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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, June 24, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 124


                            Headlines


A N D O R R A

CREDIT ANDORRA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Rating on Preference Shares


B E L A R U S

BELINVESTBANK: Moody's Affirms Caa2 LT Bank Deposits Ratings


D E N M A R K

* DENMARK: Won't Abide by BRRD, Plans to Draw Up Own Framework


G E R M A N Y

BREMER LANDESBANK: Moody's Changes Review Direction to Uncertain
NESCHEN AG: Bueckeberg Court Orders Self-Administration


G R E E C E

FREESEAS INC: Terminates M/V Fiorello Bareboat Hire Agreement


I R E L A N D

EUROMAX V ABS: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on 5 Note Classes
ICG-METAPHOR: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Ratings to Class E Notes
ST. PAUL'S VI: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class E Notes


I T A L Y

CEVOLANI SPA: June 27 Deadline Set for Expression of Interest
CIRENE FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to CCC-
FRANZ ISELLA: June 25 Deadline Set for Exression of Interest
INDUSTRIE METALLURGICHE: June 25 Expression of Interest Deadline
TELECOM ITALIA: Egan-Jones Cuts Commercial Paper Ratings to B


K A Z A K H S T A N

OIL INSURANCE: S&P Affirms 'B' IFS Rating; Outlook Stable


M O N A C O

NAVIOS MARITIME: Egan-Jones Cuts FC Sr. Unsecured Rating to CCC


N E T H E R L A N D S

ALME LOAN V: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Ratings to Class F Notes
ALME LOAN V: S&P Assigns B- Rating to Class F Notes
AURIUM CLO II: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
AURIUM CLO II: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class F Notes
DRYDEN 44: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Ratings to Class F Notes

DRYDEN 44: S&P Assigns B- Rating to Class F Notes


P O L A N D

BANK MILLENNIUM: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Deposit Ratings


R U S S I A

AK BARS: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Negative


S E R B I A

PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Raises IDRs to 'BB-', Outlook Stable


S W I T Z E R L A N D

SELECTA GROUP: S&P Lowers LT Corporate Credit Rating to to 'B'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Documents Reveal Pension Plan Funding Arrangements
BHS GROUP: Owners Charged Hefty Fees on Short-Term Loans
BHS GROUP: Chappell Used Company Money to Fund Holiday Flights
BRISTOW COMPANY: Egan-Jones Cuts FC Sr. Unsecured Rating to B
CARE UK: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B-' CCR

CONSOLIDATED MINERALS: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'SD'
DECO 8 - UK: S&P Lowers Ratings on 6 Note Classes to D
HARKAND GULF: Files in U.S. to Further UK Liquidation
HBOS PLC: FRC's Report on Collapse Investigation Delayed
WEST BROMWICH: Moody's Affirms Deposit Ratings at B1/Not-Prime


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Oil Business in Latin America: The Early Years


                            *********


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A N D O R R A
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CREDIT ANDORRA: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Rating on Preference Shares
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
of Credit Andorra, Andorra Banc Agricol Reig (Andbank) and Mora
Banc Grup, SA (MoraBanc) at 'BBB', 'BBB' and 'BBB-' respectively;
the Outlooks are Stable on all of the IDRs.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs AND VRs

The ratings reflect the banks' domestic operating environment,
which is characterized by moderate economic stability and a
developing regulatory framework.  They also factor in the banks'
good earnings generation, adequate capitalization and relatively
weak loan quality ratios.  The effects of the intervention and
recent resolution of Banca Privada d'Andorra (BPA) have been
limited, with Credit Andorra, Andbank and MoraBanc experiencing
some outflows of assets under management (including deposits),
while maintaining liquidity at fairly stable levels.

The Andorran banks focus mainly on private banking/wealth
management, and maintain domestic retail-banking activities.  In
recent years, Andbank and Credit Andorra in particular have
pushed ahead with international expansion, through a combination
of organic and inorganic growth.  MoraBanc has a more limited
international presence, but it also intends to increase
diversification through expansion.  In Fitch's view, this
international expansion will likely erode margins, as
international markets are more competitive than domestic ones.

Fitch's assessment of the banks' asset quality takes into account
their relatively weak loan quality (including foreclosed assets),
following six years of economic contraction from 2008-2013;
however, they have been increasing reserve coverage levels and a
large proportion of lending has tangible collateral.  Moreover,
the banks' interbank exposures are with sound counterparties, and
debt securities are mostly with highly rated sovereigns.

The limited development of the financial markets in Andorra,
among other aspects, is reflected in the lack of a lender of last
resort.  Central bank access can only be achieved through the
banks' international subsidiaries, which we view as less reliable
and a shortcoming compared to international peers.  This limits
the banks' funding and liquidity scores, and is reflected in the
banks having the lower of two possible Short-Term IDRs for banks
with a Long-Term IDR of 'BBB'.

The Andorran regulatory framework is strengthening.  The
authorities took swift measures to manage the fallout from BPA,
and are in the process of harmonizing bank regulation with that
of the EU.  The resolution of BPA included the creation of a new
bank, Vall Banc, to which BPA's legitimate assets and liabilities
have been transferred.  Vall Banc has been capitalized with
EUR30 mil. of funds, provided by the Andorran banks to the
resolution fund. Taking this into account, the banks'
capitalization remains adequate.

Credit Andorra's ratings also take into account good earnings
generation, adequate and steady strengthening of capital, a
balanced approach towards international expansion and a
proportionally larger exposure to the domestic economy than its
peers.

Andbank's ratings consider a greater focus on international
private banking and wealth management, its progress in restoring
capital to historical levels, and a resilient recurrent earnings
generation capacity.  Its ratings further take into account risks
related to the rapid expansion of the bank's activities, which
could be a strain on the risk control framework.

MoraBanc's ratings reflect good capitalization and earnings
generation capacity.  Its strategic vision has been revised
following its failure to complete its first major international
acquisition last year; the new approach includes enhanced
corporate governance and a reduction of balance sheet risks
relating to alternative and equity investments.

The Stable Outlook on the banks' ratings reflects our
expectations that the overall credit profiles of the three banks
are set to remain stable in the foreseeable future.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The banks' Support Ratings (SRs) of '5' and Support Rating Floors
(SRFs) of 'No Floor' reflect the low probability of the Andorran
banks receiving support if needed; this reflects last year's
implementation of a framework for resolving banks, in accordance
with the EU's BRRD.

CREDIT ANDORRA'S PREFERRED STOCK

Credit Andorra's preferred stock is rated five notches below the
bank's Viability Rating (VR), reflecting higher-than-average loss
severities for senior unsecured creditors and a higher-than-
average risk of non-performance, given discretionary coupon
payments.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRs AND VRs

The banks' IDRs and VRs are sensitive to a change in Fitch's
assessment of the Andorran operating environment in the medium
term, which may benefit from the further alignment of the
Andorran financial markets and regulatory framework with other
European countries.  The ratings also assume continued sound
capital ratios, supported by an ability to generate capital
internally through earnings, and a stabilization of asset quality
indicators, supported by expected moderate economic growth.  A
weakening of capital ratios or asset quality indicators could
therefore put pressure on the ratings.

Andbank's ratings are also sensitive to the bank's ability to
continue enhancing core capital and the execution of its growth
strategy.

MoraBanc's ratings are sensitive to the successful
diversification of business volumes, via the expansion of its
international franchise and the execution of its risk reduction
plan.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

An upgrade to the SR and upward revision to the SRF of these
banks would be contingent on a positive change in the sovereign's
propensity to support its banks.  While not impossible, this is
highly unlikely in Fitch's view.

CREDIT ANDORRA'S PREFERRED STOCK

Credit Andorra's preferred stock ratings are broadly sensitive to
the same considerations that might affect its VR.

The rating actions are:

Credit Andorra:

  Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB', Outlook Stable
  Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  VR: affirmed at 'bbb'
  Preference shares: affirmed at 'B+'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

Andbank:

  Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB', Outlook Stable
  Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  VR: affirmed at 'bbb'
  Support Rating affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor'

MoraBanc:

  Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-', Outlook Stable
  Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  VR: affirmed at 'bbb-'
  Support Rating affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor'



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B E L A R U S
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BELINVESTBANK: Moody's Affirms Caa2 LT Bank Deposits Ratings
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on four
Belarusian banks, following its affirmation of Belarus' Caa1
government bond ratings and changing the outlook on the sovereign
ratings to stable from negative on June 17, 2016.

Moody's has changed to stable from negative the outlooks assigned
to the long-term ratings of the following four lenders:
Belarusbank (Caa1/Caa2, caa1), Belagroprombank JSC(Caa1/Caa2,
caa1), BPS-Sberbank (B3/Caa2, caa1) and Belinvestbank (Caa1/Caa2,
caa1). Concurrently, the long-term ratings and baseline credit
assessments (BCAs) of these institutions were also affirmed.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's decision to change the outlook on the banks' ratings to
stable from negative was driven by the stabilization of the
sovereign credit profile, as is now reflected in the stable
outlook assigned to the Caa1 sovereign ratings of Belarus, as
well as by the upgrade of the Belarus banking system's Macro
Profile to "Very Weak" from "Very Weak-".

The positive change in Belarus' Macro Profile was driven by
improvements in Belarus' economic strength and reduction in its
external vulnerability. Prudent macroeconomic management and some
progress with structural reforms have already led to a fall in
inflation that should support the medium-term fiscal and economic
outlook. This results in a more stable and predictable operating
environment for Belarusian banks.

In addition, although economic conditions and access to funding
remain challenging factors for Belarusian banks, some factors
which previously weighed on the Macro Profile have lessened:
notably, there has been a decrease in government-directed lending
and Moody's expects a shift towards a more competitive industry
environment. Together these developments drove a one-notch
upgrade of Moody's Macro Profile for Belarus, which is now "Very
Weak" instead of "Very Weak-".

Moody's has affirmed banks' caa1 BCAs, at the same level as the
rating on Belarus itself, because of the continued very high
interlinkages between the banks and the sovereign; in particular,
the banks have very high direct exposure to government debt.

This improving environment and the stable outlook on the
sovereign rating have led Moody's to affirm the ratings on the
banks' long-term local- and foreign currency deposit ratings and
to revise to stable from negative the outlook on these ratings.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Substantial improvements in Belarus' sovereign credit profile --
if supported by improvements in the standalone creditworthiness
of these four Belarusian banks -- could lead to upgrades in their
BCAs which would likely lead to higher long-term deposit ratings.

In turn, the banks could be downgraded following a deterioration
in the creditworthiness of Belarus. Downgrades could also be
triggered by a deterioration of the banks' solvency metrics, e.g.
weaker asset quality, lower capital adequacy and/or loss-making
performance.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

The following rating actions were taken:

Affirmations:

Issuer: Belarusbank

-- Baseline Credit Assessment and Adjusted Baseline Credit
    Assessment were affirmed at caa1;

-- LT Bank Deposits (Domestic) ratings were affirmed at Caa1,
    outlook was revised to stable from negative;

-- LT Bank Deposits (Foreign) ratings were affirmed at Caa2,
    outlook was revised to stable from negative;

-- ST Bank Deposits (Domestic and Foreign) ratings were affirmed
    at NP

Issuer: Belagroprombank JSC

-- Baseline Credit Assessment and Adjusted Baseline Credit
    Assessment were affirmed at caa1;

-- LT Bank Deposits (Domestic) ratings were affirmed at Caa1,
    outlook was revised to stable from negative;

-- LT Bank Deposits (Foreign) ratings were affirmed at Caa2,
    outlook was revised to stable from negative;

-- ST Bank Deposits (Domestic and Foreign) ratings were affirmed
    at NP

-- LT Counterparty Risk Assessment was affirmed at B3(cr) ;

-- ST Counterparty Risk Assessment was affirmed at NP(cr).

Issuer: BPS-Sberbank

-- Baseline Credit Assessment and Adjusted Baseline Credit
    Assessment were affirmed at caa1 and b3;

-- LT Bank Deposits (Domestic) ratings were affirmed at B3,
    outlook was revised to stable from negative;

-- LT Bank Deposits (Foreign) ratings were affirmed at Caa2,
    outlook was revised to stable from negative;

-- ST Bank Deposits (Domestic and Foreign) ratings were affirmed
    at NP

Issuer: Belinvestbank

-- Baseline Credit Assessment and Adjusted Baseline Credit
    Assessment were affirmed at caa1;

-- LT Bank Deposits (Domestic) ratings were affirmed at Caa1,
    outlook was revised to stable from negative;

-- LT Bank Deposits (Foreign) ratings were affirmed at Caa2,
    outlook was revised to stable from negative;

-- ST Bank Deposits (Domestic and Foreign) ratings were affirmed
    at NP

-- LT Counterparty Risk Assessment was affirmed at B3(cr) ;

-- ST Counterparty Risk Assessment was affirmed at NP(cr).

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Belarusbank

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Belagroprombank JSC

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: BPS-Sberbank

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative

Issuer: Belinvestbank

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Negative



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D E N M A R K
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* DENMARK: Won't Abide by BRRD, Plans to Draw Up Own Framework
--------------------------------------------------------------
Frances Schwartzkopff at Bloomberg News reports that Denmark's
financial regulator says it won't abide by a key principle in
Europe's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive as the nation
carves out its own vision for how to tackle insolvencies.

According to Bloomberg, while the BRRD was formulated with a view
to letting smaller banks fail if they get into trouble, Denmark
says it won't allow that to happen.

Bankruptcy is "messy," Bloomberg quotes Birgitte Holm, deputy
director general at the Financial Supervisory Authority in
Copenhagen, as saying.  "If you have a loan in a bank, for
instance, and it suddenly goes bankrupt, it can take many, many
years before it's resolved, and we don't think that's a good
idea."

Denmark's aversion to bankruptcies stems in part from its history
with bail-ins, Bloomberg notes.  It was the first country in
Europe to adopt a resolution framework in 2010, Bloomberg
recounts.  A year later, Amagerbanken A/S became Europe's first
lender to test that law, with senior bondholders suffering
losses, Bloomberg relates.

The move earned the Nordic country international renown,
Bloomberg says.  But the cost was high: ratings companies
downgraded banks, leaving them pariahs cut off from capital
markets, Bloomberg states.

The shock to Denmark's financial system from failures by non-
systemic banks has persuaded the regulator that it can't enforce
BRRD as it was intended, Bloomberg discloses.

Denmark's FSA is currently considering how much lenders should
hold and the proportion of debt to equity, according to
Bloomberg.  Also under discussion is how much should be
subordinated, with final decisions expected by the end of year at
the latest, Bloomberg relays.



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G E R M A N Y
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BREMER LANDESBANK: Moody's Changes Review Direction to Uncertain
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed to uncertain from review for
downgrade the direction of its review of the Ba1 long-term debt
and issuer ratings and of the Baa3 long-term deposit ratings of
Bremer Landesbank Kreditanstalt Oldenburg GZ (BremerLB).

The actions were prompted by the joint announcement by the bank's
owners made on June 10, 2016, in which they confirmed their joint
responsibility to fully restore BremerLB's capitalization. The
bank's owners confirmed the necessity of a capital increase,
which they intend to arrange before year-end.

BremerLB's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) of caa2
remains on review for downgrade, while Moody's changed the rating
review direction on BremerLB's b1 Adjusted BCA to uncertain from
review for downgrade. The uncertainty in relation to the Adjusted
BCA's future direction reflects the concurrence of continued
downside risks to BremerLB's BCA, as well as the declared owner
intent to provide support measures through its majority owner
Norddeutsche Landesbank GZ (NORD/LB; deposits A2/senior unsecured
A3, BCA ba2, Adjusted BCA baa3, all under review for downgrade).

Concurrently, Moody's also changed the rating review direction to
uncertain from review for downgrade on BremerLB's Prime-3 short-
term debt and deposit ratings; on the bank's (P)B2 subordinated
medium-term note (MTN) program rating and on BremerLB's
Baa3(cr)/P-3(cr) Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessment.

While Moody's expects to obtain more clarity on the progress of
the owners' timely recapitalization of the bank, the final
closure of the review on the bank's ratings is also contingent
upon the closure of the ratings review of its parent NORD/LB.

BremerLB's grandfathered debt ratings are unaffected by today's
rating actions.

RATINGS RATIONALE

CONTINUED REVIEW FOR DOWNGRADE OF BREMERLB's caa2 STANDALONE
BASELINE CREDIT ASESSMENT

A net loss of the magnitude announced by the bank could leave it
with regulatory common equity tier 1 (CET1) and Tier 1 ratios
above the current minimum requirements of 5.125% and 6.625%,
respectively. Even so, Moody's expects the remaining capital
cushion to be very thin relative to the challenges and
vulnerabilities BremerLB faces with respect to the risks arising
from its EUR6.9 billion shipping loan book as of December 2015.
BremerLB's Tier 1 and CET1 ratios as of December 2015 stood at
10.8%. As a result, BremerLB's BCA of caa2 remains on review for
downgrade, reflecting Moody's concerns regarding the amount of
capital required to restore sufficient capital buffers against
BremerLB's elevated asset risk profile. In the rating agency's
view, the risks exceed the bank's limited ability to raise such
capital without the support of its majority owner NORD/LB.

CHANGE IN DIRECTION OF REVIEW OF BREMERLB'S DEBT, ISSUER AND
DEPOSIT RATINGS

The review with direction uncertain of BremerLB's Ba1 long-term
debt and issuer ratings as well as of the bank's Baa3 long-term
deposit ratings reflects the uncertain direction of the rating
review on BremerLB's b1 Adjusted BCA and the rationale behind it.
The bank's rated debt instruments will, upon the closure of the
ratings review, also take into account Moody's assessment of the
financial strength of BremerLB's parent NORD/LB, as well as the
liability structure of NORD/LB, since both are currently under
review for downgrade.

The review with direction uncertain of BremerLB's b1 Adjusted BCA
reflects: 1) Continued downward pressure on BremerLB's BCA
exerted primarily by its weak capitalization, asset quality and
profit outlook; 2) the ongoing rating review for downgrade of
NORD/LB's baa3 Adjusted BCA; and incorporates as a mitigating
factor 3) the very high probability that BremerLB will receive
capital support from its 54.8% shareholder NORD/LB and the
owners' joint intention to provide such support without involving
public-sector money.

The joint declaration of BremerLB's owners published on 10 June
2016 demonstrates a very high commitment to provide capital for
BremerLB in an order that would lift the bank's risk-bearing
capacity to levels more commensurate with the bank's high asset
risks resulting from its concentrated exposures to the shipping
industry. In a press interview, the deputy chairman of the bank's
supervisory board, Lower Saxony's (unrated) Finance Minister
Mr. Schneider, quantified recapitalization needs of up to between
EUR400 million and EUR500 million. According to the 10 June
declaration, the joint focus of the owners will be on two
alternative recapitalization options, both of which would result
in full ownership of BremerLB by NORD/LB. Whereas the focus on
these two possibilities limits the risk of state aid proceedings
and bank resolution measures being opened against BremerLB,
execution risks remain around both variants. In particular,
NORD/LB itself continues to operate under the conditions of a
state aid case, which inter alia requires the bank to abstain
from acquisitions until year-end 2016.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - UP

There is currently no upward pressure on BremerLB's BCA, as
indicated by the direction of the rating review.

The uncertain direction of the rating review on BremerLB's
Adjusted BCA and long-term ratings incorporates that Moody's may
upgrade or confirm at their current levels these ratings when
closing the rating review if NORD/LB and/or the institutional
protection scheme of Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe (S-Finanzgruppe;
Corporate Family Rating Aa2 stable; BCA a2) that BremerLB adheres
to significantly recapitalize the bank without exposing BremerLB
to state aid proceedings.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING -- DOWN

Moody's may downgrade the BCA of BremerLB if the bank's
capitalization declines more strongly than currently
anticipated -- towards the level of immediate regulatory
intervention.

BremerLB's Adjusted BCA and its ratings could be downgraded as a
result of a BCA downgrade or of a multi-notch Adjusted BCA
downgrade of NORD/LB or as a consequence of failure to
successfully execute the intended recapitalization of BremerLB
without triggering of European Commission state aid proceedings
or bank resolution measures.

In addition, BremerLB's senior debt ratings may be downgraded if
NORD/LB's senior unsecured debt layer provided less loss
absorption capacity following last year's maturities of
grandfathered debt than Moody's previously expected.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

For the following ratings of BremerLB, the direction of the
rating review was changed to uncertain from review for downgrade:

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, currently b1

-- Short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently P-3(cr)

-- Long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently Baa3(cr)

-- Long-term Issuer Rating, currently Ba1 Rating under Review

-- Short-term Deposit Ratings, currently P-3

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)B2

-- Other Short Term, currently (P)P-3

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)Ba1

-- Commercial Paper, currently P-3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently Ba1 Rating
    Under Review

-- Long-term Deposit Ratings, currently Baa3 Rating Under Review

The following rating input of BremerLB remains on review for
downgrade:

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, currently caa2

BremerLB's issuer outlook remains Rating under Review


NESCHEN AG: Bueckeberg Court Orders Self-Administration
-------------------------------------------------------
By resolution of June 21 and upon application by Neschen AG and
its subsidiary Neschen Benelux B.V., the Bueckeberg District
Court has repealed the decision from July 1, 2015, ordering self-
administration.

Former trustee Arndt Geiwitz has been named insolvency
administrator.  Henrik Felbier remains CEO of Neschen AG and
General Manager of Neschen Benelux B.V.

Neschen AG is a Germany-based company engaged in the manufacture
of self-adhesive and laminating products.


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G R E E C E
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FREESEAS INC: Terminates M/V Fiorello Bareboat Hire Agreement
-------------------------------------------------------------
FreeSeas Inc. announced that on June 15, 2016, the bareboat hire
agreement in connection with the M/V Fiorello was terminated.

Subsequent to the termination of the hire, the vessel was sold
with the sale proceeds being applied towards obligations to the
Bareboat Owners of the vessel and trade creditors.  As a result
of the transaction, outstanding obligations to the Owners have
been reduced by US$750,000.

                        About FreeSeas Inc.

Headquartered in Athens, Greece, FreeSeas Inc., formerly known as
Adventure Holdings S.A., was incorporated in the Marshall Islands
on April 23, 2004, for the purpose of being the ultimate holding
company of ship-owning companies.  The management of FreeSeas'
vessels is performed by Free Bulkers S.A., a Marshall Islands
company that is controlled by Ion G. Varouxakis, the Company's
Chairman, President and CEO, and one of the Company's principal
shareholders.

The Company's fleet consists of six Handysize vessels and one
Handymax vessel that carry a variety of drybulk commodities,
including iron ore, grain and coal, which are referred to as
"major bulks," as well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizers, steel
products, cement, sugar and rice, or "minor bulks."  As of
Oct. 12, 2012, the aggregate dwt of the Company's operational
fleet is approximately 197,200 dwt and the average age of its
fleet is 15 years.

Freeseas reported a net loss of US$52.94 million on US$2.30
million of operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2015,
compared to a net loss of US$12.68 million on US$3.77 million of
operating revenues for the year ended Dec. 31, 2014.  As of
Dec. 31, 2015, FreeSeas had US$18.71 million in total assets,
US$35.47 million in total liabilities and a total shareholders'
deficit of US$16.76 million.

RBSM LLP, in New York, issued a "going concern" qualification on
the consolidated financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31,
2015, citing that the Company has incurred recurring operating
losses and has a working capital deficiency.  In addition, the
Company has failed to meet scheduled payment obligations under
its loan facilities and has not complied with certain covenants
included in its loan agreements and is in default in other
agreements with various counter parties.  Furthermore, the vast
majority of the Company's assets are considered to be highly
illiquid and if the Company were forced to liquidate, the amount
realized by the Company could be substantially lower that the
carrying value of these assets.  These conditions among others
raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue
as a going concern.



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I R E L A N D
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EUROMAX V ABS: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on 5 Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Euromax V ABS PLC's notes, as:

  Class A1 (XS0274615656): affirmed at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable
  Class A2 (XS0274616381): affirmed at 'CCCsf'
  Class A3 (XS0274616977): affirmed at 'CCsf'
  Class A4 (XS0274617439): affirmed at 'Csf'
  Class B1 (XS0274617603): affirmed at 'Csf'
  Class B2 (XS0274617942): affirmed at 'Csf'
  Class D1 combination notes (XS0274619138): affirmed at 'Csf'
  Class D2 combination notes (XS0274619211): affirmed at 'Csf'

Euromax V is a securitization of mainly European structured
finance securities with the total note issuance of EUR307.5 mil.
invested in a portfolio of EUR300 mil.  The underlying securities
are RMBS, CMBS and corporate CDO assets.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation reflects the deleveraging of the performing
portfolio since the last review, offsetting migration to default
of four assets.  The class A1 notes have amortized by EUR22.4
mil. over the past year.  Amortization was enabled by paydowns of
a number of underlying assets.  However, changes in credit
enhancement were minor, given increased defaults and accumulated
deferred interest on classes A4 to class B2.  Deferred interest
on these notes is EUR9.7 mil.

Overall, the quality of the performing portfolio improved.
Rating migration since the last review has been positive.  The
weighted average rating factor substantially decreased to 25.5
from 36.7 in June 2015, and approximately 16% of the portfolio is
in the 'CCC' and below bucket, from 32.9% a year ago.  Most of
the portfolio is concentrated in the RMBS and CMBS sectors,
accounting for 75.6% and 14.2% of the portfolio excluding
defaults, respectively.

Defaulted assets substantially increased and represent 66.4% of
the performing balance.  All defaults but one are CMBS assets,
which with the exception of three assets, are of German origin.
There have been four new defaults over the past year.  There are
no recovery expectations for any of the defaulted assets.

In its analysis, Fitch applied a maturity extension scenario
based on a time to maturity assumption for the portfolio.  For
underlying assets that are not currently amortizing and for CMBS
assets, Fitch derived the asset bullet maturity as per the
following: 25 years from closing for RMBS or SF CDO assets, and
legal maturity for CMBS.  Otherwise, a bullet average maturity
date for currently amortizing assets was derived by assuming a
linear amortization between the analysis date and the assumed
maturity date as determined above.  The calculated weighted
average life was subject to a maximum at the legal maturity of
the asset.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch tested the ratings' sensitivity to a 25% increase in the
obligor default probability and a 25% reduction in expected
recovery rates and in both cases found no rating impact on the
notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing.  The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


ICG-METAPHOR: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Ratings to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
seven classes of notes issued by ICG-Metaphor D.A.C.:

-- EUR245,000,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR34,000,000 Class A-2A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR10,000,000 Class A-2B Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR24,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR18,500,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR28,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR11,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2029. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Intermediate
Capital Managers Limited ("ICML") has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

Please note the provisional ratings were assigned to the deal
under the name of St. Paul's CLO VI D.A.C.

ICG-Metaphor is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of unsecured
senior loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and high
yield bonds. The portfolio is expected to be at least 80% ramped
up as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

ICML will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions. In addition to the seven classes of notes rated by
Moody's, the Issuer has issued EUR42,300,000 of subordinated
notes which are not rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. ICML's investment decisions
and management of the transaction will also affect the notes'
performance.


ST. PAUL'S VI: Fitch Assigns 'B-sf' Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned St. Paul's CLO VI Designated Activity
Company notes ratings, as:

  Class A-1: 'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class A-2A: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class A-2B: 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class B: 'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  Class C: 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class D: 'BBsf'; Outlook Stable
  Class E: 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable
  Subordinated notes: not rated

St. Paul's CLO VI Designated Activity Company is a cash flow
collateralized loan obligation (CLO).

                       KEY RATING DRIVERS

'B'/'B-' Portfolio Credit Quality
Fitch expects the average credit quality of obligors to be in the
'B'/'B-' category.  The agency has public ratings or credit
opinions on all the obligors in the identified portfolio.  The
weighted average rating factor of the identified portfolio, which
represents 67.3% of the target par amount, is 31.

High Expected Recoveries
At least 90% of the portfolio will comprise senior secured
obligations.  Recovery prospects for these assets are typically
more favorable than for second-lien, unsecured, and mezzanine
assets.  Fitch has assigned Recovery Ratings to all obligations
in the identified portfolio.  The average recovery rate of the
identified portfolio is 75.6%.

Limited Interest Rate Risk
Unhedged fixed-rate assets cannot exceed 5% of the portfolio
while fixed-rate liabilities represent 2.5% of the target par
amount. The transaction is therefore partially hedged against
rising interest rates.

Unhedged Non-Euro Exposure
The transaction is allowed to invest up to 2.5% of the portfolio
in non-euro-denominated primary market assets without entering
into an asset swap on settlement, subject to principal haircuts.
Unhedged assets may only be purchased if after the applicable
haircuts the aggregate balance of the assets is above the
reinvestment target par balance.  Additionally, no credit in the
overcollateralization (OC) tests is given to assets left unhedged
for more than 180 days after settlement.

Class E OC Test
Interest proceeds used to cure the class E overcollateralization
test will be used to redeem the class E notes, and subsequently
the class A-1 through D notes in order of seniority.  The test
benefits the class E notes by repaying the notes early with
excess spread.

TRANSACTION SUMMARY
Net proceeds from the notes are being used to purchase a
EUR400 mil. portfolio of mainly euro-denominated leveraged loans
and bonds.  The transaction has a four-year reinvestment period.
The underlying portfolio of assets is managed by Intermediate
Capital Managers Limited.

The transaction documents may be amended, subject to rating
agency confirmation or noteholder approval.  Where rating agency
confirmation relates to risk factors, Fitch will analyze the
proposed change and may provide a rating action commentary if the
change has a negative impact on the ratings.  Such amendments may
delay the repayment of the notes as long as Fitch's analysis
confirms the expected repayment of principal at the legal final
maturity.

If in the agency's opinion the amendment is risk-neutral from a
rating perspective Fitch may decline to comment.  Noteholders
should be aware that confirmation is considered to be given if
Fitch declines to comment.

                       RATING SENSITIVITIES

A 25% increase in the obligor default probability would lead to a
downgrade of up to two notches for the rated notes.

A 25% reduction in expected recovery rates would lead to a
downgrade of up to five notches for the rated notes.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


CEVOLANI SPA: June 27 Deadline Set for Expression of Interest
-------------------------------------------------------------
Prof. Avv. Umberto Tombari, the Extraordinary Commissioner for
Cevolani S.p.A, disclosed that it is given notice that, in
execution of the sale program of the business complex approved by
the Ministry of Economic Development with its own decree dated 28
April 2016, Cevolani under Extraordinary Administration intends
to begin a procedure for the sale of the business complex of
Cevolani.

The business complex covered by the procedure includes complex of
assets, licenses, authorizations, certifications and any other
assets, services or activities for the business activity carried
out by Cevolani in the field of automatic machines for tinplate
cans production.  In order to have a complete and detailed
description of the offered products, of the relevant market and
of the Company's profile, please see the document available to
the following website: www.cevolani.eu

For the reasons stated, the Extraordinary Commissioner of
Cevolani invites all the parties interested in purchasing the
Company's business complex to submit a non-binding expression of
interest in accordance with terms and conditions set forth in the
integral version of the present call, available, in Italian and
in English, to the following web site www.cevolani.eu
These expressions of interest shall be submitted, by registered
mail or internationally recognized overnight delivery service,
charges prepaid, not later than 12:00 a.m. (Italian time), on
June 27, 2016, in a closed envelope setting out the wording
"Expression of Interest - Cevolani Procedure" to the Notary Gaia
Nardone, office in Via Francesco Ferrucci 33, 59100 Prato (Po),
and identifying the sender.

Any request of clarification shall be sent, by email only, to the
following address: cevolanibid@cevolani.eu mentioning in the
object "Clarification Cevolani Procedure".

The present announcement represents an invitation to express
interest and does not constitute an offer to the
public pursuant to article 1336 of the Italian civil code, nor
does it constitute a mobilization of public savings ex
art 94 and further provisions, of Law Decree dated February 24th
1998 No. 58.


CIRENE FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to CCC-
----------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its credit ratings on Cirene Finance
S.r.l.'s class D and E notes.

The downgrades follow S&P's ongoing review of the nonperforming
loan (NPL) portfolio's performance, the portfolio's recovery
prospects, and the transaction's structural deleveraging since
closing.

On the June 2016 interest payment date (IPD), the servicer
reported a gross book value (GBV) of EUR114.06 million, compared
with EUR215.05 million at closing.

Cumulative collections are currently EUR129.56 million, of which
EUR78.79 million are from fully closed positions (representing
61% of the total collections since closing).  The reported gross
collections relative to the reported GBV on the closed positions
reflect a recovery rate of 79.4%.  Since closing, the issuer has
redeemed about 81% of the original principal balance of the rated
notes.

Over the past two semiannual collection periods, gross
collections have been about EUR1.0 million, compared with EUR2.6
million in the previous two collection periods.

Since the principal shortfall mechanism was triggered on the June
2013 IPD, the class C notes have fully redeemed and available
funds are currently being applied to pay interest and principal
on the class D notes.  The class E notes' interest is being
deferred until the class D notes have fully repaid.

In S&P's stressed cash flow scenarios arising from the average
collection amounts for each rating category, it assessed the
likelihood that the outstanding notes would fully redeem by the
transaction's legal final maturity in December 2017.  In
addition, S&P stressed the recovery timings in its analysis,
whereby it further adjusted projected collections to account for
a continuing decline.

S&P's analysis indicates that the class D and E notes are
dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic
conditions to repay by their legal final maturity date (Dec. 15,
2017).

In S&P's opinion, these classes of notes face at least a one-in-
two likelihood of default.  Therefore, S&P has lowered to
'CCC (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its rating on the class D notes and to
'CCC- (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating on the class E notes, in
line with S&P's criteria for assigning 'CCC' category ratings.

Cirene Finance is a 2006 commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS) transaction backed by a portfolio of secured and unsecured
NPLs.  Banca MPS SpA originated the loans.  The portfolio largely
comprises positions secured by first-ranking mortgages on
residential and commercial/industrial properties.

RATINGS LIST

Cirene Finance S.r.l.
EUR101.45 mil mortgage-backed floating-rate notes and deferrable-
interest notes
                                   Rating
Class            Identifier        To                   From
D                IT0004115470      CCC (sf)             B (sf)
E                IT0004115488      CCC- (sf)            B- (sf)


FRANZ ISELLA: June 25 Deadline Set for Exression of Interest
------------------------------------------------------------
Claudio Franceschini, Marco Sogaro and Simone Manfredi, the
Official Receivers of Franz Isella S.p.A. under Extraordinary
Administration, in order to implement the Disposal Scheme
approved by the MISE on March 10, 2016, call all interested
parties to submit by June 25, 2016, their non-binding expression
of interest to purchase the Franz Isella Business Unit located in
Casciago, in accordance with the procedures set out in the tender
specifications available on the website www.astafranzisella.it


INDUSTRIE METALLURGICHE: June 25 Expression of Interest Deadline
----------------------------------------------------------------
Claudio Franceschini, Marco Sogaro and Simone Manfredi, the
Official Receivers of Industrie Metallurgiche Spoleto S.r.l.
under Extraordinary Administration, in order to implement the
Disposal Scheme approved by the MISE on December 3, 2015, call
all interested parties to submit by June 25, 2016, their non-
binding expression of interest to purchase the IMS Business Unit
located in Spoleto, in accordance with the procedures set out in
the tender specifications available on the website www.astaims.it


TELECOM ITALIA: Egan-Jones Cuts Commercial Paper Ratings to B
-------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company lowered the commercial paper ratings
on debt issued by Telecom Italia SpA/Milano to B from A3 on
June 14, 2016.

Telecom Italia is an Italian telecommunications company
headquartered in Rome, which provides telephony services, mobile
services, and DSL data services.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


OIL INSURANCE: S&P Affirms 'B' IFS Rating; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B' long-term insurer financial
strength and counterparty credit ratings on Kazakhstan-based JSC
Oil Insurance Co (NSK).  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'kzBB+' Kazakhstan national
scale rating on NSK.

The affirmation balances S&P's view that NSK's capital adequacy
and liquidity improved in 2015 as a result of a large foreign
exchange revaluation gain prompted by the tenge devaluation,
against an expected weak underwriting performance.  The company
has a very high combined (loss and expense) ratio, which could
trigger capital volatility.

S&P acknowledges that NSK has improved its solvency margin and
liquidity ratio, which were significantly below the required
regulatory level in 2015.

At the same time, S&P considers that capitalization in 2016 could
weaken versus year-end 2015 levels owing to weak technical
performance.  S&P expects that the expense ratio will be high, at
58%-62% in the coming years, reflecting sizable acquisition
expenses, while the loss ratio will likely remain at about 50%.
S&P thinks NSK's loss ratio in the coming years will be at levels
similar to those of other motor insurers in Kazakhstan.  S&P
anticipates a high loss ratio for NSK owing to expected loss
development and claims inflation resulting from the tenge
devaluation in 2015.

Following a court decision in May 2015, NSK fully paid the claim
on the aviation liability insurance in compensation for the death
of passengers in a plane crash on Dec. 25, 2012, near the city of
Shymkent.  The plane was operated by the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Kazakhstan.  NSK paid out Kazakhstan tenge
(KZT)1.1 billion, which at the time comprised one-third of its
total capital.  In March 2016, the company won its appeal on this
case S&P understands it expects to receive subrogation in full
from Kazaeronavigacia, a government agency regulating air
traffic. The sum is to be paid as dividends and will have an
overall neutral effect on S&P's assessment of NSK's capital and
earnings.

S&P has revised its liquidity assessment to strong from less than
adequate, reflecting the improvements in capitalization and
following the growth in liquid assets at the end of 2015.  In
S&P's base-case scenario, it expects that NSK's liquidity will
stay broadly at this level in the next few years.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that in the next 12-18
months NSK will maintain its capital adequacy at least at a level
commensurate with S&P's less-than-adequate assessment following
the weaker earnings it expects in 2016-2017, while maintaining
its current competitive position.

S&P could take a positive rating action on NSK if operating
performance in 2016 is stronger than S&P currently anticipates
and the company's capitalization stabilizes at levels achieved in
2015.  S&P could also consider an upgrade if it thinks that the
company's reduction of high-risk assets in 2015 is sustainable
over the longer term, and its open currency position moderates,
leading to asset liability mismatch.

S&P could lower its ratings on NSK in the unlikely scenario that
it is unable to maintain its competitive position at the current
level.



===========
M O N A C O
===========


NAVIOS MARITIME: Egan-Jones Cuts FC Sr. Unsecured Rating to CCC
----------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company lowered the foreign currency senior
unsecured rating on debt issued by Navios Maritime Holdings Inc
to CCC from B- on June 13, 2016.  EJR also downgraded the
commercial paper rating on the Company to C from B.

Navios Maritime Holdings Inc. operates as a seaborne shipping and
logistics company. Based in Monte Carlo, Monaco, the company
focuses on the transportation and transshipment of dry bulk
commodities, including iron ore, coal, and grains.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ALME LOAN V: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Ratings to Class F Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by ALME Loan Funding
V B.V. (the "Issuer" or "ALME CLO"):

-- EUR213,800,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR31,170,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR10,530,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR18,800,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR17,900,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR21,600,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR8,400,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2029. The definitive ratings reflect the risks due
to defaults on the underlying portfolio of loans given the
characteristics and eligibility criteria of the constituent
assets, the relevant portfolio tests and covenants as well as the
transaction's capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's
is of the opinion that the collateral manager, Apollo Management
International LLP ("Apollo"), has sufficient experience and
operational capacity and is capable of managing this CLO.

ALME CLO is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of the
portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior secured
floating rate notes and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and
high yield bonds. The bond bucket gives the flexibility to ALME
CLO to hold bonds. The portfolio is expected to be 83% ramped up
as of the closing date and to be comprised predominantly of
corporate loans to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

Apollo will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.


ALME LOAN V: S&P Assigns B- Rating to Class F Notes
---------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to ALME Loan
Funding V B.V.'s floating- and fixed-rate class A, B-1, B-2, C,
D, E, and F notes.  At closing, ALME Loan Funding V also issued
unrated participating term certificates.

ALME Loan Funding V is a European cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO), securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior
secured euro-denominated leveraged loans and bonds issued by
primarily European borrowers.  Apollo Management International
LLP is the collateral manager.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes pay quarterly
interest unless there is a frequency switch event.  Following
this, the notes will permanently switch to semiannual payment.
The portfolio's reinvestment period ends approximately four years
after closing.

S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of the collateral
portfolio's credit quality, which has a weighted-average 'B+'
rating.  S&P considers that the portfolio at closing was well-
diversified, primarily comprising broadly syndicated speculative-
grade senior secured term loans and senior secured bonds.
Therefore, S&P has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis by
applying its criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt
obligations.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used the EUR350 million target
par amount, the covenanted weighted-average spread (4.15%), the
covenanted weighted-average coupon (6.0%), and the covenanted
weighted-average recovery rates at each rating level.  S&P
applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using four different
default patterns, in conjunction with different interest rate
stress scenarios for each liability rating category.

Elavon Financial Services Ltd. is the bank account provider and
custodian.  S&P considers that the documented downgrade remedies
are in line with its current counterparty criteria.

Following the application of S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria,
it considers that the transaction's exposure to country risk is
sufficiently mitigated at the assigned rating levels.  This is
because the concentration of the pool comprising assets in
countries rated lower than 'A-' is limited to 10% of the
aggregate collateral balance.

S&P considers that the issuer is bankruptcy remote, in accordance
with its European legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes.

RATINGS LIST

ALME Loan Funding V B.V.
EUR357.00 Million Senior Secured Floating- And Fixed-Rate Notes
and Participating Term Certificates

Class                 Rating            Amount
                                       (mil. EUR)

A                     AAA (sf)           213.80
B-1                   AA (sf)             31.17
B-2                   AA (sf)             10.53
C                     A (sf)              18.80
D                     BBB (sf)            17.90
E                     BB (sf)             21.60
F                     B- (sf)              8.40
PTC                   NR                  34.80

PTC--Participating Loan Certificates.
NR--Not rated.


AURIUM CLO II: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Rating to Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned the following definitive
ratings to notes issued by Aurium CLO II Designated Activity
Company (the "Issuer" or "Aurium CLO II D.A.C."):

-- EUR205,000,000 Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR49,700,000 Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR23,600,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR18,900,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR17,200,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR10,300,000 Class F Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2029, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2029. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of loans given the characteristics
and eligibility criteria of the constituent assets, the relevant
portfolio tests and covenants as well as the transaction's
capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's is of the
opinion that the collateral manager, Spire Partners LLP
("Spire"), has sufficient experience and operational capacity and
is capable of managing this CLO.

Aurium CLO II D.A.C. is a managed cash flow CLO. At least 90% of
the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and senior
secured bonds and up to 10% of the portfolio may consist of
unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine obligations and
high yield bonds. The bond bucket gives the flexibility to the
Issuer to hold bonds if Volcker Rule is changed. The portfolio is
expected to be 75% ramped up as of the closing date and to be
comprised predominantly of corporate loans to obligors domiciled
in Western Europe. The remaining of the portfolio will be
acquired during the 6 month ramp-up period.

Spire Partners LLP will manage the CLO. It will direct the
selection, acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of
the Issuer and may engage in trading activity, including
discretionary trading, during the transaction's four-year
reinvestment period. Thereafter, purchases are permitted using
principal proceeds from unscheduled principal payments and
proceeds from sales of credit risk and credit improved
obligations, and are subject to certain restrictions.

In addition to the six classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer has issued EUR 35m of subordinated notes, which are not
rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.


AURIUM CLO II: S&P Assigns 'B-' Rating to Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings assigned its credit ratings to Aurium CLO II
Designated Activity Company's class A, B, C, D, E, and F senior
secured floating-rate notes.  At closing, Aurium CLO II also
issued unrated subordinated notes.

Aurium CLO II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior secured
loans granted to speculative-grade European corporates.  Spire
Partners LLP manages the transaction.

Under the transaction documents, following a long first interest
period, the rated notes pay quarterly interest unless there is a
frequency switch event.  Following such an event, the notes would
switch to semi-annual payment.

The portfolio's reinvestment period ends approximately four years
after the closing date, and the portfolio's maximum weighted-
average maturity date is eight years after the closing date.

At the end of the ramp-up period, S&P understands that the
portfolio will represent a well-diversified pool of corporate
credits, with a fairly uniform exposure to all of the credits.
Therefore, S&P has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis by
applying its criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt
obligations.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used the portfolio target par
amount of EUR350.00 million, the covenanted weighted-average
spread (4.40%), the covenanted weighted-average coupon (6.25%),
and the covenanted weighted-average recovery rates at each rating
level.

Citibank, N.A., London branch is the bank account provider and
custodian.  S&P considers that the participants' downgrade
remedies are in line with its current counterparty criteria.

S&P understands that the issuer is bankruptcy remote, in
accordance with its European legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, S&P believes its ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Assigned

Aurium CLO II Designated Activity Company
EUR359.70 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes (Including
EUR35.00 Million Subordinated Notes)

Class               Rating             Amount
                                      (mil. EUR)
A                   AAA (sf)            205.00
B                   AA (sf)              49.70
C                   A (sf)               23.60
D                   BBB (sf)             18.90
E                   BB (sf)              17.20
F                   B- (sf)              10.30
Sub                 NR                   35.00

NR--Not rated.


DRYDEN 44: Moody's Assigns B2(sf) Ratings to Class F Notes
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has assigned the
following definitive ratings to notes issued by Dryden 44 Euro
CLO 2015 B.V. (the "Issuer" or "Dryden CLO"):

-- EUR 232,400,000 Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 12,300,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

-- EUR 36,000,000 Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
    due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 7,200,000 Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due
    2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa2 (sf)

-- EUR 23,000,000 Class C Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

-- EUR 18,700,000 Class D Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR 28,100,000 Class E Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba2 (sf)

-- EUR 11,800,000 Class F Mezzanine Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2030, Definitive Rating Assigned B2 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's definitive rating of the rated notes addresses the
expected loss posed to noteholders by the legal final maturity of
the notes in 2030. The ratings reflect the risks due to defaults
on the underlying portfolio of loans given the characteristics
and eligibility criteria of the constituent assets, the relevant
portfolio tests and covenants as well as the transaction's
capital and legal structure. Furthermore, Moody's is of the
opinion that the collateral manager, PGIM Limited ("Pramerica"),
has sufficient experience and operational capacity and is capable
of managing this CLO.

Dryden 44 Euro CLO 2015 B.V. is a managed cash flow CLO. At least
90% of the portfolio must consist of senior secured loans and
senior secured floating rate notes and up to 10% of the portfolio
may consist of unsecured loans, second-lien loans, mezzanine
obligations and high yield bonds. The bond bucket gives the
flexibility to Dryden CLO to hold bonds if Volcker Rule is
changed. The portfolio is expected to be 62% ramped up as of the
closing date and to be comprised predominantly of corporate loans
to obligors domiciled in Western Europe.

Pramerica will manage the CLO. It will direct the selection,
acquisition and disposition of collateral on behalf of the Issuer
and may engage in trading activity, including discretionary
trading, during the transaction's four-year reinvestment period.
Thereafter, purchases are permitted using principal proceeds from
unscheduled principal payments and proceeds from sales of credit
risk and credit improved obligations, and are subject to certain
restrictions.

In addition to the eight classes of notes rated by Moody's, the
Issuer issued EUR43.4m of subordinated notes, which will not be
rated.

The transaction incorporates interest and par coverage tests
which, if triggered, divert interest and principal proceeds to
pay down the notes in order of seniority.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the
ratings:

The rated notes' performance is subject to uncertainty. The
notes' performance is sensitive to the performance of the
underlying portfolio, which in turn depends on economic and
credit conditions that may change. Pramerica's investment
decisions and management of the transaction will also affect the
notes' performance.


DRYDEN 44: S&P Assigns B- Rating to Class F Notes
-------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings has assigned its credit ratings to Dryden 44
Euro CLO 2015 B.V.'s class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C, D, E, and F
notes.  At closing, Dryden 44 Euro CLO 2015 also issued an
unrated subordinated class of notes.

S&P has assigned its ratings following its assessment of the
transaction's capital structure and the collateral portfolio's
credit quality, a cash flow analysis, and a review of the
transaction documents.  The portfolio is diversified, primarily
comprising broadly syndicated speculative-grade senior secured
term loans and senior secured bonds.  Therefore, S&P has
conducted its credit and cash flow analysis by applying its
criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligations.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it used the target par amount of
EUR400 million, the covenanted weighted-average spread of 4.10%,
the covenanted weighted-average coupon of 6.00%, and the
covenanted weighted-average recovery rates at each rating level.

S&P's analysis also shows that the credit enhancement available
to each rated class of notes is sufficient to withstand the
defaults applicable under the supplemental tests outlined in
S&P's CDO criteria.

S&P considers that the transaction's documented counterparty
replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate its
exposure to counterparty risk under S&P's current counterparty
criteria.

Following the application of S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria,
it considers the transaction's exposure to country risk to be
limited at the assigned rating levels, as the concentration of
the pool comprising assets in countries rated lower than 'A-'
does not exceed 10% of the aggregate collateral balance.

The transaction's legal structure is bankruptcy remote, in line
with S&P's European legal criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, it believes its ratings are
commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each class
of notes.

Dryden 44 Euro CLO 2015 is a European cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction, securitizing a portfolio of
primarily senior secured loans and bonds issued by speculative-
grade European borrowers.  PGIM Ltd. is the collateral manager.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Assigned

Dryden 44 Euro CLO 2015 B.V.
EUR412.90 Million Floating- And Fixed-Rate Notes (Including
EUR43.40 Million Subordinated Notes)

Class              Rating          Amount
                                 (mil. EUR)

A-1                AAA (sf)        232.40
A-2                AAA (sf)         12.30
B-1                AA (sf)          36.00
B-2                AA (sf)           7.20
C                  A (sf)           23.00
D                  BBB (sf)         18.70
E                  BB (sf)          28.10
F                  B- (sf)          11.80
Sub                NR               43.40

NR--Not rated.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


BANK MILLENNIUM: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Deposit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the long and short-term bank
deposit ratings at Ba1/Not Prime, the baseline credit assessment
(BCA) ba3, Adjusted BCA of ba3 and the Counterparty Risk
Assessment (CRA) at Baa3(cr)/Prime-3(cr) of Bank Millennium S.A.
(BM). Concurrently, Moody's maintains a stable outlook on BM's
long-term ratings.

The rating action follows the upgrade of the BCA of BM's parent
that holds a majority stake at 50.1%, Banco Comercial Portugues,
S.A. (BCP), to b3 from caa1. As part of the action, BCP's long-
term deposits and senior debt ratings were affirmed at B1 stable
and B1 negative respectively.

RATINGS RATIONALE

Affirmation of Deposit Ratings, Adjusted BCA and CRA

The affirmation of BM's deposit ratings reflects: 1) affirmation
of the bank's BCA; and (2) the results from Moody's Advanced Loss
Given Failure (LGF) analysis, which takes into account the
severity of loss faced by the different liability classes in
resolution, and which leads to two notches of rating uplift off
its adjusted BCA -- reflecting the likely reduction in expected
loss due to the loss absorption provided by the substantial
volume of deposits, as well as some senior and subordinated debt.

Mooody's said, "We assess the probability of parental support
from BCP to be high. However, this does not bring any benefit
owing to BCP's significantly weaker b3 BCA, resulting in Adjusted
BCA of BM being equal to its BCA. We incorporate a low likelihood
of public support for BM's deposits in the event of its failure,
which we don't consider as a systemically important bank. BM
operates in Poland (A2, negative), which is an EU-member country.
As such, under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)
it is subject to an Operation Resolution Regime, similar to other
EU countries. Poland is on its way to adopt a national version of
the directive in the course of 2016. Furthermore, it reflects the
operational resolution regime which is likely to restrict the
ability of the government to provide such support, even if it
were willing to do so, requiring losses to be imposed on even
senior creditors and large depositors under many circumstances.
As a result, BM's deposit ratings do not benefit from any support
from Polish authorities."

The Baa3(cr)/P-3(cr) CR Assessment of BM is positioned three
notches above the Adjusted BCA, based on the cushion against
default provided to the senior obligations. In addition, the low
probability of government support does not result in any uplift.

Affirmation of Standalone BCA

The affirmation of BM's BCA is driven by BM's largely stable
asset quality, good earnings generation and adequate
capitalization levels. As of year-end 2015 BM's (i) market shares
are at established 5% of loans and deposits, (ii) asset quality
with non-performing to gross loans at 4.5% is significantly
better than the system average of 6.8%, and (iii) the capital
position measured by the adjusted Tangible Common Equity to Risk
Weighted Assets stands at a solid 16.4%. BM's profitability is at
an adequate 0.84% largely in line with system average of 0.79%
during the first quarter of 2016, as measured by the annualized
net income to tangible assets.

At the same time, the ba3 BCA is constrained by the significant
portion of legacy foreign currency mortgages (predominantly CHF
denominated), at 38.3% of BM's gross loan book and 2.9x its tier
1 capital, amongst the highest in the sector. The related risks
are associated with asset quality, funding and cash collateral
needs, due to CHF funding needs, under cross-currency swap
agreements, which could be subject to fluctuations in the
currency markets. Furthermore, the bank is highly sensitive, due
to the high level of its exposure and weaker credit profile of
its parent, to a potential foreign-currency mortgages conversion
into the local currency, the zloty, due to an anticipated law
where currently there is a high level of uncertainty around its
final terms and impact on banks. As a result, BM's BCA is
positioned at the lower end of the BCA range reflecting these
material contingent risks.

The three-notch difference, one of the highest amongst Moody's
rated banks' universe, between the BCA of the parent (BCP) and
the subsidiary (BM) is underpinned by (1) the limited operational
inter-linkages between BM and BCP, given BM's purely domestic
focus within Poland and the absence of a common client base with
its parent; (2) BM's full funding independence from its parent;
and (3) close supervision of capital and liquidity buffers by the
Polish regulatory authority (KNF), which provides, among others,
annual dividend distribution guidelines. In Moody's opinion, a
wider gap than this would suggest minimal correlation between the
default probabilities between the entities in the same group,
which given some of the indirect linkages through the management
and brand association, is in Moody's opinion unlikely.

WHAT CAN CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

There is no upwards pressure on the ratings of BM at present,
given the high CHF mortgage exposure of the bank and the
uncertainty surrounding the foreign-currency mortgages conversion
into the local currency and its financial impact on banks. In
addition, the inverse BCA gap with its parent represent a
constraint due to BCP's still weak credit profile. Upward
pressure on the ratings could materialize over the medium term,
following a significant reduction in the CHF mortgage exposure of
the bank, a benign outcome from the foreign-currency mortgages
conversion and/or an improvement in BCP's BCA. Any additional
volumes of subordinated instruments implying higher protection
for senior creditors and a lower loss-given-failure in
resolution, which could lead to an additional uplift for the
deposit ratings up to one notch.

Negative pressure on the long-term deposit ratings could arise in
the event of: (i) a downgrade of the parent combined with the
erosion of the bank's franchise owing to group-related pressures;
(ii) a substantial weakening in BM's profitability, erosion of
its capital base and/or deterioration in asset quality resulting
in Moody's lowering its BCA; or (iii) BM's volume of subordinated
instruments decreases relative to its total banking asset
resulting in the reduction in the two notch rating uplift BM's
deposits ratings current enjoy per Moody's Advanced LGF analysis.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


AK BARS: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term IDR, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed AK BARS Bank's (ABB) Long-Term Foreign
Currency IDR at 'BB-' with a Negative Outlook.  At the same time,
the agency has downgraded ABB's Viability Rating (VR) to 'ccc'
from 'b-'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, SENIOR DEBT, NATIONAL AND SUPPORT RATINGS

The affirmation of ABB's IDRs, Support, National and senior debt
ratings reflect Fitch's view of the moderate probability of
support the bank may receive, in case of need, from the Republic
of Tatarstan (RT, BBB-/Negative).  This assessment takes into
account (i) RT's majority ownership; (ii) the close association
between the bank and the regional administration (RT's
representatives sit on ABB's board); (iii) ABB's agent function
for the RT budget and systemic importance in the region (market
share of around 40%); and (iv) the recent track record of
support.

The three-notch difference between RT's and the bank's ratings
reflects the limited flexibility of the RT budget, which may
impede its ability to provide support in a necessary amount and
in a timely manner at all times given the bank's relatively large
size.  This risk is offset somewhat by the ability to provide
support through RT-affiliated entities, as has been recently
demonstrated.  The notching also reflects significant corporate
governance weaknesses at ABB, given its large and weakly-reserved
related party and relationship-based lending exposure, which
together with other risky and non-core assets amounted to a
sizable 4.9x Fitch Core Capital (FCC) at end-1Q16.  Coupled with
weak core profitability, this could make support costly and less
politically acceptable.

At end-1Q16, a 63% stake in ABB (up from 51% at end-1H15) was
controlled by RT through its Ministry of Property, the RT-
controlled Svyazinvestneftekhim (SINEK; BB+/Negative) and the
State Housing Fund under the President of Tatarstan (HFPT).

In 2H15, ABB received an RUB9.8 bil. equity injection from HFPT
and also recognized a RUB16.2 gain from the sale of RUB29bn of
risky assets to RT-affiliated entities at above their net value,
albeit the majority of sale proceeds were in non-cash form
(listed shares of Russian companies rated in 'BBB'/'B' categories
by Fitch and receivables of more such shares), which undermines
the quality of this support.  The capital support was largely
consumed by losses the bank incurred in 2015, and the bank's weak
core capitalization, as reflected in the FCC ratio, has therefore
not improved.

VR
The downgrade of the bank's VR reflects the limited progress in
derisking the balance sheet.  Asset quality and capitalization
remain under pressure in light of sizable weakly-secured
exposures to high-risk assets and only marginal capacity to
absorb potential credit losses through capital and pre-impairment
profits.  On the positive side, the VR factors in large and
stable funding from the budget and RT affiliated entities, and
moderate refinancing risks in the medium term.

Reported NPLs (loans overdue by 90 days or more) were a moderate
5% of loans at end-2015 (mostly in the retail book) and were
adequately reserved.  However, certain weakly reserved corporate
exposures of a relationship/related-party nature (which although
not NPLs are considered very risky by Fitch) and investment
property together amounted to a sizable RUB141bn net of reserves
or 4.9x of FCC.  These increased from RUB116bn, or 4.2x of FCC,
at end-2014 despite the sale of certain high-risk loans to RT-
related entities in 2015.

Fitch believes the origination of these exposures raises
significant corporate governance risks, while their
recoverability may be lengthy and most likely would require
additional capital support and/or problem loan buy-outs from the
authorities or related entities.

The high risk exposures net of reserves include:

   -- RUB25 bil. (0.9x FCC) of receivables from RT-related
      companies in the form of listed shares of a Russian
      company. According to management, RUB7 bil. of this was
      repaid in April 2016, with the bank receiving more of these
      shares;

   -- RUB15 bil. (0.5x FCC) loans to a shell company ultimately
      used, according to management, to refinance SINEK's
      Eurobond in 2015;

   -- RUB40 bil. (1.4x FCC) of long-term construction/real estate
      loans (with considerable non-completion risks), mainly
      related to RT-administration;

   -- RUB10 bil. (0.3x FCC) blank loan to HFPT, the bank's new
      shareholder, used to purchase risky real estate from the
      bank;

   -- RUB18 bil. (0.6x FCC) of unsecured or weakly-secured loans
      to investment companies. Management reported that
      RUB10 bil. of this were repaid in June 2016;

   -- RUB19 bil. (0.7x FCC) of other related-party/relationship
      loans and/or high risk exposures;

   -- RUB14 bil. (0.5x of FCC) of investment property/non-core
      assets, mostly comprising land and commercial real estate
      in RT.

According to management, one of ABB's shareholders provided
RUB22 bil. of sureties at end-1Q16 against some of these
exposures, but Fitch considers these to be a weak mitigant.  Some
additional risks may also be identified as a result of the
ongoing review of the bank by the Central Bank of Russia.

ABB's core capital ratios have not improved since end-2014, as
capital support has been largely consumed by losses, and
therefore remain very weak (FCC ratio of 7% at end-2015),
especially relative to the significant unreserved high-risk
exposures.  The regulatory capital cushion at end-1Q16 was
sufficient to increase reserves by only 2% of loans, while core
pre-impairment profitability (net of one-offs, securities
revaluation gains and accrued but not received interest income)
was slightly above break-even in 1Q16 after being deeply negative
in 2015.  Net income in 1Q16 was supported by significant
revaluation gains, as equity and debt markets rebounded.

Fitch believes there are also risks with regards to the quality
of RUB14bn of Tier 2 capital, which in the agency's view could
have been financed from the bank's balance sheet through the
posting of excess collateral in a direct repo transaction.

The liquidity buffer (of cash, net short-term interbank
placements and unpledged liquid securities) net of near-term
wholesale repayments was sufficient to withstand around 20%
deposit outflow at end-1Q16.  Liquidity management is supported
by limited near-term refinancing risks (no bulky wholesale
repayments after ABB refinanced its USD500 mil. eurobond in 2015)
and fairly sticky corporate customer funding from budget/RT-
related entities.

SUBORDINATED DEBT

ABB's 'old-style' (without mandatory conversion triggers)
subordinated debt is rated two notches below its Long-Term IDR.
The rating differential reflects one notch for incremental non-
performance risk (in Fitch's view, the risk of default on
subordinated debt could be moderately higher than on senior
obligations in a stress scenario) and one notch for potential
loss severity (lower recoveries in case of default).

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, DEBT RATINGS, SUPPORT AND NATIONAL RATINGS

The Negative Outlook on ABB reflects that on RT's ratings.  ABB's
IDRs could be downgraded if either (i) the RT is downgraded (e.g.
as a result of a sovereign downgrade); or (ii) the scale of ABB's
support requirement increases, potentially reducing the RT's
ability or propensity to provide assistance to the extent needed.

The Outlook could be revised to Stable, thereby implying a
potential reduction of notching between RT and ABB to two
notches, if the bank considerably reduces the amount of high-risk
assets or the authorities provide sufficient equity to cover the
associated credit risks.

VR

Downward pressure on the Viability Rating (VR) could stem from
potential further deterioration in asset quality, resulting in
renewed weakening of the capital position, or if other
significant risks arise as a result of the regulatory review, and
these are not promptly addressed by the RT.  An upgrade of ABB's
VR would require a significant reduction of high-risk assets or a
strengthening of capital.

The rating actions are:

  Long-Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BB-',
   Outlook Negative

  Short-Term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  National Long-Term rating: affirmed at 'A+(rus)',
   Outlook Stable

  Viability Rating: downgraded to 'ccc' from 'b-'

  Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

  Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BB-'

  Senior unsecured debt National rating: affirmed at 'A+(rus)'

AK BARS Luxembourg S.A:

  Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BB-'

  Senior unsecured debt short-term rating: affirmed at 'B'

  Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'B'



===========
S E R B I A
===========


PROCREDIT BANK: Fitch Raises IDRs to 'BB-', Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded ProCredit Bank ad Beograd's (Serbia,
PCBS) and ProCredit Bank SH.A. Kosovo's (PCBK) Long-Term Foreign
Currency Issuer Default Ratings to 'BB-' from 'B+' and Support
Ratings to '3' from '4'.  It also upgraded PCBS's Long-Term Local
Currency IDR to 'BB' from 'BB-'.  The Outlook on the Long-Term
Foreign and Local Currency IDRs is Stable.

At the same time, the agency has affirmed PCBS's Viability Rating
at 'b+'.  PCBK's VR is unaffected by this rating action.

The rating actions follow Fitch's upgrade of the Serbian
sovereign rating and revision of the Country Ceiling.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS

PCBS's and PCBK's IDRs and Support Ratings are driven by
potential support from the parent, ProCredit Holding AG & Co.
KGaA (PCH, BBB/Stable).  The support considerations include the
100% ownership, the strategic importance of south-eastern Europe
to PCH, strong integration within the parent and a track record
of capital and liquidity support.

However, the extent to which such support can be factored into
the ratings is constrained by the Serbian Country Ceiling (PCBS)
and Fitch's assessment of risks relating to Kosovo (PCBK).
Absent of country risk constraints, support considerations would
typically be reflected in a one-notch differential between the
rating of the parent, PCH, and that of the subsidiary banks.

The Stable Outlook on PCBS's IDRs reflects that on Serbia's Long-
Term Foreign and Local Currency IDRs.

The one-notch uplift of PCBS's Local Currency IDRs above its
Foreign Currency IDR reflect a lower probability of restrictions
being placed on servicing of local currency obligations in case
of systemic stress.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS

Changes in Fitch's perception of risks relating to Kosovo in
either direction could affect PCBK's IDRs and Support Ratings.
Changes to Serbia's sovereign rating, currently not expected
given the Stable Outlook, accompanied by a revision of the
Country Ceilings, would affect PCBS's IDRs.

VR

PCBS's VR could be downgraded in the event of a material
worsening of its operating environment or if a sharp
deterioration in asset quality puts pressure on profitability and
capitalization.  Upside potential is currently limited for the VR
given the still challenging operating environment and the bank's
limited franchise.

The rating actions are:

PCBS

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
   Outlook Stable

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  Long-term local currency IDR: upgraded to 'BB' from 'BB-';
   Outlook Stable

  Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b+'

  Support Rating: upgraded to '3' from '4'

PCBK

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+';
   Outlook Stable

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  Support Rating: upgraded to '3' from '4'

  Viability Rating: unaffected



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


SELECTA GROUP: S&P Lowers LT Corporate Credit Rating to to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it lowered its long-term corporate
credit rating on Switzerland-based Selecta Group B.V. to 'B' from
'B+' and placed the rating on CreditWatch with negative
implications.

At the same time, S&P lowered to 'BB-' from 'BB' the issue rating
on Selecta's super senior revolving credit facility (RCF) due in
2019 and placed it on CreditWatch with negative implications.
The recovery rating on this facility is '1', indicating S&P's
expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery prospects in the
event of a payment default.

S&P also lowered to 'B' from 'B+' the issue rating on the
EUR350 million and Swiss franc (CHF) 245 million senior secured
notes due June 2020 and placed the rating on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  The recovery rating on the notes is '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful recovery prospects in
the lower half of the 50%-70% range.

The rating actions reflect Selecta's weaker-than-expected full-
year results for financial year 2015 (ending Sept. 30) and
results for the first half of financial 2016.  Selecta has faced
ongoing operational difficulties in the vending operator and
office coffee supply fields.  The group's revenues increased by
4% year on year over the past six months but reported EBITDA
declined by 24%, primarily due to increased rental expenses,
restructuring costs, and other one-off consultancy costs on
reshaping the business.

Lower EBITDA margins combined with material maintenance capital
expenditure needs have also put pressure on the company's cash
flow generation.  Free operating cash flow (FOCF) for financial
2015, including the positive impact of ongoing machine sales, was
negative by EUR15 million, compared with S&P's base-case forecast
of positive EUR10 million.  For the first half of financial 2016
the group has reported negative FOCF of about EUR57 million.

S&P notes that FOCF has been meaningfully burdened by a seasonal
peak in working capital needs during the first half of this
financial year.  Despite the reversal of the working capital and
a seasonal lift in the group's EBITDA in the second half of the
year, it is probable that FOCF will continue to be negative for
financial 2016.  Absent a material operational turnaround, S&P
believes the company's liquidity profile and covenant headroom
could weaken.  In December 2015, financial sponsor KKR supported
the group's liquidity with an equity injection of about
EUR17 million.

As of March 31, 2016, the group reported financial debt of
EUR645 million and a reported leverage ratio of 5.1x debt to
EBITDA, resulting in covenant headroom of about 20%.

S&P will resolve the CreditWatch within 90 days, once it has
discussed with the management its strategic plans and underlying
trends on the group's business prospects, profitability, cash
flow generation, leverage metrics, and liquidity.  S&P could also
take into account KKR's investment plans for the group, along
with its willingness to bring in additional equity capital.

S&P could lower the rating if it believes that its updated
forecasts would not support a solid liquidity profile and
covenant headroom above 15%, and if S&P expects continued
negative free operating cash flow generation as a result of
ongoing weaker reported EBITDA margins.

S&P could affirm the rating if it believes the updated forecasts
continue to support adequate liquidity, including covenant
headroom of about 15%, positive free operating cash flow, and
improving EBITDA trends compared with fiscal 2015.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: Documents Reveal Pension Plan Funding Arrangements
-------------------------------------------------------------
Josephine Cumbo and Mark Vandevelde at The Financial Times report
that as a deal to sell BHS was hammered out in 2015, lawyers for
the buyer repeatedly reduced the amount of cash they wanted Sir
Philip Green to inject into the ailing retailer's underfunded
pension scheme, documents reveal.

MPs are probing the funding arrangements of the BHS pension plan
after the group's collapse this year left about 20,000 scheme
members facing cuts to their retirement income, the FT discloses.

Documents published by parliament on June 20 revealed the
progress of presale talks between Sir Philip and Swiss Rock, a
vehicle for Dominic Chappell, the former bankrupt who bought BHS
for GBP1 last year, the FT relays.

Early drafts of the documents indicate that Sir Philip was to
meet the pension fund contributions of the BHS group for three
years after the sale, and to make "available" a GBP50 million
fund for pension expenses, the FT states.

The documents show later the anticipated support was changed to
annual contributions of GBP10 million a year for three years,
with a one-off contribution of GBP20 million after the third
year, the FT notes.

A further revision of the presale documents indicates that the
annual contributions were to be halved from GBP10 million to GBP5
million and made by Arcadia, the parent group of BHS and not Sir
Philip himself, the FT discloses.

The documents released by parliament did not make clear what
prompted the proposed terms to change, the FT says.

Giving evidence to MPs last week, Sir Philip pledged to "resolve"
the BHS pension issues, the FT recounts.  The scheme, which has
an estimated GB571 million deficit, is being assessed by the
pensions rescue fund, according to the FT.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


BHS GROUP: Owners Charged Hefty Fees on Short-Term Loans
--------------------------------------------------------
Mark Vandevelde at The Financial Times report that the owners of
BHS Group charged hefty fees on short-term loans raised at
triple-digit interest rates as the retailer battled to raise the
cash it needed to stay afloat.

Retail Acquisitions, which was led by former bankrupt Dominic
Chappell and which bought the chain from Sir Philip Green in
March last year, was entitled to receive a fee of 2% of any loan
they arranged for the retailer, according to documents released
by a parliamentary inquiry that is probing the retailer's
collapse, the FT relates.

Mr. Chappell, as cited by the FT, said fees were agreed on a
loan-by-loan basis and the owners had to pay costs out of the
fees.

BHS took out loans with an aggregate value of about GBP100
million in the 13 months that followed the sale, the FT
discloses.

According to the FT, Mr. Chappell said the arrangement, which he
called a "no hay, no pay" deal, was cheaper than asking an
independent broker to raise the cash.

BHS, which has made a loss in each of the past seven years,
collapsed in April after failing to raise a GBP60 million secured
loan from Gordon Brothers, an investment fund that specialized in
lending to distressed businesses, the FT recounts.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


BHS GROUP: Chappell Used Company Money to Fund Holiday Flights
--------------------------------------------------------------
Christopher Williams at The Telegraph reports that Dominic
Chappell, the former bankrupt who bought BHS from Sir Philip
Green, attempted to pay for his family holiday flights to the
Bahamas out of the struggling retailer's travel budget, its
management has claimed.

Darren Topp, chief operating officer at BHS under Sir Philip's
ownership and promoted to chief executive when Mr. Chappell took
over, told MPs that he had spotted and blocked the payment, The
Telegraph relates.

In evidence published by the joint select committee investigation
into the collapse of BHS, Mr. Topp, as cited by The Telegraph,
said: "Chappell saw no distinction between the company's money
and his own personal money; he saw them as one and the same.  The
level of financial governance shown by Chappell was very poor.

"Chappell attempted to buy a set of family holiday flights in
December 2015 on the company travel budget; this was spotted by
Darren Topp and stopped immediately much to the annoyance of
Chappell."

The new claims emerged as the Pension Protection Fund (PPF), the
lifeboat for troubled pension schemes, said after a creditors'
meeting that a second administrator would be appointed to help
handle attempts to recover money from BHS, The Telegraph relays.

According to The Telegraph, Malcolm Weir, the PPF's head of
restructuring, said: "This is an unusual step, but one we regard
as appropriate given the circumstances of this administration.
As a result, following an application to court, we would expect
FRP to be appointed to work alongside Duff & Phelps."

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


BRISTOW COMPANY: Egan-Jones Cuts FC Sr. Unsecured Rating to B
-------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company lowered the foreign currency senior
unsecured rating on debt issued by Bristow Group Inc. to B from
BB- on June 13, 2016.  EJR also lowered the commercial paper
rating on the Company to B from A3.

Bristow Helicopters is a British civil helicopter operator
originally based at Aberdeen Airport, Scotland, which is now part
of the U.S. based Bristow Group which in turn has its corporate
headquarters in Houston, Texas.


CARE UK: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'B-' CCR
--------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings affirmed its 'B-' long-term corporate credit
rating on U.K.-based health care group Care UK Health & Social
Care Investments Ltd.  S&P also affirmed the 'B-' and 'CCC' issue
ratings on the senior secured and secured subordinated debt
issued by Care UK Health & Social Care PLC.  S&P then withdrew
all the ratings.

The outlook was stable at the time of the withdrawal.

S&P is withdrawing the ratings at the issuer's request.  Based on
the information currently available to S&P, its view on the
ratings remains unchanged.

At the time of the withdrawal, the balance on the first-lien
senior secured notes was GBP230 million and on the second-lien
notes was GBP42.6 million following redemptions in 2015.


CONSOLIDATED MINERALS: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'SD'
-------------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings said that it has lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Jersey-incorporated manganese ore
miner Consolidated Minerals Ltd. (Jersey) (ConsMin) to 'SD' from
'CC'.

At the same time, S&P lowered its issue rating on the company's
$400 million senior secured notes due 2020 to 'D' from 'CC'.  The
recovery rating remains at '4', indicating S&P's estimate of
recovery in the lower half of the 30%-50% range.

The rating actions follow the nonpayment of the coupon on
ConsMin's EUR400 million senior secured notes, due 2020, within
the 30-day grace period that ended June 15, 2016.

The company has started the process to obtain noteholders'
consent to amend the terms of the notes, including deferral of
coupon payments, which S&P considers a distressed restructuring.
Under the proposed terms, the company will defer the next two
semi-annual coupon payments and have the option to defer the
following two coupon payments, in exchange for certain cash
payments and fees.  S&P views this as a distressed restructuring
because, in its view, the noteholders will not receive
appropriate compensation for the deferral of coupon payments,
taking into account the time value of money and a risk-adjusted
discount rate. Before the expiration of the grace period (30 days
after the last coupon due date), 83% of the noteholders had
signed a lock-up agreement supporting the amendments of the
notes' terms.  Therefore S&P doesn't expect the bond repayment to
be accelerated following the missed interest payment.  The
agreement of 95% of the noteholders is required for the
amendments to take effect.  The consent solicitation is expected
to be launched on July 7, 2016, for a period of 20 days.

Manganese ore prices have shown signs of recovery in recent
months, helping to limit ConsMin's cash burn.  S&P understands
the company has maintained fairly stable cash balances in recent
months, which will likely weaken moderately after payment of
residual cash interest and fees associated with the proposed
amendments.  Moreover, ConsMin's Australian mines are on care and
maintenance.  S&P anticipates that the company will generate
neutral free cash flow in the coming months, compared with its
previous forecast of negative flows, following the deferral of
interest payments.

S&P expects to reassess ConsMin's credit standing once S&P knows
the outcome of the consent solicitation, which S&P expects will
be concluded by the end of July 2016.


DECO 8 - UK: S&P Lowers Ratings on 6 Note Classes to D
------------------------------------------------------
S&P Global Ratings lowered its credit ratings on DECO 8 - UK
Conduit 2 PLC's class A2, B, C, and D notes.

At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the
class E, F, and G notes.

S&P's ratings in this transaction address the timely payment of
interest and the ultimate payment of principal no later than the
April 2018 legal final maturity date for the class A2 notes, and
the January 2036 legal final maturity date for the class B to G
notes.  On the April 2016 interest payment date, only the class
A2 notes received full interest.

In S&P's view, the transaction experienced interest shortfalls
because of spread compression between the loans and the notes.
The weighted-average margin on the remaining loans is not
sufficient to cover issuer expenses and the notes' interest.
With only six loans remaining, the transaction has become more
exposed to periodic spikes in prior-ranking transaction costs.

S&P has therefore lowered to 'CCC (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its rating
on the class A2 notes, in line with S&P's criteria for assigning
'CCC' category ratings, to reflect the higher risk of interest
payment default.  S&P believes this class of notes faces at least
a one-in-two likelihood of interest payment default.

For the class B, C, and D notes, the interest shortfalls
represent a failure to pay timely interest, which S&P believes is
unlikely to repay within 12 months.  Non-accruing interest (NAI)
amounts have also been applied to the class C and D notes.  S&P
has therefore lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC+ (sf)', 'CCC (sf)',
and 'CCC- (sf)' its ratings on the class B, C, and D notes,
respectively, in line with S&P's interest shortfall criteria.

S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the class E, F, and G
notes as they have experienced interest shortfalls previously and
NAI amounts have been fully applied to these notes.

DECO 8 - UK Conduit 2 closed in May 2006 and was secured by a
portfolio of 22 mortgage loans backed by 75 U.K. commercial
properties and 92,464 ground leases.

RATINGS LIST

DECO 8 - UK Conduit 2 PLC
GBP630.131 mil commercial mortgage-backed floating-rate notes

                                    Rating       Rating
Class            Identifier         To           From
A2               XS0251886163       CCC (sf)     B- (sf)
B                XS0251886833       D (sf)       CCC+ (sf)
C                XS0251887211       D (sf)       CCC (sf)
D                XS0251887724       D (sf)       CCC- (sf)
E                XS0251889696       D (sf)       D (sf)
F                XS0251890199       D (sf)       D (sf)
G                243578AH4          D (sf)       D (sf)


HARKAND GULF: Files in U.S. to Further UK Liquidation
-----------------------------------------------------
Harkand Gulf Contracting Limited, Harkand Global Holdings
Limited, and Integrated Subsea Services Limited filed Chapter 15
petitions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of Texas on June 20, 2016, seeking recognition in the United
States of insolvency proceedings currently pending in the United
Kingdom.  Petitioners Ian Wormleighton, Philip Stephen Bowers and
Michael Magnay, as joint administrators of the Debtors, believe
that the filing will facilitate the liquidation of the Debtors'
estates in the UK Proceedings and protect certain of the Debtors'
property and other interests in the United States.

According to Court documents, Harkand's business was closely tied
to that of exploration and production operators around the world.
Prior to commencing insolvency proceedings in the United Kingdom,
the Debtors were part of a family of companies known as the
Harkand group that provided subsea capabilities and services to
the offshore oil and gas industry.

"The recent and prolonged depression in crude oil prices
significantly decreased demand for Harkand's services, negatively
impacting Harkand's operating performance and constraining
liquidity," according to Zack A. Clement, Esq., at Zack A.
Clement PLLC, one of the Petitioners' attorneys.  "As a result,
Harkand struggled to meet its debt payment obligations and,
ultimately determined that commencing the UK Proceedings and the
proceedings commenced by other members of the Harkand Group was
its only viable option."

In February 2016, Harkand's management engaged its various
creditors -- specifically ABN AMRO Lease N.V., Nordea Bank AB,
London Branch, Veolia ES Special Services, Inc. and certain
holders of senior secured bonds due in 2019 -- as well as other
key stakeholders, in an effort to consensually restructure
Harkand's debt obligations but to no avail.

Faced with operations that were crippled by creditor collection
efforts and an imminent liquidity crisis, the Debtors officially
commenced insolvency proceedings in the United Kingdom in April
2016.  The decision was made after Harkand failed to secure the
needed working capital of approximately $20 million for it to
continue as a going concern and ceased all business operations,
with the exception of parts of its US business and its survey
operations.

Prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings,
management, with the assistance and advice of its advisors,
negotiated with Ethos Offshore and certain of its affiliates
ultimately owned and controlled by funds managed by Oaktree, the
ultimate beneficial owner and a creditor of various Harkand Group
companies, and determined that a sale following the commencement
of administration proceedings in the United Kingdom was the best
course of action and would provide greater value than a piecemeal
liquidation of the group.

The Petitioners, acting as agents of certain Harkand entities
including HGHL and HGCL, entered into a share and asset purchase
agreement with the Ethos Group and consummated the sale of its US
and West African operations to the Ethos Group.  With respect to
HGCL, the Transaction included HGCL's sale of its shares in
Harkand Arena S.A.P.I de C.V., its Mexican subsidiary, and sale
of certain of its customer contracts.  Pre-administration, HGCL
had approximately $8 million in customer receivables; the
Transaction preserved those receivables for HGCL's estate and
obligated the Ethos Group to assist the Petitioners in collecting
the receivables and distributing receipts to HGCL's creditors.
Further, the share sale of HGCL's Mexican subsidiary ensured that
it would continue to operate and maintain its workforce, and
enabled HGCL to realize measurable value for its creditors as
compared to a break up or liquidation of HGCL that would have
created no value.

With respect to HGHL, the Transaction included the sale of HGHL's
intellectual property in the Harkand Group including, but not
limited to, the "Harkand" name and all trademarks, service marks
and business names which includes all domain names owned by the
Harkand Group, all information, data and records relating
primarily to the Harkand business, and all intellectual property
rights.  The Transaction additionally included the sale of
Harkand LLC.  The Transaction had the support of Harkand's
management, Oaktree, and Shipco, whose support was critical to
the performance of key customer contracts in West Africa.

Currently, the Petitioners are continuing to recover value for
the estates of the Debtors (as well as the other UK Debtors) for
the ultimate purpose of distributing assets to creditors.  Steps
the Petitioners are currently taking include:

   a. negotiating the sale of Harkand's survey business to a
      trade buyer, which will realize value to the estate of ISS
     (the survey business being a corporate subsidiary of ISS);

   b. attempting to collect the approximately $8 million in
      customer receivables owed to HGCL;

   c. cooperating with ABN to help find third party operators
      potentially interested in leasing or purchasing the ROVs;
      and

   d. engaging with holders of the Secured Bonds to recover
      Harkand property and equipment currently located on board
      the Bondholder Vessels.

Upon commencement of the UK Proceedings, a moratorium goes into
effect pursuant to the 1986 Act, which is similar to an automatic
stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, to prevent
creditor actions that could interfere with an orderly
administration.  Notwithstanding the moratorium, on May 6, 2016,
Titan Logistics and Support Services, Ltd., a company based in
Trinidad and Tobago, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of
Harris County, Texas, against HGCL, Harkand LLC, certain member
of the Ethos Group, and Anglo-Eastern (UK) Limited, another Titan
debtor.  Titan alleges breach of a master services agreement and
fraudulent transfers involving the transaction with Ethos Group
and seeks, among other things, monetary damages from HGCL
totaling $2.58 million and a writ of attachment on assets
transferred to the Ethos Group.  Further, certain Debtors and UK
Debtors, including HGHL, are parties to other litigation pending
in the United States, about which the Petitioners have limited
information.

A copy of the declaration in support of the Petitions is
available for free at:

        http://bankrupt.com/misc/2_HARKAND_Declaration.pdf


HBOS PLC: FRC's Report on Collapse Investigation Delayed
--------------------------------------------------------
Tim Wallace at The Telegraph reports that the report into HBOS
plc's accounts has been delayed yet again, as the audit watchdog
missed its own target date for publishing the results of its
investigation.

MPs had already complained that the Financial Reporting Council
missed earlier chances to investigate the audit in the years
since the bank's failure, and will now have to wait even longer
than expected to hear back on the state of the lender's finances,
The Telegraph relates.

HBOS collapsed in 2008 and was taken over by Lloyds, which then
required a government bailout, The Telegraph recounts.

Officials at the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct
Authority investigated the causes of the failure in a report
published last year, The Telegraph relays.

According to The Telegraph, a probe into KPMG's audit of HBOS,
which gave it a clean bill of health shortly before its near-
collapse, was left to the accounting industry regulator, the
Financial Reporting Council.

In January, it began a preliminary investigation under the
disciplinary scheme which reports to the FRC's Conduct Committee,
which then decides whether KPMG or any individuals should face a
further investigation, The Telegraph discloses.

The FRC's chief executive Stephen Haddrill told MPs in February
that he wanted to "conduct our preliminary inquiries as quickly
as possible" and although the exact timing would depend on its
findings, "we would hope to be in a position to report out
conclusions in the spring", The Telegraph relates.

It is now summer and five months have passed since the
preliminary probe began, The Telegraph notes.

The FRC declined to explain the cause of the latest delay: "Our
inquiry into KPMG's audit of HBOS is ongoing.  When it is
complete we will make a public announcement," The Telegraph
quotes the FRC as saying.

HBOS plc is a banking and insurance company in the United
Kingdom, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Lloyds Banking Group
having been taken over in January 2009.  It is the holding
company for Bank of Scotland plc, which operates the Bank of
Scotland and Halifax brands in the UK, as well as HBOS Australia
and HBOS Insurance & Investment Group Limited, the group's
insurance division.  The group became part of Lloyds Banking
Group through a takeover by Lloyds TSB January 19, 2009.


WEST BROMWICH: Moody's Affirms Deposit Ratings at B1/Not-Prime
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Baseline Credit
Assessment (BCA) /adjusted BCA of West Bromwich Building Society
(West Brom) at b1, its long and short-term deposit ratings at
B1/Not-Prime and its pref. stock non-cumulative rating at Caa1
(hyb). The outlook on the long term deposit ratings is stable.
West Brom's long and short-term Counterparty Risk Assessment was
affirmed at Ba2(cr)/Not-Prime(cr).

The affirmation of the ratings follows an adverse ruling by the
UK Court of Appeal against West Brom and in favor of a group of
buy-to-let borrowers, who are awarded GBP27.5 million remediation
costs. In Moody's view the financial impact of this payment is
consistent with the current BCA and ratings of the Society.

RATINGS RATIONALE

On June 8, 2016, the Court of Appeal ordered West Brom to
reimburse GBP27.5 million to a number of mortgages borrowers for
unfairly increasing the interest rates on certain buy-to-let
loans.

Moody's affirmation of the ratings reflects the rating agency's
view that these charges, whilst sizeable compared to West Brom's
earnings, do not significantly impact its creditworthiness.

The contested increase in interest rate contributed GBP8.7
million to the group's income in the year to 31 March 2016 and
GBP25.1 million cumulatively since the application of the rate
change in December 2013. West Brom had not previously made
provisions for any of these costs because it classified them as
contingent liabilities following a favorable initial ruling.
Moody's therefore expects the Society to report a statutory loss
in the current financial year, although this will be partly
offset by the building society's underlying profitability.

The loss will likely have a limited impact on West Brom's capital
ratio. West Brom reported a Core Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of
14.6% at end-March 2016, in line with other rated building
societies that, similar to West Brom, adopt the Standardised
Approach for all exposures and risks. After the impact of the
remediation costs, Moody's expects West Brom's CET1 ratio to
decline marginally by around 100 basis points and still be
consistent with the current BCA and ratings of the Society.

The affirmation of the b1 BCA also reflects West Brom's solid
leverage metrics, its retail deposit funding base, and its
comfortable liquidity position, which counter-balance the
Society's high, albeit declining, stock of problem loans, its
legacy commercial lending portfolio, and its weak profitability.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on West Brom's deposit ratings reflects
Moody's expectation that the Society (1) is able to partly offset
the impact of the remediation on capital through underlying
earnings; (2) improves its problem loan ratio as its commercial
book is wound down; and (3) maintains its solid funding and
liquidity profile.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

West Brom's BCA could be upgraded as a result of significant
improvements in its asset quality metrics and its ability to
regain access to wholesale markets. A positive change in the
building society's BCA would lead to an upgrade in all ratings.
West Brom's deposit ratings could also be upgraded if, after
regaining access to wholesale markets, the building society were
to issue significant amounts of senior and/or subordinated long-
term debt.

West Brom's BCA could be downgraded in the event of a notable
economic slowdown in the UK, resulting in significant asset
quality deterioration and impacting its capital levels. Higher-
than-announced remediation costs could also trigger a downgrade
of the BCA. A downward movement in West Brom's BCA would be
likely to result in downgrades to all ratings.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Oil Business in Latin America: The Early Years
-------------------------------------------------------------
Author: John D. Wirth Ed.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 282 pages
List price: $34.95
Review by Gail Owens Hoelscher
Buy a copy for yourself and one for a colleague on-line at
http://is.gd/DvFouR
This book grew out of a 1981 meeting of the American Historical
Society. It highlights the origin and evolution of the stateowned
petroleum companies in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and
Venezuela.

Argentina was the first country ever to nationalize its
petroleum industry, and soon it was the norm worldwide, with the
notable exception of the United States. John Wirth calls this
phenomenon "perhaps in our century the oldest and most
celebrated of confrontations between powerful private entities
and the state."

The book consists of five case studies and a conclusion, as
follows:

* Jersey Standard and the Politics of Latin American Oil
Production, 1911-30 (Jonathan C. Brown)
* YPF: The Formative Years of Latin America's Pioneer State
Oil Company, 1922-39 (Carl E. Solberg)
* Setting the Brazilian Agenda, 1936-39 (John Wirth)
* Pemex: The Trajectory of National Oil Policy (Esperanza
Duran)
* The Politics of Energy in Venezuela (Edwin Lieuwen)
* The State Companies: A Public Policy Perspective (Alfred
H. Saulniers)

The authors assess the conditions at the time they were writing,
and relate them back to the critical formative years for each of
the companies under review. They also examine the four
interconnecting roles of a state-run oil industry and
distinguish them from those of a private company. First, is the
entrepreneurial role of control, management, and exploitation of
a nation's oil resources. Second, is production for the private
industrial sector at attractive prices. Third, is the
integration of plans for military, financial, and development
programs into the overall industrial policy planning process.
Finally, in some countries is the promotion of social
development by subsidizing energy for consumers and by promoting
the government's ideas of social and labor policy and labor
relations.

The author's approach is "conceptual and policy oriented rather
than narrative," but they provide a fascinating look at the
politics and development of the region. Mr. Brown provides a
concise history of the early years of the Standard Oil group and
the effects of its 1911 dissolution on its Latin American
operations, as well as power struggles with competitors and
governments that eventually nationalized most of its activities.
Mr. Solberg covers the many years of internal conflict over oil
policy in Argentina and YPF's lack of monopoly control over all
sectors of the oil industry. Mr. Wirth describes the politics
and individuals behind the privatization of Brazil's oil
industry leading to the creation of Petrobras in 1953. Mr. Duran
notes the wrangling between provinces and central government in
the evolution of Pemex, and in other Latin American countries.
Mr. Lieuwin discusses the mixed blessing that oil has proven for
Venezuela., creating a lopsided economy dependent on the ups and
downs of international markets. Mr. Saunders concludes that many
of the then-current problems of the state oil companies were
rooted in their early and checkered histories." Indeed, he says,
"the problems of the past have endured not because the public
petroleum companies behaved like the public enterprises they
are; they have endured because governments, as public owners,
have abdicated their responsibilities to the companies."
Jonh D. Wirth is Gildred Professor of Latin American Studies at
Standford University.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *