---

        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, March 27, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 061


                            Headlines


C Y P R U S

ARAGVI HOLDING: S&P Affirms Prelim 'B-' ICR, Outlook Stable


F I N L A N D

TEOLLISUUDEN VOIMA: S&P Affirms 'B' ST ICR; Outlook Stable


G R E E C E

NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Raises ICR to 'B+', Outlook Positive


I R E L A N D

AURIUM CLO IV: S&P Assigns Prelim B- (sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes


I T A L Y

ASTALDI SPA: Moody's Lowers CFR to Caa1, Outlook Negative
LEONARDO SPA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' ICRs, Outlook Stable
PORTA VITTORIA: May 8 Deadline Set for Irrevocable Offers
TEAMSYSTEM SPA: Moody's Rates Proposed EUR750MM Sr. Sec. Notes B3


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZKOMMERTSBANK: S&P Retains 'B+' ICR on CreditWatch Positive


N E T H E R L A N D S

CEVA GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B-' ICR, Outlook Stable


R U S S I A

CB ARSENAL: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
SOVCOMBANK PJSC: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' ICR, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CARILLION PLC: Bosses Accused of Being Focused on Own Pay Packets
DIGNITY FINANCE: S&P Lowers Class B Notes Rating to 'BB (sf)'
GLG EURO IV: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating to GBP9.5MM Class F Notes
HOUSE OF FRASER: Future Uncertain After Financing Talks Fail
JOHNSTON PRESS: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC-, Outlook Negative

MICRO FOCUS: S&P Places 'BB-' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
VAUGHAN ENGINEERING: Prepares to File for Administration
VIRGIN MEDIA: Moody's Rates New GBP300MM Sr. Unsecured RFNs B1
ZINC HOTELS: Administrators to Commence Sale of Properties


                            *********



===========
C Y P R U S
===========


ARAGVI HOLDING: S&P Affirms Prelim 'B-' ICR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its preliminary 'B-' long-term issuer
credit rating on ARAGVI HOLDING INTERNATIONAL LTD (TransOil) and
extended the rating for another three months. The outlook is
stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed and extended its preliminary 'B-'
issue rating on the group's proposed senior unsecured U.S.-dollar
denominated Eurobond, maturing in five years, issued by Aragvi
Finance International DAC.

The final ratings will depend on S&P's receipt and satisfactory
review of all final transaction documentation. Accordingly, the
preliminary ratings should not be construed as evidence of final
ratings. If S&P Global Ratings does not receive final
documentation within the next 90 days, or if final documentation
departs from materials reviewed, it reserves the right to
withdraw or revise its ratings.

The preliminary ratings mainly continue to reflect our assessment
of the group's vulnerable business risk profile, reflecting the
high risk of exposure to a small geographic area for the sourcing
of agriculture commodities, balanced with the industry's strong
barriers to entry.

TransOil is the biggest originator of Moldovan grains and, over
the years, has strengthened its dominant position mainly through
a nationwide infrastructure network. The group enjoys a large
network of silos (13) and crushing facilities (2), and has its
own fleet of railcars (75 owned and up to 300 leased) and two
port terminals on the Danube River (one in Moldova, which is the
only port with access to international waters in the country, and
the other in Ukraine). This network enables the group to run its
origination operations efficiently. The group is the only sizable
sunflower seed crusher in Moldova, complementing its trading
operations and its infrastructure and logistics operations.

S&P said, "The preliminary ratings also incorporate our view that
TransOil is largely exposed to one single country, Moldova, which
we view as having a highly risky corporate environment, and a
limited surface of arable land compared with large agricultural
regions in Europe. Moreover, we consider the group's current
creditworthiness to be constrained somewhat by its sourcing
capabilities, which are only in Moldova, a small country that is
much more exposed to volatility of volumes harvested than its
neighbors, Ukraine and Romania. We take into account, however,
TransOil's nationwide infrastructure network, which acts as a
natural barrier to entry, preventing the entrance of new players
in Moldova. Also, this efficient infrastructure network
constitutes the arm of its trading operation."

TransOil's trading model is different from that of the largest
global agricultural trading firms (ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and
Louis-Dreyfus), because it mainly involves few physical
commodities, on a very small scale and sourced only within one
country--Moldova representing more than 85%. S&P said,
"Therefore, the concentration of its agricultural footprint is
much more important, and represents the main characteristic
clearly constraining our business assessment under our trading
criteria. The group's trading business model allows it to quickly
lock up margin (maximum three days of open position), and we
consider the group's value at risk is not substantial. We
consider TransOil's operating model as less risky than strategies
developed sometimes by larger traders, notably because TransOil
trades only physical commodities, which are much less volatile
than non-physical ones. Complex trading operations would usually
imply building large trading positions and monitoring them on a
daily basis through quite sophisticated tools backed by a
dedicated team and a strong know-how in derivatives and financial
markets."

S&P said, "Nevertheless, we consider the progress Moldovan
farmers have made through pre-crop financing somewhat exposes the
group to significant counterparty risk. These advances granted to
Moldova's farmers in to order start planting their crops could
translate into material losses, in our view, if the country were
to face a very poor harvest.

"We understand that the purpose of the bond issuance is to
replace the majority of the pre-export financing facilities and
other secured credit lines, allowing the group to strengthen and
lengthen its debt portfolio and to reduce its dependence on
short-term debt financing. We also understand the group intends
to use the proceeds to purchase inventory to load up new capacity
in its Romanian crushing plant, which it plans to operate in the
second half of 2018, following the notes' issuance. Our
preliminary issue rating is currently contingent on the
successful placement of this long-term debt instrument, without
which, in our view, TransOil may not be able to successfully ramp
up its Romanian crushing operation or increase the utilization
rate of its Moldovan plants.

"The group's financial metrics take into account specific
adjustments on readily marketable inventory, thanks to our
spectrum of analysis (trading company criteria), which allows us
to net them against gross debt to a certain extent. The group
generated positive free cash flow in 2017, but it might turn
negative in 2018 due to the increasing interest burden following
the proposed bond issuance and the higher amount of operating
lease engagements, and to the large working capital outflow
stemming from the sizable inventory build-up for the group's
crushing operation. The group's debt service coverage ratio
(EBITDA interest coverage) is in line with the current
preliminary ratings, at more than 2x following the transaction.
That said, TransOil's annual cash flow generation is affected by
very high intrayear working capital requirements, historically
covered by short-term pre-export facility lines. We consider
that, following the issue of the eurobond, the group will rely
substantially less on short-term debt. Moreover, we view
positively that TransOil captures more than 90% of its cash flow
in hard currency, enabling it to cover debt-servicing with
limited risk of currency mismatch.

"The stable outlook on TransOil primarily reflects our view that
the group will post solid operating performance, enabling it to
start its deleveraging process after the proposed Eurobond
issuance. We assume the group will maintain its EBITDA interest
coverage sustainably above 2x while avoiding liquidity pressure
in the next 12 months.

"We could downgrade TransOil in the event of a very poor harvest
in Moldova, which would reduce volume throughput at its
facilities or result in large decrease in volumes originated
throughout its efficient infrastructure network, translating into
pronounced liquidity deterioration.

"A positive rating action on TransOil would be contingent on
acceleration of organic growth, ahead of our current base case,
such that capacity utilization improves materially, combined with
a successful ramp-up of the new Romanian facility, spurring
significant free operating cash flow generation and, in turn,
reducing sustainably and substantially its leverage ratio. A more
diversified sourcing beyond the group's domestic boarders could
also strengthen TransOil's business risk profile."


=============
F I N L A N D
=============


TEOLLISUUDEN VOIMA: S&P Affirms 'B' ST ICR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its long-term issuer credit rating on
Finland-based nuclear power producer Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO)
and removed the rating from CreditWatch with negative
implications, where S&P had placed it on Oct. 17, 2017. S&P also
affirmed the 'B' short-term issuer credit rating on TVO. The
outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch our 'BB+' issue rating on TVO's EUR1.3 million
revolving credit facility (RCF) and EUR4.0 billion euro medium-
term note program. The recovery rating is unchanged at '3',
indicating our expectation of average (30%-50%; rounded estimate
30%) recovery in the event of payment default.

"The affirmation reflects our view that the comprehensive
agreement signed by TVO and the Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) supplier
consortium (Areva GmbH, Areva NP, and Siemens AG) successfully
resolves the longstanding dispute under an arbitration process
for the costs and losses due to the delay of OL3."

The agreement settles the size of the litigation payment that the
supplier consortium must make to TVO, which is set at EUR450
million. It also ensures that Areva has enough resources, both
technical and financial, to complete the project. At the same
time, S&P believes that the terms of the agreement incentivize
the supplier to complete OL3 project by the end of 2019 and
protects TVO against potential cost overruns through incremental
penalties.

S&P said, "We note that the series of delays on OL3 construction,
which was originally planned to come onstream in 2009, have
significantly increased TVO's financial leverage as construction
costs have been capitalized and will start to be depreciated when
OL3 comes into operation. We expect the increased EBITDA at that
point to reduce the company's leverage to about 13x-14x adjusted
debt to EBITDA. This ratio will slightly benefit from the first
settlement amount TVO will be receiving from Areva, which we now
incorporate in our analysis (about EUR300 million).

"We view the incentive payment of EUR150 million due to the
supplier if OL3 is completed by June 2019 as an effective
mechanism to reduce the risk of further delay, which should
enable TVO to embark on its lengthy deleveraging path. Given the
turnkey nature of the contract, the construction cost is now
estimated at EUR5.5 billion. If the project were to be delayed
beyond 2019, we believe that the penalty mechanism in place would
protect TVO against additional cost overruns, up to a maximum of
EUR400 million if the completion of OL3 were delayed to June
2021.

"In our view, the undertaking of the consortium companies to
dedicate adequate funds to the completion of OL3 project,
including setting up a trust mechanism funded by the Areva
entities, is sufficient to secure the second settlement
instalment due by the end of 2019 (EUR122 million) and to cover
the maximum amount of penalties for further delays. We consider
that this trust mechanism is important to protect TVO from a
potential insolvency of the Areva entities, given that they have
no other operational activities apart from TVO after the
restructuring and the sale of Areva NP to EDF."

The effectiveness of the agreement is subject to certain
conditions precedent, some of which remain pending and are
expected to be met over the coming weeks. Although this is
unlikely in our opinion, if the agreement does not enter into
force, the uncertainty about the outcome of the arbitration
process and the risk that Areva might not be able to complete OL3
could lead us to revise our current assumptions, with potential
negative implications for the ratings on TVO.

S&P said, "We view the EUR150 million additional shareholder loan
commitments provided in December 2017 as a solid indication of
the willingness of TVO's shareholders to support the company. We
believe that the terms of the settlement agreement lend further
comfort to shareholders for the economic value of the project as
further cost overruns are covered by Areva, preserving TVO's
production costs. Reduced market prices over the past four years
have indeed reduced TVO's cushion against any increased cost
overruns.

"Our rating on TVO remains underpinned by its Mankala model,
which largely insulates the company from competition and market
risk. This stems from the company's ability to sell electricity
produced to its shareholders "at cost." TVO's owners --
comprising major Finnish industries, utilities, and
municipalities -- are responsible, in line with TVO's articles of
association, for TVO's annual fixed costs (about 80%-85% of total
costs), in proportion to their shares and irrespective of whether
or not they have used their share of electricity. Annual fixed
costs include interest and loan instalments and depreciation. We
also consider TVO as playing an important role in the Finnish
electricity market as it generates about 20% of total electricity
produced in Finland. We expect this share to increase to 30% when
OL3 comes into operation.

"We acknowledge that TVO's financial metrics are substantially
weaker than those of profit-maximizing companies due to its non-
profit nature. Therefore, TVO has a relatively short-dated debt-
maturity profile -- about four years -- compared with the
economic lifetime of its asset base of over 40 years. This
increases the company's exposure to refinancing risk. However,
TVO maintains EUR1.3 billion of RCFs, maturing in 2021-2023, to
ensure that it is able to cover funding needs over the next few
years and an additional EUR380 million in committed lines were
signed in 2016 and 2017. Although TVO should be able to charge
its shareholders for instalments and interest payments on loans
falling due annually -- in accordance with the article of
association -- its debt does not benefit from any guarantees."

S&P's base-case scenario incorporates the following assumptions:

-- The settlement agreement signed with the OL3 EPR plant
    supplier consortium enters into force under the current
    terms.

-- TVO receives the EUR300 million settlement payment (net of
    the maximum incentive payment due to the supplier) and Areva
    pays no penalties, assuming OL3 will be completed by June
    2019.

-- Remaining capital expenditure (capex) to complete OL3
    (including capitalized interest) slightly higher than EUR1
    billion over 2018-2019, reflecting milestone payments to the
    supplier, gross of any settlement payments.

-- Annual maintenance capex on OL1 and OL2 amounting to about
    EUR50 million-EUR80 million, higher than the maintenance
    capex expected on OL3 once it is in operation.

-- TVO's production cost slightly lower than EUR30/megawatt hour
    (mwh) when OL3 comes into operation, increasing from
    EUR20/mwh, reflecting the start of the depreciation of OL3's
    capitalized costs and interest.

-- TVO's shareholders will continue to fully cover the company's
    production costs (including interest expenses) for existing
    plants OL1 and OL2, which S&P expects will remain competitive
    in the near term.

-- No unexpected outages at OL1 and OL2.

-- Use of EUR200 million of shareholder loan commitments for
    OL3, out of EUR350 million committed amount.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

-- Debt to EBITDA of about 13x-15x from 2020 onward; and
-- Funds from operations interest coverage of 2x-3x from 2020.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the
third nuclear reactor will be completed on time by June 2019, as
the penalty mechanism in place under the settlement agreement
signed with the supplier consortium effectively transfers the
risk of potential cost overruns to the supplier. It also reflects
the stability of cash flow driven by the contractual nature of
TVO's revenue and cost structure backed by its shareholders, and
our expectation that TVO's cost advantage versus market prices
will not further deteriorate.

"We could take a negative rating action if the settlement
agreement does not enter into force, putting at risk the
completion of OL3 project due to the uncertainty of the impact of
the arbitration outcome on Areva's liquidity. We see this event
as unlikely. We could also lower the rating on TVO if we see any
doubts regarding Areva's capacity to complete OL3, leading to
further material delays or cost overruns that are not compensated
by the supplier. These factors could hinder TVO from beginning
its long deleveraging path. We could also lower the ratings if we
see a widening negative gap between market prices and TVO's
production costs, indicating lower future value for shareholders.
Finally, we could also lower the ratings if we saw a diminishing
willingness or ability of the shareholders to support TVO, which
could be indicated by weakening credit quality of its main
shareholders.

"We could raise the rating on TVO if the company significantly
reduced its leverage, but we see this scenario as unlikely at the
moment."


===========
G R E E C E
===========


NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Raises ICR to 'B+', Outlook Positive
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term issuer credit rating on
Marshall Islands-registered dry-bulk and container shipping
company Navios Maritime Partners L.P. to 'B+' from 'B'. The
outlook is positive.

S&P said, "In addition, we raised our issue rating on Navios
Partners' $441 million senior secured term loan due 2020 to 'BB-'
from 'B+'. The '2' recovery rating indicates our expectation of
substantial recovery prospects (70%-90%; rounded estimate 85%) in
the event of default."

The upgrade reflects Navios Partners' improved credit profile
because of the recovery in dry bulk- and container-shipping
industry conditions. S&P said, "It also reflects our opinion that
the risk of charter amendments to the company's existing
contracts with South Korean container liner Hyundai Merchant
Marine Co., Ltd. (HMM) and Taiwanese container liner Yang Ming
(YM) (and the ensuing strain on Navios Partners' cash flows) has
materially diminished. This is because the industry conditions
for container liners recovered well in 2017, and we expect
freight rates to stabilize in 2018. Furthermore, because of
significantly improved charter rates for containership owners,
the gap between the contracted rates by Navios Partners with HMM
and YM, and the industry rates for containerships, has tightened.
This reduces the likelihood of charter amendments and a drain on
Navios Partners' EBITDA if it were to unexpectedly employ its
containerships at industry rates. Finally, because of a rebound
in dry bulk charter rate conditions, Navios Partners' share of
EBITDA coming from its core dry bulk shipping fleet has increased
and, accordingly, the share coming from container shipping linked
to charters with HMM and YM has decreased. We forecast that HMM
and YM will account for 30% of Navios Partners' EBITDA in 2018
(from about 50% in 2017) and about 20% in 2019 because charters
with YM mature by October 2018."

S&P believes that the recovery in dry bulk charter rates in 2017-
-to an average of $15,000 per day (/day) for Capesize ships and
$10,500/day for Panamax ships (from around $8,000/day and
$6,000/day, respectively, in the previous year)--will continue
into 2018. S&P's 2018 base case factors in the average rate for
Capesize vessels reaching $18,000/day and for Panamax $12,000/day
(which largely corresponds to the respective industry average
rates seen year to date) because of supporting industry
fundamentals, most importantly:

-- Rising iron ore, coal, and grain ton-mile demand, among other
    reasons because China, the single largest commodities'
    importer in the world, seeks higher quality raw materials
    which brings in additional volumes from more distant places
    than previously, such as Brazil and North America; and

-- Close to all-time low order book and slowing global fleet
    expansion.

The rebound in dry bulk charter rates will strengthen Navios
Partners' cash flow generation and trigger an improvement in the
company's debt service prospects. S&P said, "Our base case is
that EBITDA will recover to about $140 million in 2018 from about
$108 million in 2017. This, accompanied by the assumptions of no
new debt incurred and debt amortization continuing as scheduled
(to reach adjusted debt of around $490 million as of Dec. 31,
2018), points to a material improvement in S&P Global Ratings-
adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt to 20%-23% in 2018
and results in our revision of the company's financial risk
profile to the lower end of the significant category, from
aggressive. Amid the likely firm charter-rate conditions
extending into 2019, we believe that Navios Partners' credit
measures could continue recovering, with adjusted FFO to debt
potentially reaching 25%-26%, which could lead us to raise the
rating further (as reflected in our positive outlook)."

Formed in 2007, Navios Partners is listed on the New York Stock
Exchange and owns and operates a fleet of 40 dry-bulk vessels and
container ships, including 33 small-to-large dry-bulk carriers
with a total carrying capacity of about 3.8 million deadweight
tons, and seven container ships that total 50,400 20-foot
equivalent units.

S&P said, "Our assessment of Navios Partners' business profile
remains constrained by the company's relatively narrow scope and
diversity, with a focus on the volatile dry-bulk and container
shipping industries and a fairly concentrated and low-quality
customer base. We also believe that the dry-bulk and container
shipping sectors have less favorable characteristics in general,
compared with those for oil and gas shipping. This is because the
credit quality of the oil and gas shipping sectors' customer base
is stronger. Dry-bulk and containership time charters are also
typically more fragile, and we continue to observe more charter
defaults on those contracts than in other shipping segments."

The key credit support to Navios Partners' competitive position
comes from its time-charter profile, with the average charter
duration at two years as of Feb. 5, 2018. Furthermore, Navios
Partners benefits from competitive and predictable running costs.
As of Feb. 5, Navios Partners had chartered out about 64% of
available days for 2018 and about 18% for 2019 (including index-
linked charters). This adds to earnings visibility, provided the
charterers honor their original commitments, which S&P
incorporates into its base case.

In S&P's base case, it assumes the following:

-- Worldwide economic growth will remain vital to the shipping
    industry. S&P said, "Given the global nature of shipping
    sector demand, we consider the GDP growth of all major
    contributors to trade volumes, especially China as the
    largest consumer of dry-bulk commodities. We forecast GDP
    growth in China of 6.5% in 2018 and 6.3% in 2019, compared
    with 6.8% in 2017; largely flat GDP of 5.4% in 2018 and 5.6%
    in 2019 in Asia-Pacific, compared with about 5.6% in 2017;
    and 2.0% this year in the eurozone and 1.7% in 2019, after
    2.3% in 2017. On continued job gains, wage inflation, and a
    relatively healthy economy, we expect U.S. GDP growth of 2.8%
    this year and 2.2% in 2019, compared with 2.3% in 2017."

-- Contracted vessels will perform in accordance with the
    committed daily rate. Revenue calculations are based on 360
    operating days per year. S&P foresees no customer defaults
    under the charters.

-- Time charter rates for Capesize ships will be $18,000/day in
    2018 and $19,000/day in 2019 (compared with the industry
    average rate of $15,100/day in 2017, according to Clarkson
    Research). For Panamax, they will stand at $12,000/day in
    2018 and $12,500/day in 2019 (compared with the industry
    average rate of $10,600/day in 2017, according to Clarkson
    Research).

-- Time charter rates for containerships to remain at the
    current level of around $18,000/day in 2018-2019. Charter
    rates for containership owners will at least stabilize this
    year after the improvement seen in 2017. Containership demand
    points to healthy mid-single-digit growth in 2018. Scrapping
    of vessels has been persistently high, and there has been no
    incentive to place new orders, as demonstrated by the limited
    contracting activity since late 2015 and the order book
    reaching its lowest level on record of around 13%. Combined
    with funding constraints, these factors will help restore the
    balance between demand and supply in the containership
    segment as S&P progresses into 2018.

-- Daily operating cost per vessel, which is contracted with
    Navios Maritime Holdings Inc. (Navios Holdings; Navios
    Partners' largest shareholder) for the period 2018-2020, as
    reported by the company.

-- Capital expenditure (capex) for drydocking and special survey
    of vessels will average $8 million-$10 million annually.
    There are no vessels on order.

-- Annual dividend distribution of $13.7 million, as announced
    by the company.

-- Further potential investment in fleet expansion or
    rejuvenation will be conservatively funded (either using
    equity or internal excess cash flows) to limit the increase
    in financial leverage and deterioration of credit measures.

Under its base case, S&P arrives at the following credit measures
for Navios Partners:

-- Adjusted EBITDA of $135 million-$140 million in 2018 and $140
    million-$145 million in 2019, compared with about $108
    million in 2017.

-- Adjusted FFO to debt of 22%-23% in 2018 and about 25%-26% in
    2019 (14%-15% in 2017).

-- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 3.5x-4.0x in 2018 and about 3.0x-
    3.5x in 2019 (4.5x-5.0x in 2017).

S&P said, "We do not factor reported cash into these credit
ratios because we regard Navios Partners' business risk profile
as weak.

"We assess Navios Partners based on our approach outlined in
"Master Limited Partnerships And General Partnerships," published
Sept. 22, 2014. We consider that Navios Partners does not
constitute a group with Navios Holdings, given our opinion that
the default risk of these entities is differentiated. We believe
Navios Holdings exercises meaningful ongoing control and
influence over Navios Partners through its 100% control of Navios
GP LLC, Navios Partners' general partner. We currently consider
the strategic and financial interests of Navios Holdings and the
other unitholders in Navios Partners to be aligned. Third parties
own a material percentage (80%) of Navios Partners' units.
Furthermore, unitholders elect four of the seven members of
Navios Partners' board of directors. We understand that this is
the key reason for Navios Holdings not consolidating Navios
Partners in its accounts under U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles.

"The positive outlook reflects the possibility of an upgrade over
the next 12 months if Navios Partners' cash flow generation and
credit metrics further improve, as the company captures the
benefits of recovering charter rates, and management pursues
prudent financial and treasury policies.

"We could upgrade Navios Partners if charter rates for Capesize
and Panamax ships remain or exceed $18,000/day and $12,000/day,
respectively, which would (i) strengthen Navios Partners'
financial measures such that they align with a higher rating,
with adjusted FFO to debt improving to and staying at 25% or
higher, and (ii) support a sustained robust cash flow generation
providing a cushion for discretionary spending."

An upgrade would also depend on the company pursuing a balanced
dividend distribution, while investing in fleet expansion or
rejuvenation, and maintaining adequate liquidity sources over
uses.

S&P said, "We would revise the outlook to stable if charter rates
appear to perform below our base case because of weak commodities
imports and/or the aggressive ordering of new vessels posing a
risk to the industry's demand-and-supply equilibrium. We could
also consider a negative rating action if the company
unexpectedly made largely debt-funded vessel acquisitions or
substantial shareholder returns. These developments would likely
impede the recovery in Navios Partners' credit measures to be
commensurate with a higher rating.

"Given the inherent volatility in the underlying sector, we
consider the company's consistent ratio of liquidity sources to
uses of more than 1.2x in the upcoming 12 months and sufficient
financial covenant headroom to be stabilizing factors for a 'B+'
rating. The downside rating pressure would emerge if Navios
Partners' liquidity or vessels valuation appear to deteriorate
without prospects of a short-term improvement."


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


AURIUM CLO IV: S&P Assigns Prelim B- (sf) Rating to Cl. F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary credit ratings to
Aurium CLO IV DAC's class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, and F notes. At
closing, the issuer will also issue unrated subordinated notes.

Aurium CLO IV is a European cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO), securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior
secured leveraged loans and bonds. Spire Management Ltd. will
manage the transaction.

The preliminary ratings assigned to the notes reflect our
assessment of:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
    broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans and bonds that are governed by collateral quality and
    portfolio profile tests.

-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
    cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.

-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
    the performance of the rated notes through collateral
    selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.

-- The transaction's legal structure, which S&P expects to be
    bankruptcy remote.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes will pay
quarterly interest unless there is a frequency switch event.
Following this, the notes will permanently switch to semiannual
payment. The portfolio's reinvestment period will end
approximately 4.25 years after closing.

S&P said, "Our preliminary ratings reflect our assessment of the
preliminary collateral portfolio's credit quality, which has a
weighted-average 'B' rating. We consider that the portfolio at
closing will be well-diversified, primarily comprising broadly
syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term loans and senior
secured bonds. Therefore, we have conducted our credit and cash
flow analysis by applying our criteria for corporate cash flow
collateralized debt obligations.

"In our cash flow analysis, we used the EUR400 million target par
amount, the covenanted weighted-average spread (3.55%), the
reference weighted-average coupon (5.25%), and the minimum
weighted-average recovery rate of 32.50% at the 'AAA' level as
indicated by the collateral manager. We applied various cash flow
stress scenarios, using four different default patterns, in
conjunction with different interest rate stress scenarios for
each liability rating category.

"Citibank N.A., London Branch is the bank account provider and
custodian. At closing, we anticipate that the documented
downgrade remedies will be in line with our current counterparty
criteria.

"Under our structured finance ratings above the sovereign
criteria, we consider that the transaction's exposure to country
risk is sufficiently mitigated at the assigned preliminary rating
levels.

"At closing, we consider that the issuer will be bankruptcy
remote, in accordance with our legal criteria. Following our
analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty, operational, and
legal risks, we believe our preliminary ratings are commensurate
with the available credit enhancement for each class of notes."

RATINGS LIST

  Preliminary Ratings Assigned

  Aurium CLO IV DAC
  EUR407.60 Million Senior Secured Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes
  (Including EUR36.30 Million Unrated Subordinated Notes)

  Class          Prelim.          Prelim.
                 rating            amount
                                 (mil. EUR)

  A-1            AAA (sf)          199.00
  A-2            AAA (sf)           30.00
  B              AA (sf)            54.00
  C              A (sf)             32.00
  D              BBB (sf)           24.20
  E              BB- (sf)           20.30
  F              B- (sf)            11.80
  Sub            NR                 36.30

  NR--Not rated.
  Sub--Subordinated.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


ASTALDI SPA: Moody's Lowers CFR to Caa1, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa1 from B3 the
corporate family rating (CFR) and to Caa1-PD from B3-PD the
probability of default rating (PDR) of Italian construction
company Astaldi S.p.A. ("Astaldi" or "group"). Concurrently,
Moody's downgraded to Caa1 from B3 the instrument rating on the
group's EUR750 million senior unsecured notes due 2020. The
outlook on all ratings is negative.

The rating action follows Astaldi's announcement of its fiscal
year 2017 results and additional information provided in a
related conference call on March 15, 2018 and concludes the
review for downgrade process initiated on November 16, 2017.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade to Caa1 mainly reflects the delayed execution of
the group's proposed rights issue, which Moody's had expected to
be completed by now since placing the ratings under review in
November last year. While negotiations around the final structure
and implementation of various capital strengthening measures are
still ongoing, visibility of their successful and timely
execution remains unchanged and only limited. The group now aims
to raise EUR300 million of equity, whereas originally it was
intended to launch a EUR400 million capital strengthening
program, comprising of a EUR200 million capital increase and
EUR200 million of new financial instruments. However, a
successfully managed capital increase would certainly bolster the
group's stressed liquidity, which Moody's continues to regard as
weak.

Moreover, the downgrade factors in the persistent uncertainty
whether the group will be able to complete its planned asset
disposals during the first half of 2018, given that only some
non-binding offers exist so far. Nonetheless, Moody's recognizes
the group's confidence to sell its stake in the third Bosporus
bride (approximately EUR349 million book value as of December 31,
2017) over the next few months, which would be another important
milestone for improving its liquidity profile.

The downgrade further reflects the group's declining operating
cash flow generation in 2017 (around EUR221 million negative),
partly explained by the delayed collection of slow moving
receivables and work in progress in some regions. Likewise,
Moody's expects strongly negative and much weaker than
anticipated free cash flow (FCF) in 2017. Although expected to
improve (and possibly turning positive) in 2018, FCF depends to a
large degree on typically sizeable working capital swings and
work in progress movements, which are difficult to forecast.
Given the higher cash burn, Astaldis's gross debt at year-end
2017 increased to almost EUR2.3 billion, compared with around
EUR2.0 billion in the prior year and Moody's previous forecast of
around EUR1.9 billion for 2017. Although reported EBITDA
(excluding profits from joint ventures and associates) of around
EUR319 million in 2017 was slightly better than expected, Moody's
estimates Astaldi's leverage at around 9x gross debt/EBITDA
(Moody's-adjusted) at the end of 2017. Considering the agency's
maximum leverage guidance of 7.5x for a B3 rating, a meaningful
reduction towards this level over the next 18 months appears
challenging, unless the capital increase and asset disposals were
executed as planned.

RATING OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects the risk of Astaldi's weak
liquidity to further deteriorate if the proposed capital increase
and/or planned asset disposals could not be properly executed.
Liquidity would also materially suffer from a possible covenant
breach at the end of June 2018 if the planned financial
strengthening measures were not put in place in due course.
However, Moody's would consider to stabilize the outlook, if
Astaldi's liquidity situation were to improve to an adequate
level.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN / UP

Downward pressure on the ratings would arise, if (1) Astaldi's
liquidity were to deteriorate further, and (2) the group was
unable to properly execute its targeted capital increase and
asset disposals in a timely manner.

Upward pressure on the ratings would build, if Astaldi's (1)
leverage as adjusted by Moody's declined to well below 7.5x gross
debt/EBITDA (around 9x estimated at year-end 2017), (2) free cash
flow generation improved into positive territory, and (3)
liquidity strengthened to adequate levels, supported, for
instance, by the successful implementation of the envisaged
financial strengthening measures.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Construction
Industry published in March 2017.

COMPANY PROFILE

Headquartered in Rome, Italy, Astaldi S.p.A. provides general
contracting, construction and procurement services with
consolidated construction revenue of EUR2.9 billion in 2017.
Projects include highways, railways, bridges, tunnels, subways,
airports, commercial and civil buildings, mining and industrial
facilities. Astaldi is the second largest construction company in
Italy by revenue and has developed an international presence for
a long time. The company also holds a portfolio of minority
stakes in concessions, which are not consolidated. Established in
1926 and listed since 2002, the majority of the company's capital
stock is owned by the Astaldi family.


LEONARDO SPA: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' ICRs, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term
issuer credit ratings on Italian aerospace and defense company
Leonardo S.p.a. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed the 'BB+' issue rating
on the company's unsecured notes. The '3' recovery rating on the
notes is unchanged, reflecting our expectation of about 55%
recovery (rounded estimate) in the event of a default.

The prolonged market weakness for Leonardo's core business,
helicopters, coupled with operating issues at the business unit
that culminated with a profit warning at the end of last year,
has not materially weakened the creditworthiness of Leonardo in
our view. This is because the company has offset a disappointing
operating performance with accelerated deleveraging through debt
retendering, thus mitigating headwinds on adjusted funds from
operations (FFO) to debt. This is our main credit metric for
Leonardo, and we estimate it was in the 25%-30% range at year-end
2017. We also believe that the combination of low-single-digit
revenue growth and cost-reduction measures will help to maintain
adjusted FFO to debt at the higher end of the 20%-30% range over
2018-2020. This, despite negative free operating cash flow (FOCF)
mostly linked to an increase in working capital absorption
because of the ramp up of production to service the Eurofighter
contract. The rating is further supported by our view of
manageable debt maturities over 2018-2019.

In its business plan, Leonardo is targeting enlarging the product
offering, increasing commercial presence in strategic markets,
and optimizing production processes. S&P said, "In our view, this
will support the company's efforts to retain market leadership in
the consolidated markets for civil helicopters, trainers, naval
armaments, radars and sensors, and space missiles. The recent
news that Leonardo will be the prime contractor for the sale of
28 helicopters for both naval and land operations in Qatar
supports the company's strategy to increase its presence in
countries where military campaigns are likely over the next two
to three years. Despite the lack of evidence of a clear rebound
in civil helicopter demand, we see Leonardo as well placed to
seize opportunities from military campaigns." Leonardo's
successful bids, as in the case of the Qatar contract, represent
an upside to our base-case scenario.

S&P said, "We consider Leonardo to be less favorably positioned,
from a business risk perspective, than peers in the same
category, like Thales S.A., Embraer, and Textron Inc. This takes
into account Leonardo's exposure to a stagnant civil helicopter
market, coupled with Leonardo's lack of scale in some of its
operations along the value chain, its cautious approach to
disrupting trends like digitalization and electrification in
comparison with its main peer, French A&D company Thales, and
ultimately its exposure to markets with relatively low defense
budgets (namely Italy), which all weigh on the company's
competitive advantage in our view.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that, in 2018-2020, FFO to
debt will hover in the 25%-30% range despite negative FOCF as a
result of working capital absorption related to the delivery on
Leonardo's large contracts.

"We would consider lowering the ratings if Leonardo's leverage
metrics were to deteriorate, more specifically if FFO to debt
fell below 20% for a sustained period. We believe this scenario
is currently unlikely, given the headroom built at the current
rating level. However, a significant drop in operating
performance or adoption of a more aggressive financial policy
could put pressure to ratings.

"We could consider upgrading Leonardo if the company stepped up
its cash flow generation such that the adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio
reached the mid-30% region for a sustained period. Although this
is not our base-case scenario, we believe it could result from a
combination of factors, namely a sound recovery of the civil
helicopter market, improving profitability, and the company's
continued commitment to a higher rating."


PORTA VITTORIA: May 8 Deadline Set for Irrevocable Offers
---------------------------------------------------------
Porta Vittoria Spa invites interested parties to present
irrevocable offers to purchase real estate properties known as
"Porta Vittoria", located in Milan, in the block between Via
Giovanni Cena, Via Cervignano, Via Monte Ortigara and Viale
Umbria, as described in greater detail in the assessment survey
drawn up by Reddy's Group Srl (hereinafter "Survey"), and
specifically:

SINGLE LOT: consisting of the real estate complex, as identified
on the land registry on pages 76 to 80 of the Survey (ref. Lot B
of aforementioned Survey); Offer price no lower than
EUR120,000,000.00; Minimum raise: EUR3,000,000.00.

It is hereby specified that irrevocable offers to purchase must
contain: (i) a copy of the "General terms and conditions of
sale", duly signed as acknowledgement for acceptance in the
broadest sense, including relative annexes, and (ii) copy of the
list, signed for acknowledgement, of all documents present in the
data room -- that shall be requested by certified email to the
address within and no later than May 3, 2018.

Irrevocable offers to purchase must be submitted by hand in a
sealed anonymous envelope indicating a pseudonym to Studio
Masciello-Nannoni in Milan, Via Boccaccio no. 7, within and no
later than 1:00 p.m. of the day before the sale, namely
May 8, 2018, together with a deposit, amounting to 10% of
the offered price, as specified in the "General terms and
conditions of sale" available for consultation on the following
websites: https://portalevenditepubbliche.giustizia.it;
www.tribunale.milano.giustizia.it; www.entitribunali.kataweb.it,
www.immobiliare.it, www.aste.immobiliare.it,
www.repubblicamilano.it; and on the international multi-lingual
portals www.auctionsitaly.com and www.auctionsitaly.it, which can
be consulted for further information.

If several offers are submitted, a competitive bidding sale not
by auction will occur on May 9, 2018, at 11:00 a.m. at the
Court of Milan, before the Bankruptcy Judge, Ms. Amina Simonetti.

For further information, please contact Mrs. Paola Galasso and
the lawyer Mrs Marina De Cesare of Studio MascielloNannoni,
at phone number: 0243995584, or at the following certified email
address: f814.2016milano@pecfallimenti.it.

The real estate units are available for viewing prior
appointment, until May 3, 2018.

Judge Ms. Amina Simonetti is overseeing the bankruptcy process at
the Court of Milan.

The Panel of bankruptcy trustees include Mr. Vincenzo Masciello,
Mr. Maurizio Orlando, Mr. Giorgio Zanetti.

It is hereby specified that this notice is not legally binding
for any reason and does not constitute a commitment or
obligation to sell for the Bodies of the procedure, nor it
constrains them to pay for any expenses for any mediation
or consultation services, nor does it constitute an invitation to
offer, or an offer to the public, pursuant to art. 1336
of Italian Civil Code, or mobilisation of public savings pursuant
to art. 94 et seq. of Italian Legislative Decree 58/1998.


TEAMSYSTEM SPA: Moody's Rates Proposed EUR750MM Sr. Sec. Notes B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B3/LGD4 to the proposed
new EUR750 million senior secured notes maturing in 2023 and
2025, which will be issued by Italian enterprise software
provider TeamSystem S.p.A. (TeamSystem). The action follows the
launch of syndication for the new senior secured notes, which
will be split into 5-year and 7-year floating rate notes. The
proceeds from the new notes will be used to repay TeamSystem's
existing EUR570 million senior secured notes due 2022, and EUR150
million senior secured notes due 2023, as well as fund
transaction fees and expenses, including the redemption premia on
the existing notes.

Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed TeamSystem Holding S.p.A.'s B3
corporate family rating (CFR) and B3-PD probability of default
rating (PDR). The outlook on all ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR NEW SENIOR SECURED NOTES

The proposed senior secured notes are rated B3, in line with the
CFR, as they will represent a very substantial part of the future
capital structure. Only the relatively small super senior
revolving credit facility (RCF, unrated) ranks ahead and Moody's
considers the vendor loans' ranking to be pari passu with the
notes.

RATIONALE FOR THE RATINGS AFFIRMATION

"Moody's expect that TeamSystem's free cash flow generation will
materially improve as a result of the refinancing and reach at
least EUR25 - EUR30 million per annum, owing to much lower
interest payments and a more efficient tax structure" says
Frederic Duranson, a Moody's Analyst and lead analyst for
TeamSystem. "Better cash flow could reduce the risk of debt
additions that the group has a track record of but the leverage
and free cash flow are constrained by ongoing high levels of
exceptional items" Mr Duranson adds.

Moody's adjusted leverage for TeamSystem stands at 8.7x for the
year ending in December 2017 pro-forma for the proposed
transaction, which is elevated and commensurate with the current
B3 rating. However, in light of the reduced risk of debt
additions compared to the existing capital structure, Moody's
anticipates deleveraging on the back of strong EBITDA growth such
that adjusted leverage would decrease below 7.0x in the next 24
months. TeamSystem has grown management adjusted EBITDA
organically by over 10% each year since 2014 and Moody's
considers that there is good earnings growth visibility for 2018
and part of 2019, as a result of executed and ongoing cost saving
initiatives as well as executed price increases and legislative
changes leading to further license sales.

Forecasts are supported by the group's leading position in the
fragmented Italian enterprise resource planning (ERP) market,
with just over 25% market share in SMEs and just over 40% with
accountants and its track record of outgrowing the Italian
economy and indeed the local ERP sector which has been broadly
flat historically. The business and financial profile is also
enhanced by retention rates around 95% and approximately 70%
recurring revenues from maintenance fees and growing cloud
subscriptions.

TeamSystem's credit quality is constrained, however, by its
geographic concentration in Italy (whose forecast growth is lower
than the Eurozone's) and relatively small scale versus rated
peers, with product concentration in the ERP sector exposing the
group to risks of technological shift. Moody's also highlights
that TeamSystem could face more competition in cloud products as
a non-pure player but will at least partially benefit from its
incumbent position in the traditional enterprise software market
for SMEs with up to 250 employees.

Furthermore, Moody's expects that the group will remain
acquisitive and complete several bolt-on deals every year, with
focus on cloud products, reducing net cash flows and increasing
the risk of debt funding. In 2018-19, TeamSystem will also
continue to incur a high level of non-recurring costs related to
the reorganisation of the group initiated in 2016-17, which will
reduce its free cash flow generation. Moody's forecasts that
FCF/debt will reach at least 3% in the next 12-18 months.

Moody's views TeamSystem's liquidity as adequate. The transaction
is expected to leave only EUR5.5 million of cash on balance sheet
at closing but the liquidity profile will be supported by
positive, albeit somewhat seasonal, free cash flow generation and
a new upsized 4.5-year EUR90 million RCF, to remain undrawn at
closing.

RATING OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that TeamSystem
will gradually reduce leverage, driven by sustained organic
revenue growth and further cost savings initiatives. It also
assumes that the company will not make any large debt-funded
acquisitions or dividend distributions.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Positive ratings pressure could develop if TeamSystem reduces
Moody's adjusted leverage towards 6.5x on a sustainable basis,
whilst improving its free cash flow (FCF) generation and
liquidity profile.

Negative rating pressure could arise if Moody's adjusted leverage
moves above the pro forma level at LBO closing (7.7x) on a
sustainable basis, if the liquidity profile deteriorates, or if
FCF stays negative for a prolonged period.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Software
Industry published in December 2015.

TeamSystem is a provider of ERP software to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and professionals in Italy. It designs,
develops and installs different lines of integrated ERP systems
covering largely accounting, tax, legal and payroll management
software solutions. The group also provides vertical-specific
software solutions and trainings (CAD/CAM, Education and other)
for sectors such as manufacturing, retail and construction. It
operates through direct commercial branches as well as indirect
channels (value added resellers or VARs). For the fiscal year
ended December 31, 2017, the group reported revenues of EUR316
million and EBITDA before exceptional items of EUR113 million.

TeamSystem is controlled by funds managed by Hellman & Friedman
LLC (88% equity), following an LBO completed in March 2016, with
HgCapital and management holding the balance of the equity.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZKOMMERTSBANK: S&P Retains 'B+' ICR on CreditWatch Positive
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings kept its 'B+' long-term global scale issuer
credit rating and 'kzBBB-' long-term Kazakhstan national scale
rating on Kazkommertsbank (KKB) on CreditWatch with positive
implications, where we placed them on Dec. 22, 2017.

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term issuer credit
rating and removed it from CreditWatch positive, where S&P placed
it on Dec. 22, 2017, in error. The error did not affect its
ratings on KKB.

The CreditWatch continues to reflect the still-pending approvals
of the merger from the shareholders of both banks and the banking
regulators of Kazakhstan and Russia, where KKB has a subsidiary.
The banks expect to receive shareholder approval for the merger
around the end of April 2018.

S&P said, "We understand from KKB that preparations for the
merger are proceeding according to the planned timeline, with the
merger expected to be completed in the second half of 2018.

"We have identified and corrected an error in our previous review
when we placed our 'B' short-term issuer credit rating on KKB on
CreditWatch positive. Raising the short-term rating would have
required us to raise the long-term rating on KKB above 'BB+', a
scenario we see as highly unlikely in the short term. Therefore,
in our previous review, we should not have placed the short-term
rating on KKB on CreditWatch positive. However, this error has
had no impact on the ratings.

"We intend to resolve the CreditWatch on KKB upon completion of
the merger, which we understand is likely to occur in the second
half of 2018. At that point, we would likely equalize our ratings
on KKB with those on Halyk Bank and then withdraw them, since KKB
will cease to exist as a separate legal entity.

"If the merger does not occur, we would likely affirm our ratings
on KKB. This could happen if the shareholders of either bank or
their regulators do not approve the merger."


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CEVA GROUP: S&P Affirms 'B-' ICR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'B-' long-term
issuer credit ratings on Netherlands-based integrated logistics
services provider CEVA Group PLC (CEVA) and its holding company
CEVA Holdings LLC. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed our 'B-' issue rating on
CEVA's first-lien notes. The recovery rating is unchanged at '4',
reflecting our expectation of average (30%-50%, rounded estimate:
30%) recovery in the event of default.

"We also affirmed the issue ratings on CEVA's first-and-a-half-
lien and unsecured notes at 'CCC'. The recovery rating is
unchanged at '6', reflecting our expectation of negligible (0%-
10%) recovery in the event of default.

"The affirmation reflects our expectation that CEVA's operating
cash flow will improve, underpinned by its so far well-executed
cost saving strategy and structural improvement in working
capital management. In particular, CEVA Holdings LLC demonstrated
significant improvement in reported EBITDA to $185 million in
2017, compared with $153 million in 2016. This improvement was
underpinned by its cost efficiencies and its ability to maintain
a strong customer base. Furthermore, we expect CEVA to maintain a
strong focus in working capital management -- that is, billing
and collecting faster -- which will support better cash flows in
2018-2019. As a result, we believe that CEVA's cash flow
generation will gradually revert to sustainable levels, whereby
it can cover financing and capital needs instead of using
additional debt."

The ratings on CEVA continue to reflect the company's exposure to
highly fragmented and competitive underlying industry with
stronger and larger players, which limits growth prospects and
pressures profitability. Although CEVA seeks to offset operating
risk and pricing pressure with long-term contracts, it is still
highly exposed to air and freight rate cyclicality and volatile
volume demand, which can hit profit margins during economic
slowdowns. In addition, the industry relies heavily on technology
to be competitive and serves demanding customers demanding faster
and cheaper services. As a result, part of CEVA's growth will
depend on its ability to further invest in new technology where,
in S&P's view, competitors have greater capital resources to fund
cost-efficient technologies such as data analytics and
automation.

These weaknesses are. In addition, while bidding for contracts is
competitive partly mitigated by the company's strong client
retention rates and long-standing relationships across a broadly
diversified end-market and can pressure margins, we positively
note that CEVA has been reducing its exposure to underperforming
contracts. Furthermore, we believe that CEVA's top management,
including the CFO who joined in the last two years, has
demonstrated good operational effectiveness  and focus on
profitability that will drive further efficiencies in CEVA's cost
structure.

Majority owned by financial sponsors, the rating on CEVA remains
constrained by our view of the company's highly leveraged
financial profile. S&P said, "We estimate high adjusted debt and
weak cash flow protection measures, including adjusted weighted-
average funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 4.0%, and
debt to EBITDA of about 8.4x for 2018. In addition, we believe
the company has very low flexibility to reduce capital
expenditure (capex) since a large amount will be destined to
support growth. Moreover, while we consider a gradual improvement
in leverage metrics as the company expands its EBITDA base, we
consider that CEVA will remain highly leveraged beyond 2018,
further constrained by the intrinsic characteristics and nature
of its private equity ownership."

S&P's base case assumes:

-- For 2018, an increase in net revenue of about 3% for both the
    contract logistics and freight management business segments.
    This growth is supported by our estimates of annual GDP and
    inflation growth rates for Europe, the Americas, and Asia-
    Pacific. While main growth will come from Asia-Pacific
    region, S&P notes that the U.S. operations could add to
    growth as the company expands its customer base. S&P expects
    Europe to contribute the least revenue growth to CEVA.

-- Revenue growth of 2.5%-3.0% from 2019, reflecting the strong
    competitive pressures in the highly fragmented segment.

-- Cost cutting initiatives, notably personnel reductions,
    automation, and letting go non-profitable contracts to
    improve margins by about 0.2% in 2018. Beyond 2018, S&P
    forecasts a slight 0.1% improvement in margins to reflect
    stabilization in the cost base.

-- Heightened focus on working capital to generate a modest
    inflow in 2018 after 2017 improvement. S&P projects $10
    million inflow in 2018 down from $26 million in 2017. The
    improvement incorporates the company's proven ability to
    collect and bill faster.

-- Capex requirements of $70 million-$80 million per year and
    mostly to support revenue growth. Of the total, about 30%
    relates to maintenance capex.

-- Debt adjusted for the $863 million, 10% second-lien secured
    payment-in-kind notes due 2023. S&P treats these preference
    shares as debt mainly because they can be sold independently
    to any third party.

-- No significant debt reduction in the short term due to
    neutral free operating cash flow.

-- No dividend distributions.

Although available, S&P thinks it is unlikely that the company
will use cash to retire debt, so it does not deduct cash from its
leverage calculations. This is mainly due to the nature of its
financial sponsor ownership.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures for the next two years:

-- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 8.0x-8.5x in 2018-2019 (down
    from 9.7x in 2017).

-- Adjusted FFO to debt of about 4%-5% in 2018-2019 (from 3% in
    2017).

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that, over the
next 12 months, CEVA's credit metrics will remain highly
leveraged and liquidity will be sufficient to meet the company's
financing needs.

"We could lower the rating if CEVA's cash balance reduced
materially and financial leverage increased significantly due,
for example, to negative free operating cash flow generation.
This could stem from deterioration in the global supply chain
industry, poor working capital management, or higher capex that
is not linked to new customers.

"We consider an upgrade to be unlikely in the near term, based on
our forecast that CEVA's financial profile will remain highly
leveraged in the next 12 months. We could consider an upgrade if
revenue growth, cost cutting initiatives, and continuous
improvement in working capital results in sustainable free cash
flow that could be used to pay down debt resulting in debt to
EBITDA of 6.0x or below."


===========
R U S S I A
===========


CB ARSENAL: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
-------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration to manage the credit institution
CB ARSENAL LLC, appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-2726,
dated September 21, 2017, following the revocation of its banking
license, in the course of examination of the bank's financial
standing, has revealed operations towards siphoning off of assets
by extending loans to borrowers with dubious solvency or unable
to meet their liabilities, to a total of more than RUR160
million.

According to the estimate by the provisional administration, the
assets of CB ARSENAL LLC do not exceed RUR408.5 million, whereas
the bank's liabilities to its creditors amount to RUR529.8
million.

On January 12, 2018, the Arbitration Court of the city of Moscow
recognised CB ARSENAL LLC as bankrupt.  The State Corporation
Deposit Insurance Agency was appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on financial
transactions bearing the evidence of the criminal offence
conducted by the former management and owners of CB ARSENAL LLC
to the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and the
Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for
consideration and procedural decision making.

The current development of the bank's status has been detailed in
a press statement released by the Bank of Russia.


SOVCOMBANK PJSC: S&P Affirms 'BB-/B' ICR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB-/B' long- and short-term
issuer credit ratings on Public Joint-Stock Company Sovcombank
and Rosevrobank. The outlooks remain stable.

S&P also affirmed the 'BB-' issue rating on Sovcombank's senior
unsecured notes.

On March 13, 2018, Sovcombank announced its intention to purchase
a further large stake in Rosevrobank, adding to the 45.4% it
already owns. S&P said, "We understand the purchase may be
finalized in late April 2018 and the legal merger completed in
2019. Once the acquisition is completed, Sovcombank will
effectively have a 92% stake in Rosevrobank. The affirmation
reflects that our inherent concerns regarding integration risks
are balanced against both banks' sustainable financial metrics.

"In addition, given Sovcombank's sound intention to finalize the
announced acquisition, we now consider Rosevrobank to be a highly
strategic subsidiary of Sovcombank.

"Since 2015, Sovcombank has gradually increased its stake in
Rosevrobank. Therefore, we believe that the merger is well
thought-out, and that Sovcombank fully understands Rosevrobank's
risk profile. During the past two years, Sovcombank has made
significant efforts to ensure the forthcoming integration is
smooth. We understand that the transaction is set to cost about
Russian ruble (RUB) 14 billion (about $245 million). To finance
the acquisition, in early March 2018, Sovcombank issued tier 1
perpetual bonds of $100 million, which we believe fulfill our
requirements for possessing intermediate equity content, and tier
2 debt of $150 million. Additionally, we expect Sovcombank to
convert existing subordinated debt of about $117 million into
tier 1 equity to support its consolidated capital buffer.

"In our view, once the transaction is finalized, the consolidated
bank could have a more diversified business model with larger
access to corporate clients. We note that Sovcombank continues to
demonstrate better asset quality dynamics than those observed
among many of its regional peers. We expect the consolidated bank
to maintain a good-quality loan book, due to well-developed loan-
underwriting and risk-management systems. We expect the
consolidated bank to retain net interest margins of 5.5%-5.7%.
Under our base-case scenario, we expect the banks' combined
operations will continue reporting relatively strong financial
results in 2018 of about RUB20 billion, which is on par with what
the banks reported for 2017 under International Financial
Reporting Standards. More importantly, we believe Sovcombank has
a positive track record in acquiring and integrating smaller
banks, and the Rosevrobank transaction follows several other
acquisitions in the past six or seven years, all of which it
managed successfully. Rosevrobank is by far the biggest though.

"We note, however, that capital constraints could stem from
challenging macroeconomic conditions and the increasingly
competitive environment in Russia, both of which are out of
Sovcombank's control.

"We anticipate total consolidated assets could reach RUB1.0
trillion by end-2018. We assume that management will be able to
efficiently run this more diversified and much bigger bank. In
our opinion, there are no material risks that could lead to
deterioration of the franchise of any of the engaged banks. We do
not rule out other smaller acquisitions in the future, but expect
the consolidated bank will keep its long-standing selective
approach to inorganic growth.

"We believe that in 2018, while the two banks continue to operate
separately, Rosevrobank will maintain its stable business
position supported by a track record of more than 10 years of
sound revenue generation that is better than the average for
peers. We expect Rosevrobank will keep credit costs at around 1%,
supported by our expectation that nonperforming loans will not
increase. We also believe that Rosevrobank's strong risk
management practices will not deteriorate in 2018. We understand
that Rosevrobank may opt for thinner capital buffers in 2018,
partly driven by expected share buy-back and somewhat accelerated
credit growth, but this remains a neutral factor for the ratings
overall. In our base case, we expect that the acquisition process
will have a neutral impact on Rosevrbank's funding and liquidity
metrics."

SOVCOMBANK

S&P said, "The stable outlook on Sovcombank reflects our opinion
that the bank should maintain its credit metrics in the next 12-
18 months, including good portfolio quality indicators and strong
profitability despite the challenging, albeit recovering,
economic environment in Russia. We do not anticipate any negative
developments stemming from the announced acquisition.

"We could consider a negative rating action if, contrary to our
current expectations, we observed that Sovcombank's portfolio
quality had substantially deteriorated and the bank had to create
new provisions substantially above sector-average levels. An
inability to manage the larger and now-more-complex banking
group, from a strategic or operational point of view, could also
result in a negative rating action. A potential significant
acquisition of new assets not supported by adequate capital
buffers might prompt us to revise downward our assessment of the
bank's capital position."

An upgrade is unlikely in the near term. For this to happen, the
merger with Rosevrobank would need to be finalized and the
consolidated bank's strategy and risk appetite following the
integration of Rosevrobank would need to be assessed by S&P.

ROSEVROBANK

S&P said, "The stable outlook on Rosevrobank reflects our view
that the bank will be able to preserve its credit standing over
the next 12 months during the acquisition process. In particular,
we expect the bank will continue demonstrating strong
profitability, supporting its capital buffers and maintaining the
solid quality of its loan portfolio.

"We could take a negative rating action if we see unexpected
negative developments due to significant management turnover or
deterioration of corporate governance procedures, which would
hurt Rosevrobank's franchise. We would also consider a downgrade
if the bank experienced material deposit outflows that depleted
its currently adequate liquidity buffers without sufficient
support from its new majority shareholder.

"All positive ratings actions on Rosevrobank will depend on the
integration of the two banks, the evolution of Rosevrobank's
status within the group, and our view of the combined group's
systemic importance and creditworthiness."


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CARILLION PLC: Bosses Accused of Being Focused on Own Pay Packets
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Rhiannon Curry at The Telegraph reports that Carillion bosses
have been accused of being "focused on their own pay packets" at
the expense of the outsourcer's perilous financial situation as
it emerged that the firm's remuneration committee had considered
clawing back executive bonuses.

According to The Telegraph, papers published by the joint
business and pensions select committee inquiry into Carillion's
collapse on March 26 show that after the company's first profit
warning in July last year, board members looked again at the
clawback conditions for directors.

It agreed to extend them to include instances such as serious
reputational damage and failures of risk management, The
Telegraph relates.  However, the select committee, as cited by
The Telegraph, said it had "seen no evidence that the
remuneration committee sought to enforce these, despite the dire
state of the company's finances".

"These papers are further evidence that when the walls were
falling down around them, Carillion bosses were focused on their
own pay packets rather than their obligation to address the
company's deteriorating balance sheet," The Telegraph quotes
Rachel Reeves, the chairman of the business select committee, as
saying.

Earlier papers from Aug 2016 suggested that the company should
have flexibility "to increase the maximum bonus opportunity",
despite shareholders expressing a growing dissatisfaction with
the way that the company was setting its pay for senior managers,
The Telegraph discloses.

Headquartered in Wolverhampton, United Kingdom, Carillion plc --
http://www.carillionplc.com/-- is an integrated support services
company.  The Company operates through four business segments:
Support services, Public Private Partnership projects, Middle
East construction services and Construction services (excluding
the Middle East).


DIGNITY FINANCE: S&P Lowers Class B Notes Rating to 'BB (sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'BB (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' and
removed from CreditWatch negative its credit rating on the class
B notes issued by Dignity Finance PLC. At the same time, S&P has
affirmed its 'A (sf)' rating on the class A notes.

Following Dignity PLC's announcement of significant changes to
its pricing strategy on Jan. 19, 2018, S&P placed on CreditWatch
negative its 'BBB (sf)' rating on Dignity Finance's class B
notes.

The transaction is a corporate securitization backed by operating
cash flows generated by the borrower, Dignity (2002) Ltd., as the
primary source of repayment of an underlying issuer-borrower
secured loan. The ultimate parent of the borrower is Dignity PLC,
one of the largest providers of funeral services in the U.K.
market. It originally closed in April 2003, followed by three
subsequent tap issuances in February 2006, September 2010, and
July 2013, and was refinanced in October 2014.

BUSINESS RISK PROFILE

S&P said, "We have applied our corporate securitization criteria
as part of our rating analysis on the notes in this transaction.
As part of our analysis, we assess whether the operating cash
flows generated by the borrower are sufficient to make the
payments required under the notes' loan agreements by using a
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) analysis under a base-case and
a downside scenario. Our view of the borrowing group's potential
to generate cash flows is informed by our base-case operating
cash flow projection and our assessment of its business risk
profile, which is derived using our corporate methodology.

"We have historically assessed Dignity (2002)'s business risk
profile (BRP) as satisfactory reflecting its strong reputation as
a provider of premium funeral services. In addition, the company
maintained a successful defensive strategy whereby the company
looked to acquisitions and price increases to maintain its market
share and drive revenue growth in its funeral services segment,
which we viewed as a weakness in our assessment of the borrower's
BRP."

In S&P's view, Dignity's reputation remains solid. However, the
U.K. funeral services industry is changing and S&P's assumptions
about competitive pressure and price inelasticity that have
historically supported its assessment of the satisfactory BRP
have evolved due to the following factors:

-- Although annual funeral volumes are linked to deaths in the
    U.K., which exhibit a degree of stability and predictability
    over the long term, the volumes captured by the borrower are
    less stable and predictable than what S&P initially
    perceived. The competition is more aggressive with large
    players such as the Co-operative Group cutting prices and
    capturing market shares.

-- An increase in consumers' propensity to search online for
    more affordable services and for better value for money. This
    has led to a change in the business mix with a higher
    proportion of customers opting for basic funerals.

-- A large number of small operators dominate the industry,
    which offer basic funeral services that are cheaper and,
    increasingly, chosen by consumers. Thus, it is unlikely that
    these smaller players would exit the market due to the
    strategic shift decided by Dignity.

-- Consequently, S&P believes that Dignity's decision to cut
    prices on the basic services and to freeze prices on the
    premium services, will only allow it to maintain its funeral
    services market share but its growth opportunities are
    limited.

-- The number of deaths over the last two years has exceeded the
    Office for National Statistics' (ONS) forecasts. However,
    even if this trend were confirmed over the long term, S&P
    believes that organic growth through volumes remains
    constrained due to limited differentiation capacity.

-- The company's external growth potential also seems limited,
    with an acquisition envelope of GBP10 million to GBP15
    million per year.

After considering these pressures, S&P has lowered its assessment
of the BRP of the borrower to fair from satisfactory.

S&P continues to consider the following strengths in its
assessment of the BRP:

-- Dignity's position in the U.K. funeral services market as the
    second-largest funeral service provider in the U.K., after
    the Co-operative Group, and the largest private cremation
    provider in the market with limited material competition.

-- Large network comprising 39 facilities in the cremation
    business, which we consider to be more shielded from market
    share erosion due to existing barriers to entry, including
    having to show proof-of-need to local authorities, public
    resistance to new builds, and building costs of GBP4 million
    to GBP5 million.

-- Good track record of integrating small boutiques playing an
    active role in the consolidation of a market that remains
    fragmented.

-- Dignity's profitability is bolstered by its highly profitable
    crematorium business, which is above the industry average and
    well above the company's peers.

RECENT PERFORMANCE

As of the latest investor report, for the 52-week period ended
December 2017, there are 759 funeral locations within the
securitization group (an increase of 28 locations compared to end
of 2016) and 39 crematoria. Total reported revenue and EBITDA
were GBP297.2 million and GBP110.1 million, respectively,
representing a growth of 0.4% and a decline of 3.6% from the same
period last year. The crematoria business was the only positive
contributor to revenue and EBITDA growth (growing by 2.9% and
1.6% for this segment respectively) whereas the funeral services
(-0.25% and -2.6%) and pre-arranged funeral plans segments
declined modestly (-0.4% and -8.0%). The EBITDA margins remain
stable at 41% for the funeral services business and 58% for the
crematoria business, and it decreased to 28% from 31% for the
pre-arranged plans business.

However, S&P does not believe that the recent performance of the
borrowing group reflects its potential future performance due to
the changes in the industry's dynamics and the new pricing
strategy of the company.

Faced with the competitive and consumer challenges, the firm took
the strategic decision to reduce the price of its simple funeral
by about 25% on average to GBP1,995 in England and Wales and to
GBP1,695 in Scotland, matching its main competitor, the Co-
operative group, and has frozen the prices on its premium funeral
services. Having a forward-looking approach to reflect the
strategic change, we estimate the three-year weighted-average
EBITDA margin at about 32%.

Despite those reductions, S&P understands that Dignity expects to
abate, rather than neutralize, any further erosion in market
share. Specifically, we expect the company to conduct 63,000
funeral services in 2018 against an expected total number of
deaths of around 580,000, according to the ONS, for a market
share of 10.9% (2017: 11.6%).

At the occasion of its preliminary results publication on March
14, the company indicated that it has engaged L.E.K. Consulting
to help it develop its plan for the funeral business. S&P's
analysis does not reflect any potential refinement of Dignity's
strategy.

RATING RATIONALE

Dignity's primary sources of funds for principal and interest
payments on the outstanding notes are the loan interest and
principal payments from the borrower, which are ultimately backed
by future cash flows generated by the operating assets.

S&P's ratings address the timely payment of interest and
principal due on the notes.

A tranched liquidity facility is also available at the issuer
level and is sized to cover 18 months of peak debt service.

DSCR ANALYSIS

S&P's cash flow analysis serves to both assess whether cash flows
will be sufficient to service debt through the transaction's life
and to project minimum DSCRs in its base-case and downside
scenarios.

BASE-CASE SCENARIO

S&P said, "Our base-case EBITDA and operating cash flow
projections for FY2018 and the company's fair BRP rely on our
corporate methodology, based on which we give credit to growth
through the end of FY2018. The price declines combined with our
expectations of a deteriorated product mix and a stagnant market
share result in a base-case EBITDA for FY2018, which is about 25%
lower than the one we considered in our previous review. Beyond
FY2018, our base-case projections are based on our global
corporate securitizations criteria, from which we then apply
assumptions for capital expenditures (capex) and taxes to arrive
at our projections for the cash flow available for debt service."
For Dignity, S&P's assumptions were:

-- Capex: GBP20.0 million for FY2018 and GBP11 million
    thereafter, in line with the transaction documents' minimum
    requirements; and

-- Tax: S&P considered the statutory corporate tax rates.

S&P established an anchor of 'bbb' for the class A notes and an
anchor of 'bb' for the class B notes based on:

-- S&P's assessment of Dignity's fair BRP, which it associates
    with a business volatility score of 4; and

-- The minimum DSCR achieved in S&P's base-case analysis, which
    considers only operating-level cash flows but does not give
    credit to issuer-level structural features (such as the
    tranched liquidity facility).

These new anchors are three notches lower than the ones S&P
determined in its previous review (which were at 'a' and 'bbb'
for the class A and B notes, respectively). This results from the
combination of the lower BRP and the deteriorated forecasted
minimum DSCR levels.

The class A and B notes are fully amortizing, with the
amortization schedule of the class B notes occurring from June
2035, after the repayment of the class A notes, to December 2049.

DOWNSIDE DSCR ANALYSIS

S&P said, "Our downside DSCR analysis tests whether the issuer-
level structural enhancements improve the transaction's
resilience under a stress scenario. Dignity falls within the
business and consumer services industry. Considering the
structural, regulatory, operating, and competitive position
changes in the funeral services market, we have assumed a 25%
decline in EBITDA from our base case, a five percentage point
increase from our previous assumption. The additional stress
reflects our view of the new market conditions and increased
competition in the funeral services sector and Dignity's lower
pricing power. Accordingly, we have lowered our assumption for
the company's average price per funeral under moderately stressed
market conditions, which we view as in keeping with a defensive
strategy to maintain its funeral services market share, which we
assume to remain flat from our base case. For the crematory
segment, we assume that neither the company's market share nor
average price per cremation is affected under moderately stressed
market conditions.

"Our downside DSCR analysis resulted in an excellent resilience
score for the class A notes and a strong resilience score for the
class B notes. These resilience scores are unchanged compared to
our previous review despite the effect of a lower base-case in
combination with a higher downside EBITDA decline. This reflects
the headroom above a 4.0:1 DSCR threshold, in the case of the
class A notes, and a 1.8:1 DSCR threshold, in the case of the
class B notes, that are required under our criteria to achieve
their respective resilience scores."

The combination of an excellent resilience score and the 'bbb'
anchor derived in the base-case results in a resilience-adjusted
anchor of 'a-' for the class A notes. Similarly, the combination
of a strong resilience score and the 'bb' anchor derived in the
base-case results in a resilience-adjusted anchor of 'bbb-' for
the class B notes.

The issuer's GBP55 million liquidity facility balance represents
a significant level of liquidity support, measured as a
percentage of the current outstanding balance of the class A
notes. Given that the full two notches above the anchor have been
achieved in the resilience-adjusted anchor of the class A notes,
we consider a one-notch increase to their resilience-adjusted
anchor warranted. As long as the class A notes remain
outstanding, the class B notes are supported by only 45% of the
GBP55 million liquidity facility, which represents less than 10%
of the current outstanding balance of the class B notes, and are
therefore not eligible for a one-notch increase to the class B
resilience-adjusted anchor.

MODIFIERS ANALYSIS

The amortization profile of the class A notes results in full
repayment within 20 years. Therefore, S&P has not made any
specific adjustment to the class A notes. The amortization
profile of the class B notes results in full repayment beyond 28
years which, according to our criteria, could result in up to a
three-notch downward adjustment. However, due to the reasonable
predictability of revenues and cash flow projections, S&P has
applied a two-notch adjustment, resulting in a resilience-
adjusted anchor of 'bb' for the class B notes.

COMPARABLE RATING ANALYSIS

S&P's comparable rating analysis did not lead to any specific
adjustments.

COUNTERPARTY RISK

The terms of the issuer's liquidity facility in the liquidity
facility agreement and the issuer's and obligor's bank accounts
in their respective account bank agreements (in conjunction with
the cash administration agreement) contain replacement mechanisms
and timeframes that are in line with our current counterparty
criteria. S&P said, "We view the liquidity facility as a direct
limited support and the bank agreements as bank account limited
support, which, given their stated minimum eligible rating
requirements of 'BBB', can support a maximum rating of 'A'. As a
result, the application of our counterparty criteria caps the
ratings at the higher of (i) 'A' and (ii) the long-term issuer
credit rating (ICR) on the lowest-rated counterparty."

OUTLOOK

A change in S&P's assessment of the company's business risk
profile would likely lead to rating actions on the notes. S&P
would require higher/lower DSCRs for a weaker/stronger BRP to
achieve the same anchors.

UPSIDE SCENARIO

S&P said, "We could raise our assessment of the BRP if the
company finds alternatives to differentiate itself and expand
through new products and services. We believe this is unlikely
given the challenging competitive environment. We could raise our
rating on the class A notes if our long-term ICR on the lowest-
rated counterparty is raised to above 'A' and if our minimum DSCR
for these notes goes above 3.5:1 in our base-case scenario. We
may consider raising our rating on the class B notes if our
minimum DSCR goes above 1.7:1 in our base-case scenario."

DOWNSIDE SCENARIO

S&P said, "We could lower our ratings on the notes if we were to
lower the BRP to weak from fair. This could occur in case of
continued erosion of market shares and, or continued pricing
pressure resulting into profitability decline.

"We may also consider lowering our ratings on the notes if our
minimum projected DSCRs fall below 2.3:1 for the class A notes
and 1.4:1 for the class B notes in our base-case scenario."

  RATINGS LIST

  Dignity Finance PLC
  GBP595.306 Million Fixed-Rate Secured Notes

  Class            Rating
            To                 From

  Rating Affirmed

  A         A (sf)

  Rating Lowered And Removed from CreditWatch Negative

  B         BB (sf)            BBB (sf)/Watch Neg


GLG EURO IV: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating to GBP9.5MM Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned credit ratings to GLG Euro CLO IV
DAC's class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C, D, E, and F notes. At closing,
the issuer will issue unrated subordinated notes.

GLG Euro CLO IV is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior
secured loans granted to speculative-grade corporates. GLG
Partners LP manages the transaction.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes pay quarterly
interest unless a frequency switch event occurs. Following this,
the notes permanently switch to semiannual interest payments.

The portfolio's reinvestment period ends 4.2 years after closing,
and the portfolio's maximum average maturity date is 8.5 years
after closing. During the reinvestment period, the manager can
reinvest principal proceeds as long as certain tests are met,
mainly coverage, collateral quality (including S&P CDO Monitor),
and portfolio profile tests.

S&P said, "On the effective date, we understand that the
portfolio will represent a well-diversified pool of corporate
credits, with a fairly uniform exposure to all of the credits.
Therefore, we have conducted our credit and cash flow analysis by
applying our criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt
obligations.

"In our cash flow analysis, we have used the portfolio target par
amount of EUR350 million, the covenanted weighted-average spread
of 3.50%, and the expected weighted-average recovery rates at
each rating level."

The U.K. branch of Elavon Financial Services DAC (AA-/Stable/A-
1+) is the bank account provider and custodian. The participants'
downgrade remedies are in line with S&P's current counterparty
criteria.

S&P said, "The issuer is bankruptcy remote, in line with our
legal criteria. Following our analysis of the credit, cash flow,
counterparty, operational, and legal risks, we believe our
ratings are commensurate with the available credit enhancement
for each class of notes."

RATINGS LIST

  GLG Euro CLO IV DAC
  GBP324.00 mil fixed- and floating-rate notes and GBP37.25 mil
  subordinated notes

                                               Amount
  Class                    Rating            (mil, GBP)
  A-1                      AAA (sf)             173.00
  A-2                      AAA (sf)              30.00
  B-1                      AA (sf)               29.00
  B-2                      AA (sf)               20.00
  C                        A (sf)                23.50
  D                        BBB (sf)              20.00
  E                        BB- (sf)              19.00
  F                        B- (sf)                9.50
  Sub                      NR                    37.25

  NR--Not rated


HOUSE OF FRASER: Future Uncertain After Financing Talks Fail
------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Marlow at The Telegraph reports that fears are growing for
the future of House of Fraser after it emerged that the chain's
heavy borrowings scuppered an attempt to raise fresh financing.

According to The Telegraph, the company is understood to have
held talks with Alteri Investors, a turnaround firm, about a cash
injection of around GBP40 million.  However, discussions
collapsed because the department store group's main assets have
already been pledged as collateral against existing debts, The
Telegraph relays, citing The Sunday Times.  It has GBP400 million
of loans, made up of bank debt and bonds, The Telegraph notes.

The chain's financial predicament will fuel speculation that
House of Fraser could be the next high-profile retailer to run
into trouble, The Telegraph discloses.

House of Fraser has been dogged by rumours of a cash-crunch ever
since Chinese tycoon Yuan Yafei bought the company in 2014, The
Telegraph relates.

In September, Mr. Yafei's company Sanpower pumped GBP25 million
into the business, its first cash injection since buying the
chain three years ago, as losses widened to almost GBP9 million,
The Telegraph recounts.


JOHNSTON PRESS: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CCC-, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings forecasts that U.K.-based newspaper publisher
Johnston Press PLC's revenues and adjusted EBITDA will continue
to decline in 2018, against continued structural declines in the
industry and restructuring and other exceptional items incurred
by the group.

S&P Global Ratings said that it lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on U.K.-based Johnston Press PLC to 'CCC-' from
'CCC+'. The outlook is negative.

S&P said, "At the same time, we lowered our long-term issue
rating on Johnston Press' GBP225 million senior secured notes due
June 2019 to 'CCC-' from 'CCC+'. The recovery rating on the
senior secured debt is unchanged at '4', indicating our
expectation of average recovery prospects (30%-50%; rounded
estimate 45%) in the event of a payment default.

"The downgrade reflects our view that Johnston Press' operating
performance will continue to decline in 2018; it also reflects
our view that the group's capital structure is unsustainable in
the long term. Specifically, we now see a heightened risk of a
default scenario in the next six to 12 months (such as a debt
restructuring) given the declining time to maturity of the
group's 2019 bonds, ongoing strategic advisory process, and
negotiations with bondholders and pension trustees."

Johnston Press has reported that total revenues from continuing
operations fell 5% year on year in 2017. In 2016, the group
reported an 8% decline in revenues to GBP223 million, after
GBP242 million generated in 2015. Newspaper circulation revenue
from continuing operations was up 2% year on year in 2017,
benefiting from a full year contribution from the i newspaper,
acquired in April 2016. For the second half of 2017 on a like-
for-like basis, newspaper circulation revenues for the i were up
19% and advertising revenues were up 26%.

The growth in digital advertising revenues for 2017 -- excluding
declining classifieds -- was 14%. Including classifieds, it was
3%. Total publishing revenues, including advertising and
newspaper circulation revenue from continuing operations, were
down 6% year on year in 2017 (or 13% excluding contribution from
the i).

S&P said, "We expect that, with the declining group revenues,
digital revenues experienced a slight proportional increase in
2017. Likewise, we expect circulation revenues will continue to
grow proportionally as a percentage of the group total, at the
expense of advertising revenues. We understand that Johnston
Press' EBITDA for financial year (FY) 2017 is in line with
company expectations. S&P Global Ratings estimates that this is
about GBP40 million (group reported basis). We forecast S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA in FY2017 and FY2018 to be GBP25
million-GBP30 million. This primarily reflects adjustments for
restructuring costs associated with the group's operations, as
well as other exceptional items such as those costs related to
its strategic process. We do not expect any meaningful asset
disposal proceeds in our 2018 forecast.

"The group had about GBP25 million of cash available at the end
of December 2017. We understand that annual interest payments are
payable in June and December annually, in total amounting to
about GBP19 million. In addition, the group is required to make
GBP10.6 million total pension contributions in 2018. In our view,
the group does not face any immediate liquidity issues in the
next 12 months. However, on an S&P Global Ratings-adjusted basis,
we forecast the group will be free cash flow negative in FY2018
(after pension contributions).

"We forecast that our calculation of adjusted debt to EBITDA will
remain above 8x in 2017 and 2018. Given this leverage level, in
light of the challenging industry backdrop and our assessment of
business risks, we view the current capital structure as
unsustainable.

"The negative outlook reflects our view that Johnston Press will
continue to post weak operating performance in 2018. It also
reflects our forecast for declining liquidity over the next 12
months, an unsustainable capital structure, and a decreasing time
to maturity of the group's June 2019 bonds. Specifically, we view
a heightened risk of default (such as a debt refinancing) in the
next six to 12 months, including a distressed exchange or
refinancing.

"We could lower the rating in the next 12 months if we envision a
specific default occurrence. A default could result from, among
other factors, a debt restructuring such as a distressed exchange
offer, distressed bond buyback, or debt-for-equity swap. In
addition, we could downgrade Johnston Press upon any nonpayment
of interest.

"We currently view an upgrade as remote. However, we could revise
the rating in the next 12 months if the group's operations
improve materially, such that the group is able to successfully
refinance its debt at par."


MICRO FOCUS: S&P Places 'BB-' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed its 'BB-' long-term issuer credit
rating and issue ratings on Micro Focus International PLC on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placement follows Micro Focus' trading update
announced on March 19, 2018, in which it revised down its revenue
guidance for LTM Oct. 2018 to a decline of 6%-9%, from 2%-4%
previously. This reflects weaker-than-anticipated revenues from
end-October 2017 to date, resulting in an expected 9%-12% revenue
decline in the six months to April 2018. At this stage, S&P
believes this will result in higher-than-expected S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of above 4x for the 12 months to
October 2018 versus about 4x previously, as well as FOCF about
US$100 million-US$200 million lower, partly due to higher working
capital requirements.

According to the group's management, this guidance revision was
driven by four key factors affecting license revenues:

-- IT systems implementation issues that are affecting sales
    efficiency and cash collection.

-- Higher attrition of sales staff due to integration and
    systems issues.

-- Disruption of ex-Hewlett Packard Enterprise global customer
    accounts from the demerger of HPE Software.

-- Continued sales execution challenges in North America.

S&P said, "At this stage, we consider these to be mainly company-
specific problems that will have an adverse impact on our base-
case projections for license revenues.

"The extent of this impact would depend on the speed with which
the IT system issues are resolved and the sales function is
strengthened. We note that the timing around the second phase of
the new IT system integration project is now under review.
In general, we also plan to assess the extent to which these
issues could affect Micro Focus' ability to compete for upcoming
deals and maintain market share relative to its peers in the
enterprise infrastructure software market.

"We view negatively the unexpected resignation of the group's CEO
after six months at the combined group and about a year as head
of HPE's Software division beforehand. We believe this could
possibly cause a further distraction during this critical phase
of the integration process. However, this is partly offset by the
replacement choice of the COO, who was already directly
supervising the integration process and is therefore familiar
with the challenges at hand.

"Furthermore, we note that Micro Focus has confirmed its
commitment to its dividend policy, and market consolidation
strategy in the long run, but also its company-defined net
leverage target of 2.7x, compared with group leverage at 3.1x at
October 2017 (equivalent to 3.9x on an S&P Global Ratings-
adjusted basis).

"We aim to resolve the CreditWatch within one month after
reviewing, in more detail, Micro Focus' competitive position and
revenue growth prospects, operational execution of the HPE
Software integration, and FOCF prospects.

"At that point, we could consider a one-notch downgrade if
adjusted leverage looks likely to be above 4x and FFO to debt
below 18% in LTM Oct. 2018. We could also consider a downgrade if
we no longer expect leverage and FFO to debt to improve to about
3.5x and more than 20%, respectively, by October 2019."

A downgrade could also reflect expectations of sustained
considerable revenue declines or weaker EBITDA margins, when
compared to rated peers, resulting in weaker than expected FOCF
generation.

S&P would affirm the ratings and remove them from CreditWatch if
it does not view the above factors as likely to occur.


VAUGHAN ENGINEERING: Prepares to File for Administration
--------------------------------------------------------
Gill Plimmer at The Financial Times reports that Vaughan
Engineering, a 60-year-old engineering company that was
subcontracted by Carillion to work on a school near Liverpool is
expected to become the first casualty in the collapsed
contractor's supply chain.
According to the FT, about 160 staff at Vaughan Engineering's
three offices in Edinburgh, Warrington and Newcastle are expected
to lose their jobs as the company prepares to file for
administration.

The family-owned business is owed GBP650,000 for works completed
for Carillion, the FT discloses.  It had also been contracted to
complete a further GBP1.1 million of work in the first three
months of this year, the FT notes.

The closure, first reported in the trade journal Construction
Enquirer, is expected to be one of hundreds of bankruptcies
caused by the collapse of Carillion eight weeks ago with more
than GBP2 billion in liabilities and just GBP29 million in its
bank account, the FT states.  The collapse has left pensioners
and creditors facing hefty losses and forced the government to
take over the provision of services such as school meals, the FT
relays.


VIRGIN MEDIA: Moody's Rates New GBP300MM Sr. Unsecured RFNs B1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B1 rating to Virgin
Media Receivables Financing Notes II Designated Activity
Company's proposed GBP300 million worth of Senior Unsecured
Receivables Financing Notes (RFNs) due 2023. The outlook on the
rating is stable. All other ratings of the Virgin Media Inc.
group (VMED) remain unchanged.

The B1 rating for the new RFNs is in line with the B1 rating of
the existing GBP800 million worth of Senior Unsecured RFNs (due
2024) issued by Virgin Media Receivables Financing Notes I DAC.
The B1 rating on all RFNs is one notch lower than VMED's Ba3
Corporate Family Rating (CFR) and senior secured debt ratings and
a notch higher than the group's B2 rated senior unsecured debt.

Similar to Virgin Media Receivables Financing Notes I DAC, Virgin
Media Receivables Financing Notes II DAC (the RFN Issuer or the
SPV) is also a Republic of Ireland-domiciled orphan special
purpose vehicle created solely for the purpose of issuing the
RFNs.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Besides the GBP300 million being issued by Virgin Media
Receivables Financing Notes II DAC, Virgin Media Receivables
Financing Notes I DAC had issued GBP350 million of RFNs in
September 2016 and another GBP450 million of add-on RFNs in
September 2017. The proceeds from these notes are used to part
finance VMED group's existing vendor financing program. This
vendor financing program will total GBP2.1 billion pro-forma for
the proposed GBP300 million issuance (compared to GBP1.8 billion
as of December 31, 2017), although due to the phasing of the
program, Moody's anticipate a smaller position by mid-2018. The
recent increase in vendor financing is slightly leveraging for
VMED. VMED group's gross debt/ EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's --
based on last twelve months ending December 31, 2017) is at the
high end of the Ba3 rating category of over 5.5x on a Moody's
adjusted basis and pro-forma for the vendor financing increase.

While the RFNs are issued out of a newly established independent
SPV that is not owned or consolidated by Virgin Media, majority
of the proceeds from the RFNs are indirectly on-lent from the SPV
to VMED via the vendor financing program administered by ING Bank
N.V. (ING, rated Aa3 stable). This vendor financing is reported
as debt in VMED's consolidated audited financial statements.

Under the vendor financing program, VMED and the supplier agree
the price for the goods/services. VMED sometimes receives a
discount from the supplier for early payment. The purchase order
and the invoice are issued at an agreed price and payment terms.
VMED then grosses up the invoice based on LIBOR + margin (as
specified in Accounts Payable Management Services Agreement,
September 2016) and uploads it to the ING Vendor Financing
Platform (ING VF Platform) with a new payment term of up to 360
days from the invoice date. VMED makes an English law Irrevocable
Payment Undertaking (IPU) with respect to the Vendor Financing
Receivable (Receivable). The ING VF Platform then pays the
supplier and subsequently becomes the owner of the Receivable.
The Receivable is thereafter sold by the ING VF Platform to the
RFN issuer. Ultimately, the RFN issuer is paid by VMED the
grossed up value specified in the IPU at maturity of the
Receivable.

To the extent there are insufficient trade payables available for
the RFN Issuer to fund, notes proceeds are on-lent from the SPV
to VMED group via unsecured credit facilities (the VM
Facilities). While the transaction operates through a rather
complex structure, VMED is ultimately responsible for the payment
of coupon and principal on the RFNs via the IPU arrangement and/
or the unsecured loan under the VM Facilities.

The creditworthiness of the supplier is irrelevant for the
bondholders under this mechanism as the supplier sells the
receivable to the ING VF Platform and reduces its payment days.
ING's credit risk in contrast is to a certain degree relevant
because of its role as the sole intermediary in this transaction
but Moody's takes comfort from the protection that the
transaction agreements provide as well as ING's strong rating.
Despite several protection mechanisms built in to the transaction
agreements, there are certain structural risks such as
commingling, that could potentially lead to some delay or loss to
bond holders in a insolvency situation at VMED. While Moody's
recognizes these risks, it does not consider them material enough
to affect the B1 rating on the RFNs.

The RFNs have security over both the Receivables and the VM
Facilities. Both of these represent unsecured claims into VMED
and are supported by the key VMED entities (Virgin Media
Investment Holdings Ltd, Virgin Media Senior Investments Limited,
Virgin Media Limited and Virgin Mobile Telecoms Limited), which
represent more than 90% of the company's revenues and assets.
Both the Receivables and the VM Facilities are in particular
supported by Virgin Media Senior Investments Ltd, which sits in a
structurally senior position to the guarantors of the existing
unsecured bonds. The B1 ratings on the RFNs therefore reflect the
fact that the unsecured claims related to the RFNs are
contractually junior to the existing Ba3 rated VM Credit
Facilities and Senior Secured Notes, which benefit from fixed
asset security, and structurally senior to the existing B2 rated
Senior Unsecured Notes.

VMEDs Moody's adjusted gross leverage of is high for the Ba3
rating category, leaving no headroom for operating
underperformance. While cash flow generation from operating
activities remains healthy, its free cash flow generation is
however currently constrained due to high capex (including vendor
financing). The financial policy of VMED's is aligned with parent
Liberty Global's more leverage-tolerant stance and does not
envisage any material de-leveraging.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that VMED's
strategy of growing its subscriber base and its ARPU aided by
continued improvements in the quality of the broadband and
digital TV offer will translate into improved near-term growth in
revenue and operating cash flow ("OCF" - as defined by VMED).

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- DOWN

Downward rating pressure is likely if (1) there is a loss of
momentum in RGU and ARPU growth resulting in a sustained weak
operating performance; (2) Moody's adjusted Gross Debt/ EBITDA
increases above 5.5x and/or (3) Moody's adjusted CFO/ Debt ratio
deteriorates to below 12%.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- UP

Upward pressure on the ratings could develop over time if (1)
VMED's operating performance remains solid; (2) its adjusted
Gross Debt/ EBITDA ratio (as calculated by Moody's) falls below
4.5x on a sustained basis; and (3) its cash flow generation
improves such that it achieves a Moody's adjusted CFO/ Debt ratio
above 17%.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Assignments:

Issuer: Virgin Media Receivables Financing Notes II Designated
Activity Company

-- Senior Unsecured Receivables Financing Notes, Assigned B1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Virgin Media Receivables Financing Notes II Designated
Activity Company

-- Outlook, Assigned Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Pay
Television - Cable and Direct-to-Home Satellite Operators
published in January 2017.

Virgin Media Inc. is a cable communications company, offering
broadband internet, television, mobile telephony and fixed line
telephony services to residential and commercial customers in the
UK and in Ireland. For the last twelve months period ending
December 31, 2017, VMED generated GBP5.0 billion in revenue and
GBP2.2 billion in Operating Cash Flow (as defined by VMED).


ZINC HOTELS: Administrators to Commence Sale of Properties
----------------------------------------------------------
Jack Torrance at The Telegraph reports that administrators will
this week fire the starting gun on a sale of nine hotels owned by
flamboyant property tycoon Vincent Tchenguiz after the investment
company that owned them went under.

The properties are operated by Hilton but owned by the
Iranian-born mogul's Zinc Hotels and had been up for sale for
years before the company went bust in January owing a reported
GBP250 million, The Telegraph discloses.

According to The Telegraph, administrators AlixPartners have
appointed property firms JLL and Savills to sell the hotels,
which have a combined 1,444 rooms and are located in Cobham,
Croydon, Leeds, and several other UK towns.

Zinc's other hotel, a flagship site in Kensington, has been put
up for sale through a separate process, The Telegraph notes.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *