/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/170711.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, July 11, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 136


                            Headlines


F R A N C E

AREVA: S&P Upgrades CCR to B+, Outlook Remains Developing
FINANCIERE EFEL: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable
NEW CO: S&P Raises CCR to B+, On CreditWatch Positive


G E O R G I A

LIBERTY BANK: Moody's Assigns First-Time B1 Deposit Ratings


G R E E C E

GREECE: EU Stability Mechanism Okays EUR8.5BB Bailout Tranche


I R E L A N D

CADOGAN SQUARE CLO IX: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. F Notes
CADOGAN SQUARE CLO IX: S&P Assigns B- Rating to Class F Notes
IRELAND: 492 Jobs Saved Via Examinership in First Half 2016
RAC BOND: S&P Gives Prelim. 'B' Rating to Class B1-Dfrd Notes


I T A L Y

BRISCA SECURITIZATION: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. B Notes
CLARIS FINANCE 2006: S&P Puts Cl. B Notes Rating on Watch Neg.


L U X E M B O U R G

PACIFIC DRILLING: Unit Seeking Consents to Extend Notes Maturity
PACIFIC DRILLING: Expects Up to $140M Second Quarter Net Loss


N E T H E R L A N D S

GARDA CLO: Moody's Affirms Caa1(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
JUBILEE CLO 2017-XVIII: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. F Notes
OI BRASIL: Chapter 15 Case Summary
OI BRASIL: Seeks U.S. Recognition of Netherlands Case
OI BRASIL: Dutch Supreme Court Nixes Financial Vehicles' Appeals


R U S S I A

ALFASTRAKHOVANIE PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IFS Rating
ALROSA PJSC: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable
CREDIT BANK: Moody's Rates $700M Add'n Tier 1 Sec. Caa1(hyb)
JUGRA BANK: Deposit Agency to Handle Provisional Administration
RUSFINANCE BANK: S&P Withdraws BB+/B Counterparty Credit Ratings

STAL BANK: Put On Provisional Administration, License Revoked


S P A I N

GRUPO ISOLUX: Fitch Cuts IDRs to D After Bankruptcy Filing


U K R A I N E

KSG BANK: NBU's Decision to Liquidate Operations Unlawful


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

DECO 6-UK: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A2 Notes to D
RAC BIDCO: S&P Lowers CCR to B on New Dividend Recapitalization


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F R A N C E
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AREVA: S&P Upgrades CCR to B+, Outlook Remains Developing
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term corporate credit rating
on France-based nuclear services group AREVA to 'B+' from 'B'.
The outlook remains developing.

S&P said, "We also raised our ratings on AREVA's EUR1,250 million
revolving credit facility (RCF) to 'B+' from 'B'. The recovery
rating is unchanged at '3', indicating our expectation of
meaningful recovery (50%-70%; rounded estimate 60%), in the event
of a default.

"The upgrade is mainly driven by our view that there is an
increased likelihood that AREVA's planned EUR2.0 billion capital
increase will take place this summer, since we think that the two
conditions set by the European Commission (EC) to authorize the
capital increase are now likely to be fully met. That said, we
understand that the completion of the restructuring may take more
time as some important approvals and processes are needed over
the coming quarters."

S&P understands that the EC set two main milestones that AREVA
has to meet before completing the capital increase:

-- The French Nuclear Safety Agency (ASN) must conclude that the
    Flamanville 3 EPR reactor vessel is fit for use, following
    the carbon segregation issue identified in parts of the
    reactor's vessel; or the Electricite De France (EDF),
    France's largest electric utility, must notify AREVA that it
    has lifted the condition precedent concerning the Flamanville
    3 EPR reactor in relation to the carbon segregation for the
    completion of the divestment of AREVA NP's activities. On
    June 28, 2017, the ASN provided its initial opinion that the
    mechanical characteristics of the Flamanville reactor
    pressure vessel are adequate. S&P said, "We understand that
    ASN will soon initiate a public consultation phase (which is
    likely to run until October 2017) before delivering its final
    conclusions. We don't expect their view to change materially
    or to derail the timing for the capital increase completion."
-- The EC must authorize EDF's acquisition of AREVA NP's
    activities, given the concentration that would be created by
    the takeover. In 2016, EDF signed a binding agreement with
    AREVA to buy AREVA NP's activities for EUR2.5 billion. Later
    in May 2017, the EC approved EDF's proposed takeover. S&P
    said, "We expect the sale will be completed in the second
    half of 2017 (following the capital increase). We understand
    that if the sale of AREVA NP's activities were unsuccessful,
    it would entail major costs and potentially reversing the
    capital increase. Under this less-than-likely scenario, we
    expect the French state would continue to provide short-term
    support to AREVA."

AREVA's subsidiary New Co plans to complete a EUR3 billion
capital increase in the near-term (of which EUR2.5 billion from
the French state are expected to come through in the summer),
which will result in the parent company AREVA S.A. becoming a
minority shareholder with initially just 50% and then to
approximately 40% with the completion of the restructuring.

Post the divestment of AREVA NP's activities, AREVA S.A. aims to
focus mainly on the OL3 project.

The developing outlook on AREVA reflects the uncertainty around
the final details and time of the sale of AREVA NP's activities,
but most importantly the future evolution of litigation claims
with Finnish electricity utility Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO). It
also reflects the uncertain degree of state support to AREVA once
its strategic assets are transferred to New Co, since AREVA S.A.
is to become a minority shareholder in New Co following the
capital increase.

S&P said, "We expect to obtain further clarity on the above
mentioned rating factor by early 2018. Our current rating assumes
the completion of EUR4.5 billion capital increase (EUR2.0 billion
at AREVA S.A. and EUR2.5 billion at New Co) this summer with an
additional EUR0.5 billion provided by minority shareholders to
New Co by the end of the year.

"We could lower our ratings on AREVA if the planned capital
increase is not executed this year, or if it fails to divest
AREVA NP's activities to EDF, the probability of which we now see
as more remote."

Future downside rating factors include:

-- The possibility that S&P considered that the ability or
    willingness of the French state to financially support AREVA
    had weakened, especially taking into account that the
    strategic activities of New Co will be clearly separated from
    AREVA S.A. (with the latter to become a minority shareholder
    post capital increase).
-- The outcome of the ongoing audit regarding possible
    irregularities in the manufacturing tracking records for
    equipment at AREVA NP's Le Creusot plant, which could cause
    reputational issues or costs to repair defective equipment.
-- The ongoing risks in relation to the OL3 plant and associated
    outstanding litigation claims between AREVA and TVO.

S&P said, "We could raise the ratings on AREVA by up to one
notch, but only if we gained more certainty on contingent risks
related to the OL3 plant, notably a manageable outcome of the
litigation with TVO. While our baseline assumes the completion of
the EUR5 billion capital increase, and the sale of AREVA NP's
activities, the extent of litigation claims with TVO remains
difficult to quantify at this stage."


FINANCIERE EFEL: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B' CCR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating to France-based Financiere Efel SAS (FE).
The outlook is stable.

At the same time, "S&P said, we assigned our 'B' preliminary
issue rating to the proposed EUR230 million senior secured term
loan B and EUR10 million revolving credit facility (RCF), which
rank pari passu. Our '3' preliminary recovery rating on these
facilities reflects the relatively low amount of prior-ranking
liabilities and our expectation of about 55% recovery for
shareholders in a payment default.

"The final ratings will depend upon the successful completion of
the transaction and our satisfactory review of the final
financing. Accordingly, the preliminary ratings should not be
construed as evidence of a final rating. If final documentation
departs from materials reviewed, we reserve the rights to
reconsider our position. Potential changes include, but are not
limited to, the amount of the funds raised, allocation of the
proceeds, and changes to the preferred shares' characteristics."

FE, the ultimate holding company of the Averys Group, is
considering refinancing its existing debt and repaying its
convertible bonds (OC) and preferred shares (ADP) -- together the
shareholder loan -- which were subscribed by one of Equistone's
investment vehicles. Equistone acquired the Averys group in June
2015.

As part of the transaction, the group will syndicate a seven-year
EUR230 million term loan B and a six-year EUR10 million RCF that
will remain undrawn upon the closing. The funds raised, combined
with the outstanding cash on the balance sheet, will be used to
refinance EUR134 million in existing debt and repay EUR106
million of the existing shareholder loan. The residual amount
will be assigned to transaction costs.

S&P said, "We assess this transaction as relatively aggressive,
since Equistone is entitled to about 43% of the cash sources. In
addition, this return to shareholders occurs within about two
years of the group's acquisition by Equistone. We understand that
when the transaction closes, only an estimated EUR5.7 million in
ADP (nominal value) owned by the management will be left outside
the restricted group. Given the ADP's features--no maturity date,
no financial covenants, no security package, and that it accrues
interest of less than 15%--we treat it as equity."

Ultimately, Equistone will continue to control the company.

FE is a European leader in the manufacturing of storage systems
(heavy and light duty racking) and metal furniture for numerous
applications in industrial warehouses. Headquartered in France,
the group operates in 13 countries across Europe, the Middle
East, and Asia-Pacific through a portfolio of eight brands. The
company generated sales of about EUR425 million and EBITDA of
EUR50 million in fiscal year 2016. This represents a compound
annual growth rate of 7% in revenues and 15% in EBITDA since 2010
supported by the strategic acquisition and successful integration
of operating subsidiary Stow in 2013.

S&P said, "Our assessment of the company's business risk profile
is constrained by its small size compared with other capital
goods companies. Its sales backlog is also limited to about one-
quarter of the year's sales, which limits visibility on new
contracts and the resulting cash flow generation. These two
factors combined could expose Averys to operating risk if it
experienced particularly difficult market conditions, in our
view."

The group's presence within the niche market of racking storage
represents a further constraining factor. The market is estimated
to be only about EUR2.5 billion in Europe and is fragmented and
competitive. In addition, S&P currently considers profitability
to be at the lower end of the average category for capital goods
players.

France accounts for almost 40% of the group's sales, and Europe
accounts for 90% on an aggregate basis. Thus, S&P views the group
as being exposed to heavy geographic concentration. Management
has been working on this issue for the past 10 years through
external growth with Standard in Turkey, Wandalex in Poland, and
Stow across Europe.

Despite its weaknesses, Averys retains solid market shares in its
core geographic markets (50% in France and 27% in Belgium), which
translates into a No. 2 position in Europe and No. 3 position
globally. Furthermore, on the strength of its leading market
position, Averys has maintained long-term relationships with a
fairly wide range of customers, from original equipment
manufacturers (such as forklift companies), to electronic
retailers, and has not suffered any contract losses.

Although its top-10 customers account for less than 30% of its
sales, the group remains highly dependent upon the fortunes of
Jungheinrich, which provides 10% of its sales. Nevertheless, S&P
considers its exposure to be mitigated by the existence of a
framework contract due 2018, which the company expects to be
renewed. In addition, the group has seen a shift in the material
handling market toward more warehousing equipment. Because of its
variable costs structure, the group has managed to deliver a
reported EBITDA margin of 10%-12% throughout the cycle. Indeed,
given the lack of a pass-through mechanism on direct sales (65%
of group sales at year end 2016), Averys can capture steel prices
fluctuations and, as a result, has been in a position to maintain
sustainable profitability throughout the cycle.

S&P said, "Our financial risk profile assessment encapsulates our
view that the contemplated transaction is relatively aggressive.
However, we consider that the group's decent cash flow generation
will translate into a gradual deleveraging.

"Until the OC's effective redemption, we treat them as debt
because they are owned by a financial investor and the return
rate is 9.5%. As a result, our total debt calculation is expected
to be above EUR250 million at year-end 2017 (including our
standard adjustment for operating leases and pensions). Given
that adjusted EBITDA for the year stands at EUR55 million, this
means a total debt to EBITDA below 5x and funds from operations
(FFO) to debt of about 12% by year-end 2017.

"We consider the group's planned leverage level is positive
compared with that of other companies that are owned by financial
sponsors."

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

-- Over 2017-2018, eurozone GDP growth of less than 2%
   (including France of less than 2%); Turkey growth of 3.0%-
    3.2%; and Asia-Pacific growth of about 5%.
-- Averys will outperform GDP growth across its core markets.
    S&P forecasts organic revenue growth in 2017 and 2018 of
    2%-4%, somewhat above market growth, based on continued
    growth in almost all divisions and supported by a further
    upside from new contracts.
-- Stable EBITDA margin of 12.5%-13.0% in 2017-2018.
-- Capital spending of about EUR12 million per year.
-- No bolt-on acquisitions or further payments to sponsors
    assumed.
-- Management and Equistone's commitment not to releverage the
    company beyond 5x.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

-- Total debt to EBITDA just 5x, deleveraging by less than 1x a
    year through 2017-2018; and
-- FFO to debt of about 12% by year-end 2017, improving to about
    14% in 2018.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our expectation FE's
organic growth and that it will maintain an EBITDA margin of 12%-
13%, and report adjusted debt to EBITDA just below 5x and FFO to
debt of about 11%-15% by year-end 2018. In our view, volumes
growth stemming from the ongoing contract with Jungheinrich,
combined with more dynamic growth in Eastern Europe than in
Western Europe, should offset the ongoing inefficiencies the
group is currently facing on some of its barely profitable
segment (EUR15 million of sales at year-end 2016).

"We could lower the rating if the company faced the loss of the
Jungheinrich contract or new volumes assigned fared less well
than anticipated, leading to weakened revenues, EBITDA, and cash
flow metrics compared with our base case. A more aggressive
financial policy -- for example, further returns to shareholders
or deteriorating liquidity -- could also put the ratings under
pressure. A ratio of FFO to debt below 12% and adjusted debt to
EBITDA above 5.0x could lead to a downgrade. Likewise, FFO cash
interest coverage converging toward less than 2.5x could also
trigger a negative rating action.

"Given the company's absolute small size, we see upward pressure
on the rating as remote. We could take a positive rating action
if the company outperformed our base-case projections, with the
EBITDA margin improving sustainably to the 16%-18% range, and if
it demonstrated a supportive financial policy, such as a constant
deleveraging path combined with a lack of further return to
shareholder. Adjusted FFO to debt sustainably above 20% and
positive FOCF generation of at least about 15%, together with
adequate liquidity, would also support a positive rating action."


NEW CO: S&P Raises CCR to B+, On CreditWatch Positive
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term corporate credit rating
on New Co, the subsidiary of France-based nuclear services group
AREVA, to 'B+' from 'B'.

S&P said, "We also raised our ratings on New Co's various senior
unsecured bonds to 'BB-' from 'B+'. The recovery rating is
unchanged at '2', indicating our expectation of substantial
recovery (70%-90%; rounded estimate 85%), in the event of a
default.

"We placed all the ratings on CreditWatch with positive
implications.

"The upgrade is mainly driven by our view that there is an
increased likelihood that New Co's planned EUR3.0 billion capital
increase will take place in the near-term, since we think that
the two conditions set by the European Commission (EC) for the
approval of the capital increase are now likely to be fully met
(see "French Nuclear Group AREVA Upgraded To 'B+' On Increased
Likelihood Of Capital Increase; Outlook Remains Developing,"
published July 6, 2017, on RatingsDirect)."

Given the full ownership of New Co by AREVA S.A., the two ratings
are linked. However, following the completion of the capital
increase, S&P said, "we are likely to delink the ratings, since
we assume that the current parent AREVA S.A. will then become a
minority shareholder. New Co would be rated as a stand-alone
entity with a separate assessment of government support."

S&P understands that the EC set two main milestones that New Co
must meet before completing the capital increase:

-- The French Nuclear Safety Agency (ASN) must conclude that the
    Flamanville 3 EPR reactor vessel is fit for use, following
    the carbon segregation issue identified in parts of the
    reactor's vessel; or the Electricite De France (EDF),
    France's largest electric utility, must notify AREVA that it
    has lifted the condition precedent concerning the Flamanville
    3 EPR reactor in relation to the carbon segregation for the
    completion of the divestment of AREVA NP's activities. On
    June 28, 2017, the ASN provided its initial opinion that the
    mechanical characteristics of the Flamanville reactor
    pressure vessel are adequate. S&P said, "We understand thats
    ASN will soon initiate a public consultation phase (which is
    likely to run until October 2017) before delivering its final
    conclusions. We don't expect their view to change materially
    or to derail the timing for the capital increase completion."
-- The EC must authorize EDF's acquisition of AREVA NP's
    activities, given the concentration that would be created by
    the takeover. In 2016, EDF signed a binding agreement with
    AREVA to buy AREVA NP's activities for EUR2.5 billion. Later
    in May 2017, the EC approved EDF's proposed takeover. S&P
    said, "We expect the sale will be completed in the second
    half of 2017 following the capital increase). Under our base
    case, we assume that New Co will receive the EUR2.5 billion
    equity increase from the French state this summer (that is
    before the official closing of the two milestones described
    above). In addition, Japanese shareholders are committed to
    contribute to an additional EUR500 million of new equity. We
    understand, however, that the EUR500 million in proceeds will
    be fully available to New Co once the sale of AREVA NP's
    activities is effective (toward year-end 2017)."

New Co is the entity created by France-headquartered nuclear
services provider AREVA to focus on the key nuclear cycle
activities, encompassing AREVA's current mining, uranium
conversion and enrichment, and back-end activities (such as
recycling, dismantling, logistics, and other downstream
services). At year-end 2016, revenues and S&P Global Ratings-
adjusted EBITDA for New Co were EUR4.4 billion and EUR1.3
billion, respectively. S&P views these activities as providing
more stable cash flows, backed by long-term contracts, which
supports its view of New Co's satisfactory business risk profile.

New Co's highly leveraged financial risk profile reflects its
very high S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt, including a number of
bonds. Once the capital increase is completed, S&P said, "we
anticipate S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA above 5x in
2017. In our debt calculation, we take into account about
EUR2 billion of debt adjustments related to pension-related
liabilities and asset-retirement obligations.

"The CreditWatch with positive implications reflects the
possibility that we might raise the rating by two to three
notches upon completion of the capital increase and AREVA S.A.
losing its majority shareholder control. We understand that the
capital increase is expected to be completed this summer."

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch after:

-- Reviewing New Co's financial results for the first half of
    2017 and guidance for future years.
-- Assessing the French state's ongoing and exceptional support
    for post the Restructuring.


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G E O R G I A
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LIBERTY BANK: Moody's Assigns First-Time B1 Deposit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned first-time B1/Not Prime
local and foreign currency deposit ratings to JSC Liberty Bank
and a b2 standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted
BCA. The outlook on the long-term deposit ratings is stable.
Moody's also assigned a Ba3(cr)/Not Prime(cr) Counterparty Risk
Assessment (CR Assessment).

According to Moody's, Liberty Bank's b2 BCA reflects (1) its
strong earnings generation capacity driven by a high interest
margin, (2) low single borrower concentrations and low exposure
to currency-induced credit risk and (3) a granular deposit
funding base and solid liquidity. These strengths are moderated
by (1) high asset risks reflecting the bank's focus on unsecured
lending and its credit concentration to Georgia's developing
economy, (2) an undiversified business model and (3) adequate
reported capital ratios, although an encumbrance against its
ordinary shares limits access to new capital and market funding.

Moody's also incorporates a moderate likelihood of government
support from Georgia (Ba3 stable) for Liberty Bank in case of
need, which results in one notch of uplift for the bank's B1
long-term deposit ratings.

RATINGS RATIONALE

BASELINE CREDIT ASSESSMENT

-- STRONG EARNINGS GENERATION CAPACITY

Moody's expects Liberty Bank's profitability to remain adequate
over the next 12-18 months supported by a strong earnings
generating capacity and accelerating economic growth in Georgia
that will support new business generation. The bank's bottom-line
profitability has been on an improving trend with net income to
tangible assets rising to 3.0% for 2016 from 2.1% in 2015 and
1.4% in 2014. The bank's pre-provision profitability benefits
from a strong net interest margin, 10.4% for 2016.

-- HIGH ASSET RISKS REFLECTING THE BANK'S FOCUS ON UNSECURED
LENDING AND CREDIT CONCENTRATION TO GEORGIA'S DEVELOPING ECONOMY

Asset risk in the bank's loan portfolio is driven by higher risk
unsecured retail lending to the lower-middle-income segment.
Credit costs averaged 3.7% during 2014-16. The bank is also
exposed to geographical concentration to Georgia's developing
economy (Macro Profile: Weak+), which is vulnerable to external
shocks. Moody's forecasts GDP growth of 3.5% in 2017 and 4% in
2018 in Georgia that will however support operating conditions
for banks over the coming quarters.

-- LOW SINGLE BORROWER CONCENTRATIONS AND LOW EXPOSURE TO
CURRENCY-INDUCED CREDIT RISK

However, Liberty Bank has low single borrower concentrations and
low exposure to currency-induced credit risk. The ten largest
borrowers accounted for only 0.9% of the bank's gross portfolio
as of year-end 2016 and foreign-currency lending for 4% of its
loan book for the same period, compared to 65% for the Georgian
banking sector. Also, partly mitigating risks from unsecured
lending, almost half of the bank's loan book is tied to the
assignment of a salary or state pension, whereby the bank deducts
loan repayments at source.

-- UNDIVERSIFIED BUSINESS MODEL

Although the bank has an established market position, its main
product range is limited. Advances on salaries, state pensions or
welfare payments accounted for 47% of gross loans as of year-end
2016, and consumer and micro loans for a further 26% and 15%
respectively. This leads to limited business diversification and
therefore the bank's business model is sensitive to negative
macroeconomic developments that may affect its principal customer
segment, and any changes to the regulatory framework (such as
caps on fees and interest rates) and competitive pressures in the
sector.

-- ALTHOUGH REPORTED CAPITAL RATIOS ARE ADEQUATE, ENCUMBERANCE
AGAINST ORDINARY SHARES LIMITS ACCESS TO NEW CAPITAL

Current capital levels are adequate (the bank reported a National
Bank of Georgia Basel II/III common equity Tier 1 ratio of 12.5%
as of March 2017) and a return on equity that averaged 24% in the
last 3 years provides substantial room for the bank to grow
through retained earnings. However, ongoing litigation against
the bank's main shareholders by former shareholders, regarding
sales of shares performed in 2008 and not related to current
activities of the bank, has led to an encumbrance against 60.5%
of the bank's ordinary shares and limits Liberty Bank's ability
to raise fresh equity in case of need.

-- GRANULAR DEPOSIT FUNDING BASE AND SOLID LIQUIDITY

Liberty Bank benefits from a granular deposit funding base, which
leads to a low reliance on market funding at 1% of tangible
banking assets as of March 2017. Over 75% of the bank's deposits
were from individuals and the top 20 deposits accounted for a
modest 13% of total liabilities as of year-end 2016, down from
17% at end-2015. The bank's liquidity and funding profile is
additionally supported by a significant volume of unencumbered
liquid assets, which amounted to 47% of total banking assets as
end-March 2017.

DEPOSIT RATINGS

Liberty Bank's B1 deposit ratings incorporate one notch of
government support uplift. The ratings reflect Liberty Bank's b2
BCA and Moody's assessment of a moderate probability of support
from the Georgian government (Ba3 stable), in case of need, given
the bank's significant market share of 8% of domestic deposits
and its importance to the country's payment system because of its
role in distributing state pensions and welfare payments in the
country.

COUNTERPARTY RISK ASSESSMENT

Moody's has also assigned a CR Assessment of Ba3(cr)/Not
Prime(cr) to Liberty Bank, which is one notch higher than its B1
deposit ratings, reflecting Moody's view that authorities are
likely to honour the operating obligations the CR Assessment
refers to in order to preserve the bank's critical functions and
reduce potential for contagion.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - UP/DOWN

There could be positive pressure on the bank's standalone BCA
following a significant improvement in operating conditions in
Georgia and if the bank is able to diversify its business model
without an increase in borrower concentrations or in currency-
induced credit risk. The bank's BCA could also be upgraded if
Liberty Bank's access to capital markets improves. However,
should the bank's BCA be upgraded, its deposit ratings would
likely remain unchanged under Moody's current government support
assumptions.

There would be negative pressure on the bank's ratings if capital
metrics deteriorate significantly below current levels mainly
because of higher credit losses. Changes to the regulatory or
competitive landscape that would impact the bank's revenue
generating capacity, or a loss of the bank's contract to
distribute state pensions or welfare payments could also put
negative pressure on its ratings. There could also be negative
pressure on the bank's deposit ratings if Moody's believes that
the government's willingness to provide support to the bank in
case of need has diminished.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.

LIST OF ASSIGNED RATINGS

- Local and foreign currency deposit ratings: B1 outlook
   stable / Not Prime

- Baseline credit assessment: b2

- Adjusted Baseline credit assessment: b2

- Counterparty Risk Assessment: Ba3(cr)/Not Prime(cr)

Outlook Actions:

-- Stable Outlook Assigned

At end-March 2017, Liberty Bank, headquartered in Tbilisi,
Georgia, had total assets of GEL1.6 billion (around $0.6
billion).

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G R E E C E
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GREECE: EU Stability Mechanism Okays EUR8.5BB Bailout Tranche
-------------------------------------------------------------
Mehreen Khan at The Financial Times reports that the European
Stability Mechanism, the eurozone's bailout fund, on July 7
approved a EUR8.5 billion cash injection after the country
successfully completed its second review as part of an EUR86
billion rescue agreed in 2015.

According to the FT, the fresh funds will allow the Greek
government to pay a EUR6.8 billion bill due to its private sector
creditors, the European Central Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, due later this month.  The remaining cash will be
used to help pay off some of the government's arrears, the FT
discloses.

Of the tranche, around EUR0.8 billion will be released after
Sept. 1 should the Syriza-led government make further improvement
in clearing its bills to suppliers, the FT states.

Greece's bailout program -- its third since 2010 -- finishes at
the end of August 2018, the FT says.  To ensure the government is
solvent after the rescue deal, Greece has hinted at an imminent
return to the bond markets, the FT notes.


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CADOGAN SQUARE CLO IX: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's assigns definitive ratings to seven classes of notes
issued by Cadogan Square CLO IX D.A.C. ("the Issuer"):

-- EUR 220,321,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 31,579,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 69,300,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 28,600,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR 20,350,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR 24,200,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR 12,100,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings of the rated notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2030. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Credit Suisse
Asset Management Limited ("CSAM"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Cadogan Square CLO IX D.A.C. is a managed cash flow CLO with a
target portfolio made up of EUR 440,000,000 equivalent par value
of mainly European corporate leveraged loans. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans or senior secured
bonds, and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of second-lien
loans, unsecured loans, mezzanine obligations and high yield
bonds. The portfolio may also consist of up to 12.5% of fixed
rate obligations and between 0% and 4% of principal hedged assets
and unhedged assets denominated in U.S. Dollars, Sterling, Swiss
Francs, Swedish Krona, Norwegian Krone and Danish Krone. The
portfolio is expected to be around 100% ramped up as of the
closing date and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans
to obligors domiciled in Western Europe. The remainder of the
portfolio will be acquired during the seven months ramp-up period
in compliance with the portfolio guidelines.

CSAM will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, collateral purchases are permitted using principal
proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from
sales of credit risk/improved obligations, and are subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer issued EUR46.5M of subordinated notes, which are not
rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. CSAM's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modelled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
October 2016. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modelling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 440,000,000

Diversity Score: 39

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.5%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.0%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 44.5%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the definitive ratings assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3163 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3575 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


CADOGAN SQUARE CLO IX: S&P Assigns B- Rating to Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to Cadogan Square
CLO IX DAC's class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, E, and F notes.

The ratings assigned to Cadogan Square CLO IX's notes reflect
S&P's assessment of:

-- The diversified collateral pool, which consists primarily of
    broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured term
    loans and bonds that are governed by collateral quality
    tests.
-- The credit enhancement provided through the subordination of
    cash flows, excess spread, and overcollateralization.
-- The collateral manager's experienced team, which can affect
    the performance of the rated notes through collateral
    selection, ongoing portfolio management, and trading.
-- The transaction's legal structure, which is bankruptcy
    remote.

S&P said, "We consider that the transaction's documented
counterparty replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately
mitigate its exposure to counterparty risk under our current
counterparty criteria (see "Counterparty Risk Framework
Methodology And Assumptions," published on June 25, 2013).

"Following the application of our structured finance ratings
above the sovereign criteria, we consider the transaction's
exposure to country risk to be limited at the assigned rating
levels, as the exposure to individual sovereigns does not exceed
the diversification thresholds outlined in our criteria (see
"Ratings Above The Sovereign - Structured Finance: Methodology
And Assumptions," published on Aug. 8, 2016).

"The transaction's legal structure is bankruptcy remote, in line
with our legal criteria (see "Structured Finance: Asset Isolation
And Special-Purpose Entity Methodology," published on March 29,
2017).

"Following our analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, we believe that our ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes."

Cadogan Square CLO IX is a European cash flow corporate loan
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) securitization of a
revolving pool, comprising euro-denominated senior secured loans
and bonds issued mainly by European borrowers. The collateral
manager is Credit Suisse Asset Management Ltd., an indirect,
wholly owned subsidiary of Credit Suisse Group AG.

RATINGS LIST

  Ratings Assigned

  Cadogan Square CLO IX DAC
  EUR452.95 Million Secured Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes
  (Including EUR46.50 Million Unrated Notes)

  Class                   Rating           Amount
                                         (mil. EUR)

  A-1                     AAA (sf)         220.32
  A-2                     AAA (sf)          31.58
  B                       AA (sf)           69.30
  C                       A (sf)            28.60
  D                       BBB (sf)          20.35
  E                       BB (sf)           24.20
  F                       B- (sf)           12.10
  Sub. notes              NR                46.50

  NR--Not rated.
  Sub.--Subordinated.


IRELAND: 492 Jobs Saved Via Examinership in First Half 2016
-----------------------------------------------------------
Peter Hamilton at The Irish Times reports that in the first six
months of this year some 492 jobs have been saved through the
process of examinership.

The number of jobs saved represents an increase of 66% on the
same period in 2016 when 297 jobs were saved, The Irish Times
relays, citing data from accountancy firm Baker Tilly Hughes
Blake.

According to The Irish Times, Neil Hughes, a managing partner at
the firm, said that uncertainty surrounding Brexit is a key
factor in business owners turning to examinership.

"The findings show the existential importance of the still
under-utilized examinership corporate recovery mechanism in
assisting fundamentally strong small and large businesses in
Ireland through periods of financial difficulty," The Irish Times
quotes Mr. Hughes as saying.  "Businesses in Ireland are facing
the challenges of increased competitiveness pressures linked to
the sizeable depreciation of sterling against the euro, a recent
slip in consumer demand and critically also the activities of
venture capital funds who have purchased thousands of business
loans in Ireland."


RAC BOND: S&P Gives Prelim. 'B' Rating to Class B1-Dfrd Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its preliminary 'B (sf)' credit
rating to RAC Bond Co. PLC's GBP275 million fixed-rate class
B1-Dfrd notes.

The transaction is a corporate securitization of the obligors'
(RAC Bidco Ltd. [Holdco] and its subsidiaries, excluding RAC
Insurance Ltd. and RACMS (Ireland) Ltd.) operating businesses,
which include roadside services, insurance brokering, motoring
services, and telematics and data services.

On the issue date, the issuer will issue the new class B1-Dfrd
notes totaling GBP275 million. These new notes will be
contractually subordinated to the outstanding class A1 and A2
notes and to the liabilities incurred by the borrower, including
the outstanding senior term and revolving credit facilities.
These new subordinated class B1-Dfrd notes are expected to bear a
fixed interest rate, which will step down following their
expected maturity date. S&P said, "Our preliminary rating on
these junior notes only addresses ultimate payment of interest
and principal.

"We anticipate that this new issuance will result in a class B1-
Dfrd notes leverage ratio of about 8.0x, based on fiscal year
2016 reported EBITDA of GBP183 million, excluding cash available
at the borrower level and considering that the revolving credit
facility is not drawn."

The class B1-Dfrd notes are structured as soft-bullet notes due
in 2046, but with interest and principal due and payable to the
extent received under the B1-Dfrd loans. Under the terms and
conditions of the class B1-Dfrd loan, if the loan is not repaid
on its expected maturity date (2022), interest will no longer be
due and will be deferred. The deferred interest, and the interest
accrued thereafter, becomes due and payable on the final maturity
date of the class B1-Dfrd notes in 2046. S&P said, "Our analysis
focuses on scenarios in which the loans underlying the
transaction are not refinanced at their expected maturity dates.
We therefore consider the class B1-Dfrd notes as deferring
accruing interest following the class A term loan's expected
maturity date and receiving no further payments until all of the
class A debt is fully repaid."

Moreover, under the terms and conditions, further issuances of
class A notes are permitted without consideration given to any
potential effect on the then current rating on the outstanding
class B1-Dfrd notes.

S&P said, "Both the extension risk, which we view as highly
sensitive to the future performance of the borrowing group given
its deferability, and the ability to issue more senior debt
without consideration given to the class B1-Dfrd notes, may
adversely affect the ability of the issuer to repay the class B1-
Dfrd notes. As a result, the uplift above the borrowing group's
creditworthiness reflected in our preliminary rating is limited
(see "U.K.-Based RAC Bidco Downgraded To 'B' On Proposed GBP275
Million Dividend Recapitalization; Outlook Stable," published on
July 6, 2017). Consequently, we have assigned our preliminary 'B
(sf)' rating to the class B1-Dfrd notes.

"On the issue date, we expect the new class B1-Dfrd notes'
issuance proceeds to be advanced by RAC Bond Co. (the issuer) to
RAC Ltd. (the borrower) under a new class B1 issuer borrower loan
agreement (IBLA). We understand that the borrower will use the B1
loan issuance proceeds to pay a dividend to RAC Midco II Ltd.,
the entity directly outside the securitization group, and
transaction fees."

Operating cash flows from Holdco and its subsidiaries (the
obligors), which include the borrower, are available to service
the borrower's financial obligations. In our analysis, we have
excluded any projected cash flows from RAC Insurance, which has
not granted security due to regulatory considerations. The
obligors jointly and severally guarantee each other's
obligations.

At the time of the issuance of the class B1-Dfrd notes, S&P
expects that a corresponding class B issuer/borrower loan will be
established and a loan agreement will be put in place, containing
covenants that are more in keeping with covenant-light high-yield
standards. However, those covenants will only become effective if
both the class A debt is fully repaid, and a rating agency
confirmation is received on the outstanding rating on the class
B1-Dfrd notes.

Therefore, S&P's preliminary rating does not reflect the covenant
package available to the class B1-Dfrd noteholders under the
class B IBLA. Instead, it considers the strength of the covenants
made in the class A IBLA. That said, the covenant package allows
for various forms of permitted indebtedness (e.g., leases
obligations, credit facilities, debt, etc.), investments, and
liens that may be related to "similar businesses," which the
agreement defines fairly broadly and whose contributions to the
obligor group are unclear. In addition, the class B1-Dfrd notes
covenant package permits the establishment of a receivables
financing program. Lastly, it is S&P's understanding that the
change of control provisions and the associated rights granted to
the class B1-Dfrd noteholders following a change of control may
contain a carve-out that limits the determination to instances
where a downgrade has occurred within 60 days of the change of
control event itself.

Final rating will depend upon receipt and satisfactory review of
all final ransaction documentation, including legal opinions, and
conditions precedent being met.

RAC Bond Co. is a whole business securitization of RAC Bidco's
operating businesses. The transaction is backed by future cash
flows generated by the operating businesses, which include
roadside services, insurance brokering, motoring services, and
telematics and data services.

RATINGS LIST

  RAC Bond Co. PLC
  GBP275.0 Million Asset-Backed Fixed-Rate Notes

  Preliminary Rating Assigned

                      Prelim.          Prelim.
  Class               rating            amount
                                    (mil. GBP)

  B1-Dfrd             B (sf)             275.0



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BRISCA SECURITIZATION: Moody's Assigns B3 Rating to Cl. B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive long-term
credit ratings to the following notes issued by Brisca
Securitization S.r.l.:

-- EUR267,400,000 Class A Asset Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    December 2037, Assigned A3(sf)

-- EUR30,500,000 Class B Asset Backed Floating Rate Notes due
    December 2037, Assigned B3(sf)

Moody's has not assigned any rating to EUR11,800,000 Class J
Asset Backed Variable Return Notes due December 2037, which are
also to be issued at the closing of the transaction.

RATINGS RATIONALE

This is the first transaction backed by non-performing loans
"NPLs" rated by Moody's with loans originated by Banca Carige
S.p.A. ("Carige"; Caa1/NP), Banca Cesare Ponti S.p.A. (NR) and
Banca del Monte di Lucca S.p.A. (NR) (together the
"Originators"). The assets supporting the notes are NPLs with a
gross book value (GBV) of EUR938 million as of the cut-off date
comprising also collections from cut-off to transfer date that,
as of March 31, 2017, amounted to EUR19.5 million.

The portfolio will be serviced by Prelios Credit Servicing S.p.A.
("PRECS"; NR) in its role as master servicer and special
servicer. The servicing activities performed by PRECS are
monitored by the monitoring agent, Zenith Service S.p.A.
("Zenith"; NR). Securitisation Services S.p.A. (NR) has been
appointed as back-up servicer at closing and will step in to take
over the role of master servicer in case the master servicer
agreement is terminated. If the servicer report is not available
at any payment date, the continuity of payment for the class A
rated notes will be assured by the calculation agent that
prepares the payment report based on estimates.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings reflect an analysis of the characteristics of the
underlying pool of defaulted loans, sector-wide and originator-
specific performance data, protection provided by credit
enhancement, the roles of external counterparties, and the
structural integrity of the transaction.

In order to estimate the cash flows generated by the pool Moody's
used a model that, for each loan, generates an estimate of: (i)
the timing of collections; and (ii) the collected amounts, which
are used in the cash flow model that is based on a Monte Carlo
simulation.

The key drivers for the estimates of the collections and their
timing are: (i) the historical data received from the special
servicer, which shows the historical recovery rates and timing of
the collections for secured and unsecured loans; (ii) at borrower
level, loans representing around 22.8% of the GBV are unsecured
loans, while the remaining 77.2% of the GBV are secured loans
whereof about 2.7% in terms of GBV are secured with a second or
lower ranking lien; (iii) of the secured loans, 60.3% are backed
by residential properties, and the remaining 39.7% by different
types of non- residential properties; (iv) in terms of GBV at
borrower level, 29.3% of the processes are bankruptcies, which
usually take a significantly longer time to go through the legal
system than a foreclosure (v) benchmarking with comparable
Italian NPL transactions.

Hedging: As the collections from the pool are not directly
connected to a floating interest rate, a higher index payable on
the notes would not be offset with higher collections from the
pool. The transaction therefore benefits from an interest rate
cap, linked to six-month EURIBOR, with Banca IMI S.p.A. (Baa1/P-2
and Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)) as cap counterparty. The notional of the
interest rate cap is equal at closing to the outstanding balance
of the class A and class B notes with a maximum band. The cap
will have a strike of 0.30% at closing, increasing over the life
of the transaction up to 1.25% after 7.5 years from closing.

Transaction structure: The transaction benefits from an
amortising cash reserve equal to around 4.6% of the class A notes
balance (4% of class A and B notes balance, the equivalent of
EUR11.9 million), which has been funded through part of the
recoveries collected from the cut-off date and the issuance date.
The cash reserve is replenished after the interest payments on
the class A notes. However Moody's notes that the cash reserve is
not available to cover Class B interest and that unpaid interest
on Class B is deferrable without accruing interest on interest.

Moody's used its NPL cash-flow model as part of its quantitative
analysis of the transaction. Moody's NPL model enables users to
model various features of a NPL European ABS transaction --
recovery rates under different scenarios, yield as well as the
specific priority of payments and reserve funds on the liability
side of the ABS structure.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: The model output indicates that
if price volatility were to be increased to 8.08% from 6.73% for
residential properties and to 9.94% from 8.29% for commercial
properties and it would take an additional 18 months to go
through the foreclosure process the Class A notes rating would
move to Baa1 assuming that all other factors remained unchanged.
Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA ABS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Securitisations Backed by Non-Performing and
Re-Performing Loans" published in August 2016.

Please note that on March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on
potential revisions to its Approach to Assessing Counterparty
Risks in Structured Finance. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, the Credit Ratings on Brisca
Securitisation S.r.l. are not expected to be affected. Please
refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled " Moody's Proposes
Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing Counterparty Risks in
Structured Finance," for further details regarding the
implications of the proposed Methodology revisions on certain
Credit Ratings.

The definitive ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the class A notes
by legal final maturity. Other non-credit risks have not been
addressed, but may have significant effect on yield to investors.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE RATINGS:

Factors that may lead to an upgrade of the ratings include that
the recovery process of the defaulted loans produces
significantly higher cash flows realised in a shorter time frame
than expected. Factors that may cause a downgrade of the ratings
include significantly less or slower cash flows generated from
the recovery process compared with Moody's expectations at close
due to either a longer time for the courts to process the
foreclosures and bankruptcies or a change in economic conditions
from Moody's central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors. For instance, should economic conditions be
worse than forecasted, falling property prices the sale of the
properties would generate less cash flows for the Issuer or it
would take a longer time to sell the properties and in addition
the weaker economic conditions could make it harder to recover
the unsecured loans and all these factors could result in a
downgrade of the ratings. Additionally counterparty risk could
cause a downgrade of the rating due to a weakening of the credit
profile of transaction counterparties. Finally, unforeseen
regulatory changes or significant changes in the legal
environment may also result in changes of the ratings.


CLARIS FINANCE 2006: S&P Puts Cl. B Notes Rating on Watch Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings placed on CreditWatch negative its 'B (sf)'
credit rating on Claris Finance 2006 S.r.l.'s class B notes.

S&P said, "Our rating on Claris Finance 2006's class B notes is
weak-linked to our long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on Veneto
Banca SpA, the liquidity facility provider, as the tranche was
not able to withstand our cash flow stress without the benefit of
the liquidity facility in our previous review (see "Rating Raised
On Italian RMBS Transaction Claris Finance 2006's Class A2 Notes;
Class B Notes Affirmed," published on May 19, 2017).

"On June 27, 2017, we withdrew our long-term ICR on Veneto Banca,
following the Italian government's decision to place Veneto Banca
under orderly liquidation and the transfer of all of its
performing assets and senior liabilities to Intesa Sanpaolo SpA
(see "Research Update: Veneto Banca Hybrid Rating Lowered To 'D';
All Ratings Then Withdrawn After Transfer Of Assets And
Liabilities," published on June 27, 2017)."

According to the transaction documents, the liquidity facility
covers the timely payment of interest and the ultimate payment of
principal. S&P said, "Under our current counterparty criteria,
our rating on the class B notes is weak-linked to our long-term
ICR on Veneto Banca (see "Counterparty Risk Framework Methodology
And Assumptions," published on June 25, 2013). Therefore, as any
change to our long-term ICR on Veneto Banca would result in an
equivalent change to our rating on Claris Finance 2006's class B
notes, we have placed on CreditWatch negative our 'B (sf)' rating
on the class B notes. We aim to resolve this CreditWatch
placement in due course, and we may lower our rating if the class
B notes are still unable to withstand our cash-flow stresses
without the benefit of the liquidity facility.

"Our rating on the class A2 notes is unaffected by today's rating
action because it is delinked from our long-term ICR on the
liquidity facility provider."

Claris Finance 2006 is an Italian residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transaction, which closed in July 2006 and
securitizes a pool of first-ranking mortgage loans that Veneto
Banca originated. The mortgage loans are mainly located in the
Veneto region and the transaction comprises loans granted to
prime borrowers.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


PACIFIC DRILLING: Unit Seeking Consents to Extend Notes Maturity
----------------------------------------------------------------
Pacific Drilling S.A. said its wholly-owned subsidiary Pacific
Drilling V Limited, as issuer, has commenced a consent
solicitation in respect of its 7.25% Senior Secured Notes due
Dec. 1, 2017, on the terms and subject to the conditions set
forth in the confidential consent solicitation statement dated
July 5, 2017.

Pacific Drilling V is soliciting noteholders' consent to extend
the maturity date of the Notes to June 1, 2018, in order to give
the Company more time to negotiate a refinancing transaction or
undertake a holistic restructuring with all of its creditors.

The Solicitation is being made only to holders of Notes that are
either (i) "qualified institutional buyers" as defined in Rule
144A under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, (ii) institutional
accredited investors within the meaning of Rule 501 under the
Securities Act or (iii) outside the United States, and are not,
and are not acting for the account or benefit of any, "U.S.
person", as defined in Rule 902 under the Securities Act.

The Solicitation solicits consents with respect to two paths for
consummation of the extension of maturity of the Notes, depending
on the level of participation by the Noteholders and whether the
Company is able to obtain consents from certain of its lenders.

If Pacific Drilling V receives valid consents from Noteholders
holding at least 95% of the outstanding principal amount of the
Notes (disregarding Notes held by the Issuer or its affiliates)
and all other conditions of the Solicitation have been satisfied
or waived by the Company (in its sole discretion), the Company
intends to implement the maturity extension either (a) out-of-
court by amending the Indenture and the Notes or (b) by a Scheme
of Arrangement.

If the Company implements the maturity extension out-of-court,
Pacific Drilling V will amend the Indenture and the Notes to (i)
extend the maturity date of all Notes held by consenting
Noteholders to June 1, 2018, (ii) release all security in respect
of all Notes held by Noteholders that do not consent and (iii)
make certain other related amendments to the Indenture.

Following the out-of-court transaction, the Notes held by holders
that do not consent will be unsecured obligations of the Issuer
and will have their current maturity, while the Notes held by
consenting holders will continue to be secured by the same
collateral that currently secures the Notes, on the same terms,
but with the amended maturity date.  The Issuer may lower the
Minimum Threshold Condition in its sole discretion so long as the
minimum threshold is not lower than 66-2/3% of the outstanding
principal amount of the Notes (disregarding the Notes held by the
Issuer or its affiliates).

Whether or not the Minimum Threshold Condition has been
satisfied, the Company reserves the right (at any time and in its
sole discretion) to terminate the Solicitation and implement the
maturity extension by applying to the Eastern Caribbean Supreme
Court in the Territory of the Virgin Islands to implement the
maturity extension pursuant to a scheme of arrangement under Part
IX of the BVI Business Companies Act 2004.

The Issuer will only pursue a Scheme of Arrangement if (i) the
Company or its affiliates have received the necessary waivers or
consents from certain of the Company's lenders for the Issuer to
commence a Scheme of Arrangement and (ii) the Issuer believes
that it is reasonably likely to obtain the consents of the
Noteholders required to effect the Scheme of Arrangement.  Under
the Scheme of Arrangement, the Indenture would be amended to
extend the maturity date of the Notes from Dec. 1, 2017, to June
1, 2018, which amendment would apply to and be binding on all
Notes.  The terms of the Notes will not be otherwise affected by
the Scheme of Arrangement.

The early consent period for the Solicitation will expire at 5:00
p.m. (eastern time) on July 19, 2017, and the Solicitation will
expire at 5:00 p.m. (eastern time) on August 2, 2017, in each
case, unless extended or earlier terminated by the Company.

The Solicitation is subject to certain conditions as set forth in
the Solicitation Statement.

In its annual report on Form 20-F filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission in February 2017, Pacific Drilling S.A.
disclosed that as of February 20, 2017, its indebtedness totaled
$3.1 billion, consisting of:

      $475.0 million under the 2013 Revolving Credit Facility;
      $669.7 million under the Senior Secured Credit Facility;
      $439.4 million of 7.25% Senior Secured Notes due 2017;
      $723.8 million under the Senior Secured Term Loan B due
                     2018; and
      $750.0 million of 5.375% Senior Secured Notes due 2020.

In February 2017, Pacific Drilling S.A., executed non-disclosure
agreements ("NDAs") with certain unaffiliated beneficial holders
of:

     -- the 7.25% Senior Secured Notes due 2017 issued by Pacific
        Drilling V Ltd, an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of
        the Company;

     -- the Term Loan B maturing 2018 borrowed by the Company
        ("2018 TLB"); and

     -- the 5.375% Senior Secured Notes due 2020 issued by the
        Company,

to facilitate discussions with the Creditors concerning the
restructuring of the Companies' capital structure.

Pursuant to the NDAs, the Company agreed to disclose publicly
after a specified period, if certain conditions were met, that
the Company and the Creditors had engaged in discussions
concerning the Companies' capital structure and information
regarding such discussions.

According to a March 16, 2017 filing with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Creditors had not agreed to extend their
NDAs.

In connection with discussions regarding a potential
Restructuring, the Company proposed to either (i) extend its
current maturities to 2022-2024 in exchange for an increase in
"pay-if-you-can" (or PIYC) and cash interest and the Creditors
taking a 25% equity ownership stake in the Company or (ii) fully
equitize the Indebtedness, with the Company's current common
shareholders retaining approximately one-third of the post-
reorganization equity of the Company and obtaining warrants to
purchase approximately an additional 20% of the equity of the
Company.

The Creditors rejected the Company's first proposal to extend
maturities and, in response to the Company's second proposal to
fully equitize the Indebtedness, proposed that the Creditors
receive approximately 98% of the post-reorganization equity of
the Company and the current common shareholders retain
approximately 2% of the post-reorganization equity and receive
warrants to purchase approximately 20% of the equity of the
Company at substantially higher strike prices than those proposed
by the Company.  As of the March SEC filing, there was no
consensus as to the form or structure of any Restructuring. While
no agreement has been reached, the Company said it intends to
continue discussions with its creditors on the terms of a
potential Restructuring.

                   About Pacific Drilling

Based in Luxembourg, Pacific Drilling S.A. (NYSE:PACD) is an
international offshore drilling contractor.  The Company's
primary business is to contract its high-specification rigs,
related equipment and work crews, primarily on a day rate basis,
to drill wells for its clients.  The Company's contract
drillships operate in the deepwater regions of the United States,
Gulf of Mexico and Nigeria.

Pacific Drilling reported a net loss of $37.15 million on $769.5
million of revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016, as compared
with net income of $126.2 million on $1.08 billion of revenues
for the year ended Dec. 31, 2015.

As of Dec. 31, 2016, Pacific Drilling had $5.99 billion in total
assets, $3.33 billion in total liabilities and $2.66 billion in
total shareholders' equity.

The Company's independent auditors KPMG LLP, in Houston, Texas,
expressed substantial doubt about the Company's ability to
continue as a going concern in their report on the consolidated
financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016.  KPMG
noted that the Company expects to be in violation of certain of
its financial covenants in the next 12 months.

                          *     *     *

In October 2016, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Pacific
Drilling's Corporate Family Rating to 'Caa3' from 'Caa2' and
Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to 'Caa3-PD' from 'Caa2-PD'.
"PacDrilling's ratings downgrade reflects our extremely negative
view of the offshore drilling sector with no near term signs of
improvement.  Depressed prices for the offshore drillships offers
weak asset coverage for PacDrilling's overall debt.  With no
material signs of improving contract coverage or utilization for
PacDrilling's drillships, cashflow through 2017 will be severely
impacted resulting in an unsustainable capital structure," said
Sreedhar Kona, Moody's senior analyst.

In February 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on
Pacific Drilling S.A., including its 'CCC-' corporate credit
rating.  S&P subsequently withdrew all ratings on the company at
its request.


PACIFIC DRILLING: Expects Up to $140M Second Quarter Net Loss
-------------------------------------------------------------
Pacific Drilling S.A. reported preliminary results for the second
quarter 2017, in connection with the consent solicitation
announced on July 5, 2017.  These results have not been reviewed
by its independent auditors.

Contract drilling revenue for the second quarter 2017 is expected
to be in the range of $66.0 million to $68.0 million, compared to
first quarter 2017 contract drilling revenue of $105.5 million.
The decrease in revenues resulted primarily from the Pacific
Santa Ana being offhire throughout the second quarter 2017,
compared to the first quarter 2017, in which it earned revenue
until completing its contract on January 31, 2017.

The Company expects a net loss for the second quarter 2017 in the
range of $130.0 million to $140.0 million, compared to a net loss
for the first quarter 2017 of $99.8 million and net income of
$8.2 million for the second quarter 2016.

The Company's cash balance, including $8.5 million in restricted
cash, totaled $416.6 million as of June 30, 2017, and its
aggregate outstanding principal amount of indebtedness was $3.0
billion (after accounting for the impact of group consolidation).

The Company expects to release its second quarter 2017 results in
the first half of August and will not be holding an earnings
conference call this quarter.

                      About Pacific Drilling

Based in Luxembourg, Pacific Drilling S.A. (NYSE:PACD) is an
international offshore drilling contractor.  The Company's
primary business is to contract its high-specification rigs,
related equipment and work crews, primarily on a day rate basis,
to drill wells for its clients.  The Company's contract
drillships operate in the deepwater regions of the United States,
Gulf of Mexico and Nigeria.

Pacific Drilling reported a net loss of $37.15 million on $769.5
million of revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016, as compared
with net income of $126.2 million on $1.08 billion of revenues
for the year ended Dec. 31, 2015.

As of Dec. 31, 2016, Pacific Drilling had $5.99 billion in total
assets, $3.33 billion in total liabilities and $2.66 billion in
total shareholders' equity.

The Company's independent auditors KPMG LLP, in Houston, Texas,
expressed substantial doubt about the Company's ability to
continue as a going concern in their report on the consolidated
financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31, 2016.  KPMG
noted that the Company expects to be in violation of certain of
its financial covenants in the next 12 months.

                          *     *     *

In October 2016, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Pacific
Drilling's Corporate Family Rating to 'Caa3' from 'Caa2' and
Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to 'Caa3-PD' from 'Caa2-PD'.
"PacDrilling's ratings downgrade reflects our extremely negative
view of the offshore drilling sector with no near term signs of
improvement.  Depressed prices for the offshore drillships offers
weak asset coverage for PacDrilling's overall debt.  With no
material signs of improving contract coverage or utilization for
PacDrilling's drillships, cashflow through 2017 will be severely
impacted resulting in an unsustainable capital structure," said
Sreedhar Kona, Moody's senior analyst.

In February 2017, S&P Global Ratings affirmed its ratings on
Pacific Drilling S.A., including its 'CCC-' corporate credit
rating.  S&P subsequently withdrew all ratings on the company at
its request.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


GARDA CLO: Moody's Affirms Caa1(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Garda CLO B.V.:

-- Euro 14,000,000 Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate
    Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 1,
    2017 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

-- Euro 13,000,000 (Current outstanding balance of EUR4.7M)
    Class E Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
    Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017 Affirmed
    Ba3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

-- Euro 21,000,000 (Current outstanding balance of EUR19.8M)
    Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
    Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017 Upgraded to Aaa
   (sf)

-- Euro 6,000,000 Class F Deferrable Interest Floating Rate
    Notes due 2022, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 1, 2017
    Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Garda CLO B.V., issued in February 2007, is a Collateralised Loan
Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield
European loans. It is predominantly composed of senior secured
loans. The portfolio is managed by 3i Debt Management Ltd, now
Investcorp Credit Management EU Ltd, and this transaction ended
its reinvestment period in April 2013.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of
deleveraging of the senior notes. Class B Notes have been
redeemed in full and Class C Notes have paid down by
approximately EUR1.2M since the last rating action in February
2017. As a result, over-collateralisation (OC) ratios have
increased. As per the trustee report dated May 2017, the Classes
C, D and E OC ratios are reported at 209.6%, 122.7% and 107.6%
respectively, compared to 157.1%, 115.0% and 104.3% in January
2017.

The key model inputs Moody's use in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analysed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par of EUR41.0M and principal proceeds balance of
EUR4.4M, defaulted par of EUR12.1M, a weighted average default
probability of 22.8% (consistent with a WARF of 3773 over the WAL
of 3.02 years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
47.02% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 10
and a weighted average spread of 4.52%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. Moody's generally applies recovery rates
for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF
CDOs" published in June 2017. In some cases, alternative recovery
assumptions may be considered based on the specifics of the
analysis of the CLO transaction. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analysing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in
the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
were unchanged for Classes C and F and within one notch of the
base-case result for the Classes D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
notes, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behaviour and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Portfolio amortisation: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortisation of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortisation could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortisation would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

* Around 20.4% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed
large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate
as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009 and
available at
http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461.

* Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralisation levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analysed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

* Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the portfolio
depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a few large
obligors with low non-investment-grade ratings, especially when
they default. Because of the deal's lack of granularity, Moody's
substituted its typical Binomial Expansion Technique analysis
with a simulated default distribution using Moody's CDOROMTM
software and an individual scenario analysis

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


JUBILEE CLO 2017-XVIII: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Cl. F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by Jubilee CLO 2017-
XVIII B.V.:

-- EUR 240,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 50,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 22,000,000 Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR 21,500,000 Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR 24,500,000 Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR 12,000,000 Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive ratings of the rated notes address the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2030. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Alcentra Limited
("Alcentra"), has sufficient experience and operational capacity
and is capable of managing this CLO.

Jubilee CLO 2017-XVIII B.V. is a managed cash flow CLO. At least
90% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and
senior secured bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist
of unsecured obligations, second-lien loans, mezzanine loans and
high yield bonds. The bond bucket gives the flexibility to
Jubilee CLO 2017-XVIII B.V. to hold bonds if Volcker Rule is
changed. The portfolio is expected to be approximately 70% ramped
up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

Alcentra will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the six classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer issued EUR45.4M of subordinated notes, which are not
rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Alcentra's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
October 2016. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 400,000,000

Diversity Score: 37

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.90%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8.0 years

As part of its analysis, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with a local currency
country risk ceiling (LCC) of A1 or below. Following the
effective date, and given the portfolio constraints and the
current sovereign ratings in Europe, such exposure may not exceed
10% of the total portfolio. As a result and in conjunction with
the current foreign government bond ratings of the eligible
countries, as a worst case scenario, a maximum 5% of the pool
would be domiciled in countries with A3 and a maximum of 5% of
the pool would be domiciled in countries with Baa3 local currency
country ceiling each. The remainder of the pool will be domiciled
in countries which currently have a local currency country
ceiling of Aaa or Aa1 to Aa3. Given this portfolio composition,
the model was run with different target par amounts depending on
the target rating of each class as further described in the
methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure size to peripheral countries and the target ratings of
the rated notes and amount to 0.75% for the Class A Notes, 0.50%
for the Class B Notes, 0.38% for the Class C Notes and 0% for
Classes D, E, and F Notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the definitive ratings assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3163 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes.-1

Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3575 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class C Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class D Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes.-2

Class E Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Deferrable Junior Floating Rate Notes: 0

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


OI BRASIL: Chapter 15 Case Summary
----------------------------------
Chapter 15 Petitioner: Jasper R. Berkenbosch
                       as foreign representative
                       Jones Day
                       Concertgebouwplein 20
                       P.O. Box 51204
                       Amsterdam 1007 EE
                       The Netherlands

Foreign Proceeding
in which appointment
of the foreign
representative
occured:               Bankruptcy Proceeding, Case No.
                       F.13/17/163, District Court of
                       Amsterdam

Chapter 15 Debtor:     Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A.
                       Strawinskylaan 3127
                       Amsterdam 1077 ZX
                       The Netherlands

Chapter 15 Case No.: 17-11888

Type of Business:      Oi Group provides services like fixed-line
                       data transmission and network usage for
                       phones, internet, and cable, Wi-Fi hot-
                       spots in public areas, and mobile phone
                       and data services.

Chapter 15 Petition Date: July 7, 2017

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court
       Southern District of New York (Manhattan)

Judge: Hon. Sean H. Lane

Chapter 15 Petitioner's Counsel: Corinne Ball, Esq.
                                 JONES DAY
                                 250 Vesey Street, Floor 32
                                 New York, NY 10281-1047
                                 Tel: (212) 326-3939
                                 Fax: (212) 755-7306
                                 Email: cball@jonesday.com

Estimated Assets: Not Indicated

Estimated Debts: Not Indicated


OI BRASIL: Seeks U.S. Recognition of Netherlands Case
-----------------------------------------------------
Jasper R. Berkenbosch, as foreign representative for Oi Brasil
Holdings Cooperatief U.A., filed a bankruptcy proceeding under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York to seek recognition
of Oi Brasil's bankruptcy proceedings in Amsterdam, The
Netherlands.

The Chapter 15 proceeding is related to the existing Chapter 15
proceedings of Oi S.A., Telemar Norte Leste S.A., Oi Brasil
Holdings Cooperatief U.A. and Oi Movel S.A., which are jointly
administered under Case No. 16-11791, currently pending before
Judge Sean H. Lane of the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern
District of New York.

Oi Brasil Cooperatief requests that this Chapter 15 proceeding be
assigned to Judge Lane.

Oi Brasil Cooperatief was granted a provisional suspension of
payments on Aug. 9, 2016, by the Amsterdam District Court.  Mr.
Berkenbosch was appointed as administrator.  In its decision of
April 19, 2017, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals has revoked the
Suspension of Payments and declared Coop bankrupt.  The
Administrator was appointed as bankruptcy trustee.

Mr. Berkenbosch -- jberkenbosch@jonesday.com -- is a Jones Day
partner in its Amsterdam office.  Corinne Ball, Esq., a partner
at Jones Day's New York office, serves as counsel in the Chapter
15 case.

The District Court of Amsterdam has appointed the Bankruptcy
Trustee to safeguard the interests of Coop's creditors worldwide.
As a result of the Bankruptcy, Coop and the board of Coop have
lost the authority to perform any acts of administration and
disposition regarding the estate of Coop.  The Bankruptcy Trustee
is exclusively authorized to act on behalf of the estate of Coop.

For more information about the Company's restructuring, visit
http://oibrasilholdingscoop-administration.com/

A full-text copy of the Chapter 15 petition is available at:

             http://bankrupt.com/misc/nysb17-11888.pdf


OI BRASIL: Dutch Supreme Court Nixes Financial Vehicles' Appeals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Telecompaper reports that the Dutch Supreme Court in Amsterdam
(Netherlands) has rejected the appeals filed by each of Oi's
financial vehicles in the Netherlands (OiBrasil Holdings and
PTIF), against the decisions that had ordered the conversion of
their respective suspension of payments proceedings into Dutch
bankruptcy proceedings.

This means the Dutch Supreme Court has maintained the decision of
the Dutch Court of Appeals that such suspension of payments
proceedings are converted into Dutch bankruptcy proceedings,
Telecompaper notes.

According to Telecompaper, Oi said these judgments do not have
effects in Brazil nor in the other jurisdictions where the
authority of the Brazilian Judiciary to process the judicial
reorganization has been recognized.

Oi also reiterated that Oi Brasil Holdings and PTIF remain under
judicial reorganization in Brazil and clarifies that the
judgments do not have any impact on the day by day and
operational activities, Telecompaper relates.

                         About Oi SA

Headquartered in Rio de Janeiro, and operating almost exclusively
within Brazil, the Oi Group provides services like fixed-line
data transmission and network usage for phones, internet, and
cable, Wi-Fi hot-spots in public areas, and mobile phone and data
services, and employs approximately 142,000 direct and indirect
employees.

Ojas N. Shah filed a Chapter 15 petition for Oi S.A. (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Case No. 16-11791), Oi Movel S.A. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case
No. 16-11792), Telemar Norte Leste S.A. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No.
16-11793), and Oi Brasil Holdings Cooperatief U.A. (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Case No. 16-11794) on June 21, 2016.  The case is
assigned to Judge Sean H. Lane.

The Chapter 15 Petitioner is represented by John K. Cunningham,
Esq., and Mark P. Franke, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in New York;
and Jason N. Zakia, Esq., Richard S. Kebrdle, Esq., and Laura L.
Femino, Esq., at White & Case LLP, in Miami, Florida.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ALFASTRAKHOVANIE PLC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' IFS Rating
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed AlfaStrakhovanie PLC (Russia)'s
(AlfaStrakhovanie) Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) Rating at
'BB'. The Outlook is Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating reflects the company's thin, albeit improving,
capitalisation, as well as a track record of profitability over
the last 5 years, a strong position in the domestic market and
sound investment quality compared with peers.

Under Fitch's Prism Factor-Based model AlfaStrakhovanie's capital
score remained below 'Somewhat Weak' in 2016, though improved on
the 2015 score. Significant profit generation, coupled with an
absence of dividend payments to the shareholder, supported the
company's available capital. However, the level of required
capital has increased due to significant net non-life premium
growth of 15% in 2016.

AlfaStrakhovanie's regulatory solvency margin was 103% at end-
2016, down from 149% at end-2015. Exchange rate movements reduced
the company's available capital while growing business volumes
increased required capital. At end-1Q17 the regulatory solvency
margin was restored to a more comfortable level of 120% and Fitch
expects AlfaStrakhovanie to remain compliant with regulatory
solvency requirements and to maintain the solvency margin above
120% at end-2017.

In 2016 the company reported a strong net profit of RUB3 billion,
up from RUB2.5 billion in 2015. Return on equity was maintained
at an exceptionally high level of 29.3% (2015: 34.2%). Robust
investment income of RUB6 billion and a positive underwriting
result supported the company's profitability. Adversely the net
result was impacted by the revaluation of the Russian rouble and
related FX losses on investments amounting to RUB2.7 billion.
AlfaStrakhovanie in 1Q17 maintained its uptrend in profitability,
with net income totalling RUB1 billion based on local GAAP.

In 2016 the company reported a positive non-life underwriting
result of RUB2.6 billion, reversing an underwriting loss of
RUB384 million in 2015. The combined ratio fell to 95% (2015:
101%). The main contributor was an improvement in the company's
loss ratio to 56% in 2016 from 60% in 2015.

AlfaStrakhovanie reported an improved underwriting result in all
major lines of business it operates in for 2016, with motor
insurance being the main driver behind its stronger underwriting
profitability. The company's loss ratio for this line decreased
to 72% in 2016 from 77% in 2015, in contrast to the overall
Russian motor insurance market which saw larger losses over the
year.

AlfaStrakhovanie has gradually strengthened its market position
through acquisitions and organic growth in recent years, with its
share of the Russian non-life insurance market excluding
obligatory medical insurance growing to 7.9% from 6.6% over 2016.
The evolution of the non-life business mix has been gradual in
the last five to seven years, with a slight predominance of motor
lines in its portfolio up to 2016. The share of compulsory motor
third-party liability (MTPL) and motor damage in gross written
premiums grew to 45% in 2016.

AlfaStrakhovanie's investment portfolio is of sound credit
quality and liquidity from a domestic perspective. Non-
investment-grade bonds increased sharply in 2016 and in 2015 as a
share of the insurer's equity due to a downgrade of the Russian
sovereign rating in 2015.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings could be upgraded if AlfaStrakhovanie strengthens its
risk-adjusted capital position to at least a 'Somewhat Weak'
score under Fitch's Prism model and maintains a positive non-life
underwriting result and a healthy regulatory solvency margin on a
sustained basis.

The ratings could be downgraded if AlfaStrakhovanie reports
negative earnings on a sustained basis or if its capitalisation
as measured by Prism weakens significantly. A downgrade could
also result from deterioration in its regulatory solvency margin.


ALROSA PJSC: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB+', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its long-term corporate credit rating
on Russian ALROSA PJSC to 'BB+'. The outlook is stable. At the
same time, S&P said, "we affirmed our short-term rating at 'B'.

"We also raised our issue rating on ALROSA's $1 billion Eurobond
to 'BB+' from 'BB'.

"We affirmed our 'B' rating on its commercial paper program.

"The rating action reflects our view that ALROSA will sustain
very low debt leverage and positive free operating cash flow
(FOCF) generation over the next two years despite potential
pressure on rough diamond prices and inherent industry
volatility. We also think that ALROSA's leading position on the
global rough diamonds market (29% share), its relatively low cost
position, large high-grade reserves with long-term operations
life, visible and manageable investment project base aimed at
sustainable production, and solid long-term contracts base
provide a stronger-than-anticipated buffer against lower cash
flow volatility amid constrained market conditions and during
bottom-of-the-cycle periods. This strength has prompted us to
reassess the company's cash flow volatility to high from very
high previously, which falls in line with our projections during
stress periods for many other metals producers and miners,
notably Russian steelmakers PAO Severstal and NLMK PJSC, and
South Africa-based gold miners Gold Fields Ltd. and AngloGold
Ashanti Ltd.

"Taking into account our expectation of ALROSA's continued strong
credit metrics and low debt leverage in the next two years
alongside our view of the company's improved cash flow
volatility, we have positively reassessed the company's financial
risk profile to modest from intermediate.

"ALROSA's fair business risk profile, in our view, is supported
by its high profitability (with EBITDA margins exceeding 50% in
the past two years), solid global market share, and sound reserve
base. It is constrained by our view of high country risk in
Russia and some customer concentration. We think that
ALROSA's business risk profile assessment is similar to those of
its peers from the Russian mining and steel-making sector,
including NLMK, Severstal, Polyus Gold PJSC, and Evraz Group
S.A., and stronger than those of international diamond miners
such as Petra Diamonds Ltd.

"However, we note that ALROSA is a single-commodity producer,
which is less flexible in terms of switching markets or products
than the steel industry, in our view, and assume that the diamond
industry is generally more susceptible to external shocks and
customer confidence than the mining one, which explains our
negative comparable ratings analysis modifier for ALROSA.

"We now assess ALROSA's stand-alone credit profile at 'bb+'. We
don't apply uplift for ALROSA's status as a government-related
entity with a moderate likelihood of receiving timely and
sufficient extraordinary government support from Russia if
needed."

This view is based on ALROSA's:

-- Limited role for Russia's economy, given its relatively small
    contribution to the country's export revenues and tax
    payments as well as its gradually decreasing role in the
    Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), as other Russian companies start
    operations there. ALROSA remains the largest employer and
    taxpayer in Yakutia, however, and has a monopoly position in
    diamond mining in Russia.
-- Strong link with the Russian federal government, its 33%
    shareholder, which together with the regional government
    share of additional 25% forming a controlling stake.
    Government largely controls company's strategy, approving
    company's capital expenditure (capex) and dividend programs.
    In 2008-2009, the government strongly supported the company
    via substantial loans from state-owned JSC VTB Bank and the
    purchase of ALROSA's diamonds by the State Diamond and
    Precious Metals Reserve (Gokhran).

In S&P's base case for 2017-2018, it assumes:

-- A 3%-5% increase in production volumes in 2017, followed by
    stable level from 2018;
-- Slightly lower diamond prices in 2017 versus last year, and
    flat afterward;
-- An exchange rate of Russian ruble (RUB) 63 to US$1 in 2017
    and RUB65 to US$1 in 2018 (compared with an average of RUB67:
    US$1 in 2016);
-- Costs in ruble terms to rise in line with our expectations of
    the Russian consumer price index, which S&P expects will be
    4.5% in 2017 and 4.0% in 2018;
-- Annual capex of RUB30 billion-RUB40 billion (about US$470
    million-US$625 million) in 2017-2018; and
-- Dividend flow in line with the stated policy of 50% IFRS net
    income payout.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures for 2017-2018:

-- Funds from operations (FFO) to debt well above 60%;
-- S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA of less than 1.5x;
    and
-- Solidly positive FOCF generation.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that ALROSA's
very low leverage, strongly positive FOCF generation, high
profitability, and solid 30% global market share help the company
mitigate the inherent volatility in the industry and potential
risk of a higher dividend payout. We assume that the company's
metrics will remain strong, with FFO to debt of above 60% and
debt to EBITDA of below 1.5x, which is commensurate with the
current rating."

Rating pressure might arise if ALROSA demonstrates weaker credit
metrics as a result of more aggressive financial policies (higher
capex or dividends than we expect) or sluggish market conditions.
Specifically, S&P could lower the rating on ALROSA by one notch
if FFO to debt falls below 60% and debt to EBITDA increases above
1.5x for a prolonged period, or if the company's liquidity
position deteriorates significantly deteriorates. The latter,
however, is currently not a part of its base-case scenario.

A higher rating is unlikely in the short term and would require
the company to continue building up a track record of strongly
positive FOCF generation, low leverage, and solid operational
results translating into sizeable global market share. An upgrade
would not hinge on stronger-than-anticipated credit metrics under
S&P's base case scenario, but rather the company's adherence to a
conservative financial policy, including a prudent approach to
mergers and acquisitions and a clearly stated shareholder
remuneration policy. An upgrade would also require stability in
the conditions on the diamond market and a marked improvement of
Russia's economy.


CREDIT BANK: Moody's Rates $700M Add'n Tier 1 Sec. Caa1(hyb)
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Caa1(hyb) rating to the
$700 million Additional Tier 1 non-viability contingent capital
securities, which CBOM Finance p.l.c. issued with the sole
purpose of financing the subordinated loan to Credit Bank of
Moscow (CBM) (LT bank deposits B1 positive, BCA b1).

The Caa1(hyb) rating assigned to the notes is based on CBM's
standalone creditworthiness and is positioned three notches below
the bank's b1 adjusted baseline credit assessment (BCA): one
notch below to reflect high loss severity and a further two
notches below to reflect the higher payment risk associated with
the non-cumulative coupon skip mechanism, as well as the
probability of the bank-wide failure. The analysis also takes
into consideration the full or partial write down feature, in
combination with the Tier 1 notes' subordinated claim in
liquidation.

The rating for these Additional Tier 1 securities was initiated
by Moody's and was not requested by the rated entity.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's framework for rating non-viability
securities under its bank rating methodology, the agency
typically positions the rating of Additional Tier 1 securities
three notches below the bank's adjusted BCA. One notch reflects
the high loss-given-failure that these securities are likely to
face in a resolution scenario, due to their subordination and
limited protection from residual equity. Moody's also
incorporates two additional notches to reflect the higher risk
associated with the non-cumulative coupon skip mechanism, which
could precede the bank reaching the point of non-viability.

The notes are unsecured and perpetual, rank at least pari passu
with the claims of all other unsecured subordinated creditors,
and senior to ordinary shares. They have a non-cumulative
optional coupon-suspension mechanism. A write down event is
triggered if the bank's base capital adequacy ratio falls below
5.125%, which Moody's views as close to the point of non-
viability, or the banking supervision committee of the Central
Bank of Russia approves a plan for the participation of the
Deposit Insurance Agency in bankruptcy prevention measures in
respect of CBM. As of June 1, 2017, CBM's base capital adequacy
ratio (N 1.1) stood at 7.14%.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Any changes in the b1 adjusted BCA of the bank would likely
result in changes to the Caa1(hyb) rating assigned to these
securities. In addition, any increase in the probability of a
coupon suspension would also lead us to reconsider the rating
level.

Upward pressure on CBM's BCA could be driven by a further
sustained improvement to its key financial metrics. Conversely,
downward pressure on the bank's standalone BCA could arise if
CBM's credit profile weakens as a consequence of an unexpected
deterioration of any of its financial fundamentals.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in January 2016.


JUGRA BANK: Deposit Agency to Handle Provisional Administration
---------------------------------------------------------------
Due to the unstable financial situation at Public Joint-Stock
Company Bank Jugra and the existence of a threat to its
creditors' and depositors' interests, by its Order No. OD-1901,
dated July 10, 2017, the Bank of Russia assigned the state
corporation Deposit Insurance Agency with the functions of the
provisional administration to manage this bank for a six-month
period from July 10, 2017, according to the press service of the
Central Bank of Russia.

The powers of shareholders connected with participation in the
authorized capital and the powers of the managing bodies of PJSC
BANK JUGRA are suspended for the period of provisional
administration activities.

The key objective of the provisional administration is to carry
out an inspection of the bank's financial situation.

At the same time, by its Order No. OD-1902, dated July 10, 2017,
issued in pursuance of Article 18938 of Federal Law No. 127-FZ,
dated 26 October 2002, "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank
of Russia imposed a three-month moratorium on meeting the
creditor claims of PJSC BANK JUGRA.

Pursuant to Federal Law No. 177-FZ, dated 23 December 2003, "On
the Insurance of Household Deposits with Russian Banks" the
moratorium on meeting bank creditors' claims is an insured event.
Payments to PJSC BANK JUGRA depositors, including individual
entrepreneurs, will start no later than 14 days since the date
the moratorium was imposed.  The state corporation Deposit
Insurance Agency will determine the procedure for paying
indemnities.


RUSFINANCE BANK: S&P Withdraws BB+/B Counterparty Credit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+/B' long- and short-term
counterparty credit ratings on Russia-based LLC Rusfinance Bank.

S&P subsequently withdrew its ratings on Rusfinance Bank at the
bank's request.

The outlook was negative at the time of withdrawal.

S&P said, "The affirmation reflects our view that the bank will
maintain its niche market position in car loan financing and
point of sales financing in Russia. It also incorporates our
expectation that the bank's capitalization and ability to
generate capital internally will remain very strong in the next
12-18 months. Our ratings also reflected the bank's strategically
important status for its parent, French banking group Societe
Generale (A/Stable/A-1). We expect the parent bank to be able to
provide support to the Russian subsidiary in case of need."

At the time of withdrawal, the outlook was negative. The outlook
reflected potential pressure on the bank's capitalization over
the next 12-18 months.


STAL BANK: Put On Provisional Administration, License Revoked
-------------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1909, dated July 10,
2017, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit
institution Stal Bank LLC from July 10, 2017.  According to the
financial statements, as of June 1, 2017, the credit institution
ranked 527th by assets in the Russian banking system, according
to the press service of the Central Bank of Russia.

Stal Bank LLC has encountered problems due to its high-risky
business model and, as a result, the low quality of a
considerable portion of its assets. Besides, the bank has failed
to properly assess its credit portfolio.  The appropriate
assessment of credit risk revealed a material loss of the capital
of Stal Bank LLC and led to the emergence of grounds for
initiating measures to prevent insolvency (bankruptcy) of the
bank, which created a serious threat to its creditors' and
depositors' interests.  The absence of intentions, on the part of
the bank's owners, to take real measures to stabilise its
financial situation points to the total uselessness of the
further activities of this credit institution.

The Bank of Russia repeatedly applied supervisory measures to
Stal Bank LLC, including restrictions on household deposit
taking.

The management and owners of the bank failed to take effective
measures to normalize its activities.  Under the circumstances,
the Bank of Russia has made the decision to withdraw Stal Bank
LLC from the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia takes this extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, due to repeated application within a year of
measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the
Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)", considering a real threat
to the creditors' and depositors' interests.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1910, dated July 10,
2017, appointed a provisional administration to Stal Bank LLC for
the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the
Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under
Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

Stal Bank LLC is a member of the deposit insurance system.  The
revocation of the banking licence is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total of
RUR1.4 million per one depositor.


=========
S P A I N
=========


GRUPO ISOLUX: Fitch Cuts IDRs to D After Bankruptcy Filing
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Spanish engineering and construction
group Grupo Isolux Corsan S.A.'s (Isolux) Long- and Short-Term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to 'D' from 'RD' (Restricted
Default). Isolux's senior unsecured debt rating has been
withdrawn from 'C' owing to restructuring of the capital
structure.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Bankruptcy Proceedings: The downgrade reflects Isolux's
application for bankruptcy proceedings announced on 4 July 2017.
Since 31 March 2017, the company had been operating under Article
5 Bis of Spanish Insolvency Law (bankruptcy protection), which
grants companies up to four months to reach an agreement with
creditors to avoid insolvency, while continuing to operate. The
board of directors, however, has applied to place into bankruptcy
the seven group companies already under protection from
creditors.

Seven Group Companies Affected: Under Spanish law, once a company
declares itself in bankruptcy, a judge and an administrator take
control of the company and may split the company's assets after
all the company's obligations have been met. The proceedings will
affect the seven group companies already under bankruptcy
protection. Total reported financial debt of the group (including
companies not under bankruptcy protection) at the end of April
2017 was EUR1.27 billion, including EUR557 million of project
financing. In addition, the group has supplier debt of EUR405
million.

At the end of 2016, Isolux restructured more than EUR2 billion of
debt through a debt-for-equity swap, granting lenders, including
their three key relationship banks, Banco Santander, Caixabank
and Bankia, 94.6% of the equity ownership of the company. To
sustain daily operations, Isolux had negotiated borrowing an
additional EUR300 million from its key banks, but Santander --
the company's largest owner with a 14.4% share -- refused to
increase its exposure to Isolux, triggering bankruptcy
protection.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

N/A

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within the rating case for Isolux
include:
- the Spanish court accepting Isolux's bankruptcy filing.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The company's ratings have reached the lowest level on Fitch's
rating scale. An upgrade is unlikely at this time given the
bankruptcy proceedings and likely sales of the company's
constituent parts.

LIQUIDITY

NA

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Grupo Isolux Corsan, S.A.
-- Long-Term IDR downgraded to 'D' from 'RD'
-- Short-Term IDR downgraded to 'D' from 'RD'
-- Senior unsecured debt rating withdrawn

Grupo Isolux Corsan Finance, B.V.
--Senior unsecured debt rating withdrawn


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


KSG BANK: NBU's Decision to Liquidate Operations Unlawful
---------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that Ukraine's higher administrative
court has rejected counterclaims of the National Bank of Ukraine
(NBU) and the Individuals Deposit Guarantee Fund against a ruling
of Kyiv's administrative court of appeals dated April 5, 2017,
declared unlawful steps of the central bank towards KSG Bank
(Kyiv).

The ruling of Kyiv's administrative court of appeals obliges the
NBU to resume operations of KSG Bank, Interfax-Ukraine says.

The press service of the NBU told Interfax-Ukraine that the
central bank seeks to challenge the ruling in the Supreme Court
of Ukraine.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, the press service said that there
is no legal tool for resuming operations of banks under
liquidation, including under court rulings.

On August 30, 2016, the NBU decided to remove the bank license of
KSG Bank and liquidate it for systemic violation of law on
prevention of money laundering, in particular, for risky
activities in the financial monitoring area, Interfax-Ukraine
recounts.

In autumn 2016, one of the shareholders in the bank -- Serhiy
Kasyanov -- filed a lawsuit to court seeking to declare unlawful
the decision of the NBU's board, Interfax-Ukraine relays.  The
claimant also asked court to oblige the central bank to resume
operations of KSG Bank, Interfax-Ukraine notes.

KSG Bank was founded in 1993. Serhiy Kasyanov and Kseniya
Kasyanova (holding 33.46% each in the bank) and Oleksandr
Shepelev are the key shareholders in the bank.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


DECO 6-UK: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A2 Notes to D
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its
credit rating on DECO 6 - UK Large Loan 2 PLC's class A2 notes.
At the same time, S&P said, "we have affirmed our 'D (sf)'
ratings on theclass B, C, and D notes. We have subsequently
withdrawn, effective in 30 days' time, our ratings on these
classes of notes."

On the April 2017 interest payment date (IPD), no interest or
principal was paid to any classes of notes.

On June 14, 2017, the issuer issued a special notice stating that
a final recovery determination has been made in respect of each
mortgage loan and no further distributions of interest or
principal to noteholders are expected.

S&P said, "Our ratings in this transaction address the timely
payment of interest (payable quarterly in arrears) and the
payment of principal no later than the July 2017 legal final
maturity date.

"The class A2 notes suffered an interest shortfall, which we
believe is permanent as no further distributions of interest or
principal to noteholders are expected. We have therefore lowered
to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' our rating on this class of notes,
in line with our criteria (see "Structured
Finance Temporary Interest Shortfall Methodology," published on
Dec. 15, 2015).

"The class B, C, and D notes have continued to experience
interest shortfalls. The issuer has also applied principal losses
to the class C and D notes. We have therefore affirmed our 'D
(sf)' ratings on these classes of notes, in line with our
criteria (see "Timeliness Of Payments: Grace Periods, Guarantees,
And Use Of 'D' And 'SD' Ratings," published on Oct. 24, 2013).

"We have subsequently withdrawn, effective in 30 days' time, our
ratings on allremaining classes of notes."

RATINGS LIST

  DECO 6 - UK Large Loan 2 PLC
  GBP555.119 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes
                                      Rating
  Class          Identifier           To              From
  B              XS0235683736         D (sf)          D (sf)
  C              XS0235684114         D (sf)          D (sf)
  D              XS0235684544         D (sf)          D (sf)
  A2             XS0235683223         D (sf)          CCC- (sf)


RAC BIDCO: S&P Lowers CCR to B on New Dividend Recapitalization
---------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on U.K.-based RAC Bidco Ltd. (RAC) to 'B'
from 'B+'. The outlook is stable.

S&P said, "The downgrade stems from our assessment that RAC's
leverage will increase as a result of its proposed GBP275 million
dividend recapitalization plan. We project the S&P Global
Ratings-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be about 8.0x in 2017
compared with 6.6x as of the financial year ended Dec. 31, 2016.
We view the financial sponsor's decision to take a dividend of
GBP270 million (GBP275 million including transaction costs),
although there was no material improvement in EBITDA over last 18
months, as relatively aggressive and therefore no longer
commensurate with a 'B+' rating.

"Our view of RAC's business risk profile is supported by the
company's high-retention, membership-based operating model; its
national scale; strong brand recognition in the U.K.; and above-
average profitability for the services sector. The group has
relatively limited exposure to macroeconomic cycles and benefits
from significant barriers to entry. However, we think that RAC
has limited geographic diversification, with virtually all
revenues generated in the U.K. With an EBITDA margin higher than
30%, we consider RAC's profitability to be above average compared
with its broader business service portfolio, although its EBITDA
margin of about 38% lags marginally behind that of the market
leader AA Intermediate Co. Ltd. (40%). The margin differential
between the two could widen if we were to include GBP20 million
of RAC's customer acquisition costs as expenses. RAC's
capitalization of customer acquisition costs is in line with
generally accepted accounting practices, but diverges from the
accounting practice of its closest peer AA Intermediate, which
charges off such costs as expenses in its income statement. We
estimate that RAC's EBITDA margin would be about 33% if it used
the same accounting policy for acquisition costs as AA
Intermediate.

"After the proposed transaction, our adjusted debt figure for RAC
is about GBP1,525 million, comprising Class A notes totaling
GBP900 million, the GBP280 million Class A term loan, GBP275
million Class B notes, and operating lease adjustments of nearly
GBP70 million. We calculate RAC's adjusted EBITDA at GBP192
million for 2017, after adding about GBP11 million for operating
leases to reported EBITDA of about GBP181 million."

Historically, the group's roadside assistance has demonstrated
generally stable revenue through economic cycles. There is a
partial natural macroeconomic hedge, since consumers tend to keep
their vehicles longer during periods of economic weakness and are
therefore statistically more likely to require breakdown
assistance.

S&P said, "The stable outlook reflects our view that RAC's market
share in roadside assistance will remain steady, with a personal
customer retention rate of about 80% and steady ARPU increase of
about 1%. We expect cash flow generation will be strong, with
FOCF generation at about GBP50 million-GBP60 million, which will
provide a liquidity cushion."

A negative rating action could result from deterioration of
operating performance, namely a decline in the personal customer
retention rate to 60%-70%; a drop in EBITDA margins from the
insurance business to materially below the current 55%; or a
material adverse event that tarnishes the group's brand name,
resulting in negative FOCF, and DSCRs declining below 2.0x for a
sustained period. Additionally, high-impact low-probability
events could weaken the group's liquidity, triggering a
downgrade.

S&P said, "We are currently unlikely to raise the ratings because
of RAC's private equity ownership and aggressive financial
policies, tolerance for high leverage, and the potential for
additional shareholder returns. However, sustained deleveraging,
improved EBITDA and cash flow generation, and stronger credit
metrics than we currently anticipate could cause us to raise the
ratings. Specifically, if the group improves the adjusted debt-
to-EBITDA ratio to less than 7.0x and adjusted DCF to debt to
more than 5%, and sustains these metrics at those levels, we
could consider taking a positive rating action."



                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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