/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/170228.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, February 28, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 042


                            Headlines


A Z E R B A I J A N

STATE OIL: Fitch Affirms BB+ Long Term IDRs, Outlook Negative


B U L G A R I A

PLOVDIV CITY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Remains Stable
Z BETA: Moody's Withdraws 'B2' CFR for Business Reasons


F R A N C E

FINANCIERE DRY: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating, Outlook Stable
PAREX GROUP: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to EUR865MM Term Loan


G R E E C E

FRIGOGLASS SAIC: Reaches Provisional Debt Deal with Creditors
GREECE: Creditors to Resume Review of Reform Program This Week


I R E L A N D

EUROCREDIT CDO VIII: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B+
RIVOLI-PAN EUROPE 1: Fitch Lowers Class B Notes Rating to 'CCC'


L U X E M B O U R G

PARK LUXCO: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

DRYDEN 32: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class F Notes


R U S S I A

SAKHA REPUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR, Outlook Stable


S E R B I A

MERCATOR: Coka Files Bankruptcy Petition for Serbian Unit


S P A I N

AYT CAJAGRANADA I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to CC
AYT GENOVA VIII: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class D Notes
BANKINTER 10: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class E Notes
HC INVESTMENTS: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating
TDA IBERCAJA 7: S&P Raises Rating on Class B Notes to BB


U K R A I N E

PLATINUM BANK: Declared Insolvent by NBU


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRIGHTHOUSE GROUP: Moody's Lowers CFR to Caa2, Outlook Negative
GJD RESTAURANTS: In Liquidation, Six Outlets Cease Trading
RUSSELL PAYNE: Enters Administration, RSM Names as Administrators
TOR HOMES: Contractual Dispute Prompts Administration


                            *********


===================
A Z E R B A I J A N
===================


STATE OIL: Fitch Affirms BB+ Long Term IDRs, Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan
Republic's (SOCAR) Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
'BB+', Short-Term IDR at 'B' and senior unsecured rating at
'BB+'. The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR is Negative.

SOCAR's ratings are aligned with Azerbaijan's, as it represents
the state's interests in the strategically important oil and gas
industry. The company is 100% state owned, accounts for 20% of
Azerbaijan's oil and gas production, is the largest employer in
the country, and a significant contributor to the state budget.

It has close ties with the government and the State Oil Fund of
the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) in financial and investment
decision-making. The assets of SOFAZ as of January 1, 2017 stood
at USD33.1bn (a 1.3% yoy decrease). Fitch views the operational
and strategic ties between SOCAR and its parent as strong, while
Fitch see its legal ties as medium (13% of total debt was state-
guaranteed at end-June 2016).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Funding of SOCAR's Projects: SOCAR set up a JV, Southern Gas
Corridor CJSC (SGC) under a decree signed by the president of
Azerbaijan in 2014, SOCAR holds a 49% share in SGC, with the
remainder held by the Ministry of Economy and Industry of
Azerbaijan. The purpose of the JV is to implement key Azeri gas
projects, including the development of the Shah Deniz gas field,
expansion of the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), and the
construction of Trans-Anatolian and Trans Adriatic gas pipelines
(TANAP and TAP).

SOCAR assumes that funding for key capex projects will come from
the state. However details on the funding structure and the
amount of contributions from the government have not been made
available to us. In Fitch forecasts, Fitch conservatively assume
that the spike in spending for projects realised by SGC in 2017
and 2018 will be funded by SOCAR's own sources and government
contributions of AZN0.5bn. If SOCAR's financial profile comes
under pressure (FFO gross leverage above 5.0x for an extended
period of time) due to higher-than-expected spending Fitch would
probably reassess the ties between SOCAR and the state, which
could lead to a downgrade.

STAR Refinery Under Construction: In May 2014 SOCAR agreed
funding for the 10 million ton, USD5.7bn STAR refinery in Turkey.
The USD3.3bn project finance debt package, which is in two
tranches, has a maturity of 18 and 15 years with a four-year
grace period. The refinery is expected to come on line in 2018
and supply the Turkish market, mainly with diesel and jet fuel.
Fitch views the planned cooperation between the refinery and
Petkim, SOCAR's Turkish petrochemical subsidiary as positive for
the project's profitability. SOCAR estimated construction
completion at 54% as of November 2016.

Gunashli Platform Still Not Fully Operational: Oil and gas output
including JVs in 2016 was 8% yoy lower and totalled 248 thousand
barrels of oil equivalent per day (mboepd). The decrease was
mainly a result of the fire at the Gunashli platform in December
2015. SOCAR planned to restore production at Gunashli by January
2017, but as of November 2016 only four out of 28 wells producing
at the time of accident were operational. Fitch assumes
production in Gunashli will be restored gradually over 2017 and
2018, while SOCAR will be able to maintain output of around 270-
280mboepd in the rating horizon.

Speculative-Grade Standalone Profile: Fitch views SOCAR's
standalone profile as being at the low end of the 'BB' rating
category, reflecting its limited reserves, the challenges related
to arresting its production decline, its ageing refineries, but
also its extensive domestic pipeline network, and an expanding
international downstream and retail portfolio. SOCAR's upstream
is weaker and its lifting costs are higher than those of its
Russian peers, but this is partially compensated by profits from
its midstream and downstream operations.

The standalone rating assessment takes into consideration the
business and financial profile of the company compared to its
international peers without taking account for the corporate
governance structure and limits related to information
disclosure, which would reduce the final standalone rating.

Advances and Put Option Liabilities Treated as Debt: Fitch treat
liabilities resulting from the transactions involving the
disposal of assets to SGC and Goldman Sachs International (GSI)
in the total amount of AZN4.7bn as debt.

Higher Leverage: Under Fitch oil price deck of USD45/bbl in 2017,
USD55/bbl in 2018 and USD60/bbl in 2019 Fitch forecast that SOCAR
will remain free cash flow (FCF) negative, assuming that funding
for key investment projects will come from the combination of
government grants and cash on balance sheet (AZN3.8bn at end-June
2016).

Lower oil prices and the manat devaluation coupled with higher
capex will lead to an increase in FFO adjusted net leverage to
4.7x in 2017, up from 2.1x in 2014, before gradually declining to
3.8x in 2019. Fitch views the forecasts as conservative. Higher
than currently projected equity contributions from the government
(AZN0.5bn annually) may decrease SOCAR's leverage within the
rating horizon.

DERIVATION SUMMARY

SOCAR's ratings are aligned with Azerbaijan's, as it represents
the state's interests in the strategically important oil and gas
industry. The company is 100% state owned, accounts for 20% of
Azerbaijan's oil and gas production, is the largest employer in
the country and a significant contributor to the state budget.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within Fitch ratings case for the issuer
include:

- crude oil price of USD45/bbl in 2017, USD55/bbl in 2018 and
   USD60/bbl in 2019;
- USD/AZN of 1.89 over the rating horizon;
- distributions to the government of Azerbaijan of AZN330
   million in 2016, AZN338 million in 2017, AZN413 million in
   2018 and AZN450 million in 2019;
- aggregate capital expenditure of AZN10 billion over 2016-2019.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Positive Rating Action

- As The Rating Outlook is Negative, the potential for a
   positive rating action is currently limited.

Future Developments That May, Individually or Collectively, Lead
to Negative Rating Action

- Weakening state support
- An aggressive investment programme and/or acquisitions
   resulting in a significant and sustained deterioration in
   standalone credit metrics
- FFO gross leverage exceeding 5.0x for an extended period of
   time, coupled with signs of weakening state support

Rating sensitivities related to the sovereign rating of
Azerbaijan

The following factors, individually or collectively, could
trigger a downgrade:

- a failure to adjust expenditure or revenue to the lower oil
   price environment, resulting in an erosion of the external
   asset position;.
- a further sustained and prolonged fall in hydrocarbon prices;
- policy initiatives or responses that further undermine
   macroeconomic stability.

As the Outlook is Negative, Fitch does not anticipate
developments with a high likelihood of triggering an upgrade.
However, the following factors, individually or collectively,
could lead to a revision of the Outlook to Stable:

- an improvement in the budgetary position, beyond the measures
   currently envisaged, sufficient to increase the longer-term
   sustainability of Azerbaijan's sovereign balance-sheet
   strengths;

- a sustained rise in hydrocarbon prices that restores fiscal
   and external buffers;

- improvements in governance and the business environment, and
   progress towards diversifying the economy away from
   hydrocarbons.

LIQUIDITY
Sufficient Liquidity: Fitch views SOCAR's liquidity as adequate -
as of end-June 2016 AZN3.8 billion of cash and cash equivalents
covered AZN3.4 billion of short-term maturities. The company's
cash balance was mainly denominated in US dollars (63%)and in
manat (23%). SOCAR's debt is predominantly dollar-denominated,
but the manat's steep depreciation versus the dollar since 2015
should be credit-neutral, as the company has effectively a long
position in US dollar on the back of its export revenue.



===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


PLOVDIV CITY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Remains Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' long-term term issuer
credit rating on the Bulgarian City of Plovdiv.  The outlook
remains stable.

                           RATIONALE

The rating benefits from Plovdiv's low but increasing tax-
supported debt burden, with low contingent liabilities.  S&P also
takes into account the city's average budgetary performance and
flexibility, as well as its adequate liquidity position.  The
rating is somewhat constrained by the evolving and unbalanced
institutional framework for municipalities in Bulgaria, and the
city's weak financial management and weak economy by
international standards.

S&P's assessment of Plovdiv's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
is 'bbb-'. In accordance with S&P's criteria for rating non-U.S.
local and regional governments (LRGs), S&P generally caps the
long-term rating on an LRG at the same level as its respective
sovereign.  S&P believes the institutional and financial
framework of Bulgarian LRGs limits their ability to meet the
conditions specified in S&P's criteria and be rated above their
related sovereign.  In particular, S&P views their autonomy to be
limited by the still-high dependency on central government
grants, subjecting local budgets to volatility stemming from
intergovernmental relations, as well as by the still relatively
centralized system, with low predictability on the outcome of
reforms.

Given S&P's opinion that Bulgarian municipalities operate under
an evolving and unbalanced institutional framework, S&P don't
rule out the possibility of unexpected changes in the
distribution of revenues and government-mandated spending.  S&P
thinks Plovdiv might feel the impact of these changes more than
other municipalities, in particular because it is the second-
largest city in Bulgaria.

"We view Plovdiv's economy as in line with national wealth
levels, but relatively weak in an international comparison.  We
estimate three-year average national GDP per capita at about
$7,300, with regional GDP in the larger Plovdiv region at about
80% of the national average.  Plovdiv benefits from industrial
zones, such as the Trakia Economic Zone, housing a variety of
companies from diverse business segments, as well as the IT
services and auto industries.  We estimate that GDP per capita is
higher in the city than in the agricultural region of Plovdiv.
We forecast Plovdiv's GDP will expand roughly in line with our
forecast for Bulgaria's economy, at an average of 2.7%per year
until year-end 2019.  The regional economy of Plovdiv might see
an additional uptick in economic growth due to continued
investment in capital projects as it prepares to be the European
Capital of Culture (ECoC) in 2019. Unlike Bulgaria as a whole,
Plovdiv's demographics are relatively stable, with the number of
inhabitants at about 341,600," S&P said.

The rating takes into account S&P's assessment of financial
management as weak, when compared globally.  Although management
prudently relies on long-term borrowing and has demonstrated its
willingness to raise taxes and delay spending in the past, its
long-term financial policy and liquidity management lack
predictability and limit future tax-raising possibilities.
Moreover, the city tends to overestimate capital and maintenance
spending in its budget, which results in large differences
between budgeted and actual financial indicators.  This may
further undermine the credibility of annual budgeting and the
city's financial planning, in S&P's view.

S&P views Plovdiv's budgetary performance as overall average and
forecast that operating surpluses will slightly weaken over 2017-
2019, averaging about 9% of operating revenues over this period.
This will be backed by increased expenditures for the ECoC in
2019, as well ashigher maintenance and personnel spending.

Plovdiv has announced plans to tackle its infrastructure spending
backlog, focusing on transport, water, and sewage projects, as
well as the construction of sport facilities and kindergartens.
While it is likely that financial assistance from the central
government and EU programs will be available, these expenses will
weigh on the city's budgetary performance, in S&P's view.  S&P
further notes that while it expects capital expenditures to
slightly decline, this could change given the 2014-2020 EU
funding cycle.  Overall, S&P expects that the balance after
capital accounts will become negative again after a positive
figure in 2016.

Plovdiv's budgetary performance is volatile, in S&P's view, as it
remains dependent on the realization of capital-expenditure
programs, payment procedures, and corresponding transfers
received from the central government.  A large share of
expenditures and corresponding revenues are related to tasks the
central government has delegated to Plovdiv.  S&P believes that
the city could postpone projects if co-financing funds,
especially funds from the central government, are delayed or
cancelled.

The central government also controls the tax base and sets the
floor and ceiling tax rates.  Plovdiv has the authority to manage
its own taxes and charges, which remain well below the central
government's maximum ceiling.  However, S&P considers its ability
to fully utilize this flexibility in practice as limited.  On the
revenue side, it is constrained by taxpayers' unwillingness and
inability to pay higher taxes, while its ability to cut
expenditures remains constrained, in S&P's opinion.  These
characteristics lead to S&P's overall assessment of average
budgetary flexibility.

Plovdiv will likely finance capital expenditures through 2019 by
issuing debt.

The city has contracted a loan from the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development to upgrade its road
infrastructure. S&P expects the majority of the loan to be
disbursed this year and the remainder in 2018.  Because of the
city's widening deficit due to its capital-spending program, S&P
believes that its debt burden will increase but stay well below
60% of operating revenues by year-end 2019, depending on actual
achievements as the city implements the program.  Because of a
reliance on long-term borrowings, Plovdiv's debt service is set
to remain modest, at about 7% of adjusted operating revenues
through 2019.

The city has minimal involvement in the local economy and holds
shares in a number of government-related entities.  Therefore,
its contingent liabilities remain restricted mostly to the
liabilities and payables of a few health care institutions, which
it might take on if needed and if political pressures arise.

                          LIQUIDITY

S&P considers Plovdiv's liquidity as adequate.  The assessment
reflects S&P's expectation that the city's average cash on
accounts will well exceed its debt service falling due in the
next 12 months, assuming no change in liquidity management.
Adjusted for S&P's base case of budget execution in 2017, free
cash over the next 12 months will continue covering more than 5x
the debt falling due over that period.  Available cash reserves
are vast in an international comparison as they cover the city's
total outstanding direct debt.

S&P views the city's access to external liquidity as limited on
account of Bulgaria's weak domestic banking sector, as reflected
in S&P's banking industry country risk assessment (BICRA) score
of '7'.  Bulgarian banks are predominantly foreign owned.

Moreover, S&P expects the city's liquidity will be volatile due
to its uncertain financial policy, high levels of cash reserved
for government-delegated tasks, and potential cash draws from
investment projects.

                               OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects that on Bulgaria (BB+/Stable/B).  Any
rating action S&P takes on the sovereign would likely be followed
by a similar action on Plovdiv.

An upgrade of Plovdiv is contingent on a positive rating action
on Bulgaria, as S&P do not rate Bulgarian municipalities above
the sovereign.

A downgrade stemming from a deterioration of Plovdiv's SACP seems
currently very unlikely, since the SACP is higher than the long-
term rating on the city.

S&P would lower the SACP if we saw deterioration in the city's
financial performance, which could either result in debt
accumulation beyond S&P's base-case scenario, or depletion of
cash reserves to a level that is not sufficient to cover yearly
debt service.

S&P currently views both scenarios as unlikely.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                Rating
                                To               From
Plovdiv (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency    BB+/Stable/--    BB+/Stable/--
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign Currency              BB+              BB+


Z BETA: Moody's Withdraws 'B2' CFR for Business Reasons
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Z Beta S.a.r.l. (Zobele
Group)'s B2 Corporate Family Rating, its B2-PD Probability of
Default Rating and the associated stable outlook for business
reasons.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for its own business reasons.

The company has no rated debt outstanding.

Zobele Group is a leading developer and manufacturer of air care
and insecticide products to major FMCG (fast moving consumer
goods) companies and retailers. Zobele Group operates six
manufacturing plants in Mexico, China, Italy, Bulgaria, Brazil
and India, five R&D centres in Italy, Spain, Mexico, China and
Bulgaria and two innovation centres in Spain and Singapore. The
company generated revenues of EUR332 million for the last twelve
months to June 30, 2016.



===========
F R A N C E
===========


FINANCIERE DRY: S&P Assigns 'B' Rating, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' rating to Financiere Dry Mix
Solutions SAS (Parex), the holding company of Dry Mix Solutions
Investissements S.A.S., France-based producer of specialty dry
mix solutions for the building industry.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to the
company's proposed EUR865 million floating rate term loan due
2024 and the EUR100 million revolving credit facility (RCF) due
2023. The recovery rating on both instruments is '4', indicating
S&P's expectation of average recovery of about 40% in the event
of a payment default.

Dry Mix Solutions Investissements plans to refinance its capital
structure by issuing a EUR865 million term loan together with a
EUR100 million revolving credit facility (RCF).  It will use the
proceeds of the new term loan to refinance its existing EUR700
million floating rate senior secured notes, repay EUR59 million
of shareholder loans, and distribute a EUR141 million dividend to
the private equity sponsor.

The final issue ratings are subject to the successful closing of
the proposed issuance and depend on S&P's receipt and
satisfactory review of all final transaction documentation.

S&P also affirmed its 'B' long-term credit rating on Dry Mix
Solutions Investissements S.A.S. and S&P's ratings on its
outstanding debt, including its 'B' issue ratings and the
recovery rating of '4' on the EUR700 million floating rate senior
secured notes and S&P's 'BB-' issue rating and the '1' recovery
rating on the EUR100 million super senior RCF.  S&P plans to
withdraw its rating on Dry Mix Solutions Investissements S.A.S.
and the issue-level and recovery ratings on the existing rated
debt upon repayment.

The rating action reflects S&P's view that, despite Parex's 2016
operating performance somewhat exceeding S&P's expectations, the
proposed transaction will likely translate into higher leverage
in the coming years.  In 2016, the increased use of industrial
dry mix solutions in the construction industry in emerging
markets and Parex's strong brand identity and solid position in
its key markets supported the company's revenue growth.  Organic
sales in emerging markets (China, South America) increased by
more than 10% compared with 2015, despite heightened
macroeconomic challenges. Some mature markets, notably the U.S.,
also posted strong organic growth on the back of recovering
construction activity.  These positive dynamics were partly
offset by foreign currency headwinds, mainly from Argentina and
China.  Nevertheless, Parex's profitability benefited from low
raw material prices, cost discipline, and successful integration
of several bolt-on acquisitions.

As a result, the company's leverage slightly reduced, with
adjusted debt to EBITDA down to 5.3x in 2016, from about 5.4x at
end-2015.  However, S&P expects that, following the proposed
refinancing and shareholder distribution in 2017, leverage will
increase above 2014-2015 levels.  In S&P's view, potential
similar distributions and extraction of cash from the company in
the future will limit ratings upside.

The ratings on Parex are constrained by its exposure to the
cyclical new-build construction market, which accounted for about
60% of its 2016 revenues.  The risk of volatility in the
underlying markets is partly mitigated by the group's geographic
diversity across several regions and its strong presence in
emerging markets, which comprised about 55% of total sales.

In 2017-2018, S&P thinks both emerging and mature markets will
provide opportunities for growth due to increasing demand in the
dry mix industry, driven by an ongoing substitution with more
sophisticated products and recovering construction activity in
Parex's key markets.  S&P believes the group's performance will
also benefit from its leading position in a niche market, strong
brand identity, and efficient distribution network.  S&P
forecasts that robust volumes growth will continue in China and
the U.S.  The group will likely finally see a turnaround in
France in the second half of 2017, as S&P understands its sales
correlate with new construction starts, creating a 12-24 month
lag.  S&P also expects market stabilization in Argentina and
Brazil.  At the same time, profitability may soften somewhat due
to rising raw materials prices, as well as continued negative
foreign currency exchange effects and pricing pressure in
Argentina.

In S&P's view, following the proposed refinancing and dividend
distribution, Parex's capital structure will remain highly
leveraged, with forecast adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to
debt of less than 12% and adjusted debt to EBITDA above 5.5x in
2017-2018.  S&P forecasts that, despite some working capital
outflows relating to business growth, the group will continue
generating a positive operating cash flow sufficient to finance
its modest capital expenditure (capex) and small bolt-on
acquisitions.

S&P's base-case for 2017-2018 assumes:

   -- Reported revenue growth of around 3.5%-5.5% in 2017-2018,
      driven by organic growth in China, the U.S., and other
      mature markets and a modest recovery in France and Latin
      America.
   -- Adjusted EBITDA margin of around 17%, constrained by
      reduced ability to pass on input costs inflation.
   -- Modest working capital outflows of about EUR10 million-
      EUR12 million per year.
   -- Capex of about EUR35 million-EUR40 million annually.
   -- Bolt-on acquisitions of up to EUR35 million per year.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these weighted credit
metrics:

   -- Adjusted FFO to debt of about 10%-11%; and
   -- Adjusted debt to EBITDA of 5.5x-6.0x.

The stable outlook on Parex reflects S&P's view that the
company's credit metrics will remain commensurate with a 'B'
rating, despite a temporary increase in leverage in 2017 due to a
dividend distribution, which will be partly financed with new
debt.  S&P forecasts that Parex will maintain EBITDA margin at
above 16% on the back of a gradual recovery of construction
activity in France and its strong position in emerging markets.
The stable outlook also assumes that the group will maintain its
currently adequate liquidity.

S&P could take a negative rating action if Parex's EBITDA margin
substantially weakened due to high-than-forecast volatility in
the company's key emerging markets.  Weaker liquidity with lower
cash on the balance sheet or limited availability under the
EUR100 million RCF could also pressure the ratings.

In S&P's view, ratings upside is currently limited due to Parex's
ownership by a private equity sponsor, which implements what S&P
views as an aggressive financial policy.  In S&P's view, in the
longer term, a reduction in leverage, with adjusted FFO to debt
exceeding 12% and total debt to EBITDA below 5x on a consistent
basis, could be positive for the ratings.


PAREX GROUP: Moody's Assigns (P)B2 Rating to EUR865MM Term Loan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional (P)B2
instrument ratings to the proposed EUR865 million senior secured
term loan B (TLB, maturing 2024) and senior secured EUR100
million revolving credit facility (RCF, maturing 2023), to be
raised by Dry Mix Solutions Investissements S.A.S. and other
intermediate holding companies of French dry mix solutions
specialist Parex Group. The term loan proceeds together with
EUR48 million of available cash on balance sheet will be used to
refinance the group's existing EUR550 million (due 2021) and
EUR150 million (due 2023) senior secured floating rate notes
(FRN), issued by Dry Mix Solutions Investissements S.A.S., to
fully redeem a shareholder loan (EUR59 million) and to pay a
EUR141 million dividend and expected transaction costs.
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a B2 corporate family rating
(CFR) and B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to Financiere
Dry Mix Solutions S.A.S., the top holding entity of Parex's new
financing group and. The outlook on all ratings is stable.

Moody's has withdrawn the B1 CFR and Ba3-PD PDR of Dry Mix
Solutions Investissements S.A.S.

Upon completion of the proposed refinancing Moody's expects to
withdraw the B1 instrument ratings on the existing senior secured
FRNs, issued by Dry Mix Solutions Investissements S.A.S.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect the rating agency's
preliminary assessment of the transaction. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive ratings to the proposed senior secured notes
and RCF. Definitive ratings may differ from provisional ratings.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The assigned B2 CFR reflects the substantial increase in Parex's
indebtedness following the proposed refinancing, which includes a
debt-funded dividend payment and full redemption of its
outstanding shareholder loan (considered as equity by Moody's).
Pro forma for the transaction, the group's leverage as adjusted
by Moody's increases to around 5.5x gross debt /EBITDA, compared
with an actual 4.5x ratio, as of 31 December 2016. This clearly
exceeds the rating agency's leverage guidance for a B1 rating of
sustainably below 5x and is, hence, reflected in the assigned B2
CFR, i.e. one notch below the withdrawn B1 CFR. In addition,
Moody's notes that the new loan documentation allows for
significant amounts of incremental facilities (at least EUR160
million), which can be raised without being subject to any
covenants.

The rating action further reflects Moody's assessment of a more
aggressive financial policy of the group, given that the
envisaged transaction involves the second material shareholder
distribution to CVC Capital Partners Ltd (CVC) after a first
EUR175 million shareholder loan repayment in March 2016 since its
acquisition by CVC in June 2014.

Notwithstanding the elevated leverage and shareholder-
preferential measures, Moody's considers the B2 CFR to be solidly
positioned. This takes into account the group's sustained sound
operating performance during 2016, which, despite considerable
adverse currency effects, was again ahead of Moody's
expectations. While group sales increased by 2.9% (or 7% at
constant scope and currencies) year-on-year (yoy) to EUR931
million in 2016, EBITDA as adjusted by Parex reached a record
high of EUR157.5 million (+5.7% yoy). Moody's expects Parex to
benefit from a benign environment also over the next three years
and to maintain its track record of consistent solid topline and
earnings growth. Housing starts in Parex's home market France
have finally started to recover during 2016 and point to a slight
pick-up in demand from mid-2017 onwards, which will add to
continued growth. However, Moody's expects strong penetration in
Parex's emerging regions to remain the key driver of its medium-
term performance, as well as the ongoing substitution towards
industrial dry mix solutions in developing regions such as China,
which has supported its rapid growth during the last few years.
As a result, Moody's forecasts Parex's profits to increase at
mid-single-digit rates over the next two to three years, albeit
potential headwinds from weaker foreign currencies (e.g. ARS or
GBP) or increasing raw material prices might slightly squeeze
margins in the near future. Moreover, Moody's expects Parex's
free cash flow generation and liquidity to remain strong owing to
its limited capital expenditures (3%-3.5% of sales) and despite
somewhat higher interest costs post the refinancing. While
forecasting Parex to gradually de-lever over the next quarters,
in the context of special dividend distributions and shareholder
loan repayments during the last 12 months, the B2 rating reflects
a lower likelihood that the group will sustain a Moody's-adjusted
leverage of well below 5x debt/EBITDA.

LIQUIDITY

Parex's liquidity is good. An expected cash position of around
EUR95 million post the proposed refinancing, combined with funds
from operations of around EUR90 million expected for this year,
will comfortably cover the group's short-term cash requirements.
Such cash uses mainly include capital expenditures of around 3.5%
of group sales (c.EUR35 million in 2017), working capital needs
of EUR5-10 million and minor remaining payments for recent
acquisitions.

Moreover, the liquidity assessment takes into account that the
proposed EUR100 million revolving credit facility (maturing 2023)
will remain undrawn at closing of the transaction and that the
new springing covenant (net leverage ratio, to bested only when
the RCF is drawn by more than 40%) will be set with ample
headroom.

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

The proposed new EUR865 million senior secured TLB and the EUR100
million RCF will rank pari passu among themselves, share the same
collateral package (mainly intercompany receivables and share
pledges) and will be guaranteed by operating subsidiaries of the
group accounting for at least 70% of group EBITDA (excluding
EBITDA of subsidiaries in North America and China). Given the
weak collateral value in a potential default scenario, the new
bank loans are modeled as unsecured and, hence, rank equal with
other obligations at the level of operating companies (trade
payables, pensions and leases) in Moody's loss given default
(LGD) analysis.

Assuming a standard 50% recovery rate due to the covenant-lite
documentation for the new bank facilities, the proposed
instruments are rated (P)B2 (LGD4) in line with the CFR.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects the expectation that Parex's topline
will continue to grow above construction output in its core
regions and profitability to remain strong with Moody's-adjusted
EBITDA margins of 17%-18%. The outlook further assumes leverage
to progressively reduce towards 5x Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA
over the next two years and positive free cash flow generation to
be applied to fund potential bolt-on acquisitions and/or to
retire indebtedness.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's might upgrade Parex's ratings, if (1) leverage was
sustainably reduced below 5x Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA; (2)
EBITDA-margins at least 16% (Moody's-adjusted) were maintained;
and (3) free cash flow generation remain solid with FCF/debt
ratios of around 5%. An upgrade would also require the group to
establish a more conservative financial policy, for instance by
using positive cash flows for debt repayment and abstaining from
further material shareholder-friendly measures.

Downward pressure on the ratings would evolve, if Parex's (1)
debt/EBITDA (Moody's-adjusted) exceeded 6x; (2) free cash flow
generation turned negative; and/or its (3) liquidity profile
weakened unexpectedly.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Building
Materials Industry published in January 2017.

Headquartered in Issy-les-Moulineaux, France, Parex is a leading
manufacturer and distributor of specialty dry-mix solutions for
the construction industry. The group's product offering is
divided into three business lines, (1) FaƔade Protection and
Decoration; (2) Tiles Setting Materials; and (3) Waterproofing &
Technical Solutions across which it holds top 3 positions in its
key markets. In fiscal year 2016, Moody's expects Parex to
generate net sales of around EUR931 million and EBITDA (as
adjusted by the group) of EUR157.5 million. The group operates 67
manufacturing sites and 9 R&D facilities in 21 countries with
over 3,900 employees. It has been owned by funds advised by CVC
Capital Partners since June 2014.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


FRIGOGLASS SAIC: Reaches Provisional Debt Deal with Creditors
-------------------------------------------------------------
Luca Casiraghi at Bloomberg News reports that Frigoglass SAIC
reached a provisional agreement with creditors, paving the way
for the Greek maker of retail refrigerators to reduce its EUR393
million (US$416 million) debt pile.

According to Bloomberg, a statement on Feb. 23 said that under
the plan, the company will get new funding, including a capital
injection from its largest shareholder, Truad Verwaltungs AG.

Debt maturities will also be extended, Bloomberg discloses.
There were no exact details in the announcement, Bloomberg notes.

Frigoglass began talks with bondholders last year after plans to
cut debt through the sale of a glass business fell through,
Bloomberg recounts.

Truad also stepped in to provide a term loan, which expires at
the end of next month, Bloomberg relates.

Frigoglass is a Greek refrigerator maker.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 26,
2016, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the Greek manufacturer
Frigoglass SAIC's corporate family rating (CFR) to Caa3 from Caa1
and its probability of default rating (PDR) to Caa3-PD from Caa1-
PD. Concurrently, Moody's downgraded the senior unsecured
rating assigned to the notes issued by Frigoglass Finance B.V.
and due 2018 to Caa3 from Caa1.  Moody's said the outlook on the
ratings remains negative.


GREECE: Creditors to Resume Review of Reform Program This Week
--------------------------------------------------------------
Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports that the European Commission
confirmed Greece's team of creditors will be arriving "early this
week" to resume a review of the country's reform program.

According to DPA, Greece needs to make sweeping reforms to its
labour market, pension system and collective bargaining
agreements in order to receive its next vital bailout payment.
Representatives from the European Commission, the European
Central Bank, the European Stability Mechanism and the
International Monetary Fund will meet with the Greek government
to discuss lowering the income tax threshold from the current
EUR8,636 (US$9,140) to EUR6,000, DPA relays, citing Greek media
reports.

Greece has been bailed out three times since 2010, DPA notes.  So
far EUR31.7 billion have been disbursed, DPA states.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


EUROCREDIT CDO VIII: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to B+
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on Eurocredit CDO
VIII Ltd.'s class D and E notes.

The upgrades follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the
transaction using data from the latest available trustee report.

Eurocredit CDO VIII has been amortizing since the end of its
reinvestment period in January 2011.  Since S&P's previous review
on Oct. 20, 2015, the class C notes have fully repaid and a
significant amount of the class D notes has amortized.
Approximately 17% of the principal amount of the class D notes
remains outstanding.  As a result of the structure's
deleveraging, available credit enhancement for both the class D
and E notes has increased.

However, as a consequence of the above, the portfolio's aggregate
collateral balance has decreased.  As a result, the ratings on
the notes may be exposed to greater single-obligor concentration
risk, in S&P's view.  There are currently six performing obligors
in the underlying portfolio, which in S&P's view represents a
risk factor to the transaction.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rates for each rated class of
notes at each rating level.  In S&P's analysis, it used the
reported portfolio balance that it considered to be performing,
the current weighted-average spread as stated in the trustee
report, and the weighted-average recovery rates calculated in
line with S&P's corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO)
criteria.  S&P applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using
four different default patterns, in conjunction with different
interest rate and currency stress scenarios.

S&P's credit and cash flow analysis, which includes the results
from its largest default test, indicates that the available
credit enhancement for the class D and E notes is commensurate
with higher ratings than previously assigned.  S&P has therefore
raised to 'B+ (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the class E
notes.

In S&P's view, the concentrated pool risk limits the level of
rating uplift achievable for the class D notes.  As a result, S&P
has raised its rating on this class of notes by one notch to an
investment grade level.

Eurocredit CDO VIII is a managed cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
European speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction
closed in December 2007.

RATINGS LIST

Class        Rating             Rating
             To                 From

Eurocredit CDO VIII Ltd.
EUR636 Million Senior And Secured Deferrable Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

D            BBB- (sf)          BB+ (sf)
E            B+ (sf)            B- (sf)


RIVOLI-PAN EUROPE 1: Fitch Lowers Class B Notes Rating to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Rivoli - Pan Europe 1 Plc's
floating-rate notes due 2018:

   EUR35.5 million Class B (XS0278739874) downgraded to 'CCCsf'
   from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable; Recovery Estimate (RE) 100%

   EUR23.6 million Class C (XS0278741771) affirmed at 'CCCsf';
   RE50%

The notes are secured on a 50% syndication of the EUR59 million
Rive Defense loan, which remains in safeguard proceedings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The downgrade reflects the possibility of the class B notes
defaulting given a narrowing of the timeframe for sale of the
collateral to take place. In September 2016, a package of
amendments to the safeguard proceedings was passed, including an
extension until April 2018. While the safeguard envisages a sale
taking place, if not completed within this process only months
would remain before August 2018 bond maturity for the servicer to
take over and arrange a sale.

The property is a recently vacated office outside core Paris.
Nanterre city council gave planning permission for the demolition
and comprehensive redevelopment of the site. The former tenant,
SFR, vacated the premises in January 2016 to relocate to new
premises, terminating their lease early and making a surrender
payment of EUR38.1m. These funds are being used to pay debt
service, including EUR750,000 per annum for amortisation until
bond maturity.

The tenant's decision to surrender its lease should help the
borrower market the property as a development opportunity free of
this encumbrance -- particularly if the borrower secures an
unconditional pre-letting (a safeguard milestone). On 16 January
2017, the French administrator confirmed that milestone one had
been met in the form of a letter of intent from an interested
tenant.

In its credit analysis, Fitch has taken into consideration market
information in estimating gross redevelopment costs (assumed at
approximately EUR3,000 psm) and future annual rental income once
redeveloped (assumed at approximately EUR28 million), on the
basis that a property of 80,000 sqm is built over two years.

Fitch expects the loan to be resolved at a loss consistent with
the RE on the class C notes.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch estimates 'Bsf' recoveries of EUR45 million.

Delays in securing a pre-let or an extension in the safeguard
process would increase the risk of default and therefore result
in downward pressure on the ratings.

USE OF THIRD-PARTY DUE DILIGENCE PURSUANT TO RULE 17G-10
Form ABS Due Diligence-15E was not provided to, or reviewed by,
Fitch in relation to this rating action

DATA ADEQUACY
Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall and together with the assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


PARK LUXCO: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a first-time B1 corporate
family rating (CFR) and B1-PD probability of default rating (PDR)
to Park LuxCo 3 S.C.A., a holding company of the German parking
operator Apcoa. Concurrently, Moody's assigned a first time B1
rating to the proposed EUR325 million Senior Secured Term Loan B
due 2024 and the EUR35 million Revolving Credit Facility (RCF),
both being issued by APCOA Parking Holdings GmbH. The proceeds of
the transaction will be used to refinance the group's existing
indebtedness in the total amount of EUR320 million. The outlook
on all ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Apcoa's B1 CFR reflects the company's (1) leading position among
European parking operators; (2) its well diversified contract
portfolio by end-market and geography; (3) good revenue and
earnings visibility supported by high historical retention rates;
(4) recently improving operational performance supported by new
management team.

The CFR is constrained by (1) the company's exposure to a
fragmented and competitive market with contract renewal risk; (2)
Apcoa's exposure to volume risks with ca. 44% of revenues being
generated from contracts with airports and shopping centers; (3)
subdued market growth expectations and chance of technological
disruptors; (4) 2016 opening gross leverage of around 5.5x or
around 3.4x (as adjusted by Moody's including operating leases),
with limited deleveraging prospects.

Moody's considers Apcoa's near-term liquidity position, pro forma
for the transaction, to be adequate. The company's liquidity
profile is supported by ca. EUR28 million cash on balance sheet
and a EUR35 million RCF, which is expected to be fully undrawn at
closing.

The Term Loan B, RCF and the Guarantee Facility benefit from
first ranking security interests over all material asset of the
group, whilst guarantors include not less than 80% of
Consolidated EBITDA of APCOA Parking Holdings GmbH and its
subsidiaries. The capital structure is protected by only one
financial maintenance covenant, a net leverage ratio, tested
quarterly starting 6 months after the closing date, and Moody's
expects the company to retain sufficient headroom.

Rating Outlook

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectations that
Apcoa will benefit from stable underlying market conditions,
revenue growth from contracts wins, whilst improving its
profitability through operating leverage.

Factors that Could Lead to an Upgrade

Upward pressure could arise if (1) adjusted Debt/EBITDA trends
towards 3.0x (Moody's adjusted), corresponding to a reported
Debt/EBITDA dropping sustainably below 5.0x and (2) improved FCF
generation, whilst the company maintains a solid liquidity
profile.

Factors that Could Lead to a Downgrade

Downward pressure on the ratings could arise if earnings weaken
such that (1) Moody's adjusted Debt/EBITDA exceeds 3.5x
sustainably, corresponding to a reported Debt/EBITDA sustainably
exceeding 6.0x, (2) FCF generation were to worsen, and (3) the
liquidity profile weakens. Any material debt-funded acquisition
or other shareholder friendly action could further put could
further put pressure on the ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in October 2016.

                      Company profile

Park LuxCo 3 S.C.A. ("Apcoa" or "the company") is a leading
European parking operator, managing approximately 1.4 million car
parking spaces across ca. 9,000 sites in 13 countries. The group
mainly provides parking management services to a broad client
base, including airports and railways, shopping centers, city
centers, hotels, hospitals, as well as trade fairs and events.
Alongside the company's core parking service offering, adjacent
services include taxi and shuttle management. The company
provides its services exclusively through a managed and
leaseholder operated model and generates no revenue from owned or
concession based contracts.

Headquartered in Germany, the company is expected to generate ca.
EUR670 million revenue in the financial year ending 2016. Since
2014, Centerbirdge Partners holds 64.9% of the groups share
capital with a remaining 16.3% and 18.8% held by Strategic Value
Partners and other minority shareholders, respectively.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DRYDEN 32: Moody's Affirms B2(sf) Rating on Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to four
classes of notes ("Refinancing Notes") issued by Dryden 32 Euro
CLO 2014 B.V.:

-- EUR199,250,000 Class A-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2026, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR31,000,000 Class A-1B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes
due 2026, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR18,420,000 Class B-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
due 2026, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

-- EUR31,580,000 Class B-1B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes
due 2026, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

Additionally, Moody's has upgraded and affirmed the ratings on
the existing following notes issued by Dryden 32 Euro CLO:

-- EUR32,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes due 2026, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 23,
2014 Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR22,000,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes due 2026, Affirmed Baa2 (sf); previously on Jul 23,
2014 Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR26,000,000 Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes due 2026, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 23,
2014 Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR17,000,000 Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes due 2026, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Jul 23, 2014
Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

Moody's had assigned provisional ratings to the Refinancing Notes
in this transaction on February 1, 2017.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's ratings of the notes address the expected loss posed to
noteholders. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults on the
underlying portfolio of assets, the transaction's legal
structure, and the characteristics of the underlying assets.

The Issuer has issued the Refinancing Notes in connection with
the refinancing of the following classes of original notes: Class
A-1A Notes, Class A-1B Notes, Class B-1A Notes and Class B-1B
Notes due 2026 (the "Original Notes"), previously issued on July
23, 2014 (the "Original Closing Date"). On the refinancing date,
the Issuer will use the proceeds from the issuance of the
Refinancing Notes to redeem in full its respective Original Notes
that will be refinanced. On the Original Closing Date the Issuer
also issued the Class C, Class D, Class E Notes and the Class F
notes as well as one class of subordinated notes, which will
remain outstanding.

The rating action on the Class C is primarily a result of the
increase in the excess spread available to the transaction
resulting from refinancing of Class A and Class B.

Dryden 32 is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 85% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans or senior secured
bonds, up to 15% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured senior
obligations and high yield bonds, and up to 10% of the portfolio
may consist of second-lien loans and mezzanine obligations. The
underlying portfolio is 100% ramped as of the second refinancing
closing date.

