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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, April 28, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 083


                            Headlines


A U S T R I A

PFANDBRIEFBANK AG: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating
VORARLBERGER LANDES: Moody's Affirms (P)Ba1 Rating on Sub. Debt


G E R M A N Y

HAPAG-LLOYD: S&P Puts B+ CCR on CreditWatch Negative
HYPO TIROL: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Long-Term Debt
TUI AG: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba2 & Changes Outlook to Stable


I C E L A N D

LANDSVIRKJUN: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Senior Unsecured Debt Ratings


I R E L A N D

DECO 10-PAN: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to D(sf)
ELM PARK: S&P Assigns Preliminary B- Rating on Class E Notes


I T A L Y

CASAFORTE SRL: Fitch Affirms B-sf Ratings on 2 Note Classes
STEFANA SPA: May 3 Deadline Set for Ramo Nave Irrevocable Offers


M A L T A

NEMEA BANK: Financial Regulator Appoints PwC to Oversee Assets


P O R T U G A L

BANCO BPI: Fitch Puts 'BB' IDR on Rating Watch Positive
CAIXABANK SA: Fitch Affirms BB Subordinated Debt Rating


R U S S I A

BFG-CREDIT LLC: Moratorium Imposed on Meeting Creditor Claims


S P A I N

BANKINTER SA: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Tier 1 Securities
SANTANDER EMPRESAS 2: Fitch Raises Class E Notes Rating to BBsf


U K R A I N E

KREDOBANK PJSC: S&P Revises Outlook to Pos. & Affirms CCC+ Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BHS GROUP: Owner Says Green's Actions Contribute to Demise
BHS GROUP: New Buyers May Snub Quarter of Stores, Data Show
SSI UK: Union Balks at News of Buyer Interest on Redcar Site
TATA STEEL UK: Urged by Gov't to Consider Funding Package


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A U S T R I A
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PFANDBRIEFBANK AG: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Pfandbriefbank
(Oesterreich) AG's (Pfandbriefbank) backed senior unsecured debt
at Ba1 and changed the outlook to stable from negative.

The rating action follows the Austrian Financial Market
Authority's (FMA) emergency administrative decision
("Mandatsbescheid") on the haircut of Heta Asset Resolution AG's
(Heta, Carinthian-state-guaranteed senior unsecured debt Ca,
developing) outstanding liabilities and related rating actions on
member banks of Pfandbriefbank.

The stable outlook on Pfandbriefbank's backed senior unsecured
ratings reflects Moody's assessment of a stabilization of the
supporting member banks' creditworthiness.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The affirmation of Pfandbriefbank's senior unsecured ratings at
Ba1 with stable outlook follows Moody's affirmation of
Pfandbriefbank member banks' ratings, from which Pfandbriefbank's
ratings are derived.  Pfandbriefbank's rating continues to be
purely based on the member banks' creditworthiness and does not
include uplift from public-sector entities, reflecting the
ongoing lack of commitment by several federal states to honor
their obligations under the existing joint and several liability
framework.

The outlook change is driven by the announced haircut providing
more clarity on the potential burden related to the resolution
process, the declining future liquidity support needs for
Pfandbriefbank as around EUR0.8 billion of the original
EUR1.2 billion Heta exposure has matured in the meantime, the
track record of liquidity support provided by the member banks
since March 2015 and the achieved provisioning level of member
banks for the support measures and Heta exposures that limits
tail risks for the individual banks.

Given its business profile as a poorly capitalized issuing
vehicle for its member banks, i.e., the Austrian
Landeshypothekenbanken or their legal successors, Pfandbriefbank
relies fully on the performance of its concentrated assets to
service its liabilities. The Heta moratorium in March 2015
therefore impaired its liquidity and solvency.  Pfandbriefbank
came under stress after the regulator in Austria (Aaa negative)
imposed a payment moratorium on the liabilities of Heta to which
Pfandbriefbank had a EUR1.2 billion exposure as of March 2015.

In April 2015, the member banks and the majority -- but not
all -- of the Austrian Federal states agreed support measures
that fully cover Pfandbriefbank's Heta exposure and have
therefore eliminated immediate liquidity and solvency concerns
for the entity.  However, the Austrian states' individual
contributions were not uniformly provided, as timely support has
been withheld by several states, undermining the reliability of
the multi-recourse support structure.  Pfandbriefbank's
liabilities are grandfathered under a statutory joint and several
guarantee from member banks and their former guarantors, i.e. the
relevant Austrian federal states, according to Austrian federal
law.

On April 10, 2016, the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA)
imposed several resolution measures on Heta, including a bail-in
of liabilities.  The FMA's emergency administrative decision
("Mandatsbescheid") reduces the face value of Heta's senior
unsecured liabilities to 46.02%, while the entity's subordinated
liabilities have been written down to zero.  In addition, the
regulator canceled interest payments and extended the maturity of
all affected liabilities until 31 December 2023, effectively
rolling over the payment moratorium that the regulatory body
ordered in March 2015.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Upward rating pressure could result from (1) a strengthening of
the member banks' credit profiles; and/or (2) a clarification of
the legal obligations of the Austrian federal member-states under
the guarantee framework, to the extent that this removes any
doubts over the full, unconditional liability of all parties to
support Pfandbriefbank in a timely fashion.

Negative rating pressure could arise if (1) any of the member
banks opts out of the agreed support measures for Pfandbriefbank,
in the absence of which the bank could be at risk of insolvency
and / or (2) the member banks' credit profiles weaken.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


VORARLBERGER LANDES: Moody's Affirms (P)Ba1 Rating on Sub. Debt
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the long-term debt and
deposit ratings of Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypothekenbank AG
(VLH) at Baa1 as well as its backed long-term debt and deposit
ratings at A3, and changed the outlook to stable from negative;
the rating agency has also affirmed VLH's subordinated debt
program rating at (P)Ba1 and its backed subordinated debt at
Baa3. Moody's has affirmed the bank's short-term deposit ratings
at Prime-2, its backed short-term deposit ratings at Prime-2,
VLH's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted
BCA at baa3, and its Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessment (CR
Assessment) at A3(cr)/Prime-2(cr).

The rating actions reflect Moody's assessment of a stabilization
in the bank's credit profile based on reduced downside risks to
VLH from its joint and several liability for Pfandbriefbank
(Oesterreich) AG (Pfandbriefbank, Backed Senior Unsecured debt
Ba1 stable).

RATINGS RATIONALE

   --- AFFIRMATION OF VLH'S LONG-TERM RATINGS

The affirmation of VLH's long-term debt and deposit ratings
reflects a stabilizing trend in the bank's credit profile as
evidenced through the financial performance in 2015 and reduced
tail risks related to support measures for Pfandbriefbank under
the statutory multi-recourse joint & several liability scheme of
its member banks and related Austrian federal states.

On April 10, the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA)
imposed several resolution measures on Heta Asset Resolution AG
(Heta, Carinthia-backed senior unsecured debt Ca developing),
including a bail-in of liabilities.  The FMA's emergency
administrative decision ("Mandatsbescheid") reduces the face
value of Heta's senior unsecured liabilities to 46.02%, while the
entity's subordinated liabilities have been written down to zero.
In addition, the regulator canceled interest payments and
extended the maturity of all affected liabilities until Dec. 31,
2023, effectively rolling over the payment moratorium that the
regulatory body ordered in March 2015.

VLH's exposure to Heta is mostly indirectly through its joint and
several liability for Pfandbriefbank.  The bank has provisioned
for its commitments to Heta to a level that is largely in line
with the haircut as announced by the FMA on April 10.  The State
of Vorarlberg (unrated) considers recovering its part of the
financial burden through a special dividend of VLH, so that VLH
continues to face the risk of assuming losses for the currently
not provisioned support (half of total support) provided to
Pfandbriefbank.  Against the background of the bank's operating
profitability and its loan loss provisions and reserves on half
of its indirect Heta exposure, Moody's considers VLH's additional
downside risks from Heta exposure to be manageable for the bank
and therefore view the expected additional adverse effects on
VLH's profits and capitalization to be adequately reflected in
its baa3 BCA.

  --- RATIONALE FOR STABLE RATING OUTLOOKS ON BACKED SENIOR DEBTS
      AND DEPOSITS

In addition to reduced downside risks resulting from the bank's
liquidity provision to Pfandbriefbank and the joint and several
liability for the obligations of that entity, Moody's expects VLH
to report an improvement in its financial profile as of year-end
2015, a trend partly offset by the bank's possible liability for
Pfandbriefbank-related losses, the recent announcement of an
unexpected departure of its CEO and the uncertainty in relation
to VLH's strategic direction associated with it.

VLH pre-announced an improvement in its regulatory Common Equity
Tier 1 ratio to 11.2% as of December 2015, up from 10.4% as of
September 2015.  At the same time, company-reported non-
performing loans increased to 3.5% (from 2.6% in December 2014,
when the bank had not yet paid out liquidity support to
Pfandbriefbank).  The bank's net income of EUR121.1 million
dwarfs prior-year after-tax profits of EUR54 million, but the
improvement is partly attributable to lower reserve and
provisioning needs for Pfandbriefbank claims and positive non-
recurring items.  In addition, VLH continued to make progress in
the execution of its refinancing plan, which in particular
targets an improved maturity profile of currently still
concentrated deficiency-guaranteed liabilities in 2017.  In the
fourth quarter of 2015 and the first quarter of 2016, VLH
accessed the market through a broad range of instruments,
including covered bonds, Italian lease ABS and subordinate debt
placed with retail clients.

On April 7, VLH's CEO Michael Grahammer announced his departure,
resulting in increased strategic uncertainty for the bank.
Moody's considers the maintenance of a constructive relationship
with the bank's owners, Vorarlberg, Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg
(LBBW, deposits Aa3 stable/senior unsecured A1 stable, BCA baa3)
and L-Bank (deposits Aaa stable/senior unsecured Aaa stable), to
be vital for the incoming CEO to ensure strategic continuity.
Together with the limited willingness demonstrated by Vorarlberg
to bear losses related to Pfandbriefbank or to abstain from
recovering these from VLH, these developments somewhat offset
otherwise positive trends in VLH's financials and lead Moody's to
assign a stable outlook.

   --- AFFIRMATION OF 'S BACKED LONG-TERM RATINGS

Moody's considers the deficiency guarantee of the State of
Vorarlberg (unrated) for the benefit of VLH's backed deposits,
backed senior unsecured debt and backed subordinate debt to
provide a "moderate" likelihood of support for these instruments,
resulting in one notch of uplift compared to VLH's unguaranteed
instruments of equal seniority.

In a decision published in July 2015, the Austrian Constitutional
Court set high hurdles for invalidating a deficiency guarantee
granted by an Austrian region for the benefit of bank creditors
and the FMA's communication around the Heta haircut makes it
clear that the bail-in does not legally relieve the State of
Carinthia (Carinthia, B3 negative) from its obligations as a
guarantor.  At the same time, a timely payment under such
deficiency guarantees remains uncertain, as illustrated by
Carinthia's rejection of creditor claims for full repayment of
Heta's unsecured guaranteed liabilities and the thus far
unsuccessful joint attempt of Carinthia and the Republic of
Austria (Aaa negative) to reach a distressed exchange agreement
with Heta's unsecured creditors.

Against this background, Moody's continues to consider the timely
enforcement of deficiency guarantees for the benefit of Austrian
bank creditors to be dependent upon the willingness and ability
of the guarantor to abide by its commitments.  For VLH, the
likelihood of guarantor support is moderate, based on the
adequate share of guarantee commitments for the bank's debt when
compared to the economic strength of Vorarlberg and based on
Vorarlberg's reluctance to participate in the joint support
effort for Pfandbriefbank.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

An upgrade of VLH's long-term debt and deposit ratings could
result from (1) an upgrade of its standalone BCA and/or (2)
higher rating uplift as result of Moody's Advanced LGF analysis.
VLH's standalone BCA could be upgraded based on a combination of
improved capital levels and the successful implementation of a
long-term sustainable funding structure.  A future upgrade of
VLH's long-term debt and deposit ratings would most likely be
driven by an upgrade of the bank's standalone BCA.

A downgrade of VLH's long-term debt and deposit ratings could be
triggered following (1) a lowering in the bank's standalone BCA;
and/or (2) an increase in the expected loss severity following a
material shift in the bank's funding mix as part of its ongoing
refinancing of deficiency-guaranteed debt maturities with
foremost covered bond issuance could result in a future decline
in uplift for senior debts as a result of Moody's LGF analysis.
Moody's Advanced LGF analysis would likely result fewer notches
of rating uplift in particular if the overwhelming part of VLH's
maturing senior unsecured instruments are replaced with secured
debt instruments.  A downgrade of VLH's standalone BCA could be
triggered if (1) Moody's were to conclude that additional,
incremental liabilities of VLH under the support scheme for
Pfandbriefbank have a further material negative impact on the
banks' financial strength; (2) the departure of VLH's CEO is a
harbinger for disagreement between the bank and its owners about
the strategic direction.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Vorarlberger Landes- und Hypothekenbank AG (VLH):

These ratings were affirmed:

   -- BCA and adjusted BCA of baa3
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment of A3(cr)/Prime-2(cr)
   -- short-term deposit and issuer ratings of Prime-2
   -- state-guaranteed short-term deposit rating of Prime-2
   -- senior unsecured MTN program rating of (P)Baa1
   -- state-guaranteed senior unsecured MTN program rating of
      (P)A3
   -- subordinate MTN program of (P)Ba1
   -- state-guaranteed subordinate debt ratings of Baa3
   -- state-guaranteed subordinate MTN program rating of (P)Baa3

These ratings were affirmed and the outlook was changed to stable
from negative:

   -- long-term debt, deposit and issuer ratings of Baa1, outlook
      changed to stable from negative
   -- state-guaranteed long-term debt and deposit ratings of A3,
      outlook changed to stable from negative

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.



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G E R M A N Y
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HAPAG-LLOYD: S&P Puts B+ CCR on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch with
negative implications its 'B+' long-term corporate credit rating
on Germany-based container liner operator Hapag-Lloyd AG as well
as its 'B-' issue rating on the company's senior unsecured notes.

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's view of uncertainty over
the implications of the potential merger with container shipping
operations of United Arab Shipping Company SAG (UASC) on Hapag-
Lloyd's future capital structure and financial leverage.  While
no binding agreement has been singed, no assurance can be given
that the discussions between Hapag-Lloyd and UASC will lead to a
definitive agreement, and financing conditions of the potential
transaction and credit quality of UASC are uncertain, the
potential merger, in S&P's view, might trigger a weakening of
Hapag-Lloyd's financial risk profile, which S&P currently assess
as aggressive.

S&P acknowledges that Hapag-Lloyd has moderate financial
flexibility for an increase in financial leverage at the 'B+'
rating level coming from the improved credit measures in 2015,
including Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from operations (FFO)
to debt of about 19%, which compares well with S&P's rating
guideline of more than 12%.  Nevertheless, S&P believes that the
company's credit ratios (excluding the potential merger) will
come under pressure, amid very difficult conditions in the
container shipping industry, which is plagued with oversupply and
historically low freight rates.  In S&P's base case, it forecasts
that Hapag-Lloyd's weighted average adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio
will decrease to about 14%-16% in 2016-2017.

Furthermore, S&P believes that its current assessment of Hapag-
Lloyd's business risk profile as weak could remain unchanged
following the potential merger.  S&P recognizes prospective
improvements to the company's diversity and competitive
Advantage -- for example access to a fairly young, but
comparatively small fleet of large containerships of UASC -- from
the merger and Hapag-Lloyd's demonstrated capability to integrate
new businesses and extract synergies.  Nevertheless, given the
scope of UASC's operations -- with an estimated carrying capacity
of 450,000-500,000 twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU), compared
with Hapag-Lloyd's current capacity of about 1.0 million TEU--S&P
would unlikely consider this sufficiently material overall to
revise its view of the business risk profile, which remains
constrained by the shipping industry's high risk and
fragmentation, and Hapag-Lloyd's vulnerable profitability.  This
stems from Hapag-Lloyd's operating margins and returns on
capital, which are tied to the industry's cyclical swings, heavy
exposure to fluctuations in bunker fuel prices, and fairly low
short-term flexibility to adjust its operating cost base.

These weaknesses are partly mitigated by Hapag-Lloyd's leading
market positions and coverage through a broad and strategically
located route network, broad customer base, and attractive fleet
profile, supported by a large and fairly diverse fleet.  S&P's
business risk profile assessment incorporates the company's track
record of achieving operational efficiencies and its proactive
efforts to steadily reduce its cost base, which S&P considers as
a critical support to earnings.  In 2015, the company generated
about EUR760 million in reported EBITDA.

Assuming the transaction goes ahead, S&P expects to resolve the
CreditWatch placement within the next three months, after S&P has
finalized its assessment of the combined company's future capital
structure and financial leverage.  The CreditWatch negative
status indicates that there is at least a one-in-two likelihood
that S&P may lower the rating if the merger dilutes Hapag-Lloyd's
financial leverage beyond the rating-commensurate level.  S&P
views adjusted FFO to debt of more than 12% as commensurate with
the 'B+' rating on Hapag-Lloyd.

Alternatively, if the deal falls through, S&P would resolve the
CreditWatch placement at that time, affirming the ratings if S&P
considers that the credit quality of Hapag-Lloyd has not
deteriorated for other reasons in the meantime, such as lower
freight rates or higher bunker fuel prices than S&P forecasts
coupled with the company's inability to adjust its cost base to
achieve a reported EBITDA margin of at least 5%, amid ongoing
difficult industry conditions.


HYPO TIROL: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Rating on Long-Term Debt
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the long-term debt and
deposit ratings of Hypo Tirol Bank AG (Hypo Tirol) at Ba1, as
well as its backed long-term debt and deposit ratings at Baa2,
and changed the outlook to stable from negative; the rating
agency has also affirmed Hypo Tirol's subordinated debt program
rating at (P)B1 and its backed subordinated debt ratings at Ba2.
Further, Moody's has affirmed the bank's short-term deposit
ratings at Not-Prime, its backed short-term deposit ratings at
Prime-2, Hypo Tirol's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA)
and adjusted BCA at ba3, and its Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR
Assessment) at Baa3(cr)/Prime-3(cr).

The rating actions reflect Moody's assessment of an improving
trend in the bank's credit profile and reduced downside risks to
Hypo Tirol from its joint and several liability for
Pfandbriefbank (Oesterreich) AG (Pfandbriefbank, Backed Senior
Unsecured debt Ba1 stable).

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

   --- AFFIRMATION OF HYPO TIROL'S LONG-TERM RATINGS

The affirmation of Hypo Tirol's long-term debt and deposit
ratings reflects an improving trend in the bank's credit profile
as evidenced through the financial performance in 2015 and
reduced tail risks related to support measures for Pfandbriefbank
under the statutory multi-recourse joint & several liability
scheme of its member banks and related Austrian federal states
while Hypo Tirol continues to face challenges in refinancing
significant debt maturities by September 2017.

On April 10, the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA)
imposed several resolution measures on Heta Asset Resolution AG
(Heta, Carinthia-backed senior unsecured debt Ca developing),
including a bail-in of liabilities.  The FMA's emergency
administrative decision ("Mandatsbescheid") reduces the face
value of Heta's senior unsecured liabilities to 46.02%, while the
entity's subordinated liabilities have been written down to zero.
In addition, the regulator canceled interest payments and
extended the maturity of all affected liabilities until 31
December 2023, effectively rolling over the payment moratorium
that the regulatory body ordered in March 2015.

Hypo Tirol's exposure to Heta is mostly indirectly through its
joint and several liability for Pfandbriefbank.  Hypo Tirol has
provisioned for its commitments to Heta to a level that is
largely in line with the haircut as announced by the FMA on 10
April and therefore expected additional adverse effects on its
profits and capitalization are adequately reflected in its ba3
BCA.

Hypo Tirol has further reduced downside risks through a
combination of a reduction in non-performing loan exposures and
an improvement in its capitalization.  Also, and despite
relatively weak funding conditions for Austrian banks, Hypo Tirol
has continued to make progress in reducing the concentration of
deficiency-guaranteed debt maturities up and until September
2017; however, Moody's continues to consider the bank's funding
structure a key weakness of Hypo Tirol's financial profile.

   --- RATIONALE FOR STABLE RATING OUTLOOKS ON BACKED SENIOR
DEBTS AND DEPOSITS

In addition to reduced downside risks resulting from the bank's
liquidity provision to Pfandbriefbank and the joint and several
liability for the obligations of that entity, Hypo Tirol reported
an improvement in its financial profile as of year-end 2015.

The bank's transitional Common Equity Tier 1 ratio improved to
12.2%, up from 10.8% as of December 2014, based on a reduction in
risk-weighted assets and the retention of full-year 2015 profits.
The bank's year-end 2015 capitalization levels compare with a now
expired cap on its local GAAP Tier 1 ratio of 10% imposed by the
terms of the EU State Aid case and the improvement prepares Hypo
Tirol for a 1% additional systemic risk buffer requested by the
FMA.

After a loss-making year 2014 characterized by the early
formation of reserves for the bank's committed liquidity
provision to Pfandbriefbank, the bank reported significantly
improved net income in 2015 of EUR20.9 million plus EUR45.2
million in extraordinary own debt valuation gains.  Stronger
interest margins and abating loan loss provisioning needs in
comparison to prior years helped offset reduced business volumes
related to the EU State Aid agreement.

Reduced provisioning needs reflect both a decline in the new
formation of non-performing loans and accelerated progress in the
workout of Hypo Tirol's Italian legacy loan book, which led to a
reduction in the bank's problem loan ratio to 9.8% as of December
2015, down from 12.3% as of December 2014.  However, when
adjusted for the bank's exposure to Heta, the improvement in its
problem loan ratio is less pronounced.

   --- AFFIRMATION OF HYPO TIROL'S BACKED LONG-TERM RATINGS

Moody's considers the deficiency guarantee of the State of Tyrol
(unrated) for the benefit of Hypo Tirol's backed deposits, backed
senior unsecured debt and backed subordinate debt to provide a
"high" likelihood of support for these instruments, resulting in
two notches of uplift compared to Hypo Tirol's unguaranteed
instruments of equal seniority.

In a decision published in July 2015, the Austrian Constitutional
Court set high hurdles for invalidating a deficiency guarantee
granted by an Austrian region for the benefit of bank creditors
and the FMA's communication around the Heta haircut makes it
clear that the bail-in does not legally relieve the State of
Carinthia (Carinthia, B3 negative) from its obligations as a
guarantor under such a deficiency guarantee.  At the same time, a
timely payment under such deficiency guarantees remains
uncertain, as illustrated by Carinthia's rejection of creditor
claims for full repayment of Heta's unsecured guaranteed
liabilities and the thus far unsuccessful joint attempt of
Carinthia and the Republic of Austria (Aaa negative) to reach a
distressed exchange agreement with Heta's unsecured creditors.

Against this background, Moody's continues to consider the timely
enforcement of deficiency guarantees for the benefit of Austrian
bank creditors to be dependent upon the willingness and ability
of the guarantor to abide by its commitments.  For Hypo Tirol,
the likelihood of guarantor support is high, based on the
relatively low share of guarantee commitments for the bank's debt
when compared to the economic strength of Tyrol and based on the
State's supportive track record for its fully-owned bank.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

An upgrade of Hypo Tirol's long-term debt and deposit ratings
could result from an upgrade of its standalone BCA.  Hypo Tirol's
standalone BCA could be upgraded if (1) Hypo Tirol makes further
significant progress in winding down its non-performing exposures
at a cost covered by current provisioning levels, (2) the bank
materially improves its capitalization, and (3) the bank
continues to make meaningful progress in refinancing upcoming
substantial maturities of backed instruments, thereby reducing
its refinancing risks.

A downgrade of Hypo Tirol's long-term debt and deposit ratings
could be triggered following (1) a downgrade in the bank's
standalone BCA; and/or (2) a reduction in rating uplift as a
result of Moody's LGF.  A downgrade of Hypo Tirol's standalone
BCA could be triggered if Moody's were to conclude that (1)
currently unexpected, additional liabilities of Hypo Tirol under
the support scheme for Pfandbriefbank have a further material
negative impact on the banks' financial credit strength; or if
(2) the bank encountered greater than expected challenges in
achieving its funding plan targets.  Moody's Advanced LGF
analysis would likely result fewer notches of rating uplift in
particular if the overwhelming part of Hypo Tirol's maturing
senior unsecured instruments are replaced with secured debt
instruments.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

These ratings were affirmed and the outlook was changed to stable
from negative:

   -- long-term debt and deposit ratings of Ba1, outlook changed
      to stable from negative
   -- state-guaranteed long-term debt and deposit ratings of
      Baa2, outlook changed to stable from negative

These ratings were affirmed:

   -- BCA and adjusted BCA of ba3
   -- Counterparty Risk Assessment of Baa3(cr)/Prime-3(cr)
   -- short-term deposit ratings of Not-Prime
   -- state-guaranteed short-term deposit ratings of Prime-2
   -- senior unsecured MTN program of (P)Ba1
   -- state-guaranteed senior unsecured MTN program of (P)Baa2
   -- subordinate MTN program of (P)B1
   -- state-guaranteed subordinate and senior subordinate debt
      ratings of Ba2
   -- state-guaranteed subordinate MTN program of (P)Ba2

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Banks
published in January 2016.


TUI AG: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba2 & Changes Outlook to Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the world's leading
tourism company TUI AG's (TUI) corporate family rating to Ba2
from Ba3 and its probability of default rating to Ba2-PD from
Ba3-PD. Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded TUI AG's senior
unsecured rating to Ba2 from Ba3.  The outlook on the ratings was
changed to stable from positive.

"Our decision to upgrade TUI's ratings reflects the company's
strong operating performance in fiscal year 2014-15 and Q1 of the
current fiscal year, as well as its continued resilience to
geopolitical events.  The upgrade also considers the progress
made in the merger with TUI Travel Plc and ongoing improvements
in TUI's financial profile," says Sven Reinke, a Moody's Vice
President-Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for TUI.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating action reflects that TUI's key credit metrics are now
well within the previously guided target levels for a Ba2 rating,
following continued improvements in its operating performance in
fiscal 2014-15 (to September), and during the first three months
of the current fiscal year.  These improvements are indicated by
the lower seasonal loss of EUR102 million in Q1 of fiscal year
2015-16 in terms of underlying group EBITA, compared with a loss
of EUR105 million in the previous year's period, as well as lower
net interest expenses of EUR41 million: a reduction of EUR26
million.

This largely resulted from the better performance of TUI's Source
Markets business in the UK and cruise ship operations, albeit
partially offset by a difficult trading environment in Germany,
where demand for North African destinations and Turkey declined.
Moody's notes positively TUI's recent confirmation of the
guidance for an at least 10% improvement of the group's
underlying EBITA and its target of at least a 3% turnover growth
for the current fiscal year.

Driven by the growing EBITDA and cash flow generation, alongside
materially reduced interest expenses, TUI's financial profile
continued to improve in fiscal 2014-15 as well as in the first
quarter of fiscal 2015-16.  For example, TUI's lease-adjusted
gross debt/EBITDA ratio was 4.2x and its retained cash flow/net
debt ratio was 19.5% at the end of Q1 fiscal year 2015-16,
despite the seasonally higher debt levels at that point during
the fiscal year.

TUI's all-share merger of fiscal 2014-15 with its majority-owned
subsidiary, TUI Travel Plc, is progressing well, and TUI has
already benefitted from EUR30 million of synergies from the
combination of the two businesses (EUR20 million in fiscal 2014-
15, and EUR10 million in Q1 of fiscal 2015-16).  TUI currently
reports a high level of one-off expenses -- partially related to
the merger with TUI Travel Plc - for which Moody's does not
adjust for when calculating key credit metrics.  Accordingly,
Moody's expects that TUI's financial profile could further
improve in the next fiscal year, when more merger synergies will
be realised and one-off expenses reduce.

Moody's considers that geopolitical events, such as terrorist
attacks in key tourist destinations, remain a key risk to TUI's
operating performance, as they could lead to weaker demand for
the impacted holiday destinations.  TUI has been able to offset
the financial impact of the terrorist attacks in Tunisia and
Egypt, and also the recent drop in demand for Turkey.  However,
Moody's notes that TUI is now more reliant on a stable
environment in its most important destination, Spain.

Moody's views TUI's liquidity position as solid, with a four-year
syndicated credit facility of EUR1,535 million maturing in
December 2020.  Of this, EUR513 million were undrawn in December
2015, which is the low-point in TUI's seasonal cash swing, as
well as EUR1,042 million of cash and cash equivalents.  Moody's
considers that TUI's liquidity is sufficiently flexible to meet
its high seasonal cash swings, in particular in the first quarter
of the fiscal year, as well as the fairly low debt maturities
over the next few years.

RATIONALE FOR THE STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that TUI's operating
performance will remain resilient to geopolitical events, and
that the material decline in bookings of holidays in Turkey can
be offset with growth in other destinations.  The outlook also
assumes that TUI's financial profile will continue to gradually
improve, mainly driven by (1) synergies as a result of the
merger, less the restructuring and merger-related one-off
expenses; and (2) further improving underlying performance, which
will be only partially offset by rising capex and dividend
payments.  TUI's financial profile could benefit further if funds
from the disposal of Hotelbeds and the equity stake in Hapag-
Lloyd AG (B2 positive) are at least partially applied to debt
reduction.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's would consider upgrading TUI's rating if the company were
to generate merger synergies as forecasted and continue to
improve its operating performance, thereby demonstrating further
the resilience of its business model to external shocks.  In
addition, the rating would benefit if TUI continues to develop a
prudent, long-term financial policy framework.  Quantitatively,
positive pressure could arise if the group's gross adjusted
leverage were to fall towards 3.5x and the retained cash flow/net
debt metric to remain above 25% throughout the seasonal swings of
the year, with the group retaining a solid liquidity profile to
address the high seasonal cash swings.

The rating could be lowered if leverage were to increase above
4.5x and retained cash flow/net debt were to fall below 15% over
the next 12-18 months, or if the group's liquidity profile were
to deteriorate materially.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Business and
Consumer Service Industry published in December 2014.

TUI AG, headquartered in Hanover, Germany, is the world's largest
integrated tourism group.  In fiscal year 2014-15, TUI reported
revenues and underlying EBITA of EUR20.0 billion and EUR1,069
million, respectively.



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LANDSVIRKJUN: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Senior Unsecured Debt Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed all of Landsvirkjun's un-
guaranteed ratings, including the (P)Ba1/(P)NP ratings of the
$1 billion EMTN programme and the company's Ba1 senior unsecured
debt ratings.  In addition Moody's has affirmed the (P)Baa2/(P)P-
2 backed senior unsecured ratings of the $2.5 billion EMTN
programme and the Baa2 ratings of the debt issued thereunder, all
benefitting from a guarantee of collection from the Government of
Iceland (Baa2 stable).  Concurrently, Moody's has raised
Landsvirkjun's standalone credit quality, expressed as a baseline
credit assessment (BCA) to ba3 from b1.  The outlook on the
rating is stable.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

Moody's has raised Landsvirkjun's BCA to ba3 from b1 to reflect
(1) the material strengthening in Landsvirkjun's financial
profile; (2) the implementation of hedging agreements, which
provides greater visibility of cash flows and helps the company
to reduce its foreign currency and interest rate risks in the
short to medium term; and (3) the reduction in exposure to
aluminium prices and the consequent reduction in the volatility
of profit and cash flows.  Over the next years, Moody's expects
that Landsvirkjun will also benefit from positive developments in
the macroeconomic conditions of the country, which could
translate into higher electricity demand from local utilities and
new businesses.

More specifically, the ba3 BCA of Landsvirkjun factors in
positively (1) the company's dominant position in the Icelandic
energy market; (2) its low-cost renewable generation asset base
and modest levels of capital expenditure; and (3) its ability to
generate relatively stable cash flows through long-term power
contracts.  However, the company's assessment is constrained by
(1) its high financial leverage; (2) its concentrated exposure to
a small number of counterparties, mainly in the aluminum
industry; and (3) a degree of exposure to aluminum prices.

Given Landsvirkjun's 100% direct and indirect ownership by the
state, the company is considered a government-related issuer
under Moody's methodology.  Therefore, its rating is determined
by an assessment of the BCA and factors pertaining to the
likelihood of extraordinary support being provided by the
Government of Iceland.

The (P)Ba1/(P)NP unguaranteed ratings of Landsvirkjun's USD1
billion EMTN programme benefit from two notches of uplift from
the BCA reflecting Moody's assessment of the likelihood of
extraordinary support being provided by the Government of Iceland
in the event this was needed to avoid a payment default.  This
uplift incorporates the commitment that the government has shown
in the past to support Landsvirkjun's debt and the strategic
importance of the company to the Icelandic economy, given the
role it plays in the provision of electricity to power intensive
industries, which directly contribute to about 40% of Icelandic
exports.

The (P)Baa2/(P)Prime-2 guaranteed ratings of Landsvirkjun's
USD2.5 billion EMTN backed program are at par with the sovereign
rating and reflect the additional credit support provided by the
guarantee of collection from the Icelandic government.  Despite
the fact that a guarantee of collection is not a timely payment
guarantee, Moody's believes that there are strong incentives for
the owners to provide timely support to Landsvirkjun.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook is in line with the outlook of the Icelandic
government's ratings.  It also reflects Moody's expectation that
Landsvirkjun will continue to prudently manage its exposure to
market risks and improve its financial position, such that credit
metrics will be comfortably positioned within the ratio guidance
for a ba3 BCA, namely the maintenance of an FFO/ Net debt ratio
in the low double digits in percentage terms.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/ DOWN

Moody's could consider an upgrade of Landsvirkjun's ratings (1)
following any upgrade of the sovereign rating; or (2) if the
company continues to demonstrate the ability to withstand
significant volatility in the commodity markets and credit
metrics were to materially improve above ratio guidance on a
sustainable basis without increasing its business risk profile.
This would also assume no change to the assumption of support
from the owner incorporated into Landsvirkjun's rating.

Conversely, downward pressure on Landsvirkjun's ratings could
develop (1) after a downgrade of the Icelandic government's
ratings; or (2) as consequence of a substantial deterioration in
Landsvirkjun's business risk profile or weakening in the
financial position, such that FFO/Net debt in percentage terms
was expected to remain consistently below 10%.  The ratings would
also come under downward pressure if Moody's were to revise the
current assumption of timely support from the government.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Unregulated
Utilities and Unregulated Power Companies published in October
2014, and Government-Related Issuers published in October 2014.

Headquartered in Reykjavik, Landsvirkjun is Iceland's dominant
power producer.  It is responsible for about 75% of Iceland's
total electricity production of 18 terawatt hours (TWh) and owns
the majority of the transmission grid.  It provides 100%
renewable energy for domestic users via electricity sales to
public utilities, although the majority of sales are to power
intensive industries, mostly for aluminum smelting, under long-
term take-or-pay contracts.


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DECO 10-PAN: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to D(sf)
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
DECO 10-Pan Europe 4 PLC's class A2, B, and E notes.  At the same
time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class C and D notes.

The rating actions reflect S&P's review of the transaction's five
remaining loans, following repayment of the DFK Portfolio and
Toom DIY loans.

                TREVERIA II LOAN (48% OF THE POOL)

As of the January 2016 special servicing report, the loan was
secured on 33 German retail properties (out of 48 at closing).
The portfolio consists of a range of retail properties including
department stores, shopping centers, food discounters, as well as
a car dealership.

This transaction only securitizes EUR73 million (50%) of the
EUR146 million senior loan.  The remaining EUR73 million of the
loan ranks pari passu with the securitized portion included in
the EuroProp (EMC VI) S.A. transaction.

The loan entered special servicing in July 2012 after the
borrower failed to repay the loan on the extended maturity date
and the nonpayment of the extension fee.

In January 2016, the servicer reported an interest coverage ratio
(ICR) of 6.52x and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 116%, based on
a June 2012 valuation of EUR164.9 million.

S&P has assumed that the loan will experience principal losses in
its 'B' rating stress scenario.

               RUBICON NIKE LOAN (29% OF THE POOL)

The loan is secured on a purpose-built building for Nike's
European headquarters.  It comprises five interconnected multi-
storey office buildings in Arena Business Park, Hilversum, 30
kilometers southeast of Amsterdam.  The current outstanding
securitized balance is EUR44 million.

The loan did not repay on its original October 2013 loan maturity
date and has been extended several times since then.  Prior to
the most recent extension request, a new report was received in
August 2015, which valued it at EUR52.4 million, decreasing from
EUR57 million at the September 2014 valuation.

In January 2016, the servicer reported an ICR of 20.12x and an
LTV ratio of 84%, based on the August 2015 valuation of EUR52.4
million.

S&P has assumed that the loan will experience principal losses in
its 'B' rating stress scenario.

                LUBECK RETAIL LOAN (9% OF THE POOL)

The loan is secured on one retail and leisure site in Lubeck,
Germany.  The property includes supermarkets, a hairdresser, a
health club, a bowling alley, a nightclub, and a car park.  The
current outstanding securitized balance is EUR13.7 million.

The borrower failed to repay the loan at maturity in October
2013. The loan subsequently entered special servicing.  In
February 2016, a sale and purchase agreement (SPA) was signed for
the property at a gross price of EUR12.7 million, which is above
the most recent 2014 market valuation of EUR9.5 million.

In January 2016, the servicer reported an ICR of 8.72x and an LTV
ratio of 144.8%, based on a January 2014 valuation of EUR9.5
million.

S&P has assumed that the loan will experience principal losses in
its 'B' rating stress scenario.

                EDEKA RETAIL LOAN (8% OF THE POOL)

The loan is secured on five predominantly retail stores in North
Rhine-Westphalia, Germany.  The current outstanding securitized
balance is EUR12 million.

The loan defaulted after the borrower failed to make a principal
payment in July 2012, and entered special servicing.  An SPA has
been signed for the remaining properties for a total amount of
EUR12.67 million.

In January 2016, the servicer reported an ICR of 9.74x and an LTV
ratio of 115%, based on a December 2012 valuation of EUR10.5
million.

S&P expects the sale proceeds to be applied on the April 2016
interest payment date.

              ECP MF PORTFOLIO LOAN (6% OF THE POOL)

The ECP MF portfolio loan matures in July 2016.  The loan is
secured on multifamily properties in Berlin and Leipzig, in
Germany.

In January 2016, the servicer reported an ICR 2.25x and an LTV
ratio of 56%, based on a July 2006 valuation of EUR15.9 million.

S&P does not expect principal losses in 'B' rating stress
scenario.

                        INTEREST SHORTFALLS

Excess spread in the transaction, which is distributed to the
unrated class X notes, is calculated based on the difference
between interest due and payable on the loans and interest
payable on the notes, less administrative expenses.  Therefore,
these amounts are not available to mitigate interest shortfalls.

The class C and D notes are now experiencing interest shortfalls.

                         RATING RATIONALE

S&P's ratings in DECO 10-Pan Europe 4 address the timely payment
of interest, payable quarterly in arrears, and the payment of
principal no later than the October 2019 legal final maturity
date.

Following principal repayments, the available credit enhancement
for the class A2 notes has increased.  However, this class of
notes has become more exposed to cash flow disruptions as a
result of spread compression.  In this transaction, the excess
spread is not available to mitigate the risk of interest
shortfall.  In line with S&P's credit stability criteria, it has
therefore lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its rating on the
class A2 notes to reflect the increased vulnerability to a
payment default.

The class B notes have become vulnerable to nonpayment, in S&P's
opinion.  Therefore, in line with S&P's criteria for assigning
'CCC' category ratings, it has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from
'B (sf)' its rating on the class B notes.

At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on the
class C and D notes because they are highly vulnerable to
principal losses and have previously experienced interest
shortfalls.

S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the
class E notes following the application of non-accruing interest
(NAI) amounts on the October 2015 interest payment date (IPD),
which resulted in an interest shortfall on the January 2016 IPD.
As interest does not accrue on the portion of the notes subject
to an NAI amount, this class of notes has not received full
interest payments, in S&P's view.

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
          To                    From

DECO 10-Pan Europe 4 PLC
EUR1.039 Billion Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered

A2        B+ (sf)               BB+ (sf)
B         CCC- (sf)             B (sf)
E         D (sf)                CCC- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

C         D (sf)
D         D (sf)


ELM PARK: S&P Assigns Preliminary B- Rating on Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has assigned preliminary
credit ratings to Elm Park CLO Designated Activity Company's
class A-1, A-2, B, C, D, and E senior secured notes.  At closing,
the issuer will also issue unrated subordinated notes.

The transaction is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO), securitizing a portfolio of primarily senior secured loans
granted to speculative-grade corporates.  Blackstone/GSO Debt
Funds Management Europe Ltd. will manage the transaction.

The issuer expects to purchase more than 50% of the effective
date portfolio from Blackstone/GSO Corporate Funding Designated
Activity Company (BGCF).  The assets from BGCF that can't be
settled on the closing date will be subject to participations.
The transaction documents require that the issuer and BGCF use
commercially reasonable efforts to elevate the participations by
transferring to the issuer the legal and beneficial interests in
such assets as soon as reasonably practicable.

Under the transaction documents, the rated notes will pay
quarterly interest unless a frequency switch event occurs.
Following this, the notes will permanently switch to semiannual
interest payments.

The portfolio's reinvestment period will end 3.9 years after
closing, and the portfolio's maximum average maturity date will
be eight years after closing.

On the effective date, S&P understands that the portfolio will
represent a well-diversified pool of corporate credits, with a
fairly uniform exposure to all of the credits.  Therefore, S&P
has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis by applying its
criteria for corporate cash flow collateralized debt obligations.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it has used the portfolio target par
amount of EUR550.0 million, the covenanted weighted-average
spread of 4.10%, the weighted-average coupon of 5.00%, and the
covenanted weighted-average recovery rates at each rating level.

Citibank N.A. London Branch will be the bank account provider and
custodian.  At closing, S&P anticipates that the participants'
downgrade remedies will be in line with its current counterparty
criteria.

At closing, S&P understands that the issuer will be in line with
S&P's bankruptcy remoteness criteria.

Following S&P's analysis of the credit, cash flow, counterparty,
operational, and legal risks, it believes its preliminary ratings
are commensurate with the available credit enhancement for each
class of notes.

RATINGS LIST

Elm Park CLO Designated Activity Company
EUR558.05 mil senior secured floating-rate notes

Prelim Amount

Class           Prelim Rating                 (mil, EUR)
A-1             AAA (sf)                      324.50
A-2             AA (sf)                       60.50
B               A (sf)                        42.50
C               BBB (sf)                      26.25
D               BB (sf)                       33.50
E               B- (sf)                       14.00
Sub             NR                            56.80

NR--Not rated



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CASAFORTE SRL: Fitch Affirms B-sf Ratings on 2 Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Casaforte S.r.l.'s notes due June 2040
as detailed below:

  EUR1,125.4 million class A affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR144.1 million class B affirmed at 'B-sf'; Outlook Stable

The transaction is a securitisation of rental income derived from
the leasing of 683 bank branches and offices in Italy. These real
estate assets are let to Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS; B-
/Stable/B) and its subsidiaries until July 2033.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of the notes follows a similar rating action on
MPS on April 20, 2016, as the notes are credit-linked to the sole
tenant MPS.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Changes to MPS's rating are likely to result in a corresponding
change for the notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


STEFANA SPA: May 3 Deadline Set for Ramo Nave Irrevocable Offers
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Judicial Liquidator, Dott. Pierfranco Aiardi of Stefana
S.p.A. under Composition with Creditors Procedure, with
registered office in Nave, via Bologna 19, invites the subjects
interested in the acquisition of the branch of business active in
the production and distribution of iron, steel and metallurgic
products (boards, beams, section bars, rounds, wire rods, nets
and frameworks) and in particular:

  Ramo Nave (Italy) -- Via Brescia -- where the production of
  wire rod, welded mesh and girder for buidlings is located and
  where n. 196 persons are employed and composed of the complex
  of assets and legal relationships organized for the performance
  of such activities

to send irrevocable offers to purchase, which shall be received
by and no later than 12:00 p.m. of May 3, 2016, in compliance
with the provisions set out in the Regulation available (in
Italian language) on the web site www.stefana.it as well as the
websites www.astegiudiziarie.it and www.bresciaonline.it

The irrevocable offers shall be addressed to "STEFANA S.p.A. in
Concordato Preventivo", with registered office in Nave, Via
Bologna 19 and shall be received in a sealed envelope, which
shall not bear any identification mark, bearing the words
"Offerta per l'acquisto di rami d'azienda Stefana", at the office
of the Notary Mr. Mario Mistretta in Brescia, Via Malta, 7 C
(telephone number 030-220320; fax 030-220786).

All the specifications related to each branch of business and all
the information on the same and their composition will be
available in the data room present in the website www.stefana.it
subject to prior execution of the "Confidentiality Agreement" to
which the indications for the consultation will follow.

For any information, the interested subjects can contact Mr.
Mauro Battistella, the lawyer of the Procedure, at the following
number +39 02-89283800 from Monday to Friday from 3:00 p.m. until
6:00 p.m.



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NEMEA BANK: Financial Regulator Appoints PwC to Oversee Assets
--------------------------------------------------------------
Times of Malta reports that the Malta Financial Services
Authority said a number of serious regulatory shortcomings have
been identified at Nemea Bank, which operates from Portomaso
Tower in St Julians.

This, it said, led it to take regulatory action to safeguard the
interests of depositors and other creditors, Times of Malta
notes.

The MFSA said it has appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers Malta to
take charge of the bank's assets for the purpose of safeguarding
the interests of depositors and its other clients; and to assume
control of the bank's business and to carry on that business and
such other functions as it (the MFSA) may direct, Times of Malta
relates.

The inspection was carried out jointly with members of the
European Central Bank and was finalized this month, Times of
Malta discloses.

Nemea was established in Malta in 2008 as an online-only bank.



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BANCO BPI: Fitch Puts 'BB' IDR on Rating Watch Positive
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings placed Portuguese-based Banco BPI S.A.'s Long-Term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB' on Rating Watch Evolving
(RWE) and Short-Term IDR on Rating Watch Positive (RWP). This
follows CaixaBank, S.A.'s (BBB/Positive) announcement on
April 18, 2016, of a voluntary tender offer for all Banco BPI's
outstanding shares. The agency also placed Banco BPI's Viability
Rating (VR) of 'bb' on Rating Watch Negative (RWN) because of
risks to the bank's credit profile in case the takeover fails
related to its breach of large exposure limits.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR, SENIOR DEBT, SUPPORT RATING

The RWE on Banco BPI's Long-Term IDR reflects rating upside
potential in case the voluntary tender offer results in CaixBank
taking control of Banco BPI, which Fitch currently deems to be
the most likely scenario. Fitch believes Banco BPI's IDRs would
benefit from institutional support from its parent and hence its
ratings would be notched from CaixaBank's, while taking into
account the Portuguese sovereign rating (currently 'BB+/Stable'
Long-Term IDR).

However, the RWE on the Long-Term IDR also reflects rating
downside potential if the offer is not successful, which is also
reflected in the RWN on the bank's VR. Under this scenario, Banco
BPI's Long-Term IDR would continue to be driven by its VR and
would be under pressure due to uncertainties related to potential
sanctions imposed by the ECB regarding the bank's failure to
correct the breach of its large exposure limits. The breach
arises from the group's exposure to the Angolan government and
the Banco Nacional de Angola (Angolan central bank) through its
operations in the country.

Fitch understands that, so far, no sanctions have been imposed on
the bank, despite the expiry of a waiver that had been in place
until 10 April. Fitch further understands that CaixaBank has
requested the ECB to suspend any fines or other administrative
actions against Banco BPI while the takeover is in process.

At its current level of 'bb', Banco BPI's VR reflects modest, but
improving, domestic earnings as well as stronger asset quality
indicators, a stronger funding and liquidity profile than
domestic peers, and its reasonable capitalisation.

The RWP on the 'B' Short-Term IDR and '5' Support Rating (SR)
reflect rating upside potential in the event of CaixaBank
obtaining a controlling majority stake. If the tender offer is
not successful, the Short-Term IDR and SR will remain unchanged.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Subordinated debt and other hybrid capital issued by Banco BPI
are all notched down from its VR in accordance with Fitch's
assessment of each instrument's respective non-performance and
relative loss severity risk profiles, which vary considerably.
They have been placed on RWE mirroring the rating action on the
bank's IDR.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANY

The ratings of Banco Portugues de Investimento (BPI) are
equalized with those of its 100% parent, Banco BPI. The
equalization is driven by its integration within its parent bank
and the benefits derived from parent support. Fitch does not
assign a VR to this institution as the agency does not view it as
an independent entity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES IDRS, VR, SENIOR DEBT AND SUPPORT RATING

Fitch expects to resolve the Watches on Banco BPI's IDRs, senior
debt and SR as the transaction unfolds, with closure expected by
CaixaBank by 3Q16. In Fitch's view, this acquisition has a high
probability of succeeding, as the removal of the voting cap, a
key condition for the transaction, has been eased by a recently
approved law. If the tender offer is successful, Fitch expects to
incorporate potential institutional support from CaixaBank into
Banco BPI's ratings. The extent of support will depend on
CaixaBank's ability, as reflected by its Long-Term IDR, and on
its propensity to support its subsidiary.

The agency anticipates that Banco BPI's Long-Term IDRs could be
notched down by up to two levels from CaixaBank's current
ratings, taking into account sovereign rating constraints. Fitch
would expect to withdraw Banco BPI's Support Rating Floor (SRF)
of 'No Floor' if CaixaBank ends up controlling Banco BPI, as
institutional support would become the more likely source of
external support for the bank. Fitch does not assign SRFs to
banks whose IDRs are driven by institutional support.

Fitch expects to resolve the RWN on Banco BPI's VR once it has
more visibility on potential sanctions imposed by the regulator
and on how the breach of large exposure limits is to be
corrected. The VR is also sensitive to continued improvements in
the recurrent profitability of the domestic operations,
supporting internal capital generation and the bank's capital
position.

SUBORDINATED DEBT AND OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

The RWE on the bank's subordinated debt and preference shares
reflects a potential upgrade for these instruments if Fitch
believes parent support would be forthcoming to neutralize the
non-performance risk of these instruments, preventing the bank
from hitting loss-absorption features. Under these circumstances,
Fitch would notch these securities from the subsidiary's IDR. In
case the takeover is not successful, their ratings are primarily
sensitive to any change in the VR.

SUBSIDIARY AND AFFILIATED COMPANIES

The ratings of BPI remain sensitive to rating action on Banco
BPI's IDRs.

The rating actions are as follows.

Banco BPI:

Long-Term IDR: 'BB', placed on RWE
Short-Term IDR: 'B', placed on RWP
VR: 'bb', placed on RWN
SR: '5', placed on RWP
SRF: 'No Floor', affirmed
Senior unsecured debt: 'BB', placed on RWE
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating: 'B', placed on RWP
Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'BB-', placed on RWE
Preference shares: 'B', placed on RWE

Banco Portugues de Investimento:

Long-Term IDR: 'BB', placed on RWE
Short-Term IDR: 'B', placed on RWP
SR: '3', placed on RWP


CAIXABANK SA: Fitch Affirms BB Subordinated Debt Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed CaixaBank, S.A.'s Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB' and Viability Rating (VR) at 'bbb'
following the recent announcement of its intent to launch a
voluntary tender offer for the remaining ordinary shares of
Portugal's Banco BPI, S.A. that it does not already own. The
Outlook on the Long-term IDR is Positive.

Fitch has also affirmed the ratings of CaixaBank's parent holding
company, Criteria Caixa, S.A., Unipersonal (Criteria) with a
Positive Outlook. A full list of rating actions is attached at
the end of this rating action commentary.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

CaixaBank's IDRs and senior debt ratings reflect the bank's
credit fundamentals, as captured by the VR. The affirmation of
CaixaBank's ratings reflects our expectation that the group's
credit profile will not be materially impacted by the potential
acquisition of BPI, given the group's stated commitment to
restore capital levels as soon as the acquisition is completed
and to address BPI's Angolan exposure within a fairly short
timeframe.

The Positive Outlook reflects a potential rating upgrade, largely
subject to further improvements in CaixaBank's asset quality,
risk profile and capital but also to a successful completion of
the BPI transaction.

BPI is the fourth-largest bank in Portugal with a sound domestic
franchise and with one of the best asset quality performance
indicators in the Portuguese banking sector. However, the bank's
earnings have been dependent on its Angolan business, through
Banco de Fomento Angola (BFA). Following a revised regulatory
approach by the ECB, BPI's exposure to Angola resulted in
excessive risk concentration which, if not addressed, could lead
to material pressures on capital.

CaixaBank currently holds a 44.1% stake in BPI, but its voting
rights are capped at 20% as set out in BPI's by-laws. However,
the Portuguese government recently approved a law eliminating the
possibility of establishing voting caps, which in Fitch's view
should facilitate the successful completion of this transaction,
in contrast to the previous voluntary tender offer launched in
February 2015. The completion of the BPI deal, which CaixaBank
expects by end- 3Q16 and which is Fitch's base case, is
conditional on i) the removal of the voting cap, which requires
the approval of at least two thirds of the shareholders attendees
at BPI's shareholder meeting; ii) acceptances of the tender offer
exceeding 50% and iii) receipt of regulatory approvals.

CaixaBank has requested the ECB to suspend fines or other
administrative actions against BPI related to excess risk
concentration in Angola while the takeover is in process. Fitch
assumes that potential costs related to excess risk
concentrations will be manageable, also in view of CaixaBank's
potential divestment of BPI's business in Angola. The disposal
will have an influence on the final impact of the transaction on
CaixaBank's capital.

CaixaBank estimates that the BPI transaction would negatively
affect its CET1 ratio by between 95 bps and 145 bps, depending on
the level of acceptances. This means an estimated CET1 ratio
ranging between 10.1% and 10.6% (from 11.6% at end-2015) post BPI
acquisition. However, CaixaBank has expressed its commitment to
maintain a fully-loaded CET1 ratio of at least 11% after the
potential acquisition of BPI. This target is, in Fitch's view,
achievable, based on CaixaBank's scope to generate capital (e.g.
through asset disposals or a capital increase among other
options). However, the timing and size of capital needs remain
uncertain and could also be influenced by future market
conditions.

Should the BPI deal fail to materialize, CaixaBank's Fitch core
capital (FCC)/weighted risks ratio would remain sound and
supported by the bank's improved internal capital generation
capacity, but would remain at risk from unreserved problem
assets.

While the completion of the BPI transaction would increase
CaixaBank's exposure to a fairly weak, albeit stabilizing,
Portuguese economy (Portugal; BB+/Stable), Fitch expects the
impact of the transaction on factors underpinning CaixaBank's VR
other than execution risk and capital to be limited. This is
because of the moderate size of BPI in relation to CaixaBank, at
about 10.5% of pro-forma combined assets at end-2015 (around 9%
only considering domestic assets), but also due to BPI's stronger
asset quality performance relative to domestic peers. Although
the transaction is prone to execution risks, these are mitigated
by management's sound experience in integrating banks and in
achieving cost synergies as planned, as well as by CaixaBank's
deep knowledge of BPI, given that CaixaBank has been part of the
shareholding of BPI since 1995.

CaixaBank's asset quality and risk appetite should not be
significantly affected by the potential acquisition of BPI, with
pro-forma non-performing and coverage ratios remaining broadly
stable. However, CaixaBank's asset quality ratios still compare
unfavourably by international standards, weighing on the ratings.
Although exchanging the equity stake in BPI for credit risk would
reduce risks related to CaixaBank's equity investments, equity
risks remain from the Spanish bank's large investment portfolio.

In Fitch's opinion, this transaction should not affect
CaixaBank's efforts to further reduce volumes of problem assets
and its real estate exposure, supporting our view of rating
upside irrespective of the BPI deal.

The proposed BPI deal will, in our view, have an immaterial
impact on the bank's operating performance. The potential to
realise cost and revenue synergies at BPI should ultimately help
improve its performance and hence its contribution to CaixaBank's
profits.

Criteria's Long-term IDR is based on the institution's VR, which
is notched down once from CaixaBank's VR given that it remains
Criteria's main asset accounting for 54.9% of its unconsolidated
balance-sheet at end-2015. Although it has no banking license,
Criteria is CaixaBank's holding company for regulatory
supervision purposes. Fitch understands from management that
Criteria intends to remain a significant and influential owner of
CaixaBank and the BPI deal should not materially change this.

The one-notch differential between Criteria's and CaixaBank's VR
reflects the planned dilution of Criteria's ownership in
CaixaBank to 48.9% from the current 56.8% by 2017 once an
intragroup deal with Criteria is completed in 1H16 and
exchangeable bonds of Criteria are converted into shares of the
bank by 2017 and without taking into account the BPI deal. Fitch
does not expect a significant dilution from the BPI deal if
CaixaBank opts to restore capital through a capital increase.
Criteria's VR also takes into account the company's large and
concentrated equity holdings in corporates (although these are
largely liquid and listed), double leverage (95% at end-2015) and
an adequate level and structure of its debt and liquidity
position.

SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR

The Support Ratings (SR) of '5' and Support Rating Floors (SRF)
of 'No Floor' of CaixaBank and Criteria reflect Fitch's belief
that senior creditors of these entities can no longer rely on
receiving full extraordinary support from the sovereign in the
event that they become non-viable. For Criteria Fitch also takes
into account its role as holding company.

Fitch views the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD) and Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) are now sufficiently
progressed to provide a framework for resolving banks that is
likely to require senior creditors participating in losses, if
necessary, instead of or ahead of a bank receiving sovereign
support. BRRD has been effective in EU member states since 1
January 2015, including minimum loss absorption requirements
before resolution financing or alternative financing (eg,
government stabilization funds) can be used. Full application of
BRRD, including the bail-in tool, is required from 1 January
2016. BRRD was transposed into Spanish legislation on 18 June
2015, with full implementation from 1 January 2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR AND SENIOR DEBT

The Positive Outlook reflects rating upside in the next 18
months, irrespective of the BPI deal, if the reduction of problem
assets (including foreclosed assets) accelerates, the sensitivity
of FCC to unreserved problem assets continues to improve to
levels comfortably below 100% and the FCC ratio remains near end-
2015 levels. Reducing risks from equity investments would also be
rating-positive.

If the BPI deal is successful, rating upside may be delayed by
Fitch's assessment of progress in restoring CaixaBank's capital
levels as planned and in managing execution risks associated with
the integration of BPI, including the delivery of planned
synergies and addressing the excessive risk concentration in
Angola via what Fitch assumes will be a divestment.

Any deviation from Fitch's base case assumptions could trigger a
revision of the Outlook or put downward pressure on the ratings.
The latter could arise from material deterioration in asset
quality and capital, which Fitch currently does not expect.
Similarly, a deterioration of the bank's funding and liquidity
profile would put pressure on the ratings. Rating downside from
the BPI deal is, in our view, limited, but could be triggered by
integration challenges or higher-than-expected (by Fitch) costs
related to BPI Angolan businesses' large exposures.

Criteria's IDRs, VR and senior debt ratings remain sensitive to
the same factors affecting CaixaBank's VR. Its ratings would also
suffer from an ownership dilution resulting in a loss of control
over the bank or changes in the regulatory supervision approach
of the group.

Downside pressures could also arise from write-downs of assets or
higher debt or double leverage.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - STATE-GUARANTEED DEBT

CaixaBank's state-guaranteed debt issues have been affirmed at
'BBB+', in line with Spain's Long-term IDR. State-guaranteed debt
issues are senior unsecured instruments that bear the full
guarantee of Spain. Consequently, its ratings are generally the
higher of CaixaBank's Long-term IDR and Spain's Long-term IDR.
The ratings are sensitive to changes in the Spanish sovereign
ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND
OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

CaixaBank's and Criteria's subordinated (lower Tier 2) debt
issues are rated one notch below the respective banks' VRs to
reflect the higher-than-average loss severity of this type of
debt.

CaixaBank's upper Tier 2 debt securities are rated three notches
below the VR to reflect the higher loss severity risk of these
securities (two notches) as well as the moderate risk of non-
performance relative to the VR (one notch).

The ratings of the instruments are primarily sensitive to a
change in the banks' VRs, but also to a change in Fitch's view of
non-performance or loss severity risk relative to the respective
banks' viability.

The rating actions are as follows:

CaixaBank:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Positive
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB'
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating: affirmed at 'F2'
Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB'

Criteria:
Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Positive
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'
Senior unsecured debt long-term rating: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Senior unsecured debt short-term rating: affirmed at 'F3'
Subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB+'



===========
R U S S I A
===========


BFG-CREDIT LLC: Moratorium Imposed on Meeting Creditor Claims
-------------------------------------------------------------
Due to the failure to meet creditors' claims on monetary
obligations within seven days from their maturity date and guided
by Article 189.38 of the Federal Law "On Insolvency
(Bankruptcy)", by its Order No. OD-1363, dated April 27, 2016,
the Bank of Russia imposed a moratorium on meeting creditors'
claims with respect to Commercial Bank BFG-Credit, LLC (CB BFG-
Credit LLC) for a three-month term from  April 27, 2016.

Pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insurance of Household
Deposits with Russian Banks" the moratorium on meeting bank
creditors' claims is an insured event.  Payments to CB BFG-Credit
LLC depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, will start no
later than 14 days since the date the moratorium has been
imposed.  The state corporation Deposit Insurance Agency will
determine the procedure for paying indemnities.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANKINTER SA: Moody's Assigns (P)Ba3 Rating to Tier 1 Securities
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a (P)Ba3(hyb) rating to
the Additional Tier 1 non-viability contingent capital securities
to be issued by Bankinter, S.A. (Baa1/Baa2 stable, baa3).

The (P)Ba3(hyb) rating assigned to the notes is based on
Bankinter's standalone creditworthiness and is positioned three
notches below the bank's baa3 adjusted baseline credit assessment
(BCA): one notch below to reflect high loss severity under our
Advanced Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis; and a further two
notches below to reflect the higher payment risk associated with
the non-cumulative coupon skip mechanism, as well as the
probability of the bank-wide failure.  The LGF analysis also
takes into consideration the conversion feature, in combination
with the Tier 1 notes' deeply subordinated claim in liquidation.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final
issuance.  These ratings represent the rating agency's
preliminary credit opinion.  A definitive rating may differ from
a provisional rating if the terms and conditions of the final
issuance are materially different from those of the draft
prospectus reviewed.

                        RATINGS RATIONALE

According to Moody's framework for rating non-viability
securities under its bank rating methodology, the agency
typically positions the rating of Additional Tier 1 securities
three notches below the bank's adjusted BCA.  One notch reflects
the high loss-given-failure that these securities are likely to
face in a resolution scenario, due to their deep subordination,
small volume and limited protection from residual equity.
Moody's also incorporates two additional notches to reflect the
higher risk associated with the non-cumulative coupon skip
mechanism, which could precede the bank reaching the point of
non-viability.

The notes are unsecured and perpetual, subordinated to
unsubordinated and subordinated instruments that do not
constitute AT1 capital, senior to shares.  They have a non-
cumulative optional and a mandatory coupon-suspension mechanism.
A conversion into common shares is triggered if the group
transitional Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio falls
below 5.125%, which Moody's views as close to the point of non-
viability.  At end-December 2015, Bankinter's CET1 ratio stood at
11.8%.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The rating of the notes is mainly driven by Bankinter's baa3
standalone BCA, which reflects the bank's sound credit risk
profile, especially in terms of asset risk metrics, which rank
among the strongest in the Spanish banking sector, and its
favorable capitalization.  The bank's BCA is constrained
primarily by its relatively modest recurrent profitability and
high reliance on market funding, although both indicators are
improving.

Any changes in the BCA of the bank would likely result in changes
to the (P)Ba3(hyb) rating assigned to these securities.  In
addition, any increase in the probability of a coupon suspension
would also lead us to reconsider the rating level.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was Banks published
in January 2016.


SANTANDER EMPRESAS 2: Fitch Raises Class E Notes Rating to BBsf
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded FTA, Santander Empresas 2's the Class
D and Class E and affirmed the remaining notes, as follows:

  EUR32.9 million Class C (ISIN ES0338058037): affirmed at
  'AA+sf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR59.5 million Class D (ISIN ES0338058045): upgraded to
  'BBBsf' from 'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR29 million Class E (ISIN ES0338058052): upgraded to 'BBsf'
  from 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable

  EUR53.7 million Class F (ISIN ES0338058060): affirmed at 'Csf';
  RE (Recovery Estimate) 0%

F.T.A. Santander Empresas 2 is a granular cash flow
securitization of a static portfolio of secured and unsecured
loans granted to Spanish small- and medium-sized enterprises by
Banco Santander S.A. (A-/Stable/F2).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Increased Credit Enhancement
The upgrade of the class D and class E notes reflects increase in
credit enhancement resulting from the amortization of the
underlying pool. Since the last review the class B notes have
paid in full and the class C notes have received EUR29.4 million
of principal proceeds. The class C notes are now 52.8%
outstanding with 100.98% credit enhancement, due in part to a
EUR34.1 million reserve fund balance.

Credit enhancement on the class D notes has increased to 52% from
37.7% over the last 12 months while that on the class E notes has
increased to 28.1% from 20.6%. The underlying portfolio continues
to amortize and is now 4.19% of the outstanding balance compared
with 5.82% a year ago.

Improving Portfolio Performance

Ninety day-plus delinquencies have been fairly stable at around
1.3% of the outstanding portfolio balance and the transaction has
benefited from a marginal improvement in recoveries with the
weighted average recovery rate rising to 21.78% from 20.63% over
the last 12 months. Due to the low observed recovery rate Fitch
has analyzed the underlying portfolio on an unsecured basis.

High Obligor Concentration

The underlying pool continues to exhibit high obligor
concentration although the top obligor exposure has been static
at 11.6% and exposure to the top 10 obligors has further
decreased to 31% from 38% over the last 12 months.

Cap at Spain's Country Ceiling
The transaction is subject to a cap of 'AA+sf', driven by the
Country Ceiling of the Kingdom of Spain of 'AA+'.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch tested the ratings' sensitivity to a 25% increase in the
obligor default probability, a 25% reduction in expected recovery
rates and a combined sensitivity of the two, and in all cases
found that there would be no rating impact on the notes.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction. There were no findings that were
material to this analysis. Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided
about the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's
initial closing. The subsequent performance of the transaction
over the years is consistent with the agency's expectations given
the operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that
the asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating
analysis was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for
the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


KREDOBANK PJSC: S&P Revises Outlook to Pos. & Affirms CCC+ Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Ukraine-based PJSC KREDOBANK (Kredobank) to positive from
negative and affirmed S&P's 'CCC+' long-term and 'C' short-term
counterparty credit ratings on the bank.

At the same time, S&P raised its Ukraine national scale rating to
'uaBB-' from 'uaB+'.

The rating action reflects S&P's view that Kredobank has shown
better asset quality indicators and stronger financial results
compared with the majority of Ukraine's banking sector.  If the
bank continues to outperform the sector in terms of asset quality
and its new loan generation continues to be of good quality on a
sustainable basis, S&P might raise its assessment of Kredobank's
risk position, which would in turn prompt an upgrade of the bank.

The conversion of a subordinated loan of $15 million (provided by
the parent bank) into share capital has strengthened Kredobank's
capital base.  As a result, S&P forecasts its risk-adjusted
capital (RAC) for the bank in the 3.5%-4% range over the next 12-
18 months, resulting in S&P's revised assessment of capital and
earnings position of weak, versus very weak previously.

In addition, the bank's portfolio quality is stronger than the
sector average, with nonperforming loans (NPLs) at about 12.6% of
total loans and credit costs of 5.1% as of year-end 2015 (versus
estimated NPLs of around 25% and credit costs of 15% in Ukraine's
banking sector).  S&P would consider revising its view of
Kredobank's risk position to adequate from moderate in the future
if the bank's asset quality remains sustainably higher than the
average for Ukrainian banks and its newly created provisioning
expense does not significantly weaken capitalization.

"Still, we expect the difficult operating conditions for
Ukrainian banks to persist in 2016, as a result of poor
macroeconomic conditions, the severe depreciation of the hryvnia
in 2014-2015, and continued funding profile constraints for
banks.  Although Kredobank reports a somewhat more stable deposit
base and better deposit dynamics compared with other banks in
Ukraine, we do not think it is immune to foreign currency
exchange controls limitations or panic-driven deposit outflows,
similar to what we observed in Ukraine in 2014-2015.  We continue
to incorporate into the ratings on Kredobank ongoing and
extraordinary support from its parent, Poland-based Powszechna
Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski (PKO, not rated).  Consequently,
our long-term rating on Kredobank is one notch above our 'ccc'
assessment of its stand-alone credit profile, reflecting the
parental support," S&P said.

The bank's credit standing is in line with S&P's definition in
its "Criteria For Assigning 'CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', And 'CC'
Ratings," published Oct. 1, 2012.  According to the criteria, a
'CCC+' rating suggests that "the issuer is currently vulnerable
and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic
conditions to meet its financial commitments."  S&P currently
believes that Kredobank's financial commitments appear to be
unsustainable in the long term, although it may not face a near-
term (within 12 months) credit or payment crisis.

The positive outlook reflects S&P's view that Kredobank
demonstrates a stronger ability to withstand the current weak
macroeconomic conditions in Ukraine than domestic peers.  In
addition, S&P could consider revising upward its view of its risk
position in the next 12-18 months, which would trigger an
upgrade.

S&P could take a positive rating action in the next 12-18 months
if it observed that Kredobank's risk position, as measured in
terms of NPL levels and credit losses, remained sustainably
better than the average in the Ukrainian banking sector and the
bank's loan loss provisioning expense did not markedly dampen the
bank's capitalization.

S&P could take a negative rating action in the next 12-18 months
if it considered that Kredobank's parent, PKO, was less willing
to support its Ukrainian subsidiary, contrary to S&P's current
expectations.  Furthermore, S&P could also take a negative rating
action if it observed a weakening of the bank's financials,
including S&P's RAC ratio falling below 3%, or if the bank faced
a significant deposit outflow, which would result in
deterioration of its funding and liquidity metrics.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BHS GROUP: Owner Says Green's Actions Contribute to Demise
----------------------------------------------------------
Murad Ahmed and Josephine Cumbo at The Financial Times report
that recriminations between the current and former owners of BHS
burst into the open on April 26 after the 88-year-old high street
retailer fell into administration this week leaving 11,000 jobs
at risk.

Speaking to the FT, Dominic Chappell lashed out at Sir Philip
Green, saying BHS's former owner had contributed to the high
street retailer's demise.

Mr. Chappell, who leads the Retail Acquisitions consortium that
acquired BHS for GBP1 from Sir Philip last year, said a dispute
between Sir Philip and the pension regulator about the estimated
GBP571 million deficit in the company's pension scheme had
hampered an attempted turnround of BHS, the FT recounts.

The former racing driver said Sir Philip had blocked a crucial
GBP60 million loan from finance group Gordon Brothers, which he
said would have allowed the company to continue trading through
this week, the FT relays.

"It's not right the way it's gone.  It was in Arcadia's gift that
this business was carried forth," the FT quotes Mr. Chappell, who
was paid GBP1.5 million in salary and other fees during his time
in charge of BHS, as saying.

But several people familiar with Sir Philip and BHS's management
team's thinking rejected Mr. Chappell's analysis, saying the
pensions dispute had no impact on the company's poor trading, the
FT notes.  According to the FT, they said the loan would not have
been sufficient to stop the company falling into administration.

One person familiar with the matter, as cited by the FT, said 50
companies had expressed an interest in buying all or part of BHS
since its administration was announced.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


BHS GROUP: New Buyers May Snub Quarter of Stores, Data Show
-----------------------------------------------------------
Joanna Bourke at Evening Standard reports that property experts
warned on April 26 more than a quarter of failed BHS's stores
could be snubbed by new buyers or tenants.

Data compiled for the Evening Standard by property agent Cushman
& Wakefield showed 26% of the High Street chain's 164 stores
could lie empty for months in the present market.

Around 30 companies are understood to have expressed an interest
in snapping up the 88-year-old retail stalwart which called in
administrators Duff & Phelps yesterday, putting 11,000 jobs at
risk, Evening Standard relays.  The stores are currently still
trading, Evening Standard discloses.

Cushman & Wakefield said only 8% of the shops are "prime or easy
to let", Evening Standard notes.

Of those which would be hard to let again, the agent's head of
retail, Justin Taylor, as cited by Evening Standard, said: "These
figures show some chunks of the BHS portfolio are more attractive
than others.

"Around 26% would be difficult to let because of location,
limited local demand and store size and layout which could be
difficult to reconfigure to suit the needs of new occupiers."

The property figures could dampen hopes a white knight will swoop
in to buy all of the business, Evening Standard states.  Instead
the firm's assets could be sold off piecemeal, according to
Evening Standard.

BHS Group is a department store chain.  The company employs
10,000 people and has 164 shops.


SSI UK: Union Balks at News of Buyer Interest on Redcar Site
------------------------------------------------------------
Mike Blackburn at GazetteLive reports that claims that several
steel companies have expressed an interest in buying loss-making
SSI UK have been blasted by union leaders as "stalling tactics".

And instead of offering hope for the future of Teesside
steelmaking the news has led to fears that Redcar's SSI site
could be left to "rot for years", GazetteLive relates.

SSI President Win Viriyaprapaikit has been reported in the Thai
press as saying he is "confident that we will find a good
solution eventually" for the British subsidiary, GazetteLive
relays.

According to GazetteLive, he told the Bangkok Post: "It would be
possible to resume operation of SSI UK, as we see global steel
prices starting to recover.  So another plan we are thinking
about is to start operation again to generate revenue."

A Thai source also told the paper that SSI UK remains a company
with strong potential, and several steel companies have expressed
interest in buying it, GazetteLive notes.

But the source added that SSI itself is unlikely to rush to sell
SSI UK at a loss, GazetteLive states.

"It will take two or three years to see if we can sell SSI UK, as
there are a lot of details to consider and our creditors will
want us to sell at a high price to allow SSI to repay all debts,"
GazetteLive quotes the source as saying.

Paul Warren, former SSI worker and regional organiser for
Community union, as cited by GazetteLive, said: "I think
personally this is a ploy by SSI and the Thai banks to use as
stalling tactics to hold out through ignorance for a better
offer.

The union, GazetteLive says, believes that if SSI realistically
wanted to bring back the Redcar steel plant it would have kept
the blast furnace operational.

SSI announced the liquidation of SSI UK in October, when the
company submitted its debt rehabilitation plan to the Bankruptcy
Court after a massive loan default, GazetteLive recounts.

The collapse of the Redcar steelworks with the loss of 2,200 jobs
and a further 1,000 contractor jobs came ahead of hundreds of
further job losses on Teesside, GazetteLive discloses.

                           About SSI UK

SSI UK is Britain's second largest steelmaker.  SSI UK is a
subsidiary of Thailand's largest steelmaker Sahaviriya Steel
Industries.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Asia on Oct. 5,
2015, The Telegraph said SSI UK went into liquidation days after
it announced it was closing one of Britain's biggest steelmakers
in Redcar, resulting in 1,700 job losses.  According to The
Telegraph, the company had its liquidation application granted by
a judge in Manchester on Oct. 2.

On Oct. 2, David Kelly, Toby Underwood and Ian Green from
PricewaterhouseCoopers were appointed as special managers and
continue to assist and support the Official Receiver in the
discharge of his duties.


TATA STEEL UK: Urged by Gov't to Consider Funding Package
---------------------------------------------------------
Michael Pooler, Peter Campbell and Jim Pickard at The Financial
Times report that the government is urging Tata to consider
accepting financial support to keep the historic Port Talbot
steel plant open.

Ministers have already put on the table a funding package to
entice prospective buyers for the steelmaker's ailing UK
operations, the FT relates.

The Indian group is attempting to sell its British steel
factories but so far only two parties have declared an interest
in taking on the whole of the business, which employs 11,000
people and supports about another 25,000 jobs in the supply
chain, the FT notes.  In order to attract more potential
investors, ministers said last week they were prepared to buy an
equity stake of up to 25% in the company as well as provide
hundreds of millions of pounds of debt on commercial terms,
recounts.

On April 26, as David Cameron, prime minister, met trade unions
and management at the Port Talbot plant in south Wales, it
emerged that comparable terms were being offered to Tata, the FT
relays.

According to the FT, one person close to Tata said the company
was taking the government's offer seriously and examining the
details and fine print.  But they added a long-term credible
business plan was still needed, the FT relates.

"There haven't been detailed discussions but I don't think
anybody has ruled it out," the FT quotes another person as
saying.  "The [government's] phrase was, 'we'd do it for a buyer
or an investor'.  Tata Steel is an investor.   It has been for a
while and it is right now as [it] continues to maintain the
plant."

Although the company's priority was to complete the sales
process, it was exploring "strategic alternatives" for its UK
business, said the source, which could "comprise a range of other
things", the FT notes.

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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