/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/180227.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, February 27, 2018, Vol. 19, No. 041


                            Headlines


C R O A T I A

TESLA STEDNA: HNB Proposes Opening of Bankruptcy Proceedings


F R A N C E

VALLOUREC: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Issuer Credit Ratings, Outlook Neg.


D E N M A R K

OSTJYDSK BANK: Capital Woes Prompt Bankruptcy Filing


G E O R G I A

GEORGIA CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Stable


G R E E C E

GREECE: Moody's Ups Issuer Rating to B3, Outlook Still Positive


L A T V I A

ABLV BANK: May Face Liquidation After Liquidity Deteriorates


L U X E M B O U R G

SAPHILUX SARL: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

GMAC INT'L: Fitch Withdraws BB+/B Issuer Default Ratings


R U S S I A

BANK OTKRITIE: Recapitalization Credit Positive, Moody's Says
DME AIRPORT: Fitch Rates Add'l. US$300MM Notes Due 2023 'BB+'
FERROGLOBE PLC: Fitch Raises Long-Term IDR to B, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DEBUSSY DTC: S&P Cuts Class A Euro CMBS Notes Rating to 'BB-(sf)'
NEW LOOK: Finance Director to Visit Property Owners This Week
POUNDWORLD: Lines Up Restructuring Advisers Amid Financial Woes
STONEPEAK SPEAR: S&P Assigns 'B' ICR on Completed Leverage Buyout


                            *********



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C R O A T I A
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TESLA STEDNA: HNB Proposes Opening of Bankruptcy Proceedings
------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Croatia's central bank, HNB, said it has
proposed to the commercial court in Zagreb to open bankruptcy
proceedings against commercial bank Tesla Stedna Banka.

According to SeeNews, the central bank said in a statement on
Feb. 21 the decision to file the proposal was made after HNB
established that Tesla Stedna Banka is on the brink of collapse
and that it is unreasonable to expect that any measure, whether
private or institutional, will prevent its collapse within a
reasonable time frame.

HNB has also found that rescuing the bank is not in the public's
best interest, SeeNews relates.  The central bank, as cited by
SeeNews, said that Tesla Stedna Banka has negative working
capital and its assets are worth less than its debt.

Tesla Stedna Banka makes up just 0.0004% of the total assets of
Croatia's banking system and is the smallest credit institution
in the country, SeeNews discloses.



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F R A N C E
===========


VALLOUREC: S&P Affirms 'B/B' Issuer Credit Ratings, Outlook Neg.
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term and 'B' short-term
issuer credit ratings on France-based seamless steel tube
producer Vallourec. The outlook is negative.

S&P said, "At the same time, we affirmed our 'B' issue rating on
Vallourec's senior unsecured debt. The recovery rating remains
unchanged at '3', reflecting our expectation of 50% recovery for
debt holders in the event of default.

"The affirmation reflects that we still expect Vallourec's EBITDA
to continue improving in 2018-2019, amid a more favorable market
environment and given the anticipated benefits from the company's
cost-saving initiatives and competitive-enhancement measures. We
also take into consideration the company's strong liquidity
position, supported by the recent refinancing and increased
headroom on the gearing covenant."

S&P said, "On Feb. 21, 2018, Vallourec published its results for
2017, reporting a breakeven EBITDA (before our adjustments),
demonstrating the ongoing improvement in the company's financial
performance after a few years of negative EBITDA. In the second
half of 2017, the company's positive EBITDA of EUR21 million
points to encouraging results. The slightly better-than-we
expected results were supported by the recovery in oil prices and
the benefits from Vallourec's ongoing restructuring program. We
note that the results continue to reflect the company's still
excessively high fixed-cost base--although the company has
already achieved significant cost savings over the past few
years--and insufficient volume and pricing recovery. In 2017
Vallourec saw a volume increase of 25% compared with 2016 (after
adjusting from the acquisition of Tianda and consolidation of
VSB). Looking into 2018, we expect a modest increase, supported
by an increase of pipe per rig in the U.S., while other regions,
notably Brazil, will remain stable.

"That said, we understand that the current supportive market
environment, with oil prices of about $70 per barrel (/bbl) and
higher oil production rates, will likely take more time to
translate into better results for Vallourec. This is due to the
nature of the contracts, by which in some regions the lead time
between tenders and project delivery can be up to 12 months. As a
result, we lowered our reported EBITDA expectations for 2018,
assuming now EUR150 million-EUR200 million, versus EUR200
million-EUR300 million previously. We continue to factor into our
base case a material improvement in the company's results in 2019
to about EUR400 million EBITDA as the new contracts kick in and
the company moves its restructuring program forward.

"We continue to see the U.S. shale gas and oil industry in Brazil
set the tune for Vallourec's profitability. About 40% of the
company's revenues come from these countries. According to the
U.S. Energy Information Administration, total U.S. crude oil
production averaged 9.3 million barrels per day (mb/d) for 2017
(versus 8.9 mb/d for 2016); it will likely rise to 10.6 mb/d in
2018 and 11.2 mb/d in 2019, supported by oil prices above
$50/bbl. That said, we assume that with a $3 natural gas price,
the gas rigs in the U.S. will remain flat in 2018 after being
flat in 2017, while producers become more efficient using the
current equipment to pump more gas."

The negative outlook reflects the risks related to the market
environment and the uncertain magnitude and timing for
improvement in Vallourec's EBITDA and cash flow generation. S&P
expects Vallourec's performance to remain weak for the rating in
2018 with a reported EBITDA of EUR150 million-EUR200 million,
followed by a marked improvement in 2019.

S&P would lower the rating by one notch if it saw Vallourec's
EBITDA falling short of EUR150 million in 2018 with no signs of a
material improvement in 2019. This could be the case if S&P saw:

-- A revision to the growth in the oil production in the U.S.
    and/or a decline in the U.S. shale oil rigs. S&P believes
    that a drop of crude oil toward $55/bbl or lower could
    trigger some changes in the macro assumptions.

-- Low margins on the newly signed contracts.

-- Deterioration of the liquidity.

-- Delays in the implementation of the cost-cutting program.

S&P said, "We see an outlook revision to stable as remote in the
next few quarters given the poor visibility on future profits and
cash flow, and due to the volatility of the market environment.

"This could, however, occur if we see signs of stronger
profitability and, as a result, anticipate a significant
reduction in leverage in 2018-2019, with EBITDA of about EUR200
million in 2018, increasing to at least EUR400 million
thereafter." These improvements would support over time an
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of at least 5x. In addition, a
higher rating would hinge on liquidity remaining in our strong
category.



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D E N M A R K
=============


OSTJYDSK BANK: Capital Woes Prompt Bankruptcy Filing
----------------------------------------------------
Christian Wienberg at Bloomberg News reports that Ostjydsk Bank
said in a statement it has filed for bankruptcy protection after
failing to meet regulators' requirements for more capital.

The statement said the bank has entered into an agreement with
Sparekassen Vendsyssel to sell its assets for DKK50 million,
Bloomberg relates.

Sparekassen Vendsyssel will take over all clients and employees,
Bloomberg discloses.  All deposits at Ostjydsk Bank are
guaranteed, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, Ostjydsk Bank's shareholders won't be
covered but subordinated capital will be "partly" covered.

The parties entered into agreement after Ostjydsk spent two
months working on raising capital after FSA required the bank to
take more writedowns, Bloomberg discloses.

Ostjydsk Bank is based in Denmark.



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G E O R G I A
=============


GEORGIA CAPITAL: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 Corporate Family
rating and a B2-PD Probability of Default rating to JSC Georgia
Capital. Concurrently the agency has assigned a B2 instrument
rating to the proposed USD300 million of senior unsecured notes
to be issued by the same entity. The outlook on all ratings is
stable. The assignment of the rating is subject to the successful
demerger of BGEO group in line with the structure as outlined in
the offering memorandum of the notes.

The rating assigned assumes the successful execution of the
demerger of BGEO Group Plc into Georgia Capital and Bank of
Georgia (subject to a shareholders vote in April 2018) and the
listing of Georgia Capital and Bank of Georgia on the London
Stock Exchange in the summer of 2018. The current Corporate
family rating assumes that Georgia Capital will be demerged and
will become an independent holding company with the only link
with Bank of Georgia being a 19.9% equity stake in the bank.

RATINGS RATIONALE

JSC Georgia Capital's B2 Corporate Family rating is mainly
supported by the company's (i) clearly defined investment
strategy focused on the Georgian economy, (ii) good track record
of raising capital (both debt and equity), which gives it a
competitive edge in acquiring Georgian assets with little if any
bidding competition from both local and international investors,
(iii) a portfolio of defensive and not too levered investments
with a stable dividend stream, (iv) a relatively good business
diversification across its investment portfolio especially in
light of the small size of the portfolio (less than $1 billion
pro-forma of the demerger and listing) although there is value
concentration on the top 2/3 assets in the portfolio and (v) a
relatively moderate market value leverage of around 30% to 40%
and a management commitment to maintain market value leverage
below 35% at any point-in-time during the market cycle.

JSC Georgia Capital's rating is mainly constrained by (i) the
investment portfolio's relatively small size, (ii) the strong
geographical concentration of the portfolio on the Georgian
economy, which is small and rated Ba2, (iii) the absence of track
record of operating as an independent, listed and rated
investment holding company notwithstanding that the former parent
company and the bank have been rated entities in the past, (iv) a
relatively high portfolio concentration with the top 2 / 3 assets
accounting for respectively around 70% / 90% of the overall value
of the portfolio of investments, (v) the increasing leverage from
a low base at some of the portfolio companies linked to material
organic investment which have resulted in substantial negative
free cash flow generation, and (vi) the relatively limited exit
options and lack of tangible liquidity of the portfolio related
to the scarcity of capital in Georgia, which makes it difficult
to divest / exit investments very easily, if needed.

The stable outlook assigned to the rating reflects Moody's
expectation that Georgia Capital will sustain a market value
leverage of around 35% at all times during the market cycle and
an interest cover of around 2.0x.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP / DOWN

Positive pressure on the rating would arise if JSC Georgia
Capital would demonstrate a prolonged track record of
successfully managing a portfolio of investments with a good
balance between defensive / growth investments as well as between
listed / private assets whilst generating value. Moody's would
expect the issuer to maintain a market value leverage of below
35% at all times during the market cycle and an interest cover
sustainably well in excess of 2.0x to consider a higher rating.
The maintenance of a strong liquidity position over time would
also be a requirement for a higher rating.

Negative pressure would arise of the rating if JSC Georgia
Capital's investment strategy would shift leading to a more
cyclical portfolio or more levered investments. An increase in
market value leverage to sustainably above 40% and interest cover
sustainably below 2.0x would exert negative pressure on the
current rating. Lastly a deterioration of the group's liquidity
position or deterioration in macroeconomic conditions in Georgia
in light of the concentration of the group's portfolio on the
Georgian economy would also exert negative pressure on the
current rating.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Investment
Holding Companies and Conglomerates published in December 2015.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Moody's Ups Issuer Rating to B3, Outlook Still Positive
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Greece's issuer rating to
B3 from Caa2. Greece's senior unsecured bond and program ratings
were also upgraded to B3/(P)B3 from Caa2/(P)Caa2. The outlook
remains positive. The Commercial Paper and other short-term
programme ratings were affirmed at Not Prime/(P)Not Prime.

The key drivers for rating action are:

1. Greece has achieved material fiscal and institutional
improvements under its current adjustment programme, which
Moody's believes will be sustained in the coming years. Those
improvements in turn should help support the recovery of the
economy as well as the banking sector;

2. Moody's believes that Greece will successfully conclude its
third support programme and return to self-sufficiency and
market-based funding. Its "clean" exit will be supported in the
near term by a substantial cash buffer and over the medium to
long term by the strong commitment of Greece's euro area
creditors to providing further debt relief;

3. The risk of another default or restructuring on the debt owed
to private investors has therefore materially declined, and the
uncertainty around that judgment has also diminished materially.
While Greece was at a similar juncture in mid-2014, Moody's
believes that the risk of reversal and derailment of the fiscal
and economic progress achieved is now materially lower.

The outlook on the ratings remains positive. Moody's could
further upgrade the rating if the reforms implemented over the
course of the programme yielded results that are more positive
than expected, leading to sustained economic growth and a more
rapid decline in the public debt ratio in the context of a stable
political environment.

The long-term country ceilings for foreign-currency and local-
currency bonds have been raised to Ba2 from B3, to reflect the
reduced risk of Greece exiting the euro area. The long-term
ceilings for foreign-currency and local-currency deposits have
been raised to B3 from Caa2. The deposit ceilings remain aligned
with the government bond rating to reflect the ongoing capital
controls. The short-term foreign-currency bond and bank deposit
ceilings remain unchanged at Not Prime (NP).

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR UPGRADE OF THE RATING TO B3

First driver: Material fiscal and institutional improvements
under the current adjustment programme, which will likely be
sustained in the coming years

Greece's performance under its current third adjustment programme
has exceeded expectations and has been far stronger than under
its two earlier programmes. In particular, the Greek government
has managed to put its public finances on a more sustainable
footing, with primary surpluses in excess of 2% of GDP and close
to balance in overall terms in 2016 and 2017. A significant part
of the improvement is due to structural measures which will
provide lasting fiscal benefits, including reforms to the income
and value added tax systems, pension and health care spending
reforms, restructuring of public enterprises as well as measures
to contain the public wage bill. Overall, the European Commission
estimates that the cumulative benefit of structural fiscal
measures will amount to around 4.5% of GDP by the end of 2018.

In addition, the Greek government has legislated a contingent
fiscal package of automatic tax increases and spending cuts that
would be activated if needed to achieve the primary surplus
target (of 3.5% of GDP) for the years 2019-2022. Those measures
support the view that the budget targets are likely to be met
even if economic growth turns out to be more moderate than
currently expected. Such a budgetary performance should reduce
the public debt ratio by around seven percentage points of GDP
within the next two years, to just above 174% of GDP in 2019,
from a peak of above 181% in 2017.

Significant progress has also been achieved with regards to the
other objectives of the programme: Greece's profound
institutional weaknesses in public and tax administration as well
as the judicial system, all of which contributed to the crisis,
are being addressed, as evidenced e.g. by the establishment of
independent tax revenue and privatisation entities and the
replacement of political appointees at the top levels of the
public administration. These institutional and governance changes
should over time result in visible improvements to Greece's
currently low institutional strength scores.

The banking sector's key weaknesses -- including very high levels
of non-performing exposures (NPEs) - are being tackled in a more
forceful manner than over the past eight years. The legal and
technical requirements for conducting electronic auctions -- a
key measure for banks to realize collateral and accelerate the
clean-up of their balance sheets -- are now in place and the
banks themselves have committed to individual NPE reduction
targets. Moody's also notes positively that the system's reliance
on emergency liquidity from the Bank of Greece and the Eurosystem
has been on a declining trend over the past year and customer
deposits have been returning to the system. The banks were also
able to issue covered bonds in recent months, diversifying their
funding away from central bank financing. Of the EUR25 billion
set aside in the programme for bank recapitalisation, only EUR5.4
billion was needed.

Economic prospects have also become more positive. The economy
has started to grow, although at a still very moderate pace.
Moody's notes that the pace of the recovery is similar to that in
the other euro area periphery countries at a similar point of
their exit from external support. Exports of goods and more
recently also revenues from tourism have been rising strongly,
reflecting the global and euro area recovery under way. Consumer
spending has been more moderate but should benefit from the
improving labour market situation as well as from the successful
conclusion of the program and the ongoing stabilization of the
banking sector. Investment is already benefitting from a
concerted effort by the EU and official lenders such as the
European Investment Bank (EIB). While Moody's is not revising its
real GDP growth forecasts of 2% and 2.2% for 2018 and 2019
respectively, the agency is more confident than before that these
forecasts will be realised, given that a successful conclusion of
the programme should lift consumer and business confidence, and
support private capital inflows.

Second driver: Successful conclusion of adjustment programme now
highly likely. Greece's return to market funding will be
supported by large cash buffer and creditor commitment to debt
relief so as to keep borrowing needs at manageable levels

Moody's now considers it highly likely that Greece will
successfully complete its third support programme in August. That
view is supported by the positive conclusions that the Eurogroup
reached at its meeting on 19 February, even though it delayed the
formal conclusion of the third review until after the completion
of two final prior actions (out of 110 in total). Greece's
"clean" exit from the programme -- without further support being
required or conditions attached -- and its return to self-
sufficiency and market-based funding will be supported in the
near term by a substantial cash buffer, using some of the
remaining funds available under the program's EUR86 billion
envelope. Moody's expects a cash buffer of at least EUR18 billion
(around 10% of 2018 GDP) to be built up initially, so as to
support investor confidence and ease Greece's return into the
capital markets. This compares to debt maturities of EUR17.3
billion between September 2018 and December 2020. Such a buffer
would be larger than those targeted by other program countries at
their point of exit.

The government's funding needs will be very manageable in the
coming years. Moody's estimates that gross borrowing needs will
decline from around 14% of GDP this year to below 12% in 2019 and
further to below 8% by 2020, in line with the latest European
Commission estimates. This reflects the back-loaded repayments to
the EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) and European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) (Greece's largest creditors) as well as
successful liability management exercises last year that have
reduced an earlier repayment "hump" in 2019. Also, the Greek
government's budgetary performance has been very strong since
2016; Moody's expects a broadly balanced overall budget this year
and a small overall surplus next year. In Moody's view, the large
cash buffer provides similar assurance as would a precautionary
or other official-sector credit line.

Over the medium to long term, the strong commitment of Greece's
euro area creditors to provide further debt relief will ensure
manageable borrowing needs and the support the sustainability of
Greece's debt load. A first set of debt relief measures has
already been implemented by the ESM over the course of 2017,
resulting in an estimated reduction in Greece's debt load by 25
percentage points of GDP by 2060. Moody's expects euro area
creditors to spell out the details of medium-term debt relief in
the coming months as they committed to do upon successful
conclusion of Greece's support programme. They are likely to
include a mechanism to link debt relief to GDP growth outcomes,
indicating a more flexible stance of the euro area than in the
past.

Third driver: Risk of another default or restructuring on private
sector debt materially lower than previously

In Moody's view, the risk of another default or restructuring on
the debt owed to private sector, which is the risk captured in
the rating, has materially declined, and the uncertainty around
that judgment has also diminished materially. While Greece was at
a similar juncture in mid-2014, Moody's believes that the risk of
reversal and derailment of the fiscal and economic progress
achieved is now materially lower.

The political situation and outlook are more stable. While
elections will have to be held by September 2019 at the latest,
the painful and politically challenging structural fiscal,
economic and institutional reforms have been legislated. The
current Greek government has established a stronger and more
consistent track record than any of its predecessors. Greece's
euro area creditors have become significantly more supportive of
Greece as a result. Moody's notes that reviews have been
concluded faster and in a significantly more constructive
atmosphere than expected at the onset and also compared to the
prior two programs.

The risk of reversal will also be limited by the likely linkage
between debt relief and Greece remaining on track with its
commitments to its official sector creditors. Such a link would
provide a clear incentive for the Greek authorities not to
reverse the key structural reforms that have been implemented
over the past several years, even given inevitable domestic
political pressures in the run up to the 2019 elections. Moody's
still believes further debt relief will be required, given the
very elevated public debt levels that even under the EC's most
optimistic scenario would still stand at 126% of GDP by 2030.
While Greece's official euro area creditors will not consider a
reduction in the principal of outstanding debt, a series of other
measures including a further extension of maturities will likely
be implemented to limit Greece's gross financing needs to
manageable levels (below 15% of GDP in the medium term and below
20% thereafter).

RATIONALE FOR POSITIVE OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects the potential for even more
positive outcomes should the good track record of implementing
reforms be maintained beyond the end of the adjustment programme,
resulting in stronger-than-expected and sustained economic growth
and a more rapid reduction in the public debt ratio than
currently foreseen. That said, the two-notch upgrade already
incorporates a forward-looking view of a continued economic
recovery, ongoing prudent fiscal policy and a gradual decline in
the very elevated public debt burden over the coming two to three
years. It also incorporates Moody's expectation that further debt
relief will be granted by the euro area.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The rating could be upgraded further if the reform efforts were
sustained beyond the end of the programme and yield, or look
likely to yield, more positive results than currently expected in
the form of stronger economic growth and a more rapid decline in
the public debt ratio. Faster-than-expected improvements in the
banking sector's health could also be a trigger for a positive
rating action.

The rating could come under downward pressure if -- against
expectations -- the Greek government decided to deviate from its
commitments and reversed reforms that had been previously agreed
and legislated, or if tensions with official creditors re-emerged
for any other reason. This would put the euro area's continued
support and commitment for further debt relief in jeopardy.

The positive conclusions that the Eurogroup announced following
its meeting on February 19 signal a high likelihood that Greece
will successfully complete the third review under its adjustment
programme.

GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 26,829 (2016 Actual) (also known
as Per Capita Income)

Real GDP growth (% change): -0.2% (2016 Actual) (also known as
GDP Growth)

Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 0% (2016 Actual)

Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: 0.5% (2016 Actual) (also known
as Fiscal Balance)

Current Account Balance/GDP: -1.1% (2016 Actual) (also known as
External Balance)

External debt/GDP: [not available]

Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience

Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or
loans) has been recorded since 1983.

On February 20, 2018, a rating committee was called to discuss
the rating of the Greece, Government of. The main points raised
during the discussion were: The issuer's governance and/or
management, have materially increased. The issuer has become less
susceptible to event risks. Other views raised included: The
issuer's economic fundamentals, including its economic strength,
have materially increased. The issuer's fiscal or financial
strength, including its debt profile, has materially increased.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign
Bond Ratings published in December 2016.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this credit rating action, if applicable.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Greece, Government of

Upgrades:

-- Long-term Issuer Rating, upgraded to B3 from Caa2

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, upgraded to B3 from
    Caa2

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, upgraded to (P)B3
    from (P)Caa2

-- Senior Unsecured Shelf, upgraded to (P)B3 from (P)Caa2

Raised:

-- Country Ceiling Bank Deposit Rating, raised to B3 from Caa2

-- Country Ceiling Bond Rating, raised to Ba2 from B3

Affirmations:

-- Commercial Paper, affirmed NP

-- Other Short Term, affirmed (P)NP

Outlook Actions:

-- Outlook remains Positive



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L A T V I A
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ABLV BANK: May Face Liquidation After Liquidity Deteriorates
------------------------------------------------------------
Xinhua reports that Latvia's troubled ABLV Bank, which U.S.
authorities accused of involvement in money laundering schemes
and bribery, is likely to be liquidated as the European Central
Bank has determined that the bank is failing or likely to fail,
the Baltic country's financial regulator said on Feb. 24.

The ECB explained that since ABLV Ban's liquidity has
significantly deteriorated the bank is unlikely to be able to pay
its debts or other liabilities, Xinhua relates.

"As a consequence, the winding up of the banks will take place
under the law of Latvia and Luxembourg, respectively," Xinhua
quotes the ECB as saying.

Speaking at a news conference in Riga on Feb. 25, Latvian Finance
Minister Dana Reizniece-Ozola said that the winding up of ABLV
was only one of the options, Xinhua notes.

The ECB, which is ABLV Bank's direct supervisor, does not say the
Latvian bank has to be shut down but just points to its inability
to meet its liabilities, Xinhua relays.  The minister, as cited
by Xinhua, said the ECB has yet to take further decisions.

According to Xinhua, Ms. Reizniece-Ozola said that ABLV Bank ran
into trouble because of reputation issues, not liquidity
problems.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has proposed sanctioning ABLV for
its money laundering schemes by banning the bank from opening or
maintaining correspondent accounts in the U.S. or altogether
blocking the bank from the U.S. financial system, Xinhua
discloses.

When the news of the U.S. report broke, clients rushed to
withdraw their money from ABLV Bank, Xinhua recounts.  To curb
the outflow of funds and in compliance with the ECB's
instructions, the Latvian banking regulator suspended ABLV Bank's
client payments in all currencies on Feb. 18, Xinhua relays.  By
that time, clients had withdrawn around EUR600 million (US$738
million U.S. dollars) from the bank, Xinhua states.

ABLV is the third largest bank in Latvia by assets.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


SAPHILUX SARL: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' ICR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has assigned its preliminary 'B'
long-term issuer credit rating to Luxembourg-based Saphilux
S.a.r.l., parent company of trust and corporate services provider
SGG Group. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we assigned our preliminary 'B' and
'4' issue and recovery ratings to Saphilux's proposed EUR484
million senior secured first-lien term loan, EUR50 million first-
lien RCF, and EUR30 million first-lien acquisition facility. The
preliminary '4' recovery rating reflects our expectation of
average recovery prospects (rounded estimate: 45%) in the event
of a payment default.

"The final ratings will depend on our receipt and satisfactory
review of all final transaction documentation. Accordingly, the
preliminary ratings should not be construed as evidence of final
ratings. If S&P Global Ratings does not receive final
documentation within a reasonable time frame or if final
documentation departs from materials reviewed, it reserves the
right to withdraw or revise the ratings. Potential changes
include, but are not limited to, the use of loan proceeds,
maturity, size and conditions of the loans, financial and other
covenants, security, and ranking."

On Dec. 20, 2017, SGG Group, backed by its private-equity sponsor
Astorg Partners, announced that it had entered into a binding
agreement to acquire Jersey-based trust and corporate services
provider, First Names Group (FNG) on a cash-plus-debt basis, from
AnaCap Financial Partners. The acquisition will be funded via
Saphilux, which proposes to issue a EUR484 million first-lien
term loan, alongside an EUR85 million second-lien term loan, a
EUR50 million first-lien RCF, and EUR30 million acquisition
facility.

Saphilux intends to use the proceeds to pay the purchase price
and refinance the group's capital structure. This is to be
supplemented by a new EUR65 million shareholder instrument, which
we expect to treat as debt. The transaction is expected to close
by June 30, 2018, subject to regulatory approvals.

S&P said, "We view the group's business risk profile as fair,
owing to the critical nature of its services, for which clients
are more sensitive to service quality than price. Therefore,
providers like SGG, with a good track record of delivery should
benefit from a fairly stable, recurring revenue base and
relatively strong margins. Furthermore, the business' referral-
based nature and low capital intensity result in relatively low
reinvestment needs. Offsetting these strengths are the highly
competitive, fragmented nature of the trust and corporate
services market, in which we regard SGG as having a similar
service offering as its direct competitors. Further constraints
are the group's small size and comparatively narrow service
offering, as well as the regulatory and reputation risks that
trust and corporate service providers generally face. We also see
some risks associated with integrating FNG.

"Our assessment of the financial risk profile reflects the
group's high post-transaction leverage, with the S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio at about 11x (about 8x
excluding shareholder instruments, considering that they contain
some equity-like features). We anticipate relatively slow
deleveraging throughout our forecast horizon, due to the high
debt burden. That said, given the group's relatively low fixed-
charge requirements and our assessment of moderate seasonality,
we expect the group will generate free operating cash flow (FOCF)
of over EUR20 million and funds from operations (FFO) to cash
interest greater than 2.5x, which support the rating.

"Saphilux's ownership by financial sponsors and its very high
leverage cause us to assess its financial policy at FS-6. We
expect its leverage will remain elevated over the next two years.
In 2018, we forecast adjusted debt at about EUR850 million,
comprising about EUR569 million in first- and second-lien term
loans, the EUR30 million acquisition facility (which we assume
will generate incremental EBITDA from the acquired businesses),
about EUR220 million of shareholder instruments, which we expect
to treat as debt, and about EUR50 million relating to
noncancellable operating lease commitments and post-retirement
obligations.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Saphilux will continue
to report sound operating performance, with adjusted EBITDA
margins at about 30%, while generating positive FOCF of more than
EUR20 million per year.

"We could lower the ratings if, contrary to our current
expectations, we observed weaker operating performance, such that
the group posted negative FOCF with little prospects for a rapid
recovery.

"We could also lower the ratings if the group were to adopt a
more aggressive financial policy than we currently envisage,
including large debt-financed acquisitions or shareholder
distributions, such that cash FFO interest coverage declined
toward 2.0x for a prolonged period.

"We see limited upside potential for the rating, given the size
of Saphilux's adjusted debt. Nevertheless, we could consider
raising the rating if we observed material outperformance
compared with our base case. In particular, this would be
demonstrated by the adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio falling below
5.0x and a strong commitment from the financial sponsor to
maintain leverage metrics at that level."



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


GMAC INT'L: Fitch Withdraws BB+/B Issuer Default Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn the ratings for GMAC International
Finance B.V., including the Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
of 'BB+', Short-term IDR of 'B', and Short-term debt rating of
'B'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

Fitch has withdrawn these ratings because the entity no longer
exists and there is no longer any debt outstanding for this
issuer.

The actions are related to an internal re-organization of Ally
Financial Inc., under which the aforementioned subsidiary was
dissolved in August 2015.

The ratings assigned to Ally Financial Inc. and GMAC Capital
Trust I are unaffected by the rating actions taken for GMAC
International B.V.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

Rating sensitivities are no longer relevant for this subsidiary
given rating withdrawals.

Fitch has withdrawn the following ratings:

GMAC International Finance B.V.

-- Long-term IDR 'BB+';
-- Short-term IDR 'B';
-- Short-term debt 'B'.

Existing ratings on Ally Financial Inc. and affiliated entities
are as follows:

Ally Financial Inc.

-- Long-term IDR 'BB+';
-- Senior unsecured debt 'BB+';
-- Viability rating 'bb+';
-- Subordinated debt 'BB';
-- Short-term IDR 'B';
-- Short-term debt 'B';
-- Support rating '5';
-- Support Floor 'NF'.

GMAC Capital Trust I
-- Trust preferred securities, series 2 'B+/RR3'.

The Rating Outlook is Positive.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK OTKRITIE: Recapitalization Credit Positive, Moody's Says
-------------------------------------------------------------
The recapitalization of three failed Russian banks by the Central
Bank of Russia (CBR) is a positive for the lenders, but they
still face challenges to their long-term viability, says Moody's
Investors Service.

The report is entitled "Banks -- Russia - Recapitalization of
three banks is credit positive but deeper challenges remain."

Over the four months to December 2017, the CBR rescued Bank
Otkritie Financial Corporation PJSC (BOFC, B2 review for upgrade,
caa3), B&N Bank, and Promsvyazbank (B2 developing, ca) and
announced plans to recapitalize them within months.

The CBR estimates that the total recapitalization cost will
exceed RUB1 trillion, an amount equivalent to over 20% of the
three banks' combined assets prior to their bailouts. Of this,
BOFC, the largest of the three banks, has already received RUB456
billion. Promsvyazbank and B&N Bank will be recapitalized by the
end of Q1 2018.

The support from the CBR will allow the banks to meet minimum
capital requirements and give them sufficient capital buffers to
absorb expected losses and support potential lending growth.

"Winning back depositors will be critical for these lenders,"
said Lev Dorf, an Assistant Vice President at Moody's. "BOFC
experienced a massive run on deposits prior to its bailout and
B&N Bank's and Promsvyazbank's deposit bases also shrank after
the CBR placed them under provisional administration."

B&N Bank and Promsvyazbank lost significant portion of their
customer funds after the CBR placed them under provisional
administration. Consequently, their reliance on funding from the
central bank increased to about 30% of their total liabilities as
of January 1, 2018.

On the lending side, it is also critical for BOFC and B&N Bank to
reestablish their business models. The CBR plans to merge the two
banks in the next 12 months and then sell the combined entity.
The combined bank will lose a significant portion of business
linked to the former owners of BOFC and B&N Bank and other
related parties.

Promsvyazbank has been picked by the government to become the
primary financial institution for the defense sector. However,
this brings a major risk in that the bank could become the target
of US sanctions due to its new role as a special purpose bank for
defense enterprises.

"Some non-related third party customers may continue to move to
other banks due to concern that the banks' past troubles and
uncertain future could result in inferior service," said Dorf.


DME AIRPORT: Fitch Rates Add'l. US$300MM Notes Due 2023 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned DME Airport Designated Activity
Company's USD300 million loan participation notes due 2023 a
'BB+' final rating. The agency has also affirmed both DME Ltd's
(DME) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB+' and existing
USD300 million loan participation notes due 2018 and USD350
million loan participation notes due 2021 at 'BB+'. The Outlook
is Stable.

DME benefits from growing, moderately volatile, largely origin &
destination (O&D) and leisure-dominated traffic from the large
Moscow catchment area. De-regulated tariffs provide pricing
flexibility within a competitive airport market. The investment
programme is ambitious but modular. Fitch revised leverage
forecasts remain low. However, the weak debt structure subject to
refinance and FX risk coupled with corporate governance and some
political, legal and regulatory uncertainty negatively affect the
ratings.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch opinion that the recovery in
traffic following the end of the recession in Russia is underway.
This is despite termination of VIM-Avia's flights and evolving
competition from other Moscow's airports.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Large catchment area with strong traffic growth: Revenue Risk
(Volume) - Midrange

DME benefits from a large catchment area that generates growing
O&D leisure traffic. S7, the main airline operating at DME
accounted for more than 30% passengers in 2017. DME experienced a
peak-to-trough decline of 12.9% during 2008-09 and 13.9% during
2014-16. DME competes with two other airports in Moscow, namely
Sheremetyevo airport, which hosts Russia's national flag carrier
Aeroflot, and Vnukovo airport.

Competition and limited track record of liberalised tariff:
Revenue Risk (Price) - Midrange

DME's revenue structure is well-diversified as the airport
provides a comprehensive range of services. In early 2016, the
regulation of aviation services under a dual-till regime was
lifted and DME can now set tariffs freely. However, the track
record of operations in the liberalised regime is limited and
competition among Moscow airports is evolving. Fitch believe the
Russian national regulator Federal Antimonopoly Service could re-
introduce a regulated tariff if it regards any future price
increases as excessive.

Ambitious but modular investment programme: Infrastructure
Renewal - Midrange

DME's runway capacity is sufficient for current operations and
growth. However, substantial investment is underway for the
expansion of the terminal capacity and related equipment. The
expansion programme is ambitious but modular. Most future outlays
after 2018 can be scaled down or postponed. DME uses cash flows
from operations and the proceeds from debt issuance to fund
capex.

Limited protection and refinancing risk: Debt Structure - Weaker
The notes are structured effectively as corporate unsecured debt.
The notes are fixed-rate with bullet maturities and bear foreign-
exchange risk. Reasonable leverage, a history of accessing
capital markets and established banking relationships mitigate
refinancing risk. Natural hedge through a portion of revenue
being in US dollars or euros lowers the foreign-exchange risk.
Covenants offer some but not comprehensive protection to
noteholders. There are no liquidity reserve provisions but DME
has historically maintained prudent levels of cash.

Financial Profile

The projected five-year average Fitch's adjusted net debt/EBITDAR
is 2.6x with a maximum of 3.1x at the end of 2018 as the airport
undergoes substantial expansion.

PEER GROUP

DME compares favourably in terms of leverage with 'BBB' category
rated airports such as Brussels Airport Company S.A./N.V.
(BBB/Positive), Manchester Airport Group Funding PLC
(BBB+/Stable) or Copenhagen Airports A/S (BBB+/Stable). However,
DME has an inherent volatility associated with emerging markets
as well as FX exposure and refinancing risk. GMR Hyderabad
International Airport Limited (BB+/Stable) is also a close peer
albeit with higher leverage. However, DME has higher perceived
traffic risk given recent traffic declines. DME's peers operate
in a more stable regulatory, legal and political environment.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action include:

- A projected five-year average Fitch's adjusted net
   debt/EBITDAR below 2x under the rating case.

- Improvement in the business risk profile due to, among other
   factors, completion of Terminal 2, a longer track record of
   operating within a liberalised tariff environment, an
   improvement in corporate governance, and reduction in
   political, legal and regulatory uncertainty.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action include:

- A projected five-year average Fitch's adjusted net
   debt/EBITDAR above 4x under the rating case, due to, among
   other factors, high shareholder returns or falling operating
   cash flows.

- Increased refinancing risk, driven by bullet repayment
   structure, and as expressed in an inability to refinance debt,
   elevated foreign exchange risk and/or worsened liquidity
   position.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY

The proceeds from the issuance of the USD300 million loan
participation notes due 2023 will be used to redeem the
outstanding USD221.5 million of the USD300 million loan
participation notes due in November 2018 with the remainder used
for capital expenditure and general corporate purposes. The notes
effectively rank pari passu and are structurally identical to the
existing notes. In addition, the new notes are callable.

CREDIT UPDATE

Traffic Recovery Underway

Following the end of recession in Russia in 2016 DME's traffic is
recovering. In 2017, DME's traffic increased 7.6% to 30.7
million. In particular, international traffic grew strongly by
15%. The ban on flights to Turkey was lifted at end-August 2016
while the ban on flights to Egypt (except regular flights to
Cairo) is still in place. Fitch perceive any removal of flight
restrictions, together with a strengthening of the Russian
economy and currency, as positive for traffic development.

VIM-Avia's Bankruptcy

VIM-Avia was the third largest airline operating at DME carrying
1.7 million pax in 2017 and representing 5.5% of the overall
traffic. The company experienced severe financial difficulties,
which resulted in a suspension of its licence in October 2017.
Fitch expects the impact of the airline's bankruptcy to be
marginally negative. The airline mainly operated chartered
flights that can be quickly taken over by other airlines
operating out of DME. Fitch understands that majority of the
airline's routes has been already replaced.

Financial Performance

In the first nine months of 2017, revenue reached RUB31.1
billion, an increase of 7.9% yoy. However, EBITDA declined yoy by
1.9% to RUB11.2 billion in the same period. The increase in staff
costs partially due to ongoing expansion, the increase in costs
of jet fuel purchased as traffic picked up and impairment
provisions for VIM-Avia diluted margins. The trailing 12 months
EBITDA as of 30 September 2017 was RUB14.2 billion and is in line
with Fitch expectations. The covenanted consolidated net
debt/EBITDA stood at 1.6x and 2.2x at end-2016 and at the end of
September 2017, respectively.

Expanding Capacity

Construction of Terminal 2 to accommodate international flights
and increase the airport's terminal capacity started in 2015.
Fitch understand that phase 1, together with a new multi-story
car parking facility, will be completed before the soccer World
Cup in Russia in 2018.

Fitch Cases

Fitch's rating case assumes passenger volumes to grow on average
by 4.7% between 2017-21, continuing on a recovery path. The
addition of new terminal capacity in 2018 and development of
other commercial offerings (e.g. multi-story car parking
facility) will lift commercial revenues by over 10% in 2018 and
2019. However, Fitch assumed that margins will remain under
pressure. Together with other various assumptions, the forecast
results in a projected five-year average Fitch's adjusted net
debt/EBITDAR of 2.6x and a maximum of 3.1x and projected five-
year average net debt/EBITDA of 2.3x and a maximum of 2.8x.

Asset Description

DME operates Domodedovo Airport, one of the three main airports
in Moscow. DME Airport Designated Activity Company, formerly DME
Airport Limited, an Irish SPV, is the issuer of the notes, with
the proceeds on-lent to the borrower, Hacienda Investments Ltd
(Cyprus).The loans are guaranteed by the holding company DME and
a majority of DME operational subsidiaries on a joint and several
basis. The group owns the terminal buildings and leases the
runways and other airfield assets from the Russian government.


FERROGLOBE PLC: Fitch Raises Long-Term IDR to B, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Ferroglobe plc's Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) to 'B' from 'B-'. The Outlook on the IDR is
Stable. Simultaneously, Fitch has affirmed the senior unsecured
rating of the USD350 million notes due 2022 jointly issued by
Ferroglobe and Globe Specialty Metals, Inc. (GSM), Ferroglobe's
US subsidiary, at 'B+'. The notes have an 'RR3' Recovery Rating.
Both IDR and senior unsecured rating have been removed from
Rating Watch Positive (RWP).

The IDR upgrade follows a strengthening of Ferroglobe's financial
profile, driven primarily by a rebound in selling prices for
silicon, and manganese- and silicon-based alloys from multi-year
lows seen in 2016. Fitch expect the company's funds from
operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage to have declined to 4.1x
at end-2017 and to remain slightly above 3x in 2018-2021, while
its FFO fixed charge cover is set to increase to 3.6x from
severely distressed levels at end-2016. Fitch views current
silicon and silicon alloys prices as sustainable over the medium
term in the absence of macroeconomic shocks, while it expects a
contraction in manganese alloy prices.

The RWP has been removed due to cancellation of the Spanish
hydro-electric asset sale after it failed to obtain approval from
the local authorities. In Fitch view, Ferroglobe may consider
selling these assets in the future. The unsecured bond rating has
remained at 'B+' due to a higher-than-expected amount of secured
debt senior to the bond, including an increase in the amount of
the available secured revolving credit facility (RCF) and the
presence of finance leases, which were previously expected to be
repaid.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Price Recovery Improves Performance: Fitch expect Ferroglobe's
EBITDA to have nearly tripled to USD185 million in 2017. This is
mainly driven by Ferroglobe's higher average realised prices in
2017, eg, 60% increase for manganese alloys and 12% for silicon-
based alloys, while silicon prices remained virtually flat year-
on-year. Fitch view current silicon and silicon alloys prices as
sustainable, although Fitch expect a contraction in manganese
alloy prices in the medium term. In Fitch view, Ferroglobe's
financial performance remains highly susceptible to market prices
for the company's products with limited headroom in the event of
a sharp decline in prices from current levels.

Fitch projects Ferroglobe's EBITDA margin to have reached 11% in
2017, up from 4% in 2016, and its funds from operations (FFO) to
have totalled USD131 million following a negative figure in 2016.
Ferroglobe's 2017 FFO adjusted gross leverage is expected to
approach Fitch's positive guidance of 4x by end-2017 and to drop
below 4x by end-March 2018 as the 4Q17 rise in global silicon
prices fully feeds through into the company's results given the
price lag in some of its contracts. Higher EBITDA from silicon
production is the main driver behind Ferroglobe's expected
stronger performance, while manganese alloys, which have
substantially improved 2017 results, will contribute less to
earnings in the future, according to Fitch forecast.

Glencore Transaction Rating-Neutral: Ferroglobe announced
acquisition of two manganese alloys plants in France and Norway
from Glencore. Following the deal completion expected in 1Q18,
its capacity in silicon-manganese and ferromanganese alloys will
rank the third-largest globally (ex-China). Fitch conservatively
assumes the new assets will generate annual EBITDA of around
USD40 million; however, the plants' earnings could be
significantly higher if manganese alloy prices remain at current
levels. Even though the deal moderately enhances Ferroglobe's
operating profile, it does not affect its ratings at present.

Silicon Production Increases: Fitch forecast a double-digit yoy
rise in Ferroglobe's silicon output in 2018. It is driven by
higher silicon prices, higher global demand and favourable
preliminary resolution of a US silicon trade case. In December
2017, European and US silicon prices were up 10%-15% on the 3Q17
average, and the positive trend continued in January 2018.
Stronger prices should allow Ferroglobe to increase production at
higher-cost locations. In addition, preliminary determinations by
US Department of Commerce on silicon anti-dumping investigations,
which demand cash deposits on silicon imports from Australia,
Brazil, Kazakhstan and Norway, if affirmed in 2018, may lead to
stronger US silicon prices and higher production at Ferroglobe's
US facilities.

Dividend Payments to Resume: Ferroglobe paid dividends of USD77
million in 2015-2016, despite substantial net and operating
losses in this period. NASDAQ-listed Ferroglobe remains majority-
owned by Spain's Grupo Villar Mir (Grupo VM), a privately held
Spanish conglomerate. Ferroglobe and its sister company Obrascon
Huarte Lain SA (OHL, B+/Negative), in which Grupo VM has a 52%
stake, are the main sources of dividends for Grupo VM. Although
the bond documentation contains covenants on dividends, Fitch
believe that the company is allowed to pay out large amounts as
long as it is not in default. Fitch expect Ferroglobe to resume
paying dividends in 2018. Under Fitch's assumptions, the company
has some headroom to pay dividends while maintaining reasonable
leverage.

Leading Western Silicon Producer: Fitch assess Ferroglobe's
operational profile as commensurate with the 'BB' rating
category, given the company's large production scale in specialty
alloys on one hand but high cost position on the other. The
company's 26 plants have a gross capacity of nearly 1.2 million
tons (mt) of silicon, silicon-based and manganese-based alloys
(excluding Glencore assets) and are located mainly in the US and
Europe. In 2016, Europe and North America accounted for 84% of
the company's USD1.6 billion total sales, with silicon accounting
for around half of the total. Ferroglobe is the largest silicon
producer in the world.

Ferroglobe's customer base is well-diversified across the steel,
aluminium and chemical sectors. Self-sufficiency in key raw
materials (the company has the resources to be 45% self-
sufficient, excluding electricity) supports its competitive
position.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Ferroglobe, a leading western producer of silicon metal, silicon-
based and manganese-based alloys, greatly depends on volatile
market prices for its products, as seen in 2016 when its cash
flows deteriorated sharply due to depressed prices. Its current
financial profile and scale of operations are comparable with
that of PAO Koks (B/Stable). In contrast to its peers, most of
Ferroglobe's assets are in western Europe and the US, ie
countries with a stable operating environment. United Company
RUSAL Plc (BB-/Stable) and Evraz Group SA (BB/Positive) surpass
Ferroglobe in both operational and financial metrics.

No country ceiling, parent/subsidiary or operating environment
aspects impact the ratings.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's Key Assumptions within Fitch Rating Case for the Issuer:

- Average 2018-2021 realised prices for silicon metal, silicon-
   based alloys and manganese-based alloys of USD2,575/t,
   USD1,675/t and USD1,065/t, respectively;

- Low double-digit growth in silicon sales volumes in 2018 and
   flat thereafter;

- Slight decrease in sales volumes of ferroalloys after 2017;

- Prices of main raw materials mostly in line with management's
   expectations;

- Capex and dividends averaging USD168 million per annum in
   2018-2021; and

- Increased usage of receivables securitisation in 2018-2021.

Fitch's key assumptions for bespoke recovery analysis include:

- The recovery analysis assumes that Ferroglobe's distressed
   enterprise value is maximised if the company is liquidated
   rather than remaining a going concern. Fitch have assumed a
   10% administrative claim.

- Fitch included the fully drawn amount under the new secured
   USD250 million committed RCF to be agreed and secured finance
   leases as effectively senior to Ferroglobe's USD350 million
   unsecured bond. Unsecured loans provided by the government to
   Ferroglobe's subsidiaries are treated as pari passu with the
   bond. Liability under Ferroglobe PLC's cross-currency swap
   related to the bond is considered effectively subordinated to
   the bond because the swap is not guaranteed by operating
   companies.

- The waterfall results in a 66% recovery corresponding to a
   'RR3' Recovery Rating for the USD350 million unsecured bond.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Positive Rating Action

- Strengthened liquidity position.
- Sustained FFO margin of at least 10%.
- Sustained FFO adjusted gross leverage below 3x through the
   cycle.

Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead to
Negative Rating Action

- Weakness in the product prices leading to sustained EBIT
   margin below 6%.

- Sustained FFO adjusted gross leverage above 4x through the
   cycle, potentially driven by subdued prices, acquisitions or
   large dividend payments.

- Deterioration in liquidity.

LIQUIDITY

Satisfactory Liquidity: Ferroglobe had short-term debt of USD196
million at end-September 2017, USD120 million of which was the
liability under the company's factoring programme that expires in
2020. Short-term debt excluding factoring was covered by cash and
equivalents of USD190 million. The company also had an undrawn
committed secured RCF balance of USD174 million, but this
facility is short-term as it expires in August 2018. Ferroglobe
is currently in the process of agreeing a new long-term USD250
million RCF.

The bond placed in early 2017 significantly improved Ferroglobe's
liquidity and extended average debt tenor to roughly five years,
reducing refinancing needs. FerroAtlantica S.A., Ferroglobe's
major opco based in Spain, joined the group of bond guarantors in
2017 after the planned sale of Ferroglobe's Spanish hydro-
electric assets was cancelled. The bond is guaranteed by opcos
representing around 84% of the group's assets at 30 September
2017 and roughly 92% of the group's revenue in 9M17 (excluding
two JVs with Dow Corning Inc.). Fitch assumes that the percentage
of revenue generated by bond guarantors broadly corresponds to
their share in total group EBITDA.

Solar Project Partially Cancelled: In December 2016, Ferroglobe's
subsidiary FerroAtlantica, S.A. borrowed nearly EUR72 million
from the Spanish government to fund two solar grade silicon
development projects in Spain. The company has decided to cancel
one of these projects and will repay USD34 million of funds
borrowed from the government in 2018, while the remainder
repayable between 2019 and 2026.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


DEBUSSY DTC: S&P Cuts Class A Euro CMBS Notes Rating to 'BB-(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' and
removed from CreditWatch negative its credit rating on Debussy
DTC PLC's class A notes.

The downgrade reflects S&P's view that the creditworthiness of
the single loan backing the notes has deteriorated and our
lowered recovery expectations.

On Dec. 15 2017, S&P placed its rating on the class A notes on
CreditWatch negative following Toys "R" Us UK's announcement that
it was in the process of seeking creditor approval to reposition
its real estate portfolio, through a company voluntary
arrangement (CVA).

Debussy is a secured European commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) transaction that closed in 2013, with notes
totaling GBP263.2 million, including GBP78.9 million of unrated
class B and C notes. The transaction has a legal final maturity
date of July 2025.

LOAN OVERVIEW

The single loan is secured by a portfolio of 30 retail stores and
one distribution warehouse in the U.K. Toys "R" Us UK owns the
properties and lets them to Toys "R" Us Ltd. on 30-year leases.
The loan matures in July 2020. As of Feb. 20, 2018, loan events
of default that include an interest coverage ratio (ICR) breach
have occurred under the loan agreement.

Most of the assets are stand-alone detached stores built for Toys
"R" Us. They range in size from 24,785 square feet (sq. ft.) to
49,771 sq. ft., and the average store size is 40,130 sq. ft. Most
of the stores were developed in the 1980s and early 1990s. A
number of the stores are located in retail parks, including some
parks that are dominant within their catchment area.

Under the CVA, the directors of Toys "R" Us UK have carried out
an assessment of its store portfolio and identified stores that
are not profitable or too large, or both. Depending on the store,
Toys "R"Us UK's plans include rent reductions, lease
terminations, or space downsizes.

LOAN AND COLLATERAL SUMMARY (As Of January 2018)

-- Securitized loan balance: GBP263.2 million
-- 2017 Estimated rental value: GBP19.6 million
-- Market value: GBP359.4 million (as of April 2017)
-- Vacant possession value: GBP196.4 million (as of April 2017)

S&P's KEY ASSUMPTIONS

-- S&P NCF: GBP18.2 million
-- S&P Value: GBP212.0 million
-- S&P LTV ratio (before recovery rate adjustments): 124%
-- S&P's analysis assumed principal losses on this loan in its
    'B' case rating stress scenario.

OTHER ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

S&P said, "Our ratings analysis includes an analysis of the
transaction's payment structure and cash flow mechanics. We
assess whether the cash flow from the securitized assets would be
sufficient, at the applicable rating levels, to make timely
payments of interest and ultimate repayment of principal by the
legal maturity date (July 2025), after taking into account
available credit enhancement and allowing for transaction
expenses and external liquidity support."

The transaction maintains a GBP19.3 million reserve account to
fund senior note interest.

RATING RATIONALE

S&P said, "We do not consider the available credit enhancement
for the class A notes to be sufficient to absorb the amount of
losses that the underlying properties would suffer at the
currently assigned rating level. We have therefore lowered to
'BB- (sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative
our rating on the class A notes."

RATINGS LIST

  Debussy DTC PLC
  GBP263.159 mil commercial mortgage-backed fixed-rate notes

                                   Rating
  Class     Identifier        To          From
  A         XS0948871784      BB- (sf)    BBB (sf)/Watch Neg


NEW LOOK: Finance Director to Visit Property Owners This Week
-------------------------------------------------------------
Oliver Shah at The Sunday Times reports that landlords to New
Look are bracing themselves for store closures and rent
reductions after the struggling fashion retailer said its finance
director would visit property owners this week.

New Look is understood to have written to big landlords on
Feb. 23 to say that Richard Collyer would be seeking meetings in
the coming days, The Sunday Times relates.

According to The Sunday Times, the chain is known to have been
considering a company voluntary arrangement (CVA), a form of
insolvency that allows retailers to restructure their property
portfolios.

New Look is owned by the investment company Brait, whose biggest
shareholder is the troubled South African tycoon Christo Wiese.
It has almost 600 stores in Britain, about 60 of which are
thought to be under threat, The Sunday Times states.


POUNDWORLD: Lines Up Restructuring Advisers Amid Financial Woes
---------------------------------------------------------------
John Collingridge at The Sunday Times reports that Poundworld is
lining up restructuring advisers as the private-equity-owned
discount retailer struggles amid "brutal" trading.

According to The Sunday Times, the chain of more than 350 stores,
owned by American buyout titan TPG Capital, is understood to have
invited company doctors from firms including Deloitte and Alvarez
& Marsal to pitch for the turnaround role.

Poundworld is the latest high street chain to suffer amid high
inflation and stagnating consumer confidence, The Sunday Times
relays.  It posted losses of GBP17.1 million in the year to the
end of last March, The Sunday Times discloses.  Figures were
inflated by almost GBP6 million of provisions for leases on
loss-making stores, The Sunday Times notes.

According to The Sunday Times, an industry source said the chain
is under pressure to cut costs and is likely to explore a company
voluntary arrangement (CVA).

Poundland is a high street discount chain.


STONEPEAK SPEAR: S&P Assigns 'B' ICR on Completed Leverage Buyout
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' long-term issuer credit
rating to U.K.-based fiber infrastructure services provider,
Stonepeak Spear Newco (UK) Ltd. and its financing subsidiary
euNetworks Holdings Ltd. (together, euNetworks). The outlook is
stable.

S&P said, "At the same time, we assigned our 'B' issue rating to
the EUR300 million senior secured term loan B, borrowed by
Stonepeak Spear UK Newco and subsequently pushed down to
euNetworks Holdings Ltd. The recovery rating on the loan is '3',
indicating our expectation of meaningful recovery (50%-70%;
rounded estimate: 55%) in the event of a payment default."

These ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings S&P
assigned on Nov. 30, 2017.

The rating action follows the completed leveraged buyout of a
majority of euNetworks by Stonepeak Infrastructure Partners. The
EUR300 million of term loan and equity capital provided by the
financial sponsor funded the transaction. These proceeds were
applied to the group's acquisition price, the repayment of net
debt, and transaction-related fees.

S&P said, "Our analysis factors in as a rating constraint
euNetworks' reported negative free operating cash flow (FOCF),
following the group's significant upfront investment to deploy
its fiber network and coverage. The negative FOCF is partly
offset by temporarily high debt to EBITDA in 2017, adjusting for
the leveraged buyout, that should decline subsequently on
continued EBITDA growth. The rating also incorporates our view of
euNetworks' good, albeit niche, positioning in the fast-growing
datacenter connectivity segment, its small size, and its largely
fixed-cost base, offset somewhat by the group's competitive
network and longstanding relationship with its demanding and
quality-oriented customers."

A London-based, pan-European provider of low-latency and high-
bandwidth infrastructure services, euNetworks focuses on
providing high bandwidth solutions to clients in the financial
services, communications, content, and media spaces, through its
network of about 1,900 kilometers (km) of metro-fiber, and almost
19,000 km of long-haul fiber. The group derives approximately 80%
of its revenues from high-margin focus products, including
wavelengths, dark fiber, and to a lesser extent, Ethernet.
Colocation and internet services generate most of the remaining
20%.

S&P's view of euNetworks' business is supported by the group's
strategic focus and leading position in the fast-growing European
datacenter connectivity market, working with data-hungry large
enterprises, carriers, and content/cloud providers. The group has
a competitive network of both metro- and long-haul fiber routes
that connect more than 300 datacenters in Europe, of which 92 are
among the identified 102 main European datacenters. While the
capillarity of its network, as measured by total km covered, is
not as broad as other competitors, euNetworks' routes leverage
strategic locations and are characterized by a higher number of
fibers per duct that support large data and bandwidth transport
capacity. Consequently, the group generates higher average
revenues per route than peers, and grows at above-market rates.

Operations are fairly diversified by customer (the top-15
customers generate less than 30% of annual revenues) and by
region as the group expands in Europe. euNetworks' business model
provides recurring revenues and a large contractual revenue
backlog, thanks to multiyear contracts. This model translates
into healthy profit margins, which are improving as revenues grow
and further cover the fixed-cost base. Lastly, the group does not
engage in speculative network developments. Rather, it focuses on
growth from new customer contracts, although there is a gap
between its upfront investment and its income profile, given that
it focuses its business model on monthly recurring revenues.

These strengths are partly offset by euNetworks being a niche
player, with single-digit overall market share. Moreover, it
faces competition from larger and better capitalized companies
that could upgrade and diversify their existing networks over
time. S&P said, "We also see as a risk the possibility that
current customers move their networks in-house. The group's small
size is a rating constraint. It generated about EUR125 million of
revenues and almost EUR60 million of S&P Global Ratings-adjusted
EBITDA in 2016. Loss of a key customer could materially change
the group's revenue and profitability patterns, but we have not
seen this happen to date. Furthermore, in line with the rest of
the industry, euNetworks faces pressure on prices of data
transport, although we understand this only happens at contract
renewal and is usually offset by volume growth due to higher data
traffic. Lastly, we believe the group's contract length is, on
average, shorter than that of some of its rated peers offering
similar solutions, partly as a result of its euTrade ultra low-
latency business, which carries shorter contract lengths.
Although we acknowledge that its contract renewal rate is high,
euNetworks' revenue prospects could decline if it faced
heightened competition."

S&P said, "Our view of euNetworks' financial risk is primarily
constrained by its reported negative FOCF. Network deployment
requires large upfront investments that are not matched by a
similar revenue and cash generation profile, given that the group
receives monthly recurring payments from customers. As a
consequence, in our base case, we expect breakeven reported FOCF
only by 2019, which prevents the group from deleveraging through
voluntary debt amortization before that date. Moreover, we assess
euNetworks' capital structure as highly leveraged due to adjusted
leverage (debt to EBITDA) calculated at above 5.0x in 2017,
adjusting for the leveraged buyout, and then decreasing to about
4.9x in 2018. An additional rating constraint is the group's
majority ownership by private-equity firm Stonepeak
Infrastructure Partners, which we consider a financial sponsor.
Still, we view positively that a meaningful portion of the
group's acquisition price has been financed with new equity from
the sponsor. We also understand that the focus of both the
sponsor and management is on network deployment and deleveraging.

"The stable outlook on euNetworks reflects our view that
increasing bandwidth demand for datacenter connectivity from
large and data-hungry companies will support solid revenue growth
of 10%-15% and a sound adjusted EBITDA margin approaching 50%
over the next 12 months. These positives, however, are offset by
our expectation of reported negative FOCF and adjusted leverage
at about 5.0x.

"We are likely to raise our rating on euNetworks if EBITDA growth
results in higher absorption of capex, resulting in stronger
credit metrics and a reduction in adjusted leverage. This would
occur if FOCF to debt improves to about 3%, and if adjusted
leverage approaches 4.5x on a sustainable basis.

"We could consider lowering our rating if the pace of euNetworks'
revenue and EBITDA growth slowed or if liquidity markedly
deteriorated. These events could occur amid increased competition
that would accentuate pressure on prices, with volume growth not
materializing or the group facing a loss of a major customer."



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante,
Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2018.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000.


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