/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/170105.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R E U R O P E Thursday, January 5, 2017, Vol. 18, No. 004 Headlines B E L A R U S MINSK CITY: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating B U L G A R I A NATSIONALNA ELEKTRICHESKA: S&P Keeps 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Neg. C R O A T I A ZAGREBACKI CITY: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable F R A N C E STX OFFSHORE: Fincantieri Named Preferred Bidder for French Unit VIVARTE SAS: Plans to Sell Lossmaking Andre Shoe Brand I T A L Y BANCO BPM: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Long Term Issuer Rating K A Z A K H S T A N KAZINVESTBANK: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'D/D' U K R A I N E DTEK ENERGO: Creditors Support Debt Conversion Proposal TRUST BANK: Nat'l Bank of Ukraine Opts to Liquidate Business U N I T E D K I N G D O M ALL LEISURE: Ceases Trading, Administrator Appointed ********* ============= B E L A R U S ============= MINSK CITY: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B-' Issuer Credit Rating ---------------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term issuer credit rating on the Belarusian City of Minsk. S&P subsequently withdrew the rating at issuer's request. At the time of withdrawal, the outlook was stable. As a "sovereign rating" (as defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 "EU CRA Regulation"), the ratings on Minsk are subject to certain publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation, including publication in accordance with S&P's pre- established calendar of 2016 sovereign, regional, and local government rating publication dates. Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for the deviation. In this case, the reason for the deviation is the issuer's request that S&P withdraw the rating. RATIONALE At the time of withdrawal, the rating on Minsk reflected S&P's long-term sovereign credit rating on the Republic of Belarus (B-/Stable/B). S&P assessed Minsk's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'b+'. The SACP is not a credit rating. Instead, it is a measure of a local or regional government's (LRG's) intrinsic creditworthiness, were the rating not constrained by the rating on the sovereign. The SACP results from the combination of S&P's assessment of an LRG's individual credit profile and the institutional framework in which it operates. S&P's view of Minsk's SACP reflected S&P's assessment of Belarus' very volatile and underfunded institutional framework for LRGs, which underpins the city's very weak budgetary flexibility, its weak economy by international standards, weak management, and high contingent liabilities. Factors supporting the rating were the city's very low debt burden, adequate liquidity, and average budgetary performance. At the time of withdrawal, the stable outlook on Minsk mirrored the outlook on Belarus. In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected in the Ratings Score Snapshot above. The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized in the above rationale and outlook. The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action. RATINGS LIST Rating To From Minsk (City of) Issuer Credit Rating Foreign and Local Currency B-/Stable/-- B-/Stable/-- Ratings Subsequently Withdrawn Minsk (City of) Issuer Credit Rating Foreign and Local Currency NR B-/Stable/-- NR--Not rated =============== B U L G A R I A =============== NATSIONALNA ELEKTRICHESKA: S&P Keeps 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Neg. ---------------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings kept its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating on the Bulgarian electricity company Natsionalna Elektricheska Kompania EAD (NEK) on CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P placed it on CreditWatch on Oct. 10, 2016. The CreditWatch reflects continued pressures on NEK's credit quality if the company's profits and cash flows remain weak, or if continuing electricity industry challenges diminish support from its parent Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH) to cover external debt payments. In December 2016, the Bulgarian government provided NEK with a EUR601.6 million loan and NEK used the proceeds to fully repay its litigation obligation to Atomstroyexport (ASE). The government loan is long term (seven years), has zero interest, and doesn't stipulate an event of default, but it is not subordinated to NEK's other debt; and if NEK manages to sell the nuclear assets received from ASE, it would need to prepay the government for its loan up to the amount received as sale proceeds in three days. Therefore, S&P treats it as debt, although it notes its favorable structure. Although the litigation issue has been resolved without impacting NEK's liquidity, the company's profitability and cash flow remain well below S&P's expectations, despite better supplier terms and the compensation of expenses via the Security of the Electricity System Fund established by the regulator. NEK continues to carry out the function of a public electricity provider in the country; and the electricity prices remain low. S&P do not expect any further material regulatory changes in the near term following the government's resignation in mid-November. S&P continues to see uncertainties regarding the ability of NEK and BEH to improve profitability and cash flow by early 2017. S&P continues to believe that NEK's financial position remains unsustainable in the long term and its stand-alone capacity to meet its financial obligations mainly depends on how quickly the recent changes in regulatory conditions will translate into positive cash flow generation. NEK's losses have reduced, but the company's EBITDA and funds from operations (FFO) remained negative in the first nine months of 2016. S&P's 'ccc+' assessment of NEK's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) therefore includes ongoing support from the parent. In particular, S&P understands most of NEK's debt is due to the parent. As of Sept. 30, 2016, more than 90% NEK's Bulgarian lev (BGN) 2.4 billion (EUR1.2 billion) debt is to BEH, and S&P understands that after Dec. 8, 2016, NEK's debt will also include EUR601.6 million of debt to the Bulgarian government. S&P continues to regard NEK as a strategically important subsidiary of BEH. S&P consequently factors in two notches of uplift from NEK's 'ccc+' SACP. S&P's rating on NEK is capped at one notch below the 'b+' group credit profile (GCP). Although S&P do not rate BEH, it factors its credit quality into its rating on NEK. S&P regards BEH as a government-related entity with moderate likelihood of extraordinary state support. S&P's assessment of BEH's GCP is 'b+', factoring in potential extraordinary state support. That said, in S&P's view, BEH's future credit quality could be affected if NEK's performance remains weak, or if NEK's liquidity issues erode BEH's standing on financial markets. In S&P's view, NEK should avoid default on its minimal external debt obligations over the next 12 months if it obtains timely financial support from BEH and from the government. If NEK fails to obtain such support, S&P may reassess its view on NEK's status in the group and with regard to the government. S&P views NEK's liquidity as weak, because of potential liquidity shortfalls in the next 12 months. S&P bases its assessment on the company's stand-alone liquidity arrangements. S&P understands that BEH is willing, and so far is able, to provide sufficient liquidity support to NEK in a timely manner. S&P understands that NEK continues to breach its current financial ratio covenant on some of its loans. S&P thinks there is a low risk of the loan maturities being accelerated, however, because most of the loans that have this covenant benefit from a government guarantee. The CreditWatch status reflects continued pressure on the rating if NEK's profitability and cash flow do not return to positive in early 2017, despite the recent regulatory reforms and improving supplier terms. In S&P's view, this could affect NEK's stand- alone credit quality, as well as S&P's view of the parent's credit quality and BEH's ability to continue to provide ongoing liquidity support to NEK. The CreditWatch also reflects risks to liquidity if NEK doesn't receive sufficient financial support from the government or BEH to cover its ongoing payments on external debt. S&P will reassess the situation within the next three months. S&P would likely lower the rating if NEK accumulates new power tariff deficits and continues to accumulate mounting overdue payables. S&P could also lower the rating in case of continuing liquidity pressures, or if parental support from BEH diminishes. S&P could affirm the rating if NEK demonstrates sustainable profits and cash flows, and continues to enjoy group support. ============= C R O A T I A ============= ZAGREBACKI CITY: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable ------------------------------------------------------ S&P Global Ratings revised its outlook on Croatian-based multi- utility Zagrebacki Holding d.o.o (ZGH) to stable from negative. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' long-term corporate credit rating on ZGH and S&P's 'BB-' issue rating on its senior unsecured debt. The outlook revision mirrors that on the rating on ZGH's parent, the City of Zagreb. It reflects S&P's view that Zagreb's ability to provide support to ZGH has stabilized. S&P considers ZGH to be a government-related entity (GRE), and believe there is a very high likelihood that Zagreb would provide extraordinary support to ZGH in the event of financial distress. This results in a two- notch uplift from the company's stand-alone credit profile (SACP), which S&P assess at 'b'. S&P do not foresee any material pressures on the SACP in the next one-to-two years. S&P continues to see ZGH's financial risk profile as aggressive. S&P thinks that the financial risk profile will be supported by funds from operations (FFO) to debt staying at about 12% in 2016- 2017, slightly improving thereafter, and an FFO interest coverage ratio of 3.0x-4.0x in the next two years. S&P's assessment of the business risk profile continues to reflect ZGH's weak regulatory environment, its poor operational performance (for instance, water leakage at ZGH's water-supply subsidiary amounts to about 50% of the total water supply), low profitability, and track record of inefficient decisions and negative returns. These weaknesses are offset by ZGH's monopoly position as a provider of public services; strong ongoing support from its owner via operating and capital subsidies; guarantees on some debt (which is repaid indirectly from the city's budget); and asset transfers. Overall, transfers from the city's budget make up almost 14% of the company's revenues and about 23% when taking financing, rents, and subsidies into account. The city's government determines the makeup of ZGH's management board, most tariffs for its regulated businesses, and its investment plan. S&P believes that ZGH is at the lower end of the weak business risk profile compared to its peers, notably with its weak operating efficiency. This also reflects its lack of strategic clarity about its future structure; S&P notes that the city, as the company's owner, has yet to develop a view on this matter. The stable outlook reflects that on ZGH's immediate parent, the City of Zagreb. It also reflects S&P's opinion that the company's SACP will remain at least at 'b'; this assumes in particular that ZGH will proactively manage its liquidity position to avoid any liquidity pressures and keep FFO to debt above 12%. S&P might downgrade ZGH if we were to downgrade Zagreb. Negative pressure on the rating might also build if S&P revises ZGH's SACP down by one notch. This might be driven by deterioration of liquidity or extensive debt accumulation because of higher capex than S&P assumes, a decrease in tariffs, structural reorganizations leading to a contraction of EBITDA or lower ongoing support from the city (in the form of subsidies and long-term receivables repayment), with FFO to debt falling below 12% without short-term recovery prospects. An upgrade is remote at this stage because S&P would have to raise the rating on Zagreb by two notches. S&P could also raise the rating on ZGH if S&P raises its SACP by three notches, but this is not likely. =========== F R A N C E =========== STX OFFSHORE: Fincantieri Named Preferred Bidder for French Unit ---------------------------------------------------------------- AFP reports that a South Korean court handling the bankruptcy of STX Offshore and Shipbuilding Co. said on Jan. 3 that Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri had been named preferred bidder for STX's profitable French unit. Judge Choi Ung-Young, who acts as a spokesman for the Seoul Central District Insolvency Court, told AFP the court reached the decision on Jan. 3. According to AFP, he said Fincantieri would now conduct field research on the shipyard and agree a price with the South Korean firm before signing a deal for a 66.6% stake. Fincantieri, Netherlands-based Damen Shipyards Group and French state-controlled naval shipbuilder DCNS had initially expressed interest in acquiring STX France, AFP notes. But the Italian shipbuilding giant was the sole bidder to submit a binding proposal last month, AFP recounts. Fincantieri later issued a brief statement confirming it had "been selected as the exclusive buyer" of a two-thirds stake in STX France, AFP relays. STX Offshore & Shipbuilding Co. Ltd. is a Korea-based company mainly engaged in the shipbuilding and offshore business. The company operates its business through five segments: merchant vessel, cruise, offshore and specialized vessel (OSV), vessel apparatus and other segment. VIVARTE SAS: Plans to Sell Lossmaking Andre Shoe Brand ------------------------------------------------------ According to Bloomberg News' David Whitehouse, Europe1, citing an unidentified person, reports on its Web site that Vivarte is likely to announce as soon as the end of January that it wants to sell its lossmaking Andre shoe brand. Europe1 says Vivarte is likely to have to pay to offload the brand, Bloomberg relates. As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 19, 2016, Bloomberg News related that the company won a waiver to terms of a EUR535 million (US$596 million) loan after terror attacks in Paris and warm winter weather hurt the company's earnings late last year. The company in 2014 was taken over by creditors who agreed to restructure EUR2.8 billion of loans after France's sluggish economy and high unemployment took its toll on earnings, Bloomberg disclosed. Vivarte SAS is a French fashion retailer. It owns brands including Kookai and Naf Naf. ========= I T A L Y ========= BANCO BPM: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Long Term Issuer Rating ------------------------------------------------------ Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following ratings to Banco BPM SpA (Banco BPM): (1) deposit ratings of Ba1/Not Prime; (2) a long-term issuer rating of Ba2;(3) a standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA of b1; and (4) Counterparty Risk Assessments (CR Assessment) of Ba1(cr)/Not Prime(cr). The outlook on the bank's long-term deposit rating is stable, and negative on the issuer rating. At the same time, Moody's has withdrawn the following ratings of Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa (Banco Popolare) and Banca Popolare di Milano S.C. a r.l. (BPM) which ceased to exist on 31 December 2016: (1) BCAs and adjusted BCAs of b1; (2) deposit ratings of Ba1/Not Prime; (3) issuer ratings of Ba2; (4) MTN ratings of (P)Ba2/(P)B2; and (5) CR Assessments of Ba1(cr)/Not Prime(cr). The ratings on debt instruments originally issued by Banco Popolare and BPM, which have all been assumed by Banco BPM, were affirmed. The rating action reflects the completion of the merger between Banco Popolare and BPM, which was approved on October 15, 2016, by the banks' shareholders. The merger became effective on January 1, 2017, after Banco Popolare and BPM transferred all of their assets and liabilities to the newly-created bank Banco BPM. Prior to this action, the ratings on Banco Popolare and BPM were aligned, already reflecting Moody's assessment of the credit profile of a combined Banco BPM. RATINGS RATIONALE --RATIONALE FOR BANCO BPM's STANDALONE BCA The b1 standalone BCA assigned to Banco BPM reflects Moody's view that the group's credit profile is constrained by the large stock of problem loans and weak profitability. The b1 BCA also reflects Banco BPM's relatively sound capital and liquidity position. Banco BPM displays very weak asset risk in view of its large stock of problem loans representing around 22% of gross loans at end- September 2016 (based on aggregated financials for Banco Popolare and BPM). This compares unfavourably with the most recently available Italian and European Union (EU) averages of 17.7% and 5.4% as at end-June 2016 respectively. Banco BPM is planning on reducing its stock of problem loans to 18% of nominal loans by 2019 through a combination of disposals and enhanced management of problematic exposures. Moody's also considers the group's asset risk to be constrained by the lower-than-average coverage of problem loans, which the rating agency estimated at 36% (excluding write-offs) at end-September 2016, significantly lower than the 46% system average as of end-June 2016. As Banco Popolare is expected to book high loan loss charges in Q4 2016, Moody's expects Banco BPM's coverage ratio to rise to around 40% (excluding write-offs) as of December 2016. In assigning a b1 BCA, Moody's has taken into consideration Banco BPM's weak profitability. Following EUR1.1 billion additional provisions aimed at increasing coverage of problem loans for Banco Popolare, the combined Banco BPM would lost about EUR1 billion before tax in Q3 2016. As part of its integration plan, Banco BPM expects to reach a EUR1.1 billion net profit in 2019, which, in the rating agency's view, will be challenging given the very modest macro-economic prospects in Italy, whose GDP Moody's forecasts to grow by 0.8% in 2017 and 1% in 2018. Capitalization is good, and in Moody's view a relative strength for the bank, albeit increased provisions at Banco Popolare in Q4 2016 are likely to result in a loss for the combined Banco Popolare and BPM at year-end 2016, which will have a negative impact on capital. Banco Popolare and BPM reported a pro forma combined 12.3% Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) as at December 2015; Banco BPM is targeting only a small improvement in capital with a 12.9% fully loaded CET1 ratio in 2019. In line with the targets of the integration plan, Moody's does not anticipate a significant improvement in Banco BPM's capital ratio. Funding and liquidity are also a relative strength for Banco BPM. Moody's believes that both Banco Popolare and BPM had a balanced funding profile focused on retail clients, as well as a sound stock of liquid assets, which will be maintained by Banco BPM. -- RATIONALE FOR BANCO BPM's DEPOSIT AND ISSUER RATINGS Moody's has assigned Ba1/Not Prime deposit ratings and Ba2 issuer ratings to Banco BPM, in line with the deposit ratings of both Banco Popolare and BPM. The rating agency also affirmed the debt instruments originally issued by Banco Popolare, Banca Italease S.p.A. (former subsidiary of Banco Popolare), and BPM, which have been assumed by Banco BPM. Moody's said it believes that Banco BPM's deposits would likely face extremely low loss-given-failure, due to the loss absorption provided by the residual equity that it expects in resolution, subordinated debt and senior unsecured debt, as well as the volume of deposits themselves. This results in an uplift of three notches from the bank's b1 BCA. Furthermore, the rating agency believes that Banco BPM's senior unsecured debt (including those instruments originally issued by Banco Popolare, Banca Italease, and BPM and now assumed by Banco BPM would likely face very low loss-given-failure. This is due to the loss absorption provided by the residual equity that it expects in resolution, subordinated debt, as well as the volume of senior unsecured debt itself. This results in an uplift of two notches from the bank's BCA. -- LOW PROBABILITY OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT Moody's assumes a low probability of government support for Banco BPM. With total assets of around EUR170 billion, Banco BPM is the third largest bank in Italy; however, being significantly smaller than the largest two banks in Italy (UniCredit SpA (Baa1/Baa1 Stable, ba1) and Intesa Sanpaolo Spa (A3 Negative/Baa1 Stable, baa3)), Moody's said it believes that there is only a low probability that Banco BPM will receive government support in case of need. As a result there is no further uplift to the deposit and issuer ratings of Banco BPM. -- STABLE OUTLOOK ON DEPOSIT RATING, NEGATIVE ON ISSUER RATING Moody's assigned a stable outlook to Banco BPM's long-term deposit rating, reflecting the rating agency's expectation that the credit profile of the new group will remain unchanged over the next 12-18 months. Despite the near-term challenges stemming from the integration of Banco Popolare and BPM, Moody's considers that the new group's solvency and liquidity will support its creditworthiness, mitigating pressures on both asset risk and profitability. The outlook on the issuer rating of Banco BPM is negative because the stock of bail-in-able senior debt is likely to reduce over the next 12-18 months, given the bank's funding plans and the maturities of retail bonds in particular. This would result in a higher loss-given-failure for this class of debt. -- RATIONALE FOR THE CR ASSESMMENT As part of the rating action Moody's has also assigned a Ba1(cr)/Not Prime(cr) CR Assessment to Banco BPM, three notches above the bank's b1 BCA, reflecting substantial bail-in-able debt and deposits, which would likely support operating obligations in resolution. The low probability of government support means that there is no further uplift. -- WITHDRAWAL OF RATINGS AND ASSESSMENTS OF BANCO POPOLARE AND BPM Moody's has withdrawn the b1 BCAs, the Ba1/Not Prime deposit ratings, the Ba2 issuer ratings, and the Ba1(cr)/Not Prime(cr) CR Assessments of Banco Popolare and BPM, following the transfer of all assets and liabilities of the two banks to Banco BPM. FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE The standalone BCA of Banco BPM could be upgraded if the group were to meet the financial targets set out in its integration plan, which assumes an improving trend in asset risk metrics (mostly through problem loan disposals) while preserving profit generation capacity and capital. An upgrade in the BCA would likely result in upgrades of all ratings. FACTORS THAT COULD LEAD TO A DOWNGRADE A downgrade in the BCA would drive a downgrade in all ratings. This could be triggered by the group's failure to meet the group's targeted cost savings and synergies, or if there were a deterioration in the asset risk or capital. The issuer rating would likely be downgraded following a reduction in the volume of senior debt outstanding. LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS Issuer: Banco BPM SpA Assignments: Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, assigned Ba1(cr) Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, assigned NP(cr) Long-term Deposit Ratings, assigned Ba1 Stable Short-term Deposit Ratings, assigned NP Long-term Issuer Rating, assigned Ba2 Negative Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, assigned b1 Baseline Credit Assessment, assigned b1 Outlook Action: Outlook assigned Stable(m) Issuer: Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa Affirmations: Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Ba2 Negative Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed B2 Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, affirmed Caa1(hyb) Withdrawals: Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated Ba1(cr) Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated NP(cr) Long-term Deposit Ratings, previously rated Ba1, outlook changed to Ratings Withdrawn from Stable Short-term Deposit Ratings, previously rated NP Long-term Issuer Rating, previously rated Ba2, outlook changed to Ratings Withdrawn from Negative Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, previously rated (P)Ba2 Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, previously rated (P)B2 Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b1 Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b1 Outlook Action: Outlook changed to No Outlook from Stable(m) Issuer: Banca Italease S.p.A. Affirmations: Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Ba2 Negative Outlook Action: Outlook changed to No Outlook from Negative Issuer: Banca Popolare di Milano S.C. a r.l. Affirmations: Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed Ba2 Negative Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, affirmed B2 Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, affirmed Caa1(hyb) Withdrawals: Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated Ba1(cr) Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, previously rated NP(cr) Long-term Deposit Ratings, previously rated Ba1, outlook changed to Ratings Withdrawn from Stable Short-term Deposit Ratings, previously rated NP Long-term Issuer Rating, previously rated Ba2, outlook changed to Ratings Withdrawn from Negative Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, previously rated (P)Ba2 Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, previously rated (P)B2 Other Short Term, previously rated (P)NP Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b1 Baseline Credit Assessment, previously rated b1 Outlook Action: Outlook changed to No Outlook from Stable(m) PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks published in January 2016. =================== K A Z A K H S T A N =================== KAZINVESTBANK: S&P Lowers Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'D/D' -------------------------------------------------------------- S&P Global Ratings lowered its long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Kazakhstan-based KazInvestBank to 'D/D' from 'B- /C'. S&P also lowered its Kazakhstan national scale rating on the bank to 'D' from 'kzB+'. At the same time, S&P lowered its ratings on KazInvestBank's rated senior unsecured and subordinated bonds to 'D' from 'B-' and 'CCC' respectively. The rating actions follow the National Bank of Kazakhstan's (NBK's) revocation of KazInvestBank's banking license on Dec. 27, 2016. In S&P's view, the regulator's action means that KazInvestBank is currently unable to fulfil its obligations to its counterparties according to the terms of the respective agreements. KazInvestBank had faced an acute liquidity shortage in December 2016, caused by deposit and interbank funding withdrawals as well as limited funding sources for the bank in the market, which led to a failure to meet its financial liabilities starting from Dec. 22, 2016. KazInvestBank's official request to the regulator for the provision of short-term liquidity was refused. ============= U K R A I N E ============= DTEK ENERGO: Creditors Support Debt Conversion Proposal ------------------------------------------------------- Ukrainian News Agency reports that creditors of DTEK Energo company have supported a proposal to convert part of the company's bank debt of USD300 million into Eurobonds. "The tender for creditor banks, at which the DTEK Energy proposed converting part of its bank debt in the amount of USD300 million into Eurobonds was completed successfully. Creditor banks supported the company's proposal," Ukrainian News quotes the company as saying in the statement. The conversion of part of the company's bank debt into Eurobonds and long-term restructuring of its bank loans are expected to take place in January 2017, Ukrainian News discloses. DTEK Energo exchanged Eurobonds worth USD750 million and USD160 million issued in 2013 and 2015, respectively, for a new, single Eurobond issue with a maturity of up to December 31, 2024 on December 29, Ukrainian News recounts. TRUST BANK: Nat'l Bank of Ukraine Opts to Liquidate Business ------------------------------------------------------------ Ukrainian News Agency reports that the National Bank of Ukraine has decided to liquidate Trust Bank. The decision to liquidate Trust Bank was made by the NBU board on December 29, Ukrainian News relates. On December 30, Deposit Guarantee Fund has started the procedure of the bank liquidation, Ukrainian News relays. Volodymyr Kukharev was given the authorities of the bank's liquidator, Ukrainian News discloses. The National Bank of Ukraine declared Trust Bank insolvent on December 6, Ukrainian News recounts. Trust Bank is based in Kyiv. =========================== U N I T E D K I N G D O M =========================== ALL LEISURE: Ceases Trading, Administrator Appointed ---------------------------------------------------- Ben Martin at The Telegraph reports that about 400 holidaymakers have been left in chaos abroad after the travel business behind Swan Hellenic cruises collapsed, forcing regulator the Civil Aviation Authority to step in to help bring its customers home. According to The Telegraph, All Leisure Holidays, the Atol- protected company that also owns the Voyages of Discovery cruise brand, has stopped trading with immediate effect. Grant Thornton has been appointed administrator to the business, The Telegraph discloses. Abta, the travel association, said the firm had taken about 13,000 future bookings, all of which have now been cancelled, The Telegraph relates. Swan Hellenic, a historic brand that traces its roots back to the 1950s, operates the Minerva vessel while Voyages of Discovery runs the Voyager cruise ship, The Telegraph discloses. There had been speculation about the financial health of All Leisure in recent days after it abruptly cancelled two cruises on the vessels that were due to depart over the New Year period, The Telegraph notes. In accounts filed with Companies House for the year to the end of October 2015, the firm's cruise business posted an annual operating loss of GBP2.6 million, The Telegraph recounts. All Leisure's chairman, Roger Allard, warned in the 2015 results that "trading conditions are expected to remain very challenging, especially in view of the escalating conflict in the Middle East and recent acts of terrorism, and the effect these events may have on consumers' propensity to travel", The Telegraph relays. Since then, All Leisure has had to contend with the impact of the EU referendum, which has rattled the tourism industry by weakening the pound and making it more expensive for Britons to travel abroad, The Telegraph states. ********* Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co- published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2017. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. 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