/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180323.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, March 23, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 059


                            Headlines


B E L A R U S

BELARUS: Moody's Hikes Issuer & Senior Unsecured Ratings to B3


G E O R G I A

GEORGIA: Fitch Revises Outlook to Positive, Affirms BB- IDR


H U N G A R Y

EST MEDIA: Bankruptcy Ends Following Agreement with Creditors


I T A L Y

BANCA CARIGE: Fitch Rates Planned Tier 2 Notes 'CCC(EXP)'
MOBY SPA: S&P Keeps 'B+' Issuer Credit Rating on Watch Negative


L U X E M B O U R G

CORESTATE CAPITAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Credit Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

BARINGS EURO 2018-1: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating to Class F Notes
TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL II: Fitch Rates EUR1.6BB Sr. Notes Offer 'BB'


R U S S I A

KOMI: Fitch Changes Outlook to Positive, Affirms BB- IDRs
VOZROZHDENIE BANK: S&P Keeps 'B' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
YAROSLAVL REGION: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable


S E R B I A

MAGNOHROM: Bankruptcy Agency Accepts Nelt's Bid for Factory


S P A I N

IBERCAJA BANCO: S&P Assigns B- Rating to AT1 Preferred Securities


U K R A I N E

METINVEST B V: S&P Rates New Senior Unsecured Notes 'B-'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CONVIVIALITY: Scrambles to Raise Funds to Avert Collapse
GRAINGER PLC: Fitch Plans to Withdraw BB+ Long-Term IDR
LEHMAN COMMERCIAL: April 9 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
NEW LOOK: Creditors, Landlords Approve Restructuring Plan
RICHMOND UK: S&P Cuts ICR to 'B-' on Underperformance & High Debt


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS


                            *********



=============
B E L A R U S
=============


BELARUS: Moody's Hikes Issuer & Senior Unsecured Ratings to B3
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the Government of Belarus'
issuer and senior unsecured ratings to B3 from Caa1. The outlook
remains stable.

The upgrade of Belarus' ratings to B3 was driven primarily by the
country's strengthening, albeit still weak, external liquidity
position. The current account deficit has narrowed despite the
economy's recovery from a two-year recession, and the excessive
growth in directed lending and guarantees to state-owned banks
and enterprises (SOEs) has been reined in. Moreover, the
government has obtained long-term funding that will help both to
mitigate the risks stemming from its significant gross external
borrowing requirements and to extend its external debt maturity
structure.

The stable outlook on Belarus' B3 ratings balances the country's
improved economic and fiscal outlook as well as its proven
willingness to pay, against its structural external vulnerability
risks and weak institutional strength.

In a related move, Moody's raised Belarus' long-term country
ceilings to B3 from Caa1 for foreign currency bonds; to Caa1 from
Caa2 for foreign currency bank deposits; and to B2 from B3 for
local currency bonds and bank deposits. The short-term foreign-
currency bond and deposit ceilings remain unchanged at NP.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADING THE RATING TO B3 STABLE

Although its external liquidity position remains the main
structural vulnerability in Belarus' credit profile, the position
has strengthened since the country experienced a balance of
payments crisis in 2015 and is expected to continue to do so.
During the past two years, Belarus has received long-term debt
disbursements from multilateral and bilateral lenders and also
tapped the international bond market for the first time in nearly
a decade, which has helped to rebuild foreign currency reserves.

Other than the new financings, the improvement in Belarus'
external position is largely attributable to the favorable impact
of the central bank's 2015 decision to float the ruble on the
trade and current accounts. Even though inflation soared in the
aftermath, the resulting depreciation in 2015-16 strengthened
Belarus' export competitiveness and dampened import demand, with
the result that the current account deficit dropped from an
average of more than 8% of GDP in 2013-14 to 3.3% of GDP in 2015-
16.

The further decline in the current account deficit to 1.8% In
2017 is the result of strong external demand from the rest of
Europe as well as the oil import agreement with Russia that led
to steep increases in both crude oil imports and refined oil
exports last year. The trade deficit still widened somewhat to
$2.9 billion from $2.5 billion, however the net surplus on
services, income and remittances -- the latter speaking to
Russia's own economic recovery -- more than offset that increase.

Foreign exchange reserves accordingly grew steadily last year but
they remain low, especially by comparison to the size of Belarus'
annual external debt service obligations. For example, Moody's
estimates Belarus' External Vulnerability Indicator (EVI), which
is the ratio of this year's short-term debt plus currently
maturing long-term debt, at about 360% this year. While down
sharply from last year, it is still the fifth highest EVI ratio
in Moody's sovereign rating universe after Bahrain, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Tajikistan and Venezuela. While the
central bank's FX reserves reached a recent peak of $4 billion at
the end of February following the latest Eurobond issue, upcoming
payments will erode this position over the course of 2018 to an
estimated USD3.2 billion by the end of the year.

Moody's expects the current account deficit to widen again -- but
only marginally to between 2ยด%-3% of GDP -- in 2018-19, mainly
due to imports for the new nuclear power plant. The fiscal policy
stance has otherwise turned more restrictive: the government is
cutting back on its approvals of guarantees to state-owned
enterprises and reducing directed lending. Monetary policy has
been kept tight as well since 2015, in a successful effort to
rein in the second-round effects of the ruble depreciation on
domestic inflation. The inflation rate dropped well below the
central bank's 9% medium term inflation target in 2017, falling
to under 5% (the target that the central bank envisaged for 2020)
by the end of last year.

Another important step that should reduce Belarus' external
vulnerability in the future is its more comprehensive borrowing
strategy, which reflects public debt management reforms
introduced in 2015. The authorities are focused on diversifying
the government's sources of funding and elongating the terms,
which has started to reduce the uncertainty about how and from
where Belarus will finance its large gross external borrowing
requirements.

In Moody's view, the Belarussian authorities have always
demonstrated a strong willingness to pay despite repeated balance
of payments crises. The current strategy aims to prevent the
recurrence of such a crisis by reducing fiscal and current
account deficits and planning further ahead for how external
borrowing requirements will be fulfilled.

In summary, smaller current account deficits, pre-funding between
years, larger (although still low) FX reserves and a borrowing
strategy that proactively identifies the sources of financing
that will cover Belarus' large foreign debt service payments
depict Belarus' improved external liquidity situation. If
sustained, such parameters and practices should mitigate the risk
of a future balance of payments crisis. Belarus had a track
record of intermittently occurring balance-of-payment crises
since the country gained its independence in 1991.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on Belarus' B3 ratings balances the country's
improved economic and fiscal outlook, as well as its proven
willingness to pay, against its structural external vulnerability
risks and weak institutional strength. After the economy's
recovery from recession last year, Moody's said it expects
average growth rates of around 2% over the next several years. In
light of the tighter fiscal stance as well as continuing
reductions in off-budget spending and directed lending, the
general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio, including guarantees,
is expected to decline gradually to below 50% by 2021 from around
53% now.

That said, Belarus continues to face structural external
vulnerability risks that expose the country to severe challenges
if a major shock were to hit, such as another abrupt drop in
global oil prices or a falling out between Belarus and Russia, by
far its most important trading partner. Furthermore, Belarus'
weak institutional strength is reflected in the government's
significant, but slowing use of its quasi-fiscal balance sheet in
recent years and a certain lack of transparency around those
operations. The large scale of the government's share of the
economy negatively affects its government effectiveness.

WHAT WOULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on the rating could develop from further
strengthening of the external liquidity position that would
reduce the economy's annual debt servicing requirements. Such an
improvement would likely stem from structural reforms that reduce
macroeconomic imbalances and support more sustainable growth.
Also positive would be a faster or larger reduction in the
government's debt and state guarantees provided to publically
owned banks and enterprises than currently foreseen or gains in
lowering the government's share of the economy, whether by growth
in the private sector or via commercialization of SOEs.

Downward pressure could come from a substantial deterioration in
foreign exchange reserves or more substantial widening of
external financing requirements than currently expected. It would
also be ratings-negative if the government's fiscal position was
to weaken significantly or contingent liabilities rise sharply,
with associated risks of spillover to the current account
deficit.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 18,073 (2016 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): -2.7% (2016 Actual) (also known as
GDP Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 10.6% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -3.4% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -3.5% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: 78.6% of GDP (2016 Actual)

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: No default events (on bonds or loans) have been
recorded since 1983.

On March 13, 2018, a rating committee was called to discuss the
rating of the Belarus, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals,
including its economic strength, have materially increased. The
issuer has become less susceptible to event risks.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.


=============
G E O R G I A
=============


GEORGIA: Fitch Revises Outlook to Positive, Affirms BB- IDR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on Georgia's Long-Term
Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to
Positive from Stable and affirmed the IDRs at 'BB-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The revision of the Outlook to Positive reflects the following
key rating drivers and their relative weights:

Medium
Georgia's growth prospects compare favourably with the 'BB' rated
peer group, where median five-year average growth is estimated to
be 3.5%. Georgia's economy grew an estimated 4.8% in 2017, after
2.8% in 2016, and under Fitch's latest projections looks set to
achieve real GDP growth of 4.6% and 4.9% in 2018 and 2019,
respectively. Composition of growth is expected to be broad-
based, supported by a favourable external environment supporting
growth in exports and remittances, as well as higher domestic
demand driven by an increasing government drive towards higher
capital spending.

Georgia's headline fiscal deficit (estimated at 3.4% of GDP,
2017) is currently above the median 3.0% deficit of its 'BB'
rated peers, but Fitch forecasts a gradual convergence towards
3.0% of GDP by 2019. The narrowing of the deficit reflects the
government's priority of reducing current expenditure in order to
meet capital spending needs, while a positive economic outlook
will help support stable growth of tax revenues. At the same
time, Fitch believes a degree of fiscal discipline will be
maintained through the IMF programme, which sets ceilings for
government spending and on-lending activities.

Fitch's projections for the budget deficit and growth performance
are consistent with a gradual decline in government debt. Fitch
sees a stabilisation in the government debt ratio, estimated at
44.5% of GDP in 2017, which is just below the median debt ratio
(47.4%) of 'BB' category peers, and forecast by the agency to
gradually decline towards 43.4% of GDP by 2019. Georgia's
government debt structure has a high level of concessional and
multilateral debt (84% of total debt), but 76% is foreign
currency-denominated, exposing it to exchange rate volatility.
The redemption profile is manageable. For 2018-2019, Fitch
estimates upcoming government debt maturities averaging 4.7% of
GDP and interest payments equivalent to 3.0% of revenues.

Georgia's current account deficit (CAD) to GDP ratio improved
significantly in 2017, with preliminary estimates by Fitch
showing a CAD of 8.7% of GDP, compared with 12.8% of GDP in 2016.
Fitch estimate that the current account including net FDI inflows
was broadly in balance in 2017. For 2018-2019, Fitch forecasts an
average CAD of around 10% of GDP, with FDI inflows averaging 7.6%
of GDP. Upside risks to Fitch's forecast could potentially come
from stronger exports, particularly in the tourism sector, which
had a very positive year in 2017.

Georgia's 'BB-' IDRs also reflect the following key rating
drivers:

Georgia's ratings balance favourable governance and business
environment indicators compared with rated peers and resilience
to recent macroeconomic shocks with weak external finances,
including large current account deficits, high net external debt
and low external liquidity.

Georgia has made good progress remaining on track with
performance and structural benchmarks set out under its three-
year extended fund facility (EFF) agreement with the IMF;
completing its first review in December 2017. Continued progress
in meeting benchmarks aimed at strengthening of its financial
sector, external and fiscal finances (including the
implementation of pension reform), will help contribute towards
further improvement of structural indicators, stimulating
investment and savings.

Despite the improvement in the CAD, Georgia's external finances
are weaker than the majority of its 'BB' category peers.
Georgia's CAD is substantially wider than the 'BB' peer median of
3.4% of GDP. Wide CADs reflect the country's low level of
domestic savings, as well as narrow export base and high import
dependency.

Vulnerabilities in external finances are also reflected by
Georgia's net external debt to GDP (estimated at 61.6% for 2017)
which is more than four times higher than the median 'BB' peer
ratio (13.4% of GDP). Gross external financing requirements as a
share of international reserves is high at 104% (estimated 2017).
Level of gross international reserves increased 10% in 2017 from
2016 levels, but coverage of months of current account receipts
is low (3.2 months). Steady government progress towards meeting
net international reserve floors set by the IMF, together with
its own medium-term 'Larisation' plan will help mitigate
vulnerabilities in external finances.

The overall soundness of the banking sector mitigates the risks
stemming from widespread dollarisation. At end-2017, the share of
total deposits in foreign currency was 66%, down from 71% at end-
2016, while the share of total loans in foreign currency fell to
57% from 65% in the same period. Georgia scores 2* on Fitch's
Macro-Prudential Indicator, indicating moderate vulnerability
from strong credit growth. Annual credit growth is high at 15.7%
(Feb 2018), but has eased from 22.4% in December 2017. The
average capital adequacy ratio in the Georgian banking sector is
high at 19.1% (2017) up from 15.1% in 2016, while the share of
non-performing loans is low at 2.8% (2017).

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Georgia a score equivalent to a
rating of 'BB' on the Long-Term FC IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the
SRM to arrive at the final Long-Term IDR by applying its QO,
relative to rated peers:

- External finances: -1 notch, to reflect that Georgia relative
to its peer group has higher net external debt, structurally
larger current account deficits, and a large negative net
international investment position.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression
rating model that employs 18 variables based on three year
centred averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a
score equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking
qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM
output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within
Fitch criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully
reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that could, individually or collectively, could
lead to an upgrade are:
- Strong and sustainable GDP growth consistent with
macroeconomic
   stability
- A reduction in external vulnerability
- Shrinkage in budget deficits and public sector indebtedness

The Rating Outlook is Positive. Consequently, Fitch's sensitivity
analysis does not currently anticipate developments with a high
likelihood of leading to a negative rating change. However,
future developments that could individually, or collectively,
result in the Outlook being revised to Stable include:
- An increase in external vulnerability, for example a widening
   of the current account deficit not financed by FDI
- Worsening of the budget deficit, leading to further rise in
   public indebtedness
- Deterioration in either the domestic or regional political
   environment that affects economics policymaking or regional
   growth and stability

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

The global economy performs in line with Fitch's Global Economic
Outlook.

The full list of rating actions is:

Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook revised
to Positive from Stable
Long-Term Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook revised
to Positive from Stable
Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Short-Term Local-Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Country Ceiling affirmed at 'BB'
Issue ratings on long-term senior-unsecured foreign-currency
bonds affirmed at 'BB-'
Issue ratings on long-term senior-unsecured local-currency bonds
affirmed at 'BB-'
Issue ratings on short-term senior-unsecured local-currency bonds
affirmed at 'B'


=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


EST MEDIA: Bankruptcy Ends Following Agreement with Creditors
-------------------------------------------------------------
(see article below)
(Joy)

MTI-Econews reports that the Budapest Municipal Court said on
March 20 an agreement between troubled Est Media and its
creditors has been approved and a bankruptcy protection procedure
initiated by the company has wound up.

The court launched the procedure one year ago, and Est Media
reached an agreement with its creditors in September which was
then approved by the court, MTI-Econews relates.  However, one of
Est Media's creditors appealed the decision, MTI-Econews notes.

The decision was upheld in a ruling taken earlier in March,
MTI-Econews recounts.



Est Media bankruptcy protection ends after deal reached with
creditors
Est Media bankruptcy protection ends after deal reached with
creditors



Budapest, March 20, 2018 (MTI-ECONEWS) - An agreement between
troubled Est Media

and its creditors has been approved and a bankruptcy protection
procedure initiated

by the company has wound up, the Budapest Municipal Court said on
Tuesday.

The court launched the procedure one year ago, and Est Media
reached an agreement

with its creditors in September which was then approved by the
court. However, one

of Est Media's creditors appealed the decision. The decision was
upheld in a ruling

taken earlier in March.


-0- Mar/20/2018 11:22 GMT



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA CARIGE: Fitch Rates Planned Tier 2 Notes 'CCC(EXP)'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Banca Carige S.p.A. - Cassa di
Risparmio di Genova e Imperia 's (Carige; B-/Negative/B/b-)
planned subordinated debt issue an expected long-term rating of
'CCC(EXP)' and a Recovery Rating of 'RR6'.

The notes will be issued under Carige's EUR5 billion debt
issuance programme and will qualify as Basel III-compliant Tier 2
debt. The final rating is contingent upon final documents
conforming to the information already received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The notes are rated two notches below Carige's 'b-' Viability
Rating (VR) to reflect Fitch expectations of poor recovery
prospects for the notes in case of a non-viability event. Fitch
believe that should the bank fail, Carige is at risk of being
placed into outright liquidation and that an intermediary
solution prior to resolution (such as a second debt restructuring
with distressed debt exchange (DDE) similar to the one completed
in late 2017 or other solution) is less likely.

Our view is supported by the bank's currently thin layers of
junior non-equity capital (less than 1% of RWAs ahead of this
issuance and less than 3% following the issuance) relative to the
risks faced, specifically the still high non-performing loan
levels with an non-performing loan ratio of 27% at end-2017. The
prospects of poor recoveries for subordinated bondholders in a
resolution scenario are reflected in the 'RR6' Recovery Rating
assigned to the notes.

Fitch does not notch the notes for non-performance risk as no
coupon flexibility is included in their terms.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The notes' rating is primarily sensitive to a change in the
bank's VR, from which it is notched. The notes' rating is also
sensitive to a change in notching should Fitch change its
assessment of loss severity (for example, the notching could
narrow if non-performing loan levels become less significant
relative to the layer of junior non-equity capital, either
through an increase in the amount of the subordinated buffers or
through a significant reduction of non-performing loans) or
relative non-performance risk.

All else being equal, the notes' rating is also subject to change
should Fitch's final Bank Rating Criteria deviate from the
Exposure Draft: Bank Rating Criteria (see "Fitch Publishes Bank
Rating Criteria Exposure Draft" dated 12 December 2017) under
which the notes are rated.


MOBY SPA: S&P Keeps 'B+' Issuer Credit Rating on Watch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it was keeping its 'B+' issuer credit
rating on Italy-based ferry operator Moby SpA and the issue
rating on the senior secured debt issued by Moby on CreditWatch
with negative implications.

S&P said, "Supported by the vessel sale in late December 2017 and
recorded gain from the asset disposal in 2017, we believe that
Moby will comply with its semi-annual net leverage covenant on
its senior secured banking facilities set at 4.0x and tested for
Dec. 31, 2017. However, we have extended our CreditWatch with
negative implications because, under our base case, we still
believe Moby is at risk of breaching its net leverage covenant on
its senior secured banking facilities on Dec. 31, 2018, when the
test level will step down to 3.5x from 4.0x.

"The current rating factors in our belief that Moby will be able
to obtain an amendment to the original covenant thresholds from
the lender group to ensure more leeway for the future tests. We
believe that Moby's leading position as a ferry operator in the
niche Italian market, well-recognized and long-standing brand,
and prospects for free operating cash flow generation help it in
case of negotiations with the lender group.

"We view the uncertainty regarding an investigation by the
European Commission (EC) as negative for the rating. The Italian
government is contracted to pay annual subsidies amounting to
about EUR87 million for all of Tirrenia-CIN's and some of
Toremar's (Moby's wholly-owned subsidiary) loss-making routes, in
exchange for provision of services. However, the EC has
challenged this payment and may determine that it is an
unauthorized state intervention. The ongoing investigation also
encompasses other issues related to allegations that the
privatization of the Tirrenia-CIN business was conducted
unfairly. Depending on the outcome, this could result in a
liquidity shortfall for the company, which would likely trigger a
downgrade.

"We believe Moby will maintain credit metrics in line with our
previous forecast. We expect a gradual improvement in
profitability combined with scheduled debt repayments will
support rating-commensurate credit metrics in 2018 and 2019."

S&P's base case assumes the following:

-- Sales growth of about 2.0%-2.5% in 2018 and 2019, linked to
    S&P's estimates of annual GDP and inflation growth rates for
    Italy and the eurozone (down from 8% estimate for 2017
    supported by new routes).

-- Low cost-base inflation given that Moby has hedges on the
    vast majority of its bunker fuel volumes in 2018, although we
    note there are no hedges in 2019. S&P believes that the
    company will continue updating its hedging program. However,
    S&P acknowledges that an increase in fuel prices could make
    it more expensive to hedge.

-- Annual capital expenditure (capex) of around EUR35 million
    for the next two years to cover investments in fleet
    refitting and dry-docking. No dividend distribution.

-- State grants continuing in 2018 and 2019. S&P assumes that
    Moby could terminate the services or implement other
    efficiency measures to mitigate any potential changes to the
    system of state grants.

-- S&P estimates that about EUR95 million-EUR105 million of the
    company's cash will be immediately accessible to repay debt
    in 2018 and 2019. This amount corresponds to the first
    instalment of EUR55 million for the deferred payment to
    Tirrenia group (which was due in April 2016), and EUR40
    million-EUR55 million for the amortization of the secured
    term loan in February (2018 is already paid).

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

-- S&P Global Ratings-adjusted funds from operations to debt of
    about 13%-14% in 2018 and 16% in 2019 (from S&P's estimate of
    about 11% in 2017).

-- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of about 4.5x-5.0x in 2018 and
    improving to about 4.0x in 2019, compared with about 6.0x-
    6.5x estimate for 2017.*

*S&P's adjusted calculation for debt to EBITDA is not consistent
with the bank's definition of net debt leverage used for the
purpose of covenant calculation. This is mainly due to S&P's
standard operating lease and surplus cash adjustments to total
adjusted debt.

As a ferry operator with a fleet of 47 passenger and cargo
ferries and 17 tugboats, Moby predominantly serves routes between
continental Italy and Italian islands (as well as French island
Corsica). S&P said, "Our business assessment for Moby continues
to reflect the company's exposure to the cyclical transportation
industry and its narrow business scope compared with other global
ship operators and transport service providers. Furthermore, we
consider that Moby participates in a competitive market where
strategic pricing to maintain market share will continue
pressuring profitability.

"As a seasonal business, Moby's revenues are highly concentrated
in Sardinian routes, some of which are not profitable outside the
tourist season, and we note that certain routes never turn a
profit. On top of its passenger ferry operations, Moby generates
about 30% of its total revenue from cargo transportation, which
we consider to have more stable volume patterns throughout the
year.

"Moby's leading position as a ferry operator in the niche Italian
market supports the rating, in our view. It has a well-recognized
and long-standing brand and has operated in the maritime industry
since the 18th century. Moby's relatively young and difficult-to-
replicate fleet of vessels is also a relative strength. We
consider the fundamentals of the ferry industry to be more
favorable than traditional cyclical transportation because demand
and pricing is generally more stable and capital intensity is
lower."

S&P assesses Moby's liquidity as less than adequate. Even though
S&P forecasts sources will cover uses by more than 1.2x over the
next 12 months, its liquidity assessment, among others, factors
in:

-- Risk of breaching its financial covenant for the Dec. 31,
    2018 test; and

-- An adverse EC ruling. We understand that under a worst-case
    scenario, the potential required repayment could go up to the
    deferred payment amount of EUR180 million.

The deferred payment is a variable price component to be paid by
Moby to the Italian state for the acquisition of some assets from
Tirrenia (through the acquisition vehicle CIN). However, this is
subject to Tirrenia-CIN receiving at least the annual subsidy,
currently set at EUR73 million, by 2020. S&P considers that the
deferred payment provides a cushion for Moby because it can be
reduced or terminated if the company is subject to the EC fine.

S&P estimates that Moby's available liquidity during the 12
months started Sept. 30, 2017, will include:

-- Available cash of about EUR157 million, but S&P notes that
    EUR55 million of this is being held for the deferred payment
    that became due in April 2016, which is still pending the EC
    investigation outcome.

-- Undrawn committed revolving credit facility (RCF) of EUR60
    million due in 2021.

-- Operating cash flows (after cash interest) of EUR75 million-
    EUR80 million.

-- About EUR15 million from the vessel sale in December 2017.

S&P also forecasts the company will have the following principal
liquidity uses:

-- Debt amortization of EUR40 million; and

-- Capex of about EUR35 million, mainly for fleet modernization
    or recurring maintenance.

The CreditWatch placement reflects the risk of a net leverage
covenant breach and the uncertainty about the company's ability
to expand its headroom. S&P believes that without a covenant
reset, Moby could be at breach when the test limit steps down to
3.5x in December 2018.

S&P intends to resolve the CreditWatch in the next month. S&P
would likely lower the rating on Moby during this time if the
company fails to increase headroom under its covenant to about
15%.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


CORESTATE CAPITAL: S&P Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' long-term issuer credit
rating on Luxembourg-based real estate asset manager CORESTATE
Capital Holding S.A. (Corestate). The outlook remains stable.

S&P said, "We also affirmed our 'BB+' long-term issue rating on
Corestate's existing EUR200 million senior unsecured convertible
bond. The recovery rating remains unchanged at '4', indicating
our expectation of average recovery prospects (30%-50%; rounded
estimate: 30%).

"Additionally, we assigned a 'BB+' long-term issue rating to the
proposed senior unsecured EUR300 million bond due 2023 to be
issued by Corestate. The recovery rating on the debt is '4',
indicating our expectation of average recovery prospects (30%-
50%; rounded estimate: 30%).

"We expect to review the ratings on the proposed debt once the
transaction is completed -- which we assume will occur within the
coming 90 days -- and once we review final terms of the senior
unsecured loans' documentation.

"The affirmation reflects our view that Corestate's
creditworthiness is unchanged, since our last review, and that
the new senior unsecured issue will not change the company's
financial profile. The company's projected performance and
financial metrics continue to be in line with our original
expectations. Our rating on Corestate, a fully integrated real
estate investment manager focused on German-speaking countries,
primarily reflects our view of its fair business risk profile and
intermediate financial risk profile." With only EUR22 billion of
assets under management (AUM), Corestate is a small asset manager
with high geographic exposure to Germany, which represents over
75% of invested AUM. The company derives most of its income from
real estate assets and strategies and is, therefore, also highly
concentrated in terms of industry compared with large asset
managers.

However, Corestate's strategies are relatively well diversified
within real estate as the company offers an extensive range of
investment products to clients, and invests in a wide variety of
real estate assets, such as residential, office, retail, and
student housing. Furthermore, Corestate partly benefits from its
niche position in the German real estate market and its solid
network in Germany's secondary cities, which tend to have a local
investor base and to be underserved by other large asset
managers. The Corestate's business position is further supported
by the positive performance of its investment portfolio in the
past two years and its increasing ability to diversify its
investor base and attract institutional investors to its funds.

S&P said, "We expect Corestate's profitability metrics, following
the recent acquisition of Hannover Leasing Group (HL) and
Helvetic Financial Services (HFS), to be well above average for
the asset-management industry, with the S&P Global Ratings-
adjusted EBITDA margin forecast to be above 60% from 2018 until
2019. We also view Corestate's earnings volatility as relatively
low following the acquisition of HFS and HL, which increases the
share of recurring fee income to roughly 90% of total revenues.
Corestate's medium-term target of recurring fees is between 85%
and 90%.

"Our view of the company's financial risk is supported by its
large acquisition pipeline following the acquisition of HL and
HFS, which brings visibility to near-term fee income. We expect
that Corestate should be able to reduce leverage during our
forecast period through a mix of debt repayment and EBITDA growth
following the full-year impact of the integration of HFS and HL
in 2018, as well as some margin accretion from the sale of low-
yielding assets. We see the company's net debt to adjusted EBITDA
dropping to 2.0x by 2020 from about 4.5x in 2017, which is
consistent with the company's long-term leverage target of below
2.0x. We expect that Corestate's appetite for acquisitions and
shareholder distributions will remain unchanged over our forecast
horizon. That said, we believe that the firm's financial policy
is at least moderately conservative, and that management will try
to balance any acquisition or exceptional dividend outflows by
issuing additional equity, as was the case for recent
acquisitions.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Corestate's
operating performance and financial risk profile will remain
commensurate with the current rating over the coming 12 months.
We expect the ratio of net debt to EBITDA will reduce to 2x-3x
over the medium term as Corestate reduces leverage through EBITDA
improvement and debt repayment. We also expect that management
will be able to successfully integrate its recent large-scale
acquisitions.

"We could consider a positive rating action if we observed a
sustained strengthening of Corestate's main business and
financial metrics. This would need to be supported by a
successful integration of recent acquisitions and stability of
core revenues alongside an improvement of the group's debt
profile due to deleveraging and lengthening of the debt maturity
profile. Substantial growth of AUM and further diversification of
the business would also contribute to strengthening the company's
competitive advantage and support the quality of its earnings,
with a higher proportion of stable and recurring fees.

"We would consider a negative rating action if we saw a worsening
of Corestate's leverage due to the company's operating
environment deteriorating, or an increase in debt-funded
acquisitions. More specifically, we could take a negative rating
action if debt (net of surplus cash) to adjusted EBITDA was above
3x, and we came to the conclusion that this reflected a weakening
of the company's competitive position. We could also consider a
negative action if we observed a strong decline in margins, or an
uptick in success-related fees to the detriment of recurring fee
income as a percentage of total revenues. This would lead us to
consider that the company's business risk had deteriorated. Any
material negative surprises in relation to the integration of the
recent acquisitions could also trigger a negative rating action."


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BARINGS EURO 2018-1: S&P Assigns B- (sf) Rating to Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to Barings Euro
CLO 2018-1 B.V.'s class A, B-1, B-2, C, D, E, and F notes. At
closing, Barings also issued an unrated subordinated class of
notes.

Barings 2018-1 is a European cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior
secured euro-denominated leveraged loans and bonds issued by
European borrowers. Barings (U.K.) Ltd. Is the collateral
manager.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes pay quarterly
interest unless a frequency switch event occurs. Following this,
the notes permanently switch to semiannual payments. The
portfolio's reinvestment period ends approximately four years
after closing.

S&P said, "Our ratings reflect our assessment of the collateral
portfolio's credit quality, which has a weighted-average 'B'
rating. We consider that the portfolio is well-diversified,
primarily comprising broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior
secured term loans and senior secured bonds. We have conducted
our credit and cash flow analysis by applying our criteria for
corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligations."

Elavon Financial Services DAC is the bank account provider and
custodian. The documented downgrade remedies are in line with our
current counterparty criteria.

The issuer is bankruptcy remote, in line with S&P's legal
criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, it believes its ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes.

RATINGS LIST

  Barings Euro CLO 2018-1 B.V.
  EUR509.25 mil senior secured floating- and fixed-rate notes
  (including EUR42.05 mil subordinated notes)

                                            Amount
  Class                    Rating         (mil, EUR)
  A                        AAA (sf)          292.50
  B-1                      AA (sf)            35.65
  B-2                      AA (sf)            33.35
  C                        A (sf)             33.50
  D                        BBB (sf)           25.00
  E                        BB (sf)            27.50
  F                        B- (sf)            15.00
  Sub                      NR                 46.75

  NR--Not rated


TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL II: Fitch Rates EUR1.6BB Sr. Notes Offer 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned 'BB'/'RR4' ratings to Teva
Pharmaceutical Finance Netherlands II B.V.'s sale of EUR1.6
billion of EUR-denominated senior unsecured notes and Teva
Pharmaceutical Finance Netherlands III B.V.'s sale of $2.5
billion of USD-denominated senior unsecured notes. The offerings
are exempt from registration requirements under the Securities
Act of 1933, but Fitch expects that Teva and the issuers of the
notes will enter into a registration rights agreement with
respect to the notes. Fitch expects the net proceeds from the
offerings to be used to pay approximately $2.3 billion
outstanding indebtedness under Teva's USD and Japanese Yen term
loan agreements and, together with cash on hand, to pay: $1.5
billion outstanding indebtedness under its 1.4% senior notes due
2018, EUR1 billion EUR-denominated 2.875% senior notes due 2019,
and fees and expenses.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

High Debt Levels and Non-investment Grade Status: Teva's
consolidated debt levels were approximately $32.5 billion and
estimated leverage (measured as gross debt to EBITDA) was 5.2x at
Dec. 31, 2017. Fitch expects leverage to stay elevated through
2020, despite Teva's aggressive and committed deleveraging plans.
This belief is based on the expectation that Teva's cash flows
will continue to decline in the near term because of price
erosion challenging its generic medicines business and increased
competition related to its specialty medicines business. Even
though Teva has a number of levers to reduce its debt to EBITDA
ratio, including reducing costs, paying debt from FCF and selling
assets, Fitch estimates that leverage will remain above 5x
through 2019. Fitch's Negative Outlook is premised on the belief
that there is uncertainty about whether Teva can reduce its gross
leverage below 5x in 2020.

Continued Price Erosion and Pricing Pressure:  Teva's generics
business in the U.S. has been negatively affected by certain
developments, including: (i) additional pricing pressure as a
result of customer consolidation into larger buying groups
capable of extracting greater price reductions, (ii) accelerated
FDA approvals for versions of off-patent medicines, resulting in
increased competition for Teva's products and (iii) delays in the
launch of new products. Pricing pressure, particularly in the
U.S., will likely continue to meaningfully weigh on revenue and
margins in the near term. This is particularly concerning for the
less differentiated product segments. Fitch expects aging
populations in developed markets and increasing access to
healthcare in emerging markets will support volume growth for
Teva and its generic pharma peers, but price erosion is expected
to meaningfully offset such growth over the near term..

Asset Sales Required: Teva is taking meaningful steps to reduce
costs and stabilize margins. However, operational stabilization
and dividend reduction, alone, is expected to be insufficient to
provide the FCF needed to deleverage below 5x by year-end (YE)
2019. The company will also need to use proceeds from asset
divestitures to pay down debt. As with all asset sales, the
valuation multiples (sales price/EBITDA) are variable and
important inputs into the deleveraging potential.

Decreasing Sales of COPAXONE Resulting From Generic Competition:
Teva's best-selling product, Copaxone, is gradually declining in
revenue. Generic competition for Copaxone is expected to continue
over the forecast period in the U.S. market in light of the FDA
approval of a generic version of both 20mg and 40mg Copaxone and
the possibility of more generics to follow. Fitch expects
revenues and profitability from Copaxone to decrease by roughly
50% in 2018 compared to 2017, which will pressure Teva's cash
flows and ability to pay debt.

Execution of Restructuring Plan: Teva announced a comprehensive
restructuring plan in December 2017, aimed at reducing its cost
base by $3 billion by the end of 2019. Fitch believes the plan
has the potential to stabilize Teva's business by creating
operational efficiencies to help offset the substantial decline
in revenues. However, even if Teva is successful in realizing the
benefits from the restructuring by the end of 2019, Fitch
believes there remain substantial challenges to Teva's growth and
cost structure that continue to support a Negative Outlook over
the forecast period.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited's 'BB'/Negative rating
reflects the company's substantial indebtedness and modest
financial flexibility; this position is caused by several adverse
developments including: (i) regular and increasing price erosion
of its generic medicines business, (ii) heightened competition
for Teva's leading specialty medicine, Copaxone, (iii) continuing
consolidation of Teva's customer base, and (iv) delays in
development and launches of both generic and speciality products.

Despite these challenges, Teva is the leading pharmaceutical
manufacturer of generic drugs in the world relative to Mylan
N.V., (BBB-/Stable) and Novartis (AA/Negative). The company's
scale, geographic reach, and the level of product differentiation
contribute to FCF estimated to be $2.6 billion in 2018. Mylan is
Teva's closest peer and its investment grade credit profile
reflects a stronger balance sheet and less operational risk
compared to Teva.

Because of these challenges, it is expected that Teva will need
to sell assets or find external capital resources to pay its debt
through 2020. Over the medium to long term, Fitch believes that
Teva may benefit from its focus on innovative pharmaceuticals and
difficult to manufacture, chemically complex drugs, which
generally command relatively more defensible prices and margins.
However, the commoditized portion of its generic drug portfolio
is more prone to pricing pressure. That pressure, as well as its
substantial debt, is expected to result in gross leverage for
Teva remaining above 5x by YE 2019, unless the company undertakes
aggressive deleveraging efforts involving asset sales.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions Within Fitch Rating Case for the Issuer

-- Generic competition for Copaxone and additional generic
    launches in 2018 result in revenues of $1.8 billion in 2018
    and $1.26 billion in 2019, representing a decrease of 66%
    over two years.
-- Generic medicine revenue growth declines at a rate of 13% in
    the U.S. in 2018 and declines at a decreasing rate through
    2021. European generics face low-single-digit price
    increases, somewhat mitigated by flat growth in ROW.
-- Proceeds from the sale of the Women's Health division of $703
    million in 2018 are used mainly for debt repayments. An
    additional $1 billion of asset sales are expected in the
    intermediate term.
-- Restructuring represents a $3 billion decline in operating
    expenses by YE 2019; however, this still results in a
    decrease in EBITDA margin from historical levels.
-- Allergan working capital settlement provides around $700
    million of cash in 2018.
-- Working capital held roughly static 2018 and 2019.
-- There are one-time restructuring charges of $800 million in
    2018.
-- No new equity is issued for cash; however, common equity
    increases $3.6 billion in 2018 as a result of the conversion
    of convertible preferred stock into common.
-- Gross leverage is assumed to remain above 5x through 2019.
-- The refinancing of debt improves Teva's financial flexibility
    in the near term, but is neutral to the rating, because gross
    leverage remains unchanged.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive:
-- A one-notch upgrade would be considered if Teva were expected
    to maintain gross debt/EBITDA below 4.5x.
-- In addition, positive rating momentum could build if Teva is
    able to grow EBITDA; which may occur if Teva is able to
    arrest the rate of price deflation in North American generics
    and replace the loss of the revenue and EBITDA from Copaxone
    by successfully launching new products.
-- The application of proceeds from asset sales to pay debt is
    viewed positively, but will need to be considered in the
    context of the company's earnings power thereafter.

Negative:
-- A one-notch downgrade would incorporate the company operating
    with gross debt/EBITDA durably above 5.0x.
-- The company does not return to sustainably stable operating
    performance, in part due to an even more onerous than
    forecasted pricing environment.
-- The U.S.FCF, while positive, declines to levels that
    meaningfully increase Teva's reliance on asset sales or new
    external capital resources to be able to meet its debt
    obligations.
-- Generic competition against Copaxone 40mg drives a greater
    than expected share loss in 2018 and 2019.

LIQUIDITY

Cash Prioritized for Deleveraging:
Cash and cash equivalents were approximately $1.1 billion as of
Dec. 31, 2017. In addition, Teva had access to a $3 billion
syndicated revolving line of credit at Dec. 31, 2017, which Teva
reported was unused as of Dec. 31, 2017.

The proposed refinancing of long-term debt is a positive credit
development for Teva. In addition, Fitch expects Teva to generate
meaningfully positive FCF in the range of $2.4 billion to 2.9
billion per year through 2020. However, it is unclear whether FCF
and available sources of liquidity (cash and lines of credit)
will be adequate to meet total debt obligations due through 2020,
because of the headwinds to revenues.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Fitch has assigned the following ratings:

Senior unsecured notes 'BB'/'RR4'.

Fitch currently rates Teva:

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited
-- Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) 'BB'.

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
-- Long-Term IDR 'BB'.

The Rating Outlook is Negative.

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
-- Senior unsecured bank facilities 'BB'/'RR4'.

Teva Pharmaceutical Finance Company LLC
-- Senior unsecured notes 'BB'/'RR4'.

Teva Pharmaceutical Finance IV, LLC
-- Senior unsecured notes 'BB'/'RR4'.

Teva Pharmaceutical Finance Company, B.V.
-- Senior unsecured notes 'BB'/'RR4'.

Teva Pharmaceutical Finance IV, B.V.
-- Senior unsecured notes 'BB'/'RR4'.

Teva Pharmaceutical Finance V, B.V.
-- Senior unsecured notes 'BB'/'RR4'.

Teva Pharmaceutical Finance Netherlands II B.V.
-- Senior unsecured notes 'BB'/'RR4'.

Teva Pharmaceutical Finance Netherlands III B.V.
-- Senior unsecured notes 'BB'/'RR4'

Teva Pharmaceutical Finance Netherlands IV B.V.
-- Senior unsecured notes 'BB'/'RR4'.

All bonds issued by Teva subsidiaries are unconditionally
guaranteed by the parent company, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries
Ltd.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


KOMI: Fitch Changes Outlook to Positive, Affirms BB- IDRs
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on Russian Republic of
Komi's Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) to Positive from Stable and affirmed the IDRs at
'BB-'. Fitch has also affirmed the region's Short-Term Foreign-
Currency IDR at 'B' and its outstanding senior unsecured domestic
bonds at 'BB-'.

The revision of the Outlook to Positive reflects Fitch's
expectation that Komi will consolidate its budgetary performance,
which notably improved in 2017 after a prolonged period of high
deficit and weak operating margin. The 'BB-' ratings also factor
in Russia's weak institutional framework leading to the limited
budget flexibility and volatile tax revenue of the regional
budget. This is counterbalanced by Komi's sound socio-economic
metrics by national standards.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The Outlook revision reflects the following rating drivers and
their relative weights:

HIGH

Fiscal Performance Assessed as Neutral (revised from Weakness)
Komi recorded a significant improvement in its budgetary
performance in 2017, with surplus before debt variation at 4.7%
of total revenue (2014-2016: average deficit 13.7%) and operating
margin at 15% (2014-2016: average -1.8%), driven by exceptionally
high corporate income tax (CIT) proceeds. The latter reached
RUB23 billion, which is 1.4x higher compared with the previous
year. This led to 17.6% growth of operating revenue in 2017,
while opex remained almost stable due to strict control by
management.

Fitch projects Komi's budgetary performance will moderately
deteriorate in 2018 due to scaling back of CIT to its historical
average. However, Fitch expect the region to demonstrate 5%-6%
operating margin in the medium term, which will be sufficient to
cover interest payments. The expected better performance is
underpinned by management's intention to streamline expenditure
and an improvement in major taxes proceeds, particularly personal
income tax, CIT and property taxes, which altogether account for
more than 90% of total tax revenue.

We expect management will keep expenditure under control in line
with inflation, which will limit the deficit before debt
variation to about 3% of total revenue in 2018-2020.

Direct Debt and Other Long-Term Liabilities Assessed as Neutral
Fitch projects Komi's direct risk will stay below 65% of current
revenue in 2018-2020. By end-2017 the risk accounted for RUB38
billion, down from RUB41.2 billion in 2016. Absolute debt decline
and notable revenue growth led to a significant debt burden
reduction to 55% relative to current revenue after a prolonged
period of rapid debt growth. The debt burden increased materially
during 2013-2016 due to an ongoing budget deficit. It peaked at
70.3% of current revenue by end-2016.

Like the majority of Russian regions, Komi participates in the
budget loans restructuring programme initiated by the federal
government at the end of 2017, which eases immediate refinancing
pressure. According to the programme, the maturity of RUB6.9
billion budget loans granted to the region have been prolonged
until 2024, with most repayments to be made close to the end of
maturity. This will help save on interest payments and free the
region from needing to borrow from market for refinancing of
these loans in the medium term. At the same time, management does
not expect any new budget loans from the federal government in
2018-2020.

Komi has a favourable debt structure, which is dominated by long-
term bond issues (60% of direct risk), followed by low-cost
budget loans (21% of direct risk) and bank loans (19%). The debt
maturity profile is stretched to 2034, but about half of the risk
is concentrated in 2019-2021. This leads to a weighted average
life of debt of about four years, which is relatively short in an
international context.

MEDIUM

Management and Administration Assessed as Neutral
Debt policy is relatively sophisticated compared with national
peers. The administration relies on long-term bonds and is
actively using the available low-cost debt instruments (90 day
treasury loans and federal loans at near-zero rates) in order to
gain cost savings on interest. Fitch assume that no significant
changes will be made to the budgetary practice over the medium
term.

The administration aims to reduce debt in the medium term and
budgeted a surplus for 2019-2020. However, the region is
dependent on the decision of the federal authorities, which
hamper the forecasting ability.

LOW

Economy Assessed as Neutral
Komi has a sound economy by national context and its GRP per
capita was almost twice as high as the national median and the
average salary about 50% above the national median. However, the
economy is concentrated in the natural resources sector, which
exposes the region to commodity price fluctuations and potential
changes in fiscal regulation.

Institutional Framework Assessed as Weakness
The republic's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian local and regional
governments (LRGs), which has a shorter record of stable
development than many of its international peers. Weak
institutions lead to lower predictability of Russian LRGs'
budgetary policies, which are subject to the federal government's
continuous reallocation of revenue and expenditure
responsibilities within government tiers.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The maintenance of a positive current balance and direct risk at
below 75% of current revenue (2017: 55%) at a sustainable base
would lead to an upgrade.


VOZROZHDENIE BANK: S&P Keeps 'B' ICR on CreditWatch Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings announced that it has kept its 'B' long-term
issuer credit rating on Russia-based Vozrozhdenie Bank on
CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P initially puts the
ratings on CreditWatch on Dec. 19, 2017.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term issuer credit
rating on the bank.

The CreditWatch continues to reflect the uncertainty regarding
the bank's future ultimate ownership structure and business
strategy. S&P said, "We understand that the effective ownership
of the bank has not yet changed after CBR issued the prescription
to the Ananiev brothers to sell their stake in the bank on Dec.
18, 2017. Although the Ananievs have transferred their stake to
several Cyprus-registered companies, we understand these
companies are affiliated to the brothers, which is why CBR has
further restricted the voting rights of the related group of
shareholders to 10% of overall votes (without the restriction,
they account for 50.034%).

"In addition, although we understand that several parties
expressed their interest to acquire control of Vozrozhdenie Bank,
we do not have clarity on who will eventually become its ultimate
strategic controlling shareholder. On March 7, 2018, the bank re-
elected its board of directors where five directors now represent
an investment company Bonum Capital; three directors represent
investment company Renaissance Capital; three directors represent
Vozrozhdenie Bank's management; and one director is independent.
In addition, we do not have clarity on how the bank's business
strategy and risk appetite will change following the expected
transformation of the ownership structure.

"We see the bank's stand-alone credit profile remaining unchanged
at 'b'.

"We aim to resolve the CreditWatch placement within the next
three months, when we expect to get greater clarity on
Vozrozhdenie Bank's ultimate ownership structure and business
strategy as well as how the prolonged uncertainty about its
future might affect the bank's franchise and funding and
liquidity.

"We would affirm the rating in the next three months if we gained
an understanding of the bank's final ownership structure and
considered that its business strategy continues to incorporate a
conservative risk-taking approach, as we have previously
observed. We would also need to conclude that the company's asset
quality remains in line with peers and the bank is able to
sustain its franchise, capital buffers, funding and liquidity.

"We could lower the rating if we observed any material client
fund outflows or deterioration of asset quality and
capitalization due to increased credit costs or other unexpected
losses that we do not account for in our base-case scenario, with
the risk-adjusted capital ratio falling below 3%. We could also
lower the rating if we saw that prolonged uncertainty around the
bank's future has a material negative impact on the customer
franchise, weakening the business position of the bank."


YAROSLAVL REGION: Fitch Affirms BB- Long-Term IDR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russian Yaroslavl Region's Long-Term
Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at
'BB-' and Short-Term Foreign-Currency IDR at 'B'. The Outlook is
Stable. The region's senior debt ratings have been affirmed at
long-term local currency 'BB-'.

The 'BB-' ratings reflect Yaroslavl's volatile fiscal
performance, with a recently improved operating balance and
reduced deficit before debt variation and stabilised direct risk.
The ratings also factor in the region's moderate social-economic
profile and Russia's weak institutional framework for sub-
nationals.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fiscal Performance Assessed as Weakness, Trend Revised to
Positive from Stable
Fitch projects Yaroslavl Region's fiscal performance to
continually improve, with operating balance growing above 5%
level in 2018-2020 (2017: 2.9%) and current balance consolidating
enough to fully cover interest payments. The region's budgetary
performance improved in 2017, with its current balance turning
positive having been consistently negative in 2013-2016. The
region's full-year deficit before debt variation reduced to 2.7%
of total revenue by end-2017 (2016: 6.6%).

Fitch expects Yaroslavl to record a minor deficit before debt
variation over the medium term (about 1%), as the region's
administration targets close to balanced budgets. The region
posted slightly better performance than Fitch expected last year.
Yaroslavl's fiscal performance was positively affected by
increase in the region's tax revenue, which went up to 8.6% yoy
in 2017. Taxes remain the key item of the region's operating
revenue, accounting for 88% in 2017, while opex remains rigid,
with proportion of inflexible spending items (salaries and
transfers) averaging 94% of operating expenditure.

Debt and Other Long-Term Liabilities Assessed as Neutral, Trend
is Stable
Fitch expects consolidation of the region's direct risk at about
60% of current revenue in 2018-2020, after it scaled back to 64%
in 2017 down from 69% in 2016. Yaroslavl's debt structure is
dominated by domestic bonds (53% of 2017 total debt), followed by
low-cost federal budget loans (42%) and bank loans (5%). The low
cost of federal funding at 0.1% interest rate and refinancing of
bank loans with domestic bonds helps the region to save on
interest payments, which Fitch expect to hover around 2%-3% of
operating revenue in 2018-2020 after it reduced to 2.6% in 2017
(5.1% in 2016).

The region's immediate refinancing risk is manageable with 16% of
its current debt stock scheduled to mature in 2018, while debt
amortisations are fairly smooth and spread until 2034. The
average life of the region's debt was further extended to 5.1
years by end-2017 (2016: 3.6 years). Reduced refinancing risk and
saving on debt servicing was a result of careful use of funding
offered by domestic capital markets, national banks and federal
government.

Management and Administration Assessed as Neutral, Trend is
Stable
The region's administration demonstrates prudent debt management
policy aimed at maintaining manageable debt portfolio and
adherence to the restoration of a satisfactory budgetary
performance. The region's budgeting approach is quite
conservative and actual budget execution normally leads to a
lower than expected deficit. Fitch assume continuity of these
policies and practices over the medium term.

Economy Assessed as Neutral, Trend is Stable
The region's economy performs in line with the national median,
as measured by the latest available wealth metrics such as gross
regional product (GRP) per capita (4% above the national median
in 2015) and average salary (2% above the national median in
2016). Various sectors of the diversified regional economy
provide Yaroslavl with a broad tax base, while the top 10
taxpayers contributed 35% of Yaroslavl's tax revenue in 2017.
According to preliminary estimates the region's 2017 GRP grew by
3.6% yoy (2016: 1.2%). According to the administration's base
macro-forecast in 2018-2020 economic growth will accelerate to
4%-4.5% yoy.

Institutional Framework Assessed as Weakness, Trend is Stable
The region's credit profile remains constrained by the weak
institutional framework for Russian local and regional
governments (LRGs), which has a shorter record of stable
development than many of the region's international peers. The
predictability of Russian LRGs' budgetary policy and overall
resource planning horizon is hampered by frequent reallocation of
revenue and expenditure responsibilities between government
tiers.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

An improvement in the operating balance towards 10% of operating
revenue, coupled with a debt coverage ratio (direct risk-to-
current balance) at around 10 years (2017: 180 years) for a
sustained period could lead to an upgrade.

Inability to maintain a positive current balance and widening of
the deficit above 10% of total revenue could lead to a downgrade.


===========
S E R B I A
===========


MAGNOHROM: Bankruptcy Agency Accepts Nelt's Bid for Factory
-----------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Serbia's Bankruptcy Supervision Agency said
it accepted the bid of logistics company Nelt Group for the
acquisition of the electrothermal products factory of the
insolvent producer of fire-resistant materials Magnohrom in
Kraljevo.

According to SeeNews, the Bankruptcy Supervision Agency said in a
statement that Nelt group placed its RSD98 million (US$1
million/EUR828,000) bid during an auction for the sale of assets
of state-controlled Magnohrom held on March 21.

The agency also accepted a RSD24.8 million proposal from Serbian
company Malbex WBI for the purchase of a brick factory of
Magnohrom in Kraljevo, SeeNews relates.

According to SeeNews, the agency said no bids were placed for
Magnohrom's factory for the production of fire-resistant
materials, chrome, magnesite and dolomite mines in Gornji
Milanovac and Zlatibor, as well as plots of land in Kraljevo,
Cacak, Cajetina and Gornji Milanovac.

Kraljevo commercial court declared Magnohrom insolvent in
September 2016, when the company's outstanding liabilities
totalled RSD4.1 billion, SeeNews recounts.



=========
S P A I N
=========


IBERCAJA BANCO: S&P Assigns B- Rating to AT1 Preferred Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
On March 19, 2018, S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B-' issue
rating to the proposed perpetual non-cumulative additional Tier 1
(AT1) preferred securities to be issued by Spain-based Ibercaja
Banco S.A.

S&P said, "We also affirmed the 'BB+/B' long- and short-term
issuer credit ratings on Ibercaja. The outlook remains positive.

"We are assigning our 'B-' rating to the AT1 preferred
securities, five notches below our 'bb+' stand-alone credit
profile for Ibercaja." S&P calculates this five-notch difference
as follows:

-- Two notches to reflect subordination risk;

-- Two additional notches to take into account the risk of
    nonpayment at the full discretion of the issuer, and the
    hybrid's expected inclusion in Tier 1 regulatory capital; and

-- One further notch to reflect the proposed issue's mandatory
    contingent capital clause leading to principal write down if
    Ibercaja's Common Equity Tier 1 ratio falls below 5.125%.

S&P notes that coupon suspension is mandatory if the amount of
distributable items is not sufficient or if the bank does not
comply with the minimum regulatory solvency requirements. At this
stage, S&P views these risks for Ibercaja as limited because:

-- S&P estimates that distributable items at year-end 2017 will
    cover annual AT1 coupon payments by about 10 times, and it
    anticipates that distributable items should gradually
    increase through earnings retention; and

-- The bank's Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of 11.72%/11.04%
    (phased-in/fully-loaded) as of end-December 2017 is well
     above the 8.125% minimum level set by the regulator under
    the Supervisory Review and Evaluation for 2018.

S&P said, "We acknowledge the existence of an outstanding legacy
preferred hybrid instrument (ES0114954003) which amounts to EUR5
million and is rated 'CCC+', one notch below the proposed AT1.
This instrument ranks pari passu with the above-mentioned AT1,
but unlike the proposed security, has a mandatory non-payment
clause linked to a narrow earnings definition (i.e. previous
year's net distributable profit). Given the small outstanding
amount remaining on this legacy capital instrument and the bank's
ability to redeem it at any call date, we view the risk of
mandatory coupon non-payment on the legacy instrument leading the
bank to decide to skip coupon payments on the proposed AT1
preferred securities as limited.

"We intend to assign intermediate equity content to the new AT1
preferred securities, once the regulator approves them for
inclusion in the bank's regulatory Tier 1 capital. The
instruments meet the conditions for intermediate equity content
because they are perpetual, with a first call date at five years
from issuance. In addition, they do not contain a coupon step-up
and have loss-absorption features on a going-concern basis due to
the bank's flexibility to suspend the coupon at any time.

"While we view Ibercaja's capital strengthening positively, it is
not enough to change our view of the bank's creditworthiness. We
estimate that the proposed AT1 preferred securities will have a
positive 80-90 basis point impact on our risk-adjusted capital
(RAC) ratio, which should stand around 5.6%-5.7% at end-2018. We
are therefore revising our capital and earnings assessment to
moderate from weak. Our forecast also considers further
deleveraging and some internal capital generation. That said, we
still view Ibercaja's capitalization relative to the risks it
runs as a rating weakness, and its financial flexibility as
limited, given its unlisted status. With the proposed AT1,
Ibercaja will completely fill the AT1 bucket (representing 1.5%
of its RWAs) and any further capital strengthening will depend on
earnings generation, which we expect to be moderate.

"Ibercaja remains challenged to reduce its still-high stock of
nonperforming assets. We forecast the bank will organically
reduce its nonperforming assets (NPAs) by about 10%-15%
cumulatively in the next two years, bringing its NPA ratio to
just below 10% by end-2019, relatively in line with our system-
expectation. We have therefore revised our risk position
assessment to adequate from strong.

"Our ratings on Ibercaja also reflect its solid retail banking
franchise in northeastern Spain and conservative management, as
well as its ample liquidity. Its liquid assets covered its short-
term wholesale funding 2.7x on Sept. 30, 2017.

"The positive outlook on Ibercaja reflects the possibility that
we could raise our long-term rating in the next 12 months if
Spain's economic and operating environment becomes more
supportive, ultimately resulting in a higher anchor for banks
operating primarily in Spain. An upgrade would also depend on our
view of its ability to turn around and sustainably increase its
profitability, as well as preserve its franchise. Raising
Ibercaja's long- and short-term ratings would imply a two-notch
upgrade on the AT1 preferred securities, owing to the bank's
transition to investment grade.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if, contrary to our
current expectations, we don't see the economic or operating
environment in Spain becoming more supportive for banks. We could
also revise the outlook to stable if Ibercaja is not able to
prove that it can be sustainably profitable, the relative value
of its regional banking franchise weakens, or it engages in
acquisitions that impair its financial profile."


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


METINVEST B V: S&P Rates New Senior Unsecured Notes 'B-'
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has assigned its 'B-' issue
rating to the proposed senior unsecured notes of Metinvest B.V.,
the holding company of a group of mostly Ukraine-based vertically
integrated steel and mining assets.

The company is expecting to refinance the outstanding $1.2
billion notes due 2021 with new notes comprising a proposed
indicative five-year tranche and an eight-year tranche. The
proceeds will be used to refinance existing debt.

The notes issue is part of the company's larger liability
management exercise, and completion is subject to consent from
different debtholders, including an acceptance of 75% of
noteholders. S&P sees the transaction as credit neutral, somewhat
improving the company's liquidity profile, with lower maturities
in the coming years.

The transaction includes the following elements:

-- PXF--Of the existing pre-export facility (PXF) of $1.1
    billion, the company intends to repay 20% upfront on the
    settlement date and swap up to $300 million into the new
    notes, on a noncash basis. The main features of the new PXF
    include an extension of the maturity profile by 14 months
    with final maturity in October 2022, as well as release of
    the cash sweep mechanism and the common security. The new
    features of the PXF also include a different set of covenants
    including removing the limitation on dividends, allowing
    Metinvest to distribute up to 50% of the net income once 35%
    of the PXF is repaid.

-- The company intends to repay the existing $1.2 billion senior
    secured notes due 2021, with the new notes.

The company has published its results for 2017, pointing to
stronger-than-expected credit metrics and cash balance ($259
million as of Dec. 31, 2017). Under S&P's base case, assuming
iron ore of $65 per ton for the rest of the year, it projects S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA of about $1.4 billion-$1.7 billion
in 2018, compared with its previous EBITDA forecast of about $1.3
billion. This should translate into free operating cash flow of
$170 million-$210 million and adjusted debt to EBITDA of about
2x.

Looking to 2019 under the proposed new capital structure, S&P
doesn't rule out resuming dividend payments. S&P understands that
one of the conditions to pay dividends would be further repayment
of 15% of the PXF or about $160 million.

ISSUE RATINGS--SUBORDINATION RISK ANALYSIS

CAPITAL STRUCTURE

The pro forma capital structure, taking into account the proposed
new senior unsecured bonds, consists of:

-- $0.6 billion-$0.9 billion of a senior unsecured PXF with
    maturity in October 2022 (the exact amount will be subject to
    the swap of the PXF to new notes);

-- Post-tender residual of the existing senior secured notes due
    in December 2021;

-- Up to $1.2 billion new senior unsecured notes plus
    additionally up to $300 million of PXF shift; and

-- Other financial debt.


ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS

There are no elements of subordination risk in Metinvest's
current and proposed capital structure. The proposed notes and
the PXF rank pari passu.

S&P rates Metinvest's proposed bonds 'B-', in line with the
issuer credit rating, reflecting no elements of subordination
risk in the capital structure.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CONVIVIALITY: Scrambles to Raise Funds to Avert Collapse
--------------------------------------------------------
Hannah Boland at The Telegraph reports that Conviviality is
meeting with investors over the coming days as it scrambles to
raise funds to pay off its debts, though warned that if it failed
to secure the cash, it could go bust.

The Bargain Booze owner, which earlier this month said it was
considering tapping shareholders for funds, said it had arranged
meetings with institutional investor this week to persuade them
to take part in its share placing to raise GBP125 million, The
Telegraph relates.

According to The Telegraph, Conviviality said it needed the cash
to resolve overdue payments with creditors, settle payments with
tax authorities, repay its GBP30 million revolving credit
facility and provide enough capital headroom to allow it to
recapitalize the business.

The company, as cited by The Telegraph, said it was exploring
"other funding alternatives in the event that the placing is
unsuccessful", but cautioned that "if the company is unable to
raise funds by way of the placing or otherwise, it is unlikely to
be able to trade on a going concern basis".

Conviviality, in the same statement on March 21, issued a third
profit warning, saying its earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation and amortization for the year to end April 29 would
be around GBP10 million less than expected, The Telegraph notes.


GRAINGER PLC: Fitch Plans to Withdraw BB+ Long-Term IDR
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings plans to withdraw the ratings on Grainger plc on or
about April 16, 2018 for commercial reasons.

Fitch currently rates Grainger plc:
-- Long-Term IDR 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
-- Senior secured notes 'BBB-'

Fitch reserves the right in its sole discretion to withdraw or
maintain any rating at any time for any reason it deems
sufficient. Fitch believes that investors benefit from increased
rating coverage by Fitch and is providing approximately 30 days'
notice to the market of the rating withdrawal of Grainger plc.
Ratings are subject to analytical review and may change up to the
time Fitch withdraws the ratings.

Fitch's last rating action on Grainger plc was on Feb. 2, 2018
when the ratings were upgraded.


LEHMAN COMMERCIAL: April 9 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Rule 14.29 of the Insolvency (England and Wales)
Rules 2016, Derek Anthony Howell, Anthony Victor Lomas, Steven
Anthony Pearson, Julian Guy Parr, Gillian Eleanor Bruce, all
Joint Administrators of Lehman Commercial Mortgage Conduit
Limited, intend to declare an eighth interim dividend to
unsecured non preferential creditors within two months from the
last date of proving, being April 9, 2018.

Such creditors are required on or before that date to submit
their proofs of debt to the Joint Administrators,
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 7 More London Riverside, London SE1
2RT, United Kingdom, marked for the attention of Diane Adebowale
or by email to lehman.affiliates@uk.pwc.com

Persons so proving are required, if so requested, to provide such
further details or produce such documents or other evidence as
may appear to the Joint Administrators to be necessary.

The Joint Administrators will not be obliged to deal with proofs
lodged after the last date for proving but they may do so if they
think fit.

For further information, contact details, and proof of debt
forms, please visit http://www.pwc.co.uk/services/business-
recovery/administrations/lehman/lcmc-limited-in-
administration.html.

Alternatively, please call Carly Barrington on +44(0)207 213
3387.

The Joint Administrators were appointed October 30, 2008.


NEW LOOK: Creditors, Landlords Approve Restructuring Plan
---------------------------------------------------------
James Davey at Reuters reports that creditors and landlords of
New Look overwhelmingly approved the British fashion retailer's
restructuring plan at a meeting on March 21, enabling it to stave
off a potential fall into administration.

Earlier this month, the chain, owned by South African investment
heavyweight Brait and saddled with GBP1.2 billion (US$1.7
billion) of debt, said it would seek creditor approval for a
Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA), Reuters relates.

According to Reuters, the plan will see the closure of 60 of its
593 stores in Britain and reductions in rent, ranging from 15 to
55 percent, and revised lease terms across another 393 stores.
It would lead to up to 980 redundancies among its UK workforce of
15,300, Reuters states.

At the March 21 meeting, 98% of votes cast were in favor of the
restructuring proposals, Reuters relays.

New Look, as cited by Reuters, said the affected stores would
likely close within six to 12 months, subject to decisions by
individual landlords.

The retailer, which also has 313 overseas stores, is another
victim of Britain's brutal trading environment where consumer
spending is under pressure as inflation runs ahead of wage rises
and with economic uncertainty due to Brexit, Reuters notes.

New Look Group Limited, through its subsidiaries, operates as a
multichannel retail brand in the United Kingdom and
internationally.  The company offers apparel, footwear, and
accessories for women, men, and teenage girls.  It operates 867
stores, comprising 591 in the United Kingdom and 276
internationally, as well as an e-commerce site under the
newlook.com name serving approximately 120 countries. The company
is based in Weymouth, the United Kingdom. New Look Group Limited
is a subsidiary of Hamperwood Limited.


RICHMOND UK: S&P Cuts ICR to 'B-' on Underperformance & High Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term issuer credit rating to
'B-' from 'B' on U.K.-based holiday park operator Richmond UK
Holdco Ltd. (PdR), the parent company of Parkdean Resorts. The
outlook is stable.

Similarly, S&P lowered its issue ratings on PdR's GBP658.5
million senior secured debt by one notch to 'B' from 'B+'. The
'2' recovery rating is unchanged and indicates its expectation of
significant recovery (70%-90%; rounded estimate: 70%) in the
event of a payment default.

The downgrade principally reflects PdR's materially weaker
performance versus our forecasts, additional debt through a
second ground rent transaction, and our expectation that leverage
will remain elevated over the next 12-24 months.

PdR's operating weakness in 2017 stemmed mainly from softness in
the holiday-home sales segment, with 13% less volume sales and a
21% decline in net contribution from levels in 2016. PdR
attributes last year's underperformance to poor planning in terms
of ordering and managing stock, the design and communication of
sales incentive plans, some legacy and customer issues from 2016,
as well as its decision to reduce the annual percentage rate
(APR) interest it charges customers, resulting in lower
commission income from third-party providers. S&P said, "Although
we recognize that the majority of the decline originated at eight
of PdR's 72 parks, management's decisions and inactions had a
materially adverse impact on the company's 2017 results. The S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA figure for 2017, at GBP102.3
million, was about 20% lower than our previous forecast, also
constrained by exceptional costs mostly linked to PdR's
acquisition by private equity firm Onex Corp., which we do not
anticipate will affect future earnings. We do not exclude these
costs in our adjusted EBITDA calculation."

In addition, a decline in spending on food and beverages resulted
in a somewhat lower net contribution from that subsegment. This
was due to poor integration, menu composition, pricing, and the
supply chain. S&P said, "We understand the impact was more
pronounced during the first half of the year. We recognize that
management took some remedial actions in time for peak trading,
but overall performance from this segment for the year was still
10% below our expectations."

Furthermore, during the second half of the year, PdR entered into
a new ground rent transaction for nine of its parks for a total
of GBP71.5 million. S&P said, "This amount was previously not
factored into our metrics, and we note that these ground rents
are ultimately being accounted for as finance leases and are
treated as on-balance-sheet debt. We understand that about
GBP16.5 million of the transaction's proceeds were used to repay
a portion of the company's first-lien debt."

S&P said, "As a result of the aforementioned factors, PdR's
adjusted credit metrics are markedly weaker than we estimated,
with adjusted debt to EBITDA at about 9.5x as of year-end 2017
versus our previous projection of 6.9x.

"Our assessment of PdR's business risk profile reflects our view
of the company's limited geographic diversity, being solely based
in the U.K., and restricted offering relative to the broader
competitive tourism market. This is because holiday parks such as
PdR are typically used only for holidays and weekend retreats,
and by a niche customer base. We also take into account the
company's exposure to cyclical consumer discretionary spending,
which could be further threatened by Brexit concerns. In
addition, there is a moderately seasonal aspect to the group's
revenues, which peak during school holiday periods; PdR generates
about 60% of its EBITDA between June and August. Also, in our
view, PdR has relatively low brand recognition, compared with
other companies in the broader leisure accommodation industry.
Still, we note that the company enjoys solid brand recognition
within its niche customer market, since it generates about 80% of
bookings directly via its websites. Moreover, we view the
relative predictability of revenues, particularly annual income
paid by caravan owners (representing about 20% of revenues), and
high occupancy rates during peak periods, as supporting our
assessment. Moreover, PdR's profitability is in line with the
average of its lodging peers, with adjusted EBITDA margins at
about 25%.

"We view PdR's capital structure and ultimate ownership by Onex,
which we regard as having an aggressive financial policy, as a
further constraint to the company's creditworthiness. Our debt
calculation includes about GBP930.0 million of financial debt
(including GBP221.5 million in relation to the ground rent
transactions), adjusted by about GBP35.0 million of operating
leases. We don't expect substantial deleveraging over the next
two years, due to the bullet nature of PdR's capital structure
maturing in 2024 and our forecast of broadly neutral free
operating cash flow (FOCF) generation, since we assume most of
the cash flows will be used for growth investments and
maintenance of facilities.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that PDR's operating
performance will stabilize in 2018, particularly in the holiday-
home sales segment. We assume management's steps will contribute
to EBITDA growth, while maintaining adequate liquidity. We expect
adjusted leverage of about 9.0x and EBITDA interest coverage to
decline toward 1.9x in 2018.

"We could lower the ratings on PdR if we perceive a risk that the
capital structure could become unsustainable, which could arise
if the company's operating issues continued or worsened, capex
were larger than expected, or we concluded that the group cannot
generate sufficient free cash flows, such that its liquidity
weakened substantially. In addition, pressure could stem from
debt-funded acquisitions, additional ground rent transactions, or
shareholder returns that could further weaken PdR's credit
profile.

"Although unlikely over the next 12 months, we could take a
positive rating action if the group deleveraged, with adjusted
debt to EBIDTA below 7x and adjusted EBITDA interest coverage
sustainably above 2x. This could occur if operating performance
materially exceeded our expectations and PdR was able to generate
sustained positive FOCF. An upgrade would also hinge on greater
visibility on Onex's financial policy and tangible evidence of
using FOCF to reduce debt rather than for acquisitions or
shareholder returns."


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS
----------------------------------------
Authors: Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren,
& Jay Westbrook
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 370 Pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by: Susan Pannell
Order your personal copy today at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/as_we_forgive_our_debtors.ht
ml

So you think you know the profile of the average consumer debtor:
either deadbeat slouched on a sagging sofa with a three day
growth on his chin or a crafty lower-middle class type opting for
bankruptcy to avoid both poverty and responsible debt repayment.
Except that it might be a single or divorced female who's the one
most likely to file for personal bankruptcy protection, and her
petition might be the last stage of a continuum of crises that
began with her job loss or divorce. Moreover, the dilemma might
be attributable in part to consumer credit industry that has
increased its profitability by relaxing its standards and
extending credit to almost anyone who can scribble his or her
name on an application. Such are among the unexpected findings in
this painstaking study of 2,400 bankruptcy filings in Illinois,
Pennsylvania, and Texas during the seven-year period from 1981 to
1987. Rather than relying on case counts or gross data collected
for a court's administrative records, as has been done elsewhere,
the authors use data contained in the actual petitions. In so
doing, they offer a unique window into debtors' lives.

The authors conclude that people who file for bankruptcy are, as
a rule, neither impoverished families nor wily manipulators of
the system. Instead, debtors are a cross-section of America. If
one demographic segment can be isolated as particularly
debtprone, it would be women householders, whom the authors found
often live on the edge of financial disaster. Very few debtors
(3.7 percent in the study) were repeat filers who might be viewed
as abusing the system, and most (70 percent in the study) of
Chapter 13 cases fail and become Chapter 7s. Accordingly, the
authors conclude that the economic model of behavior -- which
assumes a petitioner is a "calculating maximizer" in his in his
decision to seek bankruptcy protection and his selection of
chapter to file under, a profile routinely used to justify
changes in the law -- is at variance with the actual debtor
profile derived from this study.

A few stereotypes about debtors are, however, borne out. It is
less than surprising to learn, for example, that most debtors are
simply not as well-off as the average American or that while
bankrupt's mortgage debts are about average, their consumer debts
are off the charts. Petitioners seem particularly susceptible to
the siren song of credit card companies. In the study sample,
creditors were found to have made between 27 percent and 36
percent of their loans to debtors with incomes below $12,500
(although the loans might have been made before the debtors'
income dropped so low). Of course, the vigor with which consumer
credit lenders pursue their goal of maximizing profits has a
corresponding impact on the number of bankruptcy filings.

The book won the ABA's 1990 Silver Gavel Award. A special 1999
update by the authors is included exclusively in the Beard Book
reprint edition.



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *