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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Tuesday, July 4, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 131


                            Headlines


A R M E N I A

ANELIK BANK: Moody's Assigns B2 LT Deposit Rating, Outlook Stable


B E L A R U S

BELARUSBANK: Fitch Affirms B- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR


G E R M A N Y

DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEFBANK: DBRS Confirms BB Sub. Debt Rating


I R E L A N D

AQUEDUCT EUROPEAN 1-2017: Moody's Rates EUR11.3MM Cl. F Notes B2
WILLOW NO.2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Series 39 Notes to B3

* IRELAND: 20 Examinerships, 340 Receiverships Reported in 2016
* IRELAND: Update to Irish Revenue Guidelines on Tax Consequences


I T A L Y

VENETO BANCA: DBRS Cuts Issuer Rating to Selective Default

* ITALY: Banks Sitting on EUR300-Bil. Bad Loans


N E T H E R L A N D S

NOSTRUM OIL: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Proposed Senior Notes
STORM 2017-II: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Class E Notes
STORM 2017-II: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Class D Notes


P O L A N D

KRAKCHEMIA SA: Two Wholly-Owned Units Opt for Liquidation


P O R T U G A L

DOURO MORTGAGES NO 1: Fitch Corrects October 28 Rating Release


R U S S I A

KOKS PAO: Fitch Revises Outlook to Stable, Affirms 'B' IDR
MTS BANK: Fitch Places B+ Long-Term IDR on Rating Watch Negative


S W E D E N

AQERI HOLDING: Files for Bankruptcy in Solna Court
INTRUM JUSTITIA: Fitch Assigns BB Long-Term IDR, Outlook Positive


S W I T Z E R L A N D

SK SPICE: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR, Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CASTELL 2017-1: DBRS Assigns BB Provisional Ratings to Cl. F Debt
HBOS PLC: Scandal Victims Criticize Independent Reviewer
N BROWN: To Close Five Loss-Making Stores
PMG SERVICES: Forced to Close Following Eviction
ROSSENDALE OVERLAND: Falls Into Administration

TAURUS CMBS: DBRS Confirms BB (sf) Rating on Class C Debt
WISE 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class C Notes

* UK: Midlands Businesses Face Debt Payment Woes, R3 Says


                            *********



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A R M E N I A
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ANELIK BANK: Moody's Assigns B2 LT Deposit Rating, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned B2 long-term and NP short-
term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings, a b2 baseline
credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA, as well as a B1(cr)
long-term and NP(cr) short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR
Assessment) to Armenia's Anelik Bank CJSCo. (Anelik Bank). The
long-term deposit ratings carry a stable outlook.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B2 long-term deposit ratings assigned to Anelik Bank
incorporate its b2 Baseline Credit Assessment and reflect the
bank's: (1) strong loss absorption capacity -- evidenced by
robust capital buffers and strengthening profitability; (2)
adequate asset quality indicators; (3) adequate funding and
liquidity profiles. At the same time, Anelik Bank's ratings are
constrained by the bank's evolving business model and short track
record under its new ownership and strategy.

STRONG LOSS ABSORPTION

The assigned ratings reflect Anelik Bank's strong loss absorption
supported by the bank's robust capital buffers and strengthening
income generating capacity. Anelik Bank reported solid capital
metrics with a Total Capital Adequacy ratio of 32.8% at 31
December 2016. Moody's expects Anelik Bank's capital position to
remain strong over the next 12-18 months supported by
strengthening internal capital generation.

In 2016, Anelik Bank's total regulatory capital increased by 165%
to AMD 35.5 billion from AMD 13.4 billion as at YE2015, exceeding
the minimum capital requirements of AMD 30 billion for Armenian
banks effective from 2017. The increase was largely boosted by a
capital injection of AMD 21.8 billion ($45 million) contributed
by the bank's new shareholder FISTOCO LTD which acquired 59.68%
equity stake and became Anelik Bank's majority shareholder .

For 2016, Anelik Bank posted net profit of AMD 1.1 billion, up
from AMD 215 million in 2015 which translated into a moderate
Return on Average Assets of 0.6%. Moody's expects that Anelik
Bank's recurring profitability will substantially improve over
the next 12-18 months, supported by increased business volumes
and strengthening interest margin due to declining funding cost.

Moody's expects asset quality to remain adequate, supported by
the stabilized operating environment and the bank's increased
focus on secured lending products. As of December 31, 2016, the
bank's problem loans (impaired corporate and retail loans overdue
more than 90 days) accounted for 3.4% of gross loans.

ADEQUATE LIQUIDITY AND FUNDING PROFILES

Moody's expects Anelik Bank's liquidity and funding profiles to
remain adequate over the next 12-18 months. Customer accounts,
mainly comprising corporate deposits, accounted for 70% of total
liabilities. Interbank funding and issued local bonds constitute
the remaining portion of the bank's funding and in Moody's view
carry a low refinancing risk. In addition, Anelik Bank has
maintained a sufficient buffer of liquid assets -- around 20% of
total liabilities, consisted mainly cash and liquid government
bonds.

STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on the bank's ratings reflects Moody's
expectations that over the next 12-18 months Anelik Bank's credit
profile will not deteriorate and the bank will maintain a robust
capital position, healthy profitability and liquidity profiles.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING -- UP/DOWN

A longer track record of sustainable and robust financial
performance driven by recurring income, along with improving
macroeconomic conditions could result in a positive rating
action. Conversely, negative pressure could be exerted on Anelik
Bank's ratings in the case of a substantial deterioration of the
bank's asset quality or liquidity profile.

COUNTERPARTY RISK ASSESSMENT

Anelik Bank's CR Assessment is positioned at B1(cr)/NP(cr). Such
assessments are opinions of how counterparty obligations are
likely to be treated if a bank fails and relates to a bank's
contractual performance obligations (servicing), derivatives
(e.g., swaps), letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity
facilities. Senior obligations represented by the CR Assessments
are more likely to be preserved to limit contagion, minimize
losses and avoid disruption of critical functions.

LIST OF ASSIGNED RATINGS

Issuer: Anelik Bank CJSCo.

Assignments:

-- LT Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), Assigned B2,
    Outlook Stable

-- ST Bank Deposits (Local & Foreign Currency), Assigned NP

-- LT Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned B1(cr)

-- ST Counterparty Risk Assessment, Assigned NP(cr)

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Assigned b2

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, Assigned b2

Outlook Actions:

-- Outlook, Assigned Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


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B E L A R U S
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BELARUSBANK: Fitch Affirms B- Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Belarusbank's (BBK), Belinvestbank's
(BIB) and Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus' (DBRB)
Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) 'B-' with Stable
Outlooks.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS

The three banks' Long-Term IDRs, Support Rating and Support
Ratings Floors are underpinned by potential state support, in
case of need, and are aligned with the sovereign rating (B-
/Stable). In assessing support, Fitch considers the banks' state
ownership, government control through supervisory board
representation at each of the banks and the track-record of
support to date.

Fitch also factors in the policy roles of BBK and DBRB as the
country's largest providers of government programme lending
backed by dedicated government funding, the systemic importance
of BBK (market share of 41% by assets and 45% of retail deposits)
and the government's subsidiary liability on DBRB's bond
obligations, which, however, is as yet untested.

The authorities' ability to provide support in foreign currency
is limited, in Fitch's view, given the three banks' significant
external funding (a combined USD2.2 billion at end-2016,
including USD1.2 billion short-term debt maturing over the 12
months starting from March 1, 2017) and high dollarisation of
domestic liabilities (USD7.3 billion at end-2016), largely in the
form of customer deposits (bonds at DBRB). These FX liabilities
are large relative to the country's international reserves of
USD5.2 billion, while FX liquidity at all three banks is largely
invested in the FX bonds issued by the government (long-term
debt) and central bank (short-term debt).

Fitch expects the authorities to make this FX liquidity available
to banks, in case of need, to avoid defaults on external
borrowings. Positively, around 40% of the latter comprise
facilities from Russian creditors and so are more likely to be
rolled over, in its view. Liquidity shortages in local currency,
if any, are likely to be covered by the central bank (BBK, BIB)
or the authorities (DBRB).

There were no new capital contributions from the government at
the three banks in 2016 (although government-held subordinated
debt at BIB was converted into equity) and none are expected in
the near term. The original plan to partially privatise BBK
announced in 2016 has now been postponed and the bank will focus
on structural reforms as Fitch understands from management. The
privatisation of BIB (100% stake) is also unlikely in the near
term in Fitch's view given this bank's similar need for
structural reforms and uncertainty over the country's economic
prospects.  Fitch believes the authorities' propensity to support
will remain unchanged for both BBK and BIB as long as the
government holds a controlling stake.

VRs - BBK, BIB

The banks' standalone credit profiles are closely linked to that
of the sovereign due to large direct exposure to the government
and, more generally, the public sector. This makes the banks'
asset quality dependent on the state of government finances and
the ability of the authorities to support macroeconomic stability
and the public sector. At end-2016, direct exposure to the
sovereign (including claims on the government and the central
bank) relative to Fitch Core Capital (FCC) was 3x at BBK, and
2.7x at BIB. Loans issued to public sector corporates (including
those issued under government programmes) contributed a further
3.8x FCC at BBK and 2x at BIB.

Credit risks remain high as the economy is sluggish and borrower
performance remains constrained by generally significant leverage
in the corporate sector and loan dollarisation (BBK: 60%; BIB:
70% of loans), while the share of hedged borrowers is limited.
Asset quality metrics have weakened across the board during 2015-
2016. Fitch expects this trend to continue through 2017 as
operating conditions remain challenging.

BBK's individually impaired loans (as per IFRS accounts) grew to
a high at 37% of end-2016 gross loans from 30% at end-2015,
reflecting deterioration in borrowers' financial standing and/or
collateral value. At the same time, loans over 90 days overdue
remained low, at 1.6% of loans, helped by loan
restructuring/roll-overs but also reflecting the high share of
borrowers benefitting from government support (in the form of
subsidies on interest payments or loan repayments under state
guarantees). BIB's individually impaired loans were also high at
30% of loans at end-2016, down from 34% at end-2015, and loans
over 90 days overdue were 11.6%.

Asset quality ratios have benefitted from moderate balance sheet
clean-ups arranged by the authorities in 2015-2016 through
exchange of selected problem loans for long-term bonds issued by
the Ministry of Finance, DBRB or local governments. Fitch expects
that clean-up will continue although this is likely to be a
gradual process given the government's limited financial capacity
for significant support.

Fitch views capitalisation as modest given the banks' credit
exposures and levels of impaired loans. The unreserved portion of
the latter was equal to a high 1.7x FCC at BBK and 1x FCC at BIB.
At end-5M17, the regulatory Tier 1 and Total capital adequacy
ratios were 16.2% and 18.6%, respectively, at BBK and 10.5% and
15.2%, respectively, at BIB. These capital cushions allowed
limited loss absorption capacity equal to 9% of loans at BBK and
5% at BIB, without breaching regulatory minimum levels (including
buffers).

Pre-impairment profit (net of accrued interest not received in
cash) was a solid 5.8% of average gross loans (BBK) and 8% (BIB).
However, in Fitch's view there is uncertainty about the ability
of some borrowers to service loans out of their own cash flows
rather than through receipt of new credit. Large loan impairment
charges (equal to 65% of pre-impairment operating profit at BBK
in 2016 and 98% at BIB) constrained returns on equity (ROAE) at
8.9% at BBK and 0% at BIB.

Core funding is from customers (over 70% of liabilities), but
with a high proportion of foreign currency accounts (67% at BBK,
62% at BIB). Deposit trends have been stable recently, limiting
immediate liquidity pressure. However, liquidity management
remains highly dependent on the confidence of depositors and
support from the authorities.

Fitch has not assigned a VR to DBRB due to the bank's special
status as a development institution and its close association
with the authorities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
IDRS, SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS

Changes to the banks' IDRs are likely to be linked to changes in
the sovereign credit profile, and the Stable Outlooks reflect
that on the sovereign ratings.

The banks' ratings could also be downgraded, and hence notched
down from the sovereign, in case timely support is not made
available, when needed, or if increased pressure on the country's
external finances heightens the risk of capital or exchange
controls being introduced prior to a sovereign default.

VR - BBK, BIB

Downgrades of VRs could result from capital erosion due to a
further marked deterioration in asset quality or a significant
tightening of FX liquidity positions. Upgrades of VRs above the
sovereign rating are extremely unlikely given the close linkages
between sovereign and bank credit profiles.

The rating actions are as follows:

BBK and BIB

Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B-'

DBRB

Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Long-Term Local Currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B-'


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G E R M A N Y
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DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEFBANK: DBRS Confirms BB Sub. Debt Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited confirmed the Issuer and Senior Unsecured
Long-Term Debt & Deposit ratings of Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG
(pbb or the Bank) at BBB and the Bank's Short-Term Debt and
Deposit rating at R-2 (high). pbb's intrinsic assessment (IA)
remains at BBB and the Bank's Subordinated Debt has been
confirmed at BB (high).

The confirmation of the ratings reflects the Bank's concentrated
core franchise, pbb's solid albeit slowing new business
generation and its track-record as one of Germany's largest
Pfandbrief issuers. The Stable Trend reflects DBRS view that the
ratings are well-placed at the current level, taking into account
the cyclicality of pbb's monoline business model against the
background of high competition and margin pressure.

The Bank reported 1Q17 net income of EUR 38 million based on
consolidated IFRS figures. The 1Q17 result was mainly driven by
i) significantly lower net other operating expenses of EUR 8
million in 1Q17 (Q1 2016: EUR 14 million), driven partly by EUR 7
million higher positive net one-offs mainly from the sale of
assets from the non-strategic value portfolio ii) higher
administrative expenses in 1Q17 of EUR 50 million (Q1 2016: EUR
45 million) due to both higher personnel expenses and increased
project related costs, particularly with regard to increasing
regulatory burdens and iii) higher but still minor impairment
levels of EUR 2 million (Q1 2016: EUR 0 million) as pbb continues
to benefit from historically low default rates.

Lending margins on new real estate business have reduced slightly
YoY in 1Q17. Loan to value ratios (LTVs) in the strategic
Commercial Real Estate portfolio, in which the Bank finances
commercial real estate properties, mainly in Germany, Great
Britain and France, have remained solid at around 56%. pbb's
sound asset quality as of 1Q17 is reflected in a problem loan
ratio at a low of 0.6% (1Q16: 1.0%) against the background of the
benign point in the credit cycle in its core market Germany and
in other Northern European markets.

DBRS recognises the Bank's efforts on maintaining a cost-income
ratio (CIR) around 50% through ongoing cost discipline on
underlying expenses despite one off expense items and increased
costs for regulatory compliance.

DBRS considers the Bank's funding and liquidity profile as
largely aligned with its business model. The balance sheet is
predominantly wholesale funded via secured mortgage and public
sector Pfandbriefe. Unsecured issues also account for a
significant funding component, although the Bank has also
initiated an online platform for retail deposits back in 2013
which, with a volume of EUR 3.4 billion as of 1Q17 accounted for
approximately 5.6% of total liabilities. Overall the Bank remains
dependent upon access to unsecured wholesale funding. DBRS notes
that pbb issued EUR 5.6 billion of long-term funding in 2016
(roughly 50% through Pfandbriefe; 50% unsecured).

DBRS views pbb's capitalisation as generally good, supported by
fully loaded Basel III Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) of 19.2% at
end-1Q17, and a fully loaded leverage ratio of 4.3%. Regulatory
ratios have been strengthened over the previous years, while DBRS
notes that the increase reflects mainly a reduction in risk-
weighted assets through deleveraging in the Bank's non-strategic
Value Portfolio, and improved internal ratings. DBRS notes that
the Bank's RWA density (RWA as a proportion of total assets) is
currently at a low level of around 21% due to the mix of its
assets. In DBRS' view pbb needs to retain a prudent dividend
distribution policy and a cautious approach on regulatory capital
buffers in view of the current regulatory uncertainty surrounding
the recalibration of asset risk weights under the upcoming Basel
IV regime and the ECB's TRIM (Targeted Review of Internal Models)
initiative. The Bank's SREP requirement for 2017 is 9.00% CET1,
leaving the Bank well positioned on its capital levels for 2017.


Concurrently DBRS has today discontinued the ratings on Trust
Preferred Securities issued by Hypo Real Estate International
Trust I (ISIN XS0303478118) as the notes were redeemed on 14 June
2017.

RATING DRIVERS

A material strengthening of the Bank's financial position,
accompanied by the maintenance of strict credit discipline, the
successful run down of the value portfolio and greater portfolio
diversification could exert positive rating pressure on the BBB
Intrinsic Assessment.

The ratings could be negatively impacted by factors such as
deterioration in credit quality standards, an adverse weakening
of the liquidity profile, alterations in the business model or
the financial profile and/or targets, or a weakening of the
capitalisation.


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I R E L A N D
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AQUEDUCT EUROPEAN 1-2017: Moody's Rates EUR11.3MM Cl. F Notes B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by Aqueduct European
CLO 1-2017 Designated Activity Company:

-- EUR 234,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 54,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 27,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR 20,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR 24,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR 11,300,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2030. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, HPS Investment
Partners CLO (UK) LLP ("HPS Investment Partners"), has sufficient
experience and operational capacity and is capable of managing
this CLO.

Aqueduct European CLO 1-2017 Designated Activity Company is a
managed cash flow CLO. At least 96% of the portfolio must consist
of senior secured loans and senior secured bonds and up to 4% of
the portfolio may consist of unsecured obligations, second-lien
loans, mezzanine loans and high yield bonds. The bond bucket
gives the flexibility to Aqueduct European CLO 1-2017 Designated
Activity Company to hold bonds. The portfolio is expected to be
approximately at least 60% ramped up as of the closing date and
to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors
domiciled in Western Europe.

HPS Investment Partners will manage the CLO. It will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk obligations, and are subject
to certain restrictions.

In addition to the six classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer issued EUR 19.1m of subordinated M-1 notes, EUR 21.5m of
subordinated M-2 notes and EUR 0.1m of subordinated M-3 notes,
which are not rated. To the extent M-2 and M-3 subordinated notes
are held by affiliates of HPS Investment Partners, these notes
will accrue interest in the amount of the senior and subordinated
management fee which would have otherwise been paid to the
collateral manager. In case of a distribution switch event
triggered by the removal and replacement of HPS Investment
Partners as the manager under this transaction, the transaction
will convert back to directly paying fees to the (third party)
collateral manager.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. HPS Investment Partners'
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the notes' performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
October 2016. The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios
that are then weighted considering the probabilities of the
binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used the following base-case modeling assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 400,000,000

Diversity Score: 36

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2775

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 3.70%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 43%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years.

Moody's has analysed the potential impact associated with
sovereign related risk of peripheral European countries. As part
of the base case, Moody's has addressed the potential exposure to
obligors domiciled in countries with local currency country risk
ceiling of A1 or below. Following the effective date, and given
the portfolio constraints and the current sovereign ratings in
Europe, such exposure may not exceed 10% of the total portfolio.
As a result and in conjunction with the current foreign
government bond ratings of the eligible countries, as a worst
case scenario, a maximum 10% of the pool would be domiciled in
countries with A3. The remainder of the pool will be domiciled in
countries which currently have a local or foreign currency
country ceiling of Aaa or Aa1 to Aa3.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modeling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the definitive rating assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3191 from 2775)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3608 from 2775)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes:-1

Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -4

Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Further details regarding Moody's analysis of this transaction
may be found in the upcoming new issue report, available soon on
Moodys.com.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.


WILLOW NO.2: Moody's Hikes Rating on Series 39 Notes to B3
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating on the
following notes issued by WILLOW NO.2 (IRELAND) PLC Series 39:

-- Series 39 EUR7,100,000 Secured Limited Recourse Notes due
    2039, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2015
    Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of a
rating action on Grifonas Finance No. 1 Plc Class A Notes, which
was upgraded to B3 (sf) from Caa2 (sf) on June 27, 2017.

WILLOW NO.2 (IRELAND) PLC Series 39 represents a repackaging of
Grifonas Finance No. 1 Plc Class A Notes, a Greek residential
mortgage-backed security (the "Collateral"). All interest and
principal received on the underlying asset are passed net of on-
going costs to the Series 39 notes. This rating is essentially a
pass-through of the rating of the Collateral.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in June 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

This rating is essentially a pass-through of the rating of the
underlying securities. Holders of the notes will be fully exposed
to the credit risk of Grifonas Finance No. 1 Plc Class A Notes. A
downgrade or an upgrade of the Grifonas Finance No. 1 Plc Class A
Notes will trigger an equal downgrade or upgrade on the notes.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
rating of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy especially as the transaction
is exposed to collateral domiciled in Greece and 2) more
specifically, any uncertainty associated with the underlying
credits in the transaction could have a direct impact on the
repackaged transaction.


* IRELAND: 20 Examinerships, 340 Receiverships Reported in 2016
---------------------------------------------------------------
Peter Hamilton at The Irish Times reports that the Companies
Registration Office annual report for 2016 shows some 20
companies went into examinership in 2016, 14 of which were in a
position to return to trading.

According to The Irish Times, the number of receiverships
initiated in 2016 increased on the previous year by 13 as some
340 companies entered receivership in the year.  That's
significantly less than 2012, when 654 receiverships were
initiated, The Irish Times notes.


* IRELAND: Update to Irish Revenue Guidelines on Tax Consequences
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Michael Ryan, Esq., Eleanor MacDonagh, Esq., Alan Heuston, Esq.,
and Deirdre Barnicle, Esq., of McCann FitzGerald writing for
Lexology, report that Irish Revenue have updated part of their
Tax and Duty Manual which sets out the tax consequences for
Receivership and Mortgagee in Possession cases (other than court-
appointed receivers).

This update includes material in relation to direct tax, VAT,
RCT, and payroll tax, as well as capital gains tax clearance
certificates and e-stamping returns, according to Lexology.



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I T A L Y
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VENETO BANCA: DBRS Cuts Issuer Rating to Selective Default
----------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited on June 23 downgraded Veneto Banca SpA's
(the Issuer or the Bank) Issuer Rating to Selective Default (SD)
from B (high). The Bank's B (high) Senior Long-Term Debt &
Deposits Rating and R-4 Short-Term Debt & Deposits Rating remain
Under Review with Negative Implications (URN). The ratings on the
State Guaranteed Notes remain unchanged at BBB (high), with a
Stable trend, in line with DBRS' rating on the Republic of Italy.
DBRS does not rate the Bank's subordinated debt.

The downgrade of Veneto Banca's Issuer Rating to SD takes into
consideration the deferral of the payment of the Bank's
subordinated debt maturing on June 21, 2017 (Veneto Banca EUR 150
million Subordinated Notes Step-up Lower Tier 2 2007-2017, ISIN:
IT0004241078) following the approval by the Italian Government,
on June 16, 2017, of the Law Decree (No. 89/2017).

In particular, according to the Law Decree No. 89/2017, which
DBRS expects to be converted into law by August 16, 2017, the
payment of all subordinated notes issued by banks which applied
for State Aid in the form of precautionary recapitalisation are
delayed for a period of six months since the application for
State Aid. This is to ensure that all holders of subordinated
debt will be treated equally if a bank receives State Aid. In the
case of Veneto Banca, which has expressed its intention to apply
for State Aid on March 17, 2017, the payment of the subordinated
bond (ISIN: IT0004241078), as communicated to the market, has
been delayed to September 17, 2017 (or September 18, 2017 which
is the first business day after September 17, 2017). During this
period, however, the subordinated bond will continue to pay
interest.

In downgrading the Bank's Issuer Rating, DBRS notes that it
considers the postponement of the payment of the subordinated
bond (ISIN: IT0004241078) as a failure to satisfy an obligation
on a debt issue. The Selective Default (SD) reflects the fact
that this decision has specifically affected only the
subordinated debt. Negotiations are continuing with regards to
the Bank's future, and DBRS expects greater clarity to emerge
within coming days.

RATING DRIVERS
DBRS ratings on the Bank's Senior Long-Term Debt & Deposits
Rating and Short-Term Debt & Deposits Rating at B (high) / R-4
remain Under Review with Negative Implications. The URN reflects
the ongoing uncertainty over the Bank and its protracted
recapitalisation and restructuring.


* ITALY: Banks Sitting on EUR300-Bil. Bad Loans
-----------------------------------------------
Massimo Gaia at Reuters reports that Italian banks have largely
held onto loans backed by property and are now seeking to manage
these assets more actively, as repossessions take years and
judicial sales curtail their value.

According to Reuters, even after crises at Monte dei Paschi di
Siena and Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca are resolved,
Italy's banks will be sitting on EUR300 billion (US$335 billion)
of loans that soured during a harsh recession.

The fragility of Italian banks, compounding chronic low growth
and a huge public debt, make the country a dormant risk to euro
zone stability, Reuters notes.

As the economy recovers, inflows of new problem loans have slowed
to pre-crisis levels, Reuters says.  But banks are struggling to
shift impaired debts off their balance sheets, hurting their
already weak profitability, according to Reuters.

Accounting rule changes and a European Central Bank review next
year of assets held by small cooperative lenders could fuel fresh
loan losses, warned Katia Mariotti of consultancy EY, Reuters
discloses.

Gross bad loan sales in Italy totalled just EUR15 billion in
2015-2016, Reuters relays, citing the Bank of Italy.

Up to EUR70 billion in sales are now in the pipeline, driven by
ECB-enforced clean-ups at Monte dei Paschi, Italy's fourth-
largest bank, and the two Veneto lenders, Reuters states.
Together the three are set to offload EUR45 billion in bad loans,
using taxpayers' money to cover the bulk of ensuing losses,
Reuters notes.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


NOSTRUM OIL: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Proposed Senior Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 rating with a loss
given default assessment of LGD4 to the proposed senior unsecured
notes to be issued by Nostrum Oil & Gas Finance B.V., a wholly
owned subsidiary of Nostrum Oil & Gas Plc (Nostrum). The outlook
of Nostrum Oil & Gas Finance B.V. is negative. The B2 Corporate
Family Rating (CFR) of Nostrum is unchanged as is the negative
outlook. The company intends to use the proceeds from the notes
to pay a portion of the cash tender price for the existing $400
million and $560 million notes of Zhaikmunai LLP maturing in
2019, as well as transaction fees and expenses.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The B2 rating assigned to the notes is the same as Nostrum's CFR,
which reflects Moody's view that the proposed notes will rank
pari passu with Nostrum's existing notes. The notes will be fully
and unconditionally guaranteed by Nostrum Oil & Gas Plc and
certain of its subsidiaries (including the group's core operating
company Zhaikmunai LLP), which accounted for 98% of the group's
EBITDA in 2016 and 120% of the group's net assets as of December
31, 2016.

The noteholders will have the benefit of certain covenants made
by Nostrum, including limitations on dividends, liens, merger and
consolidation and sale of assets, as well as a debt incurrence
covenant preventing Nostrum and its subsidiaries from incurring
indebtedness if its consolidated coverage ratio, defined as the
ratio of EBITDAX to interest expense, falls below 2.5x.

Nostrum's B2 CFR reflects the company's (1) deteriorated credit
metrics owing to low oil prices; (2) relatively modest scale of
operations by international standards, with an average daily
production of approximately 40 thousand barrels of oil equivalent
(boe) per day in 2016; (3) high field concentration, with only
one field currently in operation; (4) large-scale investment plan
until 2017, encompassing Gas Treatment Unit (GTU) 3, which the
company expects to complete until the end of 2017; and (5)
Moody's views that the company's liquidity will be largely
absorbed to fund the GTU 3 project and drilling program, although
it is expected to remain sufficient over the next 12-18 month
period.

More positively, the rating acknowledges the company's (1)
positive track record of implementing large investment projects
(GTU 1 and 2) and converting reserves; (2) beneficial field
geology, geographic positioning and reserves' quality, which
account for the company's low production costs; and (3)
potentially improved liquidity profile, following the results of
the new notes offering.

RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on Nostrum's ratings captures elevated
leverage in light of the decline in earnings and extensive capex
spending as well as the risks related to the timely launch of the
GTU 3 facility and execution of the drilling program allowing
full utilisation of GTU 3 amid volatile oil price environment.
The outlook could be stabilised if Moody's were to see a gradual
growth in retained cash flows over the course of 2017 provided
that the company remains on track with its drilling program and
the GTU 3 construction. As the company continues to make positive
progress in addressing these uncertainties, including refinancing
of a part of its debt following the tender offer, this could
contribute to outlook stabilisation during 2017.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's would consider an upgrade of Nostrum's ratings, if (1)
the company successfully launches GTU 3 with sufficient feedstock
to ramp up hydrocarbons production in accordance with its current
plan; and (2) the company's RCF/debt ratio improves to above 20%
on a sustained basis.

Moody's could downgrade the ratings as a result of developments
that weaken Nostrum's operating or financial profile, including
(1) deterioration of RCF/debt ratio to below 10% on a sustained
basis; (2) deterioration in the company's liquidity and financial
profile beyond Moody's current expectations; and (3) the
imposition by the Government of Kazakhstan of material regulatory
and/or contractual changes adversely affecting the economics of
Nostrum's operations.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Independent
Exploration and Production Industry published in May 2017.

Registered in England and Wales, Nostrum Oil & Gas Plc, via its
indirectly owned subsidiary Zhaikmunai LLP, is engaged in
exploration, development and production of oil and gas in
Kazakhstan under the framework of production sharing agreements.
Nostrum's main shareholders are Mayfair Investments B.V. (25.7%),
Baring Vostok Capital Partners (15.4%) and Claremont Holdings
C.V. (13.2%). In 2016, Nostrum reported revenue of $348 million
and its Moody's-adjusted EBITDA amounted to $215 million.
Nostrum's production in 2016 was approximately 40.4 thousand boe
per day and its proven reserves stood at 147 million boe as of
end-2016.


STORM 2017-II: Moody's Assigns Ba1 Rating to Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
following classes of notes issued by STORM 2017-II B.V.:

-- EUR 1,600 million Senior Class A Mortgage-Backed Notes due
    2064, Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 48.0 million Mezzanine Class B Mortgage-Backed Notes due
    2064, Assigned Aa1 (sf)

-- EUR 36.0 million Mezzanine Class C Mortgage-Backed Notes due
    2064, Assigned Aa3 (sf)

-- EUR 36.0 million Junior Class D Mortgage-Backed Notes due
    2064, Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR 17.6 million Subordinated Class E Notes due 2064,
    Assigned Ba1 (sf)

STORM 2017-II B.V. is a revolving securitisation of Dutch prime
residential mortgage loans. Obvion N.V. (not rated) is the
originator and servicer of the portfolio.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The definitive ratings on the notes take into account, among
other factors: (1) the performance of the previous transactions
launched by Obvion N.V.; (2) the credit quality of the underlying
mortgage loan pool; (3) legal considerations; and (4) the initial
credit enhancement provided to the senior notes by the junior
notes and the reserve fund.

The expected portfolio loss of 0.65% and the MILAN CE of 7.7%
serve as input parameters for Moody's cash flow and tranching
model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution,
as described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in July 2000.

MILAN CE for this pool is 7.7%, which is in line with preceding
revolving STORM transactions and in line with other prime Dutch
RMBS revolving transactions, owing to: (i) the availability of
the NHG-guarantee for 27.4% of the loan parts in the pool, which
can reduce during the replenishment period to 25%, (ii) the
replenishment period of 5 years where there is a risk of
deteriorating the pool quality through the addition of new loans,
although this is mitigated by replenishment criteria, (iii) the
weighted average loan-to-foreclosure-value (LTFV) of 90.79%,
which is similar to LTFV observed in other Dutch RMBS
transactions, (iv) the proportion of interest-only loan parts
(60.1%) and (v) the weighted average seasoning of 7.15 years.
Moody's notes that the unadjusted current LTFV is 90.31%. The
slight difference is due to Moody's treatment of the property
values that use valuations provided for tax purposes (the so-
called WOZ valuation).

The risk of a deteriorating pool quality through the addition of
loans is partly mitigated by the replenishment criteria which
includes, amongst others, that the weighted average CLTMV of all
the mortgage loans, including those to be purchased by the
Issuer, does not exceed 87% and the minimum weighted average
seasoning is at least 40 months. Further, no new loans can be
added to the pool if there is a PDL outstanding, if loans more
than 3 months in arrears exceeds 1.5% or the cumulative loss
exceeds 0.4%.

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss of 0.65%, which
is in line with preceding STORM transactions and with other prime
Dutch RMBS transactions, are: (1) the availability of the NHG-
guarantee for 27.4% of the loan parts in the pool, which can
reduce during the replenishment period to 25%; (2) the
performance of the seller's precedent transactions; (3)
benchmarking with comparable transactions in the Dutch RMBS
market; and (4) the current economic conditions in the
Netherlands in combination with historic recovery data of
foreclosures received from the seller.

The transaction benefits from a non-amortising reserve fund,
funded at 1.02% of the total class A to D notes' outstanding
amount at closing, building up to 1.3% by trapping available
excess spread. The initial total credit enhancement for the Aaa
(sf) provisionally rated notes is 8.0%, 6.98% through note
subordination and the reserve fund amounting to 1.02%. The
transaction also benefits from an excess margin of 50 bps
provided through the swap agreement. The swap counterparty is
Obvion N.V. and the back-up swap counterparty is COOPERATIEVE
RABOBANK U.A. ("Rabobank"; rated Aa2/P-1). Rabobank is obliged to
assume the obligations of Obvion N.V. under the swap agreement in
case of Obvion N.V.'s default. The transaction also benefits from
an amortising cash advance facility of 2.0% of the outstanding
principal amount of the notes (including the class E notes) with
a floor of 1.45% of the outstanding principal amount of the notes
(including the class E notes) as of closing.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: At the time the ratings were
assigned, the model output indicated that class A notes would
have achieved Aaa (sf), even if MILAN CE was increased to 10.78%
from 7.7% and the portfolio expected loss was increased to 1.30%
from 0.65% and all other factors remained the same.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed. The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
September 2016.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Please note that on March 22, 2017, Moody's released a Request
for Comment, in which it has requested market feedback on
potential revisions to its Approach to Assessing Counterparty
Risks in Structured Finance. If the revised Methodology is
implemented as proposed, the credit rating of Class A notes
issued by STORM 2017-II B.V. is not expected to be affected.
Please refer to Moody's Request for Comment, titled "Moody's
Proposes Revisions to Its Approach to Assessing Counterparty
Risks in Structured Finance", for further details regarding the
implications of the proposed Methodology revisions on certain
Credit Ratings.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with Moody's
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from Moody's central scenario forecast or
idiosyncratic performance factors would lead to rating actions.

For instance, should economic conditions be worse than forecast,
the higher defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in a downgrade of the ratings.
Downward pressure on the ratings could also stem from (1)
deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement; or (2)
counterparty risk, based on a weakening of a counterparty's
credit profile, particularly Obvion N.V. and Rabobank, which
perform numerous roles in the transaction.

Conversely, the ratings could be upgraded: (1) if economic
conditions are significantly better than forecasted; or (2) upon
deleveraging of the capital structure.

The definitive ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the notes by the
legal final maturity. Moody's ratings only address the credit
risk associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have
not been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.


STORM 2017-II: Fitch Assigns 'Bsf' Rating to Class D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Storm 2017-II B.V.'s notes final
ratings as follows:

Class A (XS1628023134): 'AAAf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (XS1628024702): 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (XS1628024884): 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (XS1628025188): 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Class E (XS1628025261): Not rated

This transaction is a securitisation of prime Dutch residential
mortgage loans originated and serviced by Obvion N.V.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Market Average Portfolio
This is an 86-month seasoned portfolio consisting of prime
residential mortgage loans, with a weighted average (WA) original
loan-to-market-value of 86.3% and a WA debt-to-income ratio of
26.8%, both of which are typical for Fitch-rated Dutch RMBS
transactions and in line with previous Storm transactions.

Revolving Transaction
A five-year revolving period allows new assets to be added to the
portfolio. In Fitch's view, the additional purchase criteria
adequately mitigate any significant risk of potential migration
due to future loan additions. Fitch considered a stressed
portfolio composition, based on the additional purchase criteria,
rather than the actual portfolio characteristics.

Interest Rate Hedge
At close, the issuer entered into a swap agreement with Obvion to
hedge any mismatches between the fixed and floating interest on
the loans and the floating interest on the notes. In addition,
the swap agreement guarantees a minimum level of excess spread
for the transaction, equal to 50bp per year of the outstanding
class A through D notes' balance, less principal deficiency
ledgers. The remedial triggers are linked to the parent's ratings
(Rabobank).

Rabobank Main Counterparty
This transaction relies strongly on the creditworthiness of
Rabobank, which fulfils a number of roles. Fitch analysed the
structural features in place, including those mitigating
construction deposit set-off and commingling risk and concluded
that counterparty risk is adequately addressed.

Robust Performance
The past performance of transactions in the Storm series, as well
as data received on Obvion's loan book, indicate good historical
performance in terms of low arrears and losses.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Material increases in the frequency of foreclosures and loss
severity on foreclosed receivables could produce losses larger
than Fitch's base case expectations, which in turn may result in
negative rating action on the notes. Fitch's analysis revealed
that a 15% increase in the WA foreclosure frequency, along with a
15% decrease in the WA recovery rate, would imply a downgrade of
the class A notes to 'AA-sf' from 'AAAsf'.


===========
P O L A N D
===========


KRAKCHEMIA SA: Two Wholly-Owned Units Opt for Liquidation
---------------------------------------------------------
Krakchemia SA on June 30 disclosed that its wholly-owned units,
Ivy Capital Sp. Z o.o. And Ivy Capital Sp. Z o.o. Ska, resolved
to liquidate.

Krakchemia SA is a Poland-based distributor of industrial and
commercial chemicals and plastic products.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


DOURO MORTGAGES NO 1: Fitch Corrects October 28 Rating Release
--------------------------------------------------------------
This commentary replaces the version dated October 28, 2016 to
clarify that the ratings of Douro No 1's class A notes are only
sensitive to an adverse change in Portugal's Country Ceiling.

Fitch Ratings has upgraded the junior notes of Douro Mortgages
No. 1 and No. 2 and affirmed the remaining tranches of Douro
Mortgages No. 1, No.2 and No.

The transaction is a securitisation of Portuguese residential
mortgages originated and serviced by Banco BPI S.A. (BB/RWE/B).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Robust Performance
The upgrades reflect the transactions' sound performance, with
arrears over three months remaining low (between 0.4% and 0.7%)
since October 2015 and below the 1.05% average observed for
Portuguese RMBS transactions.

Pro-Rata Amortisation
Increases in credit enhancement since issuance remained limited
for all tranches. This is due to the pro-rata test conditions
being fulfilled and all notes amortising pro-rata since 2007
(Douro No.1), 2008 (Douro No. 2) and 2010 (Douro No. 3). Douro
No. 2 and Douro No. 3 include a trigger to return to sequential
amortisation once the outstanding notes balance is 10% or less of
the initial notes balance. Douro No. 1 does not include such
sequential trigger; as such, its senior notes may be exposed to
tail risk, which is addressed in Fitch's analysis.

Variation from Criteria
The transactions are outperforming the average observed for
Portugal. As a result, Fitch decided to remove the Performance
Adjustment Factor floor of 0.7x from its analysis and applied the
model-derived performance adjustment factor of 0.56x (Douro No. 1
and 2) and 0.58x (Douro No. 3). This constitutes a criteria
variation and is one of the key drivers underlying the rating
actions.

Expected Provisioning Needs
Both transactions have staggered provisioning mechanisms,
diverting excess spread to cover principal losses. The mechanism
depends on the number of monthly instalments in arrears. The
transactions provision 25% after 12 months in arrears, another
25% after 24 months and the remaining 50% after 36 months.

To account for the staggered nature of the provisions, Fitch has
estimated the loan balance that have defaulted in the
transactions, but which have not yet been fully provisioned.
Those amounts have been deducted from the available current
credit enhancement in Fitch's analysis, since they are expected
to be written off in the coming quarters.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings may be sensitive to a change of the underlying
economic factors influencing the ability of borrowers to settle
their mortgage payments. Should this translate into significant
portfolio deterioration beyond Fitch's stress assumptions, the
notes may see negative rating action.

The rating of Douro No. 1's class A notes currently coincides
with Portugal's Country Ceiling of 'A+' and consequently is
sensitive to adverse changes to the Country Ceiling

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10

Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action.

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transactions. There were no findings that affected
the rating analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of any
third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pools ahead of the transactions'
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transactions
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.

List of rating actions:
Sagres, STC S.A. / Douro Mortgages No. 1:
Class A (ISIN XS0236179270): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0236179601): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0236180104): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS0236180443): upgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable

Sagres, STC S.A. / Douro Mortgages No. 2:
Class A1 (ISIN XS0269341334): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class A2 (ISIN XS0269341680): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0269343389): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0269343892): upgraded to 'BB+sf' from 'BBsf';
Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS0269344197): upgraded to 'BB-sf' from 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable

Sagres, STC S.A. / Douro Mortgages No. 3:
Class A (ISIN XS0311833833) affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class B (ISIN XS0311834211) affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISIN XS0311835374) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
Class D (ISIN XS0311836349) affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable


===========
R U S S I A
===========


KOKS PAO: Fitch Revises Outlook to Stable, Affirms 'B' IDR
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Russian pig iron company PAO KOKS's
Outlook to Stable from Negative and simultaneously affirmed its
Long-Term Foreign- and Local-Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'B'.

The group is Russia's largest merchant coke producer and the
world's largest exporter of merchant pig iron with a 17% market
share. The Outlook stabilisation reflects diminished liquidity
risk following Koks's placement of USD500 million 7.75% notes due
2022, with the proceeds used to refinance primarily short-term
facilities. At end-May 2017, the Fitch-calculated liquidity ratio
improved to well above 2x, a level more commensurate with the
current rating level, from 0.5x at end-2016. Debt repayments
remain at manageable levels of around RUB2 billion in 2017 and
RUB9 billion in 2018.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Leverage Rebasing from 2017: Fitch expects the group's funds from
operations (FFO) adjusted leverage to fall below 3x in 2017
(2016: 4.4x), underpinned by 2017 sales peaking at above RUB85
billion (2016: RUB65 billion) and the EBITDAR margin peaking at
23% (2016: 18%) on high pig iron prices and contributions from
new coal capacity.

Fitch expects leverage to rise to around 3.5x in 2018-2019 as
price moderation for pig iron drives revenues back to around
RUB65 billion while margins settle around 25%, supported by the
newly integrated coal operations. Fitch conservatively
incorporates capex at 10%-12% of sales and RUB9 billion
investment outflow to the off-balance-sheet Tula-Steel project
during 2017-2018.

Coal Self-Sufficiency Nears Completion: In 2016 the group had
self-sufficiency of nearly 70% in iron ore and 40%-45% in coking
coal. It aims to achieve full self-sufficiency in coal during
2017 as both the Tikhova mine and the second phase of Butovskaya
mine that were launched in April continue ramping up. The group
plans to complete its integration into iron ore from 2019 when
KMA Ruda's new iron ore capacity is commissioned and ramps up to
0.9mt iron ore concentrate additional capacity by 2022.

Unconsolidated Tula-Steel Project: Koks is developing a steel
project in Russia with two partners, DILON Cooperatif U.A. and
LLC Steel, which control the Tula-Steel project through equity
interests of 67% and 33%, respectively. All three parties are
ultimately controlled by the Zubitskiy family. The group has no
equity participation, legal ties or debt recourse to the project,
nor does Koks consolidate it.

However, the group has been the sole project investor (end-2016:
RUB7 billion) other than Gazprombank's committed RUB30 billion
project financing (end-2016: RUB6.4 billion drawn). Tula-Steel
will produce specialty steel for the machinery and automotive
sectors, sourcing hot pig iron from Tulachermet, a neighbouring
group subsidiary. Fitch conservatively expects the group to
invest up to RUB9 billion in the project in 2017-2018 and note
that Koks might also fund Tula-Steel capex overruns, although the
likelihood of this decreases as the project progresses, with
commissioning expected in late 2017.

Lack of Legal Ties: Fitch does not consolidate Tula-Steel in its
forecasts due to the lack of legal ties and its moderate
strategic importance to the group. On the other hand, the group
may decide to consolidate Tula-Steel once the project's leverage
moderates. It should not increase the group's leverage after
2018, if realised on a non-cash basis, but the additional secured
debt of up to RUB30 billion might significantly affect the
recoveries of Koks's senior unsecured debtholders.

Strong Position in Pig Iron: The group specialises in commercial
pig iron and focuses on increasing its presence in premium pig
iron used in the automotive, machinery and tools industries that
require high-purity pig iron with low sulphur and phosphorous
content. North America and Europe are its key markets. Fitch
believes that Koks's single-site operations, limited scale of
operations and lack of diversification into higher value-added
products cap its ratings in the 'B' category.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

Koks ranks lower than its Russian metals and mining peers, eg
Evraz (BB-/Stable) and Metalloinvest (BB/Stable) in terms of
scale, operational diversification and share of value-added
products. The group's profitability and leverage rank below
Metalloinvest's but above that of Evraz.

No Country Ceiling, parent/subsidiary or operating environment
aspects affect the rating.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

  - realised input-driven pig iron price up by nearly 35% on
    2017 and down by almost 20% in 2018-2019;

  - full integration in coal on ramp-up of new Butovskaya and
    Tikhova coal capacity in 2017;

  - average USD/RUB rate of 61 in 2017 with gradual rouble
    appreciation towards 58 in 2019;

  - capex/sales of 10%-13% and no dividends during 2017-2019;

  - RUB9 billion funding contribution to non-consolidated Tula-
    Steel in 2017-2018.

Fitch's key assumptions for bespoke recovery analysis include:

  - post-restructuring EBITDA of RUB12 billion, reflecting a
    hypothetical downturn that would provoke a default as well
    as Fitch's expectation of the company's corrective actions;

  - 5.0x distressed multiple reflects the typical multiple
    applied to small-scale metals and mining players;

  - Fitch has applied standard discounts to end-2016 property,
    plant and equipment (50%), receivables (25%) and inventories
    (50%);

  - 10% administrative claims are deducted from the liquidation
    enterprise value;

  - Eurobonds due 2018 and 2022 rank pari passu with all the
    senior unsecured debt totalling RUB54 billion (including
    undrawn committed portion) at end-May 2017 and only rank
    below the secured RUB15 billion debt (including undrawn
    committed portion) in the waterfall.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- FFO adjusted gross leverage maintained at below 3x
- FFO fixed charge coverage maintained at above 4x
- Enhanced business profile with greater product diversification

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action
- Market deterioration or underperformance of new capacity
   driving FFO adjusted gross leverage above 4x

- Increasing reliance on short-term debt financing or tightening
   liquidity with liquidity ratio falling below 1x

- FFO fixed charge coverage falling to below 2x

LIQUIDITY

Adequate Liquidity: Koks's liquidity improved after USD500
million notes were placed and the short-term debt was repaid in
1H17. In particular, end-May 2017 RUB1.7 billion cash and
equivalents and RUB7.2 billion committed undrawn long-term
facilities well covered the RUB4.6 billion short-term debt.
Fitch-projected positive free cash flow (FCF) in 2017 - 2018 add
additional buffer to the group's liquidity.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

PAO Koks
- Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR of 'B' affirmed; Outlook
   revised to Stable from Negative

- Long-Term Local-Currency IDR of 'B' affirmed; Outlook revised
   to Stable from Negative

- Short-Term IDR of 'B' affirmed

Koks Finance DAC
- Senior unsecured rating for Eurobond issue due in 2018 and
   2022 of 'B'(RR4) affirmed


MTS BANK: Fitch Places B+ Long-Term IDR on Rating Watch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed MTS Bank's (MTSB) Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'B+' and Support Rating of '4' on Rating
Watch Negative (RWN).

The rating action follows a similar action on the bank's majority
shareholder, Sistema Joint Stock Financial Corp. (Sistema; BB-
/RWN) following a Russian court injunction to freeze Sistema's
significant assets including its 31.76% stake in PJSC Mobile
TeleSystems (MTS, BB+/RWN), in relation to claims filed by
Rosneft against Sistema.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs and Support Ratings
MTSB's IDRs and Support Ratings reflect Fitch's view that the
bank would likely be supported, in case of need, by Sistema
and/or its subsidiaries. This view is mainly based on the (i) the
track record of capital support, including RUB15 billion of
equity provided in 2016; (ii) MTSB's role as a treasury for the
group; and (iii) the brand association with MTS, a major
operating subsidiary of the group.

At the same time, the one-notch difference between the ratings of
Sistema and MTSB reflects the bank's weak performance to date,
and its limited franchise and therefore strategic importance for
the group.

The affirmation of the Short-Term IDR at 'B' reflects Fitch's
view that the bank's Long-Term IDR is unlikely to be downgraded
by more than two notches, due to the bank's standalone
creditworthiness, as reflected in its Viability Rating of 'b-'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs and Support Ratings
The RWN on MTSB's Long-Term IDR could be resolved once a similar
action is taken on Sistema. A downgrade of the parent entity
would also likely result in a downgrade of MTSB's support-driven
ratings. Failure of the parent to provide timely support, if
needed, could also result in a downgrade.

The rating actions are as follows:

Long-Term IDR: 'B+', placed on RWN
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating: 'b-', unaffected
Support Rating: '4', placed on RWN



===========
S W E D E N
===========


AQERI HOLDING: Files for Bankruptcy in Solna Court
--------------------------------------------------
On June 16, 2017, Aqeri Holding AB published a press release with
information that the company has filed for bankruptcy with Solna
District Court.  According to another press release published
June 20, 2017, the filing for bankruptcy has been approved.

The trading in Aqeri Holding AB's shares was to cease with effect
from June 22, 2017.

The shares are halted and trading will not be resumed.

Headquartered in Spanga, Sweden, Aqeri Holding AB (publ) develops
and supplies rugged computers and communication equipment for
defense, industrial, automotive, and public safety markets in
Sweden and internationally.


INTRUM JUSTITIA: Fitch Assigns BB Long-Term IDR, Outlook Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Intrum Justitia AB (Intrum) a Long-
Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB', a Short-Term IDR of 'B'
and a senior unsecured long-term debt rating of 'BB'. The Outlook
on the Long-Term IDR is Positive.

The ratings are in line with the expected ratings assigned on
June 12, 2017, and follow the completion of Intrum's combination
with fellow credit management services provider/debt purchaser
Lindorff Group.

KEY RATING DRIVERS
IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

Intrum's ratings reflect the combined company's well-established
and diversified franchise within the credit management/debt
purchaser sector. In Europe it is materially the largest in its
sector as measured by EBITDA, with more than half of its revenue
relating to servicing as opposed to purchasing activities.
Intrum's business model remains focussed on the narrow debt
purchasing and collection markets, but its broad-based franchise
within these industries supports Fitch's assessment of Intrum's
company profile, which has a positive influence on its ratings
overall.

The European Commission's (EC) June 12, 2017 approval of the
Intrum/Lindorff combination was conditional upon the divestment
of Lindorff's business in Denmark, Estonia, Finland and Sweden as
well as Intrum's business in Norway. Fitch expects these
disposals to proceed, in line with Intrum management's stated
intentions. According to Intrum, these actions will reduce pro-
forma EBITDA (excluding the impact of portfolio amortisation,
synergies and non-recurring items) by an estimated 12%-13% from
its pre-divestment level of around SEK5 billion, but maintain the
larger of the group's two pre-transaction operations in each
market. Given continuing leading market share within each of the
five affected countries, as well as the breadth of the group's
coverage across Europe as a whole, Fitch continues to view
Intrum's franchise positively for the ratings.

The Long-Term IDR also takes into account Intrum's leverage (as
measured by gross debt/EBITDA), which has a high influence on the
ratings. By Fitch's calculations (pro-forma for the merger at
end-2016, adding back portfolio amortisation, prior to proposed
divestments) this will be elevated post transaction-closing at
around 4.1x. This equates to a quantitative benchmark score for
leverage in the 'b' category range under Fitch's Global Non-Bank
Financial Institutions Rating Criteria and therefore represents a
constraint on Intrum's Long-Term IDR and senior debt ratings.
Fitch expects only a marginal increase in the calculated leverage
figure from the net effect of the EC-mandated divestments, as
currently proposed, although sale proceeds could also be used to
pay down debt.

Fitch regards Intrum's risk controls (based on a three lines-of-
defence model) as good, and the combined group demonstrates a
track record in adequately pricing asset purchases. Asset quality
is driven by the accuracy of Intrum's pricing models and strength
of the company's collection activities, both of which Fitch views
as being in line with industry practice for the debt purchasing
segment of the wider finance company sector. There is execution
risk on the integration of Lindorff, but Fitch views it as
manageable, given both companies' significant M&A experience and
the similarities in risk governance between the two institutions.

Intrum's profitability benefits from recurring cash flows within
the company's core businesses and an EBITDA margin that remains
wide after excluding portfolio amortisation as non-margin
revenue. Pre-tax return on average assets will fall sharply
following the merger, in part reflecting the additional interest
expense burden associated with Lindorff's higher leverage, but
profitability will still be a rating strength. Compared with
smaller debt purchasers, profitability also has the advantage of
considerable geographic and product diversification.

Similar to peers, Intrum's collection time horizon is long (up to
180 months), but forecast collections are skewed towards the
first 84 months. This reflects Intrum's focus on smaller ticket
unsecured receivables and improves the predictability and
accuracy of its estimated remaining collections. However,
revenues are concentrated by activity given the strong
correlation between offering debt purchasing and debt collection
activities.

The ratings also reflect Intrum's reliance on wholesale funding
sources, partially offset by their diversity and generally stable
nature. On June 16, 2017 Intrum issued EUR3 billion (equivalent)
of senior unsecured bonds with a mix of five and seven year
maturities. The proceeds are being used to repay substantially
all of Lindorff's previous outstanding debt, Intrum's pre-
combination revolving credit facility and related fees and
expenses. Intrum has a new EUR1.1 billion revolving credit
facility, which Fitch regards as sufficient to support the merged
group's near-term liquidity, while also allowing for portfolio
investment opportunities. Interest coverage (EBITDA/interest
expense) is adequate and in line with Intrum's Long-Term IDR.

The Positive Outlook on the Long-Term IDR principally reflects
Fitch's expectation that leverage will fall in the short to
medium term post transaction, in accordance with the business
plan set out by management.

The rating assigned to Intrum's senior unsecured debt reflects
Fitch's view of average recovery prospects for the debt class in
the event of default.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SENIOR DEBT

A sustained reduction of Intrum's cash flow leverage resulting in
a gross debt/EBITDA ratio well within Fitch's 'bb' category
quantitative benchmark range for leverage (2.5x to 3.5x), could
trigger an upgrade of Intrum's Long-Term IDR and senior debt
ratings, assuming other key rating drivers, notably Intrum's
franchise, remain unchanged (or improve).

Conversely, a delay in reducing cash flow leverage in line with
current management forecasts could lead to a revision of the
Outlook to Stable from Positive.

Indication that revenue attrition will be higher than currently
expected, or an inability to realise anticipated cost synergies
within the current indicated timeframe, could also lead to a
revision of the Outlook to Stable from Positive.

The Positive Outlook means a downgrade is not anticipated, but
Intrum's Long-Term IDR and senior debt ratings could be
downgraded if leverage weakens or an inability to address EC
disposal requirements affects Intrum's business model.

Intrum's Short-Term IDR would only change if the company's Long-
Term IDR was upgraded to 'BBB-' or higher or downgraded below
'B-'.

Intrum's senior unsecured debt rating is primarily sensitive to
changes in Intrum's Long-Term IDR. Changes in Intrum's debt
structure (e.g. a materially larger revolving credit facility
which ranks senior to senior unsecured debt) affecting Fitch's
assessment of recovery prospects for senior unsecured debt in a
default scenario could also affect the bond rating and result in
the unsecured debt being notched below the IDR.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


SK SPICE: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B2 corporate family
rating (CFR) of SK Spice Holdings Sarl (Archroma), the ultimate
parent holding company of the Archroma Group, a leading global
supplier of specialty chemicals serving the textiles, packaging,
paper, coatings and adhesives sectors. Concurrently, Moody's has
upgraded Archroma's probability of default rating (PDR) to B2-PD
from B3-PD, to reflect the new contemplated covenant-lite capital
structure comprised of first and second lien bank debt.

The rating agency has concurrently assigned a provisional (P)B1
rating to the new USD680 million equivalent senior secured Term
Loan B due 2024 ('new TL B'), to the new senior secured Capex
Facility due 2023 and to the new committed senior secured
revolving credit facility due 2023 ('new RCF'), and a (P)Caa1
rating to the new senior secured Second Lien facility due 2025
('new SL'). All new proposed facilities will be borrowed by
Archroma Finance Sarl, a new holding vehicle set up for the
purpose of the transaction. The new TL B and new SL, together
with USD 202 million (10% common equity and 90% preferred equity
certificates (PECs) preliminarily assessed by Moody's as equity)
being injected from the new fund of the current private equity
owner SK Capital Partners ('SK Fund IV'), will be used to repay
the existing rated debt instruments in full and to pay USD 202
million to the current shareholders ('SK Fund III') for the sale
of an approximate 50% stake and a USD 252 million extraordinary
distribution to existing shareholders. The residual 50% stake in
Archroma owned by existing shareholders including SK Fund III,
worth USD 202 million in aggregate will be rolled-over (90% in
the form of new PECs).

All the ratings have a stable outlook.

The ratings on the new TL B, new Capex Facility, new RCF and new
SL are provisional, as they are based on the review of draft
documentation and on a pro-forma LBO capital structure at
closing. Upon completion of the leveraged buy-out ('LBO')
transaction and after conclusive review of the final
documentation, which will include also final terms of the PECs,
Moody's will assign definitive ratings on the debt instruments.
Definitive ratings may differ from provisional ratings.
Furthermore, upon closing of the transaction, Moody's will
withdraw the B2 rating of the existing first lien debt of SK
SPICE S.A.R.L (existing TL and existing RCF), as it will be
repaid in full. Upon transaction closing, Moody's expects that a
new different corporate organizational structure for Archroma
will be put in place, with a new parent holding company, Archroma
Holdings Sarl, which will be the new consolidating and reporting
entity and will own 100% of Archroma Finance Sarl, the borrower
of the new rated debt instruments. Once such new corporate
structure is in place, the rating agency will withdraw the
existing CFR and PDR of Archroma assigned at the level of SK
Spice Holding Sarl (Archroma), the current top holding company,
and reassign them at the level of Archroma Holdings Sarl, the new
parent entity.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of the B2 CFR of Archroma reflects Moody's view
that the proposed LBO transaction, albeit weakening the key
credit metrics of the company and delaying its deleveraging, will
not fundamentally change its credit profile. The financial
profile of the company will however be weaker and more vulnerable
to downside risks due to the incremental debt being used to make
an extraordinary distribution of USD 252 million to SK Fund III.
As a result, Moody's estimates that the adjusted gross
debt/EBITDA pro-forma for the transaction will be equal to 5.8x
on a LTM March 2017 basis, which is very high for a B2 CFR.

However, the B2 rating is underpinned by Moody's positive view on
the company's liquidity and deleveraging prospects, under the
expectation that Archroma will continue to convert a large
portion of its future EBITDA into positive free cash flow (FCF)
within an USD 45 to USD 55 million annual range, assuming capex
at c. 2% of sales p.a. and modest annual working capital
requirements.

The projected FCF should support the company's liquidity, which
Moody's considers as good. The absence of meaningful debt
maturities would imply a fast build-up of cash, which the company
could use to fund bolt-on acquisitions in its reference markets,
which are fragmented and undergoing consolidation dynamics,
and/or to accelerate debt reduction. The projected build-up of
cash would allow a relatively fast deleveraging on an adjusted
net debt basis, from a pro-forma adjusted net debt/EBITDA of 5.5x
on a LTM March 2017 basis to 4.9x by 2018 FYE, and further down
to 4.3x in 2019 FYE. Given the bullet amortization profile of the
new debt, Moody's anticipates that deleveraging would be slower
on an adjusted gross debt/EBITDA basis, with a projected ratio
slightly above 5.5x in 2018 and only down towards 5x by 2019,
assuming the company mandatorily prepays part of its debt in 2019
based on the terms of the cash sweep mechanism contemplated in
the loan documentation.

Deleveraging will only be modestly driven by rising adjusted
EBITDA, because Moody's does not anticipate a material EBITDA
increase in the next 12 to 18 months. Most of the benefits of the
acquisition of the BASF Textiles Chemicals business, which was
closed at the end of FY 2015, has been already reflected into
2016 adjusted EBITDA of EUR 159 million, 64% higher than the year
before. Furthermore, the full consolidation from mid-2017 of M.
Dohmen, a small textile chemical supplier for the automotive
sector, now 75% owned by Archroma from a 49% stake held before
the company's exercise of a call option last May, will only
marginally benefit 2017 EBITDA on a pro-forma basis by c. EUR 4
million. Some synergies from this acquisition, anticipated by
management in the range of EUR 5 to 7 million p.a., as well as
ongoing cost saving initiatives, which should have full impact in
late 2018/2019, should support an increase in adjusted EBITDA
towards EUR 190 million by 2019 FYE. This level assumes a low
single-digit growth in revenues p.a. over the forecast period,
which is consistent with mature end-user markets such as textile
and packaging.

Moody's anticipates that the company will be able to defend its
adjusted EBITDA margin within a 13% to 13.5% level, which should
be supported by Archroma's constant focus on product mix
improvement, via the launch of new products with higher value
added, and disciplined cost management, via further cost savings
being targeted over the next 12 to 18 months, based on multi-year
plans, such as 'Project Core' to streamline the organization
further.

The affirmation of the CFR at B2 also acknowledges Archroma's (i)
balanced global geographic presence, with revenues evenly spread
across the Americas, Asia and EMEA; (ii) broad product portfolio
supported by in-house R&D capabilities (R&D expenses represent
c.2% of revenues) and protected by several patents and
trademarks, (iii) well-maintained manufacturing base with 23
facilities spread across several different countries and (iv)
large customer base spread across its three core business lines
of textile chemicals, paper solutions and emulsions. At the same
time, the CFR reflects the high exposure of the company to (i)
mature and declining markets, particularly Europe that still
accounts for about 30% of its revenues, and (ii) the cyclical
textile end market, which accounts for around 66% of the
company's sales. The CFR is also taking into account the
generally less conservative financial policies of private equity
owned companies, and associated high likelihood of financial
events ranging from dividend recapitalisations to debt funded
bolt-on M&A.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The new proposed capital structure includes a new senior secured
USD680 million equivalent TL B, a new senior secured Capex
Facility of USD75 million, a new senior secured RCF of USD75
million, ranking pari-passu with the new TL B (together,
the 'first lien facilities'), and a new SL of USD200 million,
contractually subordinated to the first lien facility via an
intercreditor agreement.

The collateral for all facilities is represented mainly by pledge
on shares and bank accounts of the material operating
subsidiaries. These will account for at least 80% of consolidated
EBITDA and gross assets of Archroma and will guarantee the first
lien facilities and the new SL. In line with Moody's Loss Given
Default methodology, the rating agency has assumed a 50% recovery
rate across the contemplated debt structure. Based on this
assumption and the contemplated debt structure pro-forma for the
transaction, Moody's has assigned a (P)B1 rating on the new TL B
and new RCF, one notch above the CFR, and a (P)Caa1 on the new
SL, two notches below the CFR.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the company
will continue to generate positive FCF and will be able to
deleverage towards 5.5x over the next 12 months, from a level of
5.8x pro-forma at transaction closing. The stable outlook also
assumes a good liquidity position at all times.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- UP

Currently Moody's does not consider any upward rating pressure. A
rating upgrade may be considered over time if the company were
able to improve its credit metrics, with a total debt/EBITDA
adjusted ratio of less than 4.5x and a RCF/Debt ratio above 15%
on a sustained basis, while maintaining positive free cash flow
generation and good liquidity.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- DOWN

Moody's would consider downgrading the rating if the company were
to perform materially below expectations, which would translate
into a much weaker financial and liquidity profile compared to
Moody's current expectations. A downgrade could be triggered if
adjusted gross leverage would exceed 5.8x on a sustained basis,
and RCF/Debt would fall below 5%. Debt-financed acquisitions,
which would prevent deleveraging and result in a weaker liquidity
position, may also contribute to exert negative rating pressure.

List of affected ratings:

Affirmations:

Issuer: SK Spice Holding Sarl (Archroma)

-- Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B2

Upgrades:

Issuer: SK Spice Holding Sarl (Archroma)

-- Probability of Default Rating, Upgraded to B2-PD from B3-PD

Assignments:

Issuer: Archroma Finance Sarl

-- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned (P)B1

-- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned (P)Caa1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: SK Spice Holding Sarl (Archroma)

-- Outlook, Remains Stable

Issuer: Archroma Finance Sarl

-- Outlook, Assigned Stable

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Chemical Industry Rating Methodology published in December 2013.

Swiss based Archroma was set up in September 2013, when SK
Capital Partners, the current owner, acquired from Clariant AG
(Ba1 developing) its textile chemicals, paper solutions and
emulsion products businesses. Archroma has become the largest
global supplier of textile chemicals, following its acquisition
of BASF's textile chemical business ('BASF Textile') in June
2015. Archroma has also a marginal presence in the large paper
chemicals industry, with leading positions in selected products,
particularly colorants and optical brightening agents (OBAs), and
in the more regional emulsion products industry, in Latin
America. In FY ending September 2016, Archroma reported
consolidated revenues of USD1,300 million. SK Capital Partners,
the owner of Archroma, is a mid-sized US based private equity
sponsor with a strong focus on the chemical industry. Upon
closing of the contemplated LBO transaction, anticipated to occur
before mid-July 2017, the ownership of Archroma would be 50%
comprised of SK Fund IV and affiliates and 50% by existing
shareholders including SK Fund III and affiliates, Archroma
Management and Clariant AG.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CASTELL 2017-1: DBRS Assigns BB Provisional Ratings to Cl. F Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited assigned provisional ratings to the notes
issued by Castell 2017-1 PLC (Issuer) as follows:

-- Class A Notes rated AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes rated AA (low) (sf)
-- Class C Notes rated A (low) (sf)
-- Class D Notes rated BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes rated BB (high) (sf)
-- Class F Notes rated BB (low) (sf)

The Class X Notes and Class Z Notes are not rated.

Castell 2017- 1 Plc is a bankruptcy-remote special-purpose
vehicle incorporated in the United Kingdom. The issued notes will
be used to fund the purchase of UK second-lien mortgage loans
originated by Optimum Credit Limited (Optimum Credit or Seller).
Partial proceeds of the Class Z Notes will be used to fund the
General Reserve Fund. Optimum Credit is a new lender based in
Cardiff, Wales and launched as a specialised provider of second-
charge mortgages in the UK in November 2013. The majority of loan
originations are sourced through brokers all of whom, since March
2016, are regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority under the
Mortgage Code of Conduct and Business. The originator is owned by
Patron Capital Partners, a Western European private equity real
estate fund with its main investment advisor, Patron Capital
Advisers LLP, based in London.

The mortgage portfolio will be serviced by Optimum Credit with
Capita Mortgage Services Limited (Capita) in place as the back-up
servicer. Intertrust Management Limited has been appointed as a
back-up servicer facilitator.

As of 30 April 2017, the portfolio consisted of 5,823 mortgage
loans with a total portfolio balance of GBP 242.3 million. The
average loan per borrower is GBP 41,612. The weighted-average
(WA) seasoning of the portfolio is 10.6 months with a WA
remaining term of 15.94 years. The WA loan-to-value, inclusive of
any prior ranking balances of the portfolio, is 64.10%. Within
the portfolio, 40.94% of the loans are fixed-rate loans reverting
to floating, 13.32% are discount-rate loans, 21.48% are floating-
rate loans linked to Optimum Base Rate and 24.25% are floating-
rate loans linked to one-month Libor. 1.64% of the portfolio
comprises loans originated to borrowers with a prior County Court
Judgement and 0.74% of the borrowers are in arrears.

Credit enhancement for the Class A Notes is calculated as 25.50%
and is provided by the subordination of the Class B Notes to the
Class Z Notes (excluding the Class X notes). Credit enhancement
for the Class B Notes is calculated as 20.50% and is provided by
the subordination of the Class C Notes to the Class Z Notes
(excluding the Class X notes). Credit enhancement for the Class C
Notes is calculated as 14.50% and is provided by the
subordination of the Class D Notes to the Class Z Notes
(excluding the Class X notes). Credit enhancement for the Class D
Notes is calculated as 10.00% and is provided by the
subordination of the Class E Notes to the Class Z Notes
(excluding the Class X notes). Credit enhancement for the Class E
Notes is calculated as 6.26% and is provided by the subordination
of the Class F Notes to the Class Z Notes (excluding the Class X
notes). Credit enhancement for the Class F Notes is calculated as
2.96% and is provided by subordination of the Class Z Notes. The
Class Z notes provide subordination to the extent they are
collateralised.

The transaction benefits from an amortising cash reserve that is
available to support the Class A to Class F Notes. The cash
reserve is fully funded at close and is required to be funded at
the minimum of 2.0% of the initial balance of the Class A to the
Class Z Notes (excluding the Class X notes) and 4.0% of the
current balance of the Class A to the Class Z Notes (excluding
the Class X notes).

The Notes are provided liquidity support from an amortising
liquidity reserve which is able to support payment of senior fees
and interest on the Class A and Class B Notes. The liquidity
reserve is zero on the closing date and is funded from principal
receipts to 1.5% of the outstanding balance of the Class A and
Class B Notes. Additionally, principal receipts may be used to
also provide liquidty support to payments of senior fees and
interest on the Class A and Class B Notes subject to principal
deficiency ledger conditions.

The Issuer has entered into a fixed-floating swap with The Royal
Bank of Scotland PLC (trading as NatWest Markets), to mitigate
the fixed interest rate risk from the mortgage loans and the
three-month Libor payable on the Notes. The fixed-floating swap
documents reflect DBRS's "Derivative Criteria for European
Structured Finance Transactions" methodology.

The Account Bank, Cash Manager, Principal Paying Agent, Agent
Bank and Registrar is Cititbank N.A., London Branch. The DBRS
private rating of the Account Bank complies with the threshold
for the Account Bank outlined in DBRS "Legal Criteria for
European Structured Finance Transactions", given the rating
assigned to the Class A Notes.

The ratings on the Notes address the timely payment of interest
and ultimate payment of principal on or before the legal final
maturity date. DBRS based the ratings primarily on the following:

-- The transaction capital structure, form and sufficiency of
    available credit enhancement and liquidity provisions.
-- The credit quality of the mortgage loan portfolio and the
    ability of the servicer to perform collection activities.
    DBRS calculated portfolio default rates (PDRs), loss given
    default (LGD) and expected loss (EL) outputs on the mortgage
    loan portfolio.
-- The ability of the transaction to withstand stressed cash
    flow assumptions and repay the Rated Notes according to the
    terms of the transaction documents. The transaction cash
    flows were modelled using PDRs and LGD outputs provided by
    the European RMBS Insight Model. Transaction cash flows were
    modelled using INTEX DealMaker.
-- The structural mitigants in place to avoid potential payment
    disruptions caused by operational risk, such as downgrade and
    replacement language in the transaction documents.
-- The transaction's ability to withstand stressed cash flow
    assumptions and repay investors in accordance with the Terms
    and Conditions of the notes.
-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions addressing
    the assignment of the assets to the Issuer and consistency
    with DBRS's "Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance
    Transactions" methodology.


HBOS PLC: Scandal Victims Criticize Independent Reviewer
--------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Ford at The Financial Times report that victims of the
HBOS Reading scandal have stepped up their attacks on a GBP100
million compensation scheme after it emerged that the independent
reviewer Lloyds Banking Group appointed to oversee it had
undisclosed business links to the company.

According to the FT, Professor Russel Griggs, who was chosen by
Lloyds to head the process of recompensing victims of the fraud,
undertook consultancy work for the bank several years ago for
which he was paid in the low tens of thousands.

This was on top of Prof Griggs's industry-wide work on small
business lending appeals that was publicly known and funded by
Lloyds and other UK banks, the FT notes.

His consultancy work with Lloyds was not revealed to the victims
when he was appointed in March, the FT recounts.  The Financial
Conduct Authority was informed, however, and the City of London
regulator raised no objection, the FT states.

Victims, as cited by the FT, said the revelations undermined the
position of Prof Griggs, an acknowledged banking expert whose
role with Lloyds is to act as the "victims' champion" in
negotiations with the bank over compensation for the HBOS fraud.

According to the FT, they have previously complained that the
process was biased in the bank's favor, citing Lloyds' reluctance
to share information about their cases, or to explain the
methodology behind compensation offers.

The victims are fighting to recover losses sustained a decade ago
when a group of HBOS bankers mainly based in Reading conspired
with a corrupt external consultant, David Mills, to load small
and medium-sized businesses with debt and then loot them, the FT
discloses.  HBOS was rescued by Lloyds in 2009, the FT recounts.

The news came as Lloyds announced that it had made settlement
offers totalling GBP3 million in aggregate to just seven of the
67 disclosed victims, of which only one had been accepted, the FT
relays.

The bank said in April that it hoped to have made offers by the
end of June to all those who had applied for compensation, the FT
recounts.  Lloyds confirmed that 53 had done so, the FT notes.

HBOS plc is a banking and insurance company in the United
Kingdom, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Lloyds Banking Group
having been taken over in January 2009.  It is the holding
company for Bank of Scotland plc, which operates the Bank of
Scotland and Halifax brands in the UK, as well as HBOS Australia
and HBOS Insurance & Investment Group Limited, the group's
insurance division.  The group became part of Lloyds Banking
Group through a takeover by Lloyds TSB January 19, 2009.


N BROWN: To Close Five Loss-Making Stores
------------------------------------------
Claire Heffron writing for Daily Mail reports British fashion
retailer N Brown is to close up to five loss-making stores as it
grapples with business rates hikes and lower high street
footfall.

The company, which focuses on plus-sized customers said the
decision to shut up to five Simply Be and Jacamo outlets takes
into account 'weak high street footfall, both current and
predicted, together with significant future business rate
increases for some stores,' according to Daily Mail.

The report discloses that N Brown made the announcement alongside
a trading update, which showed first quarter sales rose 5.6 per
cent, driven by a strong ladies wear performance.

The stores accounted for the group's entire GBP2million operating
loss from its store estate in 2017, the report relays.  N Brown
generates over 70 per cent of its revenue from online sales, a
rise of 4 percentage points over the last year, the report notes.
Overall traffic to its websites was up 34 per cent in the period.

The report discloses that Chief Executive Angela Spindler said:
'As a result of ongoing weak footfall in some locations, and with
a clear focus on driving financial returns across all areas of
our business, we will be closing up to five loss-making stores.'

The company announced that Andrew Higginson is to step down as
chairman after almost five years in order to 'pursue
opportunities in private equity', the report relays.

The report notes that N Brown said Mr. Higginson will remain as
chairman during the search for his replacement and through what
it called 'an orderly handover period'.

The report adds that it said the closure process will be
completed by the end of August at a cost of around GBP10million
to GBP14million.


PMG SERVICES: Forced to Close Following Eviction
------------------------------------------------
Press and Journal reports that the owner of a heavy haulage
repair firm outside Oban is closing his business -- with the loss
of eight jobs -- after being evicted from his premises by the
local council.

Peter MacGregor of PMG Services said he is being punished for his
success after Argyll and Bute Council served him with a planning
enforcement notice, according to Press and Journal.

The report discloses that the saga began after he set up at D&J
Campbell hauliers yard in Connel in 2010, providing maintenance
for the firm's lorries.

He said they were visited by the planning department at that
time, but eventually told there was no planning issue, the report
notes.

The report states that as his business grew they started
providing maintenance and repair for other companies, and last
year an investigation was launched.

The report relays that Mr. MacGregor said: "In January the
council said they would help us get a site at Connel airfield.
For months they told us this would be the case. Then a couple of
weeks ago they said they couldn't give us a site there.

"It has cost myself and the landowner GBP20,000 defending this
over the last year and a half. I have no money to pay for new
premises.

"Come September I have no option but to close. I am absolutely
devastated. I have a first and second year apprentice plus three
qualified engineers.

"We provide a service, we look after all the local marine sector,
forestry sector, agricultural. There is no-one else in the area
providing this service."
The report states that a spokesman for Argyll and Bute Council
said: "The business was served with a planning enforcement notice
to vacate the premises by September this year following the
investigation of a complaint.  This decision was upheld by the
Scottish Government Reporters. The business was established
without the required planning permission.

"We have been assisting the owners by identifying alternative
available accommodation in the area and are happy to continue to
offer this support.

"The business expressed an interest in relocating to a site
adjacent to Oban Airport. The site remains available. However, it
is not zoned for the purpose required and there are other
constraints associated with proximity to the airport and nearby
residencies."

The report discloses that MP for Argyll and Bute, Brendan O'Hara,
has written to the council.  He said: "My entire campaign was
based around engaging our own bright ambitious entrepreneurs to
stay in Argyll and Bute while attracting others to come.

"This sends out all the wrong messages.

"It is someone who has built up a business from scratch, who
employs eight people, closing his doors because of red tape. It
is a successful business, all it needs is a bit of help.

"I will not let this go and will continue to beat a path to the
council's door about it. I find it deeply frustrating."

The report adds that Oban-based councillor Roddy McCuish added:
"I can't understand for the life of me how this problem can
continue when we have empty sites in council ownership less than
two miles from Mr MacGregor's business."


ROSSENDALE OVERLAND: Falls Into Administration
-----------------------------------------------
Richard Frost writing for Insider Media reports that a Land Rover
dealership in the Lancashire town of Bacup has fallen into
administration after a creditor issued a winding-up petition.

Rossendale Overland 4x4 entered administration on 9 June 2017,
with Manu Mistry and Hemal Mistry of Bury-based insolvency
practitioner Horsfields appointed joint administrators, according
to Insider Media.  The company, which trades from Park Road
Business Centre, primarily buys and sells used Land Rover
Defenders but also sells other vehicles on behalf of third
parties, the report notes.

It offers a range of services to customers including part
exchange, finance packages, cash purchases and warranties, the
report discloses.

Rossendale Overland 4x4 had a petition for winding-up issued by a
creditor and the company's director took advice following which
an application was made to court for an administration order, the
report relays.

The company continues to trade following the appointment and
administrators are now seeking a buyer for the business and
assets, the report notes.  It has five employees in total who
continue to work for the business, the report notes.

Any interested parties are advised to contact Manu Mistry at
Horsfields, the report adds.


TAURUS CMBS: DBRS Confirms BB (sf) Rating on Class C Debt
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited on June 23 confirmed the ratings on the
following classes of the Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes Due May 2022 (the Notes) issued by Taurus CMBS UK 2014-1
Limited:

-- Class A at A (sf)
-- Class B at BBB (sf)
-- Class C at BB (sf)

The Class A trend is Stable. Classes B and C have had their
trends changed to Stable from Negative.

The rating confirmations reflect the broadly stable performance
of the transaction since issuance in July 2014, also considering
the deleveraging of the loan due to property sales and voluntary
prepayment. As part of this review, as the deleveraging offsets
deteriorating cash flow performance, DBRS has changed the trend
to Stable from Negative for Classes B and C. In July 2016, DBRS
had assigned a Negative Trend to Classes B and C as a result of
the potential decline in commercial real estate (CRE) property
values and the slowdown of investments in the United Kingdom
following the EU Referendum vote in June 2016.

The transaction consists of one interest-only, floating-rate loan
with an initial securitised balance of GBP 211.5 million, which
was secured by 132 properties located throughout the U.K. The
loan represents the 95% pari passu interest of the whole loan
that was granted to 13 affiliated borrowing entities, all of
which are cross-defaulted and cross-collateralised. The sponsor's
business plan is to fully dispose of the property portfolio
before the fully extended loan maturity of May 2019. As of the
most recent investor report from May 2017, the loan had a current
whole loan balance of GBP 90.2 million and a current securitised
loan balance of GBP 85.7 million. This represents a total 59.5%
loan collateral reduction since issuance. The reduction is due to
the disposal of 83 assets leading to GBP 38.2 million of
principal prepayments and a voluntary prepayment of GBP 5.8
million made by the sponsor in May 2017. A combined 32.8% of
collateral reduction occurred during the last 12 months.

The sponsor is an affiliate of Apollo Global Management, which
purchased the portfolio through various loan foreclosures. The
collateral primarily consists of retail properties, including
shopping centres, which account for 77.7% of the allocated loan
amount and 34.9% of the total annual rent. The markets for the
assets are a mix of city centre and suburban real estate
locations spread across the U.K. in secondary locations. The
current portfolio, following the 59.5% collateral reduction, is
mainly concentrated in the northwestern areas of the U.K. and
accounts for approximately 35.1% of the current portfolio market
value. The properties were classified as either Tier 1 or Tier 2
properties based on location and all the sold assets are subject
to 20% (Tier 1) or 10% (Tier 2) repayment premiums. As of May
2017, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 concentration ratios were 75.9% and
24.0%, respectively. The most recent reported vacancy rate
increased slightly to 26.2% from 25.1% at last review in 2016.
The largest ten tenants account for 19.2% of the portfolio's
annual rental income; however, all of them present a current
weighted-average lease length below 12 months. The largest tenant
in the portfolio, Sheffield Hallam University, which accounts for
3.7% of the total income in the portfolio, already gave notice to
vacate and will be departing in June 2017. In total, the
portfolio shows a high lease rollover with an aggregated 29.7% of
the total contracted rent expiring within the following 12
months. DBRS will continue to monitor the lease rollover and
subsequent leasing activity.

The servicer's 12-month projected net operating income (NOI) is
GBP 10.6 million, but based on actual performance, the portfolio
shows declining performance with higher operational costs
resulting in lower NOI. High street retail properties show a
current vacancy rate of 34.3%, compared with the 8.5% at
issuance, and operational expenses of approximately 78.4% of the
total contractual rent for this property type. DBRS has updated
its underwritten cash flows to reflect the higher operational
expenses and estimated a long-term stabilised NOI of GBP 11.9
million for the entire portfolio. According to the investor
report from May 2017, the reported interest coverage ratio is
3.31x.

The sponsor's business plan is to fully dispose of the property
portfolio before the fully extended loan maturity in May 2019.
Per the loan documents, the loan has a target whole loan amount
in each quarter. The maximum target whole loan amount for
February 2018 is GBP 56.4 million, which represents a 37.5% of
collateral reduction needed from the current loan balance. During
the last 12 months, 32.8% of principal was repaid, of which 28.4%
was due to asset disposals and 4.3% due to to voluntary
prepayments in order to meet the maximum target whole loan
balance. DBRS foresees that the borrower will potentially
exercise the second of its one-year extension to complete the
full liquidation of the assets until its final fully-extended
maturity in May 2019.

In October 2016, CBRE revalued the portfolio and estimated a
current portfolio valuation of GBP 213.5 million, considering the
remaining assets. The new market value represents a 5.7% increase
over the same assets per the previous valuation. As of the most
recent investor report from May 2017, the loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio was 42.3% and was lower than the 65.0% at issuance.

Per the loan documents, every quarter the loan is subject to
covenant tests. These covenants require maintaining a minimum ICR
of 1.8x and a 2.0x ICR Cash Trap. Additionally, the loan has an
LTV covenant test of a maximum of 78.5% LTV and a 72.5% LTV Cash
Trap trigger. As of this review, all the ratios were within the
expected range at issuance and DBRS estimates a currently low
risk of the covenant's triggers being breached during the
remaining loan term.

The transaction does not benefit from a liquidity facility. The
final maturity date of the CMBS Notes is in May 2022, three years
beyond the fully extended maturity date of the loan in May 2019.

The rating assigned to Class A Notes materially deviates from the
higher rating implied by the direct sizing hurdles that are a
substantial component of the DBRS "European CMBS Rating and
Surveillance" methodology. DBRS considers a material deviation to
be a rating differential of three or more notches between the
assigned rating and the rating implied by a substantial component
of a rating methodology. In this case, the assigned rating
reflects that the transaction does not benefit from a liquidity
facility.


WISE 2006-1: Moody's Affirms Caa3 Rating on Class C Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on the following classes of notes issued by WISE 2006-1
PLC:

-- GBP 30,000,000 Class A Credit-Linked Notes due 2058, B2 (sf)
    Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on
    Feb 3, 2016 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

-- GBP 22,500,000 Class B Credit-Linked Notes due 2058, Affirmed
    Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2016 Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

-- GBP 11,250,000 Class C Credit-Linked Notes due 2058, Affirmed
    Caa3 (sf); previously on Feb 3, 2016 Affirmed Caa3 (sf)

The transaction is a synthetic project finance CDO with an
underlying portfolio consisting of GBP denominated PFI and
regulated utility bonds, each guaranteed by one of six monolines.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's explains that the rating actions taken are the result of
a rating action on Assured Guaranty (London) Plc, which was
upgraded to Baa1 and placed on review for upgrade on 27 June
2017.

Assured Guaranty (London) Plc wraps currently 12.27% of the
portfolio. It became effectively the wrapper of all of the
obligations previously held by MBIA (INC) after it was acquired
by Assured Guaranty Corp.

Moody's expects to conclude this review when the review of
Assured Guaranty (London) Plc is completed.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralised Debt Obligations Backed by
Project Finance and Infrastructure Assets" published in August
2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The ratings of the notes rely on the ratings of the wrappers but
also on the credit quality of the underlying reference portfolio.
In particular, an upgrade to the Insurance Financial Strength
rating of Assured Guaranty (London) Plc could result in an
upgrade of the ratings of the notes.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

* Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
weighted average life assumption of the underlying portfolio.
Moody's has assumed the average life of the bonds as reported,
however legal final maturity could be up to 39 years.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment and specific
documentation features. All information available to rating
committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other
Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final ratings.


* UK: Midlands Businesses Face Debt Payment Woes, R3 Says
---------------------------------------------------------
According to Greater Birmingham Chambers of Commerce, a report by
insolvency and restructuring trade body R3 shows 5% of Midlands
businesses would be unable to repay their debts if interest rates
were to rise by a small amount.

This is a significant increase from the less than 1% of local
businesses R3 recorded in September 2016, Greater Birmingham
Chambers of Commerce notes.

The research, part of a long-running survey of business distress
by R3 and BDRC Continental, also found that 12% of Midlands firms
were just paying interest on their debts, a notable rise from 9%
last September, Greater Birmingham Chambers of Commerce
discloses.

R3 Midlands chairman Chris Radford, a partner at Gateley plc in
Birmingham, as cited by Greater Birmingham Chambers of Commerce,
said: "Midlands firms have faced a challenging 2016 and early
2017: the sharp fall in the pound has made things difficult for
importers, while a rising National Living Wage and the roll-out
of pensions auto-enrolment have added to businesses' running
costs."

However, Mr. Radford says only paying the interest on debts does
not always indicate that a business is in distress, Greater
Birmingham Chambers of Commerce relays.

"It may be that a company is taking advantage of low rates to
invest in its operations or assets -- but only repaying the
interest is also a common characteristic of a 'zombie business',"
Greater Birmingham Chambers of Commerce quotes Mr. Radford as
saying.

"This is a business only able to continue trading due to an
ultra-low cost of borrowing and with little chance of survival.

"The R3 research shows that there are tens of thousands of firms
currently walking a very tight line.  Rising inflation may also
lead to a double-whammy for struggling businesses.

"It may increase the chance of the Bank of England raising
interest rates, and it would undermine the consumer spending that
has driven the economy over the past year."


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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