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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, September 2, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 174


                            Headlines


A U S T R I A

SAPPI PAPIER: Moody's Cuts Bond Ratings to Ba3, Outlook Positive


F R A N C E

TECHNICOLOR SA: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to Ba3


G E R M A N Y

BREMER LANDESBANK: NordLB to Take Full Control of Business
HSH NORDBANK: Has Until February 2018 to Restructure Business


G R E E C E

GREECE: Auctions Off Broadcast Licenses Under Bailout Plan


I R E L A N D

CVC CORDATUS VII: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Notes


L U X E M B O U R G

4FINANCE HOLDING: Moody's Affirms B3 Corporate Family Rating


N E T H E R L A N D S

ARES EURO CLO I: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class F Notes
STORM 2016-II: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1 Rating on Class E Notes


R U S S I A

BANK BOGORODSKY: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Inspection Shows
GLOBAL PORTS: Moody's Assigns Ba3 CFR, Outlook Negative
SMARTBANK JSC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AMEC FOSTER: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to Ba2
BENCHMARK PODS: Creditors to Vote on CVA Proposal on September 6
GREEN ENERGY: Goes Into Administration, Owes More Than GBP1MM
IONA ENERGY: Bridge Misses Deadline to Complete Purchase
MABEL MEZZCO: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR & Changes Outlook to Pos.


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The First Junk Bond


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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SAPPI PAPIER: Moody's Cuts Bond Ratings to Ba3, Outlook Positive
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2 the
various financial instrument ratings of Sappi Papier Holding GmbH
(SPH), the 100% Austrian subsidiary of Sappi Limited (Sappi)
including the now senior unsecured notes and credit facilities.
The downgrade brings SPH's ratings in line with the Ba3 corporate
family rating (CFR) of its parent, South African pulp and paper
company Sappi Limited (Sappi, Ba3 positive). The outlook on SPH's
ratings remains positive.

The rating action reflects SPH's decision to exercise its option
to release existing security pledged under its loan agreements
and bond documentations following certification of compliance for
Sappi remaining below the stipulated net leverage threshold of
2.5x for two consecutive quarters (March and June 2016), a
condition for the release.

Sappi's Ba3 CFR, Ba3-PD probability of default rating (PDR) and
positive outlook are unaffected by this rating action.

The B2 rating of SPH's senior unsecured notes due 2032 is
affirmed.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of SPH's bond ratings to Ba3 reflects the release
of effectively all material security including first-lien
security interest in certain of Sappi's subsidiaries' property,
plant and equipment, real estate and inventories, as well as
share pledges on the stock of certain of Sappi's operating
subsidiaries. The Ba3 (LGD 4) rating assigned to the group's
senior unsecured notes due in 2017, 2022 and 2023 is now in line
one with the company's Ba3 corporate family rating (CFR) and
reflects the relative seniority of the instruments in Sappi's
capital structure. The group's unsecured notes benefit from the
same upstream guarantees as Sappi's EUR465 million revolving
credit facility maturing in 2020, as well as certain other
indebtedness. Upstream guarantees are provided on a senior basis
by essentially all material operating subsidiaries of Sappi's
international business, but excluding the South African
operations. Furthermore, the notes benefit from a senior
downstream guarantee provided by the ultimate holding company
Sappi Limited.

The rating of the existing $221 million global bond due 2032
issued by the holding company Sappi Papier Holding GmbH is
affirmed at B2 (LGD 6). The instrument is rated two notches below
the CFR, reflecting the effective subordination relative to the
considerable amount of senior unsecured debt ranking ahead in the
capital structure, as the notes only benefit from a downstream
guarantee by the ultimate holding company Sappi Limited on an
unsecured basis and an upstream guarantee from the group's
treasury company Sappi International SA, to be shared with the
senior unsecured instruments.

RATIONALE FOR POSITIVE OUTLOOK

The positive rating outlook is based on Moody's expectation that
Sappi will maintain or even further improve its profitability
through 2016 while retaining credit metrics in line with Moody's
expectations for a Ba2 rating, as indicated by EBITDA margins in
the mid-teens and RCF/Debt coverage above 15%. Recently published
Q3 2016 results confirm the positive trend in Sappi's operating
performance and we also note continued commitment to further
reducing debt as positive rating drivers.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Further upward rating pressure could occur if Sappi continues to
successfully manage the structural demand decline and pricing
pressures in coated fine paper while gradually improving the
diversification of its business profile towards growing and more
profitable paper grades. More quantitatively, the company would
need to maintain its credit metrics, as reflected in RCF/debt
above 15% (19.7% as per LTM June 2016) and EBITDA margins above
12% (13.7%). Moody's said, "In addition, we would expect to see a
more permanent improvement in Sappi's Moody's adjusted leverage
below 4 times in terms of debt/EBITDA (3.7x) before considering a
rating upgrade."

The ratings could experience downward pressure over the coming
quarters in case of material weakening of profitability, or the
inability to sustain current credit metrics, reflected in EBITDA
margins (13.7% as per LTM June 2016) and RCF/ Debt (19.7%)
declining towards single digit percentages, or debt/EBITDA
towards 4.5x (3.7x). In addition, the rating could come under
pressure in case Sappi makes sizable debt-funded acquisition or
pays out material amounts of cash to shareholders resulting in a
more permanent deterioration of its credit metrics.

List of affected ratings

Affirmations:

   Issuer: Sappi Papier Holding GmbH

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture June 2032,
      Affirmed B2 (LGD 6)

Downgrades:

   Issuer: Sappi Papier Holding GmbH

   -- Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility March 2020,
      Downgraded to Ba3 (LGD4) from Ba2 (LGD 3)

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture July 2017,
      Downgraded to Ba3 (LGD4) from Ba2 (LGD 3)

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture April 2022,
      Downgraded to Ba3 (LGD4) from Ba2 (LGD 3)

   -- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture April 2023,
      Downgraded to Ba3 (LGD4) from Ba2 (LGD 3)

Outlook:

   Issuer: Sappi Papier Holding GmbH

   -- Outlook, Remains Positive

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Paper
and Forest Products Industry published in October 2013.

Sappi Limited, with its head offices in Johannesburg, South
Africa and reported group sales of $5.2 billion in the last 12
months ending June 2016, is a leading global producer of coated
fine paper and dissolving wood pulp. The company reports by
regional segments: North America (26% of group sales in Fiscal
Year (FY) ending September 2015), Europe (49%) and South Africa
(25%).

Sappi's Fine Paper Operations, generated a significant proportion
of revenues, with over 70% of group sales, including the European
and North American coated fine paper and coated magazine
manufacturing activities. In addition, the company produces
packaging paper, printing and writing paper and tissue for the
South African market.

Sappi's Southern Africa division produces bleached and unbleached
paper pulp for internal and third-party consumption. Sappi is
also the world's largest producer of dissolving wood pulp. The
company owns and manages various plantations totalling 492,000
hectares in Southern Africa, that supply over 75% of Sappi South
Africa's wood requirements.


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F R A N C E
===========


TECHNICOLOR SA: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to Ba3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded to Ba3 from B1 the Corporate
Family Rating (CFR) and to Ba3-PD from B1-PD the probability of
default rating (PDR) of Technicolor S.A. (Technicolor).
Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded to Ba3 from B1 the ratings for
the senior secured term loans issued by Tech Finance & Co S.C.A.
The outlook on all the ratings remains positive.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The upgrade reflects the ongoing re-balancing of Technicolor's
operating model towards Connected Home and Entertainment Services
as the contribution from MPEG-2 licensing falls away," says Scott
Phillips, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and lead
analyst for Technicolor. "Furthermore, the group's strong
commitment to deleveraging, underpinned by healthy free cash flow
generation is commensurate with an improving credit profile,"
added Mr. Phillips.

Moody's believes that the focus of Technicolor since its default
and restructuring in 2009 has allowed it to not only deleverage
but to also grow -- organically and through acquisitions.
Furthermore, the full-year contribution of the businesses
acquired in 2015 -- Cisco Connected Devices (CCD), The Mill and
Cinram -- will partially mitigate the loss of revenue from MPEG-2
licensing, which falls to nil by the end of 2016, adding
stability to the group's future cash flows. Moody's believes that
of all these acquisitions, CCD is the most important because it
almost doubles Technicolor's footprint within the Connected Home
segment and allows it to better compete with its peers. While
Moody's anticipates that margins in Connected Home will remain
lower than the group average and that Technicolor will face
threats to its competitive position from a wide ranging number of
players, the agency believes Technicolor is well placed to
capitalize on the long-term trends of: (1) higher quality home
video services; (2) the increasing prevalence of "smart devices";
and (3) ever-faster broadband speeds.

Moody's anticipates that over the next 24-36 months, revenue for
Technicolor will be relatively stable, at around EUR5 billion.
Nevertheless, the rating agency forecasts the group to be highly
free cash flow positive -- generating around EUR200-EUR250
million per annum. Moody's believes the bulk of this free cash
flow will be used to reduce financial indebtedness and projects
that leverage (as measured by Moody's adjusted debt / EBITDA,
excluding MPEG-2) will fall from around 4.8x in 2015, to 3.5-4x
in 2016 and to 3-3.5x in 2017. The agency's expectation for
sustained deleveraging is the rationale for the positive outlook.

Liquidity is expected to be good reflecting the aforementioned
free cash flow generation, a significant cash balance (of EUR 385
million at the end of H1-2016), and full access to two undrawn
revolving credit facilities (RCFs) with an aggregate balance of
around EUR210 million. The agency believes these cash sources
will amply cover the group's scheduled debt amortization, of
around EUR63 million per annum (recently reduced due to the July
EUR100 million debt prepayment).

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Technicolor's rating could be further upgraded if the company is
able to maintain overall levels of profitability as reflected in
high single digit Moody's adjusted EBITA margins and free cash
flow and delivers further deleveraging. Leverage (as measured by
Moody's adjusted debt / EBITDA) below 3x would lead to positive
rating pressure.

Conversely, leverage above 4x, a deterioration in liquidity
strength or a loosening of the group's financial policy could put
negative pressure on the ratings.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in December 2014.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


BREMER LANDESBANK: NordLB to Take Full Control of Business
----------------------------------------------------------
James Shotter at The Financial Times reports that NordLB is to
take full control of Bremer Landesbank, which is facing a big
loss this year as a result of its portfolio of shipping loans.

In a statement late on Aug. 31, NordLB, which already owns 54.8%
of its smaller peer, said it would pay the city of Bremen and the
association of savings banks in Lower Saxony EUR180 million for
the rest, the FT relates.

The sellers will also receive stakes worth EUR82 million in three
companies, including a logistics business and a building society,
the FT discloses.

BLB, which had a balance sheet of EUR29.9 billion at the end of
June, said it had made a net loss of EUR384 million in the first
half of the year, after EUR449 million in provisions for losses
on its portfolio of shipping loans, the FT relays.

The takeover is the latest sign of the pressure that the collapse
in ship prices and freight rates is putting on the German banks,
which have traditionally played a big role in financing the
industry, the FT states.

According to the FT, NordLB said in a statement BLB would retain
its name and individual identity.

Bremer Landesbank is based in Bremen, Germany.


HSH NORDBANK: Has Until February 2018 to Restructure Business
-------------------------------------------------------------
James Shotter at The Financial Times reports that the European
Union has given German lender HSH Nordbank until February 2018 to
restructure and sell itself, or face being wound down.

Commerzbank, once a big shipping financier, has drastically
shrunk its lending to the industry, the FT notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 3,
2016, Bloomberg News related that HSH Nordbank won formal EU
approval for an increased state guarantee, paving the way for its
sale after it unloads distressed shipping loans to a bad bank.

                       About HSH Nordbank

HSH Nordbank -- http://www.hsh-nordbank.com/-- is a commercial
bank in northern Europe with headquarters in Hamburg as well as
Kiel, Germany.  It is active in corporate and private banking.
HSH's main focus is on shipping, transportation, real estate and
renewable energy.


===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Auctions Off Broadcast Licenses Under Bailout Plan
----------------------------------------------------------
Nektaria Stamouli and Marcus Walker at The Wall Street Journal
report that Greece was auctioning off broadcast licenses on
Aug. 31 in a move the left-led government says will clean up a
corrupt media sector but that critics say is a bid for political
control of TV.

Gathered in a government building in the Greek capital,
executives from eight companies started the auction early on
Aug. 30, with offers beginning at EUR3 million (US$3,341,250) and
increasing in increments of EUR500,000, the Journal relates.

The sale, which will reduce the number of national private
television stations from seven to four, was expected to continue
until Aug. 31 or Sept. 1, the Journal discloses.

Under the country's bailout plan with international creditors,
the government promised to auction broadcast licenses for the
first time, the Journal states.

In Greece's battered economy, media revenues have shrunk, leaving
most broadcasters deep in debt, the Journal relays.  The
long-powerful Mega channel is close to insolvency and unable to
pay staff, the Journal discloses.  It was excluded from this
week's auction because of its heavy bank debts, the Journal
notes.

Nikos Pappas, a key aide to Mr. Tsipras who is overseeing the
broadcast auction, argues Greece's economy can only generate
enough advertising revenue to support four private TV channels,
the Journal relates.

According to the Journal, the auction faces a legal challenge
from media groups, including some bidding this week, who allege
the process is unconstitutional because Mr. Pappas is controlling
it instead of Greece's independent media watchdog.

Greece's constitutional court is expected to rule on the case
this fall, the Journal says.


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I R E L A N D
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CVC CORDATUS VII: Moody's Assigns B2 Rating to Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by CVC Cordatus Loan
Fund VII Designated Activity Company (the "Issuer" or "CVC
Cordatus VII"):

   -- EUR248,400,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR20,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
      2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR37,800,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- EUR15,000,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
      2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

   -- EUR23,700,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- EUR20,300,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

   -- EUR30,800,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

   -- EUR13,200,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2029. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, CVC Credit
Partners Group Limited ("CVC Credit Partners") has sufficient
experience and operational capacity and is capable of managing
this CLO.

CVC Cordatus VII is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high
yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be at least 58% ramped
up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

CVC Credit Partners will manage the CLO. It will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk and credit improved
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer issued EUR 45m of subordinated notes which is not rated.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modelled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published
December 2015. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Par amount: EUR 440,000,000

Diversity Score: 36

Weighted Average Rating Factor (WARF): 2750

Weighted Average Spread (WAS): 4.25%

Weighted Average Coupon (WAC): 5.5%

Weighted Average Recovery Rate (WARR): 42.50%

Weighted Average Life (WAL): 8 years

Stress Scenarios:

Together with the set of modelling assumptions above, Moody's
conducted additional sensitivity analysis, which was an important
component in determining the provisional rating assigned to the
rated notes. This sensitivity analysis includes increased default
probability relative to the base case. Below is a summary of the
impact of an increase in default probability (expressed in terms
of WARF level) on each of the rated notes (shown in terms of the
number of notch difference versus the current model output,
whereby a negative difference corresponds to higher expected
losses), holding all other factors equal:

   -- Percentage Change in WARF: WARF + 15% (to 3163 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

   -- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029: 0

   -- Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029: 0

   -- Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029: -2

   -- Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029: -2

   -- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2029: -2

   -- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2029: -1

   -- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2029: -1

   -- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2029: 0

   -- Percentage Change in WARF: WARF +30% (to 3575 from 2750)

Ratings Impact in Rating Notches:

   -- Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029: -1

   -- Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029: -1

   -- Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2029: -3

   -- Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2029:-3

   -- Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2029: -3

   -- Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2029: -2

   -- Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2029: -1

   -- Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due
      2029: -2

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. CVC Credit Partners'
investment decisions and management of the transaction will also
affect the notes' performance.


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L U X E M B O U R G
===================


4FINANCE HOLDING: Moody's Affirms B3 Corporate Family Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) has affirmed 4Finance Holding
S.A.'s B3 corporate family and issuer ratings. Moody's has also
affirmed the B3 senior unsecured rating of 4Finance S.A., the
group's Luxemburg-based debt issuing company. The outlook on all
ratings is positive.

The rating action follows 4Finance's announcement on 11 August
that it had completed the acquisition of Bulgarian based TBI Bank
EAD (TBI Bank, unrated) through the acquisition of TBI Bank's
owner TBIF Financial Services B.V.

RATINGS RATIONALE

  -- 4Finance Holding S.A.

In affirming 4Finance ratings, Moody's has balanced the entity's
strong financial performance against the challenges arising from
the integration of an institution of a comparable size (4Finance
had total assets of EUR438 million at December 31, 2015, compared
to EUR274 million for TBI Bank) and with a different business
model. Although TBI Bank is primarily focused in the consumer-
finance business, the bank also engages in mortgage and SME
lending and other ancillary banking activities.

Counterbalancing these challenges, Moody's considers that
4Finance's strong financial performance will help the entity
absorb any shock arising from the integration of TBI Bank.
4Finance has a track-record of strong profitability, reporting a
return (from continuing operations) on average managed assets of
14.3% at 31 December 2015. Although part of the group's capital
will be used to fund the acquisition, given the high starting
capital level (4Finance had a tangible common equity over total
managed assets ratio of 35.2% as of the end of 2015) it will
still remain at an adequate level after the acquisition.

In addition, Moody's believes that TBI Bank's recent financial
performance is commensurate with 4Finance's B3 ratings. As of
year-end 2015, and similarly to 4Finance, the bank showed very
strong profitability with a net income over tangible assets ratio
of 6.1%, and strong capitalization, with a regulatory common
equity tier 1 ratio at 19.4%. The bank reported a very high
problem loan ratio at 20%, and a low coverage of problem loans by
loan loss reserves at 32%. While 4Finance's non-performing loans
over gross loans ratio (36.9% at the end of 2015), reduces
significantly to 9.0% if all the loans issued over a two-year
period are captured in the denominator to reflect the short-term
nature of the company's lending, TBI Bank is, as opposed to
4Finance, subject to bank regulation given its bank charter.

  -- 4Finance S.A.

The B3 senior unsecured rating assigned to 4Finance S.A., a
Luxemburg-based funding vehicle, is aligned with 4Finance Holding
S.A.'s B3 corporate family rating. The senior unsecured debt
issued by 4Finance S.A. is guaranteed by the largest operating
companies in the group.

RATINGS OUTLOOK

The positive outlook assigned to 4Finance's long term ratings
reflects Moody's opinion that the European banking license
obtained through the acquisition will facilitate 4Finance's
expansion of its consumer lending business across the European
Union, increasing geographical diversification and helping the
entity to reduce its exposure to restrictive regulatory regimes
in particular countries to carry out its consumer finance
business. Moreover, 4Finance will be able to partly fund its
activity through deposits, having the benefit of TBI Bank's
strong deposit base which covers the majority of the bank's
funding needs.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's would consider a rating upgrade if 4Finance sustains its
strong profitability and high capitalization while improving its
funding profile towards a higher reliance on deposit funding.
Upward rating pressure could also materialize if the integration
of TBI Bank translates into successful further expansion of its
consumer lending business across the European Union.

Although currently not anticipated, Moody's would consider to
downgrade 4Finance's ratings if (1) non-performing loans were to
increase substantially, either as a share of previous two-years
lending or total outstanding gross loans;; (2) the company's
average return on assets were to decrease below 2.5%; or (3) the
company's capital-to-asset ratio were to fall below 16%. Any
unfavorable progress in the integration of TBI Bank could also
translate into downward rating pressure.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS:

   Issuer: 4Finance Holding S.A.

   Affirmations:

   -- LT Issuer Rating (Local & Foreign Currency), Affirmed B3,
      Positive

   -- LT Corporate Family Ratings, Affirmed B3, Positive

   Outlook Actions:

   -- Outlook, Remains Positive

   Issuer: 4Finance, S.A.

   Affirmations:

   -- BACKED Senior Unsecured (Local & Foreign Currency),
      Affirmed B3, Positive

   Outlook Actions:

   -- Outlook, Remains Positive

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Finance
Companies published in October 2015.


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N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ARES EURO CLO I: Moody's Affirms B3 Rating on Class F Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on these notes
issued by Ares Euro CLO I B.V.:

  EUR26 mil. Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2024, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on March 4,
   2016, Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  EUR8 mil. Class Q Combination Notes due 2024, Upgraded to
   Aa1 (sf); previously on March 4, 2016, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on these notes:

  EUR151.2 mil. (current outstanding balance of EUR 13.8 mil.)
   Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 4, 2016, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR37.8 mil. Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
   2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 4, 2016, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf)

  EUR52 mil. (current outstanding balance of EUR 14.2 mil.) Class
   A-3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed
   Aaa (sf); previously on March 4, 2016, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR8 mil. Class B-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 4,
   2016, Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR13 mil. Class B-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
   due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 4, 2016,
   Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  EUR19 mil. Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on March 4,
   2016, Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR13.5 mil. Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
   Notes due 2024, Affirmed Ba2 (sf); previously on March 4,
   2016, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  EUR6 mil. Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
   due 2024, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on March 4, 2016,
   Affirmed B3 (sf)

Ares Euro CLO I B.V., issued in April 2007, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of high yield European
loans.  The portfolio is managed by Ares Management Limited.  The
transaction's reinvestment period ended on May 15, 2014.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of
deleveraging of the senior notes and subsequent improvement of
over-collateralization ratios.  Classes A-1 and A-3 notes have
paid down in total by EUR 14.4 mil. since the last rating action
in March 2016.

As a result of the deleveraging, over-collateralization has
increased across the capital structure.  As per the trustee
report dated July 2016, the classes A, B, C, D, E and F
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 250.9%, 190.2%,
156%, 125.2%, 113.6% and 109.8% respectively, compared to 222.9%,
176.6%, 148.7%, 122.2%, 111.9% and 107.8% in the January 2016
report.

The credit quality has improved as reflected in the improvement
in the average credit rating of the portfolio (measured by the
weighted average rating factor, or WARF) and a decrease in the
proportion of securities from issuers with ratings of Caa1 or
lower.  According to the trustee report dated July 2016, the WARF
was 2581, compared with 2678 in the January 2016 report.
Securities with ratings of Caa1 or lower currently make up
approximately 5.6% of the underlying portfolio, versus 9.7% in
January 2016.

The rating on the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity.  For the
Class Q notes, the 'rated balance' at any time is equal to the
principal amount of the combination note on the issue date minus
the sum of all payments made from the issue date to such date, of
either interest or principal.  The rated balance will not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR160.9
million, defaulted par of EUR4.1 million, a weighted average
default probability of 18.8% over 4.6 years weighted average life
(consistent with a WARF of 2617), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 46.6% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 26 and a weighted average spread of 3.5% and a
weighted average coupon of 4.1%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  Moody's generally applies recovery rates
for CLO securities as published in "Moody's Approach to Rating SF
CDOs".  In some cases, alternative recovery assumptions may be
considered based on the specifics of the analysis of the CLO
transaction.  In each case, historical and market performance and
a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also
relevant factors.  Moody's incorporates these default and
recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash
flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of
the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations"
published in December 2015.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate in
the portfolio.  Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the
weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs
were unchanged for classes A-1, A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2 and C, and
within two notches of the base-case result for the remaining
classes.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy.  CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to:

  Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
   portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
   conditions and have a significant impact on the notes'
   ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of
   high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales the collateral
   manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
   restructurings.  Fast amortization would usually benefit the
   ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the
   highest prepayment priority.

  Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
   have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
   collateralization levels.  Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
   defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
   the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.  Recoveries higher than Moody's
   expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
   ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations.  These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio.  All information available
to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input
from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and
judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on
the transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


STORM 2016-II: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba1 Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned provisional ratings to
these classes of notes to be issued by STORM 2016-II B.V.:

  EUR million senior class A mortgage-backed notes due 2063,
   Assigned (P)Aaa (sf)
  EUR million mezzanine class B mortgage-backed notes due 2063,
   Assigned (P)Aa1 (sf)
  EUR million mezzanine class C mortgage-backed notes due 2063,
   Assigned (P)Aa3 (sf)
  EUR million junior class D mortgage-backed notes due 2063,
   Assigned (P)A2 (sf)
  EUR million subordinated class E notes due 2063, Assigned
   (P)Ba1 (sf)

STORM 2016-II B.V. is a revolving securitization of Dutch prime
residential mortgage loans.  Obvion N.V. (not rated) is the
originator and servicer of the portfolio.

                          RATINGS RATIONALE

The provisional ratings on the notes take into account, among
other factors: (1) the performance of the previous transactions
launched by Obvion N.V.; (2) the credit quality of the underlying
mortgage loan pool; (3) legal considerations; and (4) the initial
credit enhancement provided to the senior notes by the junior
notes and the reserve fund.

The expected portfolio loss of [0.6]% and the MILAN CE of [7.5]%
serve as input parameters for Moody's cash flow and tranching
model, which is based on a probabilistic lognormal distribution,
as described in the report "The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS
Analysis", published in July 2000.

MILAN CE for this pool is [7.5]%, which is above preceding STORM
transactions and in line with other prime Dutch RMBS revolving
transactions owing to: (i) the replenishment period of 5 years
where there is a risk of deteriorating the pool quality through
the addition of new loans, although this is mitigated by
replenishment criteria, (ii) the availability of the NHG-
guarantee for [32.3]% of the loan parts in the pool, (iii) the
weighted average loan-to-foreclosure-value (LTFV) of [95.1]%,
which is similar to LTFV observed in other Dutch RMBS
transactions, (iv) the proportion of interest-only loan parts
([52.1]%), and (v) the weighted average seasoning of [4.9] years.
The risk of a deteriorating pool quality through the addition of
loans is partly mitigated by the replenishment criteria which
includes, amongst others, that the weighted average CLTMV of all
the mortgage loans, including those to be purchased by the
Issuer, does not exceed [87]% and the minimum weighted average
seasoning is at least [40] months.  Further, no new loans can be
added to the pool if there is a PDL outstanding, if loans more
than 3 months in arrears exceeds [1.5]% or the cumulative loss
exceeds [0.40]%.  Moody's notes that the unadjusted current LTFV
is [94.65]%.  The slight differences are due to Moody's treatment
of the property valuation provided for tax purposes (the so-
called WOZ valuation).

The key drivers for the portfolio's expected loss are: (1) the
availability of the NHG-guarantee for [32.3]% of the loan parts
in the pool; (2) the performance of the seller's precedent
transactions; (3) benchmarking with comparable transactions in
the Dutch RMBS market; and (4) the current economic conditions in
the Netherlands in combination with historic recovery data of
foreclosures received from the seller.

The transaction benefits from a non-amortizing reserve fund,
funded at [1.02]% of the total class A, B, C and D notes'
outstanding amount at closing, building up to 1.3% by trapping
available excess spread.  The initial total credit enhancement
for the Aaa (sf) provisionally rated notes is [8.00]% through
note subordination [6.98]% and the reserve fund [1.02]%.  The
transaction also benefits from an excess margin of [50] bps
provided through the swap agreement.  The swap counterparty is
Obvion N.V. and the back-up swap counterparty is Cooperatieve
Rabobank U.A. ("Rabobank"; rated Aa2/P-1).  Rabobank is obliged
to assume the obligations of Obvion N.V. under the swap agreement
in case of Obvion N.V.'s default.  The transaction also benefits
from an amortizing cash advance facility of [2]% of the
outstanding principal amount of the notes (including the class E
notes) with a floor of [1.45]% of the outstanding principal
amount of the notes (including the class E notes) as of closing.

STRESS SCENARIOS:

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: At the time the ratings were
assigned, the model output indicated that class A notes would
have achieved Aaa (sf), even if MILAN CE was increased to [12.0]%
from [7.5]% and the portfolio expected loss was increased to
[1.2]% from [0.6]% and all other factors remained the same.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.  The
analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not intended
to measure how the rating of the security might migrate over
time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in
January 2015.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

Significantly different loss assumptions compared with our
expectations at close due to either a change in economic
conditions from our central scenario forecast or idiosyncratic
performance factors would lead to rating actions.

For instance, should economic conditions be worse than forecast,
the higher defaults and loss severities resulting from a greater
unemployment, worsening household affordability and a weaker
housing market could result in a downgrade of the ratings.
Downward pressure on the ratings could also stem from (1)
deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement; or (2)
counterparty risk, based on a weakening of a counterparty's
credit profile, particularly Obvion N.V. and Rabobank, which
perform numerous roles in the transaction.

Conversely, the ratings could be upgraded: (1) if economic
conditions are significantly better than forecasted; or (2) upon
deleveraging of the capital structure.

The provisional ratings address the expected loss posed to
investors by the legal final maturity of the notes.  In Moody's
opinion, the structure allows for timely payment of interest and
ultimate payment of principal with respect to the notes by the
legal final maturity.  Moody's ratings only address the credit
risk associated with the transaction.  Other non-credit risks
have not been addressed, but may have a significant effect on
yield to investors.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, but these ratings only represent Moody's
preliminary credit opinion.  Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will endeavor
to assign definitive ratings to the Notes.  A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating.  Moody's will disseminate
the assignment of any definitive ratings through its Client
Service Desk. Moody's will monitor this transaction on an ongoing
basis.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK BOGORODSKY: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Inspection Shows
------------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of Bank Bogorodsky LLC appointed
by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-989, dated March 24, 2016, due to
the revocation of its banking license encountered an obstruction
of its activity starting the first day of performing its
functions, according to the Central Bank of Russia's Press
Service.

In violation of Russian legislation Bank Bogorodsky LLC
management failed to provide the provisional administration with
original loan agreements worth about RUR41.7 million.

Besides, the provisional administration detected in the course of
examination of the credit institution's financial standing
operations carried out by the bank's former management which bear
the evidence of moving out assets through extending loans known
to be unrecoverable to borrowers with dubious solvency.

According to estimates by the provisional administration, the
asset value of Bank Bogorodsky LLC does not exceed RUR1.3
billion, while its liabilities to creditors amount to RUR1.9
billion rubles.

On May 30, 2016, the Court of Arbitration of the Nizhny Novgorod
Region took a decision to recognize Bank Bogorodsky LLC insolvent
(bankrupt) and initiate bankruptcy proceedings with the state
corporation Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia has submitted the information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offences conducted
by the former management and owners of Bank Bogorodsky LLC to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for consideration and
procedural decision making.


GLOBAL PORTS: Moody's Assigns Ba3 CFR, Outlook Negative
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, ("Moody's") has assigned a long-term
Ba3 corporate family rating and Ba3-PD probability of default
rating to stevedore company Global Ports Investments Plc (GPI).
This is the first time Moody's has assigned a rating to GPI. The
outlook on all ratings is negative.

A corporate family rating (CFR) is an opinion of the GPI group's
ability to honor its financial obligations and is assigned to GPI
as if it had a single class of debt and a single consolidated
legal structure.

RATINGS RATIONALE

GPI's Ba3 CFR is weakly positioned in its current rating category
and primarily constrained by challenging economic conditions in
Russia, driven by the ongoing low oil price environment. The
impact of these exposures on GPI is exacerbated by the company's
concentration on container cargo operations (84% of 2015
revenue), which are very sensitive to variations in Russia's
gross domestic product (GDP), domestic consumption and demand for
imports. In 2015, Russia's GDP fell by around 3.7% and in this
period GPI's container cargo throughput (excluding unconsolidated
companies) and revenue declined by around 36% and 28%
respectively.

The impact of these exposures is further reinforced by the
increasing competition among stevedore companies in GPI's key
region of operations (Russia's Baltic and Far East sea basins)
which in challenging economic conditions creates an increased
risk of a downward impact on tariffs and cannibalization of
volume by competitors in the next 12-18 months. Moody's forecasts
GPI's container throughput will fall about 20% in 2016, higher
than that of the market, and its domestic market share will fall
to 35% (2015: 41%).

These conditions will negatively affect GPI's operating metrics
and limit GPI's deleveraging (Moody's expects the company's funds
flow from operations (FFO)/debt to reduce to the low teens in
percentage terms in 2016 while debt/EBITDA in this period will be
close to 5x). The Ba3 CFR incorporates the risk that GPI may
breach financial covenants in case of material underperformance
from our current expectations unless they are subsequently
recalibrated. Moody's said, "However, we expect this risk to
subside in 2017 due to a modest recovery in GPI's throughput, as
the Russian container market bounces back, and some reduction in
GPI's leverage. Furthermore, in line with previous experience,
GPI has a successful track record of renegotiation of covenants
with creditors in the past and may be able to negotiate covenant
changes with its state owned bank lenders if needed."

However, more positively, GPI's CFR reflects GPI's significant
scale and leading position in Russia. As of end-2015, GPI had
container cargo throughput (including unconsolidated companies)
of 1.6 million twenty-foot equivalent units. This makes GPI the
number one container terminal operator in Russia. GPI's CFR also
positively reflects the strong geographic position of GPI's key
assets in the strategically important Great Port of St.
Petersburg and Vostochny Port in Russia's Far East. Furthermore,
GPI's CFR reflects material ongoing operational support and
potential for extraordinary support in the form of equity
injections from key controlling shareholders.

In addition, the CFR takes into account the company's track
record of tight cost control and a flexible cost structure. This
will help the company to keep its adjusted EBITDA margin of
around 70% in the next 12-18 months despite the challenging
economic environment.

Lastly, GPI's CFR reflects GPI's reduced need for capital
expenditure given that the company's investment in new capacity
has been recently completed and GPI has large spare capacity; and
the shareholders decision to suspend dividends. These will
support the deleveraging process.

Moody's anticipates that GPI will maintain a good liquidity
position over the next 12-18 months. In this period the company
will have positive free cash flow given its low capital
expenditure and absence of dividends. The recent issuance of a
debut $350 million Eurobond and RUB15 billion (ca. $210 million)
of domestic bonds in December 2015-April 2016 enabled the company
to retire a significant part of its secured bank loans and reduce
refinancing risk over the medium term. As of 30 June 2016, the
company had a cash balance of around $120 million, which is
sufficient to cover the company's debt payments over the next 18
months.

RATIONALE FOR THE NEGATIVE OUTLOOK

The negative outlook on the ratings reflects the challenging
economic conditions in Russia over the next 12-24 months which
may result in cargo volumes falling outside the range of our
expectations. This creates a risk that mitigating measures may
not be sufficient to allow the company to maintain a financial
profile commensurate with the current CFR.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's does not currently expect any upwards pressure on GPI's
ratings given the negative outlook. However, the outlook could be
stabilized if (1) the macroeconomic environment in Russia
stabilizes resulting in a recovery of the domestic container
cargo market; and (2) the company is able to strengthen its
financial metrics in accordance with its financial policy and
negotiate any appropriate financial documentation changes with
its banks as may be necessary.

Conversely, downward pressure on the ratings could be exerted if
the cargo market becomes significantly more challenging than
Moody's anticipates, and if this or for other reasons, this were
to result in an expected decrease in the company's FFO/debt ratio
below the low teens in percentage terms or its interest coverage
ratio (FFO+interest/interest) falls below 2.5 times.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Privately
Managed Port Companies published in July 2016.

Global Ports Investments Plc is an operator of container and
other port terminals in Russia and the Baltic region. The key
shareholders of the company are Transportation Investments
Holding Limited (not rated) and APM Terminals, a member of the
A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S (Baa1 stable) group, which each own 30.75%
of the company's shares. The company is listed on the London
Stock Exchange with 20.5% of the shares held in free float. In
2015, GPI reported $406 million in revenue and $291 million in
EBITDA.


SMARTBANK JSC: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Assessment Shows
----------------------------------------------------------
The provisional administration of JSC SMARTBANK appointed by Bank
of Russia Order No. OD-1014, dated March 28, 2016, following
revocation of its banking license detected in the course of
examination of the credit institution's financial standing
operations carried out by the bank's former management which bear
the evidence of moving out assets worth around RUR4.7 billion
through replacing fixed assets with non-liquid securities,
according to the Central Bank of Russia's Press Service.

According to estimates by the provisional administration, the
asset value of JSC SMARTBANK does not exceed RUR0.93 billion,
while its liabilities to creditors amount to RUR5.2 billion.

On June 24, 2016, the Court of Arbitration of the city of Moscow
took a decision to recognize JSC SMARTBANK (bankrupt) and
initiate bankruptcy proceedings with the state corporation
Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia has submitted the information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offences conducted
by the former management and owners of JSC SMARTBANK to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for consideration and
procedural decision making.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AMEC FOSTER: Moody's Cuts Corporate Family Rating to Ba2
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, ("Moody's") has downgraded to Ba2 from
Ba1 the Corporate Family Rating (CFR) and to Ba2-PD from Ba1-PD
the probability of default rating of Amec Foster Wheeler Plc
(AMFW) and has changed the outlook assigned to those ratings to
stable from negative.

RATINGS RATIONALE

"The downgrade of Amec reflects Moody's expectation for further
weakness in the oil & gas space and the potential for further
restructuring costs which continue to drag on profitability, cash
flow and leverage," says Scott Phillips, a Moody's Vice
President -- Senior Analyst and lead analyst for Amec Foster
Wheeler Plc. "Depressed commodity prices continue to negatively
influence the business, particularly in North America while a
strategic shift following a change in management is forcing the
company to further right size its operations" added Mr. Phillips.

At the end of June 2016, AMFW's leverage (as measured by Moody's
adjusted debt / EBITDA) was 5.8x, significantly above our
expectations for the previous rating, for which we expect 3.5x or
lower. The increase in leverage, from around 4.5x at the end of
2015, was mainly driven by the incurrence of further
restructuring costs and other one-off charges which collectively
amounted to around EUR45 million. In Moody's view, while some of
these charges relate to the ongoing integration of Foster Wheeler
(completed in November 2014), it also reflects the ongoing
weakness in contract activity in the oil & gas end market,
particularly in North America. In this respect, AMFW reported
revenues in H1-2016 that were more than 50% lower for this
business area than in H1-2015, which, however, was partially
offset by increasing demand from clean energy services, although
at lower margins. While Moody's had previously expected
restructuring costs to diminish in H2-2016, the agency now
believes such charges will remain elevated into 2017 and beyond
as the company repositions itself in the low commodity price
environment and following a strategic shift under new management.
While Moody's continues to expect AMFW to execute around GBP 500
million of asset disposals, the agency believes that the negative
earnings impact from these transactions may be above its original
forecasts. This reflects primarily a lower than anticipated
valuation of the group's Global Power Group (GPG) business, and,
therefore, requires more asset disposals than initially planned.
Previously, Moody's had expected a valuation of around
GBP250-GBP300 million for GPG but this has since been lowered to
around GBP200 million, which is moderately above the book value
of the business on AMFW's balance sheet. In this respect, Moody's
notes that AMFW incurred impairment charges of GBP 261 million in
H1-2016 pertaining to the revised accounting valuation of GPG.
Nevertheless, the rating agency continues to believe that AMFW's
disposal strategy is achievable and that the bulk of the sale
proceeds will be applied towards debt reduction. In addition to
the partial re-payment of the group's revolving credit facility
(RCF) with a reduction in working capital, Moody's believes AMFW
will be able to de-lever towards 4x by the end of 2017 as a
result of asset disposals.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the asset
disposal program will be successful and that proceeds will be
applied to debt reduction which should result in the deleveraging
of the group. The stable outlook also anticipates that ongoing
restructuring costs will diminish over time, as well as the
associated impact on our metrics.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP / DOWN

Upwards pressure would exist if the company's profit margins were
to improve from current levels (Moody's adjusted EBITA margin of
around 5.2% in 2015) and its debt metrics were to sustainably
improve, as evidenced by adjusted leverage (debt to EBITDA)
falling sustainably below 3.5 times in conjunction with strong
free cash flow generation.

Conversely, negative rating pressure could develop if AMFW is
unable to fully execute its intended disposal plan, if there is a
further deterioration in operating margins or if the group were
to generate negative free cash flows such that debt / EBITDA was
sustained above 4x. Additionally, a deterioration in the group's
liquidity profile would also be a factor for a downgrade.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Construction
Industry published in November 2014.


BENCHMARK PODS: Creditors to Vote on CVA Proposal on September 6
----------------------------------------------------------------
Hull Daily Mail reports that Benchmark Pods, which owes almost
GBP3 million to creditors, is seeking a Company Voluntary
Arrangement in the hope of salvaging the company.

A meeting of the company's creditors and shareholders is due to
be held on Tuesday, Sept. 6, at 2:00 p.m., at The KP in Kilnwick
Percy, near Pocklington, Hull Daily Mail discloses.

Clark Business Recovery Ltd, of Leeds, put the proposals for the
CVA before Leeds County Court on behalf of Benchmark, Hull Daily
Mail relates.  To get a CVA, it must be approved by creditors who
are owed at least 75% of the debt, Hull Daily Mail notes.

According to Hull Daily Mail, the company has an estimated total
shortfall as regards its creditors at just under GBP2.9 million.

Benchmark Pods is a Hull manufacturer of modular bathroom pods.


GREEN ENERGY: Goes Into Administration, Owes More Than GBP1MM
-------------------------------------------------------------
David Casey at Insider Media reports that Green Energy Initiative
Ltd. has entered administration owing unsecured creditors more
than GBP1 million following a catalogue of problems that included
bad debts and reductions to energy tariffs.

Adrian Graham of insolvency firm Graywoods was appointed the
administrator of the company after its cash flow became stretched
since striking a company voluntary arrangement with its creditors
a year ago, Insider Media relates.

Although a CVA was agreed in September 2015, Green Energy
Initiative's cash flow became even more stretched as a result of
suppliers altering their terms of business, Insider Media
discloses.  This ultimately led to the appointment of the
administrator, Insider Media notes.

According to Insider Media, in a report to creditors, unsecured
claims are estimated to be in the region of GBP1.5 million, the
lion's share of which is owed to HM Revenue & Customs.

Green Energy Initiative Ltd. is a Sheffield business set up to
capitalize on government-led green energy initiatives.  The
business was formed in 2011, trading under the name Solar Tech
Systems.


IONA ENERGY: Bridge Misses Deadline to Complete Purchase
--------------------------------------------------------
Mark Lammey at Energy Voice reports that North Sea-focused oil
and gas development firm Bridge Petroleum is believed to have
missed a deadline to wrap up its purchase of Iona Energy, which
went into administration earlier this year.

Bridge, which was incorporated earlier this year, signed a sale
and purchase agreement (SPA) to buy Iona from administrators in
June, Energy Voice recounts.

And later that month, Iona's unsecured creditors approved a
Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA), a legally-binding agreement
which lets insolvent firms draw up new debt repayment schedules
and start trading again, Energy Voice relates.

In an update to bondholders published in mid-August, Iona's
administrators at FTI Consulting said the SPA had been expected
to go through late in July, Energy Voice relays.

However, Bridge asked for more time, saying "uncertainties" had
arisen in its "process to secure funding for the Orlando
development" north-east of Shetland, Energy Voice notes.

In the update, administrators, as cited by Energy Voice, said the
deadline had been moved to Aug. 31 to accommodate Bridge, but
they warned there was a "potential risk" the SPA would fail.

It is now understood that Bridge was unable to get the deal over
the line ahead of the Aug. 31 cut-off point, according to Energy
Voice.

It means administrators are likely to seek alternative buyers, or
give Bridge more time to find the funds it needs, Energy Voice
states.

Iona went into administration in January following a failed
attempt to restructure its finances, Energy Voice recounts.

Iona Energy Company UK Limited provides oil and gas exploration
and production services.


MABEL MEZZCO: Moody's Affirms B2 CFR & Changes Outlook to Pos.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook on the ratings of
Mabel Mezzco Limited (Wagamama) to positive from stable.  Moody's
has also affirmed the company's B2 corporate family rating, B2-PD
probability of default rating (PDR) and the B2 rating of GBP150
million Senior Secured Notes due 2020 issued by Wagamama Finance
plc.

"We have changed our outlook on Wagamama to positive to reflect
the company's improved leverage resulting from strong top line
growth and improved EBITDA generation over the last 24 months.
We also expect it to keep reducing its leverage in the next 12 to
18 months."

"Despite the UK's increasingly competitive casual dining market,
Wagamama has outperformed its peers by delivering double digit
percentage like-for-like sales growth in the last two financial
years and in last four quarters.  It also continues to expand
organically through the opening of new restaurants in the UK and
internationally." says Emmanuel Savoye, an AVP at Moody's.

                         RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's views positively 1) the track record of consistent
revenue and EBITDA growth, 2) the management team's success in
rolling out new restaurants in the UK and to a lesser extend
internationally, as well as 3) the strong brand recognition and
the concept differentiation offered by Wagamama as the only major
pan-Asian player in the UK.

As of April 24, 2016, (FYE 2016), UK like-for-like sales
increased by 13.1% compared to FYE April 2015 and EBITDA after
leases and pre-opening costs increased by 23.5% to GBP35.7
million, which is ahead of the original business plan and higher
than previous Moody's expectations.  Over the same period,
Moody's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA decreased significantly to 5.3x
from 6.7x and the Moody's adjusted EBITA interest coverage
improved to 1.6x from 1.1x reflecting the high coupon of 7.8% on
the outstanding debt.

The casual dining market remains highly competitive in the UK.
After a good performance in the first three quarters of 2015, the
market has slowed down in late 2015 and into 2016 in terms of
like-for-like sales.  Although underlying positive fundamentals
remain for the sector, there are also a number of challenges in
Moody's view, including 1) increased competition due to continued
new restaurant openings which makes it more difficult to achieve
positive like-for-like sales, 2) the recent outcome of the UK
referendum to leave the European Union which may lead to a period
of economic uncertainty and a possible decrease in consumer
confidence, and 3) pressure on margins due to the planned
increases of the minimum national living wage introduced in April
2016.

Against these challenges, Wagamama continued to achieve double
digit like-for-like sales growth in each of the last four
quarters, and preliminary figures indicate a continued strong
performance in Q1 2016/2017 including during the period
immediately following the Brexit vote.  In Moody's view, this
demonstrates the quality and strength of the brand as the only
player of scale offering pan-Asian cuisine in the UK.  In
addition, the company has implemented cost saving measures to
partially offset the minimum national living wage increase, such
as optimizing procurement and a more efficient use of the
workforce.  Moody's notes though that the development on consumer
confidence post Brexit are yet to be tested and that the planned
future increase in minimum national living wage may have a
negative impact on EBITDA margin.

Other sources of margin pressure could arise in the market, such
as an increasing use of external parties to expand in the
delivery sector and a potential food cost inflation over time due
to a weaker currency.  However, in Moody's view, the growth of
the delivery segment will also enable to expand revenues, while
food cost inflation is expected to be mitigated by the long term
contracts generally in place on food sourced from abroad and from
the efforts taken to find alternative local suppliers.

With revenues of GBP229.9 million, or less than half the revenues
of the top players in the UK casual dining market such as Pizza
Express and Nando's, Wagamama remains a small player with a
strong niche position and as such the company's cash flow
generation is more exposed to the underperformance of individual
restaurants or the strength of its only brand and cuisine
offering.  At the same time Moody's recognizes that the continued
growth of Wagamama in recent years has enabled it to reach a size
where it can take more advantage of economies of scale, as
evidenced by the opening of a new central kitchen in 2015, and
the centralization of the production of sauces and other key
ingredients for all of Wagamama's UK restaurants.  Moody's also
notes the improving geographic diversification along with the
expansion outside the UK.  As of July 2016, the company has 38
restaurants across 15 countries.

Moody's expects the company to continue the roll out of new
restaurants in the UK as well as internationally and to use
internally generated cash flows to finance the investments
required.  As a result, Moody's do not expect any meaningful free
cash flow generation in the next 12 months while recognizing that
a large portion of the expected capex is discretionary.  In light
of the bullet maturities of the outstanding notes, Moody's
expects deleveraging to be driven by EBITDA growth and it
currently assumes that Moody's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA will
reduce slightly below 5.0x in the next twelve months.

The company's liquidity remains adequate, including about GBP35.5
million cash on balance sheet as of FYE 2016 and a fully undrawn
GBP15 million super senior revolving credit facility maturing in
2019.  There is no scheduled debt amortization until the bond
maturity in 2020 and ample headroom under the minimum EBITDA
covenant.

                           RATING OUTLOOK

The positive outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Moody's
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA will continue to decline in the next 12
to 18 months supported by positive growth in like-for-like
revenues as well as growth in EBITDA through the roll out of new
restaurants.

             WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP / DOWN

Upward pressure on the rating could materialize if operational
key performance indicators remain strong and the Moody's adjusted
debt/EBITDA falls towards 5.0x on a sustainable basis, with
Moody's adjusted EBITA coverage of interest expenses moving
towards 2.0x.

Conversely, downward pressure on the rating could arise if
Moody's adjusted debt/EBITDA rises above 6.5x on a sustainable
basis or Moody's adjusted EBITA coverage of interest expenses
falling towards 1.0x and /or liquidity concerns emerge.  Moody's
could also consider downgrading the ratings in the event of any
material acquisitions or changes in financial policy.

List of affected ratings:

Affirmations:

Issuer: Mabel Mezzco Limited
  Corporate Family Rating, Affirmed B2
  Probability of Default Rating, Affirmed B2-PD

Issuer: Wagamama Finance plc
  BACKED Senior Secured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed B2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Mabel Mezzco Limited
  Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Issuer: Wagamama Finance plc
  Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Restaurant
Industry published in September 2015.

Founded in 1991, Wagamama has grown to become a major player in
its core UK market, where it is the only player of scale offering
pan-Asian cuisine in the branded restaurant industry.  As of July
2016, it operated 119 sites in the UK, 3 sites in the US, as well
as having 35 sites through a franchise model internationally
across Europe, the Middle East and New Zealand.  Headquartered in
London, it has approximately 4,500 employees worldwide.  For FYE
to April 2016, Wagamama reported revenues of GBP229.9 million and
EBITDA (unadjusted) of GBP35.7 million.


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* BOOK REVIEW: The First Junk Bond
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                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
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Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
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like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
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prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
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Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
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                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

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