PGIM Limited (the "Manager") manages the CLO. It directs the
selection, acquisition, and disposition of collateral on behalf
of the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's reinvestment
period. After the reinvestment period, which ends in August 2018,
the Manager may reinvest unscheduled principal payments and sale
proceeds from credit risk and credit improved obligations,
subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer has issued EUR 39.45m of subordinated notes.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using a cash flow model based on
the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1
of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" rating methodology published in October 2016. The
key model inputs Moody's used in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. For modeling
purposes, Moody's used the following base-case assumptions:

Par amount: EUR 401,800,000

Diversity Score: 40

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 3030

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.60%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 6.00%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 5.65 years.

As part of its analysis, Moody's has addressed the potential
exposure to obligors domiciled in countries with a local currency
country risk bond ceilings (LCC) of A1 and lower. Following the
effective date, and given the portfolio constraints and the
current local currency country ceilings rating in Europe, such
exposure may not exceed 15% of the total portfolio, where
exposures to countries rated below A3 cannot exceed 10% and
exposures to countries rated below Baa3 cannot exceed 0%. As a
result and in conjunction with the current local country ceiling
ratings of the eligible countries, as a worst case scenario, a
maximum 5% of the pool would be domiciled in countries with
single A local currency country ceiling and 10% in Baa2 local
currency country ceiling. The remainder of the pool will be
domiciled in countries which currently have a local currency
country ceiling of Aaa. Given this portfolio composition, the
model was run with different target par amounts depending on the
target rating of each class of notes as further described in
Appendix 14 of the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a
function of the exposure size to peripheral countries and the
target ratings of the rated notes and amount to 3.33% for the
class A-1A and A-1B notes and 2.42% for the Class B-1A and B-1B
notes.

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted an additional sensitivity analysis, which was an
important component in determining the provisional rating
assigned to the rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes
increased default probability relative to the base case. Below is
a summary of the impact of an increase in default probability
(expressed in terms of WARF level) on each of the rated notes
(shown in terms of the number of notch difference versus the
current model output, whereby a negative difference corresponds
to higher expected losses), holding all other factors equal.

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3485 from 3030)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class B-1B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -1

Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3939 from 3030)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

Class A-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: 0

Class A-1B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: 0

Class B-1A-R Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes: -2

Class B-1B-R Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes: -2

Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -1

Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes: -3

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. PGIM Limited's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in October 2016.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


SAKHA REPUBLIC: S&P Affirms 'BB' ICR, Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB' long-term issuer credit
rating and 'ruAA' Russia national scale rating on the Republic of
Sakha, a region in Russia's Far Eastern federal district.  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB' and 'ruAA' issue ratings
on Sakha's senior unsecured bonds.

                             RATIONALE

The ratings on Sakha are constrained by S&P's view of Russia's
volatile and unbalanced institutional framework and the region's
weak budgetary flexibility under existing legislation.  Sakha
demonstrates wealth levels above the Russian average and, in
S&P's view, enjoys above-average growth prospects, but S&P assess
its economy as weak because it concentrates on extraction of
natural resources.  S&P views Sakha's financial management as
weak in an international comparison, mostly owing to a lack of
reliable long-term financial planning, a situation common to most
of its Russian peers.  Average budgetary performance, adequate
liquidity, and moderate contingent liabilities are neutral for
Sakha's creditworthiness, in S&P's view.  The ratings are
supported by S&P's view of Sakha's low debt.  S&P rates Sakha at
the same level as its 'bb' stand-alone credit profile.

Under Russia's volatile and unbalanced institutional framework,
Sakha's budgetary flexibility and performance is significantly
affected by the federal government's decisions regarding key
taxes, transfers, and expenditure responsibilities.  S&P
estimates that federally-regulated revenues will continue to make
up more than 95% of Sakha's budget revenues, which leaves very
little revenue autonomy for the region.  Based on a good track
record, including a past successful sale of shares in the world's
largest diamond producer, Alrosa OJSC, and significant amounts of
assets still in the republic's possession, S&P believes Sakha has
above-average capability to generate revenues from asset sales
compared with local peers.  Overall, Sakha's expenditure
flexibility remains weak due to the region's huge territory and
harsh subarctic climate conditions, which translate into high
operating costs and large infrastructure development needs.

Sakha enjoys higher-than-average economic wealth compared with
most Russian peers, thanks to an abundance of natural resources,
including diamonds, oil, gas, coal, and precious metals.  The
local economy has continued to grow in the past three years
despite the slowdown at the national level.  In addition, S&P
believes that the republic will demonstrate above-average real
GDP growth compared with Russian peers in the near term as its
economy continues to receive support from investments in a number
of large long-term projects in resource extraction, such as the
Chayandinskoye and Talakanskoye field developments.  However, the
concentration of the economy on the mining industry, which
accounts for nearly one-half of gross regional product, leads to
potential volatility in Sakha's revenues.  Moreover, only a few
large taxpayers dominate the tax base. More than 20% of tax
revenues come from Alrosa and its subsidiaries.  Oil producer
OJSC Surgutneftegas and oil pipeline operator OAO AK Transneft
contribute another 20%-24%.

S&P forecasts that in 2017-2019 Sakha's budgetary performance
will remain average, with operating balances below 5% of
operating revenues.  Although S&P expects revenue performance
will be supported by some recovery in economic growth in Russia
and a more stable ruble exchange rate, it will likely be
negatively affected by a 1% decrease in the redistribution share
of the corporate profit tax (CPT) and only modest growth of
federal grants that represent approximately one-third of Sakha's
revenues.

At the same time, S&P assumes that financial management will
implement cost containment measures, including the reduction of
subsidies to lower budget levels, savings on procurement, and
cuts in maintenance and repair expenditures, resulting in
operating spending growth staying below the national inflation
rate, on average, in the coming three years.  This will be
supported by the easing of requirements under the 2012
presidential decrees to increase social spending and will be in
line with the federal requirements with regards to budgetary
discipline, which have tightened in the past few years following
weaker budgetary performance at the federal level.  Sakha will
also need to consolidate its budget to continue benefiting from
low interest budget loans because they come from the federal
government, with the condition that the region maintains low
deficits and debt.  The deficit after capital accounts is likely
to stay at a modest 3% of total revenues on average in 2017-2019,
in S&P's view.

Moderate deficits after capital accounts will translate into tax-
supported debt gradually expanding to about 40% of consolidated
operating revenues by year-end 2019.  S&P's estimates of tax-
supported debt factor in direct debt, guarantees, which the
region regularly issues, and the debt of non-self-supporting
government-related entities (GREs).  Given Sakha's established
track record, S&P expects it will continue issuing regularly and
obtaining bank loans.

In S&P's view, Sakha's contingent liabilities will remain
moderate.  While Sakha's numerous GREs provide vital services and
frequently require capital injections and budget loans, S&P
estimates that in 2017 Sakha might need to provide between 10%
and 15% of its operating revenues to them, a moderate level by
international comparison.

S&P views Sakha's financial management as weak in an
international context, as S&P do for most Russian local and
regional governments (LRGs).  This is mainly due to weak long-
term financial planning and a limited ability to manage external
risks, such as a potential sharp correction in the world
commodity markets.  At the same time, its debt management is more
cautious than the Russian average.

                              LIQUIDITY

S&P considers Sakha's liquidity to be adequate.  The republic's
average cash reserves net of the deficit after capital accounts,
together with available credit facilities will cover debt service
falling due within the next 12 months by more than 120%.  Along
with confirmed access to low interest budget loans from the
federal government, Sakha will have to rely on access to market
borrowing in order to refinance its maturing debt in 2017-2019.
In line with other Russian LRGs, S&P views Sakha's access to
external liquidity as limited, given the weaknesses of the
domestic capital markets.

In S&P's base-case scenario, it assumes that in the next 12
months, Sakha's cash, including cash the government can
temporarily borrow from its budgetary units, net of the deficit
after capital accounts, will equal Russian ruble (RUB) 8 billion
(about $142.4 million at the time of publication) on average.
This will cover only about 80% of debt service falling due within
the next 12 months.

However, S&P expects that in 2017-2019, Sakha will continue to
rely on medium- to long-term borrowings (bonds and bank credit
facilities) for refinancing and liquidity purposes, which it
usually organizes during the budget year, well ahead of debt
maturity dates.  S&P understands that the government plans to
contract a new RUB4.2 billion medium-term bank credit facility
and place a new RUB5 billion bond in the first half of 2017.  S&P
anticipates that the region will receive RUB2.8 billion in low
interest budget loans provided by the federal government to LRGs,
for refinancing part of its maturing commercial debt.

                              OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that in the next 12 months
in addition to retaining access to federal budget loans, Sakha
will secure credit facilities on time for refinancing and
liquidity purposes and keep sufficient free cash to maintain
adequate liquidity.

S&P could take a negative rating action if, over the next 12
months, Sakha failed to secure a sufficient amount of credit
facilities or if the deficit after capital accounts was
materially higher than S&P currently expects, so that average
cash together with available facilities no longer exceeded 120%
of debt service. This could lead S&P to revise its view of
Sakha's liquidity downward to less than adequate.

S&P could take a positive rating action within the next 12 months
if stronger revenue performance, together with budget austerity
measures, enabled Sakha to structurally improve its budgetary
performance and gradually decrease tax-supported debt to less
than 30% of operating revenues.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                               Rating
                               To                From
Sakha (Republic of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency   BB/Stable/--      BB/Stable/--
  Russia National Scale        ruAA/--/--        ruAA/--/--
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency               BB                BB
  Russia National Scale        ruAA              ruAA



===========
S E R B I A
===========


MERCATOR: Coka Files Bankruptcy Petition for Serbian Unit
---------------------------------------------------------
Gordana Filipovic at Bloomberg News reports that Coka Holding
filed request to Commercial Court in Novi Sad to initiate a
bankruptcy procedure over Mercator's unit in Serbia for unpaid
debts.

"We are urging the management of Mercator and Agrokor to honor
their liabilities or they will have electricity switched off in
all their shops," Bloomberg quotes Coka General Manager Boban
Rajic as saying in a phone interview from Smederevo.
"Electricity was cut off briefly [Thurs]day in 10 of their shops
and they were switched back on after promising to pay the debt
within seven days."

                        About Mercator

Mercator is a Slovenian multinational retail corporation in the
Central/Southeast Europe. Apart from selling products of renowned
national and international companies, Mercator also operates its
own brand of various foods, drinks, and household products sold
at discount prices.



=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT CAJAGRANADA I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to CC
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has raised its credit rating on AyT
CajaGranada Hipotecario I, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos'
class A notes.  At the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on
the class B and C notes, and affirmed S&P's rating on the class D
notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received as
of the December 2016 investor report.  S&P's analysis reflects
the application of its European residential loans criteria, S&P's
structured finance ratings above the sovereign (RAS) criteria,
and its current counterparty criteria.

The class B, C, and D notes feature interest deferral triggers of
11.0%, 7.0%, and 5.5%, based on cumulative defaults as a
percentage of the closing portfolio balance, respectively.  The
current level of cumulative defaults has increased to 6.59% from
4.18% at our Oct. 31, 2014, review.  S&P expects cumulative
defaults to increase further, leading to the class C trigger
being breached within the next six months.

Credit enhancement, considering performing collateral only, for
the class A notes has increased to 23.28%, from 22.11% at S&P's
previous review, due to the sequential amortization.  Over the
same period, credit enhancement for the class B, C, and D notes
has decreased due to increasing defaults in the portfolio.  The
class C and D notes are currently undercollateralized and the
reserve fund is fully depleted.

Class         Available credit enhancement,
              excluding defaulted loans (%)

A             23.28
B             2.15
C             (7.53)
D             (9.29)

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days, at 4.11%, are on
average higher for this transaction than S&P's Spanish
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) index.  Defaults
are defined as mortgage loans in arrears for more than 18 months
in this transaction.  Cumulative defaults, at 6.59%, are also
higher than in other Spanish RMBS transactions that S&P rates.
Although it is performing worse than S&P's Spanish RMBS index, it
has observed a significant decrease in delinquencies and periodic
defaults since 2014 for this transaction.  Prepayment levels
remain low and the transaction is unlikely to pay down
significantly in the near term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's European residential loans criteria, its
credit analysis results show a decrease in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and in the weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) for each rating level due to lower weighted-
average original and current loan-to-value, more seasoning, lower
arrears, and lower repossession market value decline in Spain.

Rating level     WAFF      WALS     CC
                (%)        (%)      (%)
AAA             26.18      31.13    8.15
AA              21.04      27.25    5.73
A               17.27      20.06    3.46
BBB             13.10      16.35    2.14
BB              9.85       13.84    1.36
B               8.51       11.63    0.99

CC--Credit coverage.

Following the application of S&P's relevant criteria, it has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria, (ii) the rating as capped by S&P's current
counterparty criteria, and (iii) the rating that the class of
notes can attain under S&P's European residential loans criteria.

Under S&P's current counterparty criteria, Cecabank S.A. as the
swap provider, cannot support a rating on the notes that is
higher than 'BBB', which is S&P's long-term issuer credit rating
(ICR) on Cecabank.  S&P has therefore performed its credit and
cash flow analysis without giving benefit to the swap provider to
determine if the class A and B notes could achieve a higher
rating when giving no benefit to the swap provider.  Following
S&P's analysis, it has delinked its ratings on the class A and B
notes from the long-term ICR on Cecabank.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

The class A notes benefit from flows diverted from the class D
notes following the interest deferral trigger breach and from
increased credit enhancement.  S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis indicates that the class A notes now have sufficient
credit enhancement to withstand its stresses at the 'AAA' rating
level without giving credit to the swap contract.  However, S&P's
RAS criteria cap its ratings in this transaction at four notches
above S&P's 'BBB+' long-term rating on the Kingdom of Spain.  S&P
has therefore raised to 'AA- (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' its rating on
the class A notes.

S&P's analysis also indicates that the class B notes have
sufficient credit enhancement to withstand its stresses at the
'B+' rating level.  Under S&P's rating definitions criteria, an
obligor rated 'B' is more vulnerable than obligors rated 'BB',
but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial
commitments.  Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions
will likely impair the obligor's capacity or willingness to meet
its financial commitments.  Additionally, credit enhancement has
decreased since October 2014 to 2.15% from 6.44% for this class
of notes.  At the same time, the class B notes are very sensitive
to recoveries in S&P's cash flow model.  Given the low pool
factor of 28.04%, the class B notes could be negatively affected
by the tail risk related to negative selection in the pool.
Consequently, S&P has lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its
rating on the class B notes.

The class C notes do not pass any of S&P's stresses under its
cash flow analysis.  S&P expects the class C notes' interest
deferral trigger to be breached in the next six months, resulting
in interest shortfalls for this class of notes.  Therefore, in
accordance with S&P's criteria, it has lowered to 'CC (sf)' from
'CCC (sf)' S&P's rating on the class C notes.

S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class D notes as they
continue to miss interest payments.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its European
residential loans criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases
these assumptions on its expectation of modest economic growth,
continuing high unemployment, and house prices stabilization
during 2017.

AyT CajaGranada Hipotecario I is a Spanish RMBS transaction,
which closed in June 2007.  The transaction securitizes a pool of
first-ranking mortgage loans Caja de Ahorros de Granada (now
Banca Mare Nostrum) originated.  The mortgage loans are mainly
located in the region of Andalusia and the transaction comprises
loans granted to Spanish residents.

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

AyT CajaGranada Hipotecario I Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR400 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

A           AA- (sf)          A- (sf)

Ratings Lowered

B           B+ (sf)           BB (sf)
C           CC (sf)           CCC (sf)

Rating Affirmed

D           D (sf)


AYT GENOVA VIII: S&P Affirms B Rating on Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took various credit rating actions in nine
Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions, comprising of loans originated by Barclays Bank
S.A.U., and serviced by Caixabank S.A. (which acquired Barclays
Bank S.A.U. in May 2015).

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Affirmed its ratings on the class A notes in AyT Genova
      Hipotecario II, III, and IV, the class A2 notes in AyT
      Genova Hipotecario VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI, the class
      B notes in AyT Genova Hipotecario VI, VII, VIII, IX, and
      XI, the class C notes in AyT Genova Hipotecario VII, VIII,
      and IX and the class D notes in AyT Genova Hipotecario VI,
      VIII, IX, and X; and

   -- Raised S&P's ratings on the class B notes in AyT Genova
      Hipotecario II, III, IV, and X, the class C notes in AyT
      Genova Hipotecario VI, X, and XI, and the class D notes in
      AyT Genova Hipotecario XI.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that it has received and
reflect each of the transactions' structural features, and the
application of S&P's relevant criteria.

"In our opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential mortgage
and real estate market is not benign and we have therefore
increased our expected 'B' foreclosure frequency assumption to
3.33% from 2.00%, when we apply our European residential loans
criteria, to reflect this view.  We base these assumptions on our
expectation that economic growth will mildly deteriorate,
unemployment will remain high, and the increase in house prices
will slow down in 2017 and 2018," S&P said.

Total delinquencies in all of the Genova transactions have
declined and have remained well below S&P's Spanish RMBS index
since its review in Q4 2014.

Cumulative defaults are also lower than in other Spanish RMBS
transactions that S&P rates.  The reserve funds in each
transaction are at their required level, except for Genova III,
X, and XI, although the levels exceed those reported in our Q4
2014 review.

CaixaBank S.A. (BBB/Positive/A-2) has a standardized, integrated,
and centralized servicing platform.  It is a servicer for a large
number of Spanish RMBS transactions, and the Genova transactions
have historically outperformed S&P's Spanish RMBS index.  S&P
believes that these factors should contribute to the likely lower
cost of replacing the servicer, and S&P has therefore applied a
lower floor to the stressed servicing fee, at 35 basis points
(bps) instead of 50 bps in S&P's cash flow analysis, in line with
table 74 of S&P's European residential loans criteria.

In error, S&P did not disclose its use of this lower stress in
the surveillance updates S&P has published on these transactions
since 2014.  Applying a lower servicing stress has been S&P's
approach since 2014 when it determined that, consistent with its
criteria for rating certain other European RMBS transactions
which exhibit similarly strong asset performance and servicing
platforms, S&P could apply a lower servicing fee stress in its
cash flow analyses for certain Spanish RMBS transactions, which
meet certain specified conditions.  S&P clarified this approach
in its updated European residential loans criteria and in this
surveillance update.

After applying S&P's European residential loans criteria, its
credit analysis shows a decrease in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequencies (WAFF) for each rating level in each
transaction due to lower arrears and the higher seasoning of the
pools.  Although the current loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and
market value decline assumptions S&P applied to each transaction
have decreased, the weighted-average loss severities (WALS) that
S&P used in its cash flow analysis generally increased.  This was
mainly due to the application of S&P's adjustments required under
paragraph 84 of our European residential loans criteria to meet
the minimum projected losses.

The notes are amortizing pro rata in all transactions, except in
Genova III, X, and XI.  Based on the transactions' historical
performance, S&P expects the notes to continue to amortize pro
rata until the transactions reach a 10% pool factor (the
outstanding collateral balance as a proportion of the original
collateral balance), when amortization will switch back to
sequential.  Credit enhancement is increasing in Genova II, III,
IV, and VI as their reserve funds have reached their required
levels and cannot amortize further.

Borrowers currently pay collections into a collection bank
account held with CaixaBank.  If CaixaBank were to become
insolvent, mortgage collection amounts in the collection account
may become part of its bankruptcy estate.  Therefore, in addition
to the cash flow stresses outlined in S&P's European residential
loans criteria, it has also applied a commingling loss stress in
its cash flow analysis, which considered the level of prepayments
S&P has observed in the Genova transactions in certain scenarios.

Societe Generale S.A. (Madrid) Branch (unrated) is the issuer
account bank provider for Genova II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, and
IX.  S&P do not rate this entity; however, under its bank branch
criteria, S&P derives its rating by relying on the rating on the
parent company, Societe Generale.  S&P considers the issuer
account bank replacement language in these transactions to be in
line with S&P's current counterparty criteria.  CaixaBank is the
issuer account bank provider for Genova X and XI.  Under these
criteria, the issuer account bank replacement language for these
transactions is only able to support a maximum rating of 'A-
(sf)', hence S&P's ratings are capped at 'A- (sf)'.

Between December 2016 and January 2017, Banco Santander, S.A.
(A-/Positive/A-2) replaced Barclays Bank S.A.U. as swap
counterparty in all nine transactions.  Each transaction's hedge
agreement mitigates basis risk arising from the different indexes
between the securitized assets and the notes.  In the swap
documentation, Banco Santander will only take remedies to support
the current ratings on the notes.  As Banco Santander is not
currently posting collateral for the Genova III and IV
transactions, S&P's current counterparty criteria cap the ratings
on the class A notes in Genova III and IV at their current rating
levels.

Under S&P's structured finance ratings above the sovereign
criteria (RAS criteria), S&P applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

Following the application of S&P's relevant criteria, it has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under S&P's European residential loans criteria.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis, the application of its criteria, and the transactions'
counterparties, S&P considers that the current available credit
enhancement for certain classes of notes is commensurate with
higher rating levels than those currently assigned.  For these
classes of notes, S&P has raised its ratings.  For those classes
of notes for which S&P considers the current available credit
enhancement to be commensurate with the currently assigned
ratings, S&P has affirmed those ratings.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 8% for one-year and three-year
horizons, for 30-90 days arrears and 90+ days arrears.  This did
not result in S&P's ratings deteriorating below the maximum
projected deterioration that S&P would associate with each
relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's credit stability
criteria.

Genova II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI are Spanish RMBS
transactions backed by pools of first-ranking mortgages secured
over owner-occupied residential properties in Spain. Barclays
Bank S.A.U. originated the underlying collateral between May 1989
and December 2007.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To               From

AyT Genova Hipotecario II Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR800 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Bonds

Rating Affirmed

A           AA+ (sf)

Rating Raised

B           A+ (sf)           BBB- (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario III Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR800 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Bonds

Rating Affirmed

A           AA (sf)

Rating Raised

B           A (sf)            BBB- (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario IV Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR800 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Bonds

Rating Affirmed

A           AA (sf)

Rating Raised

B           BBB+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario VI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR700 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Bonds

Ratings Affirmed

A2          AA+ (sf)
B           AA- (sf)
D           B (sf)

Ratings Raised

C           BBB+ (sf)         BBB- (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario VII Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR1.4 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Bonds

Ratings Affirmed

A2          AA+ (sf)
B           AA- (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario VIII Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR2.1 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Bonds

Ratings Affirmed

A2          AA+ (sf)
B           AA- (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)
D           B (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario IX Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR1 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Bonds

Ratings Affirmed

A2          AA+ (sf)
B           BBB+ (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)
D           B (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario X Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR1.05 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Bonds

Ratings Affirmed

A2          A- (sf)
D           B- (sf)

Ratings Raised

B           A- (sf)           BBB- (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)         BB- (sf)

AyT Genova Hipotecario XI Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR1.2 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Bonds

Ratings Affirmed

A2          A- (sf)
B           A- (sf)

Ratings Raised

C           A- (sf)            BBB (sf)
D           BBB (sf)           BB- (sf)


BANKINTER 10: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings took various credit rating actions in
Bankinter 3, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria, Bankinter 4,
Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria, Bankinter 5, Fondo de
Titulizacion Hipotecaria, Bankinter 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de
Activos, Bankinter 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos, Bankinter
10, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos, Bankinter 11, Fondo de
Titulizacion Hipotecaria, and Bankinter 13, Fondo de Titulizacion
de Activos.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Affirmed its ratings on all classes of Bankinter 3 and
      Bankinter 6's notes; Bankinter 4's class B and C notes;
      Bankinter 8's class A notes;

   -- Bankinter 10's class A2, D, and E notes; Bankinter 11's
      class A2 and D notes; and Bankinter 13's class A2 and E
      notes.  Raised S&P's ratings on all classes of Bankinter
      5's notes; Bankinter 4's class A notes, Bankinter 8, 10,
      and 11's class B and C notes; and

   -- Bankinter 13's class B, C, and D notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that it has received and
reflect each of the transactions' structural features, and the
application of S&P's relevant criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its European
residential loans criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases
these assumptions on its expectation that economic growth will
mildly deteriorate, unemployment will remain high, and the
increase in house prices will slow down in 2017 and 2018.

Delinquencies have decreased since S&P's previous full reviews in
Q1 2015 and are well below S&P's Spanish residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) index.

Bankinter S.A. (BBB/Positive/A-2) has a standardized, integrated,
and centralized servicing platform.  It is a servicer for a large
number of Spanish RMBS transactions, and the historical
performance of the Bankinter transactions has outperformed S&P's
Spanish RMBS index.  S&P believes that these factors should
contribute to the likely lower cost of replacing the servicer,
and have therefore applied a lower floor to the stressed
servicing fee, at 35 basis points (bps) instead of 50 bps in
S&P's cash flow analysis, in line with table 74 of S&P's European
residential loans criteria.

In error, S&P did not disclose its use of this lower stress in
the surveillance updates S&P has published on these transactions
since 2014.  Applying a lower servicing stress has been S&P's
approach since 2014 when it determined that, consistent with its
criteria for rating certain other European RMBS transactions
which exhibit similarly strong asset performance and servicing
platforms, S&P could apply a lower servicing fee stress in its
cash flow analyses for certain Spanish RMBS transactions, which
meet certain specified conditions.  S&P clarified this approach
in its updated European residential loans criteria and in this
surveillance update.

S&P's credit analysis results in all transactions have improved
due to the higher seasoning of the pools, the transactions'
performance, and the lower current loan-to-value (LTV) ratios.

In all eight transactions, the notes are amortizing pro rata.
Based on their historical behavior, S&P expects they will
continue to do so (except for Bankinter 3 and 4, which will
continue to amortize pro rata until the legal maturity of the
funds).  In these two transactions, the pro rata amortization
only occurs between the class A and B notes, until the
transactions reach a 10% pool factor (the outstanding collateral
balance as a proportion of the original collateral balance), when
amortization will switch back to sequential.  Credit enhancement
is increasing in Bankinter 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 as their reserve
funds have reached their required levels and cannot amortize
further.

Bankinter is the swap counterparty for Bankinter 3 and 4, and
Credit Agricole Corporate And Investment Bank (A/Stable/A-1) is
the swap provider for Bankinter 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 13.  Each
transaction's hedge agreement mitigates basis risk arising from
the different indexes between the securitized assets and the
notes.  S&P does not consider the replacement language in the
swap agreements of these transactions to be in line with S&P's
current counterparty criteria.  Under S&P's current counterparty
criteria, it gives benefit to the swap in its analysis at rating
levels up to its long-term issuer-credit rating (ICR) on the
corresponding swap counterparty, plus one notch.  In S&P's
analysis, it do not give benefit to the swap at rating levels
above one notch higher than our long-term ICR on the swap
counterparties.  At these levels, S&P models the basis risk as
unhedged.

Under S&P's structured finance ratings above the sovereign
criteria (RAS criteria), it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

Following the application of S&P's relevant criteria, it has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under its European residential loans criteria.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its weighted-average
foreclosure frequency assumptions by assuming additional arrears
of 8% for one-year and three-year horizons, for 30-90 days
arrears, and 90+ days arrears.  This did not result in S&P's
ratings deteriorating below the maximum projected deterioration
that it would associate with each relevant rating level, as
outlined in S&P's credit stability criteria.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis, the application of S&P's criteria, and the
transactions' counterparties, it considers that the current
available credit enhancement for certain classes of notes is
commensurate with higher rating levels than those currently
assigned.  For these classes of notes, S&P has raised its
ratings.  For those classes of notes for which S&P considers the
current available credit enhancement to be commensurate with the
currently assigned ratings, S&P has affirmed those ratings.

Bankinter 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 13 are Spanish RMBS
transactions, which closed between October 2001 and November
2006. Bankinter originated the pools, which comprise loans
granted to prime borrowers secured over owner-occupied
residential properties in Spain.  Bankinter 11 securitizes a
residential mortgage-lending product called Hipoteca SIN, which
comprises flexible loans that allow borrowers, with Bankinter's
approval, to take payment holidays, make additional draws, and
increase the term of their loans.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To               From

Bankinter 3 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR1.323 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A           AA+ (sf)
B           AA- (sf)
C           BBB (sf)

Bankinter 4 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR1.025 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

A           AA+ (sf)         AA- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B           AA- (sf)
C           B- (sf)

Bankinter 5 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR710 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A           AA- (sf)         A+ (sf)
B           A+ (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)

Bankinter 6 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.35 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A           AA+ (sf)
B           BBB+ (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)

Bankinter 8 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.07 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B           A (sf)           BBB+ (sf)
C           BBB- (sf)        BB (sf)

Rating Affirmed

A           AA+ (sf)

Bankinter 10 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.74 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B           A (sf)           BBB+ (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)         BB (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A2          AA+ (sf)
D           B- (sf)
E           CCC- (sf)

Bankinter 11 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR900 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B           AA- (sf)         A+ (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)        BB+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A2          AA+ (sf)
D           B- (sf)

Bankinter 13 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.57 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B           A+ (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
C           BBB (sf)         BB (sf)
D           B+ (sf)          B- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A2          AA+ (sf)
E           D (sf)


HC INVESTMENTS: Moody's Withdraws B2 Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B2 corporate family
rating and the B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) rating
of HC Investments S.a.r.l. (Quironsalud). At the time of the
withdrawal, the ratings were under review for upgrade.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions follow the closing of the acquisition of
Quironsalud by Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA (rated Baa3, stable) on
January 31, 2017 and the consequent repayment of outstanding
debt.

Moody's has withdrawn the ratings for reorganisation reasons.

Headquartered in Madrid, Quironsalud is the leading private
operator of hospitals in Spain. With a staff of c. 35,000
employees it manages a network of 44 hospitals, 39 outpatient
centres and around 300 occupational risk prevention centres
throughout Spain, with a presence in cities including Madrid,
Barcelona, Valencia, Sevilla, Zaragoza, Palma de Mallorca and
Malaga.


TDA IBERCAJA 7: S&P Raises Rating on Class B Notes to BB
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on TDA Ibercaja 7,
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class A and B notes.  At the
same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class C
notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that it has received and
reflect the transaction's structural features, and the
application of S&P's relevant criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its European
residential loans criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases
these assumptions on its expectation that economic growth will
mildly deteriorate, unemployment will remain high, and the
increase in house prices will slow down in 2017 and 2018.

Delinquencies have been historically low, remaining most of the
time at below 2.5% of the portfolio's outstanding balance.
Cumulative defaults are below 2.0% of the portfolio's closing
balance, well below S&P's Spanish residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) index.

Ibercaja Banco S.A. (BB+/Positive/B) has a standardized,
integrated, and centralized servicing platform.  It is a servicer
for a large number of Spanish RMBS transactions, and the
historical performance of the Ibercaja transactions has
outperformed S&P's Spanish RMBS index.  S&P believes that these
factors should contribute to the likely lower cost of replacing
the servicer, and S&P has therefore applied a lower floor to the
stressed servicing fee, at 35 basis points (bps) instead of 50
bps in our cash flow analysis, in line with table 74 of S&P's
European residential loans criteria.

In error, S&P did not disclose its use of this lower stress since
2016 in the surveillance update S&P published on this transaction
in January 2016.  Applying a lower servicing stress has been
S&P's approach since 2014 when it determined that, consistent
with its criteria for rating certain other European RMBS
transactions which exhibit similarly strong asset performance and
servicing platforms, S&P could apply a lower servicing fee stress
in its cash flow analyses for certain Spanish RMBS transactions,
which meet certain specified conditions.  S&P clarified this
approach in its updated European residential loans criteria and
in this surveillance update.

S&P's credit analysis results have improved since its previous
review.  This is due to the higher seasoning of the pool and the
lower current loan-to-value (LTV) ratio.

The notes are amortizing sequentially, increasing the
transaction's available credit enhancement.  The reserve fund has
been subject to slight draws, and totals 99% of its required
amount.

Banco Santander S.A. is the swap counterparty.  The hedge
agreement mitigates basis risk arising from the different indexes
between the securitized assets and the notes.  The swap
counterparty pays to the issuer three-month Euro Interbank
Offered Rate (EURIBOR) over the balance that the issuer receives,
plus a margin of 65 bps, plus the servicing fees (if the servicer
is replaced).  Under S&P's current counterparty criteria, it
gives benefit to this swap counterparty in its analysis at rating
levels up to S&P's long-term issuer-credit rating (ICR) on the
corresponding swap counterparty.  At higher levels, S&P models
the basis risk as unhedged.

Under S&P's structured finance ratings above the sovereign
criteria (RAS criteria), S&P applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

Following the application of S&P's relevant criteria, it has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under S&P's European residential loans criteria.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its weighted-average
foreclosure frequency assumptions by assuming additional arrears
of 8% for one-year and three-year horizons, for 30-90 days
arrears, and 90+ days arrears.  This did not result in S&P's
ratings deteriorating below the maximum projected deterioration
that S&P would associate with each relevant rating level, as
outlined in S&P's credit stability criteria.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis, the application of its criteria, and the transaction's
counterparties, S&P considers that the class A notes are able to
withstand stresses at six notches above the rating on the
sovereign without giving benefit to the swap counterparty.
Therefore, S&P's rating on the class A notes is delinked from its
long-term ICR on Banco Santander.  The available credit
enhancement for the class B notes is commensurate with a higher
rating than that currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised
its ratings on these classes of notes.  S&P has affirmed its 'D
(sf)' rating on the class C notes because it continues to
experience interest shortfalls.

TDA Ibercaja 7 is a Spanish RMBS transaction, which closed in
December 2009.  Ibercaja Banco originated the pool, which
comprises loans granted to prime borrowers secured over
residential properties in Spain.

RATINGS LIST

Class             Rating
            To               From

TDA Ibercaja 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR2.07 Billion Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A           AA+ (sf)         AA- (sf)
B           BB (sf)          BB- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

C           D (sf)



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


PLATINUM BANK: Declared Insolvent by NBU
----------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the National Bank of Ukraine on
Feb. 23 decided to accept a proposal by the Individuals Deposit
Guarantee Fund to annul the banking license of Kyiv-based
Platinum Bank and liquidate it.

The NBU decided to declare Platinum Bank insolvent due to the
fact that as of January 1, 2017, the bank had not reached the
positive value of capital, Interfax-Ukraine relates.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, the NBU said that 97% (197,000
people) of all the depositors of the Platinum Bank will get back
their deposits in full, because their volume doesn't exceed
UAH200,000 -- the maximum amount of individual deposits
guaranteed by the Individual Deposit Guarantee Fund.  All in all,
the fund will ensure payments of guaranteed amount of deposits to
the tune of UAH4.8 billion, Interfax-Ukraine discloses.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BRIGHTHOUSE GROUP: Moody's Lowers CFR to Caa2, Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the corporate family
rating (CFR) of BrightHouse Group PLC to Caa2 from B3. The
outlook on all ratings is negative.

The rating action reflects the following drivers:

- High leverage and continued deterioration in operating
   performance, leading to concerns over the sustainability of
   the capital structure

- Increased risks of debt restructuring and potential default in
   view of approaching debt maturity in May 2018

- Uncertainty over further regulatory measures

Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded the rating of BrightHouses's
GBP220 million senior secured notes due 2018 to Caa2 from B3 and
probability of default rating (PDR) to Caa2-PD from B3-PD. The
rating action on the instrument reflect Moody's assessment of the
risks of a restructuring of the group's debt, and likely
recoveries in the context of the company's refinancing capacity
and valuation.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The Caa2 CFR reflects BrightHouse's (i) high leverage of 7.3x LTM
December 2016 leading to concerns over the sustainability of the
capital structure; (ii) refinancing risk related to its notes due
in May 2018; (iii) uncertainty over the company's future
operations as the industry continues to be under intense
regulatory scrutiny with the potential for further regulatory
action.

More positively the rating reflects BrightHouse's: (i) continued
cash flow generation attributable to a reduction in purchase of
rental assets and working capital release driven by lower
business activities; (ii) well-established leading position in
the UK rent-to-own market supported by 311 branches over the UK
(as of December 2016).

For the first 9 months to December 2016, BrightHouse reported
revenues of GBP249 million, a decline of -9.7% from the previous
year. EBITDA (as reported by the company) decreased from GBP40
million to GBP12 million (-69%) whilst EBITDA margin fell to 4.9%
from 14.4%. The decline in profitability is largely due to the
significant reduction in its overall customer base that is
impacted by the stricter customer acceptance criteria and more
rigorous sign up procedures imposed by the FCA. The company also
suffered from the temporary suspension of late fees charged to
customers, higher compliance costs, enlarged fixed costs
following store expansion, ongoing price deflation on its
products and shift in sales mix towards more short-term
technology products, all of which has led to a significant margin
squeeze. To alleviate some of the pressure on the signup for new
products, the company has invested in improving customer
application processes via automation, as well as in improving
payments and call centre processes. The company has also recently
announced the closure of 28 stores out of its 311 existing stores
as part of its plan to cut costs and deliver a lower cost
operating model.

As of December 31, 2016, leverage on a Moody's-adjusted basis was
7.3x and Moody's expects it to rise towards 10x by the financial
year-end March 2017. This calculation is based on EBITDA after
rental assets depreciation, which is more in line with the
management's own measure of EBITDA

High leverage combined with significant debt maturity arising in
2018 may limit the window of opportunity for a refinancing and
increase the likelihood of a financial restructuring. In the
event of a wider restructuring Moody's considers that impairments
could arise for bondholders and lead to a default being declared
under Moody's definitions of defaults and distressed exchanges.

Rating outlook

The negative outlook reflects Moody's view that there may be a
material deterioration in trading results, with leverage further
elevated although with no immediate liquidity concerns prior to
the debt maturity.

Factors that could lead to an upgrade/downgrade

There remains limited near term potential for an upgrade in view
of the continued high leverage. However there could be upward
pressure on the ratings if risks of a restructuring event reduce,
and if there is an improvement in operating performance.

A rating downgrade could occur as a result of a deterioration in
one, or a combination of the following: (i) negative impact from
regulatory measures; (ii) BrightHouse's liquidity position; (iii)
the group's operating margins; or (iv) its cash flow generation.
A downgrade could also occur if there are increased risks of a
restructuring of the company's debt and / or lower expected
recoveries.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Retail
Industry published in October 2015.

Corporate Profile

BrightHouse Group PLC, based in Watford, is a leader in the rent-
to-own market in the United Kingdom, with 311 stores as of 31
December 2016. For the last twelve months ended 31 December 2016,
the company reported revenues of GBP344 million.


GJD RESTAURANTS: In Liquidation, Six Outlets Cease Trading
----------------------------------------------------------
John Mulgrew at Belfast Telegraph reports that a voluntary
winding-up order has been issued for GJD Restaurants Ltd., the
company behind a chain of healthy eating restaurants that has now
closed six of its eight outlets.

Slim's Healthy Kitchen, set up by Gary McIldowney in 2013 after
the former electrician underwent a dramatic weight loss, pulled
down the shutters at its Victoria Square premises in Belfast city
center and five other locations, Belfast Telegraph relates.

Nicholas McKeague -- nicky@mckeaguemorgan.com -- of McKeague
Morgan & Company has now been appointed liquidator of GJD
Restaurants, Belfast Telegraph discloses.

The firm was appointed on Feb. 22 following the first meeting of
creditors, Belfast Telegraph relays.

The Belfast Telegraph revealed that Slim's Kitchen had shut the
majority of its eateries.

It is understood around 30 people were employed across the closed
outlets, Belfast Telegraph notes.


RUSSELL PAYNE: Enters Administration, RSM Names as Administrators
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Paul Whitelam at LincolnshireLive reports that Russell Payne & Co
Ltd., a well-known Lincoln firm of accountants, has gone into
administration.  The move follows a winding up petition received
from Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC).

Founded in 1989, the firm is now being managed by administrators
based in Nottingham, LincolnshireLive discloses.

Patrick Ellward -- patrick.ellward@rsmuk.com -- and Dilip Dattani
-- dilip.dattani@rsmuk.com -- of RMS Restructuring Advisory LLP
were appointed joint administrators of Russell Payne on February
16, 2017.

The Company has a turnover of GBP1.1 million and 25 staff.

The joint administrators were said to have sought offers through
February 24, according to the report.  Interested parties were
invited to contact RMS's Nick Robinson -- nick.robinson@rsmuk.com

Russell Payne & Co, based at Landmark House in Riseholme Road,
provides accountancy, business consultancy and IT services to
small and medium sized businesses and runs the popular Bootcamp
for Business.


TOR HOMES: Contractual Dispute Prompts Administration
-----------------------------------------------------
Steven Rae at Evening Telegraph reports that Dundee construction
firm Tor Homes has gone bust just months after completing a major
housing project in the city.

The firm, which is registered in Edinburgh but lists its
principal trading address as Eastern Residences, was put into
administration on Feb. 13, Evening Telegraph relates.

Administrators told Evening Telegraph that an "ongoing
contractual dispute resulted in trading and cash flow problems"
and led to Tor Homes going bust.

The company completed the Eastern Residences last August, with
Thorntons Property acting as selling agent, Evening Telegraph
discloses.

Administrators said Thorntons was still acting as agents for
three of the apartments, with 24 now purchased, Evening Telegraph
notes.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2017.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *