---

        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

         Wednesday, September 7, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 177


                            Headlines


B U L G A R I A

CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Deposit Fund Reimburses 111,274 Depositors
SOFIA CITY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Stable


F R A N C E

BULLYPIX: Failure to Find Buyer Prompts Liquidation
SOLOCAL: Holders of 15% Equity Back Restructuring Proposal
SOLOCAL: PPLocal Calls for Independent Valuation of Rescue Plans


G E R M A N Y

GESTALTEN: Enters Into Voluntary Insolvency, 35 Jobs Affected
KT AGRAR: Commences Insolvency Proceedings


G R E E C E

GREECE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Foreign & Local Currency IDRs


I C E L A N D

ORKUVEITA REYKJAVIKUR: Moody's Raises LT Issuer Rating to Ba2


I R E L A N D

TAURUS CMBS 2007-1: DBRS Cuts Class A2 Debt Rating to CCC


I T A L Y

GAMENET GROUP: S&P Publishes 'B' Issuer Credit Rating
ITALY: Still Laggard of Europe as Banking Sector Struggles
STEFANA SPA: Sept. 20 Deadline Set for Azienda Irrevocable Offers


K A Z A K H S T A N

ATFBANK JSC: S&P Assigns 'B' Counterparty Credit Ratings


M A C E D O N I A

PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Cuts LT IDRs to 'BB+', Outlook Negative


N E T H E R L A N D S

TELEFONICA EUROPE: Fitch Cuts Hybrid Securities Rating to 'BB+'


R O M A N I A

GARANTI BANK: Fitch Retains 'b+' Viability Rating, Outlook Neg.
MAREEA: Files for Insolvency, 1,100 Clients Affected


R U S S I A

O1 PROPERTIES: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable
BANK TETRAPOLIS: Placed Under Provisional Administration
CB PRISCO: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
INTERNATIONAL BANK: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Rating
MOSCOW CITY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Negative

ORENBURG REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
SEMEINY CAPITAL: Bank of Russia Provides Update on Administration
TOMSK CITY: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Foreign & Local Currency IDRs


U K R A I N E

KYIV CITY: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CC', Outlook Negative
UKRAINE: Deposit Fund Sells Assets of 22 Under-Liquidation Banks
UKRAINE: Deposit Fund Sells Assets of 24 Insolvent Banks


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

JAGUAR LAND: Fitch Hikes LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'BB+'
PELL & BALES: In Liquidation, 20 Jobs Affected
PENMAN ENGINEERING: "Major Contract" Delay Prompts Administration
PRG RECRUITMENT: Colesco Buys Business Following Administration
TP FINANCING: Moody's Lowers CFR to B3, Outlook Negative

WORLDPAY GROUP: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corporate Credit Rating


                            *********



===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Deposit Fund Reimburses 111,274 Depositors
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Bulgarian Deposit Insurance Fund disclosed that since the
initial day of reimbursement, December 4, 2014, until 5:00 p.m.
on September 2, 2016, 111,274 depositors with Corporate
Commercial Bank (in bankruptcy) have disposed with their
guaranteed deposits to the amount of BGN3 billion and BGN677.165
million.

Corporate Commercial Bank AD is the fourth largest bank in
Bulgaria in terms of assets, third in terms of net profit, and
first in terms of deposit growth.

Bulgaria's central bank placed Corpbank under its administration
and suspended shareholders' rights in June 2014 after a run
drained the bank of cash to meet client demands.


SOFIA CITY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' long-term issuer credit
rating on the City of Sofia.  The outlook is stable.

                             RATIONALE

The long-term rating on Sofia mainly reflects S&P's long-term
sovereign credit rating on Bulgaria.

S&P caps the long-term rating on Sofia at the level of the 'BB+'
long-term rating on Bulgaria.  Under S&P's methodology, a local
or regional government (LRG) can be rated higher than its
sovereign only if S&P believes that it exhibits certain
characteristics, as described in "Ratings Above The Sovereign--
Corporate And Government Ratings: Methodology And Assumptions,"
published Nov. 19, 2013.  S&P do not currently believes that
Bulgarian LRGs, including Sofia, meet these conditions.
Consequently, we do not see a possibility that we could rate
Sofia higher than Bulgaria.

Based on Sofia's intrinsic credit strengths and in accordance
with S&P's criteria, it assess Sofia's stand-alone credit profile
(SACP) at 'bbb'.  The SACP is not a rating but a means of
assessing the intrinsic creditworthiness of an LRG under the
assumption that there is no sovereign rating cap.

The SACP on Sofia reflects S&P's view of the city's exceptional
liquidity and strong budgetary flexibility, based on its
significant autonomy in managing local revenues.  This
flexibility is somewhat constrained, however, by the city
government's reluctance to raise taxes and fees.  Sofia's
economic wealth is average compared with international peers, in
S&P's view.

The SACP is constrained by Sofia's evolving and unbalanced
institutional framework.  Combined with weak, albeit
strengthening, financial management, this limits the
predictability of the city's financial performance.  A large
capital investment program will likely keep our assessment of the
city's budgetary performance at average, with continued deficits
after capital accounts.  It will also see the city's debt burden
remain high, with high contingent liabilities relating to its
exposures to municipal companies and a municipal bank.

S&P views Sofia's economic wealth as average, compared globally.
Although Bulgaria's GDP per capita is relatively low at about
US$7,400, S&P believes Sofia benefits from an exceptionally
diversified economy.  The city is also Bulgaria's administrative,
financial, and economic center.

In S&P's view, Sofia benefits from relatively high budgetary
flexibility owing to its increased authority over local taxes.
Nevertheless, S&P understands that the city remains reluctant to
raise taxes.  In addition, owing to the large amount of off-
budget investments in the city's infrastructure, S&P assumes that
the city could delay some of its capital expenditures (capex)
beyond 2016 if needed.

In S&P's base-case scenario, the city's average budgetary
performance will be affected by sluggish economic growth of 1.6%
on average in 2016-2018, an unwillingness to raise taxes and
fees, and a continued gradual increase in operating spending.
However, better collection mechanisms will continue supporting a
solid operating balance, in our opinion.  Also, S&P expects high
levels of capex to remain, supported mostly by expected
availability of earmarked grants from the new 2014-2020 EU
budget.

In S&P's base case, it expects the city to maintain its adjusted
operating surplus (net of expenditures delegated by the central
government and corresponding revenues), as a percentage of
adjusted operating revenues, at about 16% on average during 2014-
2018.  In 2015, the city's operating surplus climbed to almost
17% of operating revenues, after 12% in the previous year.  S&P
expects that a reviving construction sector and efforts to
improve the collectability of local taxes will result in the
operating surplus remaining at about 16% of operating revenues in
2018.

The city's strong operating performance is helping finance its
ambitious capex program.  However, although the city receives
substantial capital transfers from the central government and EU
grants, it has to cofinance massive investments in transport
infrastructure and waste treatment facilities.

The EU budget cycle has a strong impact on Sofia's budgetary
performance.  The city maintained its high level of expenditures
in 2015, though lower than S&P's base-case scenario.  Together
with strong operating performance, this has resulted in only a
minor deficit after capital accounts of less than 2% of total
revenues in 2015, compared with a 13.8% deficit a year earlier.
S&P expects Sofia's capex to peak at about 29% of total
expenditures in 2016, which will result in a deficit after
capital accounts of about 8% of total revenues.

The new 2014-2020 EU financial framework will probably not lead
to an immediate hike in spending, since the approval of projects
eligible for EU cofunding needs to go through a lengthy
bureaucratic process.  As a result, S&P expects a reduction in
the city's budget deficit, to an average of 4.1% of total
revenues in 2017-2018.

S&P expects high capex will fuel Sofia's debt accumulation, which
S&P already assess as high.  In S&P's base-case scenario, its
direct debt as a percentage of operating revenues will gradually
climb to about 126% by year-end 2018.  Although the debt is
exposed to moderate market risks, S&P don't believe currency
fluctuations will increase risks materially.  As of Dec. 31,
2015, about 27% of the city's debt was denominated in Japanese
yen and remained unhedged.

Tax-supported debt, which also includes debt of municipal non-
self-supporting companies (companies that do or will likely
require financial support from the city), will be about 60% of
consolidated operating revenues by end-2018.  S&P includes debt
of the city-owned heating utility, Toplofikacia, and the Urban
Mobility Center, the company that coordinates Sofia's public
transport services, in S&P's calculation of tax-supported debt.
S&P notes that last year the Urban Mobility Center signed a
credit line agreement of about Bulgarian lev (BGN) 80 million
(about EUR41 million) to meet its payables to transport
operators, and S&P forecasts transport companies will take on
more debt themselves over S&P's forecasting period, to finance
related capital projects.

The ratings are also constrained by the city's high contingent
liabilities, which, if they fully materialize, S&P estimates at
between 15%-30% of its adjusted operating revenues.  These
include sizable overdue payables of Toplofikacia, accumulated
over several years, and Municipal Bank A.D.'s potential capital
requirement. Toplofikacia is the largest district heating
producer and distributor in Bulgaria.  It has been suffering
financially for many years because of a gap between collected
payments and obligations to Bulgargaz for natural gas.  The
company is also exposed to the volatility of energy prices.  In
late 2015, Toplofikacia agreed a repayment schedule with
Bulgarian Energy Holding (owner of Bulgargaz).

In S&P's view, the city's financial management is weak, albeit
strengthening, backed by improving quality of budgeting and the
degree of its control over its government-related entities.  The
reliability of the newly established long-term financial planning
is as yet untested.

The ongoing turbulence in the Bulgarian political environment
creates uncertainty for the evolution of intergovernmental
relations.  S&P cannot rule out unexpected changes in the
distribution of revenues and spending tasks, which could arise
from the evolving-but-unbalanced institutional framework under
which Bulgarian municipalities operate.

                             LIQUIDITY

S&P considers Sofia's liquidity to be exceptional.  S&P bases its
assessment on its exceptional debt service coverage.  Its
available cash reserves and high internal cash-generating
capacity offset what S&P views as its limited access to external
liquidity due to weaknesses in Bulgaria's banking system and its
shallow capital markets.

Thanks to a favorable long-term maturity profile, grace periods
in principal loan repayments, and an amortizing debt structure,
Sofia's debt service will average slightly below 8% of adjusted
operating revenues in 2016-2018.

S&P expects the city's average cash to cover its annual debt
service over the next 12 months by slightly less than 4x.  S&P
forecasts that, in the next 12 months, the city's average cash
position, including the coverage of the projected deficit, will
be about BGN150 million, against S&P's estimate of BGN38 million
in annual debt service.

Furthermore, S&P anticipates the city's internal cash-generating
capability will remain strong over the next two to three years,
with relatively high operating surpluses covering annual debt
service more than 2x.

The city holds free cash on accounts and deposits in Municipal
Bank, but S&P do not apply a haircut to cash holdings.  S&P
understands that banks in Bulgaria are legally obliged to hold
Bulgarian treasuries as collateral for municipalities' cash
holdings at a special account at the Bulgarian National Bank.  If
the Bulgarian National Bank were to revise its policy, S&P could
revise downward its assessment of the city's liquidity position.
S&P views the city's access to external liquidity as limited by
Bulgaria's weak domestic banking sector.

                              OUTLOOK

The stable outlook over the next 12 months mirrors that on
Bulgaria.  Any negative rating action S&P takes on the sovereign
will be followed by a similar action on Sofia.  A positive rating
action on the sovereign will be followed by a similar action on
Sofia as long as the city's SACP, at the time, remains above or
at the same level as the sovereign credit rating.

An upgrade of Sofia is contingent on a positive rating action on
Bulgaria, as S&P do not rate Bulgarian municipalities above the
sovereign.

S&P views an intrinsic downside scenario as highly unlikely
because the city's SACP is higher than the credit rating.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                     Rating
                                     To              From
Sofia (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency         BB+/Stable/--  BB+/Stable/--



===========
F R A N C E
===========


BULLYPIX: Failure to Find Buyer Prompts Liquidation
---------------------------------------------------
Matthew Handrahan at GamesIndustry.biz reports that French
publisher Bulkypix is now in liquidation, and a deadline has been
set for its development partners to recover any assets or monies
owed.

According to GamesIndustry.biz, Bulkypix is now in liquidation,
and a deadline has been set for its development partners was
declared officially insolvent in March of this year, but attempts
to find a buyer for the company proved unsuccessful.  It is now
in liquidation, leaving some of its development partners unsure
of how to proceed, GamesIndustry.biz discloses.

Bulkypix's partners can attempt to recover assets and money
through the company's liquidator, GamesIndustry.biz relays,
citing Touch Arcade.  French partners must apply within two
months of Aug. 18, GamesIndustry.biz states.  International
developers have four months from the same date, GamesIndustry.biz
relates.

Bulkypix was founded in 2009 by former members of Vivendi Games'
mobile division.


SOLOCAL: Holders of 15% Equity Back Restructuring Proposal
----------------------------------------------------------
Luca Casiraghi at Bloomberg News reports that Solocal Group said
holders of 15% of its equity and more than half of its debt
support the company's plan to restructure EUR1.2 billion (US$1.3
billion).

Shareholders will vote on the plan at a general meeting on
Oct. 19, Bloomberg relays, citing a company presentation on
Aug. 31.  The company said the proposal must also be approved by
two thirds of creditors in a vote likely to be held before then,
Bloomberg relates.  According to Bloomberg, Solocal said assuming
the deal is agreed by investors and the Court of Nanterre in
France, it will be completed by the end of the year.

Solocal, previously called PagesJaunes, is seeking to cut its
debt to EUR400 million through a restructuring plan that includes
a debt-for-equity swap and a capital injection by existing
shareholders, Bloomberg discloses.  Shareholders must subscribe
the capital increase to maintain control of the company or else
give control to creditors, Bloomberg notes.

The publisher, which reorganized EUR1.6 billion of borrowings in
2014, has said that it won't be able to repay debt due in 2018 as
online services sales haven't yet replaced lower revenues from
traditional print directories, Bloomberg relays.  It's also
struggled to invest in digital products because of its debt pile,
Bloomberg states.

Solocal turned to a so-called mandat ad hoc, which is an option
available to solvent French companies that are facing financial
difficulties, Bloomberg recounts.  The court appointed Helene
Bourbouloux as adviser to help the company reach a consensual
debt-restructuring agreement with creditors, Bloomberg discloses.

The company has said its main creditors include Paulson & Co.,
GSO Capital Partners, Farallon Capital Management, Amber Capital
and Boussard & Gavaudan Asset Management, according to Bloomberg.

                       About SoLocal Group

Solocal Group is a French directories publisher.  The Internet
activities of the Group are structured around two business lines:
Local Search and Digital Marketing. With Local Search, the Group
offers digital services and solutions to clients which enable
them to enhance their visibility and develop their local
contacts.  With over 4,400 employees, including a salesforce of
1,900 local communication advisors specialized in five verticals
(Home, Services, Retail, Health & Public, BtoB) and
Internationally (France, Spain, Austria, United Kingdom), the
Group generated in 2015 revenues of EUR873 million.


SOLOCAL: PPLocal Calls for Independent Valuation of Rescue Plans
----------------------------------------------------------------
David Whitehouse at Bloomberg News reports that the PPLocal group
representing some shareholders of SoLocal has called for an
independent expert to be appointed to evaluate restructuring
proposals that the company will make at the Annual General
Meeting.

According to Bloomberg News, PPLocal wants the expert to be
appointed by the Tribunal of Commerce or by France's AMF
financial regulator.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 27,
2016, Bloomberg News related that Solocal began a court-backed
process to restructure EUR1.1 billion (US$1.3 billion) of debt,
its second reorganization in about two years.  According to
Bloomberg, the company said a statement on June 23 it asked the
Commercial Court of Nanterre to appoint a restructuring adviser,
triggering a default event on EUR350 million of June 2018 bonds.
Solocal, previously called PagesJaunes, warned it won't be able
to repay debt due in 2018 as online services lure users from
traditional print directories, Bloomberg disclosed.

                       About SoLocal Group

Solocal Group is a French directories publisher.  The Internet
activities of the Group are structured around two business lines:
Local Search and Digital Marketing. With Local Search, the Group
offers digital services and solutions to clients which enable
them to enhance their visibility and develop their local
contacts.  With over 4,400 employees, including a salesforce of
1,900 local communication advisors specialized in five verticals
(Home, Services, Retail, Health & Public, BtoB) and
Internationally (France, Spain, Austria, United Kingdom), the
Group generated in 2015 revenues of EUR873 million.




=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


GESTALTEN: Enters Into Voluntary Insolvency, 35 Jobs Affected
-------------------------------------------------------------
Dezeen reports that Gestalten has entered into voluntary
insolvency after losing money on a concept store in Berlin.

According to Dezeen, the company made the declaration after
failing to secure an extended credit line from its bank.

Gestalten found itself short of cash after running into problems
with Space Berlin, a concept store it operated on the top floor
of the Bikini Berlin retail and leisure complex in the German
capital, Dezeen relates.

According to Dezeen, Gestalten CEO Robert Klanten said Sales at
the store declined after the owners of Bikini Berlin closed the
second-floor retail level and moved stores to the ground level.

The insolvency agreement protects Gestalten from creditors
including Bikini Berlin while it attempts to restructure itself
and refocus on its core publishing business, Dezeen notes.
Around 35 staff at the store have been made redundant,
Dezeen discloses.

Gestalten has informed writers and other suppliers that invoices
for services submitted before Aug. 22 have been frozen, but
invoices submitted after that date will be guaranteed, Dezeen
relays.

Mr. Klanten, as cited by Dezeen, said it was up to legal
administrators to decide whether invoices would be paid but he
added: "It's totally clear that Gestalten will survive as a brand
and as a company."

"I have a couple of potential investors and I'm reviewing my
options" he added, saying that the company was otherwise healthy
and had been growing strongly.

Gestalten is a German publishing house.  The company publishes
books about architecture, design and other creative disciplines,


KT AGRAR: Commences Insolvency Proceedings
------------------------------------------
Ivan Shumkov at SeeNews reports that KTG Agrar SE, a debt-laden
German farming company that operates biogas plants, on Sept. 1
announced the commencement of insolvency proceedings regarding
its assets.

KTG Agrar, which has debts of about EUR394 million (US$440.5
million) said in a statement that the Hamburg District Court had
ordered self-administration, SeeNews relates.

According to SeeNews, the opening of proceedings marks the start
for a structured sale process involving the company's
agricultural segment and a roughly 50% stake in KTG Energie AG.
The company noted that alternative restructuring options are very
limited, SeeNews states.

Write-downs in investments and receivables of the company are
estimated at up to EUR222 million and in other assets at around
EUR169 million, SeeNews relays, citing the provisional trustee's
report.  Because of that, the insolvency rate for creditors will
be extremely low, it added, SeeNews notes.


===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' LT Foreign & Local Currency IDRs
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Greece's Long-Term Foreign and Local-
Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'CCC'. The issue
ratings on Greece's long-term senior unsecured bonds have also
been affirmed at 'CCC'. The Short-term Foreign and Local Currency
IDRs and the rating on Greece's short-term debt have all been
affirmed at 'C', and the Country Ceiling at 'B-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The completion of the first review and approval in May of the
second tranche (EUR10.3 billion, 6% of GDP) of Greece's EUR86
billion European Stability Mechanism (ESM) program highlights
improved relations with creditors, but in Fitch's view
implementation risks are still high. The agreement was reached
several months later than planned but the delay did not give rise
to marked economic volatility.

The country's 2015 primary surplus (program definition) was
confirmed at 0.7% of GDP, better than the target of a deficit of
0.25%. A run-up of government arrears during creditor
negotiations led to a fall in general government debt, to 177% of
GDP in 2015 from 180% of GDP in 2014, still the second highest of
all Fitch-rated countries. Fiscal performance so far this year is
consistent with meeting the 2016 primary surplus target of 0.5%
of GDP, but the remaining fiscal targets, of 1.75% of GDP in 2017
and 3.5% in 2018, will be progressively harder to meet.

In completing the first review, the government legislated as
"prior actions" measures to meet the estimated fiscal gap of 3%
of GDP to 2018, of which just above two-thirds come from pension
and income tax reform. Relatively weak domestic ownership of
program policy, however, makes their full implementation
difficult. The agreement also includes a contingent fiscal
mechanism retrospectively triggering further measures if a fiscal
target is missed, as well as tax efficiency reforms on which the
follow-through is less certain.

The second review is slated to commence in 4Q16, with labor
reform expected to be the most contentious component. Fitch
estimates that the government will have sufficient buffers (cash,
repos and possible arrears build-up) to last into 2Q17 without
release of funds on completing the second review, which increases
the likelihood of negotiations slipping into next year. The
nature of IMF participation is likely to hinge on the scope for
relaxation of the medium-term fiscal targets and degree of
commitment to debt relief.

So far the Eurogroup has set out only general parameters of a
potential debt deal; namely that gross financing needs should
remain below 15% of GDP "for the medium term" and below 20%
thereafter, and that the more substantial relief such as interest
rate caps, coupon deferrals and maturity extensions are
conditional on successful program completion in 2018. Delivering
debt relief in stages and contingent on delivery could
incentivize performance, but could have the opposite effect if it
came to be seen by Greek politicians or the public as a distant
or unattainable prospect. Uncertainty around the likely outcome
also limits the economic benefits through boosting confidence in
the long-term sustainability of Greek debt.

Syriza has been losing ground in the polls to the centre-right
New Democracy, which has less ideological opposition to a number
of the program policies but has argued for its renegotiation in
particular on fiscal targets. Despite a slim majority, Fitch
expects Prime Minister Tsipras to be able to continue to rely on
votes from centrist parties, but the potential for political
surprises remains. Maintaining sufficient support to deliver on
the demanding conditions through to 2018 is highly challenging,
particularly in view of the track record of slippage under
previous programs.

GDP contracted 0.75% (annualized) in 1H16, and Fitch expects a
modest pick-up in the remainder of 2016 taking full year growth
to -0.5%. Fitch said, "We forecast GDP growth of 1.8% in 2017,
supported by an increase in investment and, to a lesser extent,
private consumption, and a moderately positive net trade
contribution. Unemployment fell to 23.5% in May 2016 from close
to 25.9% at the beginning of 2015 and we expect a further gradual
fall, to an average 21.9% in 2018, still the highest in the
eurozone." The low oil price and sharp import contraction
following imposition of capital controls has taken the current
account close to balance from a deficit of 2.1% of GDP in 2014.
Fitch expects small current account surpluses in 2016 and 2017,
with net external debt remaining elevated at close to 130% of GDP
in 2016.

Last year's bank recapitalization helped stabilize the financial
sector but consumer and investor confidence have been slow to
recover. Bank deposits have increased only 2% since their 25%
(EUR38 billion) drop in 1H15, although the relaxation of capital
controls in July, in particular the withdrawal of restrictions on
new deposits, is expected to lead to some moderate pick-up in
deposits in 2H16. As a result, Greek banks continue to face very
large funding imbalances, with Emergency Liquidity Assistance
(ELA) accounting for 20% of system-wide funding. June's ECB
reinstatement of the waiver permitting Greek government bonds to
be used as collateral will allow a fairly small share of ELA
funding (estimated 7%) to be transferred to ECB's regular
financing operations at a 150bp lower interest rate.

The key challenge for the Greek banking sector is tackling non-
performing exposures (NPEs) which remain extremely high at above
45% of gross loans. Improvement has been made to the legal and
institutional framework for resolving loans, but progress in
working through problem assets has been relatively slow. High
NPEs, funding imbalances and weak credit demand continue to
constrain net private sector lending, which Fitch forecasts will
contract 2.8% in 2016 and 1.5% in 2017.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) and QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Greece a score equivalent to a
rating of BB on the Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR scale.

In accordance with its rating criteria, Fitch's sovereign rating
committee decided to adjust the rating indicated by the SRM by
more than the usual maximum range of +/-3 notches because of
Greece's experience of financial crisis.

Consequently, the overall adjustment of five notches reflects the
following adjustments:-

   -- Macro: -1 notch, to reflect a history of weak macroeconomic
      management that contributed to financial crises and steep
      declines in GDP.

   -- Public Finances: -1 notch, to reflect public debt at close
      to 180% of GDP; the SRM does not capture "non-linear"
      vulnerabilities at such a high level.

   -- External Finances: -2 notches, to reflect: a) Greece's high
      net external debt which is not captured in the SRM, and
      restricted market access which reduces financing
      flexibility; and b) the +2-notch SRM enhancement for
      "reserve currency flexibility" has been adjusted to +1
      notch given Greece's financial crisis experience.

   -- Structural Features: -1 notch, to reflect political risks
      to the program, and a weak banking sector reliant on
      official funding and with capital controls still largely in

     place.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression
rating model that employs 18 variables based on three year
centered averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a
score equivalent to a Long-Term Foreign Currency IDR. Fitch's QO
is a forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for
adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating,
reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully
quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that could, individually or collectively,
result in an upgrade include:

   -- A further track record of successful implementation of the
      ESM program, brought about by an orderly working
      relationship between Greece and its official creditors and
      a relatively stable political environment.

   -- An economic recovery, further primary surpluses, and
      official sector debt relief would provide upward momentum
      for the ratings over the medium term.

Developments that could, individually or collectively, result in
a downgrade include:

   -- A repeat of the prolonged breakdown in relations between
      Greece and its creditors seen last year, for example in the
      context of a failure to meet program targets and worsening
      liquidity conditions.

   -- Non-payment, redenomination or distressed debt exchange of
      government debt securities issued in the market or a
      government-declared moratorium on all debt service.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Any debt relief given to Greece under the ESM program will apply
to official-sector debt only, and would not therefore constitute
an event of default under the agency's criteria.


=============
I C E L A N D
=============


ORKUVEITA REYKJAVIKUR: Moody's Raises LT Issuer Rating to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Ba2 from Ba3 the
long-term issuer rating of Orkuveita Reykjavikur (OR).
Concurrently, a stable outlook has been assigned.

The rating action concludes the rating review initiated on
June 13, 2016, and it is driven by the speed and extent of
Iceland's progress in recovering from its 2008 crisis, as
captured by Moody's upgrade of Iceland's government bond rating
to A3 stable from Baa2 under review for upgrade on Sept. 1, 2016.
For details, please refer to:

    http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PR_351195

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade of OR's issuer rating to Ba2 reflects the progress
the company has made with regard to strengthening its financial
profile and improving its liquidity position in the context of a
continuing improvement in the macroeconomic environment and
market conditions in Iceland.  It also takes account of Moody's
expectation that OR should be able to maintain its improved
financial performance and good liquidity position.

OR's financial profile has improved as a result of the company's
successful execution of a five-year plan approved by the board of
directors in March 2011.  The company has outperformed against
almost all targets, including those related to increasing
revenues, reducing costs, and postponing certain investments.

The rating upgrade takes into account Iceland's improved
macroeconomic dynamics and the positive impact this will likely
have on OR's business.  The Icelandic economy has continued to
grow at a strong pace since 2011 and Moody's forecasts GDP growth
of 5% in 2016 and 3.9% in 2017.  These improvements are
underpinned by increasingly robust domestic demand from private
consumption and business investments, including the expansion of
the fast-growing tourist infrastructure, which should be
supportive of sustained demand growth for utility services.

OR's foreign currency exposure remains substantial owing to a
significant mismatch between the majority of its revenues being
generated in Icelandic krona and the majority of its debt being
denominated in foreign currency, and this continues to weigh on
the rating.  Since the beginning of 2015, the Icelandic krona has
appreciated by more than 12% in trade-weighted terms.  The
strengthening of the local currency reflects both the solid
fundamentals of the economy and market expectations that the
interest rate differential between Iceland and other major
countries will remain high.  This has helped OR to alleviate its
foreign currency debt servicing burden, and we expect OR's 2016
credit metrics to be positively impacted.  Such benefits could
disappear if the Icelandic krona reverses direction and weakens.
Whilst we do not expect material movement in the exchange rate in
2016 and 2017, OR remains exposed to developments in the exchange
rate, albeit against a background of lower exchange rate
volatility.

Overall, OR's rating factors in positively (1) the company's
strong market position and strategic importance to Reykjavik, and
Iceland more broadly, as the provider of essential utility
services to more than 70% of Iceland's population; (2) the low
business risk profile associated with regulated activities, which
account for more than 60% of the company's EBITDA and provide a
good degree of cash flow predictability; (3) the positive
macroeconomic dynamics in Iceland that should be supportive of
sustained demand growth for utility services; and (4) OR's asset
base that has predictable and low levels of capital expenditure
requirements.  However, the rating also takes account of (1) OR's
significant financial leverage; (2) its foreign currency
exposure; and (3) its exposure to long-term power purchase
agreements with aluminum smelters, which exposes revenues to the
price of aluminum.

OR is considered a government-related issuer under Moody's
methodology because of its ownership by municipal authorities,
which include the City of Reykjavik (93.5%), the Town of Akranes
(5.5%) and the Municipality of Borgarbyggd (1%).  The owners
provide a guarantee of collection in support of OR, which
currently covers more than 95% of the total outstanding debt.
The company's Ba2 rating incorporates one notch of uplift for
potential extraordinary support to the company's baseline credit
assessment (BCA, a measure of standalone credit strength) of ba3.
This recognizes that despite the very strong incentives of the
owners to provide timely financial support to OR its ability to
do so in potential stress case scenarios may be constrained,
given OR's very significant debt burden relative to the financial
resources of its shareholders.  Therefore, considering the
critical nature of utility services that OR provides to the City
of Reykjavik and the surrounding communities, covering more than
70% of the Icelandic population, Moody's would expect the central
government to try and coordinate with the local governments to
arrange timely intervention, if necessary.  Moody's notes that
instances of default by municipalities in Iceland during the 2008
crisis indicate a low probability of extraordinary support could
be forthcoming directly from the central government in the event
that OR were to face financial distress.

                   RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that OR will
continue to prudently manage its liquidity and improve its
financial position, such that credit metrics will be comfortably
positioned within the ratio guidance for a ba3 bca, namely the
maintenance of an FFO/ Net debt ratio in the low to mid-teens in
percentage terms.

              WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/ DOWN

Moody's could consider an upgrade if the company's credit metrics
were to improve such that FFO/Net debt was greater than 15% on a
sustainable basis without increasing its financial risk profile.
This would also assume no change to the assumption of support
from the owner incorporated into OR's rating.

Conversely, downward pressure on OR's rating could develop (1) as
consequence of a weakening in the company's financial profile,
such that FFO/ Net debt in percentage terms was expected to
remain consistently below 10%; or (2) it would appear likely that
the company's liquidity was not sufficient to insulate it from
market risks, particularly in relation to exchange rates,
aluminium prices or interest rates, and OR were unable to raise
debt in the domestic or international markets.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Regulated Electric
and Gas Utilities published in December 2013, and Government-
Related Issuers published in October 2014.

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Orkuveita Reykjavikur is the largest
multi-utility in Iceland.  The company operates its own power
plants, electricity distribution system, geothermal district
heating system and provides cold water and waste services in 20
communities in the southwest of the country, covering more than
70% of the Icelandic population.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


TAURUS CMBS 2007-1: DBRS Cuts Class A2 Debt Rating to CCC
---------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited downgraded the rating of the following class
of Commercial Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes (the Notes)
issued by Taurus CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2007-1 Limited:

   -- Class A2 to CCC (sf) from B (low) (sf)

In conjunction with this rating action, DBRS has also confirmed
the ratings of the remaining four classes of the transaction as
follows:

   -- Class A1 at B (sf)

   -- Class B at CCC (sf)

   -- Class C at CCC (sf)

   -- Class D at C (sf)

Classes C and D also have Interest in Arrears. The trend on Class
A1 is Negative. The other classes have ratings that carry no
trends.

The rating downgrade of Class A2 reflects the uncertainty in the
Fishman JEC Portfolio (Fishman JEC) individual asset disposal
plan, which may delay the principal and interest repayment due at
bond maturity in February 2020, ten months ahead of the Fishman
JEC extended maturity date in December 2020. Therefore, DBRS also
maintains the Negative trend for the senior class.

The Fishman JEC loan currently represents 84.0% (EUR127.4
million) of the current pool balance and is the larger of the two
loans remain in the transaction, both in special servicing. The
Fishman JEC loan is secured by 15 office and industrial
properties located throughout France. The loan initially
transferred to special servicing in May 2014 after the borrower
triggered insolvency proceedings ahead of the originally
scheduled maturity in July 2014. Therefore, the Fishman JEC loan
was specially serviced whereby cash flows and asset disposal
proceeds were frozen, which led to drawings being made to the
liquidity facility. On September 7, 2015, the French courts
formally adopted the Safeguard Plan for Fishman JEC borrowers,
unfreezing payments and allowing the issuer to have cleared
accrued and unpaid interest on the Class A1, A2 and B notes, as
of August 2016. On each anniversary of the adoption of the
Safeguard Plan, the Fishman JEC loan will amortize by a scheduled
increasing percentage of the loan balance. The next amortization
payment is scheduled for September 2016 and will represent 5.0%
of the Fishman JEC whole loan balance. Based on the adopted
Safeguard Plan, Fishman JEC borrowers are obliged to start
marketing all remaining properties by certain dates set out. As
of August 2016, 10 properties were scheduled to be marketed, with
only one secondary asset being sold. Although DBRS expects the
Fishman JEC loan to continue to pay interest, the principal
repayment at bond maturity will strongly depend on the borrowers'
ability to dispose properties of the portfolio ahead of schedule.
The Fishman JEC portfolio is currently 84.1% occupied; the top
five tenants represent 76.6% of the total rent with a weighted-
average remaining lease-to-break option of 1 year and 9 months.
The portfolio was reappraised in December 2014 at EUR 126.3
million, excluding the asset sold, which resulted in a loan-to-
value ratio of 100.8%.

The Hutley loan, which represents 15.9% (EUR 24.1 million) of the
current pool, is currently secured by 11 properties containing
office, retail and leisure components located throughout Germany.
No property disposal has been made since issuance. The Hutley
loan was restructured in 2011, which resulted in a new loan
maturity in July 2014 with two one-year extension options to
extend the maturity date to July 2015 and then July 2016. The
borrower exercised both extension options; in July 2016, the
Hutley borrower failed to pay in full all amounts outstanding in
relation to the Hutley whole loan. As such, a loan event of
default has occurred, and the Hutley loan became specially
serviced as of August 1, 2016. According to the most recent RIS
notification, the Hutley borrower has informed the Servicer and
the Special Servicer that it is in the process of negotiating the
terms of a refinancing for the Hutley Whole Loan and that
completion of the refinancing remains subject, amongst others, to
the parties, including the Hutley Borrower, locating the relevant
Land Charge certificate. A cancellation procedure with respect to
the Land Charge certificate has been commenced and is expected to
take approximately nine months. Completion of the refinancing is
expected to occur as soon as possible once the Land Charge
certificate has been located or once the cancellation procedure
has been completed. As of the August 2016 deal summary report ,
the overall portfolio occupancy has improved to 88.0%, slightly
higher than the 86.2% occupancy reported in the previous review
last year. The top three tenants account for 49.4% of the rental
income with a weighted-average lease-to-term of 5.54 years.

DBRS's rating actions follow the current credit characteristics
and performance of the transaction since the last DBRS rating
action in September 2015.

Notes:

All figures are in euros unless otherwise noted.

The principal methodology applicable is European CMBS
Surveillance.

DBRS has applied the principal methodology consistently and
conducted a review of the transaction in accordance with the
principal methodology.

A review of the transaction legal documents was not conducted as
the documents have remained unchanged since the most recent
rating action.

The sources of information used for this rating include the
Servicer: Capita Asset Services (Ireland) Limited; and Special
Servicer: Capita Asset Services (UK) Limited.

DBRS does not rely upon third-party due diligence in order to
conduct its analysis.

DBRS was not supplied with third party assessments. However, this
did not impact the rating analysis.

DBRS considers the information available to it for the purposes
of providing this rating to be of satisfactory quality.

DBRS does not audit the information it receives in connection
with the rating process, and it does not and cannot independently
verify that information in every instance.

The last rating action on this transaction took place on 2
September 2015, when DBRS downgraded five classes and withdrew
ratings on two classes of this transaction.

The lead responsibilities for this transaction have been
transferred to Jorge Lopez Herguido.

To assess the impact of the changing the transaction parameters
on the rating, DBRS considered the following stress scenarios, as
compared to the parameters used to determine the rating (the
"Base Case"):

A decrease of 10% and 20% in the DBRS net cash flow (NCF),
derived by looking at comparable properties, market rents, market
occupancies in addition to expenses ratios, capital expenditures
and re-tenanting costs, would lead to the following ratings in
the transaction, as noted below for each class respectively:

Class A1 Notes Risk Sensitivity:

   -- 10% decline in DBRS NCF, expected rating of Class CCC (sf)

   -- 20% decline in DBRS NCF, expected rating of Class CCC (sf)

Class A2 Notes Risk Sensitivity:

   -- 10% decline in DBRS NCF, expected rating of Class B at CCC
      (sf)

   -- 20% decline in DBRS NCF, expected rating of Class B at CCC
      (sf)

Class B Notes Risk Sensitivity:

   -- 10% decline in DBRS NCF, expected rating of Class C at CCC
      (sf)

   -- 20% decline in DBRS NCF, expected rating of Class C at CCC
      (sf)

Class C Notes Risk Sensitivity:

   -- 10% decline in DBRS NCF, expected rating of Class C at CCC
      (sf)

   -- 20% decline in DBRS NCF, expected rating of Class C at CCC
      (sf)

Class D Notes Risk Sensitivity:

   -- 10% decline in DBRS NCF, expected rating of Class C at C
      (sf)

   -- 20% decline in DBRS NCF, expected rating of Class C at C
      (sf)

Generally, the conditions that lead to the assignment of a
Negative or Positive Trend are resolved within a 12-month period.
DBRS's outlooks and ratings are monitored.

Ratings assigned by DBRS Ratings Limited are subject to EU
regulations only.

Initial Lead Analyst: Abbey Fitzgerald
Initial Rating Date: 2 July 2007
Initial Rating Committee Chair: Mary Jane Potthoff, Managing
Director, Global CMBS
Lead Surveillance Analyst: Jorge Lopez Herguido, Financial
Analyst, European CMBS
Rating Committee Chair: Erin Stafford, Managing Director, Global
CMBS

DBRS Ratings Limited
20 Fenchurch Street, 31st Floor
London EC3M 3BY United Kingdom
Registered in England and Wales: No. 7139960

   -- European CMBS Surveillance

   -- European CMBS Rating Methodology

   -- Legal Criteria for European Structured Finance Transactions

   -- Derivative Criteria for European Structured Finance
      Transactions

   -- Unified Interest Rate Model for European Securitisations


=========
I T A L Y
=========


GAMENET GROUP: S&P Publishes 'B' Issuer Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it is publishing its issuer credit
rating of 'B' on Gamenet Group S.p.A., the issuing vehicle of
Gamenet's EUR200 million senior secured notes and EUR30 million
revolving credit facility, as S&P had stated on July 20, 2016.
S&P erroneously did not publish the issuer credit rating.  This
error has now been rectified.

Under S&P's corporate methodology, the assignment of an issuer
credit rating is effectively a prerequisite for the assignment of
issue ratings on the senior notes and on the revolver.  S&P
assigned Gamenet Group S.p.A. an issuer credit rating of 'B' and
a stable outlook.  The issue rating on its debt is unchanged at
'B'.


ITALY: Still Laggard of Europe as Banking Sector Struggles
----------------------------------------------------------
Lorenzo Totaro at Bloomberg News reports that Lorenzo Codogno,
former head of economic analysis and planning at Italy's Treasury
Department, said the country is still the laggard of Europe due
to a combination of lingering factors including a "quasi credit
crunch" and weak demand.

"The current government has done a lot, but a lot more needs to
be done," Mr. Codogno said on Aug. 1 in an interview with
Bloomberg Television.  "The banking sector is still struggling to
fully recover, which basically means not enough credit to the
economy in my view."

The euro region's third-biggest economy stagnated in the second
quarter, Bloomberg relays, citing a preliminary estimate by
national statistics office ISTAT.

Italy also faces a possible banking crisis due to the amount of
its lenders' non-performing loans, Bloomberg discloses.

"The medium- to long-term outlook is still pretty poor" for
Italian banks, Mr. Codogno, who is now a visiting professor at
the London School of Economics, as cited by Bloomberg, said.
"The next couple of months will be key."

Mr. Codogno also said Italy was likely to obtain some extra
budget flexibility from the European Union, Bloomberg notes.


STEFANA SPA: Sept. 20 Deadline Set for Azienda Irrevocable Offers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Judicial Liquidator, Dott. Pierfranco Aiardi of Stefana
S.p.A. under Composition with Creditors Procedure, with
registered office in Nave, via Bologna 19, invites the subjects
interested in the acquisition of the branch of business active in
the production and distribution of iron, steel and metallurgic
products (boards, beams, section bars, rounds, wire rods, nets
and frameworks) operating in Nave (BS) Via Bologna 19, to send
irrevocable offers to purchase, which shall be received by and no
later than 12:00 a.m. of September 20, 2016, in compliance with
the provisions set out in the Regulation available (in Italian
language) on the web site www.stefana.it as well as the
websites www.astegiudiziarie.it and www.bresciaonline.it

The irrevocable offers shall be addressed to "STEFANA S.p.A. in
Concordato Preventivo", with registered office in Nave, Via
Bologna 19 and shall be received in a sealed envelope, which
shall not bear any identification mark, with indication on the
envelope of the following statement "Offerta per l'acquisto del
ramo d'azienda Stefana Nave Via Bologna", at the office of the
Notary Mr. Mario Mistretta in Brescia, Via Malta, 7 C (telephone
number 030-220320; fax 030-220786).

All the specifications related to each branch of business and all
the information on the same and their composition will be
available in the data room present in the website www.stefana.it
subject to prior execution of the "Confidentiality Agreement" to
which the indications for the consultation will follow.

For any information, the interested subjects can contact Mr.
Mauro Battistella, the lawyer of the Procedure, at the following
number +39 02-89283800 from Monday to Friday from 3:00 p.m. until
6:00 p.m.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ATFBANK JSC: S&P Assigns 'B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its 'B' long-term and 'B' short-term
counterparty credit ratings to ATFBank JSC.  The outlook is
negative.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'kzBB' Kazakhstan national
scale rating to the bank.

S&P's ratings on ATFBank reflect the high operating environment
risks for a commercial bank functioning primarily in Kazakhstan,
which S&P factors into its 'bb-' anchor (the starting point for
assigning a rating to a bank) for Kazakhstan domestic banks.
They also reflect S&P's view of the bank's moderate business
position as the fifth-largest bank in Kazakhstan; its weak
capital and earnings, due to its small capital buffer, which are
restrained by elevated credit costs and low profitability; the
bank's moderate risk position, reflecting significant legacy
nonperforming loans (NPLs) and potential new loan-loss provisions
required; and finally the bank's average funding and adequate
liquidity, owing to its diversified funding base and an abundant
liquidity cushion.

The long-term rating on ATFBank is one notch higher than its
stand-alone credit profile, reflecting S&P's view of the bank's
moderate systemic importance in Kazakhstan as the fifth-largest
bank with a market share of 4.4% in total loans and 6.0% in total
deposits on Aug. 1, 2016.  This means S&P considers that
ATFBank's failure would likely have a material, but manageable,
adverse impact on Kazakhstan's financial system and real economy.
Thus, S&P believes ATFBank has a moderate likelihood of receiving
extraordinary support from the government if needed.

S&P assess ATFBank's business position as moderate, reflecting
the bank's medium size and its cautious business development
strategy implemented by the experienced management team.

ATFBank was acquired by a Kazakh businessman, Galimzhan Yessenov,
in June 2013 from UniCredit SpA.

The new management, installed by the new shareholder aims to
substantially reduce legacy NPLs and deleverage the balance
sheet, while increasing the share of retail and small and midsize
enterprise (SME) customers, both in lending and funding.  S&P
expects that the bank will manage to retain its current position
among the top 10 banks in Kazakhstan and proceed with new
sustainable business development over the next 12 months.

S&P's assessment of ATFBank's capital and earnings as weak
reflects S&P's view of the bank's low capitalization, as measured
by S&P's risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio and its expectation
that its internal capital generation will be restrained by the
persistently elevated credit costs, with no planned capital
injections in the next two years, despite a reduction in risk-
weighted assets.  S&P envisage that its RAC ratio for the bank
won't exceed 3.1% in the next 18 months.  If credit losses or
loan growth dynamics exceed S&P's expectations, then it could
slip below 3% in the next 18 months.

The bank's core profitability is weak, with return on adjusted
assets below 1% in 2014-2015.  The core earnings are insufficient
to rebuild capital and provide enough loss-absorption capacity if
the quality of the loan portfolio deteriorates.  S&P don't expect
that the bank's net interest margin and core profitability will
improve in the next 18 months, due to the bank's planned
deleveraging and S&P's expectations of elevated credit costs.

S&P's assessment of ATFBank's risk position as moderate, in
comparison with other Kazakh banks bearing the same economic
risk, factors in the still significant level of NPLs and high
single-name concentrations, mitigated by continued bad loan
write-offs and recovery, and historically conservative loan
growth.

In S&P's view, the management team has achieved a significant
reduction of legacy NPLs through recoveries and write-offs.  As a
result, NPLs reported under International Financial Reporting
Standards reduced to a still high 21.4% as of Dec. 31, 2015, from
44.2% two years earlier.  On a positive note, restructured loans
represented less than 1% of total loans at year-end 2015.
However, S&P considers provision coverage of NPLs to be
relatively low, at 76% as of year-end 2015, although coverage has
increased from 68% as of year-end 2014.  This level is lower than
for the majority of Kazakh peers.

However, in view of still unfavorable economic environment in
Kazakhstan, S&P expects that the level of NPLs will still remain
sizable for ATFBank, due to still large exposure to corporate
clientele involved in international trade that are affected by
the economic stagnation.  Thus, S&P expects that new loan-loss
provisions will likely be required over the next 12 months.  This
will exert further pressure on the bank's profitability and
capital.

S&P's assessment of ATFBank's funding as average and liquidity as
adequate is based on the bank's diversified funding base, which
includes long-term capital market sources, and its abundant
liquidity cushion, balanced against notable reliance on short-
term wholesale funding.

The bank's funding base is predominantly comprised of customer
deposits (80% of total liabilities as of April 1, 2016), and also
includes such long-term sources as bond issues (10% of total
liabilities) and subordinated debt (7% of total liabilities).

The bank's stable funding ratio of 146% at April 1, 2016, is
stronger than the average of local peers.  At the same time,
ATFBank's loan-to-deposit ratio was at a healthy 73.2% as of
April 1, 2016, which compares favorably with the Kazakh banking
system average of 97% on the same date.

As of April 1, 2016, ATFBank had a sizable liquidity cushion,
with the net broad liquid assets covering 57% of short-term
customer deposits, which compares favorably with local peers.

The negative outlook on ATFBank reflects the one-in-three
likelihood of a downgrade if the pressure on the bank's asset
quality, profitability, and capital increases over the next 12-18
months, owing to weaker economic growth prospects and the
negative impact of substantial tenge devaluation.

S&P could lower the ratings if ATFBank's asset quality
deteriorates considerably over the next 12-18 months, which would
result in the rise in credit costs up to the expected system
average of 3.0%-3.5% by the end of 2016, exerting further
pressure on the bank's profitability and capital and pushing the
RAC ratio down below 3%.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable in the next 12-18 months
if the bank's capital buffer expands significantly, resulting in
a RAC ratio, as calculated by S&P Global Ratings, remaining
sustainably above 3%, supported by stronger profitability or on
the back of sufficient capital injections.


=================
M A C E D O N I A
=================


PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Cuts LT IDRs to 'BB+', Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded ProCredit Bank ad Skopje's
(Macedonia, PCBM) Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'BB+' from 'BBB-'. The Outlook is
Negative.

At the same time PCBM's Short-Term Foreign and Local Currency
IDRs have been downgraded to 'B' from 'F3' and Support Rating to
'3' from '2'. Its Viability Rating has been affirmed at 'bb-'.

The IDRs have been downgraded following a downgrade of
Macedonia's sovereign ratings as they are capped at one notch
above the sovereign's. The Negative Outlook reflects that of the
sovereign.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

PCBM's IDRs are driven by the support the bank can expect to
receive from its parent, ProCredit Holding (PCH, BBB/Stable). The
support considerations include strategic importance of Macedonia
and wider south-east Europe to PCH, its 100% ownership of the
subsidiary, close supervision and integration of functions as
well as a track record of capital and liquidity support.

However, the extent to which the support can be factored in is
limited by Fitch's view of Macedonia's country risks at one notch
above the sovereign rating. Absent of country risk constraints,
support considerations would typically be reflected in a one-
notch differential between the rating of the parent, PCH, and
that of PCBM.

VR

The VR of PCBM reflect its record of stable performance and sound
asset quality through the cycle, which compares well with the
wider banking sector averages. The bank's profitability is driven
by strong interest margins and low loan impairment charges,
compared with the banking sector, due to its stronghold on the
profitable SME segment and conservative underwriting standards.

The small scale of operations at PCBM weighs on its cost
efficiency which, with a cost/income ratio above 60%, is weaker
than the wider banking sector. In Fitch's view, this should over
the medium term be addressed by the bank's focus on the larger,
more formalized borrower segments, and development in automated
channels, provided the bank is able to gain enough economies of
scale to offset the lower margins on such exposures.

PCBM's capitalization remains only modest, taking into account
the bank's focus on higher-risk SME lending as well as a
challenging operating environment. The bank's Fitch Core Capital
(FCC) ratio stood at 10.1% at end-1H16, with a regulatory total
capital ratio at 14%, comparable to the sector's average of 14.1%
at end-1H16.

The VR benefits from PCBM's participation in the PCH Group, in
terms of strong corporate governance and risk management
frameworks as well as from ordinary liquidity and capital support
available from the parent.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS AND SUPPORT RATING

PCBM's IDRs are sensitive to a potential downgrade of the
Macedonian sovereign rating, which is currently on Negative
Outlook. PCBM's IDRs could also be downgraded by one notch to the
level of the Macedonian sovereign (BB), if Fitch believes the
risk of intervention by the authorities in the banking system has
increased.

PCBM's IDRs are also sensitive to a material weakening of the
commitment of PCH to Macedonia, which is not currently expected
by Fitch.

The Outlook on the Long-Term IDR could be revised to Stable in
case of a similar action on the Macedonian sovereign rating.

VR

PCBM's VR could be downgraded in the event of further weakening
of the operating environment or a sharp deterioration of the
bank's asset quality. Upside is currently limited by the
challenges in the operating environment and a limited franchise.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


TELEFONICA EUROPE: Fitch Cuts Hybrid Securities Rating to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Telefonica SA's Long-Term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured rating to 'BBB' from
'BBB+'. The Outlook on the IDR is Stable.

The rating downgrade reflects expectations that Telefonica is
unlikely to reduce leverage on an organic basis during 2016 as we
originally envisaged. This is due to higher-than-expected
pressure on funds from operations (FFO) resulting from a
combination of restructuring charges, FX depreciation and weaker
performance in the group's Hispam division. Fitch said, "We now
expect FFO-adjusted net leverage is likely to peak end-2016 at
3.9x, or 0.4x higher than our previous forecast, before declining
to 3.5x by 2018 as a result of growth in organic free cashflow.
This leverage profile is more consistent with a 'BBB' rating."

Fitch is also adjusting the rating sensitivity measures it
applies to Telefonica to reflect the company's increased exposure
to countries with a non-investment-grade rating. The increase has
primarily been driven by the successive downgrades to Brazil's
sovereign rating by Fitch over the past six months. The change
implements tighter leverage metric thresholds that aim to
maintain comparability of the company's rating with other
diversified western European telecoms operators.

The Stable Outlook reflects Telefonica's commitment to its
medium-term leverage target and the strong competitive position
of its operating subsidiaries.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Well-Positioned Operating Subsidiaries

Telefonica's ratings are supported by a portfolio of assets that
are competitively well positioned and geographically well
diversified across Europe and Latin America. The operator has a
leading domestic market position, which drove about 47% of group
operating free cash flow (EBITDA less capex on an underlying
basis) in 2015. The Spanish operations underpin Telefonica's
ratings and recent consolidation has improved market structure
while the company's investments in network, content and bundled
products sustain its competitive capability.

Higher-Than-Expected Leverage

Telefonica's 1H16 results indicate higher-than-expected pressure
on FFO from three principal areas. Firstly, EUR650m-EUR700m
annual cash restructuring costs in Spain over three years. These
costs reduce Fitch's forecast 2016 operating free cash flow (FCF)
by 9%. Secondly, adverse currency movements in Brazil and Hispam
has led to a 10% fall in group organic EBITDA during 1H16 or
EUR836m (based on Telefonica's reporting).

"We expect pressure from adverse currency movements in Latin
America to improve during 2H16 however, this still represents a
drag to our original 2016 estimates. Thirdly, competitive,
regulatory and commercial cost pressures in Hispam. While the
Hispam division continues to outperform its main competitors, the
cost pressures have led to a contraction of 2.5 percentage points
yoy in Hispam's 1H16 organic EBITDA margin." Fitch said.

As a result of the lower FFO, Fitch now expects FFO-adjusted net
leverage at YE2016 to increase to about 3.9x from 3.6x at end-
2015. Previously, Fitch expected Telefonica's FFO-adjusted net
leverage to decline to 3.5x during 2016 through organic cashflow
generation and within 18-24 months. This, however, is unlikely to
be achieved on an organic basis alone, given the group's
trajectory.

Organic Deleveraging Capacity Constrained

Fitch expects FCF to increase over the next three to four years
driven primarily by cost reduction in Europe, operating free
cashflow growth in Spain, synergy extraction in Germany and
Brazil, and a decline in capital expenditure as the intensity of
fixed and mobile broadband network deployment reduces. Our base-
case scenario envisages pre-dividend FCF margins expanding from
6% in 2016 to about 8% by 2018. This assumes revenue growth of
less than 1% over 2017 and 2018.

Dividends to shareholders are likely to consume 65%-70% of pre-
dividend FCF over the next two years (assuming no change to
Telefonica's dividend policy), leaving limited capacity to
delever through organic cashflow generation alone. On this basis,
the group's FFO-adjusted net leverage is likely to decline to
about 3.5x by 2018 supported by the conversion of EUR1.5bn
mandatory convertible notes in 2017.

Telefonica's target is to achieve a net debt to EBITDA ratio of
2.35x (based on its own leverage definition) by end-2017. The
scenario is likely to require the use of asset sales and possibly
the issuance of hybrid securities. To this extent the company has
announced its intention to list a stake of at least 25% in
Telxius, while also considering strategic options for O2 UK that
will involve Telefonica maintaining a majority stake. Fitch does
not include these events in its ratings until they are complete.

FX Exposure on Leverage

Telefonica's main FX exposure comes from its Latin American
operations, which in 2015 comprised 42% of operating free
cashflow (the proportion is lower when interest and tax is taken
into account) but about 13% of net debt (as defined by the
company). The mismatch in cash flow and net debt creates pressure
on leverage metrics when there is significant and sustainable
devaluation in currencies as there has been in 2H15 and 1H16.

Revised Rating Sensitivities

Fitch has tightened Telefonica's FFO-adjusted net leverage metric
to achieve a 'BBB+' rating to 3.3x from 3.5x. The lower leverage
threshold reflect the group's sizeable exposure to Brazil.
Telefonica derived 21% of its EBITDA from Brazil in 1H16. Fitch
has progressively downgraded the country's sovereign rating to
'BB'/Negative from 'BBB'/Negative over the past 12 months.

The downgrade of Brazil's sovereign rating has significantly
increased the proportion of Telefonica's group EBITDA that is
generated from countries with non-investment-grade ratings, which
Fitch estimates was about 26% in the past 12 months to 1H16 on an
underlying basis. The proportion is significantly higher than
Fitch's estimates for its immediate peer group of large,
diversified western European telecoms operators, such as Deutsche
Telekom (7%), Orange (12%) and Vodafone (10%). Telefonica's non-
investment-grade exposure carries a relatively higher cash flow
risk, which is now reflected in the tighter leverage rating
sensitivities.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
are:

   -- Reported revenue decline of 5% yoy in 2016 with 0.5%-1.0%
      growth a year thereafter. This assumes some improvement in
      FX rates in 2H16.

   -- EBITDA margins increasing from 31% in 2016 to 32% by 2019.

   -- Capex to sales ratio of 16.6% in 2016 declining to 15.3% by
      2019.

   -- Off-balance-sheet debt adjustment based on an operating
      lease multiple of 6.7x. The multiple is based on an
      estimated weighted average of the geographic dispersion of
      long-term operating leases.

   -- Fitch's calculation of net debt assumes that the vast
      majority of the company's derivative financial assets and
      liabilities are related to FX hedges.

   -- Telefonica's reported operating income before depreciation
      and amortization (OIBDA) has been considered as EBITDA.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Developments that may, individually or collectively,
lead to positive rating action include:

   -- FFO adjusted net leverage falling sustainably below 3.3x.

   -- Improved competitive position in Telefonica's domestic and
      other key international markets combined with strong growth
      in pre-dividend FCF.

Negative: Developments that may, individually or collectively,
lead to negative rating action include:

   -- FFO-adjusted net leverage trending above 3.8x on a
      sustained basis.

   -- Pressure on FCF driven by EBITDA erosion, FX and capital
      repatriation constraints, higher capex and shareholder
      distribution, or significant underperformance in the core
      domestic and international markets.

LIQUIDITY

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Telefonica SA

   -- Long-Term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+', Outlook
      Stable;

   -- Senior unsecured: downgraded to 'BBB'/'F3' from
      'BBB+'/'F2';

   -- Short-Term IDR: downgraded to 'F3' from 'F2'.

Telefonica Europe B.V. / Telefonica Emisiones S.A.U

   -- Senior unsecured bonds: downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+';

   -- Subordinated hybrid securities: downgraded to 'BB+' from
      'BBB-'.

Telefonica Finance USA LLC

   -- Preference shares: downgraded to 'BB' from 'BB+'.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


GARANTI BANK: Fitch Retains 'b+' Viability Rating, Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Garanti Bank S.A.'s (GBR) Outlook to
Negative from Stable, and affirmed the Long and Short-Term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) and Support Rating (SR). GBR's Viability
Rating is not affected by this rating action.

The Outlook revision for GBR's support-driven Long-Term IDR to
Negative from Stable follows the similar rating action on GBR's
ultimate parent, Turkiye Garanti Bankasi S.A.(Garanti;
BBB/Negative)

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, SUPPORT RATING

GBR's IDRs and Support Rating are driven by the potential support
the bank can expect to receive from its parent, Turkey-based
Garanti. In turn, Garanti's IDRs are based on the potential
support the bank can expect to receive from its minority but
controlling shareholder, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA;
A-/Stable).

GBR's support-driven Long-Term IDR is one notch below that of the
parent, reflecting Fitch's view that GBR is a strategically
important subsidiary of Garanti. To date, there has been no
indication from Garanti or BBVA that they might be considering a
change in their strategy for Romania as a result of BBVA gaining
management control of Garanti in July 2015. GBR shares Garanti's
branding and IT systems, and the risk management framework for
both Garanti and GBR is currently being aligned with that of
BBVA. In addition, key management and supervisory board members
are drawn from Garanti.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SUPPORT RATING

GBR's IDRs are sensitive to changes to Garanti's ratings or to
Fitch's view of Garanti's commitment to Romania.

In the event that GBR's Long-Term IDR is downgraded, Fitch would
also expect to downgrade the bank's Short-Term IDR to 'B' and
Support Rating to '3'.

The rating actions are as follows:

   Garanti Bank S.A.(GBR)

   -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook revised to
      Negative from Stable

   -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'

   -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'

   -- Viability Rating: unaffected at 'b+'


MAREEA: Files for Insolvency, 1,100 Clients Affected
----------------------------------------------------
Romania Insider reports that Mareea filed for insolvency on
Friday, September 2, due to cash-flow issues.

About 1,100 of the company's clients, who had paid for holidays,
will not be served, Romania Insider says, citing Romania's
National Tourism Authority - ANT.

According to Romania Insider, ANT said the total value of the
contracts that Mareea can't honor is EUR460,000, some EUR285,000
of which are liabilities to suppliers.

Mareea announced its insolvency through a message posted on its
website and on Facebook on Sept. 3, Romania Insider recounts.
According to the announcement, none of the clients who had
holidays booked after Sept. 4 will be served, Romania Insider
notes.

The company informed its clients that they can go to local
insurer Generali to recover their money, Romania Insider says.

Romanian investor Marius Usturoiu, Mareea's owner, told local
Profit.ro that the company's insolvency has been determined by
the weak results on the charter flights this summer and by the
50-60% drop in holidays in Turkey, Romania Insider relates.

Mareea is one of the top 15 tour operators in Romania.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


O1 PROPERTIES: Moody's Assigns B1 CFR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a first-time non-
investment grade B1 corporate family rating and B1-PD probability
of default rating (PDR) to O1 Properties Group (O1), a commercial
real estate investment and management company operating in
Moscow.  The outlook on the ratings is stable.

"O1's B1 rating reflects risks related to elevated leverage
profile with a high reliance on secured debt and its single-
market concentration in Moscow particularly amid the current
challenging economic environment in Russia.  These risks are only
partly compensated by the company's competitive position with a
large high-quality office portfolio, strong tenant base, and
balanced lease terms as well as a sound liquidity position," says
Ekaterina Lipatova, a Moody's Assistant Vice President and
Analyst.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

O1's B1 rating reflects the company's (1) large office property
portfolio, which is comparable to those of its Baa-rated peers in
Europe and the US, as measured by its adjusted gross assets of
$4.3 billion as at Dec. 31, 2015; (2) modern properties, with
Class A offices comprising around 92% of its total asset value
and around 81% of assets being located in Moscow's central
business district (CBD); (3) diversified top-tier tenant base
with 68% of net operating income coming from large multinational
companies with strong credit profiles and the share of its top-10
clients not exceeding 30%; and (4) well-spread lease maturity
profile, averaging 4 years, and protective lease terms with a
triple net structure, annual indexation, and no break clauses.

The company's strong business profile -- which features the
leading position in the most lucrative and stable segment of
Class A properties in the Moscow CBD -- coupled with prudent
asset management partly mitigates the risks related to its high
geographic concentration in Moscow.  The capital city, while
being the largest and the most stable market in Russia, remains
vulnerable to the country's economic cycles and its generally
less developed regulatory, political and legal framework.

Indeed, despite the ongoing pressure exerted by a weak economy on
the Moscow office market, O1 has preserved adequate occupancy and
retention rates, as well as reported relatively modest rent
reductions and asset revaluations when compared with the market
average.  Moreover, supported by the positive effect of the
rouble's depreciation on its operating expenses, O1's
historically strong adjusted EBITDA margin further improved to
89% in H1 2016 from 78% in 2014 and will likely exceed 90% in
2016.

The rating also incorporates O1's conservative development
strategy.  The company has generally targeted development
projects equal to around 10% or less of its total portfolio, but
now prefers to further limit development risk to below 5% in
response to the market downturn.  It has also shifted its focus
to optimizing its existing property portfolio with no material
cash acquisitions planned in the near term.

At the same time, the rating is largely constrained by O1's
historically leveraged financial profile due to its aggressive
investments in 2010-2013 when it was actively building its real
estate portfolio via debt-financed acquisitions, as well as
pressure from negative asset revaluations and declines in rental
income against the backdrop of the current economic downturn.

Moody's expects that the adoption of a more conservative
financial and development policy and some stabilization in the
market since Q2 2016 will likely result in gradual deleveraging
in 2016-2017 with "effective" leverage measured as adjusted
debt/gross assets falling below 70%, adjusted net debt/EBITDA
declining below 9.0x, and fixed charge coverage improving to
above 1.5x.  However, the company's financial metrics will still
be fairly weak and remain subject to the ongoing uncertainties
related to geopolitical and economic developments in the country,
and further market shocks.

Despite O1's increased focus on optimizing its debt portfolio,
the company will remain highly reliant on secured debt funding at
its properties level.  It will also stay exposed to foreign
exchange risks with almost all its debt denominated in US dollars
albeit partly mitigated by its ability to retain around 64% of
revenues derived from US dollars.

The company's sound liquidity position, however, partly offsets
the risks related to elevated leverage, in view of support from a
substantial cash balance, which comfortably covers debt
maturities over the next 18 months, moderate capex, and flexible
dividends.

Moody's also expects that O1 will be able to improve otherwise
fairly tight headroom under bank financial covenants at the
properties level and further extend its maturity profile by the
end 2016.  Moreover, the rating positively incorporates potential
support from its founding shareholder, Mr. Boris Mints, whose
commitment to support is evidenced by several rounds of equity
capital increases in 2014-2015, and a flexible approach to
dividend payments with a historically modest FFO payout to be
further reduced to 20% in 2016-2017 in response to the
challenging market environment.

                    RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that despite the weak
economic climate prevailing in Russia, O1 will continue to
produce healthy cash flows, leveraging its competitive market
position with its high quality office portfolio in prime Moscow
locations, strong tenant base, and balanced lease terms.

Moody's also expects the company to continue to adhere to its
conservative financial and development policy, which will allow
it to improve and maintain its adjusted "effective" leverage
below 75% and adjusted fixed charge coverage at 1.4x or above,
while preserving its historically solid liquidity profile.

                 WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on the rating could develop if, on a sustained
basis, adjusted "effective" leverage and adjusted fixed-charge
coverage trend towards 60% and 2.0x respectively, secured
debt/total assets stays below 50%, while O1 preserves its strong
liquidity and operating profile.

O1's rating could come under pressure if the company faced a
material deterioration in its business and financial profile,
with adjusted "effective" leverage exceeding 75% and adjusted
fixed-charge coverage falling below 1.4x on a sustained basis.  A
noticeable deterioration of the company's liquidity could also
pressure the rating.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Rating
Methodology for REITs and Other Commercial Property Firms
published in July 2010.

O1 Properties Group is Russia's leading real estate investment
company.  It manages, develops, and acquires office properties in
Moscow.  O1 owns a portfolio of 12 yielding assets with net
rentable area of 484.000 sqm, generating $368 million in annual
rental income.  Including two development projects, the reported
gross asset value of its real estate portfolio stood at
$3.7 billion as of June 30, 2016.  The company also participates
with a 50%+1 share in a JV for the "Bolshevik" development
project with a total reported gross asset value of $264.5
million.


BANK TETRAPOLIS: Placed Under Provisional Administration
--------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2932, dated September 2,
2016, revoked the banking license of Saint Petersburg-based
credit institution JSC Bank TETRAPOLIS from September 2, 2016,
according to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation's Press
Service.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, repeated violations within a year of Bank of Russia
requirements stipulated by Articles 6 and 7 (excluding Clause 3
of Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism" as well as application of measures stipulated by the
Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank
of Russia)" and taking into account a real threat to the
interests of creditors and depositors.

JSC Bank TETRAPOLIS failed to comply with the requirements of law
and the Bank of Russia regulations on countering the legalization
(laundering) of criminally obtained incomes and the financing of
terrorism with regard to timely submitting information on
operations subject to compulsory control to the authorized body.
Besides, the credit institution initiated actions to move out
highly liquid assets.  Under the circumstances to protect
interests of the bank's creditors and depositors the Bank of
Russia took a decision to take out JSC Bank TETRAPOLIS from the
banking services market.

The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2933, dated September 2,
2016, appointed a provisional administration to JSC Bank
TETRAPOLIS for the period until the appointment of a receiver
pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a
liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and
Banking Activities".  In accordance with federal laws, the powers
of the credit institution's executive bodies are suspended.

JSC Bank TETRAPOLIS is a member of the deposit insurance system.
The revocation of the banking license is an insured event as
stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of
Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's
retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The said Federal
Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the bank's
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the amount of
100% of the balance of funds but no more than RUR1.4 million per
depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of August 1, 2016, JSC
Bank TETRAPOLIS ranked 533rd by assets in the Russian banking
system.


CB PRISCO: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of CB PRISCO CAPITAL BANK, JSC
appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-2080, dated June 29,
2016, following revocation of its banking license detected in the
course of examination of the credit institution's financial
standing operations carried out by the bank's former management
which bear the evidence of moving out assets also through
extending loans known to be unrecoverable to borrowers with
dubious solvency and through performing claim assignment deals
with credit institution's related entities, according to the
Central Bank of the Russian Federation's Press Service.

According to estimates by the provisional administration, the
asset value of CB PRISCO CAPITAL BANK, JSC does not exceed
RUR0.6 billion, while its liabilities to creditors amount to
RUR2.3 billion.

On August 8, 2016, the Court of Arbitration of the city of Moscow
took a decision to recognize CB PRISCO CAPITAL BANK, JSC
insolvent (bankrupt) and initiate bankruptcy proceedings with the
state corporation Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as a
receiver.

The Bank of Russia has submitted the information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offences conducted
by the former management and owners of CB PRISCO CAPITAL BANK,
JSC to the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation,
the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for consideration and
procedural decision making.


INTERNATIONAL BANK: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its long- and short-term counterparty
credit ratings on Russia-based International Bank of Saint-
Petersburg (IBSP) at 'B-/C'.  The outlook is negative.

S&P also affirmed its Russia national scale rating on IBSP at
'ruBBB-'.

The affirmation reflects that, although S&P considers IBSP's
liquidity position has been under pressure recently, S&P expects
the bank will be able to fulfill its financial commitments in the
long term.

"We note that, as corporate funding became scarce in 2015, IBSP
has shifted its funding strategy toward retail deposits, the
share of which increased to about 24% of the funding base at mid-
2016 from just 14.5% in 2015.  At the same time, we note that
IBSP's balance sheet liquidity sources of remained under pressure
through 2016, making the bank more reliant on contingent
liquidity sources to cover its needs in case of stress such as
interbank limits or potential additional lines from the Central
Bank of Russia (CBR). Consequently, we believe that in case of an
adverse situation, the bank is likely to increase its dependence
on the CBR, which is in line of our definition of a moderate
liquidity position," S&P said.

At the same time, S&P notes that the bank's contingent liquidity
limits have been robust since 2015, despite market volatility.
S&P also believes that the pressure on the bank's liquidity
buffers have somewhat reduced with coverage of short-term
customer deposits by net broad liquid assets improving to over
10% at mid-2016 from 1.4% at year-end 2015, based on financials
prepared under Russian general accepted accounting principles.
Consequently, S&P expects IBSP's financial commitments will be
sustainable in the long run and are affirming S&P's ratings on
IBSP.

S&P also believes that subordinated debt provided by Deposit
Insurance Agency to the bank in late 2015 strengthens market
confidence in the bank.  Nevertheless, S&P considers it to have
limited loss-absorption capacity on a going-concern basis.  As
such, S&P expects its risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio adjusted
for the earnings buffer will stay at 3.8%-4.0% over the next 12-
18 months.

The negative outlook on IBSP indicates the possibility of a
downgrade over the next 12-18 months, owing to the vulnerability
of the bank's franchise and dependence on its owner's commitment
in the challenging environment in Russia.

S&P could lower the ratings if it considers IBSP's financial
commitments unsustainable in the long term.  This may come from
higher-than-anticipated credit costs weakening the bank's
currently low Tier 1 capital buffer, due to delinquency of any of
the bank's largest exposures.  A loss of customer confidence and
a withdrawal of the deposits that undermine the bank's liquidity
position could also lead to a downgrade.

S&P could take a positive rating action if it sees IBSP
diversifying its narrow customer base and loan portfolio, while
maintaining sustainable levels of capitalization, with a RAC
ratio consistently above 5%.


MOSCOW CITY: S&P Affirms 'BB+' ICR, Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'BB+' long-term issuer credit
rating on Russia's capital city of Moscow.  The outlook is
negative.

The 'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating was affirmed.

                            RATIONALE

The long-term rating on Moscow reflects, and is capped by, the
'BB+' foreign currency long-term rating on the Russian Federation
because S&P believes that Russian local and regional governments
(LRGs) cannot be rated above the sovereign.  This reflects S&P's
view of Russia's institutional framework, in which LRGs have very
restricted revenue autonomy and are unable to withstand possible
negative intervention by the federal government.

In accordance with S&P's criteria, it assess Moscow's stand-alone
credit profile(SACP) at 'bbb', two notches higher than the issuer
credit rating.  The SACP results from the combination of S&P's
assessment of an LRG's individual credit profile and the effects
we see of the institutional framework in which it operates.

The 'bbb' SACP reflects Moscow's position as Russia's economic,
administrative, and financial center.  This position underpins
Moscow's very low debt, exceptional liquidity, strong budgetary
performance, and very low contingent liabilities.  Moscow's
average budgetary flexibility and average economy are neutral for
the city's creditworthiness, in S&P's view.  Moscow's SACP is
constrained by Russia's volatile and unbalanced institutional
framework, under which distribution of revenues and expenditures
largely depends on decisions by the federal government, and by
what S&P views as the city's weak financial management, given the
only emerging nature of long-term planning and limited
predictability of budget policy.

S&P views Moscow's economy as average internationally because its
relatively high income level in terms of GDP per capita is
counterbalanced by the ongoing economic contraction in Russia.
As Russia's capital, Moscow accounts for about 17% of the
country's GDP and its urban area is home to more than 13% of the
country's population (8.4% reside within the city limits).

Under the volatile and unbalanced institutional framework for
Russian regions, the majority of Moscow's budget revenues is
controlled by the federal government, and remains subject to
regular changes in the national tax legislation and
interbudgetary relations.  Nevertheless, S&P assess Moscow's
budgetary flexibility as average.  S&P believes that, thanks to
better infrastructure, Moscow has more flexibility on the capital
spending side than most Russian LRGs.  In S&P's base case, it
expects the city will maintain its capital program at about 20%
of total expenditures.  If necessary, Moscow would likely be able
to partly cut capital spending to constrain budget deficits and
reduce debt accumulation.

"In our base-case scenario, we expect Moscow's budgetary
performance will remain strong, with a high operating surplus and
a minor five-year average deficit after capital accounts in 2014-
2018.  The 2015 results exceeded our expectations, with a surplus
after capital accounts of about 9% of total revenues as a result
of revenue growth and cost-cutting measures.  In the first half
of 2016, the city demonstrated relatively high spending growth
compared with other Russian LRGs, but we believe this is because
of the low spending base the previous year.  Overall, we assume
that the 2016 results will be weaker than those of 2015, with an
almost balanced budget.  We expect the operating balance will
reduce slightly to 17% of operating revenues on average in 2016-
2018 compared with 22% on average in 2013-2015, due to slow
revenue growth, but remain high in an international context.  The
city's large investments in transport infrastructure will likely
put pressure on its budget balance.  We expect the city's
deficits after capital accounts will widen to a still modest 2.5%
average of total revenues in 2016-2018, from an average positive
balance of 3% on average in 2013-2015," S&P said.

Owing to only modest deficits after capital accounts, Moscow's
tax-supported debt will likely increase very gradually and in
S&P's forecast reach only 11% of consolidated operating revenues
by the end of 2018.  In S&P's base case, it don't expect the city
will borrow in 2016, thanks to its large cash reserves.
Borrowing in 2017-2018 will likely be limited and depend highly
on improvements in market conditions.

S&P views Moscow's contingent liabilities as very low.  S&P
estimates that the maximum amount of extraordinary financial
support that might be required by the numerous city-owned public
service providers would not exceed 10% of its operating revenues.

S&P views Moscow's financial management as weak in an
international context, as S&P do for most Russian LRGs.  In S&P's
view, Moscow's long-term financial and capital planning lacks
transparency and predictability, especially given delays in
implementation of capital projects.  Visibility of the policy
regarding its numerous government-related entities is also
constrained.  At the same time, Moscow's cautious debt and
liquidity management is better than the Russian average, in S&P's
view.

Currently, S&P don't envisage any potential upward revision of
its assessment of the city's SACP.  S&P could, however, revise
down its assessment of Moscow's SACP if the city's budgetary
performance and liquidity weakened as a result of a significant
reduction in tax revenues and insufficient use of the spending
flexibility that S&P currently expects in its base case.

                            LIQUIDITY

S&P considers Moscow's liquidity to be exceptional, given the
city's combination of exceptional debt-service coverage, limited
access to external liquidity, and high internal cash-flow
generation capability.  Over the next 12 months, S&P expects the
city's debt-service coverage will remain exceptional because it
will likely maintain cash reserves well in excess of annual debt
service.  In S&P's opinion, Moscow also has a structurally strong
capacity to generate internal cash, thanks to high operating
margins, but S&P also thinks that it remains exposed to the
weaknesses of the domestic capital market and has limited access
to external liquidity.

S&P expects that, in 2016-2017, the city will spend a portion of
its cash to cover the deficit after capital accounts.  However,
it will still have about Russian ruble 325 billion (about $5
billion) of free cash on its accounts on average, which will
exceed its debt service by more than 4.5x.  Thanks to reliance on
amortizing medium-term bonds with gradual repayment profiles and
only limited borrowing in recent years, debt service will likely
remain at only 2.7% of operating revenues on average until the
end of 2018.

                              OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on Moscow mirrors that on Russia.  Any
rating action S&P takes on the sovereign would likely be followed
by a similar action on Moscow.

S&P views a downside scenario based on Moscow's intrinsic
creditworthiness as highly unlikely, because S&P's assessment of
Moscow's SACP is two notches higher than the long-term rating on
the city.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                    Rating
                                    To                From
Moscow (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency        BB+/Neg./--       BB+/Neg./--
  Russia National Scale             ruAA+/--/--       ruAA+/--/--
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency                    BB+                BB+


ORENBURG REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT IDRs, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Orenburg Region's
Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'BB', and Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B'. The
agency has also affirmed the region's National Long-Term Rating
at 'AA-(rus)'. The Outlooks on the Long-Term ratings are Stable.

Fitch has also affirmed Orenburg Region's and JSC Orenburg
Housing Mortgage Corporation's (OHMC) senior debt -- the latter
guaranteed by the region -- at 'BB' and 'AA-(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects our unchanged base case scenario in
which Orenburg Region is expected to see satisfactory operating
performance and moderate direct risk that are commensurate with
its ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'BB' rating reflects the region's moderate debt with limited
exposure to refinancing risk and satisfactory fiscal performance.
The ratings also factor in the concentrated nature of the
region's tax base in oil and gas companies.

Fitch expects Orenburg Region to maintain direct risk at a
moderate 40%-45% of current revenue in 2016-2018, after
stabilizing it at 40% in 2014-2015. The region's direct risk is
composed of 56% domestic bonds and 44% subsidized loans
contracted from the federal government. In line with our
projections the region's payback period -- as measured by direct
debt/current balance -- stabilized at 2.5 years in 2014-2015,
after having hit a negative 16 years in 2013.

The region's exposure to immediate refinancing risk is limited as
the average maturity of Orenburg's debt portfolio is manageable
at four years and eight months. The region faces refinancing of
RUB2.2 billion in 2016, or less than 10% of its outstanding
direct risk.

The region's contingent risk is low. The region guaranteed OHMC's
domestic bond of RUB1.5bn issued in 2012 and issued two other
guarantees. None of the guarantees have been called by the
lenders.

Fitch projects the region will maintain satisfactory fiscal
performance over the medium term, with an operating margin of
about 10% and a small deficit before debt variation at below 5%
of total revenue. Orenburg Region recorded a larger deficit
before debt variation of 5.2% of total revenue at end-2015 (2014:
deficit 3.8%), driven by funding needs for capex.

Orenburg Region's fiscal performance stabilized in 2014-2015 with
an operating surplus 10%, compared with a small deficit of 0.2%
in 2013. Taxes dipped to 76% of the region's operating revenue
(2012-2014: average 80%) but Orenburg also successfully reduced
its opex growth to 5%-6% in 2014-2015 (2013: 8%).

Orenburg's average monthly cash reserves amounted to RUB572
million in 1H16, after the region had partially depleted its
cash, which decreased to RUB391 million at end-2015 from RUB1.9
billion in 2014. The region had standby credit lines of up to
RUB5 billion at end-August 2016, which supports its interim
liquidity.

In its medium-term forecast the region's administration projects
modest economic growth of 1.2%-1.9% per annum in 2016-2018.
Orenburg Region's economy is dominated by oil and gas companies,
which provide a sustainable tax base. However, the concentrated
tax base exposes the region to potential changes in the fiscal
regime, business cycles or price fluctuations in the sector.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The ratings could be positively affected by a sustained debt
payback ratio of below four years and direct risk remaining below
40% of current revenue.

The ratings could be negatively affected by consistently weaker
budgetary performance leading to weak debt coverage (direct
debt/current balance).


SEMEINY CAPITAL: Bank of Russia Provides Update on Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Clause 1 of Article 183.5 and Clause 1 of Article
189.3 of Federal Law No. 127-FZ, dated October 26, 2002, "On the
Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" the Bank of Russia took a decision to
appoint from January 11, 2016 the provisional administration of
the credit consumer cooperative Semeiny Capital (Bank of Russia
Order No. OD-3853, dated December 31, 2015) for a 6-month term,
according to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation's Press
Service.

Olesya V. Romanchuk, receiver, member of the non-profit
partnership Siberian Guild of Turnaround Managers has been
appointed as a head of the provisional administration.

The Bank of Russia, by Order No. OD-2184, dated July 8 2016,
extended the term of activity of the provisional administration
extended by two months.

Based on the report on the financial standing of the credit
consumer cooperative Semeiny Capital submitted by its provisional
administration the Bank of Russia took a decision on May 19,
2016, to let the provisional administration appeal to the court
of arbitration to recognize the credit cooperative insolvent
(bankrupt) due to the impossibility to recover its solvency.

By its decision with regard to case No. A56-35184/2016 the Court
of Arbitration of the city of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad
Region has recognized the credit cooperative insolvent (bankrupt)
with a receivership procedure launched.

Daniil V. Fedichev, member of the Non-profit Partnership Alliance
of Receivers, has been appointed as a receiver.

In compliance with Federal Law No. 127-FZ, dated October 26,
2002, "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" creditors shall have the
right to raise claims on the financial organization within two
months from the day the information on recognizing the financial
organization bankrupt is published.

Creditors' claims go the court of arbitration, to the financial
organization and the receiver with documents confirming the
validity of claims attached.  The receiver shall add such claims
to the register of creditors' claims.


TOMSK CITY: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LT Foreign & Local Currency IDRs
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian City of Tomsk's Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BB'
with Stable Outlooks and Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR at 'B'.
The agency has also affirmed the city's National Long-Term Rating
at 'AA-(rus)' with a Stable Outlook. The city's senior debt
ratings have been affirmed at 'BB'/'AA-(rus)'.

The affirmation reflects Tomsk's stable fiscal performance, which
remains in line with Fitch's base case scenario. The Stable
Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that the city will maintain
moderate debt levels over the medium term and that its operating
balance will be sufficient to cover interest payments.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The 'BB' ratings reflect the city's historically strong, though
weakened operating performance, which is supported by diversified
local economy and steady transfers from the Tomsk region. The
ratings also factor in the city's moderate debt, albeit with
concentrated refinancing risk, and the weak institutional
framework for Russian subnationals.

Fitch projects Tomsk's operating margin to consolidate at about
6% in 2016-2018, little changed from 2015's 7%. This operating
margin, though well below the historical average of 20% in 2011-
2014, is still sufficient to cover twice the city's interest
payments.

The city's tax-generating capacity remains limited by the
recession in Russia as more than 50% of tax proceeds are personal
income tax. The city's performance is supported by regular
transfers from Tomsk region, which accounts for about half of the
city's operating revenue. The city's fiscal flexibility remains
limited as the transfers are largely earmarked for certain
expenditures.

Fitch projects the city's direct debt to remain moderate at 35%-
40% of current revenue in 2016-2018 (2015: 32%) on the back of
limited capital expenditure. The prudent budgetary policy of the
city's administration aims to limit the fiscal deficit this year
and record a surplus starting from 2017. Fitch said, "We have a
more conservative view and project fiscal deficit at a modest 4%
over the medium term (2015: 5.3%) that will moderately fuel debt
growth. Contingent risk is likely to remain low as the city does
not have outstanding guarantees and its public sector is small
and mostly self-sufficient."

Despite the moderate debt burden, Tomsk is exposed to refinancing
risk as 66% (RUB1.6 billion) of its direct risk at August 1,
2016, required refinancing in 2016. To meet this obligation, the
city has contracted several revolving credit lines with banks, of
which RUB1.6 billion are undrawn and available at first demand.

The city may also issue five-year RUB1 billion bonds by end-2016,
providing additional liquidity. This will extend the debt
maturity profile and reduce refinancing pressure over the medium
term. Fitch expects the city to roll over its maturing debt
without difficulty.

Tomsk has a well-diversified service-oriented economy, dominated
by academic and research educational institutions. The tax
concentration of the city's revenue is low, with the top 10
taxpayers representing 13% (2014: 8%) of total tax revenue in
2015. Fitch forecasts national GDP will contract 0.5% in 2016
after a 3.5% drop in 2015, which will weigh on the city's
economic and budgetary performance.

The City of Tomsk's credit profile remains constrained by the
weak institutional framework for local and regional governments
(LRGs) in Russia, which has a shorter record of stable
development than many international peers. The predictability of
Russian LRGs' budgetary policy is hampered by the frequent
reallocation of revenue and expenditure responsibilities among
government tiers.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Increasing direct risk above 50% of current revenue, coupled with
growing refinancing pressure, could lead to a downgrade.

An upgrade is unlikely in the medium term unless the city returns
to an operating surplus of 20% of operating revenue, coupled with
a lengthening of the city's debt profile.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


KYIV CITY: S&P Lowers ICR to 'CC', Outlook Negative
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its long-term issuer credit rating on
Ukraine's capital, the City of Kyiv, to 'CC' from 'CCC+'.  The
outlook is negative.

                             RATIONALE

The rating action follows Kyiv's decision to extend for another
360 days the maturity of its domestic bond falling due on Dec.
19, 2016, although the city is current on this bond's interest
payments.  Under S&P's criteria, it would expect to classify such
an extension as tantamount to default.  Moreover, in S&P's view,
the default is a virtual certainty.  S&P believes that because
this decision has been approved by Ukraine's Ministry of Finance,
there is little chance that the city will repay these bonds using
its own sources.  Kyiv treats this bond as part of
intergovernmental relations and we believe it assumes that the
central government will likely provide it with funds to repay the
bond.  In 2012, the central government forced Kyiv to issue
Ukrainian hryvnia (UAH) 1.915 million (about US$75,000) to
compensate for the difference in tariffs to utility government-
related entities (GREs).

S&P continues to monitor Kyiv's individual credit factors.

S&P views Kyiv's economy as weak in an international context.
For Ukrainian local and regional governments (LRGs), S&P uses the
national GDP per capita (about US$2,000) as a proxy, given their
high dependence on transfers from the central government and the
very centralized system.  At the same time, S&P assumes that
Kyiv's economy is well diversified and is Ukraine's wealthiest,
although the wealth level is still low in an international
context.  The city's personal income levels are likely to remain
twice as high as the national average, by our estimates.  S&P
also thinks the unemployment rate will continue to be the lowest
in Ukraine.

The city's budgetary flexibility is very weak, in S&P's view, as
Kyiv operates under very volatile and underfunded institutional
framework.  The modifiable revenues make up a relatively low 15%
of operating revenues, because most of the taxes are regulated by
the central government.  Moreover, S&P believes that the city's
ability to adjust modifiable revenues is limited.  Kyiv's
substantial investment requirements and high share of social
spending continue to restrict its spending flexibility.

S&P views Kyiv's budgetary performance as average.  Despite
currently strong balances, fueled in particular by high
inflation, S&P assumes that performance is likely to deteriorate
in the longer term due to accumulated spending pressures.  In
S&P's 2016-2018 forecast, it expects the operating balance to
average 8.5% of operating revenues, compared with roughly the
same average in 2013-2015.  This will be due to the high revenue
growth, fueled by the high inflation and allocation of some new
taxes to the city budget (corporate profit tax, excise, and
property tax).  S&P expects the central government grants to
continue supporting the city.  At the same time, spending growth
will likely lag behind that of revenues.  The relatively high
operating balance and modest capital spending will likely
translate into surpluses after capital accounts, at about 4% of
total revenues on average in 2016-2018, compared with roughly the
same average surplus posted in 2013-2015.  S&P notes, however,
that service underfunding and capital spending pressures remain
material.  In addition, budgetary performance will likely remain
volatile and very unpredictable owing to frequently changing
fiscal rules.

Given the expected surpluses after capital accounts, and
therefore no new borrowings, S&P assumes that Kyiv's tax-
supported debt will likely continue to decline and stay slightly
above moderate levels of 30% of operating revenues through 2018.
As of Aug. 1, the city's direct debt consisted of domestic bonds
series 'G' of UAH1.915 million (series 'H' bonds of UAH2.248
million were repaid ahead of schedule earlier this year and the
ratings are therefore withdrawn) and an intergovernmental debt
liability of US$351.1 million (the Eurobonds restructured in
2015).  Kyiv's Eurobonds, which it restructured in December 2015,
are mirrored by an intergovernmental debt liability of the city
to the central government.  S&P therefore includes both of the
Eurobonds into the city's debt burden and also therefore believe
that the debt burden might be subject to the potential exchange
rate volatility.  S&P's calculation of tax-supported debt also
includes debt at Kyiv's GREs (including guaranteed loans from
multilateral lending institutions).

S&P views Kyiv's management as very weak, given the city's
decision to extend the maturity of the bond, despite having
sufficient amounts of cash reserves to repay them.  S&P's
management assessment also implies weak debt management and only
emerging long-term planning, as well as weak oversight over the
city's GREs.

S&P assess Kyiv's contingent liabilities as high since the city's
utility companies have accumulated payables to suppliers.

                              LIQUIDITY

S&P revised Kyiv's liquidity assessment to less than adequate
from weak, reflecting the fact that the city has accumulated a
significant amount of cash reserves this year.  At the same time,
the city's access to external liquidity remains uncertain, in
S&P's view.

S&P estimates that Kyiv's average cash position over the past 12
months stood at UAH3.5 billion (about US$140 million).  S&P
conservatively apply a 50% haircut to the city's cash reserves,
as the city keeps them in the Central Treasury and, given the
track record of the central government with regard to default,
S&P believes that access to these reserves could be interrupted.
Even using this lower figure and after adding the surplus after
capital accounts, the debt service coverage ratio stays above
100% over the next 12 months.

S&P also believes that the coverage ratio might fall sharply
beyond the 12-month horizon, when the city's intergovernmental
debt liability is due.  In S&P's base case, it assumes that the
extended domestic bond will be repaid in 2017 with the help of an
earmarked grant from the central government.

The weaknesses of Ukraine's banking sector are reflected in S&P's
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA), which
classifies Ukraine in group '10'.  S&P's BICRA ranks risk
relating to banking systems on a scale of '1' to '10', with '1'
being the lowest risk and '10' being the highest risk.

                             OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that the nonpayment of
the bond on the maturity date is virtually inevitable.  S&P will
lower its rating on Kyiv to 'D'if it does not pay the upcoming
maturity in December.

In the unlikely event of no maturity extension and the city
repaying its domestic bond in December 2016 in full and on time,
S&P might raise the rating.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot above.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                             Rating
                                             To   From
Kyiv (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating
  Foreign and Local Currency           CC/Neg./--  CCC+/Stable/--
Senior Unsecured
  Local Currency
   Series G Bonds: UAH1.915 bil 15.25% nts
   due 12/19/2016                      CC               CCC+
  Local Currency
   Series H Bonds: UAH2.248bil 15.20% nts due
   10/10/2016                          NR               CCC+

NR--Not rated


UKRAINE: Deposit Fund Sells Assets of 22 Under-Liquidation Banks
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the Deposit Guarantee Fund
sold assets of 22 under-liquidation banks for UAH47.74 million on
August 22-26.

According Ukrainian News, of them, UAH18 million received from
sale of banks' assets and UAH29.05 from sale of receivables on
loans.

The remaining amount was received from direct sale of the
property of insolvent banks (UAH0.56 million), and of other
assets -- pictures, coins etc (UAH0.13 million), Ukrainian News
states.

In particular, receivables of Aktabank were sold for UAH12.62
million, of Forum Bank for UAH8.32 million, of Imexbank for
UAH3.24 million, of VAB Bank for UAH0.73 million, and of
Pivdencombank for UAH0.15 million, Ukrainian News discloses.

Besides, proceeds from sales of assets of Expobank were UAH11.78
million, of Terra Bank UAH2.82 million, of Nadra bank UAH2.81
million, and of Ukrprofbank UAH0.11 million, Ukrainian News
relays.

Also, total proceeds of assets and receivables sale of Zlatobank
comprised UAH4.5 million, Ukrainian News says.


UKRAINE: Deposit Fund Sells Assets of 24 Insolvent Banks
--------------------------------------------------------
Ukrainian News Agency reports that the Deposit Guarantee Fund was
to sell assets of 24 insolvent banks for UAH1.4 billion from
August 29-September 2.

According to Ukrainian News, from UAH1.4 billion, the Fund
expects to obtain about UAH0.97 billion from the sale of
receivables, and also UAH0.44 billion on the sale of assets of
the under-liquidation banks.

Besides, the receivables owed to Forum Bank will be sold at
UAH0.02 billion, Ukrainian News discloses.

The Fund is offering for sale assets and receivables of Forum
Bank for a total of UAH404.05 million; of National Credit bank
for UAH265.13 million; of Ukrgasprombank for UAH186.84 million;
Eurogasbank for UAH186.52 million, VAB Bank for UAH122.26
million, Imexbank for UAH20.19 million, Contract bank for
UAH17.49 million, Finrostbank for UAH14.64 million, Forto Franco
bank for UAH10.74 million and Prime Bank for UAH2.05 million,
Ukrainian News relays.

Also, they are offering for sale receivables of Nadra bank for a
starting price of UAH61.67 million, BrokBusinessBank for UAH29.87
million, of Activ-Bank for UAH29.31 million, of Kyivka Rus bank
for UAH26.65 million, of BG Bank for UAH9.37 million, of
Ukrprofbank for UAH4.52 million, of Energobank for UAH2.83
million, of Zlatobank for UAH2.61 million, of Promeconombank for
UAH1.49 million, and of Demark bank for UAH0.4 million, Ukrainian
News notes.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


JAGUAR LAND: Fitch Hikes LT Foreign Currency IDR to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Jaguar Land Rover Automotive plc's
(JLR) Long-Term Foreign-Currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and
senior unsecured ratings to 'BB+' from 'BB-'. The Outlook is
Stable.

The two-notch upgrade reflects JLR's delivery on its commitment
to widen and strengthen its product portfolio, increase
geographic diversification, and expand capacity outside of the
UK. This should provide it with greater flexibility and
resilience over the medium term, which the agency considers to be
commensurate with a 'BB+' rating for an automotive manufacturer.
Notably the success of its entry models into new segments
(specifically the Jaguar XE and initial indications for the
F-PACE) while maintaining robust profitability, positive free
cash flow and a strong financial profile, are considered
instrumental as it transitions to become a higher-volume premium
manufacturer.

"We expect JLR's launch of more new and refreshed models to
continue to support its sales volumes and profitability, even as
it faces challenges on several fronts, including increased
competition and margin pressure in the premium market in China,
and continued uncertainty around the fall-out from the UK's vote
to leave the EU," Fitch said.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Stable Profitability: "We expect JLR to maintain EBIT margins of
7%-8% in the financial year ending March 31, 2017 (FY17) and
FY18. We expect profitability to be supported by JLR's core Land
Rover products, continued robust sales of the Jaguar XE (compact
sedan), the global roll-out of new and refreshed products
including the Evoque convertible, Jaguar F-PACE (crossover), and
in China the release of Jaguar XF L (luxury sedan)." Fitch said.

In FY16, EBIT margin narrowed to 8.5% (FY15: 12.4%) on a weaker
product mix and declining sales volumes in China due to a slowing
economy. A drop in EBIT margin to 5.2% in 1QFY17 was mainly
attributable to negative FX effects from the Brexit vote -- the
sterling's sharp depreciation caused an unfavorable revaluation
of the company's euro-denominated payables -- which more than
offset the positive effects of a stronger product and volume mix.
EBIT margin, adjusting for this FX effect, was 7.4% (1QFY16:
10.1%).

Strong Demand Drives Volumes: "We expect JLR's Land Rover
products -- mainly luxury SUV's -- to continue to benefit from
robust demand in both developed and developing markets. JLR's
successful launch of the all-new Jaguar XE and F-PACE are filling
important segments where the company has previously not had a
product presence," Fitch said.

"Under our base case scenario, we expect JLR's retail volumes to
increase by around 10% in FY17 from FY16," Fitch said. In 1QFY17,
JLR enjoyed double-digit unit volume growth in all regions
including China, with total retail volumes up 16% from 1QFY16. In
FY16, retail volumes increased by 13% from FY15 to 521,571 units
with double-digit volume growth in Europe, UK, and North America
more than offsetting a decline in China (down 16%).

Capex to Remain High: Fitch said, "We expect JLR's investments in
capacity expansion, engine manufacturing, vehicle architecture
and new technologies to meet carbon emission requirements to
contribute to negative FCF in FY17, despite strong cash flows
from operations. However, we expect the company to post positive
FCF in FY18. Investments include a new manufacturing facility in
Slovakia with an initial capacity of 150,000 units that is
targeted for completion by 2018."

Robust Financial Profile, Liquidity: Fitch said, "We expect JLR
to maintain a strong financial profile and ample liquidity buffer
in FY17-FY18. FFO-adjusted leverage will remain at or below 1.0x
and FFO-adjusted net leverage at or less than 0.0x (FY16: 0.8x
and -0.1 respectively). At 1QFY17, JLR had strong liquidity, with
cash and cash equivalents of GBP2.4 billion (FY16: GBP3.4
billion), short-term liquidity deposits of GBP1.3 billion (FY16:
GBP1.3 billion) and committed undrawn facilities of GBP1.9
billion maturing in 2020."

Limited Scale, Product Diversity: JLR's scale and range of
products are smaller than its premium-segment peers, which raise
the risk of volatility in earnings and cash flow, and constrain
the business profile. However, JLR's recent heavy investments are
increasing its product breadth and volume, thereby helping to
diminish this business risk.

Geographic Diversification: JLR's efforts over the last five
years have helped it to achieve a more balanced geographic mix,
with around 60% of retail sales volumes outside of UK and Europe.
JLR's growth in China has been rapid and it is the fourth-largest
automaker in the premium segment by volumes after Audi, BMW and
Mercedes.

Fuel Efficiency Requirements: Tightening carbon dioxide emission
requirements in both developed and developing countries remain a
challenge for JLR, as its product portfolio is currently weighted
towards larger, less fuel-efficient SUVs. However, a further
broadening of its product line to include more compact, fuel-
efficient models would reduce its exposure to the risk of
evolving environmental legislation.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Retail sales volume growth of around 10% in FY17

   -- EBIT margin of 7%-8% in FY17-FY18

   -- Capex of GBP3.7 billion in FY17 and GBP3.2 billion in FY18
     (FY16: GBP2.8 billion)

   -- Dividends remain modest at GBP150 million per year in FY17-
      FY18 (FY16: GBP150 million)

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive rating action is unlikely in the medium term given the
need for a substantial increase in scale to achieve a transition
to investment grade. However, a positive rating action may result
if the company materially increases the volume and breadth of its
products, while maintaining profitability and a strong financial
profile.

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

   -- Deterioration in key credit metrics including FFO-adjusted
      net leverage above 1.0x on a sustained basis (FY16: -0.1x)
      and a material weakening of JLR's liquidity position;

   -- Problems with operational execution and/or decreasing
      market share


PELL & BALES: In Liquidation, 20 Jobs Affected
----------------------------------------------
Third Sector reports that Pell & Bales has gone into liquidation
with the loss of 20 full-time jobs just two months after being
sold by the business processing outsourcing firm Parseq.

A statement issued on Aug. 24 by Gerry Hoare, one of the main
investors who acquired Pell & Bales and its sister telephone
fundraising company Pure Fundraising from Parseq in June for an
undisclosed sum, said the management team had been "forced by
creditors" to place the company into liquidation, Third Sector
relates.

According to Third Sector, Mr. Hoare said in a statement: "The
challenging market place has meant it just is not possible to
maintain the Pell & Bales business."

Pell & Bales is a telephone fundraising agency.


PENMAN ENGINEERING: "Major Contract" Delay Prompts Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Guy Anderson at IHS Jane's 360 reports that Penman Engineering
has gone into administration.

Armstrong Watson was appointed as administrator of the Scotland-
based firm, which is continuing to trade while a buyer is sought,
IHS Jane's 360 discloses.

Administrators said a "considerable number of prospective
purchasers" had been identified, the report relates.

According to IHS Jane's 360, a delay in the arrival of a "major
contract" was blamed.

Penman Engineering is a UK armoured vehicles specialist.  The
company currently employs 140 people.


PRG RECRUITMENT: Colesco Buys Business Following Administration
---------------------------------------------------------------
Scott McCulloch at Daily Record reports that the business and
assets of PRG Recruitment LLP have been sold to a new company
after it called in administrators.

Companies House records show the administrators from RSM were
appointed on Aug. 16, Daily Record discloses.

PRG Recruitment is reported to have run into cash flow
difficulties, Daily Record notes.

A staff member confirmed on Aug. 30 PRG was taken over by a new
company, Colesco Consulting Ltd., "a couple of weeks ago", Daily
Record relays.

Colesco Consulting Ltd., set up by former PRG director Margaret
Richmond, was incorporated on Aug. 2, Daily Record states.

The new company acquired the business and assets of PRG
Recruitment from administrators for an undisclosed sum and is now
trading from serviced offices in Glasgow, Daily Record discloses.

According to Daily Record, around seven staff employed at PRG's
Edinburgh office are reported to have left the business after
transferring over to Colesco Consulting in the pre-pack deal.

PRG Recruitment filed unaudited abbreviated accounts for the 2014
year to December showing debts of GBP1.97 million falling due
within one year of the accounts being signed off June 10, 2015,
Daily Record recounts.

Joint Administrators Paul Dounis -- paul.dounis@rsmuk.com -- and
Adrian Allen -- adrian.allen@rsmuk.com -- of RSM Restructuring
Advisory LLP, as cited by Daily Record, said the PRG business was
sold to Colesco Consulting "as part of a pre-pack deal,
protecting the jobs of 22 full time staff and many temporary
workers".

A public notice published in The Herald newspaper notes a joint
motion was presented at Glasgow Sheriff Court on Aug. 27 craving
the court to dismiss a petition from HM Revenue and Customs for
PRG Recruitment LLP to be wound up and liquidators appointed,
Daily Record relays.

The joint motion was granted and the petition was dismissed,
according to Daily Record.

PRG Recruitment LLP is a professional services recruitment firm.


TP FINANCING: Moody's Lowers CFR to B3, Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded foreign currency
exchange specialist TP Financing 3 Limited's ("Travelex" or "the
company") corporate family rating to B3 from B2 and its
probability of default rating to B3-PD from B2-PD.  Concurrently
Moody's has downgraded the GBP90 million senior secured bank
facility rating of TP Financing 3 Limited to Ba3 from Ba2, as
well as the GBP350 million senior secured notes rating of
Travelex Financing plc to B3 from B2.  All ratings have a
negative outlook.

"The downgrade reflects Travelex's deteriorating operational
performance and debt protection ratios, our expectations that its
profitability will remain weak and its free cash flow negative
over the next 12 months" says Guillaume Leglise, a Moody's
analyst and lead analyst for Travelex.  "We also believe that
Travelex's liquidity profile has weakened and now exhibits
limited room for manoeuvre, resulting in a level not compatible
with a B2 rating", says Mr. Leglise.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects Travelex's weak operating results in
the first half of its current financial year ending December
2016, far below Moody's expectations, owing to margin pressure in
Europe, adverse market conditions in Brazil and Nigeria,
continued investments in digital platforms and increase in
central and shared costs.  Moody's expects that, absent a
material recovery in trading conditions in H2 2016, Travelex's
reported leverage (gross debt before Moody's adjustments to Core
group EBITDA as defined by the company) will remain high, in
excess of 7.0x at end-2016 (vs 4.5x in FY2015).

Travelex has recorded lower profitability across all of its
business units in the first half 2016 compared to the same period
last year, with reported EBITDA (defined as 'Core group EBITDA')
down by GBP18.6 million, or 58%.  The underperformance was most
pronounced in Wholesale activities, where profitability was
impacted by the sharp fall of banknotes volumes in Nigeria, one
of the company's largest wholesale supply regions.  Challenges in
Nigeria translated into a material GBP7.1 million (-30%) decline
of Travelex' wholesale segment EBITDA.  While banknotes volumes
are expected to gradually resume as the Central Bank of Nigeria
started to relax its currency controls in June 2016, the phasing
of a full removal of currency controls by the Nigerian
authorities is unclear at this juncture, and it will take time
for Travelex to recover to volumes and earnings levels achieved
prior to the currency control introduction.

In addition, the Brazilian division continued to be severely
impacted by the weak real compounded by a high inflationary
environment and a high fixed cost base.  Moody's does not expect
a meaningful recovery in the company's performance in Brazil in
the next 12 months in light of challenging political and
macroeconomic conditions.  While reported EBITDA in the company's
largest division, Retail, was only slightly lower year-on-year,
notably impacted by margin pressures in Europe, the results here
were helped by favorable translational foreign currency effects
and top line growth in Japan and in the Middle-East.

Travelex's profitability was also affected by higher central and
shared costs, up by a material GBP5.4 million (+23%) compared to
the first half of 2015, as well as by increased operating
expenses linked to investments in digital and business
development.  These are designed to support the company's recent
initiatives in the digital segment notably through the
development of its own digital solutions.  Although paper-based
payment remains the leading consumer payment type globally, the
strong growth of digital payments led to additional investments
into R&D and staffing in this domain.  Moody's believes that
these efforts will take time to materialize and will constrain
profitability and free cash flow generation in the next 12-18
months.

Moody's decision to downgrade the CFR also reflects Travelex's
weakened liquidity profile, owing to a sustained negative free
cash flow generation.  Moody's expects Travelex's free cash
generation will remain negative in the next 12 to 18 months owing
to challenging conditions in Brazil and Nigeria, continued
investments in digital and adverse working capital movements this
year linked to the termination of an agreement with a wholesale
banknote supplier.

The company's amount of "usable cash" on the balance sheet
(defined as the amount of net cash available to Travelex for
immediate use and excluding cash in tills and vaults) at the end
of June 2016 was modest at GBP35.5 million, compared to GBP60.7
million at the end of June 2015.  This mainly reflects negative
cash flow generation over the past year owing to declining
profitability, adverse working capital requirements, exchange
rate movements on cash inventory and continued capex investments
linked to IT developments and maintenance.

As at June 30, 2016, Travelex was utilizing around GBP80 million
of its GBP90 million Super Senior Revolving Credit Facility
(RCF), comprising GBP49.9 million cash drawings and around GBP30
million in respect of letters of credit guaranteeing rents at
airports. This results in a limited room to manoeuvre for
Travelex, notably to offset any sizeable seasonal swings,
reflecting holiday patterns.  Moody's however notes that the
recent agreement with the shareholders provides some working
capital flexibility for the supply of banknotes.

More positively, the rating remains supported by Travelex 's
strong brand recognition, business profile and position as the
leading global retail foreign exchange provider, backed by a
geographically diverse network of points of sale.

                 RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects Moody's expectations that margins
will continue to be under pressure in the next 12 to 18 months
and free cash flow generation will remain negative, constrained
by challenging business conditions in certain markets and
continued capex investments.

               WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS DOWN/UP

Moody's could stabilize the outlook if there is evidence of a
sustainable recovery in earnings in the company's operations
especially within its wholesale division and in Brazil leading to
a moderation in its cash burn.

An upgrade is unlikely at this stage considering the negative
outlook.  Over time, upward pressure on the rating could develop
if Travelex restores its profitability and improves materially
its free cash flow generation.  Quantitatively, a Moody's-
adjusted EBITA/interest expense ratio comfortably above 1.0x and
a positive free cash flow generation could trigger an upgrade.

Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the ratings if Travelex's
free cash flow generation further weakens as a result of a
further drop in operating performance or higher-than-expected
capital expenditures or working capital outflows.
Quantitatively, a Moody's-adjusted EBITA/interest expense ratio
sustainably below 1.0x could trigger a downgrade.  Any further
weakening of the company's liquidity profile would also exert
immediate downward pressure on the rating.

                     PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in December 2014.

Domiciled in Jersey, TP Financing 3 Limited, is the 100% holder
of Travelex, a market leading independent retail foreign exchange
business, with a wide network of stores (more than 1,500) and
ATMs (more than 1,400) concentrated in some of the world's
busiest international airports and tourist locations in 29
countries.  The company also provides wholesale foreign exchange
currencies to central banks, financial institutions and travel
agents and has partnerships with supermarkets, high street banks,
travel agencies, hotels and casinos as a provider of outsourced
foreign currency services.  At year-end 2015, Travelex reported
statutory revenues of GBP655.7 million and statutory EBITDA of
GBP66.8 million (before exceptional items, as per statutory
accounts).


WORLDPAY GROUP: S&P Affirms 'BB' Corporate Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it affirmed its 'BB' corporate
credit rating on U.K.-based payments processor Worldpay Group
PLC.

At the same time, S&P assigned a 'BB' long-term corporate credit
rating to Worldpay's wholly owned financing subsidiary Worldpay
Finance PLC, the issuer of the group's unsecured notes.

S&P also affirmed its 'BB' issue rating on Worldpay's senior
unsecured notes.  The recovery rating is unchanged at '3',
reflecting S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery prospects in
the higher half of the 50%-70% range in the event of a default.

The affirmation follows Worldpay's solid performance over the
last 12 months and S&P's expectation of its continued expansion,
despite our anticipation of meaningful exceptional costs and
capital expenditure (capex).

S&P has equalized its rating on Worldpay Finance PLC with that on
Worldpay because S&P views it as a core financing vehicle of the
group.

S&P forecasts that Worldpay will post growth in net revenues
(excluding interchange and scheme fees) of 8%-9% and free
operating cash flow (FOCF) of about GBP100 million for 2016.  At
the same time, S&P still anticipates meaningful exceptional costs
and capex this year -- relatively similar to 2015 -- and some in
2017. The combination of earnings growth and higher cash balances
should support deleveraging to comfortably less than 4x S&P
Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA in 2016, despite S&P's
inclusion of platform separation costs within our EBITDA
calculation. However, S&P do not expect meaningful deleveraging
given the lack of explicit leverage targets from the company.

In 2016, financial sponsors Bain Capital and Advent International
partially further reduced their stake in Worldpay down to 28% of
common equity.  S&P's therefore no longer considers Worldpay to
be a financial-sponsor-controlled company, and we have netted
cash that S&P views as surplus from the adjusted debt figure.  As
of June 2016, S&P applied a haircut of about GBP79 million.  This
reflects the net cash proceeds from the sale of Visa, which S&P
currently considers to be restricted, and minor cash balances
that S&P anticipates will be kept at subsidiaries and will
therefore not be immediately accessible for debt repayment.

S&P's assessment of Worldpay's business risk profile continues to
reflect its leading market position in the U.K., its ample
geographic diversity, solid growth prospects from e-commerce
transactions, the ongoing shift from cash to card and mobile
payments, and its complete end-to-end payment processing
solutions.  The group's competitive advantage remains constrained
by its ongoing exceptional costs and capex related to Worldpay's
separation from the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and the
migration of its customers to the new payment processing
platform.  S&P anticipates these expenses will continue to limit
Worldpay's margin and cash flow generation over the next 12
months, but they could potentially meaningfully decline from the
second half of 2017.

S&P's base-case operating scenario for Worldpay assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of 8%-9% in 2016 and 6%-8% in 2017, mainly
      due to significant growth of e-commerce, cross-selling in
      its U.K. segment WPUK, and higher transaction volumes in
      the U.S. segment WPUS.  Slower growth in 2017, factoring in
      S&P's assumption for some slowdown in leisure spending in
      2017, notably in the U.K., but more than offset by
      continuing favorable market trends.  While S&P sees some
      potential for lower growth at Worldpay following the U.K.'s
      vote to leave the EU, S&P anticipates that the impact on
      the U.K. operations will be limited given that the average
      transaction size for Worldpay is only about GBP30, and
      hence the company has limited exposure to luxury items.
      S&P anticipates that potential slower growth from the U.K.
      will be more than offset by continued double-digit growth
      from e-commerce.

   -- Adjusted margins potentially increasing to about 10% by
      2017 from 8.8% in 2015, despite continued exceptional
      costs, because of a growing portion of higher-margin
      e-commerce revenues and the benefits of increased operating
      leverage.  S&P assumes exceptional costs of about GBP30
      million in the second half of 2016 and about GBP30
      million-GBP40 million in 2017.

   -- Capex of about 16%-18% of net sales in 2016-2017.
      Dividends of 30% of net income starting second half of
      2016.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Funds from operations to debt of about 19% in 2016, up to
      about 25% in 2017;
   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 3.7x in 2016, from 4.3x in 2015,
      and declining further in 2017;
   -- FOCF to debt increasing to about 7% in 2016 and potentially
      at about 10% in 2017.
   -- EBITDA interest coverage of 5x-6x in 2016.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that, despite its
anticipation that Worldpay will continue to post high-single-
digit revenue growth over the next 12 months, its EBITDA margins
and capex will continue to be constrained by the migration of
customers to Worldpay's new platform.

S&P thinks there is potential for an upgrade beyond 12 months if
profitability continues to improve once the separation from RBS
is completed.  In particular, S&P could raise the ratings if it
sees a marked improvement in Worldpay's operating efficiency --
with EBITDA margins rising sustainably above 10% and return on
capital increasing to more than 8%.  S&P thinks this will be
subject to completion of successful migration to the new IT
platform, resulting in minimal exceptional costs.  An upgrade
would also be subject to Worldpay maintaining adjusted leverage
below 4x and FOCF to debt of about 10%.

While S&P sees potential for further deleveraging over the medium
term, it do not anticipate a meaningful improvement in S&P's
ratios given a lack of explicit leverage targets.  As a result,
S&P anticipates that some of the company's excess cash would
likely be used for bolt-on mergers and acquisitions or for
shareholder distributions.

S&P could consider a downgrade if the company experienced
meaningful issues in the migration to the new platform, resulting
in higher-than-anticipated costs, in conjunction with an increase
in customer churn, resulting in a drop in earnings.  S&P could
also lower the rating if Worldpay undertakes debt-funded
acquisitions that result in adjusted debt to EBITDA of above 4x.

                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Julie Anne L. Toledo, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and
Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *