that reduces exposure to
foreign currency fluctuation, even if doesn't remove it
completely.

S&P said, "We also understand that the appetite for dividends of
KEGOC's parent, 100% state-owned national welfare fund Samruk-
Kazyna, is increasing to up to 100% of net income -- in line with
the existing dividend policy -- compared with moderate 40%
payouts on average in the past. This, together with still-
significant capex needs, will lead to negative discretionary cash
flow (DCF) in 2018. We factor this risk into our assessment of
KEGOC's SACP.

"We continue to regard KEGOC's business risk profile as
constrained by the tariff system, which lacks transparency and
does not guarantee either full or timely cost recovery. We do not
consider that the mechanism allows for full pass-through of
costs. In addition, the regulator's lack of independence from the
government aggravates this risk because the government often uses
utilities' tariffs as a social or macroeconomic instrument (as is
the case with tariff caps, for example). Still, we note that the
current tariffs set for 2016-2020 enable the company to generate
cash flows sufficient to cover operating costs and capex, and to
gradually repay its debt and reduce leverage."

With the introduction of a capacity market in Kazakhstan,
starting in 2019, KEGOC will undertake additional
responsibilities related to zero-profit power balancing
operations, which would add similar amounts to both revenues and
costs. Therefore, the EBITDA margin will reduce from the current
43%-48% to about 20%-25%, but S&P views this as largely
irrelevant and focus on EBITDA growth in absolute terms,
supported by higher tariffs.

S&P said, "We regard KEGOC as a government-related entity (GRE)
and believe there is a high likelihood of extraordinary
government support. KEGOC continues to play a very important role
for Kazakhstan's government, given the company's strategic
importance as the monopoly provider of essential electricity
infrastructure and its status as a system operator. Still, we
think the Kazakh government generally tolerates relatively high
leverage at its various GREs. Moreover, support mechanisms via
Samruk-Kazyna are relatively complex and time consuming, as we
have seen with other Kazakh GREs, and we cannot rule out negative
intervention from higher-than-expected dividends or regulatory
pressures.

"The stable outlook on KEGOC reflects our view that the current
improvement in KEGOC's financial performance, with FFO to debt
comfortably above 30%, is sustainable. It reflects as well our
view that the company will maintain adequate liquidity, avoid
large capex significantly above our current base case, and that
dividend pressure will not significantly exceed 100% of net
income (maximum per current dividend policy). Our view of KEGOC
as a GRE means we believe it will remain important and
operationally close to Kazakhstan's government. In addition, we
anticipate that the company's operations will continue to benefit
from ongoing government support.

"We view rating upside as unlikely in the next one to two years,
as an upgrade would require substantial improvement in KEGOC's
SACP improving to 'bbb-' from 'bb-' currently, and no downward
changes in our assessment of a high likelihood of extraordinary
state support for KEGOC, or lowering of our sovereign rating on
Kazakhstan.

"We could take a negative rating action if the company's
creditworthiness deteriorated materially, with FFO to debt
falling below 30% and DCF remaining sustainably negative or with
liquidity deteriorating to a less-than-adequate level. This could
result, for example, from extremely aggressive dividend pressure
from the parent, new large investment projects, or a significant
devaluation of the tenge, which is not our base case."

A downgrade of Kazakhstan by one notch, though unlikely, or the
likelihood of support falling to moderately high, could also lead
to downgrade.


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L U X E M B O U R G
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FLINT GROUP: $31MM Bank Debt Trades at 5% Off
---------------------------------------------
Participations in a syndicated loan under which Flint Group SA is
a borrower traded in the secondary market at 95 cents-on-the-
dollar during the week ended Friday, May 18, 2018, according to
data compiled by LSTA/Thomson Reuters MTM Pricing.  This
represents a decrease of 1.04 percentage points from the previous
week. Flint Group pays 300 basis points above LIBOR to borrow
under the $31 million facility. The bank loan matures on
September 7, 2021.  Moody's rates the loan 'B3' and Standard &
Poor's gave a 'B-' rating to the loan.  The loan is one of the
biggest gainers and losers among 247 widely quoted syndicated
loans with five or more bids in secondary trading for the week
ended Friday, May 18.

Flint Group S.A. manufactures and distributes flexography,
gravure, sheetfed, UV offset, news print, heatset, letterpress,
metal decorating, UV screen, consumables, and colorant products
for printing and packaging, converting, and colorant industries.
The company was founded in 1997 and is headquartered in
Luxembourg with operations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa,
Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Pacific Rim, as well as
North, Central, and South America. It also has an ink mixing
station in Moscow, Russian Federation. Flint Group S.A. is a
former subsidiary of BASF SE.


FLINT GROUP: $794MM Bank Debt Trades at 5% Off
----------------------------------------------
Participations in a syndicated loan under which Flint Group SA is
a borrower traded in the secondary market at 95 cents-on-the-
dollar during the week ended Friday, May 18, 2018, according to
data compiled by LSTA/Thomson Reuters MTM Pricing.  This
represents a decrease of 1.04 percentage points from the previous
week.  Flint Group pays 300 basis points above LIBOR to borrow
under the $794 million facility.  The bank loan matures on
May 19, 2021.  Moody's and Standard & Poor's have no rating for
the loan. The loan is one of the biggest gainers and losers among
247 widely quoted syndicated loans with five or more bids in
secondary trading for the week ended Friday, May 18.

Flint Group S.A. manufactures and distributes flexography,
gravure, sheetfed, UV offset, news print, heatset, letterpress,
metal decorating, UV screen, consumables, and colorant products
for printing and packaging, converting, and colorant industries.
The company was founded in 1997 and is headquartered in
Luxembourg with operations in Europe, the Middle East, Africa,
Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Pacific Rim, as well as
North, Central, and South America.  It also has an ink mixing
station in Moscow, Russian Federation.  Flint Group S.A. is a
former subsidiary of BASF SE.


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N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CIMPRESS NV: S&P Alters Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'BB' CCR
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Venlo, Netherlands-
based Cimpress N.V. to negative from stable and affirmed its 'BB'
corporate credit rating on the company.

S&P said, "At the same time, we assigned our 'B+' issue-level
rating and '6' recovery rating to the company's proposed $400
million senior unsecured notes. The '6' recovery rating indicates
our expectation for negligible (0%-10%; rounded estimate: 5%)
recovery of principal in the event of a payment default.

"We also affirmed our 'BBB-' issue-level rating on the company's
$745 million senior secured revolving credit facility which the
company intends to increase total commitments to $839.4 million
and $300 million senior secured term loan A. The '1' recovery
rating remains unchanged, indicating our expectation for very
high recovery (90%-100%; rounded estimate: 95%) of principal in
the event of a payment default. Cimpress N.V., Vistaprint Ltd.,
Cimpress Schweiz GmbH, Vistaprint B.V., and Cimpress USA Inc. are
coborrowers of the revolving credit facility and term loan.

"The negative outlook reflects the risk that the shift in
Cimpress' financial policy, by removing its public guidance to
adhere to a 3x leverage target, could cause its leverage to rise
above 4.0x, from 3.6x as of March 31, 2018, on a sustained basis.
In our opinion, the revised financial policy guidance signals the
company's intent to increase its debt-funded share repurchase
activity or undertake highly priced debt-funded acquisitions
while continuing to repurchase shares."

The negative outlook reflects the risk that adjusted leverage
could rise and remain above 4x over the next 12 to 24 months as
the company pursues high return capital investment opportunities.

S&P said, "We believe the shift in Cimpress' financial policy
signals the company's intent to increase its debt-funded share
repurchase activity or undertake higher risk and return debt-
funded acquisitions while continuing to repurchase its shares.

"We could lower our corporate credit rating on Cimpress if it
makes significant debt-financed share repurchases or a
combination of significant share repurchases and high-priced
acquisitions, causing its leverage to increase above 4x on a
sustained basis. We could also lower the rating if we expect the
company's leverage to increase above 4x on a sustained basis due
to execution missteps of its growth strategy or because its
recent investments in the business--including its mass
customization platform, expanded product offerings, and lower
shipping costs--fail to increase its EBITDA margins and cash flow
generation.

"We could revise our outlook on Cimpress to stable if we are
comfortable with the company's new financial policy and expect
its leverage to remain below 4x. Under this scenario, we would
need to see evidence that any debt-financed acquisitions or
dividends are supported by the company's EBITDA growth and that
any increase in its leverage above 4x would be temporary."


GREEN STORM 2018: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
following classes of Notes issued by Green STORM 2018 B.V.:

EUR 550 million Senior Class A Mortgage-Backed Notes due 2065,
Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR 11.3 million Mezzanine Class B Mortgage-Backed Notes due
2065, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

EUR 10.3 million Mezzanine Class C Mortgage-Backed Notes due
2065, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

EUR 10.3 million Junior Class D Mortgage-Backed Notes due 2065,
Definite Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR 5.9 million Subordinated Class E Notes due 2065, Definitive
Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Green STORM 2018 B.V. is a revolving securitisation of Dutch
prime residential mortgage loans. Obvion N.V. ("Obvion", not
rated) is the originator and servicer of the portfolio. At the
closing pool cut-off date, the portfolio consists of 2,403 loans
with a total principal balance of EUR581.8 million (net of
savings policies).

The transaction is aligned with Obvion's mission to increase and
promote energy-efficient residential housing. Obvion employs an
objective methodology and criteria to evaluate and select the
environmentally best 15% of the Dutch residential buildings for
Obvion's Green RMBS, based on accepted energy-labelling standards
for new residential buildings that have been in place in the
Netherlands since 1995.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings on the Notes take into account, among other factors:
(1) the performance of the previous transactions launched by
Obvion N.V.; (2) the credit quality of the underlying mortgage
loan pool; (3) legal considerations; and (4) the initial credit
enhancement provided to the senior Notes by the junior Notes and
the reserve fund.

The expected portfolio loss of 0.70% and the MILAN CE of 7.80%
serve as input parameters for Moody's cash flow and tranching
model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution.

MILAN CE for this pool is 7.80%, which is somewhat higher than
preceding revolving STORM transactions and in line with other
prime Dutch RMBS revolving transactions, owing to: (1) the
availability of the NHG-guarantee for 16.31% of the loan parts in
the pool, which can reduce during the replenishment period to
14%, (2) the replenishment period of 5 years where there is a
risk of deteriorating the pool quality through the addition of
new loans, although this is mitigated by replenishment criteria,
(3) the Moody's weighted average loan-to-foreclosure-value (LTFV)
of 86.87%, which is similar to LTFV observed in other Dutch RMBS
transactions, (4) the proportion of interest-only loan parts
(46.11%) and (5) the weighted average seasoning of 5.00 years.
Moody's Notes that the unadjusted current LTFV is 86.80%. The
difference is due to Moody's treatment of the property values
that use valuations provided for tax purposes (the so-called WOZ
valuation).

The risk of a deteriorating pool quality through the addition of
loans is partly mitigated by the replenishment criteria which
includes, amongst others, that the weighted average CLTMV of all
the mortgage loans, including those to be purchased by the
Issuer, does not exceed 85% and the minimum weighted average
seasoning is at least 40 months. Further, no new loans can be
added to the pool if there is a PDL outstanding, if loans more
than 3 months in arrears exceeds 1.5% or the cumulative loss
exceeds 0.4%.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss of 0.70%, which
is in line with preceding STORM transactions and with other prime
Dutch RMBS transactions, are: (1) the availability of the NHG-
guarantee for 16.31% of the loan parts in the pool, which can
reduce during the replenishment period to 14%; (2) the
performance of the seller's precedent transactions; (3)
benchmarking with comparable transactions in the Dutch RMBS
market; and (4) the current economic conditions in the
Netherlands in combination with historic recovery data of
foreclosures received from the seller.

The transaction benefits from a non-amortising reserve fund,
funded at 1.01% of the total Class A to D Notes' outstanding
amount at closing, building up to 1.3% by trapping available
excess spread. The initial total credit enhancement for the Aaa
(sf) rated Notes is 6.50%, 5.48% through note subordination and
the reserve fund amounting to 1.01%.

The transaction also benefits from an excess margin of 50 bps
provided through the swap agreement. The swap counterparty is
Obvion N.V. and the back-up swap counterparty is COOPERATIEVE
RABOBANK U.A. ("Rabobank"; rated Aa3/P-1). Rabobank is obliged to
assume the obligations of Obvion N.V. under the swap agreement in
case of Obvion N.V.'s default. The transaction also benefits from
an amortising cash advance facility of 2.0% of the outstanding
principal amount of the Notes (including the Class E Notes) with
a floor of 1.45% of the outstanding principal amount of the Notes
(including the Class E Notes) as of closing.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2017.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: At the time the ratings were
assigned, the model output indicated that Class A Notes would
have achieved Aaa (sf), even if MILAN CE was increased to 10.92%
from 7.80% and the portfolio expected loss was increased to 1.05%
from 0.70% and all other factors remained the same.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Significantly higher losses compared with Moody's expectations at
close due to either a change in economic conditions from its
central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic performance factors
would lead to rating actions.

For instance, should economic conditions be worse than forecast,
the higher defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in a downgrade of the ratings.
Downward pressure on the ratings could also stem from (1)
deterioration in the Notes' available credit enhancement; or (2)
counterparty risk, based on a weakening of a counterparty's
credit profile, particularly Obvion N.V. and Rabobank, which
perform numerous roles in the transaction.

Conversely, the ratings could be upgraded: (1) if economic
conditions are significantly better than forecasted; or (2) upon
deleveraging of the capital structure.

The definitive ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the Notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the Notes by the
legal final maturity. Moody's ratings only address the credit
risk associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have
not been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.


SPECIALTY CHEMICALS: S&P Raises ICR to 'B+', Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised to 'B+' from 'B' its long-term issuer
credit rating on Specialty Chemicals International B.V.
(Specialty Chemicals), the intermediate holding company of the
combined intermediates, coating, and composites producers Polynt
and Reichhold. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we raised to 'B+' from 'B' our issue
rating on the EUR363 million term loan borrowed by Specialty
Chemicals Holding II B.V., Specialty Chemicals International
Inc., Reichhold Holdings International B.V., Polynt Composites
USA Inc., and Reichhold LLC 2. The recovery rating on the term
loan is '3', indicating our expectation of meaningful recovery
(50%-70%; rounded estimate 65%) in the event of payment default.

"The upgrade reflects the group's strong financial performance
since the merger of Polynt with Reichhold in May 2017 and a
faster-than-expected deleveraging to 3.5x S&P Global Ratings'
adjusted debt to EBITDA at the end of 2017, which we anticipate
will further improve toward 3.0x in 2018, in line with our
expectation for a 'B+' rating.

"Specialty Chemicals' 2017 performance is above our expectation
with adjusted EBITDA (after restructuring costs) at EUR193
million. Key drivers for the increase in EBITDA are cost
synergies from the integration, which have been both greater than
expected and realized ahead of schedule. We previously expected
synergies to begin this year, but integration is well on track
and already generated about EUR16 million of gross cost savings
in 2017 (with a net impact of EUR4 million after restructuring
costs). Key areas of synergy include headcount reduction,
rationalization of logistical costs, and purchasing power
improvement.

"Similar to 2017, we expect the underlying business to remain
stable in 2018 on the back of stable market demand for composites
and resin products. We also anticipate that further progress in
the integration and realization of higher synergies will lead to
a continuous strengthening of the group's adjusted EBITDA margin.
In addition, Specialty Chemicals' business model of low capital
expenditures (capex) and relatively low working capital
requirements should support continuous generation of significant
free operating cash flow (FOCF). Under our base-case scenario, we
assume the group will use FOCF to pay down debt, given the
mandatory excess cash sweep mechanism in the facility agreement.
As a result, we expect debt to EBITDA will improve to around 3.0x
and fund from operations (FFO) to debt to above 20% in 2018-2019.

"Given Specialty Chemicals' track record of maintaining leverage
(debt to EBITDA) below 4.0x since the merger, we consider the
group's financial policy and financial risk profile have
strengthened. We understand that the private equity sponsor has
no plans for dividend distributions or large acquisitions, and
that its financial policy is to keep net leverage at 2.5x-3.5x.

"Our assessment of business risk is constrained by the group's:
exposure to cyclical end markets, especially construction and
transportation; relatively limited breadth of product offering,
with focus on composites and coating resins; and relatively
moderate EBITDA margin, even though we recognize potential for
improvement thanks to synergies from the merger. Specialty
Chemicals' moderate profitability is due to the fragmented and
competitive nature of the industry, the relatively commoditized
nature of its products such as unsaturated polyester resin (UPR),
and the structurally lower margins at Reichhold.

"At the same time, the business risk profile is supported by the
group's: leading market position in composites and coating resins
in Europe and the U.S., with around 35% share of UPR capacity,
although this a small niche market; vertically integrated
business model that provides some competitive advantage; and
strong operational diversification; and a good geographic balance
of sales despite a significant exposure to low-growth mature
regions."

Since the merger, the group now has a higher degree of backward
integration into intermediates, and is gradually shifting its
product mix to UPR products with less volatile earnings. The
majority of the intermediates output (90%-95%) is used for
internal production of specialties products, such as
plasticizers, special anhydride, and composites such as UPR. The
integrated business model allows for better control of the value
chain, and reduces earnings volatility in case of a potential
shortfall of key intermediates. S&P views the group as well
diversified geographically, with Europe and North America
accounting for more than 40% and 35% of the combined group's
revenues post merger in 2017, respectively; and more than 10% is
generated in Asia. The group's manufacturing footprint is
diverse, with about 40 plants across Europe, North America, Latin
America, the Middle East, and Asia. The proximity to final
customers results in low logistical costs and short lead times,
which create, to some extent, a barrier to entry, but also result
in high operating leverage.

S&P said, "The stable outlook on Specialty Chemicals reflects our
view that the group will continue to increase EBITDA and realize
synergies stemming from the merger. The outlook factors in that
the group will report consolidated adjusted EBITDA of above
EUR200 million in 2018 under our base-case scenario, and reduce
its adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio toward 3.0x in the next 12
months. The stable outlook also reflects our view that the group
will continue to generate positive FOCF.

"We could lower the rating if leverage increased as a result of a
material weakening of the group's performance due to a downturn
in its end markets or loss of key customers. This would happen if
adjusted debt to EBITDA increases to above 4.0x without near-term
prospects of recovery. Alternatively, we could lower the rating
in the event of deteriorated liquidity, a large debt-funded
acquisition, or a significant dividend payment, which would
signal a change to the financial policy as we currently
understand it.

"We could raise the rating if the group demonstrated a track
record of successful integration and sustained improvement in its
EBITDA margin to more than 12% and maintained positive FOCF of at
least EUR80 million. In addition, a higher rating would require
continued strong commitment from both private equity sponsors to
maintain adjusted leverage at least at the current level."


===========
P O L A N D
===========


GETIN NOBLE: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Deposit Ratings, Outlook Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Getin Noble Bank S.A.'s
(GNB) Ba3/Not Prime long-term and short-term local and foreign-
currency deposit ratings, its Ba2(cr)/Not Prime(cr) long-term and
short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment (CRA) and its b2 baseline
credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA. The outlook on GNB's
long-term deposit ratings remains negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMING THE STANDALONE CREDIT ASSESSMENT

By affirming GNB's b2 BCA, the rating agency has taken into
account the balance of risks for the bank's financial health in
light of persistent pressures on its solvency and the anticipated
capital replenishment until year-end 2019 as approved by the
Polish Financial Supervision Authority's (KNF) in April 2018.

As of year-end 2017, GNB's Tier 1 ratio was 9.6%, down from 11.6%
reported in December 2016. According to the bank's estimate, its
shortfall to meet a minimum required Tier 1 ratio of 12.42% was 3
percentage points in March 2018. Moody's acknowledges the
benefits of the recently approved capital replenishment plan.
Under this plan, GNB will be recapitalized by a total amount of
around PLN1.4 billion in 2018-2019, which should allow it to meet
the regulator's minimum required capital levels. It is the rating
agency's understanding that a first tranche of common equity
amounting to PLN190 million was already successfully placed.

GNB's weak standalone credit profile is also reflected in its
modest loss absorption capacity - problem loans as a percentage
of loan loss reserves and Moody's key capital metric tangible
common equity (TCE) equalled 98% as of December 2017, unchanged
from December 2016. GNB's asset quality remains weak with non-
performing loan ratio (NPLs, includes defaulted and other
impaired loans) at 15.8% in December 2017, up from 14.7% as of
December 2016. This deterioration was driven by the contraction
of the loan book whilst the stock of problem loans declined
slightly. GNB's coverage of NPLs by loan loss reserves increased
significantly to 44.2% in December 2017 from 37.1% in December
2016. However, the bank's coverage compares unfavourably with the
average of 68.1% for Moody's-rated banks in Poland as of December
2017, and will likely require higher provisioning over the next
12 to 18 months.

GNB's profitability is constrained by sizable loan loss
provisions and modest revenue generation. In 2017 the bank
reported a loss of PLN573 million, more than a tenfold increase
from a loss of PLN55 million in 2016. This large loss was mainly
due to around 80% increase in provisioning expenses as part of
the loan book clean-up measures. On a positive note, GNB managed
to increase its fee income notably and prop-up net interest
margin by reducing funding costs and focusing on higher-yielding
consumer lending. Given its profitability challenges, GNB has
been admitted to a special program of the Polish regulator for
restoring loss-making banks' long-term profitability which
temporarily exempts the bank from paying a special bank levy.
Measures taken under the program, along with the significant
savings from the exemption of the bank levy will likely benefit
GNB's operating profitability over the next 12 to 18 months.
However, the bank's net income remains vulnerable to higher loan
loss provisions as well as to potential significant costs arising
from policy measures on Swiss Franc (CHF) mortgages. GNB has one
of the largest exposures to CHF mortgages in Poland, which
accounted for 24% of the bank's total loans as of December 2017
(29% a year earlier).

RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMING THE LONG-TERM DEPOSIT RATINGS

The affirmation of GNB's deposit ratings was driven by the
affirmation of its BCA. Consequently, the bank's Ba3 long-term
deposits ratings incorporate (1) its b2 BCA, and (2) maintaining
two notches of rating uplift from Moody's Advanced Loss Given
Failure (LGF) analysis.

RATIONALE FOR MAINTAINING THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The rating agency's maintaining of the negative outlook on GNB's
long-term deposit ratings reflects the still material downward
pressure on the bank's BCA despite the approved capital
replenishment plan over 2018-2019. The plan relies on the
scattered provision of various capital instruments, comprising
common shares as well as other forms of capital instruments such
as Tier 2 or Additional Tier 1 securities, primarily issued to
the private key shareholder. Moody's believes that the
vulnerabilities of GNB's fundamental credit profile will likely
abate only over time and once the majority of capital measures
has been successfully executed, thereby eventually closing the
gap to the regulator's minimum required capital levels.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Successful execution of the recapitalisation plan, coupled with a
significant reduction in the level of NPLs and improving
profitability will likely lead to stabilization of the rating
outlook.

Material deterioration in the bank's loan book and/or larger than
currently expected costs arising from the implementation of
policy measures on CHF mortgages as well as a delay or failure to
execute the targeted capital measures and/or a further weakening
of capital adequacy may result in ratings downgrade.

Further, changes in the bank's liability structure may modify the
amount of uplift provided by Moody's Advanced LGF analysis and
lead to a higher or lower notching from the bank's adjusted BCA,
thereby affecting the deposit ratings and CRA.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Getin Noble Bank S.A.

Affirmations:

Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, affirmed b2

Baseline Credit Assessment, affirmed b2

Long-term Bank Deposits, affirmed Ba3 Negative

Short-term Bank Deposits, affirmed NP

Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed Ba2(cr)

Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, affirmed NP(cr)

Outlook Action:

Outlook remains Negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in April 2018.


=============
R O M A N I A
ROMANIA: Commercial Insolvency Rises in First Four Months
---------------------------------------------------------
Xinhua, citing the latest data published on the website of the
National Office of Trade Registry (ONRC), reports that Romania
saw a sharp increase in commercial insolvency in the first four
months of this year.

According to Xinhua, the statistics showed the number of
commercial companies and authorized natural persons (ANP) in
insolvency or suspension increased year-over-year by 17.38 and
35.58%, respectively, in January-April, 2018.

The ONRC data showed 2,965 companies and ANP declared insolvency
in the first four months of 2018, while 6,958 others suspended
their activity, Xinhua relays.

The sectors that are most affected by the insolvency phenomenon
are wholesale and retail trade, as well as car repair workshops,
Xinhua states.

Last year, 9,102 companies and ANP announced insolvency, up 8.73%
from 2016, while other 16,380 suspended their activity, a
year-over-year increase of 2.9%, Xinhua discloses.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK URALSIB: S&P Alters Outlook to Pos. & Affirms 'B-/B' ICRs
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Russia-based Bank
URALSIB PJSC to positive from stable and affirmed the 'B-/B'
long- and short-term issuer credit ratings.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's expectation that the bank
will continue to improve its business model and strengthen its
franchise over the next 12 months, likely yielding a more
sustainable financial performance.

Over the last year, Bank URALSIB has worked on cleaning up its
balance sheet, and we expect this will continue over the next 12
months. Thanks to significant write-offs, the bank has
considerably reduced its exposure to nonperforming loans (loans
more than 90 days overdue), which accounted for 9.2% of total
loans at the end of 2017, down from 17.6% a year before. Exposure
to noncore assets (mainly consisting of real estate assets in
Moscow and the Moscow region) decreased to about 4.3% of total
assets on April 1, 2018, from 7.9% a year before. S&P notes,
however, that the bank continues to be exposed to insurance
assets risk. Despite selling former insurance subsidiaries to a
third party, the bank extended a long-term investment loan to
their new owner that assumes bullet repayment of principal at
maturity.

S&P said, "We expect the bank will continue to improve its
operating performance as it expands operations in the retail and
small-and-midsize enterprise segments, targeting expansion in
mortgages and consumer loans to its corporate clients' employees.
We forecast the bank's net interest margin will stay about 4.5%
in 2018-2019, about the same level as in 2017, improving from the
low of 2.4% recorded in 2015 when the bank experienced
significant problems, lost clientele, and was eventually put
under financial rehabilitation by the regulator. We also expect
the bank's credit costs will stabilize at 2.3%-2.5% of total
loans in the next two years, after peaking at 5% in 2015, because
of balance sheet clean-up. In our view, the majority of legacy
problem assets has now been provisioned.

"We also expect Bank URALSIB's exposure to related-party loans
will decrease during the next 12 months. We currently estimate
that the level of the bank's exposure to related-party deals,
including exposure to affiliated companies and companies that are
not formally related to but still linked with the bank, is about
30% of corporate loans.

"Our positive outlook on Bank URALSIB reflects the potentially
positive effect of the bank's efforts to improve its business
model and strengthen its franchise, possibly leading to a more
stable and predictable financial performance.

"We may upgrade the bank in the next 12 months if it continues to
develop its core business, diversify its lending operations, and
demonstrates sound financial results. This also assumes that the
bank will reduce its related-party exposures to more manageable
levels.

"We would revise the outlook back to stable if the bank's
operating performance deteriorates significantly, for example
because of increased credit costs or other unexpected losses. We
may also revise the outlook back to stable if the bank maintains
significant related-party exposures, increases its risky
exposures, or if we see instability in the bank's ownership
structure leading to corporate governance weaknesses."


CB ACCENT: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-1249, dated
18.05.2018, revoked the banking license of Orsk-based credit
institution Public Joint-stock Company Joint-stock Commercial
Bank Accent, or PJSC CB Accent (Registration No. 696), further
also referred to as the credit institution.  As of May 1, 2018,
the credit institution ranked 465th by assets in the Russian
banking system.  It was not a socially important lender, and its
impact on aggregate indexes of the Orenburg Region's banking
sector was unsubstantial.

Problems in the credit institution's operations owe its origin to
an excessively risky business model, which resulted in multiple
low-quality assets building up on its balance sheet.  The due
diligence check of credit risk conducted at the regulator's
request established a substantial loss of capital and entailed
the need for action to prevent the credit institution's
insolvency (bankruptcy), which created a real threat to its
creditors' and depositors' interests.  Also, the credit
institution conducted "scheme" operations, involving its owners,
intended to artificially sustain the amount of capital to create
the appearance of formal compliance with prudential regulations.

Also, the credit institution's operations were found to be non-
compliant on multiple counts with Bank of Russia regulations on
countering the legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained
incomes and the financing of terrorism with regard to the
accuracy of information the credit institution submitted to the
authorized body, including about operations subject to obligatory
control and the identification of its customers' beneficiary
owners.

The Bank of Russia repeatedly applied supervisory measures
against PJSC CB Accent, including two impositions of restrictions
on household deposit taking.

Under the circumstances the Bank of Russia took the decision to
withdraw PJSC CB Accent from the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia took this measure following the credit
institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws and
Bank of Russia regulations, repeated violations, within a year,
of Bank of Russia regulations issued in accordance with the
Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation (Laundering) of
Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism", and
multiple applications within a year of measures stipulated by the
Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank
of Russia)", and taking into account a real threat to the
interests of creditors and depositors.

Following the banking license revocation, in accordance with Bank
of Russia Order No. OD-1249, dated May 18, 2018, the credit
institution's professional securities market participant licence
was cancelled.

The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-1250, dated
May 18, 2018, appointed a provisional administration to the
credit institution for the period until the appointment of a
receiver pursuant to the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)'
or a liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks
and Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the
powers of the credit institution's executive bodies have been
suspended.

PJSC CB Accent is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of RUR1.4
million per depositor.

The current development of the bank's status has been detailed in
a press statement released by the Bank of Russia.


CB USSURI: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1326, dated May 25, 2018,
revoked the banking license of Khabarovsk-based credit
institution Joint-stock Company Bank Ussuri, further referred to
as the credit institution (Reg. No. 596).  As of May 1, 2018, the
credit institution ranked 275th by assets in the Russian banking
system, with unsubstantial impact on aggregate indexes of the
Khabarovsk Region's banking sector.

The credit institution management's activities resulted in the
emergence of overvalued assets in the credit institution's
balance sheet.  The due diligence check of the value of assets,
conducted at the regulator's request, established a substantial
loss of the credit institution's capital and entailed the need
for action to prevent the its insolvency (bankruptcy), which
created a real threat to its creditors' and depositors'
interests.  Also, the credit institution conducted 'scheme'
operations with bad loans, intended to artificially sustain the
amount of capital and to create the appearance of its formal
compliance with prudential regulations.

Also, the credit institution's operations were found to be non-
compliant with Bank of Russia regulations on countering the
legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained incomes and the
financing of terrorism with regard to the accuracy of information
the credit institution submitted to the authorized body and the
identification of its customers' beneficiary owners.

The Bank of Russia repeatedly applied supervisory measures
against the credit institution, including the imposition of
restrictions on household deposit taking.

Under these circumstances, the Bank of Russia took the decision
to withdraw Bank Ussuri from the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia took this measure following the credit
institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws and
Bank of Russia regulations, repeated violations, within a year,
of Bank of Russia regulations issued in accordance with the
Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation (Laundering) of
Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism", and
multiple applications within one year of measures stipulated by
the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation
(Bank of Russia)", and taking into account a real threat to the
interests of creditors and depositors.

In accordance with its Order No. OD-1327, dated May 25, 2018, the
Bank of Russia appointed a provisional administration to Bank
Ussuri for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

Bank Ussuri is a member of the deposit insurance system. The
revocation of the banking licence is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of RUR1.4
million per depositor.

The current development of the bank's status has been detailed in
a press statement released by the Bank of Russia.


OK BANK: Put on Provisional Administration, License Revoked
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-1328, dated
May 25, 2018, revoked the banking license of Yaroslavl-based
credit institution Public Joint-stock Company United Credit Bank,
or PJSC OK Bank from May 25, 2018.

PJSC OK Bank repeatedly carried out scheme transactions to
transform assets, aimed at concealing the bank's real financial
standing and avoiding the supervisor's requirements to adequately
assess the risks assumed; this resulted in a significant amount
of dubious assets on the bank's balance sheet.  This May, PJSC OK
Bank carried out securities transactions aimed at diverting a
considerable share of liquid assets to the detriment of creditors
and depositors.

The Bank of Russia has repeatedly applied supervisory measures
against PJSC OK Bank, which included restrictions (on two
occasions) and a ban on household deposit taking.

Under the circumstances, the Bank of Russia took the decision to
withdraw PJSC OK Bank from the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia takes this measure following the credit
institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws and
Bank of Russia regulations, due to repeated application within a
year of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central
Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)", considering a
real threat to the creditors' and depositors' interests.

The Bank of Russia, by virtue of its Order No. OD-1329, dated May
25, 2018,  appointed a provisional administration to PJSC OK Bank
for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to
the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

Following banking license revocation, in accordance with Bank of
Russia Order No. OD-1328, dated May 25, 2018, the credit
institution's professional securities market participant licence
was cancelled.

PJSC OK Bank is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking licence is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of RUR1.4
million per depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of May 1, 2018, the
credit institution ranked 200th by assets in the Russian banking
system.

The current development of the bank's status has been detailed in
a press statement released by the Bank of Russia.


RIB JSC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
----------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of JSC RIB, appointed by Bank of
Russia Order No. OD-2551, dated September 04, 2017, following the
revocation of its banking license, in the course of examination
of the bank's financial standing revealed that at the time of
solvency problems the Bank's management closed transactions aimed
at diverting liquid assets through lending to borrowers of
dubious creditworthiness and not engaged in real business
activity, as well as through transfer of credit claims to legal
entities.

Besides, the provisional administration revealed operations
conducted despite the signs of bankruptcy and aimed at the
deliberate and wrongful satisfaction of property claims of
certain customers at the expense of the debtor's property and to
the detriment of other creditors.

The provisional administration estimates the value of the Bank's
assets to be not more than RUR6.8 billion, vs more than RUR11.9
billion of its liabilities to creditors.

On November 7, 2017, the Arbitration Court of the City of Moscow
recognised the Bank as insolvent (bankrupt).  The State
Corporation Deposit Insurance Agency was appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on financial
transactions bearing the evidence of the criminal offence
conducted by the former management and officers of JSC RIB to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation in December
2017 and April 2018 for consideration and procedural decision
making.

The current development of the bank's status has been detailed in
a press statement released by the Bank of Russia.


=========
S P A I N
=========


CAIXABANK CONSUMO 4: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to Series B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following definitive
ratings to Notes issued by CAIXABANK CONSUMO 4, FONDO DE
TITULIZACION:

EUR1,564 million Series A Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes due July
2056, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa3 (sf)

EUR136 million Series B Fixed Rate Asset Backed Notes due July
2056, Definitive Rating Assigned B1 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The transaction is a static cash securitisation of unsecured
consumer loans extended to obligors in Spain by CaixaBank, S.A.
(CaixaBank) (Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr), Baa1 LT Bank Deposits).

The provisional portfolio of underlying assets consists of
unsecured loans originated in Spain for a total balance of c. EUR
1,84bn, from which a final pool will be selected, based on
certain eligibility criteria, funded by the issued Notes equal to
an amount of EUR 1,70bn.

As at April 25, 2018, the provisional pool cut contains 272,205
contracts with a weighted average seasoning of 0.71 years. The
portfolio consists of unsecured consumer loans. These pools are
composed of unsecured consumer loans, used for several purposes,
such as property improvement, car acquisition or repair and other
undefined or general purposes. 42% of the portfolio correspond to
pre-approved unsecured loans. Pre-approved loans require the
borrower to be a CaixaBank active customer for at least 7 months
and a minimum behavioral scoring. 7.12% of the provisional pool
correspond to bullet loans.

According to Moody's, the transaction benefits from credit
strengths such as the granularity of the portfolio, the high
excess spread and the financial strength and securitisation
experience of the originator. However, Moody's Notes that the
transaction features some credit weaknesses such as the
amortisation of the reserve fund lacking performance triggers and
a floor in terms of the initial Notes balance, and the high
degree of linkage to CaixaBank. Commingling risk is partly
mitigated by the transfer of collections to the issuer account on
a daily basis.

Moody's analysis focused, amongst other factors, on (i) an
evaluation of the underlying portfolio of loans and the
eligibility criteria; (ii) historical performance information of
the total book and past ABS transactions; (iii) the credit
enhancement provided by subordination and the reserve fund; (iv)
the static nature of the portfolio; (v) the liquidity support
available in the transaction by way of principal to pay interest
and the reserve fund; and (vi) the overall legal and structural
integrity of the transaction.

MAIN MODEL ASSUMPTIONS

Moody's determined a portfolio lifetime expected mean default
rate of 6.5%, expected recoveries of 15% and Aa2 portfolio credit
enhancement ("PCE") of 18.5%. The expected defaults and
recoveries capture Moody's expectations of performance
considering the current economic outlook, while the PCE captures
the loss it expects the portfolio to suffer in the event of a
severe recession scenario. Expected defaults and PCE are
parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its lognormal portfolio
loss distribution curve and to associate a probability with each
potential future loss scenario in its ABSROM cash flow model to
rate consumer ABS transactions.

METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan-Backed ABS" published in
September 2015.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the Notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal by the legal final maturity of the Class A
Notes only. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Factors that may cause an upgrade of the ratings include a
significantly better than expected performance of the pool
together with an increase in credit enhancement of the Notes.
Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings include a
decline in the overall performance of the pool and a significant
deterioration of the credit profile of the originator CaixaBank,
S.A.

LOSS AND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS:

Moody's used its cash flow model ABSROM as part of its
quantitative analysis of the transaction. ABSROM enables users to
model various features of a standard European ABS transaction -
including the specifics of the loss distribution of the assets,
their portfolio amortisation profile, yield as well as the
specific priority of payments, swaps and reserve funds on the
liability side of the ABS structure. The model is used to
represent the cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche.
The cash flow model evaluates all loss scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the lognormal
distribution assumed for the portfolio loss rate. In each loss
scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of Notes is
calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the
outgoing payments to third parties and Noteholders. Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of
(i) the probability of occurrence of each loss scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each loss scenario
for each tranche.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

In rating consumer loan ABS, the mean default rate and the
recovery rate are two key inputs that determine the transaction
cash flows in the cash flow model. Parameter sensitivities for
this transaction have been calculated in the following manner:
Moody's tested 9 scenarios derived from the combination of mean
default: 6.5% (base case), 6.85% (base case *1.05), 7.25% (base
case *1.15) and recovery rate: 15% (base case), 10% (base case -
5%), 5% (base case - 10%). The 6.5%/15% scenario would represent
the base case assumptions used in the initial rating process. At
the time the rating was assigned, the model output indicated that
Class A would have achieved Baa1 even if the mean default was as
high as 9% with a recovery as low as 10% (all other factors
unchanged). Class B would have achieved Caa3 in the same
scenario.


HIPOTOTTA NO. 5: S&P Affirms CCC- (sf) Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has raised its credit ratings on HipoTotta No.
5 PLC's class C and D notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed
its ratings on the class A2, B, E, and F notes.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow our credit and cash flow
analysis of the most recent transaction information that we have
received as part of our surveillance review cycle. Our analysis
reflects the application of our European residential loans
criteria, our current counterparty criteria, and our structured
finance ratings above the sovereign (RAS) criteria.

"On April 6, 2018, we raised to 'A' from 'A-' our long-term
issuer credit rating (ICR) on Banco Santander S.A., the swap
provider in this transaction.

"Our ratings on the class C, D, E, and F notes are capped at the
ICR on Banco Santander, as it has not complied with the swap
agreement's terms (by either posting collateral, obtaining a
guarantor, or replacing itself) since becoming an ineligible
counterparty.

"We continue to delink our ratings on the class A2 and B notes
from our ICR on the swap counterparty, as these classes of notes
can achieve higher ratings when giving no benefit to the swap
provider. That said, under our current counterparty criteria, the
maximum potential ratings on the class A2 and B notes is 'A (sf)'
according to the replacement language in the issuer's bank
account agreement.

"After applying our European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, the overall effect in our credit analysis results is
a decrease in the required credit coverage for each rating level
compared with our previous review, mainly driven by the decrease
of the arrears level and the application of our updated market
value decline assumptions."

  Rating level     WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
  AAA                 10.38        8.04
  AA                   7.69        5.76
  A                    6.27        2.26
  BBB                  4.54        2.00
  BB                   2.84        2.00
  B                    2.35        2.00

WAFF--Weighted-average foreclosure frequency. WALS--Weighted-
average loss severity.

The available credit enhancement for the class A2, B, C, D, and E
notes has increased to 17.08%, 13.12%, 9.47%, 5.52%, and 0.80%,
respectively, from 15.99%, 12.27%, 8.84%, 5.12%, 0.69% due to the
notes' sequential amortization.

The reserve fund is at its target level and is amortizing as all
the amortization conditions are met.

S&P said, "Following the application of our criteria, we have
determined that our assigned ratings on the classes of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by our RAS criteria, (ii) the rating as capped by our
counterparty criteria, or (iii) the rating that the class of
notes can attain under our European residential loans criteria.

"We consider that the available credit enhancement for the class
A2, B, and E notes is commensurate with the currently assigned
ratings. We have therefore affirmed our ratings on these classes
of notes.

"Following the upgrade of Banco Santander (acting as swap
provider), the class C notes can now achieve a higher rating
under our current counterparty criteria. In addition, we consider
that the available credit enhancement for the class C notes can
support higher stresses than those at the currently assigned
rating. We have therefore raised to 'A (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' our
rating on the class C notes.

"The available credit enhancement for the class D notes is
commensurate with a higher rating than that currently assigned.
We have therefore raised to 'A- (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' our rating
on the class D notes. In reviewing our rating on the class D
notes, in addition to applying our credit and cash flow analysis,
we have differentiated this rating based on its relative position
in the capital structure.

"The class F notes are non-asset-backed and were issued to fund
the reserve fund. Given its junior position in the waterfall and
reliance upon excess reserve fund amounts to pay principal, in
our opinion, the payment of interest and principal on the class F
notes is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and
economic conditions. We have therefore affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)'
rating on the class F notes in line with our 'CCC' criteria."

HipoTotta No. 5 is a Portuguese residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transaction, which closed in March 2007. It
securitizes a pool of first-ranking mortgage loans, which Banco
Santander Totta, S.A. originated. The mortgage loans were granted
to prime borrowers mainly located in the Lisbon and North
regions.

  RATINGS LIST

  Class              Rating
            To                  From

  HipoTotta No. 5 PLC
  EUR2.01 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
  Ratings Raised

  C         A (sf)              A- (sf)
  D         A- (sf)             BBB- (sf)


  Ratings Affirmed

  A2        A (sf)
  B         A (sf)
  E         BBB- (sf)
  F         CCC- (sf)


INSTITUTO VALENCIANO: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' ICRs, Outlook Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on financial agency
Instituto Valenciano de Finanzas (IVF), based in Spain's
Autonomous Community of Valencia (AC Valencia), to positive from
stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB/B' long- and
short-term issuer credit ratings on IVF.

The rating action follows our outlook revision on AC Valencia.
S&P said, "We see IVF as a government-related entity (GRE), and
consider that there is an almost certain likelihood that AC
Valencia would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to IVF if needed. We base our view on our assessment of
IVF's:

Integral link with AC Valencia. IVF is a public entity, created
by law, that is fully owned and tightly controlled by AC
Valencia. We understand that IVF cannot be privatized without a
change in its bylaws, and, if dissolved, AC Valencia would
ultimately be liable for its obligations. Moreover, AC Valencia
provides a statutory guarantee on IVF's debt, which supports our
assessment of the agency's integral link with AC Valencia. We
also think that, due to the guarantee, the markets would perceive
a default by IVF as tantamount to a default by the region.
However, we do not base our ratings on IVF on the language of the
statutory guarantee. We see AC Valencia as being strongly
involved in IVF's management." The region appoints the majority
of representatives on IVF's supervisory board as well as IVF's
general director. IVF's president is also the regional
government's minister of finance. IVF receives ongoing financial
support from the regional government through yearly operating and
capital transfers, as well as capital injections, to offset
losses and cover maturing debt, when necessary.

Critical role for AC Valencia as its financing agency to
implement public credit policy by providing loans to small and
midsize enterprises (SMEs) and local businesses in the region.
IVF has a very specific business model and strategy compared with
those of commercial banks, because it acts essentially on behalf
of AC Valencia. S&P said, "That is why we think a private entity
could not easily take on IVF's role. In our view, the guarantee
provided by the regional government to IVF's debt highlights its
role for AC Valencia. IVF's intentions to transfer the
responsibility ofn managing AC Valencia's debt to the regional
administration by the end of 2018 does not diminish IVF's role
for AC Valencia, in our view."

S&P said, "As per our rating approach for GREs, our assessments
of IVF's critical role for and integral link with AC Valencia,
and an almost certain likelihood of support from the region if
needed, lead us to equalize the ratings on IVF with those on AC
Valencia."

The positive outlook on IVF mirrors that on AC Valencia.

S&P said, "We could upgrade IVF if we upgraded AC Valencia in the
next 12 months and continue to expect an almost certain
likelihood of support for IVF from AC Valencia, based on our view
of the agency's integral link with and critical role for the
region.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if we took the same action
on AC Valencia."


JOYE MEDIA: S&P Assigns Prelim 'BB-' ICR, On Watch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has assigned its preliminary
'BB-' long-term issuer credit rating to Spain-based Joye Media
SLU, and then placed it on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

At the same time, S&P withdrew its preliminary 'BB-' long-term
rating on Invictus Media SLU. The rating was on CreditWatch
negative before the withdrawal.

S&P said, "We also assigned a preliminary 'BB' issue rating to
Joye Media's proposed first-lien debt. The proposed facilities
comprise a EUR300 million six-year senior secured term loan A,
EUR380 million seven-year senior secured term loan B, and EUR60
million senior secured revolving credit facility (RCF). The
preliminary recovery rating on these facilities is '2',
indicating our expectation of about 85% recovery for debtholders
in the event of a payment default.

"We also assigned our preliminary 'B' issue rating to Joye
Media's proposed EUR180 million seven and a half-year second-lien
facility. The preliminary recovery rating on this instrument is
'6', indicating our expectations of negligible recovery (of about
0%) for debtholders in the event of a payment default.

"At the same time, we placed the preliminary ratings on these
facilities on CreditWatch negative, in line with the issuer
credit rating on Joye Media.

"In view of the new proposed capital structure, we withdrew our
preliminary 'BB-' issue and '3' recovery ratings that we assigned
on March 13, 2018, on the previously proposed senior secured
debt.

"The final ratings will depend on our receipt and satisfactory
review of all final transaction documentation. Accordingly, the
preliminary ratings should not be construed as evidence of final
ratings. If S&P Global Ratings does not receive final
documentation within a reasonable time, or if the final
documentation departs from materials reviewed, we reserve the
right to withdraw or revise our ratings. Potential changes
include, but are not limited to, use of loan proceeds, maturity,
size and conditions of the loans, financial and other covenants,
security, and ranking."

The rating on Joye Media reflects the updated acquisition
structure for the leverage buyout acquisition of Spain-based
sport, media and entertainment company Imagina.

Private equity fund Orient Hontai Capital will now acquire 54% of
Imagina through Joye Media (a holding company above Invictus
Media), instead of through Invictus Media.

S&P said, "Our rating on Joye Media also reflects the previous
rating on Invictus, which has now been withdrawn.

"We aim to resolve the CreditWatch in the coming months, once we
have more clarity on Imagina's ability to secure profitable terms
for the Champions League in Spain, the auction for La Liga
domestic rights, and the rights situation in Italy.

"All other factors remaining unchanged, we could lower the
ratings, likely by one notch, if Imagina is unable to sell the
rights to the Champions League in Spain on profitable terms or
renew its contract for the domestic rights of La Liga, without
material new profitable contracts being signed. In our view, this
would call into question the company's ability to secure
profitable contracts and reduce the visibility on its cash flows,
translating into higher business risk than we previously
assessed."


MADRID RMBS IV: S&P Raises Class E Notes Rating to B- (sf)
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took various rating actions in MADRID RMBS I,
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos and MADRID RMBS IV, Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos.

S&P said, "The rating actions follow the application of our
relevant criteria and our full analysis of the most recent
transactions information that we have received, and reflect the
transactions' current structural features. We have also
considered our updated outlook assumptions for the Spanish
residential mortgage market.

"Our structured finance ratings above the sovereign (RAS)
criteria classify the sensitivity of these transactions as
moderate. Therefore, after our March 23, 2018 upgrade of Spain to
'A-' from 'BBB+', the highest rating that we can assign to the
senior-most tranche in these transactions is six notches above
the Spanish sovereign rating, or 'AAA (sf)', if certain
conditions are met. For all the other tranches, the highest
rating that we can assign is four notches above the sovereign
rating.

"Following the sovereign upgrade, on April 6, 2018, we raised to
'A' from 'A-' our long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on Banco
Santander S.A., the swap provider in MADRID RMBS I and
transaction account provider in MADRID RMBS IV; raised our long-
term ICR to 'A-' from 'BBB+' on Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
S.A., which is the swap provider in MADRID RMBS IV; and raised
our long-term ICR to 'BBB' from 'BBB-' on Bankia S.A., which is
the servicer in these transactions.

"Our European residential loans criteria, as applicable to
Spanish residential loans, establish how our loan-level analysis
incorporates our current opinion of the local market outlook. Our
current outlook for the Spanish housing and mortgage markets, as
well as for the overall economy in Spain, is benign. Therefore,
we revised our expected level of losses for an archetypal Spanish
residential pool at the 'B' rating level to 0.9% from 1.6%, in
line with table 87 of our European residential loans criteria, by
lowering our foreclosure frequency assumption to 2.00% from 3.33%
for the archetypal pool at the 'B' rating level."

MADRID RMBS I

The collection account is held with Bankia S.A. (BBB/Stable/A-2)
in the name of the servicer, which is also Bankia. The documents
reflect that two days after the receipt of the collections, which
are evenly distributed during the month, the available funds are
transferred to the transaction account in the name of the fund.
Consequently, the transaction is exposed to commingling risk. S&P
said, "We have therefore stressed commingling risk as a loss of
one month of interest and principal collections for rating levels
above Bankia's long-term ICR in line with our European
residential loans criteria. As a consequence, in our analysis we
have weak-linked our ratings on the class C, D, and E notes to
the long-term ICR on Bankia, as servicer."

S&P said, "We do not rate the transaction account provider,
Citibank Europe PLC (Madrid Branch). Therefore, in accordance
with our bank branch criteria, in our analysis we have used the
rating on the parent company, Citibank Europe PLC (A+/Stable/A-1)
and the sovereign rating on Spain to infer the rating on the
transaction account provider, which does not constrain the rating
on the notes."

Banco Santander S.A. (A/Stable/A-1) is the swap counterparty in
this transaction. Under S&P's counterparty criteria, the rating
on the class A2 notes are no longer capped by the dynamic
downgrade language in the swap provider.

After applying S&P's European residential loans criteria to this
transaction, the overall effect in its credit analysis results is
a decrease in the required credit coverage for each rating level
compared with its previous review, mainly driven by its revised
foreclosure frequency assumptions.

  Rating level     WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
  AAA                 47.85       46.91
  AA                  32.11       41.94
  A                   24.16       33.39
  BBB                 17.75       28.54
  BB                  11.34       25.10
  B                    6.50       21.91

WAFF--Weighted average foreclosure frequency. WALS--Weighted
average loss severity.

MADRID RMBS I's credit enhancement has increased for all classes
of notes since our January 2017 review. This is due to the
amortization of the notes, which is sequential as the reserve
fund has been fully depleted since March 2013.

S&P said, "Following the application of our criteria, we have
determined that our assigned ratings on the classes of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by our RAS criteria, (ii) the rating as capped by our
counterparty criteria, or (iii) the rating that the class of
notes can attain under our European residential loans criteria.

"The application of our RAS criteria caps our rating on the class
A2 and B notes at our unsolicited 'A-' long-term sovereign rating
on Spain. We have therefore removed from CreditWatch positive and
raised to 'A- (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' and 'BBB (sf)' respectively
our ratings on the class A2 and B notes.

"Our rating on the class C notes is not capped by our RAS
analysis as the application of our European residential loans
criteria, including our updated credit figures, determine our
rating on the notes at 'BB- (sf)' due to its sensitivity to
potential negative interest rates. We have therefore removed from
CreditWatch positive and raised to 'BB- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' our
rating on this class of notes.

"The class D notes do not pass any stresses under our cash flow
model. However, for this class of notes, the first interest
shortfall in the worst case scenario in a 'B' rating environment
is February 2024, its credit enhancement has increased to 2%, and
the breach of its interest deferral trigger is remote. Following
the application of our "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC',
'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," we believe that payments on this class
of notes do not depend on upcoming favorable financial and
economic conditions. Therefore, we have raised to 'B- (sf)' from
'CCC+ (sf)' our rating on the class D notes.

"The class E notes do not pass any stresses under our cash flow
model and the results show interest shortfalls in the next 12
months. Following the application of our "Criteria For Assigning
'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC' Ratings," we believe that
payments on this class of notes depend on favorable financial and
economic conditions. Therefore, we have affirmed our 'CCC- (sf)'
rating on the class E notes."

MADRID RMBS IV

The collection account is held with Bankia S.A. (BBB/Stable/A-2)
in the name of the servicer, which is also Bankia. The documents
reflect that two days after the receipt of the collections, which
are evenly distributed during the month, the available funds are
transferred to the transaction account in the name of the fund.
Consequently, the transaction is exposed to commingling risk. S&P
said, "We have therefore stressed commingling risk as a loss of
one month of interest and principal collections for rating levels
above Bankia's long-term ICR in line with our European
residential loans criteria. As a consequence, in our analysis we
have continued to weak-link our ratings on the class C, D, and E
notes to the long-term ICR on Bankia, as servicer."

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (BBVA; A-/Stable/A-2) is the
swap counterparty. Under our current counterparty criteria, the
downgrade language in the swap documentation caps the ratings on
the notes at 'A- (sf)' when credit is given to the swap in our
cash flow analysis. We have continued to conduct our cash flow
analysis without the benefit of the swap agreement and our
ratings on all of the notes continue to be de-linked from the
long-term ICR on the swap counterparty."

Banco Santander S.A. (A/Stable/A-1) has been the transaction
account provider since November 2017, when it replaced BBVA. The
downgrade language in the transaction account agreement caps the
ratings on the notes at 'A (sf)', in line with S&P's current
counterparty criteria.

S&P said, "After applying our European residential loans criteria
to this transaction, the overall effect in our credit analysis
results is a decrease in the required credit coverage for each
rating level compared with our previous review, mainly driven by
our revised foreclosure frequency assumptions."

  Rating level     WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
  AAA                 36.63       52.10
  AA                  25.27       47.34
  A                   19.15       38.90
  BBB                 14.22       33.88
  BB                   9.24       30.19
  B                    5.41       26.72

MADRID RMBS IV's credit enhancement has increased for all classes
of notes. This is due to the amortization of the notes, which is
sequential as the reserve fund has not been at its required
level.

S&P said, "Following the application of our criteria, we have
determined that our assigned ratings on the classes of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by our RAS criteria, (ii) the rating as capped by our
counterparty criteria, or (iii) the rating that the class of
notes can attain under our European residential loans criteria.

"The application of our counterparty criteria caps our ratings on
the class A2 and B notes at 'A (sf)'. We have therefore removed
from CreditWatch positive and affirmed our 'A (sf)' ratings on
these classes of notes.

"Our ratings on the class C and D notes are not capped by our RAS
analysis as the application of our European residential loans
criteria, including our updated credit figures, determines our
ratings on these classes of notes at 'BB+ (sf)' and 'B (sf)',
respectively. We have therefore removed from CreditWatch positive
and raised to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' our rating on the class C
notes and to 'B (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' our rating on the class D
notes. The class E notes do not pass any stresses under our cash
flow model. However, for this class of notes, we do not expect
its default to be a virtual certainty. Following the application
of our "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," we believe that payments on this class of notes do not
depend on upcoming favorable financial and economic conditions.
Therefore, we have raised to 'B- (sf)' from 'CCC (sf)' our rating
on the class E notes."

MADRID RMBS I and MADRID RMBS IV are Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions that securitize
first-ranking mortgage loans. Bankia originated the pools, which
comprise loans granted to borrowers mainly located in Madrid.

  RATINGS LIST

  Class             Rating
              To               From

  MADRID RMBS I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
  EUR2 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

  Ratings Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

  A2          A- (sf)         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Pos
  B           A- (sf)         BBB (sf)/Watch Pos
  C           BB- (sf)        B- (sf)/Watch Pos

  Rating Raised

  D           B- (sf)         CCC+ (sf)

  Rating Affirmed

  E           CCC- (sf)

  MADRID RMBS IV, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos EUR2.4 Billion
  Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
  Ratings Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

  A2          A (sf)           A (sf)/Watch Pos
  B           A (sf)           A (sf)/Watch Pos

  Ratings Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Positive

  C           BB+ (sf)         BB (sf)/Watch Pos
  D           B (sf)           B- (sf)/Watch Pos

  Rating Raised

  E           B- (sf)          CCC (sf)


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAMHALLSBYGGNADSBOLAGET I: Fitch Assigns 'BB' IDR, Outlook Pos.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned the Swedish property company
Samhallsbyggnadsbolaget i Norden AB (SBB) a Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB' with a Positive Outlook.

The rating of SBB reflects its strong rental income profile and
SEK23 billion (as of end-2017) property portfolio with moderate
geographical diversification. The stability of SBB's rental
income is supported by low-risk residential rents, which
contribute roughly 25% of group net operating income (NOI) and
have long average tenant tenures, and the remainder being mainly
Community Service properties, which have a diverse tenant base
(public or public funding-linked tenants), long average lease
lengths and high occupancy rates. Fitch also notes SBB's key
management team's experience from previously working at a Swedish
property company with a similar portfolio mix.

These rating positives are partially offset by SBB's higher
leverage than international peers', the limited amount of
unencumbered assets with the group's key assets pledged, the
location of some portfolios in smaller regional cities, and SBB's
short track-record as one group.

The Positive Outlook reflects that SBB is at its early stages of
establishing itself and its potential to migrate to investment
grade as it de-leverages through monetisation of its building
rights portfolio, expands in size (from 2017's annualized pro
forma cash from operations (CFO) of around SEK400 million), and
meets management's stated financial policies.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Niche Assets: The annualised rental income of SBB's SEK23 billion
property portfolio has a 47% weighting in community service
properties (excluding the DNB building, which Fitch classifies as
commercial offices). These properties have an indirect and direct
government tenant base including government departments,
municipalities, elderly care, and LSS (disabled) group housing.
The remainder of the portfolio is regional rental residential
(31%) and commercial offices/retail (22%). The portfolio is
mainly in Sweden (66%) and Norway (34%) with four properties
recently acquired in Finland.

Non-residential Portfolio Concentration: The non-residential
portfolio is concentrated with the top eight properties (Norway-
heavy) constituting 66% of its NOI and with more than 10 years in
remaining lease length. The lease length of the remainder of this
portfolio is shorter with an average of seven years. SBB's
residential portfolio is regional and benefits from the stability
of rents under Sweden's rental regulation and a shortage of
available rented housing.

Bespoke Nature of Some Assets: The community service-orientated
portfolio contains some bespoke, niche assets such as schools,
city halls, regional municipal's offices, and elderly peoples'
apartments. Rental evidence may be difficult to ascertain, but
these leases have contractual indexed uplifts and management
states that about 30% of the scheduled lease expiries during
2018-2021 are with community service tenants who have been in the
same building for more than 20 years (62% for more than 10
years).

Greater Leverage Headroom: The mix of contractual longevity of
income, a stable tenant base and the resultant low-income yield
of the residential portfolio affords SBB slightly greater
leverage headroom than EMEA commercial property portfolios which
have shorter lease length and whose rental values are more
sensitive to economic cycles.

Lack of History: Through recent acquisitions of companies and
established property portfolios, SBB has amassed an investment
portfolio totalling SEK23 billion since its inception in March
2016. SBB has a short track record of managing its portfolio and
accessing capital markets as a combined entity, although Fitch
notes positively SBB's recent active issuance of unsecured bonds
and hybrids with lower funding costs.

The main assets without a track record are the residential
development building rights (2017 book value: SEK1.2 billion),
which can be monetised when sold to property developers and/or
JVs. If sold to a JV and subsequently developed, SBB will, over
time, take its share of development profits as these units are
sold without further capital commitments.

Founder Influence: SBB's ownership is concentrated in CEO Ilija
Batljan, who has around a 40% voting share, resulting in some key
man risk. SBB has made a number of ongoing improvements to its
corporate governance structure, such as recently appointing a new
deputy CEO, COO and Head of Investor Relations. SBB's earlier
arrangement of using a related-party property management company
has now been taken in-house and the CEO is prepared to widen the
equity base with institutional investors.

Transitional Capital Structure: Fitch forecasts SBB's capital
structure to improve in 2018-2020, with net debt/EBITDA reaching
10x-12x, including scheduled building rights disposals, and funds
from operations (FFO)-based interest cover of around 1.7x-2x. The
FFO-based ratio includes preference share dividends and hybrid
interest expense. The group's financial policy is a loan-to-value
of less than 60% and an EBITDA-based interest cover greater than
1.8x, aided by planned monetisation of SEK0.8 billion of building
rights during 2018. Relative to SBB's portfolio mix, these
financial parameters are consistent with an investment-grade
capital structure.

The group has increased its proportion of unsecured bonds with
new issues and hybrids that Fitch gives 50% equity credit to, but
SEK14.9 billion of gross debt (as of end-2017) is mainly secured
debt. The remaining AB Hogkullen (SEK109 million) preference
shares and Nye Barcode preference shares (NOK470 million) are
treated as debt by Fitch and rank ahead of SBB's unsecured
creditors due to their proximity to the property assets within
the capital structure.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Coupled with the lower yielding nature of SBB's residential
rental portfolio (2017 portfolio: roughly 25% of the portfolio at
Fitch-calculated 4.4% NOI yield, versus 5.2% for the Community
Service portfolio), and longer lease length than peers (from both
community service and residential assets), Fitch has allowed SBB
more leverage headroom and slightly tighter interest cover than
(i) commercial property-orientated Swedish peers and (ii) EMEA
peers with commercial property companies, which underpinned the
'BB' EMEA REIT Navigator mid-point guidelines.

Fitch views SBB's portfolio as more stable due to the strength of
Swedish residential property with its regulated below-market
rents and the community service properties' stable tenant base
with longer term leases. SBB's portfolio fundamentals are less
sensitive to economic cycles than commercial office property
companies that are reliant on open markets with multiple
participants.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions within its Rating Case for the Issuer

  -Pro forma gross rents of SEK1.6 billion at end-2017.

  -NOI surplus ratio of 50% and 80% for residential and community
service/office respectively.

   -Like-for-like rental growth of 2% for residential and 2.2%
for community service per year (2018: up 3.5%)

-SEK100 million-SEK 200 million spend per year on residential
refurbishments with 10-12 year NOI payback period.

  -SEK0.8 billion building rights realised in 2018 and SEK0.2
billion in 2019, and planned SEK150 million per year thereafter.

  -Cost of debt averaging 3.5% to 3% (including 7% hybrids)
during 2018-2021

  -Tax rate at 9% of profit before tax (excluding unrealised
valuation changes)

  -Dividend of SEK0.1 per share (in total SEK74 million per year
from 2018)

  -Small development exposure, usually on existing properties.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

  - Longer track record, successful unwinding of related-party
transactions, a simplified financing structure with more
unencumbered assets and a more diverse equity base.

  -Well-laddered debt maturity schedule with longevity.

  -Fixed charge cover (FCC) ratio greater than 1.8x (which
includes the interest expense of hybrids and dividends on
preference shares).

  - Net debt-to-EBITDA of less than 10x (FFO-based net equivalent
less than 11x).

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

  -Reversal of group transparency and expansion of the group's
equity base.

  -Heavier weighting in secured debt and more encumbered assets.

  -Overpriced acquisitions reducing FCC below 1.4x.

  -Net debt-to-EBITDA greater than 12x (FFO-based net equivalent
greater than 13x).

  -Group loan-to-value approaching 65% (compared with individual
property company covenant breach of 70%-75%)

LIQUIDITY

Active Refinancings: As of mid-May 2018, SBB has raised SEK1.3
billion unsecured debt, SEK300 million net additional hybrids,
and prepaid/repaid short-term maturities. Committed undrawn bank
lines totalled SEK1.9 billion (of which SEK0.9 billion mature
after 2018). Debt maturities are less concentrated than domestic
peers with 14% of total debt maturing in 2019 (cumulatively 42%
by end-2020). In addition, SBB is scheduled to produce over SEK1
billion of cash flow from building rights monetisation in 2018
and 1Q19.

Mix of Debt Creditors: Within over SEK15 billion of total Fitch-
adjusted debt as of mid-May 2018, SEK3.2 billion was unsecured
debt. This is small compared with SEK11.2 billion of secured bank
loans and bonds. SBB is looking to increase the proportion of
unsecured debt, as secured debt financings mature, which should
leave more assets unencumbered. The average cost of debt
(including the 7% coupon hybrids) is around 3.5%. Whereas Swedish
peers have legacy derivatives from Sweden's previous interest
rate environment, SBB suffers from some instrument coupons
inherited from when it was a start-up, some of which mature in
2020.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


CREDIT AGRICOLE: Fitch Affirms IDR at 'B-', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed five Ukrainian foreign-owned banks'
Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B-'
with Stable Outlooks. The banks are:

  - PJSC Credit Agricole Bank (CAB);

  - ProCredit Bank (Ukraine) (PCBU);

  - PJSCCB PRAVEX-BANK (PXB);

  - PJSC Alfa-Bank (AB); and

  - Ukrsotsbank (USB).

Fitch has also affirmed CAB, PCBU and PXB's Long-Term Local-
Currency IDRs at 'B' and AB's and USB's at 'B-'. The affirmation
of the Long-Term IDRs reflects Fitch's unchanged view of support
prospects for the banks.

Fitch has affirmed CAB's VR at 'b' and PXB's VR at 'b-' due to
limited changes in the banks' credit profiles since the last
review. Fitch has upgraded PCBU's VR to 'b' from 'b-', primarily
reflecting a somewhat more extended track record of profitable
performance with stable and sound loan quality and
capitalisation.

Fitch has also removed AB and USB's VRs from Rating Watch
Evolving (RWE) following the introduction on 28 March 2018 of its
Bank Rating Criteria, which among other things expanded the
rating scale with the introduction of '+' and '-' modifiers for
the 'CCC' rating category. Fitch affirmed AB's VR at 'ccc' and
downgraded USB's VR to 'ccc-' from 'ccc'. Simultaneously, Fitch
has withdrawn all of USB's ratings for commercial reasons.


KEY RATINGS DRIVERS - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS, DEBT RATINGS,
SUPPORT RATINGS

The 'B-' Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDRs of CAB, PCBU and PXB and
Support Ratings of '5' reflect the limited extent to which
institutional support from these banks' foreign shareholders can
be factored into the ratings, primarily because of Ukraine's high
transfer and convertibility risks as captured by the 'B-' Country
Ceiling.

The 'B' Long-Term Local-Currency IDRs of these banks, one notch
above their Long-Term Foreign Currency IDRs and the sovereign
rating, take into account the slightly more limited impact of
Ukraine's country risks on the issuers' ability to service senior
unsecured obligations in the local currency, Ukrainian hryvnia,
than in foreign currency.

The National Long-Term Ratings of 'AAA(ukr)' reflects CAB and
PCBU's status as some of the highest rated local issuers. CAB is
fully owned by Credit Agricole S.A. (A+/Stable). PCBU is
controlled (94% of voting stock) by Germany's ProCredit Holding
AG & Co. KGaA (BBB/Stable).

The Negative Outlook on PXB's Long-Term Local-Currency IDR
reflects Fitch's view that the long-term risks of disposal for
this bank and therefore the high risks of the rating being
downgraded to the level of PXB's VR. PXB's 'AA+(ukr)' National
Long-Term Rating captures its more limited role in the parent's
group. The bank is fully owned by Intesa Sanpaolo (BBB/Stable)
and since 2014, has been managed as a non-core asset, before
being recently reassigned to the parent's International
Subsidiaries Division. Despite this organisational change, Fitch
continues to view PXB as having a limited role in the Intesa
group, in consideration of its small size and weak performance,
and Fitch's view that a disposal would not fundamentally alter
the parent's franchise.

AB's and USB's 'B-' Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs and
'AA(ukr)' National Long-Term Ratings reflect Fitch's view that
some support may be forthcoming to both banks from their
controlling shareholder, Alfa Group. However, in Fitch's view the
probability of such support is lower than that of the foreign-
owned peers due to AB and USB's indirect relationship with other
group assets and the mixed track record of support from the
shareholders.

AB and USB are both controlled by ABH Holdings S.A. (ABHH), which
is part of Alfa Group's financial business and is the owner of
several other banking subsidiaries, mostly in the CIS, including
Russia-based Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank (BB+/Stable). In
October 2016, USB's former owner, UniCredit S.p.A. (UniCredit,
BBB/Stable), transferred its 99.9% share in USB to ABHH in
exchange for 9.9% of ABHH's shares.

AB's senior unsecured debt ratings of 'B-' and expected rating of
'B-(EXP)' are aligned with its Long-Term Local-Currency IDR and
the 'AA(ukr)' National Rating and 'AA(ukr)(EXP)' expected
National Rating are equalised with the bank's National Long-Term
Rating in view of Fitch's average recovery expectations on these
instruments in case of the issuer's default.

KEY RATINGS DRIVERS - VRS

CAB and PCBU

CAB and PCBU's 'b' VRs, one notch above Ukraine's sovereign
rating, reflect their relatively strong (in the local context)
financial profiles due to established franchises, solid asset
quality and capital positions, good performance through the
cycle, as well as ordinary benefits of shareholder support.
PCBU's credit profile, although somewhat constrained by its high
loan growth and unseasoned portfolio, further benefits from a
record of regular and material core capital injections by its
parent company, which has supported growth of the Ukrainian
franchise.

CAB and PCBU's good underwriting standards have resulted in
relatively low generation of non-performing loans (NPLs, more
than 90 days overdue), while sound earnings allowed them to be
written off quickly. As a result, both banks had relatively low
NPLs, at 6% and 1% of gross loans, respectively, at end-2017.
Restructured loans also made up a modest 5% at CAB and 4% at
PCBU. Some downside risks, stemming from foreign-currency loans
classified as non-impaired (21% of gross loans at CAB and 27% at
PCBU), are potentially mitigated by export revenues of
agricultural borrowers to whom such loans had mostly been
provided.

The sound capitalisation of both banks is highlighted by their
high Fitch Core Capital (FCC), which stood at 14% of risk
weighted assets at CAB and 15% at PCBU at end-2017.
Capitalisation is also supported by strong earning, with return
on average equity at a high 39% at CAB and 31% at PCBU in 2017,
as well as parent capital injections for PCBU.

Funding and liquidity profiles benefit from a low share of
wholesale debt funding in the liabilities and high liquidity
coverage. Net of 2018 wholesale debt repayments, liquid assets,
comprising cash, short-term investment-grade bank placements and
local-currency central bank notes, equalled to high 40% of total
liabilities at CAB. The more modest 11% at PCBU was only due to a
material share of IFI funding.

PXB

PXB's lower 'b-' VR reflects its considerably weaker market
positions, loss-making core performance, evolving business model
and recently resumed fast loan growth. Positively, the VR factors
in the bank's currently limited credit risks exposure, which
resulted from the loan book clean-up and the bank's
recapitalisation by the parent in 2017-1Q18.

PXB's NPLs and restructured loans have remained at relatively low
levels since the last review at 0.7% of gross loans and a mid-
single digit, respectively, at end-2017, after the loan cleaning
supervised by the parent bank in 1H17. However, PXB's recent plan
to build up loan portfolio rapidly is a risk, given the
previously weak execution of the bank and fragile economic
recovery in Ukraine.

While the FCC/risk-weighted assets ratio surged to very high
levels, roughly 35% at end-1Q18 from 16% at end-2017, as a result
of the parental EUR33 million core capital contribution in March
2018, Fitch expects it to descend in the medium term due to high
loan growth and loss making pre-impairment performance. The bank
expects it can potentially become profitable not earlier than in
two years.

Liquidity risks were also limited at end-1Q18 given the liquid
assets at 1.3x deposits. While potentially helped by PXB's
association with its Italian parent, the bank's liquidity might
become tighter as it will be absorbed through loan growth.

AB and USB

AB's 'ccc' VR reflects its weak loan quality, limited
capitalisation, and weak core performance while ordinary benefits
of support from the broader Alfa Group appear limited in light of
AB's default track record, as well as current political tensions
between Ukraine and Russia. Fitch also expects a moderate
negative impact on AB's credit profile from a planned merger with
a deeply distressed but smaller sister bank, USB.

Despite recent loan write-offs AB continues to suffer from
significant loan-quality problems, mostly captured by the NPLs at
14%, weakly performing restructured loans at 44% and loan
impairment reserves at a still moderate 35% of gross loans at
end-2017 (35%, 33% and 25% at end-2016, respectively). USB had
78% NPLs and 10% restructured loans, and only moderate loan
impairment reserve coverage, at 66% of gross loans at end-2017.
Fitch expects AB's aggregated post-merger impaired loans, i.e.
NPLs and restructured loans, to rise to end-2016's levels or
above.

Near- to medium-term potential for improvement in AB's FCC/risk
weighted assets ratio, which stood at a modest 6% at end-2017, is
limited, as shareholder capital injections are not expected.
Furthermore, unreserved impaired loans equalled to a high 5.6x
FCC at end-2017. Due to USB's higher FCC ratio of 12% at end-2017
the post-merger unreserved impaired loans could be about 5x FCC.

AB's performance has recently been improving but the bank
forecasts its pre-impairment profit to near 2% of average loans
for 2017 from a moderate loss in 2016. However, Fitch believes
that the bank might still be essentially loss making on the pre-
impairment level adjusting for interest accrued on impaired loans
and not collected in cash. The combined bank would likely also
suffer from USB's negative core performance.

Liquidity is a neutral factor for both banks as liquidity is
managed centrally and currently maintained at reasonable levels.
AB's liquid assets were at 12% of liabilities and USB's liquidity
at a high 17%. These excluded unencumbered sovereign bonds, which
although they might not be repoable at all times, equalled to
additional 13% of liabilities at AB and 4% at USB at end-1Q18.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The IDRs of CAB, PCBU and PXB could be upgraded if Ukraine's
sovereign ratings are upgraded and the Country Ceiling revised
upwards, and downgraded in case of a sovereign downgrade. An
upgrade of AB's IDRs and Support Ratings would require a
strengthening of the support track record for both banks.

A significant weakening of the ability and/or propensity of
shareholders to provide support could also result in the
downgrade of AB's IDRs. A sale of PXB to a weaker investor would
result in a downgrade of its support-driven Long-Term Local
Currency IDR and National Long-Term Rating.

The banks' VRs could come under downward pressure if additional
loan impairment recognition undermines capital positions without
sufficient support being made available. Upside potential for VRs
is currently limited.

The rating actions are as follows:

PJSC Credit Agricole Bank

Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Long-Term Local-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term Foreign- and Local- Currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)'; Outlook Stable
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

ProCredit Bank (Ukraine)

Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Long-Term Local-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term Foreign- and Local- Currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'AAA(ukr)'; Outlook Stable
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'b' from 'b-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

PJSCCB PRAVEX-BANK

Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Long-Term Local-Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Negative
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'AA+(ukr)'; Outlook
Negative
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

PJSC Alfa-Bank

Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B-' ;
Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'AA(ukr)'; Outlook Stable
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'ccc'; removed from RWE
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Senior unsecured debt ratings: 'B-'/'AA(ukr)'; Recovery Rating at
'RR4'
Expected senior unsecured debt ratings: 'B-(EXP)'/'AA(ukr)(EXP)';
Recovery Rating at 'RR4'

Ukrsotsbank

Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency IDRs: affirmed at 'B-';
Outlook Stable; withdrawn
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'; withdrawn
National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'AA(ukr)'; Outlook Stable;
withdrawn
Viability Rating: downgraded at 'ccc-' from 'ccc'; removed from
RWE; withdrawn
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'; withdrawn


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AIR PARTNER: Suspends Share Trading, Delays Financial Results
-------------------------------------------------------------
Alan Tovey at The Telegraph reports that shares in aircraft
charter company Air Partner have been suspended from trading as
an investigation into a hole in its accounts drags on.

In early April, the business said it had discovered a long-
running accounting error that meant it had to push back its
results from April 26 to the end of May, The Telegraph relates.

According to The Telegraph, the Gatwick-based company, which
charters passenger and freight aircraft and includes royalty and
the horse racing industry among its customers, discovered
problems relating to the way it collects payments.

Air Partner, as cited by The Telegraph, said its board had agreed
with auditor Deloitte it would now not be able to publish its
annual accounts until June 11 at the latest and requested the
shares be suspended until then.

In April, Air Partner initially estimated the amount in question
to be approximately GBP3.3 million, The Telegraph notes.


VIVO ENERGY: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Vivo Energy plc a Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB+' with a Stable Outlook, and an
expected senior unsecured rating of 'BB+(EXP)' with a Recovery
Rating of 'RR4'. Fitch has also assigned Vivo Energy Investments
B.V.'s prospective up to USD400 million bond (final amount to be
confirmed) an expected senior unsecured rating of 'BB+(EXP)' with
'RR4'. The bond is guaranteed by Vivo Energy and Vivo Energy
Holding B.V. The bond ranks pari passu with Vivo Energy
Investments B.V.'s unsecured USD400 million revolving credit
facility (RCF), which shares the same guarantors.

The conversion of the expected bond rating into final rating is
conditional upon the completion of the above bond, prepaying
existing secured funding, and final terms and conditions of the
new unsecured bond being in line with information already
received. In line with Fitch's criteria, prior-ranking debt
(readily marketable inventory- and lease-adjusted) at the
operating companies' level is below 2.0-2.5x EBITDA and thus not
sufficiently material to affect the bond rating.

Vivo Energy's IDR is constrained at 'BB+' by the group's limited
geographic diversification and concentration of operations in
Africa. Its post-IPO financial structure, including the equity
consideration to acquire Engen International Holdings Limited
(EIHL), which is targeted to complete in 2H18, together with
management's intention to run the business with lease-adjusted
net debt/EBITDA below 1.5x, supports the rating. The rating also
reflects Vivo Energy's inherent cash-generative profile and
Fitch's view of generally stable fuel demand through the cycle.

Vivo Energy operates in the forecourt fuel retail business, and
also the non-fuel retail, commercial and lubricant segments in
Africa exclusively. The new listed holding company is registered
in the UK with its operating units sourcing, distributing and
marketing Shell-branded fuels and lubricants to retail and
commercial customers across 15 countries in Africa (and exporting
lubricants to more than 10 African countries).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Africa Operating Environment: The rating is based on Vivo
Energy's operations being exclusively in Africa, together with
the associated risks and the benefits of these emerging market
countries. Although the group's governance structure, the new UK
holding company and its recent LSE premium listing, increase the
group's access to international capital markets, the fundamental
operations span 15 African countries (24 including EIHL). This
provides both benefits (growth potential in retail and commercial
fuel usage, further urbanisation prospects) and risks (rule of
law, contract base).

Despite Vivo Energy's limited geographic diversification, as
reflected in the rating, the current mix of group operations and
country exposure indicates an operating environment assessment up
to 'BBB-'.

Retail Fuel Margin Protected: Although Vivo Energy operates in
markets where its gross margin in retail fuel is protected, this
activity (60.4% of 2017 group EBITDA including non-fuel retail
contribution) and other commercial and B2B operations are
susceptible to volume changes. Whether Vivo Energy operates in
regulated markets where gross fuel margins are regulated or in
competitive liberalised markets, its profits can be enhanced by
economies of scale (cementing its average 23% market shares),
logistics or storage and handling efficiency, and by augmenting
forecourts with destination food/retail offers.

Vivo Energy's profits are also underpinned by the Shell-branded
fuel and lubricants outlets, also enhancing commercial (28.4%
2017 EBITDA) activities for mines, aviation, and B2B; and by the
lubricants business (11.2% FY17 EBITDA). The Engen acquisition
also adds its own brand to the group's portfolio.

Cash-Generative Profile/Low RMI-Adjusted Leverage: Vivo Energy's
financial profile does not constrain the group's rating. The pre-
IPO increase in debt left the group with around 1.5x lease-
adjusted net debt/EBITDA as calculated by Fitch. On applying
Fitch's RMI-adjusted metrics (which nets readily marketable
inventory against related short-term debt), 2017 leverage is
lower at 0.7x. Vivo Energy's cash-generative operations are
expected to reduce this further even after acquiring Engen for
USD399 million largely with equity consideration.

Given the group's low capex intensity, Vivo Energy's cash-
generative financial profile includes cash from operations (CFO)
above USD200 million per year, and a post-dividends post-Engen
free cash flow (FCF) of over USD50 million per year. Profit
levels and the group's negative working capital position help
operations to self-finance themselves.

Engen (EIHL) Acquisition:  The Engen acquisition complements Vivo
Energy's existing core operations and adds nine new African
geographies. Complementing Vivo Energy's skills base, these Engen
brand activities should continue to grow under the Vivo Energy
model of operation and gradually improve Vivo Energy's key
performance indicators. This home-soil acquisition will be seen
as a test of the group's ability to integrate other acquisitions,
in other geographies, in the future.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

The closest peer is Puma Energy Holdings Pte Ltd (BB/Stable),
which has a broader business profile with its integrated
downstream and midstream operations, and wider geographic
diversification (although also in emerging market countries).
Puma and Vivo Energy demonstrate stability of profitability given
the regulated or historical performance of their core fuel
activities. Vivo Energy has far lower RMI-adjusted net leverage
metrics (below 1x, versus Puma at 4x-3.5x). Vivo Energy is cash-
generative and has less capital intensity than Puma but Fitch
would expect Puma to incur capex in its midstream infrastructure.
Puma has increased capex to invest in its midstream
infrastructure, which is taking time to feed through to
profitability.

With similar operations but in developed markets, EG Group
Limited's 'B' IDR (Stable) reflects the group's leading market
position as an independent petrol station operator in Europe,
positive FCF and diversification towards more profitable non-fuel
retailing and food-to-go segments. It has a leveraged structure
following its planned debt-funded US and Dutch acquisitions
resulting in funds from operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage
above 7.0x and FFO fixed-charge cover of 2.1x.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions within Its Rating Case for the Issuer

  - Fuel and lubricants volumes to each grow 3%; commercial
volumes flat.

  - Resultant gross profit / litre up 2% p.a. in fuel; flat in
commercial; and up 3%-5% in lubricants (including synergies).

  - No non-cash adjustments for management's equity plan.

  - 2019 figures represent a full year contribution from EIHL as
Fitch expects this acquisition to complete in 2H18.

  - Minority dividend payment of USD8 million p.a. and SVL cash
dividend received of USD12 million p.a.

  - Tax rate around 40%.

  - Average cost of debt at 5.5%.

  - Dividend at 30% profit after tax.

  - Increased capex at USD100 million-USD120 million a year
(primarily expansionary, compared with maintenance capex of USD40
million - USD45 million p.a.).

EIHL assumptions:

  - Consideration USD122 million in cash and 124 million primary
shares of Vivo Energy valued at admission price of GBP165 per
share. EIHL's debt was USD15 million less cash of USD89 million
equal.

  - Same volume growth as Vivo Energy.

  - Same gross profit/litre growth as Vivo Energy, with absolute
levels reaching Vivo Energy's over time.

  - Over USD150 million capex for more than 100 sites by 2022.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

  - Increased geographic diversification (including outside
Africa) while maintaining solid market shares within the
countries it operates in, and without impairing group
profitability.

  - FCF/EBITDAR excluding expansionary capex above 40% on a
sustained basis.

  - Maintenance of FFO RMI-adjusted net leverage below 1.5x.

  - FFO RMI-adjusted fixed charge cover above 6x

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

  - Sharp deterioration in sales volume, signalling heightened
competition more than cyclical demand, leading to sustained
EBITDA attrition below USD300 million.

  - FCF/EBITDAR excluding expansionary capex at 20% on a
sustained basis.

  - FFO RMI-adjusted net leverage above 2.5x on a sustained
basis.

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity at OPCO Level: Vivo Energy's operating
companies' (OpCo) working capital facilities are uncommitted,
albeit with some notice period for cancellation by banks.
According to management, the working capital facilities are one-
year facilities either in USD or local currency and unsecured,
with no guarantee from the group and their main purpose is to
fund inventory.

Improvement in Liquidity Resources: The proposed USD400 million
bond and existing new USD400 million RCF (USD200 million undrawn
after EIHL acquisition) provides sufficient liquidity to the
holdco on behalf of the group. Local opcos continue to fund
working capital requirements with uncommitted short-term
facilities.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Vivo Energy Plc

  - Long-Term IDR: assigned 'BB+'; Outlook Stable

  - Senior unsecured rating: assigned 'BB+(EXP)'/'RR4'
Vivo Energy Investments B.V.

  - Senior unsecured bond (guaranteed by Vivo Energy and Vivo
Energy Holding B.V.) assigned 'BB+(EXP)'/'RR4'


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Inside Investment Banking, Second Edition
--------------------------------------------------------
Author: Ernest Bloch
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 440 Pages
List Price: US$34.95
Order your personal copy at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/inside_investment_banking.ht
ml

Even though Bloch states that "no last word may ever be written
about the investment banking industry," he nonetheless has
written a definitive book on the subject.

Bloch wrote Inside Investment Banking after discovering that no
textbook on the subject was available when he began teaching a
course on investment banking. Bloch's book is like a textbook,
though one not meant to be limited to classroom use. It's a
complete, knowledgeable study of the structure and operations of
the field of investment banking. With a long career in the field,
including work at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bloch has
the background for writing the book. He sought the input of many
of his friends and contacts in investment banking for material as
well as for critical guidance to put together a text that would
stand the test of time.

While giving a nod to today's heightened interest in the
innovative securities that receive the most attention in the
popular media, Inside Investment Banking concentrates for the
most part on the unchanging elements of the field. The book takes
a subject that can appear mystifying to the average person and
makes it understandable by concentrating on its central
processes, institutional forms, and permanent aims. The author
shows how all aspects of the complex and ever-changing field of
investment banking, including its most misunderstood topic of
innovative securities, leads to a "financial ecology" which
benefits business organizations, individual investors in general,
and the economy as a whole. "[T]he marketplace for innovative
securities becomes, because of its imitators, a systematic
mechanism for spreading risk and improving efficiency for market
makers and investors," says Bloch.

For example, Bloch takes the reader through investment banking's
"market making" which continually adapts to changing economic
circumstances to attract the interest of investors. In doing so,
he covers the technical subject of arbitrage, the role of the
venture capitalist, and the purpose of initial public offerings,
among other matters. In addition to describing and explaining the
abiding basics of the field, Bloch also takes up issues regarding
policy (for example, full disclosure and government regulation)
that have arisen from the changes in the field and its enhanced
visibility with the public. In dealing with these issues, which
are to a large degree social issues, and similar topics which
inherently have no final resolution, Bloch deals indirectly with
criticisms the field has come under in recent years.

Bloch cites the familiar refrain "the more things change, the
more they remain the same" and then shows how this applies to
investment banking. With deregulation in the banking industry,
globalization, mergers among leading investment firms, and the
growing number of individuals researching and trading stocks on
their own, there is the appearance of sweeping change in
investment banking. However, as Inside Investment Banking shows,
underlying these surface changes is the efficiency of the market.

Anyone looking for an authoritative work covering in depth the
fundamentals of the field while reflecting both the interest and
concerns about this central field in the contemporary economy
should look to Bloch's Inside Investment Banking.
After time as an economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, Ernest Bloch was a Professor of Finance at the Stern School
of Business at New York University.



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Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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