---

        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Thursday, September 15, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 183


                            Headlines


B U L G A R I A

PFC CSKA AD: Declared Bankrupt by Sofia Court
VIVACOM: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+', Outlook Stable


C Y P R U S

GLOBAL PORTS: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Proposed $350MM Notes
GLOBAL PORTS: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)' Rating to USD350MM Notes


G E R M A N Y

WITTUR INTERNATIONAL: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Negative


G R E E C E

GREECE: PM Says Dispute with Int'l Creditors Damages Economy


I R E L A N D

CORDATUS LOAN: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Note Classes to BB+
HARVEST CLO III: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E-1 Notes to Ba1


L U X E M B O U R G

GARFUNKELUX HOLDCO: S&P Affirms 'B+' ICR, Outlook Negative


N E T H E R L A N D S

CADOGAN SQUARE: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
KETER GROUP: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Stable


R U S S I A

CB EL BANK: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Examination Shows
CB MVKB: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
CB ROSPROMBANK: Placed Under Provisional Administration
KAPITALBANK JSCB: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
NIC TRANSIT: Placed Under Provisional Administration

VYBORG-BANK PJSC: Placed Under Provisional Administration


S P A I N

IM BANCO MBS 2: S&P Raises Rating on Class B Notes to B+(sf)


U K R A I N E

MRIYA AGROHOLDING: Creditors Approve Debt Restructuring
VTB BANK UKRAINE: Sale Talks with Potential Buyers Collapse


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

VEDANTA RESOURCES: Moody's Raises CFR to B1, Outlook Stable


                            *********


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


PFC CSKA AD: Declared Bankrupt by Sofia Court
---------------------------------------------
Novinite.com reports that PFC CSKA AD, the entity behind top
Bulgarian football club CSKA Sofia, has been declared bankrupt by
the Sofia City Court.

The decision applies as of Sept. 9, the date of the ruling, and
can be appealed within six days of its inclusion into the
Commercial Register, Novinite.com relays, citing local sports
media.

A distraint has been imposed on the entity's assets, Novinite.com
discloses.

CSKA was taken out of the top football division of Bulgaria after
its license was revoked over prolonged debts, recounts the
report.


VIVACOM: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+', Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had raised its long-term
corporate credit rating on integrated telecoms operator Bulgarian
Telecommunications Co. EAD (Vivacom) to 'B+' from 'B-'.  The
outlook is stable.

S&P removed the rating from CreditWatch, where it had placed it
with negative implications on Oct. 22, 2015, and with developing
implications on April 2, 2015.

At the same time, S&P raised its long-term issue rating on
Vivacom's senior secured debt to 'B+' from 'B-'.

S&P revised up the group credit profile after the EUR150 million
loan at Vivacom's Luxembourg-based holding company, InterV
Investment S.a.r.l. (InterV) was refinanced as part of a change
in ownership.  The loan matured in May 2015. As announced by
Russian VTB Bank, which is the key lender to InterV and an
indirect shareholder of Vivacom, the sale of 100% of shares in
InterV was successfully completed on Aug. 30, 2016.  InterV was
acquired by Viva Telecom (Luxembourg), owned by various
individuals; VTB Bank retained 20% minus one share.  The
transaction was partly financed through a EUR240 million facility
extended by VTB Bank to Viva Telecom (Luxembourg), and part of
the proceeds were used to repay the EUR150 million equity bridge
loan.  As a result, S&P has revised its assessment of the group's
liquidity to adequate from weak.

S&P revised down its assessment of Vivacom's stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) to reflect the increase in debt, resulting in an
adjusted leverage (including holding company debt) of about 4.5x
from less than 4.0x previously.  In addition, the near-term
maturity of the new EUR240 million facility creates significant
refinancing risk for the group and puts pressure on the rating,
which S&P reflects in its one-notch comparable rating analysis
modifier.

That said, S&P continues to see Vivacom as an insulated entity of
the group, owing to several key restrictions in the indenture,
including, but not limited to:

   -- No cross default between the EUR400 million senior secured
      notes of Vivacom and the holding company level debt;

   -- Restrictions on payments from Vivacom to the holding
      company;

   -- The fact that Vivacom holds itself as a separate entity,
      with separate funds, books, and liabilities;

   -- S&P's view that the new shareholders have no economic
      incentive to try to draw the subsidiary into any
      proceedings, as the bondholders have a first-lien security
      over Vivacom's shares.

S&P also factors in that the previous failure to repay the
EUR150 million equity bridge loan did not impact the performance
of the restricted group of Vivacom.

S&P's assessment of Vivacom's SACP continues to reflect Vivacom's
solid market position in Bulgaria as the largest telecoms
operator, holding the leading position in fixed-line telephony,
with a market share of 69% by revenues, and the No. 2 position in
fixed-line broadband Internet, with a 25% market share.
Vivacom's market position is supported by multiproduct offers,
including land-line telephony, broadband Internet, pay-TV, and
mobile telephony.  In mobile, which generated circa 57% of
Vivacom's revenues in the first half of 2016, the company
increased its market share to 28% in June 2016 from 27% in
December 2015, thanks to 1.3% growth in its subscriber base
starting in December 2015 and 3.6% growth year on year.

That said, Vivacom's reported EBITDA margin declined to 36.6% in
the first half of 2016 from 41.5% in the first half of 2015
because of higher operating costs and competitive pressure from
subsidiaries of meaningfully larger telecoms operators in the
Bulgarian market.

S&P's stable outlook on Vivacom reflects S&P's view that adjusted
debt (including holding company debt) to EBITDA will not exceed
4.5x and that liquidity at Vivacom and at the group level will
remain adequate.

S&P may downgrade Vivacom if refinancing risks at Vivacom or at
its parent are not addressed by early 2017.  S&P could also lower
the rating if the group's adjusted debt to EBITDA exceeds 4.5x,
which could be caused by further declines in profitability.

Rating upside is remote in the next 12 months.  S&P could upgrade
Vivacom if the maturity profile of its debt was extended,
combined with adjusted leverage (including holding company debt)
moving comfortably below 4.5x and free operating cash flow to
debt above 5%.


===========
C Y P R U S
===========


GLOBAL PORTS: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to Proposed $350MM Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba3 rating with a loss
given default assessment of LGD4 to the proposed $350 million
seven-year notes maturing in 2023 to be issued by Global Ports
(Finance) Plc, a wholly owned subsidiary of Global Ports
Investments Plc (GPI), incorporated as a limited liability
company under the laws of Cyprus.  The Ba3 rating of the notes is
based on an irrevocable and unconditional guarantee from GPI and
key operating subsidiaries of GPI and is in line with GPI's
corporate family rating (CFR) of Ba3.  The outlook is negative.

Global Ports (Finance) Plc will issue the notes with the sole
purpose of lending the proceeds to other GPI subsidiaries to be
used by them to repay existing indebtedness.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

With GPI and its principal operating subsidiaries (First
Container Terminal Inc, Petrolesport JSC and Vostochnaya
Stevedoring LLC) guaranteeing the issue, the noteholders rely on
the GPI group's credit quality to service and repay the debt.
These subsidiaries currently account for at least 90% of the
group's assets and EIBTDA.

The Ba3 rating of the notes, at the same level as GPI's CFR,
reflects the position of noteholders in the GPI group's capital
structure.  The agency forecasts that after the refinancing of
existing indebtedness, the share of secured debt will be modest
and no more than 15% of the total.  Moreover, Moody's anticipates
that the share of secured debt will continue to reduce, given the
company's focus on deleveraging and borrowing unsecured debt.
Given the guarantees, the notes will rank pari passu with the
other group unsecured and unsubordinated indebtedness.

