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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Tuesday, August 2, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 151


                            Headlines


B E L A R U S

BELARUSIAN REPUBLICAN: Fitch Affirms 'B-' IFS Rating


E S T O N I A

* ESTONIA: Moody's Says Growth & Low Debt Support Credit Profile


F R A N C E

SAPPHIREONE MORTGAGES: DBRS Finalizes BB(sf) Rating on Cl. E Debt
SAPPHIREONE MORTGAGES: S&P Assigns BB Rating to Class E Notes


I R E L A N D

IRISH BANK: Former Execs Get Jail Sentences for Role in Collapse


I T A L Y

GOVONI SIM: Sept. 12 Expressions of Interest Deadline Set
LUCCHINI SPA: Sept. 15 Deadline Set for Business Complex Offers


K A Z A K H S T A N

CENTRAL-ASIAN: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B+', Outlook Stable
PAVLODARENERGO: Fitch Assigns 'B+' IDR, Outlook Stable
SEVKAZENERGO JSC: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B+', Outlook Stable


L U X E M B O U R G

TIGERLUXONE SARL: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+', Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

BABSON EURO CLO 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Cl. E Notes
JUBILEE CLO 2013-X: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
NORTH WESTERLY: Moody's Hikes Class D Notes Rating to Ba1(sf)


R U S S I A

CREDO FINANCE: Placed Under Provisional Administration


S P A I N

EMPRESAS HIPOTECARIO: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class C Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: MPs Seek Details of Goldman's Work for Tina Green
CLEANEVENT GROUP: Bought Out of Administration, 700 Jobs Saved
GALAXY FINCO: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term CCR, Outlook Stable
HONOURS SERIES 2: Moody's Cuts Class C Notes Rating to Ba2(sf)
PREMIER OIL: Lenders Agree to Defer Financial Covenant Test

TATA STEEL UK: Fate of Port Talbot Steel Plant Still Uncertain

* UK: Company Insolvencies Down 4.2% to 3,617 in 2nd Qtr. 2016
* UK: R3 Comments on Drop in Q2 2016 Corporate Insolvencies


X X X X X X X X

* EU Bank Stress Tests Overlook Impact of Negative Yields


                            *********


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B E L A R U S
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BELARUSIAN REPUBLICAN: Fitch Affirms 'B-' IFS Rating
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Belarusian Republican Unitary
Insurance Company's (Belgosstrakh) Insurer Financial Strength
(IFS) rating at 'B-'.  The Outlook is Stable.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating and Outlook mirror Belarus's 'B-'/Stable Local
Currency Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and reflect the
insurer's 100% state ownership.  The rating also reflects the
presence of guarantees for insurance liabilities under compulsory
lines, the insurer's leading market position in a number of
segments, its sustainable profit generation, adequate capital
position, and the fairly low quality of its investment portfolio.

Belarus redenominated its currency on a scale of 10000:1 on
July 1, 2016.  This does not have any implications for
Belgosstrakh's rating.

Belgosstrakh continues to demonstrate a solid operating
performance, with net income of BYR75 mil. (BYR751 bil.), up from
BYR64 mil. (BYR643 bil.) in 2014.  The improvement was mainly
achieved through a stronger investment result and one-off FX
gains on investments.  The underwriting result was also positive,
but somewhat weaker than in 2014, with the combined ratio
worsening to 95% in 2015 from 89% in 2014 driven by an increased
loss ratio.  In 3M16 the insurer reported net income of BYR20
mil. (BYR203 bil.), a moderate improvement from BYR18m (BYR183
bil.) in 3M15, which reflected similar trends in the underwriting
profitability, investment yield and FX gains to those in 2015.

Belgosstrakh has a market-leading position as the exclusive
provider of a number of compulsory lines, including state-
guaranteed employers' liability, homeowners' property,
agricultural insurance and a number of other more minor lines.
The Belarusian state has established strong support for
Belgosstrakh in its legal framework, including direct guarantees
on policyholder obligations and significant capital injections in
previous years.

Based on Fitch's Prism factor-based capital model, the insurer is
adequately capitalized for its rating.  Belgosstrakh has an
exceptionally strong nominal level of capital relative to its
current business volume level.  Its Solvency I-like statutory
ratio at end-3M16 was 13x.

Belgosstrakh's investment portfolio is of relatively low quality,
reflecting the credit quality of bank deposits, which is
constrained by sovereign risks and the presence of significant
concentrations by issuer.  The investment profile is attributable
to the narrowness of the local investment market and strict
regulation of the insurer's investment policy.


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E S T O N I A
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* ESTONIA: Moody's Says Growth & Low Debt Support Credit Profile
----------------------------------------------------------------
Estonia's resilient economic growth, very high institutional
strength and very low government debt support the government's
credit rating, Moody's Investors Service says in an annual
report.

Estonia's credit challenges stem from its small and open economy,
its shrinking working-age population and competitiveness
challenges.

"However, Estonia's economy is highly flexible and diverse, which
has supported its economic resilience during the financial crisis
and the most recent challenging external environment in Russia
(Ba1, Negative) and Finland (Aa1, Stable)," said Evan Wohlmann,
Assistant Vice President -- Analyst and co-author of the report.
"Estonia also has a healthy fiscal position and one of the lowest
debt burdens in Moody's rated universe."

Moody's expects Estonia's economy to expand by 1.9% and 2.4% in
2016 and 2017, largely due to private consumption. This forecast
is supported by growth in domestic spending seen in the first
quarter of 2016, with GDP rising by 1.7% year-on-year, supported
by a more than 5% increase in household consumption.

The debt burden as a percentage of GDP is expected to remain
relatively stable at around 9.5% of GDP in 2016 and 2017,
slightly below the level recorded in 2015. At the same time,
fiscal reserves remain substantial at around 9% of GDP although
these will fall to accommodate the expected small deficits in the
next two years.

A record of steady economic growth that helps to mitigate
vulnerabilities to external shocks would improve Estonia's
creditworthiness over the longer-term. In contrast, a material
and sustained deterioration in economic growth prospects would
undermine fiscal consolidation efforts and have negative
implications for the rating.


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F R A N C E
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SAPPHIREONE MORTGAGES: DBRS Finalizes BB(sf) Rating on Cl. E Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited finalized its provisional ratings assigned
to the securitisation notes issued by SapphireOne Mortgages FCT
2016-1 (the Issuer or SapphireOne):

-- Class A Notes: AAA (sf)
-- Class B Notes: AA (sf)
-- Class C Notes: A (sf)
-- Class D Notes: BBB (sf)
-- Class E Notes: BB (sf)

The Issuer is a French fonds commun de titrisation established
jointly by Eurotitrisation, the management company, and Societe
Generale, the custodian. The issued notes have been used to fund
the purchase of residential mortgage loans secured effectively by
first lien over properties located in France which have been
originated by GE Money Bank S.C.A. (GEMB or the Bank). GEMB will
also be the servicer of the portfolio.

The mortgage portfolio sold to the Issuer aggregates EUR850.04
million (as of June 30, 2016) and consists exclusively of loans
provided to borrowers for the purposes of re-financing an
existing financing for the acquisition of, construction or works
on, residential real estate property(ies) and/or to re-finance
existing consumer credits, bank overdrafts or other indebtedness
(including personal debts) and, as the case may be, for the
purpose of other personal consumption needs, provided that all
mortgage loans to a borrower which are secured on the same
property are included in the mortgage portfolio.

The ratings are based on the following analytical considerations:

Historical performance of the mortgage product: Approximately 30%
of the portfolio was originated in 2006, 2007 and 2008. These
origination vintages have performed worse relative to other GEMB
origination vintages. Since 2008, GEMB has tightened the
origination criteria on loan-to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income,
which has resulted in better performance of origination vintages
from 2009 onward. DBRS has considered the historical performance
of the loans in the assessment of the credit risk of the
provisional mortgage portfolio.

Loan installment protection mechanism: Approximately 74% of the
mortgage portfolio has their monthly repayment installments
protected where the full extent of any increases in interest
rates is not passed on to the borrower through an increase in the
installments. The increase in installments amount is annual with
the installment protection linked to inflation. DBRS has
considered the potential increase in installments in a rising
interest rate scenario in the cash flow analysis of the
transaction.

Potential negative amortization of loans: Any change in interest
rates may also result in a change to the interest versus
principal repayment portions of the monthly installment. In a
rising interest rate scenario, the interest repayment portion of
the installment will increase, resulting in slower amortization
of the loan. If the rise in interest rates is such that the
entire installment is not enough to pay the interest on the
loans, the excess amount of interest unpaid will be capitalized
thus resulting in negative amortization. A structural feature of
the transaction enables the amortization of the notes based on an
amortization schedule defined at closing of the transaction. The
targeted amortization of the notes is based on the calculated
amortization of the loan using the principal outstanding of the
loan, the interest rate of the loan and the installment of the
loan at closing of the transaction. Thus, irrespective of the
share of interest and principal repayments of the loans' monthly
installment, the monthly installment amount will be split into
interest and principal receipts and will reference the scheduled
amortization of the loan at closing of the transaction. The
interest amount of the installment will be calculated based on
the lesser of the current interest rate of the loan and the one
at closing. As a result, the amortization of the notes is not
expected to be adversely affected on account of slower or
negative amortization of the loan. DBRS has adjusted the default
probability of the loans to account for the potential balloon
principal repayment risk in the rising interest rate scenario.

Legal title and servicing of loans: On the closing date, the
legal and beneficial title of the mortgage loans was transferred
to the Issuer. GEMB will service the mortgage portfolio during
the life of the transaction. A backup servicer is not appointed;
however, the management company, Eurotitrisation S.A., is
expected to facilitate the process to find a suitable replacement
in the event of a servicer termination event. GEMB's servicing
capabilities are considered appropriate to be able to monitor and
manage the performance of its mortgage book and securitized
mortgage portfolios.

On June 23, 2016, GE Inc. received a binding offer from an
affiliate of Cerberus Capital Management, L.P. for the potential
sale of GEMB and its operations in the French Overseas
Territories. DBRS believes that GEMB's current financial
condition mitigates the risk of a potential disruption in
servicing following a servicer event of default including
insolvency. Moreover, the rated notes will have necessary
liquidity support from the reserve fund on account of any
temporary servicing disruption.

Loans in dispute, arrears, default or restructured loans: 4.45%
of the loans in the mortgage portfolio are either in default
(1.80%), disputed or subject to litigation (0.74%) or in arrears
for more than 30 days (2.68%). Additionally, 5.11% of the loans
are either subject to a restructuring plan with Banque de France
or on a restructuring plan with GEMB. DBRS has stressed these
loans appropriately in the estimation of defaults for the
provisional mortgage portfolio.

Credit Enhancement and liquidity support for the notes: At
closing, the credit enhancement (CE) for the rated Class A notes
consisted of subordination of 17.74% by the collateralized junior
notes and a non-liquidity reserve fund of 0.43% of the aggregate
mortgage portfolio balance. The liquidity of the rated notes is
supported by a liquidity reserve fund (LRF) (2.50% of the balance
of the Class A notes). The LRF supports any shortfalls in payment
of interest on the Class A notes without any conditions. However,
the use of the LRF for the payment of any shortfall in interest
payments for the junior notes is allowed only if the principal
deficiency ledger (PDL) outstanding for a class of notes does not
exceed 10% of the outstanding amount of respective classes of
notes. As the liquidity reserve amortizes, the released amounts
would add to the non-liquidity reserve amount (NLRF). The credit
enhancement of the rated junior notes is expected to be: Class B,
13.64%; Class C, 10.80%; Class D, 8.55%; and Class E, 6.35%.
Principal receipts may also be used for shortfall in payments of
senior fees and interest on the rated notes subject to the same
PDL triggers as those for the use of LRF to support liquidity of
the rated notes.

Fixed to floating rate and basis risk hedged: The rated notes pay
interest linked to the three-month Euribor rate. The mortgages
pay a floating rate interest linked to the one-month Euribor rate
(50.15%) or the three-month Euribor rate (18.95%), fixed rate of
interest with periodic resets (6.57%) and fixed rate of interest
(for life) with no resets (24.33%) The basis risk is hedged with
an interest rate swap with notional balance equal to the
outstanding principal balance of the rated notes. The swap
notional will exclude the balance of a rated class of notes if
the PDL for the class of notes immediately senior is more than
50% of the size of that class of notes. The Issuer will pay a
fixed rate to the swap provider and will receive the notes'
three-month Euribor rate.

Three-month Euribor rate under the Swap: The three-month Euribor
rate paid under the swap to the Issuer will match that paid on
the notes. The three-month Euribor rate as of 1 July 2016 is
negative at -0.29%. The Issuer will pay this negative interest
rate in addition to the fixed rate payable to the swap provider.
This index rate will have a floor of -1.50% under the swap to
limit the liability of the Issuer on the floating leg of the swap
until the margin step-up date for the rated notes. However, the
interest coupon on the notes is floored at zero. Although the
Issuer may not have an interest liability under the notes, its
liability under the swap may increase if the three-month Euribor
rate declines further into negative territory after the margin
step-up date on the notes. DBRS has applied a declining interest
rate stress wherein the three-month Euribor declines to -0.50%
per its methodology on interest rates stresses (Unified Interest
Rate Model for European Securitisations).

The transaction was modeled in Intex to perform the cash flow
analysis using DBRS stresses.


SAPPHIREONE MORTGAGES: S&P Assigns BB Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to SapphireOne
Mortgages FCT 2016-1's class A to E notes.  At closing,
SapphireOne Mortgages FCT 2016-1 also issued unrated class F
notes.

SapphireOne is the first true sale securitization of residential
loan receivables originated by GE Money Bank (GEMB).  GEMB is the
seller of the securitized loans.

The collateral is in S&P's view atypical for the French market.
That is because it comprises entirely debt consolidation
residential mortgage loan receivables that pay a fixed
installment, which can be revised annually.  S&P considers the
specific nature of the assets in its analysis below.

SapphireOne is a French securitization fund ("Fonds Commun de
Titrisation" or FCT), which is bankruptcy remote by law.

The transaction amortizes sequentially, with one tranche repaying
at a time, starting with the most senior.  A combination of
subordination, a non-liquidity reserve, and excess spread
provides credit enhancement for the notes.

S&P's ratings on the class A to E notes address the timely
payment of interest and ultimate payment of principal.

                         RATING RATIONALE

Economic Outlook

S&P expects GDP to grow by 1.5% in 2016 and 1.2% in 2017,
primarily owing to resilient domestic demand.  Growth will be
somewhat curtailed by weakness in the external environment in
2016.  Despite an expected rise in inflation, household
consumption should still find support from the slow improvement
in the labor market, an ease in the fiscal stance, and very low
borrowing costs.  A revival of the housing market, a
strengthening in corporate profit margins (mainly owing to
corporate tax cuts), and very positive credit conditions should
continue to boost fixed investment over the next two years.

Credit Analysis

S&P has conducted a loan-level analysis to assess the mortgage
pool's credit quality by applying S&P's French residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria.

The portfolio is in S&P's experience atypical for the French
market for a number of reasons.  It comprises solely debt
consolidation mortgage loans and all of the floating-rate loans
are subject to "borrower protection mechanisms" (BPM), which
limit the potential increase in installments payable by
borrowers.

The loans are amortizing loans.  However, should interest rates
increase sufficiently, the loans that fall under the BPM may in
effect become interest-only loans as a greater proportion of the
borrower's installment is allocated to interest.  If interest
rates increase to the extent that the fixed installment is
insufficient to meet the borrower's obligation, then the excess
above the installment is capitalized.  This can result in
negative amortization on the loan and the borrower can end up
owing more than the initial balance of the loan.  S&P believes
there is a legal risk regarding this practice and have considered
this in its cash flow analysis.

Another feature of the portfolio, which is in S&P's view
relatively unique in the French RMBS market, is that 5.16% of the
pool is flagged as either having had a restructuring under the
Banque de France or as defaulted.  S&P has accounted for each of
these features in its credit analysis.

Operational Risk

GEMB is an experienced player in residential financing in France.
It also has previous home loan securitization experience through
its existing covered bond program.  S&P has assessed GEMB's
origination policies, by conducting an on-site visit in August
2015 and, although the products offered are in S&P's view
atypical of the French residential mortgage market, S&P was
satisfied with the review.

"GEMB also acts as the servicer of the loans in the pool and we
reviewed its servicing capabilities as part of our on-site review
in August 2015.  We have, under our operational risk criteria,
assessed the role of GEMB as servicer.  Given the debt
consolidation nature of the assets in the pool, they are not the
traditional type of assets we see in the French RMBS market.
Under our operational risk criteria, we therefore see this
transaction as having moderate severity risk.  The next step when
applying our operational risk criteria is to assess the
portability risk in the transaction.  We consider that this
transaction has moderate portability risk as there are a limited
number of servicers in the market capable of servicing assets
such as these.  Finally, we assessed the servicer in the context
of disruption risk, which we consider to be low.  Our operational
risk criteria do not cap the maximum potential rating achievable
in this transaction on account of the servicer," S&P said.

"In this transaction, we have also assessed the role of the cash
manager as a key transaction party (KTP) under our operational
risk criteria.  Typically, we do not consider cash managers as a
KTP.  However, in this transaction -- due to the role that the
reclassification of collections has on the structure -- we have
applied our operational risk criteria to the cash manager,
Eurotitrisation.  As before, we view the level of severity risk
as being moderate, but consider the level of portability risk and
disruption risk to be low.  Our operational risk criteria do not
cap the maximum potential rating achievable in this transaction
on account of the cash manager," S&P noted.

Legal Risk

The issuer is an FCT, which is considered bankruptcy remote under
French law, in line with S&P's European legal criteria.

S&P has received a legal opinion confirming that the sale of the
assets would survive the seller's insolvency.

S&P has also reviewed an external legal memorandum regarding the
issuer's potential exposure to future setoff in relation to the
fact that the BPM loans may be subject to negative amortization.
S&P has considered this potential risk in its analysis.

Counterparty Risk

The transaction is exposed to Societe Generale as the account
bank provider and BNP Paribas as the swap counterparty.

The transaction's documented replacement language for all of its
relevant counterparties is in line with S&P's current
counterparty criteria.  S&P's analysis shows that counterparty
risk does not constrain its ratings on the notes.  The dynamic
nature of the replacement trigger in the swap documentation
could, if S&P lowered its ratings on the notes for performance
reasons, potentially constrain the maximum potential ratings on
the notes.

Cash Flow Analysis

The notes amortize sequentially.  A combination of subordination,
the non-liquidity reserve, and excess spread provides credit
enhancement for the notes.

The transaction benefits from a fully funded, nonamortizing
general reserve fund that is divided into a liquidity reserve and
a non-liquidity reserve.

S&P has assessed the transaction's documented payment structure,
which in its experience is unique in the Europe, Middle East, and
Africa (EMEA) RMBS market as all of the collections on the assets
are pooled together and reclassified according to documented
conditions.

S&P has based its cash flow analysis on the application of its
French RMBS criteria and S&P's European cash flow criteria.
S&P's analysis indicates that the notes' available credit
enhancement is sufficient to withstand the credit and cash flow
stresses that S&P applies at the assigned rating levels.

Ratings Stability

S&P conducted its scenario analysis, in which S&P tested its
ratings under two scenarios and examined the transaction's
performance by applying its credit stability criteria.

Country Risk

S&P has assigned a rating to the class A notes, which is above
its long-term unsolicited 'AA' rating on France.  Under S&P's
updated criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations
above the sovereign foreign currency rating, as S&P rates the
sovereign in the 'AA' category, it do not apply a formal
sovereign default stress test.

            POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PROPOSED CRITERIA CHANGES

S&P's ratings are based on its applicable criteria, including its
French RMBS criteria.  However, these criteria are under review.

As a result of this review, S&P's future criteria applicable to
rating transactions backed by French mortgage assets may differ
from S&P's current criteria.  These criteria changes may affect
the rating on the outstanding notes in this transaction.  Until
such time that S&P adopts new criteria, it will continue to rate
and surveil this transaction using its existing criteria.

RATINGS LIST

SapphireOne Mortgages FCT 2016-1
EUR871.25 Million Euro-Denominated Residential Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes (Including Euro-Denominated Unrated Notes)

Class    Rating             Amount
                          (mil. EUR)

A        AAA (sf)           702.90
B        AA (sf)             34.80
C        A (sf)              24.20
D        BBB (sf)            19.10
E        BB (sf)             18.70
F        NR                  71.55

NR--Not rated.


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IRISH BANK: Former Execs Get Jail Sentences for Role in Collapse
----------------------------------------------------------------
Katie Forster at Independent reports that three former senior
Irish bankers have been jailed for their role in the collapse of
Anglo Irish Bank, now known as Irish Bank Resolution Corp.,
during the 2008 financial crisis.

According to Independent, Willie McAteer, John Bowe and Denis
Casey conspired to conceal losses of billions of euros at the
defunct Anglo Irish Bank -- the biggest accounting fraud in Irish
corporate history, which contributed to the country's devastating
financial crash.

The trio were condemned for carrying out "sham transactions"
designed to inflate Anglo's deposit levels by EUR7.2 billion
(GBP6 billion) in the Dublin bank's 2008 earnings report,
Independent discloses.

Judge Martin Nolan, as cited by Independent, said they used
"dishonest, deceitful and corrupt" tactics to defraud
shareholders and cloak the funding crisis enveloping the bank.

Former Anglo executive Mr. McAteer, 65, was sentenced to
three-and-a-half years in prison while his former colleague Mr.
Bowe, 52, received a sentence of two years, Independent relays.

And co-conspirator Mr. Casey, 56, former chief executive of
financial services company Irish Life and Permanent, was jailed
for two years and nine months, Independent states.

Mr. Casey's bank had supplied funds that Anglo falsely claimed as
new customer deposits in full-year results to shareholders,
according to Independent.

The move was designed to reassure the shareholders of the bank's
financial position after aggressively betting for more than a
decade on Ireland's property boom -- which was about to come
crashing down amid the global credit crunch that year,
Independent notes.

Investigators found that the EUR7.2 billion was on Anglo's books
for barely one day before being transferred back to Irish Life
and Permanent, Independent recounts.

Ireland's government discovered in October 2008 that Anglo was on
the verge of bankruptcy and declared, in event of an Irish bank
failure, that the taxpayer would step in to repay all depositors
and bondholders, Independent discloses.

                   About Irish Bank Resolution

Irish Bank Resolution Corp., the liquidation vehicle for what was
once one of Ireland's largest banks, filed a Chapter 15 petition
(Bankr. D. Del. Case No. 13-12159) on Aug. 26, 2013, to protect
U.S. assets of the former Anglo Irish Bank Corp. from being
seized by creditors.  Irish Bank Resolution sought assistance
from the U.S. court in liquidating Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and
Irish Nationwide Building Society.  The two banks failed and were
merged into IBRC in July 2011.  IBRC is tasked with winding them
down and liquidating their assets.  In February, when Irish
lawmakers adopted the Irish Bank Resolution Corp., IBRC was
placed into a special liquidation in the Irish High Court to
complete liquidation and distribution of the two banks' assets.

IBRC's principal asset as of June 2012 was a loan portfolio
valued at some EUR25 billion (US$33.5 billion).  About 70 percent
of the loans were to Irish borrowers. Some 5 percent of the
portfolio was under U.S. law, according to a court filing.  Total
liabilities in June 2012 were about EUR50 billion, according
to a court filing.

Most assets in the U.S. have been sold already.  IBRC is involved
in lawsuits in the U.S.

IBRC was granted protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code in December 2013.

Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG have been named the
special liquidators.


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GOVONI SIM: Sept. 12 Expressions of Interest Deadline Set
---------------------------------------------------------
In execution of the sale program of the business complex approved
by the Ministry of Economic Development with its own decree dated
April 28, 2016, GOVONI SIM BIANCA IMPIANTI S.p.A. under
Extraordinary Administration (hereinafter, 'GSBI' or the
'Company') intends to begin a procedure for the sale of the
business complex of GSBI.

The business complex covered by the procedure includes complex of
assets, licenses, authorizations, certifications and any other
assets, services or activities for the business activity carried
out by GSBI in the field of pneumatic handling systems for
pellets and powders.  In order to have a complete and detailed
description of the offered products, of the relevant market and
of the Company's profile, please see the document available to
the following website: www.gsbimpianti.com

For the reasons stated above, Prof. Avv. Umberto Tombari, the
Extraordinary Commissioner of GSBI invites all the parties
interested in purchasing the Company's business complex to submit
a non-binding expression of interest in accordance with terms and
conditions set forth in the integral version of the present call,
available, in Italian and in English, to the following web site
www.gsbimpianti.com

These expressions of interest shall be submitted, by registered
mail or internationally recognized overnight delivery service,
charges prepaid, not later than 12:00 a.m. (Italian time), on
September 12, 2016, in a closed envelope setting out the wording
"Expression of Interest - GSBI Procedure" to the
Commissioner Prof. Avv. Umberto Tombari, Piazza Dell'Indipendenza
21, 50129 Firenze (Fi), and identifying the sender.

Any request of clarification shall be sent, by email only, to the
following address: gsbibid@gsbimpianti.com, mentioning in the
object "Clarification GSBI Procedure".

The present announcement represents an invitation to express
interest and does not constitute an offer to the public pursuant
to article 1336 of the Italian civil code, nor does it constitute
a mobilization of public savings ex art 94 and further
provisions, of Law Decree dated February 24th 1998 No. 58.


LUCCHINI SPA: Sept. 15 Deadline Set for Business Complex Offers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Dott. Piero Nard, the Extraordinary Receiver of Lucchini S.p.A.
in extraordinary receivership proceedings ("Lucchini"), intends
to solicit the submission of binding offers for the purchase of
the BUSINESS COMPLEX FOR THE VERTICALIZATION, THE HEAT TREATMENT
AND THE FINISHING OF BARS AND WIRE RODS RUN BY LUCCHINI AT THE
BUILDING IN CONDOVE (TO), VIA TORINO 19 composed by (i)
industrial plant and lands located in Condove (TO), Via Torino
19; (ii) systems and industrial machinery (including,
no. 2 "coil-to-bar" wire drawing machines, no. 1 "bar-to-bar"
drawing machine, no. 3 peeling machines, no. 2 grinding lines,
no. 2 quenching lines, no. 2 brushing lines and a US control
line); (iii) spare parts warehouse and other materials warehouse;
(iv) employment contracts and other contracts; and (v)
authorizations, licenses and certifications.

In addition to the Business Complex, is offered for sale a civil
office building (the "Office Building") composed by a
building of two floors (3.239 square meters) and a court (1.556
square metres).  In case of interest for the said Office
Building, a separate offer is requested. The initial price
amounts to EUR846.700 but the Extraordinary Receiver could also
consider offers with a discount not higher than the 25% of the
initial price to be evaluated according to the terms specified in
the tender conditions.  Interested parties may request the
Extraordinary Receiver (at the address
lucchiniamministrazionestraordinaria@pec.lucchini.it) a copy of
the relevant documents, including (i) the text of the sale
contract and its annexes (which must be returned to the
Extraordinary Receiver, duly signed on each page together with
the binding offer) and (ii) the text of the guarantee below.  The
said documents shall be delivered only subject to the previous
signature of the relevant tender conditions and confidentiality
agreement.  Those who intend to adhere to this invitation to
offer shall submit to the Extraordinary Receiver (at the Notary
David Morelli, Via San Francesco 18, 57025 Piombino - Livorno)
their binding offers, firm and irrevocable for a period of 180
days from the deadline for the submissions of the offers, no
later than 6:00 p.m. (Italian time) on September 15, 2016, in a
sealed envelope (to be sent by registered mail with return
receipt and/or courier) carrying the reference "Binding offer for
the purchase of the Vertek Business Complex of Condove" and/or
"Binding offer for the purchase of the Condove Office Building".
Offers for parties to be nominated shall not be accepted.

In order not to be excluded from the process, the bidder must,
among other things, submit to the Extraordinary Receiver, along
with the above mentioned offer(s) and to guarantee its/their
reliability, a deposit (in the form of cash or of a first demand
bank guarantee without the right of raising exceptions to be
drafted in strict compliance with the text that will be provided
by the Extraordinary Receiver) equal to the 8% (eight per cent)
of the offered purchase price to be accompanied, in case of
offers for the purchase of the Vertek Business Complex of
Condove, by an at least two-years industrial plan providing the
description of the prospects of re-launching and developing the
said business complex and the undertaking of the bidder to
continue the business activity of such business complex for at
least two years from the date of the sale notary act.

The Extraordinary Receiver shall evaluate the received offers
taking into account the offered purchase price (the adequacy of
which shall be evaluated in light of the appraisals drawn up by
the experts appointed by the Extraordinary Receivership) and, in
case of offers for the purchase of the Vertek Business Complex of
Condove, also (i) the industrial characteristics, the patrimonial
and financial solidity and the reliability of the bidder, (ii)
the intentions of the bidder to preserve the integrity and the
homogeneity of the business activities on sale and the business
plan aimed at maximizing the employment safeguarding, and (iii)
the guarantees given by the bidder in relation to the
continuation of the business activities and the maintenance of
the employment levels.

This notice is an invitation to offer and not an offer to public
as per Article 1336 of the Italian Civil Code.  The publication
of this notice does not imply any Extraordinary Receiver's
obligations to admit the bidders to the sale procedure and/or to
enter into negotiation for the sale and/or to sell and does not
entitle the bidders to receive any performance by the
Extraordinary Receiver and/or Lucchini for any reasons.

Any final decision on the sale of the business complex and/or the
Office Building above shall be subject to the authorizing power
of the Ministry of Economic Development, after consultation with
the Surveillance Committee.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


CENTRAL-ASIAN: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B+', Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Kazakhstan-based Joint Stock Company
Central-Asian Electric-Power Corporation's (CAEPCo) Long-Term
Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  The
Outlook is Stable.

The downgrade reflects our expectation that CAEPCo is unlikely to
reduce its consolidated funds from operations (FFO) adjusted
gross leverage to below 3x (3.8x in 2015) and to increase FFO
interest coverage above 4.5x (4.9x in 2015) over 2016-2019.  The
weakening of CAEPCo's credit profile follows Kazakh tenge's sharp
devaluation in 2015, given the company's high exposure to foreign
currency risk.  Fifty-four per cent of its debt at 1H16 was
denominated in US dollar versus all revenue generated in local
currency.

The ratings reflect CAEPCo's solid consolidated business profile,
strong 1H16 financial results, vertical integration, and stable
regional market position (despite overall small size).  The
ratings also take into account a currently fairly benign
regulatory regime in the distribution sector, although the
ratings are constrained by an unfavorable regulatory environment
in the generation segment with tariffs kept at 2015 levels for
2016-2018. CAEPCo's capex remains significant, which Fitch
expects to be partially debt-funded, resulting in further
negative free cash flow (FCF) in 2016-2018.

Fitch assess CAEPCo, and 100% subsidiaries -- Pavlodarenergo JSC
and Sevkazenergo JSC -- on a consolidated basis, since there is
no ring-fencing, treasury is centrally managed, debt is located
at both holdco and opco levels.  The debt of CAEPCo is primarily
serviced by dividends from its opcos and we rate its notes
without opco's guarantees one notch below the IDR.

                        KEY RATING DRIVERS

High FX Exposure Pressures Credit Metrics
The Kazakhstan tenge devaluation by more than 90% in 2015
weakened CAEPCo's credit profile due to a currency mismatch
between the company's debt and revenues and the absence of
hedging to reduce the company's foreign exchange exposure.  At
end-2015, 54% of CAEPCo's outstanding debt was denominated in US
dollar, versus all local currency-denominated revenue.

Fitch expects this pressure to continue, even with no further
tenge depreciation.  However, CAEPCo has some flexibility in
dividend payments as well as in capex, as committed capex for
2016-2020 amounts to 61% of forecast total capex.

CAEPCo also maintains a portion of cash in US dollars.  At end-
2015, CAEPCo had 25% of cash and deposits in US dollars.  The
company is also exposed to interest rate risk since about half of
its outstanding loans are drawn under floating interest rates.

Covenants Breach
As a result of the tenge devaluation CAEPCo breached its
debt/equity covenant as per its loan agreement with EBRD in 2015,
for which the company received a waiver.  Fitch expects CAEPCo to
breach this covenant again in 2016-2019 even with no further
tenge depreciation.  Failure to obtain a waiver or revise the
covenant may lead to further rating downgrade.  EBRD owns 22.6%
of CAEPCo.

Significant Capex, Negative FCF Expected
Capex is expected to remain significant despite the completion of
the so-called mandatory investment program agreed with the
government in 2009-2015 when tariff caps were in place.  Fitch
expects CAEPCo to continue generating solid consolidated cash
flow from operations (CFO) of KZT19 bil. on average over
2016-2019, although FCF is likely to remain negative at KZT5 bil.
over same period.

The negative FCF will be mainly driven by the company's
significant investment program of KZT22 bil. on average annually
for 2016-2019 as well as dividend payments of about 15% of net
profit over the medium term.  Fitch has assumed lower capex, in
line with its lower-than- management revenue forecast, reflecting
that most of the investment is discretionary in nature.  Fitch
expects CAEPCo to rely on new borrowings to finance cash
shortfalls.

Dividends to Delay Deleveraging
CAEPCo's financial policy to pay dividends could delay de-
leveraging in the long term.  However, CAEPCo retains the
flexibility to lower dividends to preserve cash, as demonstrated
in 2011 when it cut dividend to offset higher capex.  In 2015
CAEPCo tightened its dividend payout range to 15% from 30%.
Fitch's rating case assumed the 15% payout from 2017, following
the payment of KZT933 mil. in in January 2016.  Nevertheless,
Fitch expects FCF to remain negative since FFO will not be
sufficient to cover the high capex and dividends.

Sound Business Profile
CAEPCo is one of the largest privately-owned electricity
generators in the highly fragmented Kazakh market, responsible
for only 7.2% of electricity generation in 2015.  Consequently,
it is somewhat smaller than its rated CIS peers.  It is
vertically integrated across electricity generation, supply and
distribution, which gives the company access to markets for its
energy output and limits customer concentration.

CAEPCo covers electricity and heat generation, distribution and
supply in the Pavlodar and Petropavlovsk regions through its 100%
subsidiaries Pavlodarenergo JSC (4.1% of Kazakhstan electricity
production) and Sevkazenergo JSC (3.1%), and electricity
transmission and supply in Akmola Region through Akmola EDC and
Astanaenergosbyt LLP.  Electricity and heat generation services
dominate CAEPCo's EBITDA, accounting for about 96% in 2015.

Strong 1H16 Results
CAEPCo demonstrated strong operational and financial results in
2015 and 1H16.  The company commissioned three new turbines ahead
of time and increased its modernized capacity to 542MW from
289MW. The share of modernized capacity reached 49%, up from 27%
in 2014. Electricity production rose 7.4% during the same period,
compared with a 3.3% decline in Kazakhstan and a further 11.6%
yoy in 1H16 versus a 0.4% decline in Kazakhstan.

Despite our forecasts of Kazakhstan GDP declining by 1% and
inflation increasing 14% in 2016, we expect the company's
financial profile to remain strong with an average EBITDA margin
of about 23% over 2016-2019, which will support CAEPCO's ratings.
This is based on our assumptions of approved tariff growth for
the distribution segment, and 0% tariff growth for the generation
segment for 2016-2018.

Regulatory Environment
Following the postponement of the capacity market launch in
Kazakhstan until 2019, the regulator decided to freeze generation
tariffs and set them at 2015 levels for 2016-2018.  However, in
electricity distribution five-year tariffs were approved using
the "cost plus allowable margin" methodology instead of the
"benchmarking" that was previously used.

Tariffs at Pavlodar EDC, North-Kazakhstan EDC and Akmola EDC in
2020 compared with 2015 were approved with 8%, 3% and 7%
increases, respectively, in CAGR terms.  In the heat segment the
"cost plus allowable margin" methodology continues to be applied
with tariffs also approved for a period of five years but at
steeper increases in the heat generation segment of CAGR 5%-21%
for 2016-2020, and in the heat distribution segment CAGR 11%-19%.
The heat distribution business continues to be loss-making due to
large heat losses and regulated end-user tariffs, which Fitch
assumes are kept low for social reasons (heat generation is
reported within overall generation and is cash flow-accretive).

No Parent Uplift or Constraint
Unlike most Fitch-rated utilities in CIS, CAEPCo is privately
owned and therefore not affected by sovereign linkage.  The
company is run as a standalone enterprise and as such we do not
assume any credit linkages with the 57.4% controlling parent,
Kazakhstan-based Central-Asian Power-Energy Company JSC (CAPEC).
The remaining shares are held by three institutional
shareholders. The ratings therefore reflect CAEPCo's standalone
credit profile.

In 2015 CAPEC sold 7.25% of shares to three private equity funds.
Fitch views the sale as credit-neutral; however, enterprise
value/EBITDA 2015 multiple of around 14x indicates the
attractiveness of the company to investors.

                         KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Electricity volume growth in line with Fitch GDP forecasts
      of 2% p.a. over 2017-2019
   -- Tariff growth as approved by the government for
      distribution segment at 3%-8% CAGR over 2016-2020 and 0%
      for the generation segment for 2016-2018
   -- Capex in line with the company's adjusted on capex/revenue
      ratio
   -- Inflation-driven cost increase
   -- No further tenge depreciation
   -- Dividend payments of 15% of IFRS net income over 2017-2019
      for CAEPCo, 50% for Pavlodarenergo and Sevkazenergo.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Sustained slowdown of the Kazakh economy, further tenge
      devaluation, increase in coal prices that is substantially
      above inflation or tariffs materially lower than our
      forecasts, leading to FFO-adjusted gross leverage
      persistently higher than 4x and FFO interest coverage below
      3.5x.

   -- Committing to capex without sufficient available funding,
      and worsening overall liquidity.

Positive: Future developments that could lead to an upgrade
include:

   -- A stronger financial profile than forecast by Fitch
      supporting FFO adjusted gross leverage below 3x and FFO
      interest coverage above 4.5x on a sustained basis.

                   LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Satisfactory Liquidity
Fitch views CAEPCo's and its subsidiaries' liquidity as
satisfactory, assuming uninterrupted access to cash deposits
mostly held at local banks as well as available external funding
to finance forecast negative FCF over 2016-2019.  At end-1H16,
CAEPCo's cash and cash equivalents stood at KZT3.6 bil., which
together with short-term bank deposits with a maturity up to one
year of KZT11.4 bil. and unused credit facilities of KZT9.2 bil.,
are sufficient to cover short-term debt maturities of KZT16.3
bil. However, further tenge devaluation and negative FCF over
2016-2019 mean CAEPCo is likely to raise further debt to finance
cash shortfalls.

At end-2015, the majority of CAEPCo's debt was bank loans
(KZT68bn or about 74%) and unsecured local bonds maturing in
2017- 2023 (KZT23bn in total or 25%).  All current debt
facilities (both secured and unsecured) are largely at the
operating company level. At end-2015 pledged assets amounted to
KZT120 bil.

Senior Unsecured Notched Down
Fitch rates CAEPCo's local bonds one notch below the company's
Long-Term Local Currency IDR of 'B+' as the notes are issued at
the holding company level (CAEPCo).  They do not benefit from
upstream guarantees from operating subsidiaries, have no security
over operating assets and no cross defaults with other
facilities.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

  Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs downgraded to 'B+'
   from 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
  National Long-Term Rating downgraded to 'BBB(kaz)' from
   'BBB+(kaz)'; Outlook Stable
  Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
  Local currency senior unsecured rating downgraded to 'B' from
   'B+'; Recovery Rating 'RR5'
  National senior unsecured rating downgraded to 'BB+(kaz)' from
   'BBB-(kaz)'


PAVLODARENERGO: Fitch Assigns 'B+' IDR, Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Kazakhstan-based electricity and heat
generator and distributor Joint Stock Company Pavlodarenergo a
Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating of 'B+' with
Stable Outlook.

The ratings of Pavlodarenergo are aligned with those of its sole
shareholder, Joint Stock Company Central-Asian Electric-Power
Corporation (CAEPCo, B+/Stable; see 'Fitch Downgrades CAEPCo to
'B+'; Outlook Stable'), reflecting its position as the largest
operating subsidiary of CAEPCo, with 55% of group EBITDA.

The ratings also reflect Pavlodarenergo's vertical integration,
stable regional market share, and a benign regulatory regime in
the distribution segment.  However, the ratings are constrained
by an unfavorable tariff environment in the generation segment,
and a significant capex program, which Fitch expects to be
partially debt-funded.

Fitch assess CAEPCo, Pavlodarenergo and another 100% subsidiary,
Sevkazenergo, on a consolidated basis, since there is no ring-
fencing, treasury is centrally managed and debt is located at
both holdco and opco levels.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

FX Exposure Pressures Credit Metrics
The Kazakhstan tenge devaluation of more than 90% in 2015
weakened Pavlodarenergo's credit profiles due to a currency
mismatch between the company's debt and revenues and the absence
of hedging to reduce foreign exchange risk exposure.  As a result
the company's funds from operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage
increased to 2.9x at end-2015 from 2.0x at end- 2014, and FFO
interest coverage weakened to 7.1x from 9.6x during the same
period.

At end-2015, 60% of company's outstanding debt was denominated in
US dollar, versus all local currency-denominated revenue.  Fitch
expects the pressure to continue, even with no further tenge
devaluation.  At end-2015, Pavlodarenergo had 48% of cash and
deposits in US dollars.

Covenant Breach
As a result of the tenge devaluation Pavlodarenergo breached its
assets/liabilities ratio covenant as per its loan agreements with
EBRD in 2015, for which the company received a waiver.  Fitch
expects Pavlodarenergo to breach this covenant in 2016 even with
no further tenge depreciation.  Failure to obtain a waiver or
revise the covenant may lead to a rating downgrade.  EBRD
indirectly owns 22.6% of Pavlodarenergo.

Significant Capex, Negative FCF Expected
Capex is expected to remain significant despite the completion of
the so-called mandatory investment program, which the company
agreed with the government in 2009-2015 when tariff caps were in
place.  Fitch expects Pavlodarenergo to generate solid cash flow
from operations (CFO) of KZT11.5 bil. on average over 2016-2019,
although FCF is likely to remain negative at an average KZT1bn
per year over the same period.

The negative FCF will be mainly driven by the company's
significant investment program of KZT10.4 bil. on average
annually for 2016-2019 as well as dividend payments of about 50%
of net profit over the medium term.  Fitch has assumed lower
capex due to our lower-than-management forecast revenue to
reflect that most of the investment is discretionary in nature.
Fitch expects Pavlodarenergo to rely on new borrowings to finance
cash shortfalls.

Dividends to Delay Deleveraging
Pavlodarenergo's financial policy to pay dividends could delay
de-leveraging in the long term.  To the extent CAEPCo has
sufficient funds to service its debt, Pavlodarenergo retains some
flexibility to lower dividends to preserve cash, as demonstrated
in 2011 when it cut dividend to offset higher capex.  According
to CAEPCo, Pavlodarenergo will not pay dividends in 2016, while
Fitch's rating case assumes a 50% payout starting from 2017.
Nevertheless, Fitch expects FCF to remain negative since FFO will
not be sufficient to cover the high capex and dividends.

Generation Dominates Despite Integration
Pavlodarenergo is CAEPCo's largest operating subsidiary.  The
company is integrated across the electricity value chain with the
exception of fuel production and transmission, which gives the
company access to markets for its energy output and limits
customer concentration.  Pavlodarenergo covers electricity and
heat generation, distribution and supply in Pavlodar region,
which was responsible for 4.1% of electricity generation in
Kazakhstan at end-2015.  Despite integration, Pavlodarenergo's
EBITDA is dominated by generation services.

Strong 1H16 Results
Pavlodarenergo demonstrated strong operational and financial
results in 2015 and 1H16.  Electricity production rose 11% yoy in
2015 compared with a 3.3% decline in Kazakhstan and a further
7.3% yoy in 1H16 versus a 0.4% decline in Kazakhstan.  Despite
Fitch's forecasts of Kazakhstan GDP declining by 1% and inflation
rising 14% in 2016, we expect the company's financial profile to
remain strong with an average EBITDA margin of about 32% over
2016-2019, which will support its ratings.  This is based on our
assumptions of approved tariff growth for distribution and 0%
tariff growth for generation for 2016-2018.

Regulatory Environment
Following the postponement of the capacity market launch in
Kazakhstan until 2019, the regulator decided to freeze generation
tariffs and set them at 2015 levels for 2016-2018.  However, in
electricity distribution five-year tariffs were approved using
the "cost plus allowable margin" methodology instead of the
previously used "benchmarking".

In the heat segment the "cost plus allowable margin" methodology
continues to be applied with approved tariffs for a period of
five years.  The heat distribution business continues to be loss-
making due to large heat losses and regulated end-user tariffs,
which Fitch assumes are kept low for social reasons (heat
generation is reported within overall generation and is cash
flow-accretive).

                           KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Electricity volume growth in line with Fitch GDP forecasts
      of 2% p.a. over 2017-2019
   -- Tariffs growth as approved by the government for
      distribution at 8% CAGR over 2016-2020 and 0% for
      generation for 2016-2018
   -- Capex in line with the company's adjusted capex/revenue
      ratio
   -- Inflation-driven cost increase
   -- No further tenge depreciation
   -- Dividend payments of 50% of IFRS net income over 2017-2019.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- A negative rating action on CAEPCo as Pavlodarenergo's
      ratings are aligned with the parent's IDR

Positive: Future developments that could lead to an upgrade
include:

   -- A positive rating action on CAEPCo

The sensitivities may change if the links with CAEPCo weaken.
For the rating of CAEPCo, Pavlodarenergo's ultimate parent, Fitch
outlined the following sensitivities in its rating action
commentary of July 27, 2016:

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Sustained slowdown of the Kazakh economy, further tenge
      devaluation, increase in coal prices that is substantially
      above inflation or tariffs materially lower than Fitch's
      forecasts, leading to FFO-adjusted gross leverage
      persistently higher than 4x and FFO interest coverage below
      3.5x.

   -- Committing to capex without sufficient available funding
      and worsening overall liquidity.

Positive: Future developments that could lead to an upgrade
include:

   -- A stronger financial profile than forecast by Fitch
      supporting FFO adjusted gross leverage below 3x and FFO
      interest coverage above 4.5x on a sustained basis.

                        LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Adequate Liquidity
Fitch views Pavlodarenergo's liquidity as adequate, assuming the
availability of external funding to finance the forecast negative
FCF over 2016-2019.  According to management, the CAEPCo group's
treasury is co-ordinated centrally for the parent company and the
subsidiaries.  At end-1H16, Pavlodarenergo's cash and cash
equivalents stood at KZT1.0 bil., which together with short-term
bank deposits with a maturity up to one year of KZT1.1 bil. and
unused credit facilities of KZT3.2 bil., are sufficient to cover
short-term debt maturities of KZT5 bil.  However, further tenge
devaluation and negative FCF over 2016-2019 mean Pavlodarenergo
will likely raise further debt to finance cash shortfalls.

At end-2015 most of Pavlodarenergo's debt was made up of bank
loans (KZT31 bil. or about 80%) and unsecured local bonds
maturing in 2017 (KZT7.7 bil. or 20%).

Senior Unsecured Debt Rating
Pavlodarenergo's KZT8 bil. local senior unsecured bond is rated
'B+', in line with the company's IDR.  This is because the bonds
are issued at the operating company level, Pavlodarenergo's
overall leverage is not excessive and the level of encumbered
assets compared with senior unsecured debt is low.  At end-2015,
pledged assets amounted to KZT50bn (out of total assets of KZT111
bil.).

                    FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

  Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs assigned at 'B+',
   Outlook Stable
  National Long-Term Rating assigned at 'BBB(kaz)', Outlook
   Stable
  Local currency senior unsecured rating assigned at 'B+';
   Recovery Rating 'RR4'


SEVKAZENERGO JSC: Fitch Lowers IDR to 'B+', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Kazakhstan-based Joint Stock Company
Sevkazenergo's Long-Term Foreign Currency Issuer Default Rating
to 'B+' from 'BB-'.  The Outlook is Stable.

The downgrade follows the downgrade of Sevkazenergo's sole
shareholder, Joint Stock Company Central-Asian Electric-Power
Corporation (CAEPCo, B+/Stable; see 'Fitch Downgrades CAEPCo to
'B+'; Outlook Stable').  Sevkazenergo's ratings are aligned with
CAEPCo's, reflecting its position as one of two key operating
subsidiaries within the CAEPCo group, contributing 43% of group
EBITDA.

The downgrade reflects the expected deterioration of CAEPCO's
credit metrics over 2016-2019 as a result of the Kazakh tenge's
devaluation in 2015 and the company's high exposure to foreign
currency fluctuation risks.

The rating also reflects Sevkazenergo's vertical integration, a
stable regional market share and a benign regulatory regime in
the distribution segment.  However, the rating is constrained by
the company's weak liquidity profile, unfavorable regulatory
environment in the generation segment and significant capex
needs, which are expected to be partially debt funded.

Fitch assess CAEPCo, Sevkazenergo and another 100% subsidiary,
Pavlodarenergo, on a consolidated basis, since there is no ring-
fencing, treasury is centrally managed and debt is located at
both holdco and opco levels.

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

High FX Exposure Pressures Credit Metrics
The devaluation of the Kazakhstan tenge by more than 90% in 2015
has weakened Sevkazenergo's credit profiles due to a currency
mismatch between the company's debt and revenues and the absence
of hedging to reduce foreign exchange risk exposure.  At end-
2015, 40% of company's outstanding debt was US dollar-
denominated, while all revenue was local currency-denominated.
Fitch expects this pressure to continue, even with no further
tenge devaluation.  The amount of cash denominated in US dollars
was negligible at end-2015.

Covenants Breach
As a result of the tenge devaluation, Sevkazenergo breached its
current ratio covenant per loan agreements with EBRD in 2015.
The company received a waiver for 2015.  Fitch expects
Sevkazenergo to breach this covenant in 2016-2019 even with no
further tenge depreciation.  Failure to obtain a waiver or revise
the covenant may lead to a further downgrade.  EBRD indirectly
owns 22.6% of Sevkazenergo.

Significant Capex, Negative FCF Expected
Fitch expects capex to remain high, despite the completion of the
mandatory investment program, which CAEPCo agreed with the
government in 2009-2015 when tariff caps were in place.  Fitch
expects Sevkazenergo to continue generating solid cash flow from
operations (CFO) of KZT9bn on average over 2016-2019, although
free cash flow (FCF) is likely to remain negative at an average
KZT1bn per year over the same period.  This will be mainly driven
by the company's significant investment program of an average
KZT9bn annually for 2016-2019 as well as dividend payments of
about 50% of net profit over the medium term.  Fitch has adjusted
Sevkazenergo's investment program on capex/revenue ratio to
reflect that most of it has is discretionary.  Fitch expects
Sevkazenergo to rely on new borrowings to finance cash
shortfalls.

Dividends to Delay Deleveraging
Sevkazenergo's financial policy to pay dividends could delay de-
leveraging in the long term.  However, Fitch believes that should
the tenge devaluation undermine the company's credit metrics, To
the extent CAEPCo has sufficient funds to service its debt,
Sevkazenergo retains the flexibility to lower dividends to
preserve cash, as demonstrated in 2011 when it cut dividends to
offset higher capex.  According to CAEPCo, Sevkazenergo will not
pay dividends in 2016, while in Fitch's rating case it assumes a
50% payout from 2017.  Nevertheless, Fitch expects FCF to remain
negative since funds from operations (FFO) will not be sufficient
to cover still high capex and dividends.

Generation Dominates Despite Integration
Sevkazenergo is one of the CAEPCo's key operating subsidiaries.
The company is integrated across the electricity value chain with
the exception of fuel production and transmission, which gives
the company access to markets for its energy output and limits
customer concentration.  Sevkazenergo covers electricity and heat
generation, distribution and supply in Petropavlovsk region,
which is responsible for 3.1% of electricity generation in
Kazakhstan as of end-2015.  Despite integration, Sevkazenergo's
EBITDA is dominated by generation services.

Strong 1H16 Results
Sevkazenergo demonstrated strong operational and financial
results in 2015 and 1H16.  Electricity production rose by 2.8%
yoy in 2015 compared with a 3.3% decline in Kazakhstan and
continued to increase by 17.4% yoy in 1H16 vs. 0.4% decline in
Kazakhstan. Despite this, Fitch expects Kazakhstan GDP to decline
by 1% and inflation to grow by 14% in 2016.  Fitch forecasts the
company's financial profiles to remain strong, with an average
EBITDA margin of about 37% over 2016-2019, which will support its
ratings.  This is based on our assumptions of approved tariff
growth for distribution segment, 0% tariff growth rate for
generation segment for 2016-2018.

Regulatory Environment
Following the postponement of the capacity market launch in
Kazakhstan until 2019, the regulator decided to freeze generation
tariffs and fix them at the 2015 level for 2016-2018.  However,
in electricity distribution five-year tariffs were approved on
the basis of "cost plus allowable margin" methodology instead of
the previously used "benchmarking".  In the heat segment "cost
plus allowable margin" methodology remained unchanged, but
tariffs were also approved for five years.  The heat distribution
business continues to be loss-making due to large heat losses and
regulated end-user tariffs, which Fitch assumes are kept low for
social reasons (heat generation is reported within overall
generation and is cash flow-accretive).

                           KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within its rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Electricity volume growth in line with Fitch GDP forecasts
      of 2.0% over 2017-2019
   -- Tariffs growth as approved by the government for
      distribution segment with 3% CAGR over 2016-2020 and 0% for
      generation segment for 2016-2018
   -- Capex in line with the company's adjusted on capex/revenue
      ratio
   -- Inflation-driven cost increase
   -- No further tenge depreciation
   -- Dividend payments of 50% of IFRS net income over 2017-2019

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Negative rating action on CAEPCo as Sevkazenergo's ratings
      are aligned with the parent IDR.

Positive: Future developments that could lead to an upgrade
include:

   -- Positive rating action on CAEPCo.

The sensitivities may change if the links with CAEPCo weaken. For
the rating of CAEPCo, Sevkazenergo's ultimate parent, Fitch
outlined the following sensitivities in its rating action
commentary of 27 July 2016:

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:
   -- Sustained slowdown of the Kazakh economy, further tenge
devaluation, increase in coal prices that is substantially above
inflation or tariffs materially lower than our forecasts, leading
to FFO-adjusted gross leverage persistently higher than 4x and
FFO interest coverage below 3.5x.

   -- Committing to capex without sufficient available funding
and worsening overall liquidity.

Positive: Future developments that could lead to an upgrade
include:

   -- A stronger financial profile than forecast by Fitch
      supporting FFO adjusted gross leverage below 3x and FFO
      interest coverage above 4.5x on a sustained basis.

                   LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Satisfactory Liquidity
Fitch views Sevkazenergo's liquidity as satisfactory assuming
availability of external funding for the forecast negative FCF
over 2016-2019.  According to the management, the CAEPCo group's
treasury is co-ordinated centrally for the parent company and the
subsidiaries.  At end-1H16, Sevkazenergo's cash and cash
equivalents stood at KZT571 mil., which together with short-term
bank deposits with a maturity up to one year of KZT160 mil. and
unused credit facilities of KZT4.2 bil. are sufficient to cover
short-term debt maturities of KZT4.1 bil.  However, any potential
further tenge devaluation and negative FCF over 2016-2019 means
Sevkazenergo will need to raise further debt to finance cash
shortfalls.

At end-2015 most of Sevkazenergo's debt was made up of secured
bank loans (KZT18.6 bil. or about 68%) and unsecured local bonds
maturing in 2020 (KZT8.9 bil. in total or 32%).

Senior Unsecured Debt Aligned Issuer Rating
Sevkazenergo's KZT9 bil. local senior unsecured bond is rated
'B+', in line with its IDR, as the bonds are issued at the
operating company level, its overall leverage is not excessive
and the level of encumbered assets compared with senior unsecured
debt is low.  At end-2015, pledged assets amounted to KZT67 bil.
(out of KZT92 bil.).

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

  Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs downgraded to 'B+'
   from 'BB-', Outlook Stable
  National Long-term Rating downgraded to 'BBB (kaz)' from
   'BBB+(kaz)', Outlook Stable
  Local currency senior unsecured rating downgraded to 'B+' from
   'BB-'; Recovery Rating 'RR4'


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


TIGERLUXONE SARL: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+', Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised to 'B+' from 'B' its long-term
corporate credit rating on TigerLuxOne S.a.r.l. (TeamViewer), a
remote access software and online meeting software provider,
wholly owned by private equity firm Permira.  The outlook is
stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' corporate credit rating
to TeamViewer's fully owned financing subsidiary Regit Eins GmbH.

In addition, S&P raised to 'B+' from 'B' its issue rating on the
company's EUR390 million-equivalent first-lien senior secured
term loan, including a $320 million tranche and a revolving
credit facility (RCF) of the equivalent of about EUR31 million
(or $35 million).  The recovery rating on these debt instruments
is '3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery in
the event of a payment default in the higher half of the 50%-70%
range.

S&P also raised to 'B-' from 'CCC+' the issue rating on the
EUR115 million-equivalent second-lien senior secured term loan
($125 million).  The recovery rating remains at '6', indicating
S&P's expectation of negligible recovery (0%-10%).

The upgrade primarily reflects TeamViewer's stronger-than-
expected billings growth and free operating cash flow (FOCF)
generation in 2015.  S&P also factors in its forecast that the
company's credit metrics and FOCF will continue to improve in
2016 and 2017, primarily thanks to continued solid demand
prospects for remote support software.  Furthermore, the upgrade
reflects the company's very high profitability and cash
conversion -- with reported cash-based EBITDA margins of about
60% in 2015 -- relative to its rated peers.

In 2015, TeamViewer reported 19% billings growth and an increase
in operating cash flow of 18% year on year.  As a result, S&P
Global Ratings' adjusted cash flow from operations (CFO)-to-debt
ratio improved to nearly 8% in 2015 from 4% in 2014.  In S&P's
base case, it forecasts billings growth of more than 20% year on
year and a further increase of the adjusted CFO to debt to about
12% in 2016.

Despite these strengths, S&P's view of TeamViewer's financial
risk profile remains unchanged, primarily because S&P thinks that
the company's owners are likely to pursue an aggressive financial
policy.  As a result, S&P don't forecast a sustainable
deleveraging in the medium term.  This is partly offset, however,
by TeamViewer's high cash conversion of profits, good cost
control, and low capital and working capital intensity, which
would facilitate relatively quick deleveraging if the company
were to use excess cash for debt reduction.

S&P's assessment of TeamViewer's business risk profile continues
to mainly reflect the company's small size and its very narrow
product focus on remote access software and online meeting
software, which S&P views as non-mission-critical for clients.
In addition, S&P thinks that the business risk profile is
constrained by customers' low switching costs and the industry's
low barriers to entry.  Also, the company competes with much
larger, more diversified, and financially stronger software
companies.

These constraints are offset in part by the company's:

   -- Sound competitive position in its niche market;
   -- Wide diversity in its client base with its focus on small
      and midsize enterprises; and
   -- Relatively high profitability of about 60% on a cash EBITDA
      basis.

In addition, the company benefits from favorable industry trends
leading to an increased need for remote access and support
software, such as working away from the office and more automated
remote support from help desks, all of which provide TeamViewer
with marked growth potential, in turn further supporting its
business risk profile.

Under S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- Continued billing growth of about 20%-25% in 2016 and 15%-
      20% in 2017, driven by new license sales and update sales
      from its very large existing customer base, underpinned by
      favorable industry trends.

   -- Following the small reduction of adjusted cash EBITDA
      margin due to the company's strategy to increase its sales
      force, margins will remain stable at slightly below 60% in
      2016 and beyond, due to limited customer acquisition costs
      and a highly optimized cost structure.

   -- Slightly higher capital expenditures of about
      EUR4.0 million-EUR4.5 million annually, which are
      relatively low, however, on an industry comparison.

   -- Moderate debt prepayment with excess cash flow in 2016.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Debt to EBITDA of about 4.0x in fiscal 2016, adjusted for
      operating leases and based on cash-based EBITDA, down from
      4.8x in 2015, mainly due to an improvement in EBITDA and
      moderate debt prepayments.

   -- CFO to debt above 10.0% in 2016 and 2017, compared with
      7.9% in 2015.

   -- High EBITDA cash interest coverage of more than 3.0x in
      fiscal 2016, increasing to about 4.5x in 2017.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's forecast that TeamViewer will
have annual billings growth of more than 15% in 2016 and 2017,
reported cash EBITDA margins between 55%-60%, and a sustainable
improvement of S&P Global Ratings' adjusted CFO-to-debt ratio to
more than 10%.

S&P would lower the rating if TeamViewer:

   -- Experienced significantly higher competitive pressure
      leading to a material decline in new billings or weakened
      cash generation, causing CFO to debt to fall below 10%.

   -- Pursued sizable shareholder returns that led to a leverage
      ratio sustainably above 4.5x; or

   -- Had an adjusted cash EBITDA margin that declined to below
      40% as a result of intensified competition.

Rating upside currently seems unlikely, in S&P's view, due to its
expectations that the company's owners are likely to pursue an
aggressive financial policy in the medium term.  However, S&P
could consider raising the rating if the company's CFO-to-debt
ratio improved further to above 20%, coupled with gross debt
reduction and a leverage ratio sustainably below 4x.  S&P would
also expect the company thereby to maintain its high cash EBITDA
margin at about 60%.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


BABSON EURO CLO 2016-1: Moody's Assigns Ba2 Rating to Cl. E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by Babson Euro CLO
2016-1 B.V. (the "Issuer"):

-- EUR228,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR12,000,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR38,500,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR7,300,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR22,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR20,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR27,300,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR12,800,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by legal final maturity of the
notes in 2030. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due to
defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Babson Capital
Management (UK) Limited ("Babson"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Babson Euro CLO 2016-1 B.V. is a managed cash flow CLO. At least
90% of the portfolio must consist of secured senior loans and up
to 10% of the portfolio may consist of Second-lien loans,
unsecured loans, Mezzanine loans. The portfolio is expected to be
approximately 70% ramped up as of the closing date and to be
comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled
in Western Europe. The remainder of the portfolio will be
acquired during the six month ramp-up period in compliance with
the portfolio guidelines.

Babson will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
improved and credit impaired obligations, and are subject to
certain restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer issued EUR 41,600,000 of subordinated notes, which is not
rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Babson's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.

Loss and Cash Flow Analysis:

Moody's modeled the transaction using CDOEdge, a cash flow model
based on the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in
Section 2.3 of the "Moody's Global Approach to Rating
Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in
December 2015. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of 0 occurrence of each
default scenario and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.


JUBILEE CLO 2013-X: S&P Affirms BB Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its credit ratings on Jubilee CLO
2013-X B.V.'s class A to E notes.

The affirmations follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the June 2016 trustee report and the
application of S&P's relevant criteria.

S&P subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class
at each rating level.  The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the
maximum level of gross defaults, based on its stress assumptions,
that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay the
noteholders.  In S&P's analysis, it used the portfolio balance
that it considers to be performing (EUR396,173,585), the current
weighted-average spread (4.69%), and the weighted-average
recovery rates calculated in line with S&P's corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.  S&P applied
various cash flow stresses, using its standard default patterns,
in conjunction with different interest rate stress scenarios.

Since S&P's effective date analysis in January 2014, the
aggregate collateral balance has increased by about EUR1.5
million.  In S&P's view, this has increased the available credit
enhancement for all of the rated classes of notes.  S&P has also
observed that there are no longer any assets in the 'CCC'
category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') and no assets classified as
defaulted.

S&P has observed that non-euro-denominated assets currently make
up 3.6% of the aggregate collateral balance.  A cross-currency
swap agreement hedges these assets.

The exposure to obligors based in countries rated below 'A-' is
lower than 10% of the aggregate collateral balance (6.4%).

Taking into account the results of our credit and cash flow
analysis and the application of S&P's current counterparty
criteria and S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria, it considers
that the available credit enhancement for all classes of notes is
commensurate with the currently assigned ratings.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its ratings on all classes of notes.

Jubilee CLO 2013-X is a cash flow collateralized loan (CLO)
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
July 2013 and is managed by Alcentra Ltd.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating

Jubilee CLO 2013-X B.V.
EUR400 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A           AAA (sf)
B           AA (sf)
C           A (sf)
D           BBB (sf)
E           BB (sf)


NORTH WESTERLY: Moody's Hikes Class D Notes Rating to Ba1(sf)
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on the following classes of notes issued by North
Westerly CLO III B.V.:

-- EUR32 million (current balance EUR 30.45 million) Class B
    Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed
    Aaa (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR17 million Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes
    due 2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016
    Upgraded to A1 (sf)

-- EUR15.5 million Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate
    Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Mar 23,
    2016 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

-- EUR14.5 million (current balance EUR7.90 million) Class E
    Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to
    B3 (sf); previously on Mar 23, 2016 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

-- EUR6 million (current rated balance EUR 3.23 million) Class R
    Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously
    on Mar 23, 2016 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

North Westerly CLO III B.V., issued in August 2006, is a
collateralised loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of
mostly high-yield senior secured European loans managed by NIBC
Bank N.V.  The transaction's reinvestment period ended in October
2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the Class C, D
and E notes are primarily a result of the deleveraging of the
Class A and Class B notes following amortization of the
underlying portfolio since the last rating action in March 2016.

Class A notes balance of EUR16.64 million paid down fully, and
Class B notes paid down by EUR1.55 million since the last rating
action in March 2016, as a result of which over-collateralization
(OC) ratios of all classes of rated notes have increased. In
addition, on the April 2016 payment date, Class E notes paid down
by EUR1.04 million from available excess spread to cure the
breach in the Class E OC trigger. As per the trustee report dated
May 2016, Class B, Class C, Class D, and Class E OC ratios are
reported at 247.09%, 158.56%, 119.52%, and 106.19% compared to
January 2016 levels of 191.70%, 142.05%, 114.92%, and 103.51%,
respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds of EUR75.80 million,
defaulted par of EUR4.45 million, a weighted average default
probability of 29.15% (consistent with a WARF of 4365 over a
weighted average life of 3.81 years), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 47.17% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 10 and a weighted average spread of 4.57%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

The rating of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class R,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the Rated
Coupon of 0.25% per annum, accrued on the Rated Balance on the
preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all payments made
from the Issue Date to such date, either through interest or
principal payments. The Rated Balance may not necessarily
correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported by the
trustee.

Moody's notes that shortly after its initial analysis based on
May 2016 data was completed, the June 2016 trustee report was
issued. There is no material change in key portfolio metrics such
as WARF, diversity score, and weighted average spread as well as
OC ratios for Classes B, C, D, and E from their May 2016 levels.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


CREDO FINANCE: Placed Under Provisional Administration
------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2405, dated July 28,
2016, revoked the banking license of the Makhachkala-based credit
institution Commercial bank Credo Finance Ltd. from July 28,
2016, according to the Central Bank of Russia's Press Service.

The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of
the banking license -- because of the credit institution's
failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia
regulations, because of the repeated violations within one year
of the requirements stipulated by Article 7 (excluding Clause 3
of Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation
(Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of
Terrorism", and also the requirements of Bank of Russia
regulations issued in pursuance of the said Federal Law, and
taking into account the application of measures envisaged by the
Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank
of Russia)".

Commercial bank Credo Finance Ltd. failed to comply with the
requirements of law and Bank of Russia regulations on countering
the legalization (laundering) of criminally obtained incomes and
the financing of terrorism with regard to submitting information
to the authorized body on time and in full.  Besides, the credit
institution's internal control rules concerning these issues were
not in line with the Bank of Russia's requirements.  The
management and owners of the credit institution did not take
effective measures to normalize its activities.

By its Order No. OD-2406, dated 28 July 2016, the Bank of Russia
has appointed a provisional administration to Commercial bank
CREDO FINANCE Ltd for the period until the appointment of a
receiver pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency
(Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal
Law "On Banks and Banking Activities".  In accordance with
federal laws, the powers of the credit institution's executive
bodies are suspended.

Commercial bank Credo Finance Ltd. is a member of the deposit
insurance system.  The revocation of the banking license is an
insured event as stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the
Insurance of Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of
the bank's retail deposit obligations, as defined by law.  The
said Federal Law provides for the payment of indemnities to the
bank's depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, in the
amount of 100% of the balance of funds but no more than a total
of RUR1.4 million per one depositor.

According to the financial statements, as of July 1, 2016,
Commercial bank Credo Finance Ltd. ranked 624th by assets in the
Russian banking system.


=========
S P A I N
=========


EMPRESAS HIPOTECARIO: S&P Affirms CCC- Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings raised to 'AA- (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its
credit rating on Empresas Hipotecario TDA CAM 3, Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos' class A2 notes.  At the same time, S&P
has affirmed its 'B- (sf)' and 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on the class B
and C notes, respectively.

Empresas Hipotecario TDA CAM 3 is a single-jurisdiction cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction securitizing a
portfolio of small and midsize enterprise (SME) loans that BANCO
CAM S.A.U. originated in Spain.  The transaction closed in July
2006.

                            CREDIT ANALYSIS

S&P has used its European SME CLO criteria to assess the
portfolio's average credit quality.  In S&P's opinion, the credit
quality of the portfolio is about 'ccc', based on these factors:

   -- S&P's qualitative originator assessment on Banco de
      Sabadell S.A. (BB+/Stable/B) is moderate.

   -- The originator has observed an average annual default
      frequency of about 3% for the past three years.

   -- Spain's Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) is
      5.

   -- S&P received only limited information on the credit quality
      of the originator's entire loan book.

S&P used its 'ccc' average credit quality assessment of the
portfolio to generate its 'AAA' scenario default rate (SDR) of
89%.

S&P has calculated the 'B' SDR, based primarily on S&P's analysis
of historical SME performance data and S&P's projections of the
transaction's future performance.  S&P has reviewed the
portfolio's historical default data, and assessed market
developments, macroeconomic factors, changes in country risk, and
the way these factors are likely to affect the loan portfolio's
creditworthiness.  As a result of this analysis, S&P's 'B' SDR is
17.5%.

S&P interpolated the SDRs for rating levels between 'B' and 'AAA'
in accordance with S&P's European SME CLO criteria.

                        RECOVERY RATE ANALYSIS

At each liability rating level, S&P assumed a weighted-average
recovery rate (WARR) by taking into consideration the asset type
(secured/unsecured) and the country recovery grouping and
observed historical recoveries.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's WARR assumption in a 'AAA'
rating scenario was 24.6%.  The recovery rates at more junior
rating levels were higher.

                          CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P used the portfolio balance that the servicer considered to be
performing, the current weighted-average spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considered to be
appropriate.  S&P subjected the capital structure to various cash
flow stress scenarios, incorporating different default patterns
and interest rate curves, to determine the rating level, based on
the available credit enhancement for each class of notes under
our European SME CLO criteria.

                             COUNTRY RISK

S&P's foreign currency long-term sovereign rating on the Kingdom
of Spain is 'BBB+'.

In our opinion, the class A2 notes have sufficient credit
enhancement to withstand the sovereign default stress test.
Therefore, under S&P's criteria for rating single-jurisdiction
securitizations above the sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS
criteria), the class A2 notes can be rated above the sovereign.

Since, according to S&P's RAS criteria, SMEs have a moderate
sensitivity to country risk, the class A2 notes can be rated up
to four notches above the rating on the sovereign.  Taking into
account the results of our credit and cash flow analysis and the
application of S&P's RAS criteria, it has raised to 'AA- (sf)'
from 'BBB+ (sf)' our rating on the class A2 notes.

S&P has affirmed its 'B- (sf)' and 'CCC- (sf)' ratings on the
class B and C notes, respectively, as the available credit
enhancement for these classes is commensurate with our currently
assigned ratings.

RATINGS LIST

Empresas Hipotecario TDA CAM 3, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR750 mil mortgage-backed floating-rate notes
                                         Rating
Class            Identifier              To             From
A2               ES0330876014            AA- (sf)       BBB+ (sf)
B                ES0330876022            B- (sf)        B- (sf)
C                ES0330876030            CCC- (sf)      CCC- (sf)



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: MPs Seek Details of Goldman's Work for Tina Green
------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Vandevelde at The Financial Times reports that Goldman Sachs
has been asked to give details of any paid work it has done for
Tina Green, as MPs continue to question the bank's involvement in
her husband's decision to sell BHS for GBP1, a year before the
failure of the high street chain.

A parliamentary investigation last week upbraided Goldman for
lending a "luster" of credibility to the "otherwise questionable"
transaction that saw BHS pass from billionaire retailer Sir
Philip Green to a thinly-capitalized investment vehicle led by a
former bankrupt, the FT relates.

Goldman has said it often carries out unpaid work for
longstanding clients, the FT relays.  The bank listed 25 unpaid
assignments it undertook for Sir Philip over the past 12 years in
a document that MPs have agreed to keep confidential, the FT
discloses.

But the new demand sent last week to Michael Sherwood, Goldman's
European co-head, suggests that MPs want further clarification of
the bank's relationship with the retail tycoon, the FT notes.

According to the FT, Richard Fuller, a member of the business
select committee that oversaw the parliamentary inquiry, added
that BHS "was not an isolated example" of Goldman Sachs acting in
an informal manner which "has the potential to lead to
misunderstanding".

He asked the bank to list any work it had done for Lady Green and
for the family's offshore businesses, and to explain why it was
willing to provide "varied and frequent advice . . . for no
compensation" over more than a decade, the FT relays.

He also asked Goldman to confirm whether its earlier letter had
listed all paid work that the bank had done for Sir Philip and
his companies, the FT discloses.

Goldman, which declined to comment, has yet to reply to Mr.
Fuller's letter, but a person familiar with its position, as
cited by the FT, said that the bank had nothing to add, as its
previous disclosures to MPs were full and accurate.

Sir Philip sold BHS to an investment vehicle led by Dominic
Chappell, a former bankrupt with no retail experience, in March
2015, the FT  recounts.

The demise of BHS barely a year later has cost 11,000 jobs and
left behind unfunded pension liabilities of GBP571 million,
triggering an official rescue that will force thousands of
pensioners to accept deep cuts to their retirement incomes, the
FT relays.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


CLEANEVENT GROUP: Bought Out of Administration, 700 Jobs Saved
--------------------------------------------------------------
Nationwide insolvency practitioners SFP has saved the future of
the CleanEvent Group of companies and in the process about 700
employees' futures.

The CleanEvent Group, which includes Cleanevent (UK) Limited, CE
Facilities Services Limited, CE Risk, Safety and Security
Services Limited, and Clean Domain Limited, all providers of
cleaning services, was bought by CleanEvent Services Limited
(formerly known as CE Revo Services Limited).

Despite being an established Group with a previous year's
turnover of around GBP10 million, the CleanEvent Group suffered
from reduced margins and increased competition, causing cash-flow
troubles and unmanageable liabilities.  One of the entities
within the group had also been presented with a winding up
petition.  As a result, SFP's joint administrators Simon Plant
and Daniel Plant, both licensed members of the Insolvency
Practitioners' Association (IPA), were appointed to manage the
Group's affairs.

CE Facilities Services Limited holds subsidiaries in Brazil,
South Africa and Australia.

Following a valuation of each of the entities within the group,
SFP successfully negotiated the sale, allowing for business
continuity and the fulfillment of ongoing contracts.

"It was necessary for four redundancies to take place.  All
remaining jobs however, have been secured and the Group is now
looking to push on and win more prestigious cleaning contracts,"
says Simon Plant.  "This is yet another example of how a
struggling business sought expert help to turn its business
around -- and as a result can continue to trade today."


GALAXY FINCO: S&P Affirms 'B' Long-Term CCR, Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said it has affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on U.K.-based warranty services provider
Galaxy Finco Ltd. (trading as Domestic & General; D&G).  S&P also
assigned its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating to D&G's core
financing subsidiary Galaxy Bidco.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue rating on the
GBP175 million senior secured floating rate notes due 2019 and
the GBP200 million senior secured notes due 2020, issued by
Galaxy Bidco.  The recovery rating on both the senior secured
floating rate notes and the senior secured notes is '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.

S&P also affirmed its 'CCC+' issue rating on the GBP125 million
senior notes due 2021, issued by Galaxy Finco.  The recovery
rating on the senior notes is '6', indicating S&P's expectation
of negligible (0%-10%) recovery for lenders in the event of a
payment default.

The affirmation primarily reflects S&P's continued assessment of
D&G's highly adjusted leverage of debt to EBITDA of about 8x-9x,
including noncommon equity (5x-6x excluding it), as well as
improving FOCF generation due to the group's continued strong
operating performance in the U.K.

S&P's business risk profile assessment continues to reflect D&G's
leading position in the mature U.K. warranty market, longstanding
contracts with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), and
relatively good customer retention that lead to good revenue
visibility.  However, S&P's assessment is constrained by D&G's
geographic concentration in the U.K. and its reliance on a few
numbers of customers.

S&P's financial risk profile assessment is constrained by D&G's
tolerance for highly leveraged capital structures due to private
equity ownership.

S&P considers Galaxy Bidco to be a core subsidiary of Galaxy
Finco due to Galaxy Finco's 100% ownership of Galaxy Bidco, its
deep involvement in strategy and management, its long-term
exposure to the operating risk of the subsidiary, and the
integral role it plays in the group's identity.  S&P has
therefore assigned the same 'B' long-term corporate credit rating
to Galaxy Bidco.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Group revenue growth of 7%-9% in 2017 and 2018, compared
      with a decrease of 9% in 2015 and growth of 12% in 2016,
      driven by continued strong demand--leading to increased
      volumes in the U.K. market--but partially mitigated by
      slower growth in international markets.  Weaker
      macroeconomic environment and consumer confidence in the
      U.K. and the rest of Europe following the Brexit vote.

   -- Flat EBITDA margins for 2017 of about 14% and a slight
      decline thereafter due to an increasing international
      segment with weaker margins of about 1%-2%.

   -- Stable capital expenditure (capex) at about 2% of revenues
      and lower working capital requirements going forward owing
      to a shift toward the subscription business.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for the next one-to-two years:

   -- S&P Global Ratings-adjusted debt to EBITDA about 8x-9x
      (about 5x-6x excluding shareholder loans and preference
      shares);

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) cash interest coverage ratio of
      about 2.5x-3.5x over the next two years; and

   -- FOCF to debt turning positive to 3%-4%.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that D&G should continue
to see robust demand for its services over the next 12-18 months,
and that the group will manage to gradually improve its FOCF
generation to positive territory, and maintain FFO cash interest
coverage above 2.0x.

S&P could lower the ratings if D&G were to experience severe
margin pressure or poorer cash flows, following, for example,
significant contract losses, leading to negative FOCF generation
and FFO cash interest of below 2x.  S&P could also consider
lowering the ratings as a result of debt-funded acquisitions and
increased shareholder returns.

S&P believes that the likelihood of an upgrade is limited at this
stage because of D&G's high tolerance for aggressive financial
policies and very high leverage.  S&P could raise the ratings if
D&G's credit metrics were to improve, more specifically, if
adjusted FFO cash interest coverage was above 3x, with clear
evidence that these improvements were sustainable.


HONOURS SERIES 2: Moody's Cuts Class C Notes Rating to Ba2(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of class C
notes' to Ba2 (sf) from Baa2 (sf), on review for downgrade and
class D notes' ratings to B3 (sf) from Ba2 (sf), on review for
downgrade in Honours PLC Series 2. At the same time, Moody's
confirmed the class B notes' A3 (sf), on review for downgrade
rating. Honours PLC Series 2 is a UK asset-backed securities
(ABS) transaction backed by student loans.

Issuer: Honours PLC Series 2

-- GBP33.35 million B Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on
    May 6, 2016 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
    Downgrade

-- GBP18 million C Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
    May 6, 2016 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
    Downgrade

-- GBP11.95 million D Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously
    on May 6, 2016 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
    Downgrade

The rating action reflects the costs incurred by the transaction
resulting from the ongoing investigation into non-compliance with
consumer credit legislation and by the change in servicer in
January 2016, as well as a decreased level of excess spread.

The rating action concludes the review of Class B, C & D notes
placed on review for downgrade on the 6th May 2016.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Over the last twelve months, principal deficiency ledger has
risen to GBP2.3 million from zero. Servicer changed from Ventura
Plc to Link Financial Outsourcing Limited on 30 January 2016.
Ventura Plc, bought in 2011 by Capita Plc, was the acting
servicer from 2006 to January 2016. The setup costs associated
with the change in servicer have contributed to the current
principal deficiency ledger.

The ongoing investigation into non-compliance with consumer
credit legislation has generated unforeseen legal counsel costs,
further reducing the excess spread in the structure. A provision
of GBP10.9 million related with the ongoing investigation into
non-compliance with consumer credit legislation is reflected in
the March 2015 audited financial statements (published February
2016) which is placing downwards pressure on the deal. These
unforeseen cost have led to a decrease in annualized excess
spread to 0.41% over the last twelve months from 2.46% prior to
July 2015.

Moody's also noticed that the defaulted loans (which overdue for
more than 24 months) increased to 8.61% of original balance from
8.11% between July 2015 and July 2016, further increasing the
principal deficiency ledger. This performance deterioration is
partially linked to the fact that a higher portion of loans
exited deferment in April 2015 due to a lower deferment threshold
(which is -7.1% lower since April 2014). Despite the April 2016
deferment threshold back at the level of April 2014, the number
of loans exiting deferment in April 2016 was still higher than
prior to April 2014. A borrower may be entitled to defer loan
payments if their income is lower than the deferment threshold,
which is equal to 85% of the average full-time earnings in the
UK.

Projection of future losses

Moody's projected future default on the outstanding portfolio by
assessing the proportion of loans leaving deferment each year. In
its analysis, the rating agency assumed that the future deferment
threshold would either stay stable or increase with the average
monthly salary in the UK.

Out of the loans that left deferment, Moody's estimated the
amount of loans that would benefit from the UK government's
cancelation indemnity, which covers loans outstanding for more
than 25 years. For the remaining part of the pool which is not
covered by this indemnity, Moody's assumed a default rate of
12.5% on loans in repayment without arrears and 30% on loans
overdue with a 30% recovery rate for both loan type.

Loans that continue to be in deferment and satisfy the
aforementioned criteria will benefit from the indemnity. As such,
these loans are unlikely to result in incremental losses to the
transaction, in Moody's view.

As a result of Moody's analysis, and given uncertainty around
future costs related to the ongoing investigation into non-
compliance with consumer credit legislation, Moody's has
downgraded the ratings of class C notes' ratings to Ba2 (sf) from
Baa2 (sf), on review for downgrade notes and class D notes'
ratings to B3 (sf) from Ba2 (sf), on review for downgrade notes.

Moody's confirmed the A3 (sf), on review for downgrade rating of
the class B notes, given their current 17.2% credit enhancement
level and the fact that the notes will benefit from the indemnity
on the loans that will continue to be deferred and on the
repaying ones meeting the criteria of age. If the PDL build up
carries on and reaches GBP3 million, Class B notes will also
benefit from the switch to sequential from pro rata order of
payment.


PREMIER OIL: Lenders Agree to Defer Financial Covenant Test
-----------------------------------------------------------
Scott McCulloch at Daily Record reports that Premier Oil's
lenders have agreed to further defer a test of its financial
covenants while debt restructuring arrangements continue.

Premier, which is developing the Catcher project in the North Sea
and owns the Solan development west of Shetland, said the test
for the 12 month period ending July 31 will now be waived and
replaced by a test for the 12 month period ending Aug. 31,
Daily Record relates.

"As previously announced, negotiations continue to progress well
with agreement of terms targeted for during this quarter,"
Daily Record quotes the group as saying.  "Further deferral of
the covenant test date will be sought if required."

Last month Premier reported net debt stood at circa US$2.6
billion and noted negotiations with lenders were "progressing
well", with the main loan covenant test having been deferred
while discussions are finalized, Daily Record recounts.

Premier Oil is a London-based oil and gas explorer.


TATA STEEL UK: Fate of Port Talbot Steel Plant Still Uncertain
--------------------------------------------------------------
Alan Tovey at The Telegraph reports that the fate of the
sprawling Port Talbot steel plant and its thousands of staff is
likely to hang in the balance until next year as Tata tries to
thrash out a deal with rival ThyssenKrupp.

Tata, the plant's Indian owner, put the company's entire UK steel
operations up for sale in March, but earlier this month said it
was halting a full-scale disposal, The Telegraph relates.

Instead the company said it would continue to seek buyers for its
British specialty steel operations, while exploring a tie-up with
its German competitor which would see it retain Port Talbot,
which is focused on strip steel, The Telegraph notes.

However, the 4,500 staff at the Port Talbot plant in Wales are
likely to face many months of uncertainty over their future
because of the complexities of Tata linking up with ThyssenKrupp,
The Telegraph states.

The Telegraph understands that Tata sees the negotiations as
being at least as complex as the ones over the sale of its
Scunthorpe long products steel plant to turnaround fund Greybull.

Tata first begun talking with Greybull about it buying Scunthorpe
in early December last year but a deal was not sealed until June,
when the new owner paid a symbolic GBP1 to take on the plant
which has 4,000 staff, The Telegraph recounts.

According to The Telegraph, a deal between Tata and ThyssenKrupp
could lead to job losses at Port Talbot, with fears that it might
even close as the older, less efficient Welsh plant as it could
be surplus to requirements.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.


* UK: Company Insolvencies Down 4.2% to 3,617 in 2nd Qtr. 2016
--------------------------------------------------------------
Vicky Shaw at Press Association reports that Insolvency Service
data show an estimated 3,617 companies entered insolvency across
England and Wales in the second quarter of 2016, which was 4.2%
lower than the previous three months and 2.7% lower than the
second quarter of last year.

According to Press Association, the decrease was driven by a fall
in compulsory liquidations, where a company is killed off after a
winding-up order is obtained from a court.

Some 662 companies were subject to a compulsory winding-up order
in the second quarter, an 18.6% fall on the previous quarter and
14% down on the same period last year, Press Association
discloses.

The Insolvency Service said the liquidation rate was the lowest
since comparable records started in 1984, Press Association
relates.

Meanwhile, there were around 340 company administrations in the
second quarter, an 8.2% increase on the previous quarter but down
by 8.7% compared with a year earlier, Press Association notes.

The quarterly increase in administrations was the first since the
second quarter of 2015. When a company goes into administration,
the objective is to rescue it as a going concern, or if this is
not possible then to get a better result for creditors than if
the company was wound up, says the report.

Looking at corporate insolvencies, Andrew Tate, president of
insolvency and restructuring trade body R3, as cited by Press
Association, said: "The cost of borrowing remains incredibly
cheap for businesses and the last quarter saw better-than-
expected GDP growth.  These factors, combined with the high
levels of creditor forbearance we have seen since the financial
crisis, mean it's not a surprise that the trend of falling
corporate insolvency numbers has continued.

"Other factors have helped bring insolvency numbers down, such as
the rise of non-statutory restructurings.  More companies are
looking to repair finances outside of formal insolvency
procedures and take action before it's too late.

"Again, creditors, particularly banks, have played a role in
pushing struggling debtors to seek help from the insolvency and
restructuring profession before an insolvency procedure is their
only option."


* UK: R3 Comments on Drop in Q2 2016 Corporate Insolvencies
-----------------------------------------------------------
Commenting on a fall in corporate insolvencies and a rise in
personal insolvencies on July 28, Andrew Tate, president of
insolvency and restructuring trade body R3, says:

Personal insolvency (up)

"This is the most sustained rise in personal insolvency numbers
since the financial crisis."

"Personal insolvencies are far from their peak, but the rise in
numbers is a concern.  Although interest rates are at record
lows, despite employment levels being high, and despite wages
growing faster than inflation, people are still struggling to pay
their debts."

"R3's latest Personal Debt Snapshot of over 2,000 British adults
found 37% of British adults say they are at least fairly worried
about their current level of debt.  And 39% of British adults say
they often or sometimes struggle to payday."

"Looking forward, a post-referendum interest rate cut might help
in future, but it might not be enough to offset the effect any
post-referendum recession -- if there is one -- might have on
personal finances."

"The bigger rises in insolvencies we have seen in the second
quarter this year and the third quarter last year may in part be
because people are struggling with tax bills, which fall due at
the start of the year.  There's a lag between when bills are due
and when any consequent insolvency proceedings begin.  The
arrival of a large tax bill has always been a frequent cause of
insolvencies."

"It's worth noting that Debt Relief Order numbers remain steady
following reforms in October to make them more accessible to
those with low debts but low assets.  The easier it is for people
to enter a debt relief solution appropriate to their needs, the
easier it is for them to be financially rehabilitated more
effectively."

"Reforms to improve the accessibility to bankruptcy in April do
not seem to have had much effect yet.  A major concern for the
insolvency profession, which was not entirely addressed by these
reforms, is the up-front government and court fees for entering
bankruptcy.  These fees are prohibitive and stop people from
accessing a debt solution appropriate to their needs.  Worse,
having cut the cost of entering bankruptcy to GBP655 in April
from GBP705, the government put the cost up to GBP680 from July
with little warning."

Corporate insolvency (down)

"The cost of borrowing remains incredibly cheap for businesses
and the last quarter saw better than expected GDP growth.  These
factors, combined with the high levels of creditor forbearance we
have seen since the financial crisis, mean it's not a surprise
that the trend of falling corporate insolvency numbers has
continued."

"Other factors have helped bring insolvency numbers down, such as
the rise of non-statutory restructurings.  More companies are
looking to repair finances outside of formal insolvency
procedures and take action before it's too late.  Again,
creditors, particularly banks, have played a role in pushing
struggling debtors to seek help from the insolvency and
restructuring profession before an insolvency procedure is their
only option."

"There is a possibility that uncertainty about the outcome of the
EU referendum could have put some businesses in serious financial
difficulty.  And although it came at the end of the quarter, the
result itself may have caused some businesses immediate problems.
However, any 'Brexit' effect would be limited to a handful of
companies, for now at least.  Gloomy confidence indicators
published in the last few weeks do not bode well for future
insolvency numbers."

R3 is the trade body for the UK's insolvency and restructuring
profession.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EU Bank Stress Tests Overlook Impact of Negative Yields
---------------------------------------------------------
Alastair Marsh at Bloomberg News reports that Deutsche Bank AG
credit strategist Jim Reid thinks regulators might have missed
something in conducting the European bank stress tests.

Mr. Reid says negative bond yields -- a scourge for lenders and
investors alike -- appear to have been overlooked, Bloomberg
relates.  That could be quite an omission since sub-zero yields
are a product of the negative interest rates that have been
proving so troublesome for Europe's banks, Bloomberg notes.

The growing pile of negative-yielding debt -- which is expanding
by the day, as the European Central Bank gobbles up assets to
boost inflation -- is painful for investors and also takes a
heavy toll on a Europe's weak financial sector, Bloomberg
discloses.  That's especially true for those lenders with large
holdings of government debt, Bloomberg states.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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