Moody's considers GPI's CFR as weakly positioned in its current
rating category.  The company's Ba3 CFR is constrained by
challenging economic conditions in Russia, driven by the ongoing
low oil price environment and growing competition among stevedore
companies in GPI's key regions of operations.  These conditions
will negatively affect GPI's operating metrics and limit GPI's
deleveraging (we expect the company's funds flow from operations
(FFO)/debt to reduce to the low teens in percentage terms in 2016
while debt/EBITDA in this period will be close to 5x).  The CFR
is also constrained by the risk that GPI may breach financial
covenants in case of material underperformance from our current
expectations, unless they are subsequently recalibrated by its
state owned lenders, as has previously been the case.  However,
this risk will materially reduce post bond issuance if, as
planned, GPI uses the proceeds from the new bond issuance to
repay certain debt facilities with the most pressured financial
covenants.

More positively, GPI's CFR reflects (1) GPI's significant scale
and strong geographic position; (2) its material ongoing support
and potential for extraordinary support in the form of equity
injections from key controlling shareholders; (3) a track record
of tight cost control and a flexible cost structure; and (4) a
reduced need for capital expenditure and the shareholders'
decision to suspend dividends which will support the deleveraging
process.

                  RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on the rating reflects the challenging
economic conditions in Russia over the next 12-24 months which
may result in cargo volumes falling outside the range of our
expectations.  This creates a risk that mitigating measures may
not be sufficient to allow the company to maintain a financial
profile commensurate with the current CFR.

                WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's do not currently expect any upwards pressure on all GPI's
ratings given the negative outlook.  However, the outlook could
be stabilized if (1) the macroeconomic environment in Russia
stabilizes resulting in a recovery of the domestic container
cargo market; and (2) the company is able to strengthen its
financial metrics in accordance with its financial policy and
negotiate any appropriate financial documentation changes with
its banks as may be necessary.

Conversely, downward pressure on GPI's ratings could be exerted
if the cargo market becomes significantly more challenging than
we anticipate, and if this or for other reasons, this were to
result in an expected decrease in the company's FFO/debt ratio
below the low teens in percentage terms or its interest coverage
ratio (FFO+interest/interest) falls below 2.5 times.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Privately
Managed Port Companies published in July 2016.

Global Ports Investments Plc is an operator of container and
other port terminals in Russia and the Baltic region.  The key
shareholders of the company are Transportation Investments
Holding Limited (not rated) and APM Terminals, a member of the
A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S (Baa1 stable) group, which each own 30.75%
of the company's shares.  The company is listed on the London
Stock Exchange with 20.5% of the shares held in free float.  In
2015, GPI reported $406 million in revenue and $291 million in
EBITDA.


GLOBAL PORTS: Fitch Assigns 'BB(EXP)' Rating to USD350MM Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Global Ports (Finance) PLC's (GPI
Finance) proposed USD350 million notes an expected senior
unsecured rating of 'BB(EXP)' with Negative Outlook. GPI Finance
is a fully owned subsidiary of Global Ports Investments PLC (GPI;
BB-/ Negative).

The final rating is contingent on the receipt of final documents
conforming materially to information already received.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Eurobond Rating

GPI Finance will issue USD350 million fixed-rate notes, which
will be unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed on a joint and
several basis by GPI (hold co) and its three major operating
subsidiaries (opco) First Container Terminal Incorporated (FCT),
Joint-Stock Company "Petrolesport" (PLP) and Vostochnaya
Stevedoring Limited Liability Company (VSC), representing 99% of
consolidated EBITDA. GPI intends to use the bond proceeds to
refinance bank loans raised at opco levels. GPI's consolidated
leverage therefore will not increase as a result of the
transaction.

The bond documentation includes a cross-default provision with
debt raised at the issuer, guarantor and subsidiary levels as
well as a cap on additional debt and restrictions on
distributions (both with carve-outs) when the pro-forma leverage
ratio is higher than 3.5x. Fitch said, "We note that the change
of control clause does not prevent APM Terminals -- one of the
two co-controlling shareholders -- to dispose of its 30.7% stake
in GPI as the bondholders' put option is exercisable only if a
new shareholder gains 50% or more of GPI share capital."

The notes' 'BB(EXP)' rating reflects our assessment of GPI's
consolidated credit profile as the unconditional and irrevocable
guarantee from the three major opcos give bondholders full and
unconditional access to group cash flow generation. The rating of
GPI, the holdco, is notched down one level to 'BB-' to reflect
the ring-fencing features included in some subsidiaries' bank
financing. These features, namely financial covenants at single
borrower level, prevent GPI's rating from being aligned with our
assessment of the group's consolidated profile.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The notes' rating is credit-linked to GPI's Long-Term IDR. Future
development that could lead to negative rating action on GPI and
the notes include:

   -- GPI's Fitch-adjusted consolidated debt/EBITDA remaining
      above 5x over 2017-2019 in Fitch's rating case.

   -- Adverse policy decisions -- such as the introduction of a
      tariff cap -- or geopolitical events affecting the port
      sector.

   -- A change in shareholder structure with the co-controlling
      shareholder APMT disposing partly or entirely of its stake
      in GPI, which may affect our analysis of some rating
      factors such as refinancing risk and potentially GPI's
      ratings


The Outlook could be revised to Stable if GPI leverage is firmly
on a downward path with Fitch-adjusted net debt to EBITDA falling
below 4x over three years.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


WITTUR INTERNATIONAL: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it had revised its outlook on Wittur
International Holding GmbH (Wittur), the parent holding company
of elevator component manufacturer Wittur, to negative from
stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Wittur International Holding GmbH.

S&P also affirmed its 'B' issue rating on Wittur's EUR80 million
revolving credit facility (RCF) and the EUR410 million term loan
B, including the new EUR35 million add-on.  The recovery rating
remains at '3', indicating S&P's expectation of recovery in the
lower half of the 50%-70% range.

S&P affirmed the 'CCC+' issue rating on the EUR225 million senior
notes.  The recovery rating on these notes remains at '6',
indicating S&P's expectation of recovery in the 0%-10% range.

"We revised the outlook on Wittur following its report at the end
of the second quarter of 2016 of higher debt than what we had
expected.  The outlook revision also reflects our downward
revision of our forecasts for Wittur's revenue growth and
profitability, based on the challenging operating conditions in
China and higher-than-previously-expected reorganization costs
for the integration of Sematic SpA, which Wittur acquired on
April 1, 2016.  As a consequence, we now see a risk that --
should the group fail to improve its earnings -- the company's
weakening operating performance, together with the increased
debt, could lead to credit ratios not commensurate with our
current rating".

Since the closing of the Sematic acquisition, which was financed
in line with S&P's expectations, Wittur has increased its debt to
finance the costs of integrating Sematic.  By June 30, 2016, the
RCF had been drawn by EUR52 million, much higher than the initial
EUR20 million.  The amount drawn on the RCF is outside of S&P's
previous base case, in which it expected the RCF to stay mostly
undrawn after the initial EUR20 million drawing had been paid
down.  On July 26, 2016, Wittur announced a EUR35 million add-on
to its existing term loan, and S&P understands that the proceeds
have been used to pay down and increase the availability under
the RCF. In total, the Wittur group's current debt is higher than
what S&P previously expected, and S&P sees a risk that the
company's operating performance might not recover enough in the
near term to compensate for the higher debt burden.  The group
has experienced weaker-than-expected performance in the first
half of 2016, due to challenging conditions in China and negative
currency translation effects from the strengthening euro.

S&P now expects the slowdown in China, representing about 35% of
the combined group's sales, to continue to weigh on revenue
growth and margins over the medium term, and to offset otherwise
solid growth in Europe and other Asian countries.  S&P has
revised its forecast and it now expects revenue growth to be flat
to slightly positive in 2016 and 2017 before improving in 2018,
when the company expects China to be back on a trajectory of
growth in new installation.  S&P also sees a risk that
intensified pricing pressure in China and higher-than-expected
reorganization costs for the integration of Sematic could trim
margins.

Nevertheless, S&P expects the group's margins to improve over
time, with additional earnings from Sematic, the achievement of
planned synergies through continued reorganization over the next
two years, and ongoing operational efficiency initiatives. Our
credit metrics are based on pro-forma average ratios over 2016
and 2017 to fully reflect the post-acquisition capital structure
and combined operations.

The ratings continue to reflect the group's weak business risk
profile, which in S&P's view is constrained by the group's
concentrated business in terms of scope, end markets, and
customers relative to peers.  The group's sales exposure to its
top four customers is around 65%-70%. Moderating some of these
weaknesses is the group's leadership position in its addressable
markets, well-established relationships with its key customers,
and good geographic diversity.

The negative outlook reflects the increased likelihood that S&P
could downgrade Wittur should the group fail to return
profitability over the coming 12 months to levels that enable
credit ratios to improve to levels commensurate with the current
rating, namely adjusted FFO to debt around 6.5%-7.5%, adjusted
debt to EBITDA around 5.5x-6.5x, and adjusted EBITDA interest
coverage above 2x.

S&P could lower the rating if adjusted EBITDA interest coverage
falls below 2x and leverage ratios deteriorate outside of S&P's
base case, without near-term prospects for recovery.  S&P could
also take a negative rating action if liquidity falls below its
adequate assessment.  These scenarios could materialize in the
event of larger contractions in revenue and EBITDA than S&P
currently anticipates, a slower-than-expected recovery in revenue
growth and margins, or if synergies are not successfully
realized.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Wittur manages to
improve its profitability to an extent that EBITDA interest
coverage recovers to above 2x.  This could result from stronger-
than-expected resilience to the slowdown in China, an earlier-
than-anticipated upturn in the company's end markets, or
improvements in its cost base thanks to greater-than-expected
synergies following the integration of Sematic.


===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: PM Says Dispute with Int'l Creditors Damages Economy
------------------------------------------------------------
RT reports that Greece's Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras said the
dispute between Greece and its international lenders on the
country's debt management is damaging recovery.

According to RT, he is calling on the EU to recognize the Greek
debt crisis as a "European problem."

"We are closer than ever before to a solution of this crisis.
What is delaying the effort of regaining the trust of the markets
is the constant disagreement between the European institutions
and the IMF," Mr. Tsipras, as cited by RT, said during a news
conference at the Thessaloniki International Fair.

Syriza party economist Marica Frangakis told CNBC Greece's
lenders have "failed miserably" in their policies aimed at
rescuing the Greek economy, RT relates.

Greece has to fulfill fifteen reforms by the Sept. 15 deadline to
get a EUR2.8 billion tranche from the bailout program, RT notes.

Under the terms of the 2015 deal, the creditors including the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank and
the eurozone are to provide EUR86 billion in aid to Greece by
2018 in return for unpopular austerity measures, RT discloses.

The reforms include tax hikes, pension cuts, as well as the
privatization of public assets, RT relays.  So far, the country
has managed to implement only two reforms out of fifteen, RT
states.

The IMF said that it would not participate in Greece's third
bailout until the issue of debt sustainability is sorted,
according to RT.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


CORDATUS LOAN: S&P Raises Ratings on Three Note Classes to BB+
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on all classes of
notes in Cordatus Loan Fund II PLC.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the latest available trustee
report and the application of S&P's relevant criteria.

The trustee report shows that the transaction's
overcollateralization tests are passing at higher levels than at
our previous review and that the reported weighted-average spread
has remained relatively stable since then.  S&P's analysis
further shows that the transaction does not currently hold any
defaulted assets (i.e., debt obligations of obligors rated 'CC',
'SD' [selective default], or 'D').  At S&P's previous review,
defaulted assets totaled 3.0% of the portfolio's performing
balance.

From S&P's analysis, it has observed a decrease in the
portfolio's weighted-average maturity and a positive ratings
migration within the portfolio.  As a result, S&P's analysis
indicates that overall developments have resulted in lower
scenario default rates across all rating levels.

S&P has subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each
rated class.  In S&P's analysis, it used the portfolio balance
that it considered to be performing (i.e., of assets rated 'CCC-'
or above), the reported weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that we considered to be
appropriate.  S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using its standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each
rating category assumed for each class of notes, in conjunction
with different interest-rate and exchange-rate stress scenarios.

Based on S&P's analysis above, it now considers that the
available credit enhancement for all classes of notes is
commensurate with higher ratings than previously assigned, and
have raised S&P's ratings accordingly.

Cordatus Loan Fund II is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
July 2007 and is managed by CVC Cordatus Group Ltd.

RATINGS LIST

Class                    Rating
                  To               From

Cordatus Loan Fund II PLC
EUR416.25 Million and GBP22.83 Million Secured Floating-Rate
Notes and Subordinated Notes

Ratings Raised

VFN               AA+ (sf)         AA- (sf)
EuroA1 DDN        AA+ (sf)         AA- (sf)
Euro A1           AA+ (sf)         AA- (sf)
SterlingA2        AA+ (sf)         AA- (sf)
B                 AA (sf)          A+ (sf)
C                 A+ (sf)          BBB+ (sf)
D                 A- (sf)          BBB- (sf)
E                 BB+ (sf)         BB- (sf)
F1                BB+ (sf)         B+ (sf)
F2                BB+ (sf)         B+ (sf)


HARVEST CLO III: Moody's Raises Rating on Cl. E-1 Notes to Ba1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Harvest CLO III plc:

  EUR16.75 mil. Class D-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
   March 8, 2016, Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  EUR9.25 mil. Class D-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed
   Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on
   March 8, 2016, Upgraded to A2 (sf)

  EUR15.75 mil. Class E-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
   March 8, 2016, Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

  EUR3 mil. Class E-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2021, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Affirmed Ba2 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  EUR77 mil. (current outstanding balance of EUR25.91 mil.) Class
   B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
   previously on March 8, 2016, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR30.75 mil. Class C-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
   Rate Notes due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR12 mil. Class C-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2021, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 8,
   2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

Harvest CLO III plc, issued in April 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield
senior secured European loans.  The portfolio is managed by 3i
Debt Management Investments Limited.  The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in June 2013.  The collateral assets
that are not denominated in Euro are hedged by perfect asset
swaps or a macro swap.

                      RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrades of the notes are primarily the result of
deleveraging since the last rating action in March 2016.  On the
last payment in June 2016 the Class B notes have amortized by
approximately EUR25.9 mil. or 33.7% of their original outstanding
balance, resulting in increases in over-collateralization levels.
As of the July 2016 trustee report, the Class B, Class C, Class D
and Class E over-collateralization ratios are reported at 510.7%,
192.7%, 139.8% and 116.7% respectively compared with 302.9%,
166.0%, 130.2% and 112.7% in January 2016.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR128.1 million
and GBP0.8 million, defaulted par of EUR8.9 million and GBP1.1
million, a weighted average default probability of 19.0% over a
3.8 years weighted average life (consistent with a WARF of 2899),
a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.9% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 14 and a weighted
average spread of 4.0%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower weighted average recovery rate for the
portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted
average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs were
unchanged for classes B and C and within one notch of the base-
case results for classes D and E.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

   Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
   portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
   conditions and have a significant impact on the notes'
   ratings.  Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of
   high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales by the
   collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-
   and-extend z restructurings.  Fast amortization would usually
   benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the notes
   having the highest prepayment priority.

   Around 11.8% of the collateral pool consists of debt
   obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
   credit estimates.  As part of its base case, Moody's has
   stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing a
   credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage
   of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions," published in
   October 2009 and available at:

    http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461

   Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
   have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
   collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
   defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
   the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.  Recoveries higher than Moody's
   expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
   ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


GARFUNKELUX HOLDCO: S&P Affirms 'B+' ICR, Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it revised to negative from stable
its outlook on Luxembourg-based intermediate holding company
Garfunkelux Holdco 2 S.A. (Garfunkelux 2), which consolidates the
activities of the main operating subsidiaries Lowell Group Ltd.
(Lowell) and GFKL Financial Services GmbH (GFKL).  S&P affirmed
the 'B+' long-term and 'B' short-term issuer credit ratings.

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'B+' issue rating and recovery
rating of '3' to the proposed EUR230 million senior secured
floating rate notes issued by Garfunkelux Holdco 3 S.A.
(Garfunkelux 3).  The rating on the proposed notes is subject to
S&P's review of the notes' final documentation.

S&P also affirmed the 'B+' issue rating and recovery rating of
'3' on the existing EUR365 million and GBP565 million senior
secured notes. S&P affirmed the 'BB' issue rating and recovery
rating of '1' on the EUR200 million revolving credit facility
(RCF) co-issued by Garfunkel Holding GmbH and Simon Bidco Ltd.
S&P also affirmed the 'B-' issue rating and recovery rating of
'6' on the GBP230 million senior unsecured notes issued by
Garfunkelux 2.

Garfunkelux 2 announced on Sept. 12 that Garfunkelux 3 intends to
issue EUR230 million floating rate notes.  S&P understands that
the proceeds will be used to refinance a EUR230 million bridge
facility -- which financed a corporate acquisition -- and pay
related fees and expenses.  The acquisition is that of
Germany-based third-party debt collections company Tesch Inkasso
Group (Tesch), which the group announced on Aug. 12, 2016.  The
transaction has been agreed and the closing is subject to certain
regulatory approvals.

Garfunkelux 2 is an intermediate holding company, majority owned
by private equity firm Permira.  The holding company consolidates
Garfunkelux Holdco 3 S.A., special-purpose entities Garfunkel
Holding GmbH and Simon Bidco Ltd., primary operating companies
GFKL and Lowell, and all of the operating subsidiaries and
companies that form the group.  The ratings reflect S&P's view of
the combined entity consolidated under Garfunkelux 2, including
the acquisition of Tesch.  S&P do not perceive any material
barriers to cash flows within the group or any significant issues
regarding fungibility of capital between the parent company,
debt-issuing holding companies, or the key subsidiaries.

S&P believes that the debt-financed acquisition of Tesch signals
a loosening of financial policy relative to our previous
expectations and increases risks relating to operational
integration.  This is accentuated by the ongoing integration of
Lowell and GFKL following the recent merger in October 2015 --
although S&P recognizes the good progress made to date.  S&P
believes that the acquisition of Tesch shortly after a
transformational merger represents a potential increase in the
group's overall risk appetite, which could lead to an extended
weakening of credit metrics, particularly if increased
operational risks lead to slower cash flow generation than S&P's
base-case scenario assumes.  The negative outlook signals a one-
in-three chance that S&P could lower the ratings if the group's
growth in total collections and third-party fee income is
insufficient to reduce the group's leverage over the next 12
months.

S&P's existing financial risk profile assessment reflects its
expectation of the combined entity's following core ratios:

   -- Gross debt to S&P Global Ratings-adjusted EBITDA between
      4x-5x;
   -- Funds from operations to gross debt between 12%-20%; and
   -- Adjusted EBITDA to interest expense between 3x-6x.

Adjusted EBITDA is gross of portfolio amortization (a noncash
item).

S&P's base-case scenario assumes that the acquisition will lead
to metrics at the weaker end of these ranges at the point of
transaction closing.  This reflects the debt-financed nature of
the acquisition.  However, S&P believes that the continued
integration of Lowell and GFKL, plus the full-year earnings of
Tesch, will likely lead to credit metrics more consistent with
the existing assessment by year-end 2017.  S&P's base-case
scenario for improving cash flow generation is predicated on the
group achieving:

   -- Continued growth in gross collections and its backbook of
      debt portfolios;
   -- Growth in alternative avenues for revenue generation
      following its focus on generating a larger proportion of
      third-party servicing income; and
   -- Strengthening in the customer footprint, given the limited
      overlap between operating entities' customer relationships.

S&P's 'b+' group credit profile (GCP) for the combined entity
already incorporates a downward adjustment of one notch under
S&P's negative comparable rating analysis modifier.  S&P applies
this negative adjustment based on its view that, among other
things, there is some uncertainty with regards to the group's
future financial policy under its relatively new ownership
structure.  While S&P considers the acquisition of Tesch to be
manageable, S&P believes that the downward adjustment remains
relevant at this time.  S&P considers that the debt-financed
acquisition shortly after the transformational merger reinforces
S&P's view that future financial policy of the group currently
remains unclear.

S&P's business risk profile assessment remains constrained by the
regulatory and operational risks that credit management services
companies' face, and S&P's view that the overall execution of the
group's strategy is relatively immature given its recent
formation.  However, S&P continues to view the group as one of
the largest credit management businesses operating across two
large European markets.  S&P believes that the group benefits
from its scale and diversification, particularly its presence
across a number of asset classes, and its growing proportion of
revenue from third-party servicing income.  Given its modest
size, Tesch is complementary to the group's business risk
profile, in S&P's view, as opposed to transformational.  S&P
believes that the acquisition has the potential to enhance the
group's market position in the German credit management services
sector.  It also provides the group with access to expertise in
new asset classes, such as e-commerce and utilities debt.

The negative outlook indicates the possibility of a downgrade if,
after the acquisition, growth in total collections and third-
party servicing income is insufficient to improve its post-
transaction leverage profile over the next 12 to 18 months.  The
acquisition of Tesch has led to a reduction in the group's
headroom under its financial risk profile.  S&P believes that
there are risks associated with operational integration, which
could potentially lead to underperformance and an extended
weakening of its creditworthiness.  However, S&P's base-case
scenario assumes that credit metrics will improve by year-end
2017, after an initial weakening on completion of the
transaction.  This is predicated on continued growth in the
group's earnings capacity and an absence of material further
acquisitions.

S&P could lower the ratings if it no longer expects that the
group will improve its credit metrics over the next 12 to 18
months after the transaction.  S&P could revise its forward-
looking financial risk profile assessment downward if it expects:

   -- Gross debt to adjusted EBITDA above 5x;
   -- Funds from operations to gross debt below 12%; or
   -- Adjusted EBITDA to interest expense below 3x.

Such a scenario could unfold if integration risks lead to a
material unanticipated rise in costs or a lowering of the group's
earnings capacity below S&P's current expectations.  It could
also occur if S&P saw further signs of an aggressive financial
policy, for example the group raising additional debt to fund
another material acquisition.

S&P could revise the outlook back to stable if it saw evidence of
the successful integration of Tesch that would enable to group to
start improving its post-transaction leverage profile in line
with S&P's expectations.  Specifically, if we believed these
ratios would remain firmly and sustainably within the given
ranges:

   -- Gross debt to adjusted EBITDA between 4x-5x;
   -- Funds from operations to gross debt between 12%-20%; and
   -- Adjusted EBITDA to interest expense between 3x-6x.

Diminishing integration risks associated with the recent merger
and acquisition activity and evidence that Permira's strategy as
a financial sponsor will not hinder Garfunkelux 2's debt-
servicing capabilities would also support a stable outlook.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CADOGAN SQUARE: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to BB+
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised its credit ratings on Cadogan Square
CLO B.V.'s class C, D, and E notes.  At the same time, S&P has
affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-1, A-2, and B
notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance by applying its relevant criteria and conducting its
credit and cash flow analysis.  In S&P's analysis, it took into
account recent developments and used the July 2016 payment date
report.

Following S&P's analysis, it has observed that the proportion of
assets that it considers to be rated in the 'CCC' category (i.e.,
rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') have decreased to 10.28% from
12.07% since S&P's June 8, 2015, review.  Defaults since S&P's
previous review have increased to 1.50% from 0.67%.  S&P has also
observed that the assets rated in the 'CCC' category and
defaulted assets in this portfolio are relatively low compared to
the other collateralized loan obligation (CLO) 1.0 transactions
S&P has recently reviewed.

Since S&P's previous review, the pool's weighted-average life has
decreased to 4.09 years from 4.71 years.  The current weighted-
average spread on the asset portfolio is 4.09%, down from 4.25%.
With further deleveraging of the class A-1 and A-2 notes (which
pay on a pro rata basis), the available credit enhancement for
all classes of notes has increased.  The par coverage tests for
all tranches continue to remain within their documented triggers.

From the July 2016 report, S&P notes that more than 20% of the
assets in the portfolio have a legal final maturity that falls
beyond the legal final maturity of the rated notes.  The
inclusion of such assets that mature on a date beyond the legal
final maturity date of the liabilities requires that the CLO
transaction sells these assets before this date.  This exposes
the transaction to the noncredit-related risk of loss of par and
is particularly troublesome for corporate bonds and other types
of instruments that return all or substantially all of the par
balance at the asset's legal final maturity date.  For these
long-dated assets in the portfolio, S&P has applied certain
haircuts.

S&P has applied its structured finance ratings above the
sovereign criteria (RAS criteria) to Cadogan Square, which is a
multijurisdictional structured finance transaction that has
tranches rated above certain sovereigns (e.g., Spain and Italy).
The RAS criteria superseded S&P's criteria for nonsovereign
ratings that exceed EMU sovereign ratings, which S&P applied at
its previous review.

Based on the current portfolio, S&P concluded that there is no
excess exposure to a lower-rated sovereign that needs to be
stressed further in accordance with S&P's RAS criteria.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, under its updated CLO criteria, it
has applied the updated recovery rates on the collateral
portfolio to determine the ratings for the class A to E notes.

S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rates (BDRs) for each rated class at each rating level.
S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios, using
various default patterns in conjunction with different interest
stress scenarios.

S&P has raised its ratings on the class C, D, and E notes as its
credit and cash flow analysis suggests that these classes of
notes can support higher ratings than those previously assigned.

S&P's credit and cash flow analysis suggests that the current
'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A-1, A-2, and B notes can be
maintained.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on
these classes of notes.

At closing, Cadogan Square CLO entered into derivative agreements
to mitigate currency risk.  The documentation for the derivative
contracts is not fully in line with S&P's current counterparty
criteria.  Therefore, in S&P's cash flow analysis for scenarios
above 'AA-', it has applied additional foreign exchange stresses.

Cadogan Square CLO is a cash flow CLO transaction that
securitizes loans granted to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms.  The transaction closed in December 2005 and is
currently in its amortization phase.

RATINGS LIST

Cadogan Square CLO B.V.
EUR450 mil secured floating-rate notes
                                    Rating
Class            Identifier         To                   From
A-1              XS0236024153       AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
A-2              XS0237038236       AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
B                XS0236025127       AAA (sf)             AAA (sf)
C                XS0236025804       AA+ (sf)             A+ (sf)
D                XS0236026281       BBB+ (sf)            BB+ (sf)
E                XS0236026950       BB+ (sf)             B+ (sf)


KETER GROUP: Moody's Assigns B2 CFR, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 corporate family
rating and a B2-PD probability of default rating to Keter Group
B.V., a holding company comprising the assets of Keter Group, an
Israel based manufacturer of resin plastic consumer goods
including outdoor furniture and home storage products.
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B2 rating to
the senior secured credit facilities intended to be issued by
Keter.  The senior secured credit facilities consist of a
EUR690 million equivalent Term Loan B and a EUR100 million
revolving credit facility which together rank pari passu.  A
stable outlook has been assigned to all of the ratings.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these reflect Moody's credit opinion regarding
the transaction only.  Upon closing of the transaction and a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign definitive ratings to the proposed facilities.
A definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

"The B2 ratings reflect Keter's strength as a top 3 player in the
market for resin plastic consumer goods," says Scott Phillips,
Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and lead analyst for
Keter.  "High margins, a credible growth plan and expectations
for greater stability under a new ownership structure add weight
to Keter's business risk profile, balanced by relatively high
initial leverage" added Mr. Phillips.

In August 2016, BC Partners (a UK based private equity firm)
entered into an exclusive agreement to acquire a majority stake
in Keter from the company's existing shareholder, the Sagol
family. Together with PSP (a Canada based private equity firm),
BC Partners will own around 80% of Keter's equity while the Sagol
family will retain a 20% stake.  Moody's notes that the
acquisition consideration - of around EUR1.4 billion -- will be
financed via the proposed senior secured credit facilities and
approximately EUR700 million of shareholder equity.  Around
EUR150 million of this equity will be in the form of a payment in
kind (PIK) instrument.

The B2 CFR reflects Keter's: (1) significant presence in the
global consumer plastic industry where it occupies top 3
positions in each of the product segments within which it
competes; (2) strong diversification across a number of wealthy
consumer end markets, including in North America, Western Europe
and Southern Europe; (3) long-standing relationships with major
DIY retailers underpinned by both its brand strength and its
track record for innovation; (4) well-regarded product portfolio
with limited concentration in any one segment; (5) an increasing
online presence; and (6) above average profitability with EBIT
margins of 13-15% reflecting a manufacturing bias towards Israel
which reduces labor costs compared with peers.

At the same time, the rating is constrained by: (1) the
competitiveness of the consumer durables sector which faces
significant pricing pressure from a small number of relatively
large customers, which have high bargaining power; (2) relatively
high customer concentration in North America; (3) exposure to the
volatility of polypropylene prices (linked to oil prices) which
accounts for around 50% of total cash costs albeit mitigated by
the company's track record of passing through cost inflation; (4)
a limited operating history for the group as a stand-alone
entity; (5) concentration of manufacturing production in Israel,
which could in the short-term following any disruption, threaten
future orders and customer relationships; (6) substitution risks
from other materials such as wood, which is also limiting pricing
dynamics to some extent; and (7) high financial leverage, which
Moody's estimates will be around 5x (gross debt / EBITDA) in 2016
and around 4.5x in 2017.

                 WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP / DOWN

Given the limited track record of the group in its current form,
as well as an absence of audited financial statements for the
combined group, Moody's believes that an upgrade of the ratings
is unlikely at the current time.  Nevertheless, and following the
publication of a fully audited financial report, the ratings
could be upgraded if leverage were to fall sustainably below 4x
gross debt / EBITDA and if free cash flow (FCF) / debt is above
5%.  In contrast, if leverage were to remain above 5x there would
likely be negative pressure on the rating.  Similarly, negative
FCF generation or a deterioration in liquidity would also put
downwards pressure on the rating.

                      STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Moody's differentiates between two layers of debt within the
provisional capital structure of Keter.  The EUR690 million
equivalent Term Loan B and the EUR 100 million RCF form the most
senior part of the capital structure, alongside trade payables,
consistent with the agency's standard approach for modelling
trade claims.  In contrast, Moody's models operating leases and
pension obligations as unsecured claims and therefore junior in
the capital structure.  Nevertheless, and given that the secured
credit facilities form the vast majority of Keter's gross
indebtedness, the rating assigned to both the Term Loan B and RCF
is (P)B2, in-line with the CFR.  While Moody's notes the presence
of a PIK instrument outside of the restricted group (the
immediate parent of the highest level company in the restricted
group capitalizes its ownership of Keter via common equity),
Moody's treats this instrument as equity for the purposes of its
debt and leverage calculations.  As a consequence, this
instrument does not feature in our loss given default (LGD)
analysis.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Consumer
Durables Industry published in September 2014.

Keter Group B.V. is a holding company, based in The Netherlands,
for a group of entities involved in the manufacturing and
distribution of a variety of resin plastic consumer goods.
Keter's key products include garden furniture and home storage
solutions. Following the completion of the envisaged transaction,
Keter will be majority owned by Private Equity firm - BC
Partners -- while minority shareholders include Private Equity
firm PSP and the original founders, the Sagol family.  The Keter
group reported revenue of EUR770 million in 2015.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


CB EL BANK: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Examination Shows
--------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of LLC CB El Bank appointed by
Bank of Russia Order No. OD-1407, dated May 5, 2016, following
revocation of its banking license detected in the course of
examination of the bank's financial standing transactions carried
out by LLC CB El Bank former management which bear the evidence
of a preferential settlement of claims from certain creditors to
the detriment of other creditors also through the encumbrance of
the bank's liabilities, as well as transactions aimed at moving
out liquid security for claims to borrowers with dubious solvency
worth over RUR100 million, according to the Central Bank of
Russia's Press Service.

Besides, the provisional administration detected the facts of
moving out bank's assets through extending loans to shell
companies not involved in real economic activities worth about
RUR2.2 billion.

According to estimates by the provisional administration, the
total asset value of LLC CB El Bank does not exceed RUR3.7
billion, while its liabilities to creditors amount to RUR5.9
billion including liabilities to households worth RUR5.1 billion.

On July 27, 2016, the Court of Arbitration of the city of the
Samara Region took a decision to recognize LLC CB El Bank
insolvent (bankrupt) and initiate bankruptcy proceedings with the
state corporation Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as a
receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offences conducted
by the former management and owners of LLC CB El Bank to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for consideration and
procedural decision making.


CB MVKB: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
----------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of OJSC CB MVKB appointed by Bank
of Russia Order No. 1016, dated March 28, 2016, following
revocation of its banking license detected in the course of
examination of the bank's financial standing transactions carried
out by OJSC CB MVKB former management which bear the evidence of
moving out assets through extending loans worth about RUR700
million to organizations with dubious solvency and replacing
liquid assets with illiquid receivables worth about RUR400
million, according to the Central Bank of Russia's Press Service.

According to estimates by the provisional administration, the
asset value of OJSC CB MVKB does not exceed RUR307 million, while
its liabilities to creditors amount to RUR1,095 million.

On May 30, 2016, the Court of Arbitration of the city of Moscow
took a decision to recognize OJSC CB MVKB insolvent (bankrupt)
with the state corporation Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as
a receiver.

The Bank of Russia submitted the information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offences conducted
by the former management and owners of OJSC CB MVKB to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for consideration and
procedural decision making.


CB ROSPROMBANK: Placed Under Provisional Administration
-------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No.OD-3052, dated September 13,
2016, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit
institution Commercial Bank ROSSIYSKY PROMYSHLENNY BANK Company
Limited (CB ROSPROMBANK Co. Ltd.) from September 13, 2016,
according to the Central Bank of Russia's Press Service.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated violation within a year of the requirements
of Articles 7 (with the exception of Clause 3 of Article 7) and
7.2 of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism", as well as requirements of Bank of Russia regulations
and the application of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)", and
considering the existence of a real threat to the interests of
its creditors and depositors.

CB ROSPROMBANK Co. Ltd. implemented high-risk lending policy
connected with the placement of funds into poor quality assets.
The adequate risk assessment at the supervisor's request and a
reliable recognition of the bank's assets resulted in the grounds
for the credit institution to implement insolvency (bankruptcy)
prevention measures.  At the same time, CB ROSPROMBANK Co. Ltd.
failed to comply with legislation requirements and Bank of Russia
regulations in countering the legalization (laundering) of
criminally obtained incomes and the financing of terrorism as
regards the submission of adequate information to the authorized
body.  CB ROSPROMBANK Co. Ltd. internal control rules in the said
area were at odds with Bank of Russia requirements.  Both
management and owners of the credit institution did not take any
effective measures to bring its activities back to normal.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-3053, dated September 13,
2016, appointed a provisional administration to CB ROSPROMBANK
Co. Ltd. for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

CB ROSPROMBANK Co. Ltd. is a member of the deposit insurance
system.  The revocation of the banking license is an insured
event as stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance
of Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the
bank's retail deposit obligations, as defined by legislation.
The said Federal Law provides for the payment of indemnities to
the bank's depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the
amount of 100% of the balance of funds but not more than RUR1.4
million per depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of September 1, 2016,
CB ROSPROMBANK Co. Ltd. ranked 323rd by assets in the Russian
banking system.


KAPITALBANK JSCB: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
-------------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of OJSC JSCB Kapitalbank appointed
by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-522, dated February 15, 2016,
following the revocation of its banking license detected in the
course of examination of the credit institution's financial
standing operations carried out by the bank's former management
which bear the evidence of moving out assets also through
extending loans to shell companies not engaged in real economic
activity for the amount over RUR1.7 billion, replacing liquid
assets with claims to companies with dubious solvency for the
amount of RUR170 million, and also through the alienation of
property in the form of securities to third parties for the
amount over RUR250 million, according to the Central Bank of
Russia's Press Service.

Moreover, the provisional administration revealed the deficiency
of funds in the amount of over RUR300 million.

According to the provisional administration's estimates, the
value of assets of OJSC JSCB Kapitalbank does not exceed
RUR1.7 billion with the value of liabilities to creditors
standing at RUR3.96 billion, including to households -- RUR2.2
billion.

On March 30, 2016, the court of arbitration of the Rostov Region
made a ruling to recognize OJSC JSCB Kapitalbank as insolvent
(bankrupt) and initiate bankruptcy proceedings.  The state
corporation Deposit Insurance Agency was approved as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia sent information on the financial operations
of criminal nature made by the former managers and owners of OJSC
JSCB Kapitalbank to the Prosecutor General's Office of the
Russian Federation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the
Russian Federation, and the Investigative Committee of the
Russian Federation for consideration and making the respective
procedural decisions.


NIC TRANSIT: Placed Under Provisional Administration
----------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2967, dated September 7,
2016, revoked the banking license of Makhachkala-based settlement
non-banking credit institution NCI Transit LLC from September 7,
2016, according to the Central Bank of Russia's Press Service.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, application of measures stipulated by the Federal
Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of
Russia)" and taking into account a real threat to creditors'
interests.

Fulfillment by HCI Transit LLC of the supervisor's demand to set
up reserves for illegally discounted promissory notes has
produced the grounds for taking insolvency (bankruptcy)
prevention measures.  Credit institution's internal control rules
to counter the legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained
incomes and the financing of terrorism did not comply with Bank
of Russia regulations.  Both management and owners of the credit
institution did not take any effective measures to bring its
activities back to normal.  Under the circumstances the Bank of
Russia took a decision to take out the credit institution from
the banking services market.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2968, dated September 7,
2016, appointed a provisional administration to HCI Transit LLC
for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to
the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the
credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

According to the financial statements, as of August 1, 2016, HCI
Transit LLC ranked 650th by assets in the Russian banking system.


VYBORG-BANK PJSC: Placed Under Provisional Administration
---------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2965, dated September 7,
2016, revoked the banking license of credit institution PJSC
Vyborg-bank from September 7, 2016, according to the Central Bank
of Russia's Press Service.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, because the capital adequacy ratio of this credit
institution was below 2%, and taking into account the repeated
application within a year of measures envisaged by the Federal
Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of
Russia)".

PJSC Vyborg-bank implemented a high-risk lending policy connected
with the placement of funds in low-quality assets.  As a result
of the fulfillment of the supervisor's requirements to make
provisions adequate to the risks assumed, the capital adequacy of
this credit institution fell to critical values.  The management
and owners of PJSC Vyborg-bank failed to take effective measures
to bring the situation back to normal.  Moreover, in August 2016
the management and owners of the bank conducted scheme operations
aimed at withdrawing assets against the backdrop of restrictions
on banking operations imposed by the Bank of Russia.

Under these circumstances, the Bank of Russia performed its duty
on the revocation of the banking license of PJSC Vyborg-bank in
accordance with Part 2 of Article 20 of the Federal Law "On Banks
and Banking Activities|.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2966, dated September 7,
2016, appointed a provisional administration to PJSC Vyborg-bank
for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to
the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator
under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking
Activities".  In accordance with the federal laws, the powers of
the credit institution's executive bodies have been suspended.

PJSC Vyborg-bank is a member of the deposit insurance system. The
revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks' in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than RUR1.4 million per
one depositor.

According to reporting data, as of August 1, 2016, PJSC Vyborg-
bank ranked 349th in the Russian banking system in terms of
assets.


=========
S P A I N
=========


IM BANCO MBS 2: S&P Raises Rating on Class B Notes to B+(sf)
------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'AA- (sf)' and to
'B+ (sf)' from 'B- (sf)'its credit ratings on IM Banco Popular
MBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class A and B notes,
respectively.

The upgrades follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the
most recent transaction information that S&P has received and
reflect the transaction's structural features.  S&P's analysis
reflects the application of its Spanish residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) criteria and S&P's structured finance
ratings above the sovereign criteria.

Long-term delinquencies (defined in this transaction as loans in
arrears for more than 90 days, excluding defaults) have decreased
since our previous full review in 2014, after peaking in Q2 2013.
However, S&P has continued to observe a continuous roll-over of
long-term delinquencies into defaults since Q2 2012.  Defaults in
this transaction are defined as assets being delinquent for more
than 12 months or classified as such by the trustee (Intermoney
Titulizacion S.G.F.T.).

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation that economic growth will mildly deteriorate,
unemployment will remain high, and the increase in house prices
will slow down in the remainder of 2016 and in 2017.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show a decrease in both the weighted-
average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) for each rating level based on the higher
seasoning of the pool, the transaction's improved performance,
and the lower current loan-to-value (LTV) ratios.

Rating level     WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
AAAA                33.72       48.96
AA                  25.59       45.39
A                   21.11       38.29
BBB                 15.57       34.37
BB                  10.04       31.58
B                    8.42       28.99

Credit enhancement, if S&P accounts for the level of available
performing collateral and cash reserve in the transaction, has
increased to 31.40% from 26.99% since S&P's previous review for
the class A notes, and to 10.96% from 9.29% for the class B
notes.

The transaction features an interest deferral trigger for the
class B notes, set at 5% of cumulative defaults over the closing
portfolio balance.  Given the lack of definition of cumulative
defaults in the transaction documentation, in order to fully
assess the effect of an interest deferral trigger breach for the
class B notes, S&P models both net cumulative defaults, factoring
in recoveries for existing defaults and on a gross cumulative
basis.

As of the June 2016 interest payment date, the levels of net and
cumulative defaults were 3.64% and 6.49% of the closing portfolio
balance, respectively.

In both cases, even if the trigger is breached and interest on
the class B notes is diverted -- when considering cumulative
gross defaults -- the class B notes can support a 'B+ (sf)'
rating.  This is because there is a reserve fund left in the
transaction, which can be used to pay interest on the class B
notes, even if deferred.

S&P gives no credit to the swap provider (Banco Popular Espanol
S.A.) in S&P's analysis as it failed to find a replacement that
is in line with its current counterparty criteria.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

Following the application of S&P's RAS criteria and its RMBS
criteria, it has determined that its assigned rating on each
class of notes in this transaction should be the lower of (i) the
rating as capped by our RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the
class of notes can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.  In this
transaction, the rating on the class A notes is constrained by
the rating on the sovereign.

Taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash flow
analysis and the application of its RAS criteria, it considers
that the available credit enhancement for the class A and B notes
is commensurate with 'AA+ (sf)' and 'B+ (sf)' ratings,
respectively.  S&P has therefore raised to 'AA+ (sf)' from
'AA- (sf)' its rating on the class A notes and to 'B+ (sf)' from
'B- (sf)' its rating on the class B notes.

IM Banco Popular MBS 2 is a Spanish RMBS transaction, which S&P
first rated in July 2010.  It features high LTV ratio residential
and commercial loans originated and serviced by Banco Popular
Espa§ol and granted to Spanish borrowers, mainly concentrated in
the Spanish regions of Andalusia, Madrid, and Galicia.

RATINGS LIST

IM Banco Popular MBS 2, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR685 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class             Rating
            To               From

Ratings Raised

A           AA+ (sf)          AA- (sf)
B           B+ (sf)           B- (sf)


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


MRIYA AGROHOLDING: Creditors Approve Debt Restructuring
-------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that creditors of Mriya agroholding have
given their consent to reduce the company's debt by 70%, to
US$330 million and after debt restructuring they would receive
50-54% of the share capital.

Mriya's debt portfolio restructuring conditions (US$1.1 billion)
have been approved by coordination committees of creditor banks
and its noteholders, Interfax-Ukraine relays, citing a press
release of the agroholding issued on Sept. 12.

After the debt restructuring, 100% of share capital of Mriya will
belong to creditors and managers: 31-35% to providers of working
capital for 2016, 7.5% to providers of working capital for 2015,
7.5% to top managers as a motivation package and 50-54% to
unsecured creditors, Interfax-Ukraine discloses.

According to the restructuring conditions, a pari passu principle
applies to all unsecured creditors -- equal relation in part of
proposed compensation and regarding tools that could be used
after restructuring, Interfax-Ukraine relates.

After implementing the key restructuring conditions, the total
debt of Mriya decreased to the feasible debt burden -- US$330
million, Interfax-Ukraine discloses.

Mriya is an agricultural producer in Ukraine focusing on crop
cultivation.


VTB BANK UKRAINE: Sale Talks with Potential Buyers Collapse
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the Russian VTB Bank has
failed to arrive at agreement with two potential buyers of the
Ukrainian VTB Bank.

The Russian media outlet wrote that SCM and TAScombank groups
were eyeing purchase of the Ukrainian VTB but the parties failed
to arrive at agreement on the assessment of the bank's price,
Ukrainian News relates.

According to Ukrainian News, the Russian bank has decided to
change the tactics and is looking for purchasers of the credit
portfolio of the Ukrainian bank.

The credit portfolio of the Ukrainian VTB Bank was estimated at
RUR34 billion on July 1, 2016, Ukrainian News discloses.

On Sept. 2, VTB governor Andrey Kostin said he did not see
prospects for developing business in Ukraine, Ukrainian News
recounts.  He expressed doubts that VTB would manage to sell its
subsidiary in Ukraine, Ukrainian News notes.

The bank incurred a loss of UAH4.6 billion in 2015 and a loss of
UAH4.956 billion in H1 2016, Ukrainian News relays.

VTB Bank is 99.97% owned by Bank VTB (Russia).  As of July 1,
2016, the bank ranked 14th in terms of the amount of assets (UAH
21,081 million) among the 101 operating banks, according to
Information from the National Bank of Ukraine.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


VEDANTA RESOURCES: Moody's Raises CFR to B1, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Vedanta Resources plc's
corporate family rating to B1 from B2.

At the same time, Moody's has upgraded the company's senior
unsecured rating to B3 from Caa1.

The rating outlook is stable.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

"The upgrade of Vedanta's ratings reflects: (1) Moody's
expectation of the relative improvement in commodity prices and
the resultant increase in the company's earnings and cash flow;
(2) the company's progress in reducing absolute debt levels; and
(3) the high probability of a successful merger of Vedanta Ltd.
(unrated) and Cairn India Limited (CIL, unrated), improving group
liquidity and enhanced financial flexibility, which in Moody's
view, could result in debt reduction, further improving
leverage," says Kaustubh Chaubal, a Moody's Vice President and
Senior Analyst.

In Moody's view, the sharp price deterioration for major base
metals -- aluminum, copper, nickel and zinc -- seen in late 2015
and early 2016 has likely bottomed.  While Moody's do not expect
material improvements from current price levels over the next 12-
18 months, prices are unlikely to deteriorate further over the
medium term, given the various growth and stimulus measures
enacted in China to offset its decelerating GDP trajectory.

Vedanta has made significant progress in reducing absolute debt
levels and alleviating near-term refinancing risk through its
receipt of a large special dividend of $1 billion from cash rich,
Hindustan Zinc (HZL, unrated).  A significant improvement in
earnings and a sizeable reduction in debt will drive a correction
in adjusted leverage towards 4.0x by March 2017, supported by an
improvement in earnings.

Furthermore, Vedanta has obtained waivers from its lenders for
testing covenants for the periods of March 2016 and September
2016, and their relaxations for periods until March 2018.  As a
result, Moody's earlier concerns around rising covenant pressure
and the importance of a timely resolution of this issue have been
addressed.

In July 2016, Vedanta Ltd., Vedanta Resources' 62.9%-owned
subsidiary, announced revised terms for its merger with 59.9%-
owned subsidiary, CIL; and as of 12 September this transaction
has now been approved by the shareholders of Vedanta, Vedanta
Ltd. and CIL.

The merger, which now awaits High Court and some regulatory
approvals is expected to be completed by March 2017.  When
successful, it will provide Vedanta Ltd. with better access to
CIL's large cash balances of $3.5 billion as of June 2016 and
future cash surpluses, as previous access was possible only
through the up-streaming of dividends.

With access to CIL's cash and future cash flow, Moody's expects
Vedanta to apply a part of it towards retiring some of the
group's debt, thereby reducing leverage, or enhancing liquidity
across the group, particularly at Vedanta Resources plc, the
issuing entity for the US$ bonds.

Moody's also views the proposed Vedanta Ltd.-CIL merger as a
major step in the simplification of Vedanta's complex structure
and, in particular, in addressing some of the risks associated
with the group's thinly capitalized, but highly leveraged parent
company.

Moreover, the structural subordination of the senior unsecured
debt at Vedanta Resources remains.  Although the merger will
remove one layer between Vedanta Resources' senior unsecured debt
and CIL's cash, Vedanta Resources will remain without operating
assets and dependent on the up-streaming of dividends from the
operating and intermediate companies.  In addition, with its
shareholding in Vedanta Ltd. falling to 50.1% from 62.9%, cash
leakage to minority shareholders will reduce Vedanta Resources'
access to Vedanta Ltd.'s profits.

To narrow the notching between the B1 CFR and the B3 senior
unsecured debt rating, Moody's would look for total priority debt
to fall below 35%-40% of total consolidated debt, and for total
priority debt to fall to less than 15%-20% of total group assets.

As of March 31, 2016, the ratios stood at 54.7% and 29.3%,
respectively.  These ratios apart, Moody's will also look at
holding company liquidity and coverage metrics to consider
narrowing the notching.

Furthermore, holding company interest coverage above at least
1.0x on a sustained basis will also be key for any consideration
of a reduction in notching.

Vedanta's ratings continue to be supported by its (1) low-cost
operations; (2) business diversity, as reflected by its presence
in the copper, zinc, aluminum, iron ore, oil and gas, and power
businesses; (3) improving leverage and interest coverage
resulting from stabilizing commodity prices and debt reduction;
(4) commitment to reduce absolute debt levels and simplify its
corporate structure, and (5) good track record in implementing
capacity expansions.

The stable outlook is based on Moody's view that the extreme
price deterioration evident for major commodities -- as seen in
late 2015 and early 2016 -- has likely bottomed, but we do not
expect material improvements from current levels over the next
12-18 months.

Stabilizing prices should support Vedanta's earnings and increase
the pace of correction in its leverage.

Vedanta has $0.2 billion of debt maturing at the holding company,
which Moody's expects to be repaid out of the repayment of a
intercompany loan.  The next sizeable debt maturity at the
holding company are term loans aggregating $1.0 billion, due in
FY18.  The stable outlook also incorporates our expectation that
Vedanta will complete refinancing of the holdco debt in a timely
manner; a delay in completing refinancing at least three months
prior to the relevant maturity dates would exert negative
pressure on the ratings.

What Could Change the Rating -- Up

The ratings could experience positive momentum if commodity
prices improve, Vedanta continues to generate positive free cash
flow, and it further reduces debt levels, thereby improving
leverage.

Financial indicators that could lead to an upgrade include
adjusted leverage below 3.0x - 3.3x, EBIT/interest above 2.5x,
and cash flow from operations (CFO) less dividends/adjusted debt
above 15%, all on a sustained basis, while generating positive
free cash flow.

Timely completion of the Vedanta Ltd.-CIL merger, followed by a
substantial debt repayment would also lead to positive ratings
momentum.

What Could Change the Rating -- Down

Moody's do not anticipate downward rating pressure over the next
12 -- 18 months, given today's upgrade.

Fundamentally, the ratings could come under negative pressure if:
(1) weak commodity prices return, such that Vedanta's
consolidated adjusted 12-month EBITDA drops below $3.5 billion,
despite its efforts to ramp up shipments; (2) the company is
unable to sustain and improve its cost-reduction initiatives,
such that profitability weakens, with consolidated EBIT margins
falling below 8% on a sustained basis; and/or (3) its financial
metrics weaken from their current levels.

Credit metrics indicative of a downgrade include adjusted
debt/EBITDA in excess of 4.0x, EBIT/interest coverage below 2.0x,
or cash flow from operations less dividends/adjusted debt below
12.5%.

A delay in completing refinancing at least three months prior to
the maturity dates or an adverse ruling with respect to CIL's
disputed $3.2 billion tax liability would also exert negative
pressure on the ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

Headquartered in London, Vedanta Resources plc is a diversified
resources company with interests mainly in India.  Its main
operations are held by Vedanta Limited, a 62.9%-owned subsidiary
which produces zinc, lead, silver, aluminum, iron ore and power.
In December 2011, Vedanta Resources acquired control, of Cairn
India Limited, an independent oil exploration and production
company in India, which is a 59.9%-owned subsidiary of Vedanta
Ltd.  On July 22 2016, Vedanta Ltd. announced revised terms for
its merger of Cairn India with itself, in a cashless all stock
transaction, and the shareholders of Vedanta Resources, Vedanta
Ltd. and CIL have approved the Scheme of Arrangement for the
merger, subject to High Court and regulatory approvals.  If the
merger goes through as announced, Vedanta Resources' shareholding
in Vedanta Ltd. will fall to 50.1%.  Listed on the London Stock
Exchange, Vedanta Resources is 69.9% owned by Volcan Investments
Ltd.  For the year ended March 2016, Vedanta Resources reported
revenues of US$10.7 billion and operating EBITDA of
US$2.3 billion.

Upgrades:

Issuer: Vedanta Resources plc
  Corporate Family Rating (Foreign Currency), Upgraded to B1 from
   B2
  Corporate Family Rating (Local Currency), Upgraded to B1 from
   B2 Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture (Foreign Currency),
   Upgraded to B3 from Caa1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Vedanta Resources plc
  Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *