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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, April 15, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 074


                            Headlines


B U L G A R I A

CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Parliament Declassifies AlixPartners Report


F R A N C E

PEUGEOT SA: Egan-Jones Hikes Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to BB+
RENAULT SA: Egan-Jones Hikes FC Sr. Unsecured Rating to BB+


G E R M A N Y

SCHLECKER: Founder, Auditor Face Criminal Charges
ZF FRIEDRICHSHAFEN: S&P Raises CCR to BB+, Outlook Stable


G R E E C E

ELECTRONIKI ATHINON: Files for Bankruptcy, Shuts Down Stores


I R E L A N D

AVOCA CLO IV: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on Class E Sr. Notes


I T A L Y

BANCO POPOLARE SOCIETA: Moody's Reviews Ba Ratings for Upgrade
ITALY: Largest Pension Scheme Won't Invest in Bank Rescue Fund
UNIPOL GRUPPO: Fitch Assigns BB+ Rating to EUR2BB EMTN Programme


N E T H E R L A N D S

AIR FRANCE-KLM: Egan-Jones Lowers FC Commercial Paper Rating to B


N O R W A Y

NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to SD


P O L A N D

BANK BPH: Moody's Affirms Ba2/Not Prime Deposit Ratings


P O R T U G A L

LUSITANO MORTGAGES 3: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. B Notes to B+


R U S S I A

CB ERGOBANK: Deemed Insolvent, Prov. Administration Halted
FCRB BANK: Moratorium Imposed on Meeting Creditors' Claims
RUSSNEFT: Moody's Confirms 'B2' Corporate Family Rating


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: Verkhovna Rada Rejects No. 2286-a Creditors' Rights Bill


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

A MORREY: Enters Liquidation Following a Period of Falling Sales
ARROW GLOBAL: S&P Affirms 'B+' Counterparty Credit Rating
CONSOLIDATED GENERAL: Ambrian PLC Update Regarding Liquidation
INSTITUTE IN HAMPSTEAD: Faces Liquidation, Classes Maybe Canceled
SANTANDER UK: Moody's Affirms Ba2(hyb) Non-Cumulative Rating


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The Money Wars


                            *********



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B U L G A R I A
===============


CORPORATE COMMERCIAL: Parliament Declassifies AlixPartners Report
-----------------------------------------------------------------
FOCUS News Agency reports that Bulgarian parliament declassified
the report of AlixPartners audit company on the bankruptcy of
Corporate Commercial Bank (CorpBank).

According to FOCUS News, this became possible after the adoption
of the latest amendments to the Bank Bankruptcy Act proposed by
MPs with the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and
Freedoms (MRF) -- Petar Chobanov, Yordan Tsonev and Delyan
Peevski.

Under the adopted amendments, the temporary assignees should
publish on their website the report on the check on the bank
insolvency, which is currently filed at the parliament's
classified information department, FOCUS News discloses.

According to the group of MPs, who filed the proposals, the
amendments are inspired by the public interest in the case and in
line with MRF's policy on clearing out all circumstances and
facts around the bankruptcy of the bank, FOCUS News relates.

Corporate Commercial Bank AD is the fourth largest bank in
Bulgaria in terms of assets, third in terms of net profit, and
first in terms of deposit growth.

Bulgaria's central bank placed Corpbank under its administration
and suspended shareholders' rights in June 2014 after a run
drained the bank of cash to meet client demands.



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F R A N C E
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PEUGEOT SA: Egan-Jones Hikes Sr. Unsecured Debt Rating to BB+
-------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company raised the senior unsecured rating on
debt issued by Peugeot S.A. to BB+ from BB on March 29, 2016.

Peugeot is a French cars brand, part of PSA Peugeot Citroen. The
family business that preceded the current Peugeot company was
founded in 1810, and manufactured coffee mills and bicycles.


RENAULT SA: Egan-Jones Hikes FC Sr. Unsecured Rating to BB+
-----------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company raised the foreign currency senior
unsecured rating on debt issued by Renault S.A. to BB+ from B+ on
March 29, 2016.

Renault SA is a France-based company primarily engaged in the
manufacture of automobiles and the provision of related services.



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G E R M A N Y
=============


SCHLECKER: Founder, Auditor Face Criminal Charges
-------------------------------------------------
Claire Jones at The Financial Times reports that the family
behind a chain of Germany pharmacies, which became one of the
country's most high-profile insolvencies, is facing criminal
charges along with its former auditors.

Schlecker, once a big presence in cities and towns across
Europe's largest economy, filed for insolvency in January 2012
after its no-frills business model failed to draw enough
customers away from rival chains, the FT relates.

Stuttgart prosecutors have now charged the former owner of the
drugstore chain, his wife and two children, and two auditors with
violating bankruptcy law by siphoning company funds into private
accounts at a time when they were aware the company was becoming
insolvent, the FT discloses.

Prosecutors, as cited by the FT, said the "main accused" was
former company owner, Anton Schlecker, who founded the group in
1975.

According to the FT, once one of Germany's richest men,
Mr. Schlecker is accused by the prosecutors of 36 cases of
setting assets aside and beyond the reach of creditors when an
insolvency was "imminent".

The prosecutors alleged the sum involved was several million
euros, the FT notes.

The prosecutors also alleged that the company provided financial
statements in the fiscal years 2009 and 2010 that gave inaccurate
information in a case presented before the insolvency court, the
FT relays.

Both of the auditors who are facing charges worked for EY, though
one has since retired, the FT discloses.

Mr. Schlecker's wife, Christa, and his children, Meike and Lars,
are accused of aiding him in the siphoning of funds on several
occasions, the FT states.

In March 2013, the company's liquidators said the business had
assets worth EUR10.1 million after bankruptcy, the FT recounts.
About 10,000 workers lost their jobs when the company became
insolvent, according to the FT.

The Schlecker drugstore chain was founded in 1975 by Anton
Schlecker in Ehingen in southern Germany.  Later, the company
expanded abroad. In 2008, it had around 14,000 branches, 50,000
employees and annual sales of more than seven billion euros,
making it the largest drugstore chain in Europe


ZF FRIEDRICHSHAFEN: S&P Raises CCR to BB+, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
long-term corporate credit rating on Germany-based automotive
component supplier ZF Friedrichshafen AG (ZF) to 'BB+' from 'BB'.
The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P raised the issue ratings on the senior
unsecured debt instruments to 'BB+' from 'BB', in line with the
rating action on the corporate credit rating.  The '3' recovery
rating on these debt instruments is unchanged, reflecting S&P's
expectation of meaningful recovery for debtholders in the event
of a payment default.  Recovery expectations are in the lower
half of the 50%-70% range for ZF's debt and in the higher half of
this range for the outstanding bonds from TRW Automotive Inc.
(now part of ZF).

The upgrade reflects ZF's debt reduction of about EUR1.4 billion
in the second half of 2015, thanks to disposal proceeds and free
operating cash flow generation.  These actions have materially
strengthened ZF's financial risk profile and have led S&P to
lower its forecast for ZF's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt by
about EUR1.4 billion.  Because ZF's credit metrics have improved
since S&P's previous base-case scenario, it now forecasts that
adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt will be about 25%-
30% for 2016 (versus S&P's previous estimate of slightly above
20%), which is commensurate with a 'BB+' rating.

S&P has consequently revised its assessment of ZF's financial
risk profile to significant from aggressive, given the group's
stronger credit metrics and S&P's expectation of the company's
further deleveraging.

S&P views ZF's business risk profile as satisfactory.  S&P mainly
bases this assessment on the entity's leading market position in
transmissions, powertrain, and chassis technology, as well as
active and passive safety components following its take-over of
U.S.-based supplied company TRW in May 2015.

The combination of a satisfactory business risk profile and
significant financial risk profile results in a possible anchor
of either 'bb+' or 'bbb-'.  S&P has chosen the 'bb+' anchor score
instead of 'bbb-' because S&P views the company's business risk
profile at the lower end of S&P's satisfactory category because
its profitability is at the lower end of S&P's average category,
as well as its limited track-record operating as one single
group.

The stable outlook on ZF reflects S&P's view that its operating
performance will remain resilient in the coming year, with a
stable EBITDA margin of about 10%-11%, including the full
consolidation of TRW.  Moreover, S&P expects that the company
will use disposal proceeds and FOCF to further deleverage.  S&P
expects that this will lead to additionally improving credit
metrics, with FFO to debt of 25%-30% and debt to EBITDA of about
3x over S&P's one-year outlook horizon applicable to speculative
grade issuers.

Given the high volatility in demand in the automotive sector, S&P
would view a material deterioration in the company's trading
results as a main reason for a negative rating action.  In
addition, S&P would also regard a ratio of FFO to debt of less
than 20% for a prolonged period as a trigger for a negative
rating action.

S&P could consider upgrading ZF if S&P observes further
deleveraging, fostering a financial risk profile closer to
intermediate, with FFO to debt well above 30% and a significant
improvement in the company's FOCF-to-debt ratio.  S&P could also
consider an upgrade if the businesses risk profile strengthens
toward the upper end of the category, mainly through sustainable
profitability and operating efficiency improvement as a result of
TRW's complete integration and emergence of new cross-selling
opportunities.



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G R E E C E
===========


ELECTRONIKI ATHINON: Files for Bankruptcy, Shuts Down Stores
------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Chrysopoulos at Greek Reporter reports that Electroniki
Athinon S.A., one of Greece's largest home appliances and
electronics chain, on April 13 disclosed that it has filed for
bankruptcy after 66 years of operation.

The High Court of Athens declared the company with the 45 stores
bankrupt, and as of April 13 all stores are closed, Greek
Reporter relates.

Electroniki Athinon attributes the bankruptcy to the failure to
receive a bank loan for a restructuring plan after capital
controls were imposed last summer, Greek Reporter discloses.

According to Greek Reporter, the company said there are no wages
owed to the approximately 450 employees, and it is estimated that
they will be able to receive their compensation pays in about
eight months.

Electroniki Athinon has outstanding debts to banks, suppliers,
and landlords of the stores, Greek Reporter notes.  After
declaring the company bankrupt, the court will appoint an
insolvency administrator and then the liquidation of company
assets will commence, Greek Reporter states.  The company assets
include 4-5 real estate properties, Greek Reporter says.

Electroniki Athinon S.A. is one of Greece's largest home
appliances and electronics chain.



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I R E L A N D
=============


AVOCA CLO IV: Moody's Affirms Caa2 Rating on Class E Sr. Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service announced that it has taken rating
actions on the following classes of notes issued by Avoca CLO IV
plc:

-- EUR31,000,000 (currently outstanding balance EUR2.3
    million) Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
    Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2015

    Affirmed Aaa (sf)

-- EUR27,000,000 Class C1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 21,
    2015 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- EUR5,000,000 Class C2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
    Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 21, 2015
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

-- EUR20,500,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep
    21, 2015 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

-- EUR20,500,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
    Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on
    Sep 21, 2015 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Avoca CLO IV plc, issued in January 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of high-yield senior
secured European loans managed by Avoca Capital Holdings Limited.
The transaction's reinvestment period ended in August 2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade to the rating on the Class D Notes is primarily the
result of the substantial deleveraging that has occurred over the
last year.

The Class A Notes have fully paid down and the Class B Notes have
amortized approximately by EUR8.17M (26.3% of its original
balance), as a result of which over-collateralization (OC) ratios
of the Classes B, C, and D have increased significantly. As per
the trustee report dated 09 March 2016, Class B, Class C, Class
D, and Class E OC ratios are reported at 3131.06%, 210.02%,
131.46% and 95.67% compared to August 2015 levels of 219.68%,
140.89%, 114.56% and 96.53% respectively.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds of EUR 74.35 million, a
weighted average default probability of 21.86% (consistent with a
WARF of 3321 over a weighted average life of 3.70 years), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 51.19% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 10 and a weighted
average spread of 3.71%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.



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I T A L Y
=========


BANCO POPOLARE SOCIETA: Moody's Reviews Ba Ratings for Upgrade
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for upgrade the
following ratings of Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa's (Banco)
and its supported entities: (1) The Ba2 long-term deposit
ratings; (2) the Ba3 long-term senior debt ratings; (3) the B3
subordinated debt ratings; (4) the Caa2(hyb) preference shares;
(5) the bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) and adjusted BCA
of b2; and (6) its long-term Counterparty Risk Assessment (CRA)
of Ba2(cr).

At the same time, Moody's has also placed on review for upgrade
the following ratings of Banca Popolare di Milano S.C.a.r.l.
(BPM) and its supported entities: (1) The Ba2 long-term deposit
ratings; (2) the Ba3 long-term senior debt ratings; (3) the B3
subordinated debt ratings; (4) the Caa2(hyb) preference shares;
(5) the bank's BCA and adjusted BCA of b2; and (6) its long-term
CRA of Ba2(cr).

This rating action follows the announcement made on March 23,
2016 by Banco and BPM that their respective boards of directors
had reached an agreement to merge the two groups by year-end
2016. The review for upgrade reflects Moody's view that the
combined group is likely to display stronger credit fundamentals
relative to those currently displayed by Banco and BPM
individually, based on: (1) improved coverage of problem loans,
thanks to a EUR1 billion capital increase, which will be fully
used to increase provisions against problem loans; (2) long-term
benefits of cost synergies and rationalization as well as
expectations of better revenue diversification; and (3)
improvements in corporate governance (a key rating constraint for
BPM) as the new group will be joint-stock company.

Banco and BPM's short-term senior debt and deposit ratings at
Not-Prime and their short-term CRA of Not-Prime(cr) have been
affirmed as part of today's rating action.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE RATING REVIEW

The review for upgrade of the ratings of Banco (total assets of
EUR120.5 billion at end-December 2015) and BPM (total assets of
EUR50.2 billion at end-December 2015) reflects Moody's view that
the combined entity following the integration of both banks is
likely to have a stronger credit profile than either of the two
banks currently has on a standalone basis. The merger is still
subject to final approvals by relevant authorities and by the
banks' shareholders.

Moody's considers that the combined Banco-BPM group -- which
would become the third largest banking player in Italy -- will be
able to weather a more competitive banking environment. In the
long-term, the merger should lead to cost savings and greater
revenue diversification. Both Banco and BPM mostly operate in the
relatively wealthy northern Italy, an overlap which offers the
opportunity to rationalise their branch networks. In addition,
Moody's notes that a larger group could offer a wider range of
products in a more efficient manner, which would in turn improve
revenue diversification.

The merger is also supported by additional capital as Banco has
agreed on a EUR1 billion capital increase, the proceeds of which
will be used to increase the coverage of the combined group's
problem loans up to 49% from 44%. The aggregate Common Equity
Tier 1 (CET1) ratio is expected to stand at close to 12.5%, which
compares well with its large domestic peers. Moody's also
believes that the merger will contribute to improved governance,
which has so far been a weakness for BPM. The new Banco-BPM group
will be a joint-stock company, in which the balance of power will
be better distributed, according to the number of shares owned by
each shareholder rather than the current one-vote-per-shareholder
rule.

Moody's notes, however, that the integration might also pose
challenges in terms of managerial capabilities and resources,
which could result in a more protracted integration process.
These challenges include IT integration, discussions with the
unions on redundancies, and the appointment of management that
represents shareholders of the two legacy banks.

The Banco-BPM group will also have significant challenges in
terms of asset risk and profitability, in Moody's view. In
particular, the stock of problem loans is still very high, mostly
coming from legacy issues at Banco and its subsidiary Banca
Italease S.p.A. (now merged into Banco). While the coverage of
problem loans will increase, the bank has so far refrained from
stating as to whether it will make use of the recently announced
Italian "bad bank" framework, but it is working on reducing the
overall stock of bad loans.

The combined entity will begin to operate in a challenging
operating environment, according to the rating agency.
Profitability is likely to be challenged by the low interest rate
environment and subdued business volumes, high reliance on gains
on securities (which are volatile in nature), a high level of
operating costs, and asset risk pressures.

Despite the near-term challenges, Moody's believes that the new
group's solvency and liquidity profile would support its
creditworthiness, mitigating the expected asset risk and
profitability pressures.

Banco and BPM's Ba2 long-term deposit and Ba3 long-term senior
debt ratings, on review for upgrade, currently reflect: (1) the
banks' b2 BCAs, which have been placed on review for upgrade
today; (2) extremely low loss-given-failure for deposits and very
low loss-given-failure for senior unsecured debt in the event of
a resolution; and (3) no government support uplift given Moody's
belief that there is only a low probability of such support from
Italy (Baa2 stable) for both banks.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Upward pressure on Banco and BPM's ratings could arise once the
merger comes into effect and the new group results in an improved
risk absorption capacity and corporate governance when compared
to Banco and BPM individually.

A downgrade of the banks' ratings is unlikely given the current
review for upgrade. However, downward pressure could develop for
Banco and BPM if the merger fails to succeed and the banks
display a material deterioration in their asset risk or
profitability metrics.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Placed on Review for Upgrade:

Issuer: Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, currently b2

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, currently b2

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently Ba2(cr)

Issuer Rating, currently Ba3, outlook changed to Rating under
    Review from Stable

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program currently (P)B3

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)Ba3

-- Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Preferred Stock, currently
    Caa2(hyb)

-- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, currently B3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently Ba3,
    outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, currently Ba2, outlook
    changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: Banca Italease S.p.A.

-- Backed Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, currently B3

-- Backed Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently
    Ba3, outlook changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Issuer: Banca Italease Capital Trust

-- Backed Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Preferred Stock, currently
    Caa2(hyb)

Issuer: Banca Popolare di Milano S.C.a r.l.

-- Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, currently b2

-- Baseline Credit Assessment, currently b2

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, currently Ba2(cr)

Issuer Rating, currently Ba3, outlook changed to Rating under
    Review from Negative

-- Subordinate Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)B3

-- Senior Unsecured Medium-Term Note Program, currently (P)Ba3

-- Pref. Stock Non-cumulative Preferred Stock, currently
    Caa2(hyb)

-- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, currently B3

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, currently Ba3,
    outlook changed to Rating under Review from Negative

-- Senior Unsecured Deposit Rating, currently Ba2, outlook
    changed to Rating under Review from Stable

Affirmations:

Issuer: Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

-- Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

Issuer: Banca Popolare di Milano S.C.a r.l.

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

-- Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP

-- Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)NP

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: Banca Italease S.p.A.

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable

Issuer: Banca Popolare di Milano S.C.a r.l.

-- Outlook, Changed To Rating Under Review From Stable(m)


ITALY: Largest Pension Scheme Won't Invest in Bank Rescue Fund
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Financial Times reports that Italy's largest pension scheme
has said it will not invest in the EUR5 billion rescue fund
created by the Italian government to shore up its ailing banks.

Maurizio Agazzi, director of Cometa, Italy's EUR9.6 billion
pension scheme for metal workers, described the bailout fund to
help weakened banks raise capital and unload bad loans as
"unsuitable for pension funds", the FT relates.

According to the FT, Matteo Renzi, the Italian prime minister,
and finance minister Pier Carlo Padoan announced the launch of
the bailout fund on April 11 in an effort to calm investor
concern about the stability of Italy's banking sector.

The bailout fund will see UniCredit, Intesa Sanpaolo and UBI
Banca, Italy's strongest banks, invest hundreds of millions of
euros in a vehicle that will mop up unsold shares from several
distressed smaller lenders, the FT discloses.

The vehicle will be established by Quaestio Capital Management,
the Italian asset manager, the FT states.

The primary investors in the bailout fund will comprise banks,
but the Italian government is open to institutional investors
injecting money into the fund, the FT notes.

Mr. Agazzi, as cited by the FT, said few pension schemes would be
interested, however.

"It is not my role to rescue the banks.  The fund does not seem
to be a suitable investment for pension funds and insurance
companies.  It would transfer the burden and risks of rescuing
[Italy's weakest lenders] on to pension savers," the FT quotes
Mr. Agazzi as saying.


UNIPOL GRUPPO: Fitch Assigns BB+ Rating to EUR2BB EMTN Programme
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Italy's Unipol Gruppo Finanziario a
Long-term Issuer Default Rating of 'BBB-'.  Fitch has also
assigned UnipolSaI (Unipol's primary insurance subsidiary) an
Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating of 'BBB' and a Long-term
IDR of 'BBB-'.  The Outlooks on the IFS rating and the Long-term
IDRs are Stable.

At the same time, Fitch has assigned Unipol's EUR2 bil. Euro
Medium Term Note (EMTN) programme a 'BB+' rating.  Fitch has also
assigned UnipolSaI's EUR3bn EMTN programme a 'BBB-' rating for
senior debt and 'BB' rating for dated and undated subordinated
debt.  These ratings are assigned to the programmes and not to
the notes issued under the programmes.  There is no assurance
that notes issued under a programme will be assigned a rating, or
that the rating assigned to a specific issue under a programme
will have the same rating as the rating assigned to the
programme.

In addition, Fitch has assigned Unipol's senior unsecured debt a
'BB+' rating and UnipolSaI's dated and undated subordinated debt
issuance 'BB+' and 'BB' ratings, respectively.

                         KEY RATING DRIVERS

The ratings reflect Fitch's expectations that Unipol's adequate
capital and profitability are likely to be negatively impacted by
the extremely weak credit quality of its banking operations
(Unipol Banca) in the coming years.  Fitch believes that Unipol's
ownership of Unipol Banca will be a drag on Unipol's earnings and
ultimately weaken capital, in view of the likely need to support
the banking operations.

Fitch's view on Unipol's capital is driven by the company's score
under Fitch's Prism factor-based model (Prism FBM).  Unipol
scored "Adequate" based on end-2014 financials, which Fitch
expects to have continued in 2015.  However, the quality of
capital is negatively affected by the amount of goodwill on the
balance sheet (EUR1.6 bil. or 19% or shareholders' funds) and
various contingent liabilities, including the bank.  The
consolidated regulatory Solvency I margin was 170% at end-2015
(end-2014: 169%), but could weaken due to Unipol's support of
Unipol Banca.  The financial leverage ratio (FLR) is relatively
high at 33% at end-2015.  The coverage of interest expenses is
moderate.

Unipol's three-year (2013-2015) average 3% return on equity is
commensurate with the low end of the 'BBB' rating category.  Net
profit is likely to remain volatile due the uncertain and lumpy
results of non-insurance operations, notably banking and real
estate.  Minority interests create a wide gap between net income
and the group's share.  The non-life combined ratio has been
favourable for the rating at below 100% (indicating an
underwriting profit) since 2010, due to pricing actions and
portfolio pruning activities.

Unipol is exposed to real estate assets (around 7.5% of total
investments at end-2015), some of which are loss making.  This
largely stems from its acquisition of Fondiaria-SAI, which had
around 15% of its liabilities invested in underperforming real
estate projects.  To improve profitability, Unipol continues to
reduce its exposure to real estate.  The success of this policy
is hampered by a difficult Italian property market.
Consequently, these substantial holdings of real estate assets
weigh on Unipol's ratings.

Unipol has a strong franchise in Italy, with a market share of
11.3%.  It is the largest Italian non-life insurance group by
non-life gross written premiums.  Unipol acquired Fondiaria-SAI
in 2012 to create the largest motor underwriter in Italy.  The
group distributes its insurance products through a multichannel
approach.

Unipol's exposure to Italian government debt was EUR42 bil. at
end-2015, around 5x consolidated shareholders' funds.  Like most
Italian insurers, Unipol's exposure creates concentration risk in
its investment portfolio.  Unipol has residual exposure to
structured credit that Fitch views as manageable.

For Unipol's senior unsecured debt, a baseline recovery
assumption of 'Below Average' was applied.  Standard notching
relative to the IDR was used.

For UnipolSaI's two dated subordinated issues (EUR300m due
June 15, 2021, (XS013071734) and EUR261.7 mil. due July 28, 2023,
(XS0173649798)), we used a baseline recovery assumption of 'Below
Average' and a non-performance risk assessment of 'Minimal'.  The
rating was notched down one notch from the IDR, based on one
notch for recovery and zero for non-performance risk.

For UnipolSaI's undated subordinated issue (EUR750m
(XS01078235733)), Fitch used a baseline recovery assumption of
'Below Average' and a non-performance risk assessment of
'Moderate'.  The rating was notched down two notches from the
IDR, based on one notch for recovery and one notch for non-
performance risk.

For the dated/undated subordinated debt that can be issued under
the EUR3 bil. ETMN programme, Fitch would use a baseline recovery
assumption of 'Below Average' and a non-performance risk
assessment of 'Moderate'.  The rating would be notched down two
notches from the IDR, based on one notch for recovery and one
notch for non-performance risk.

                        RATING SENSITIVITIES

Factors that could trigger a downgrade of Unipol's ratings
include:

   -- Prism FBM assessment worsens to 'Somewhat Weak'
   -- FLR deteriorates to above 40% for a sustained period
   -- Return on equity falls below 3% for a sustained period

Factors that could trigger an upgrade include:

   -- Prism FBM assessment improves to 'Strong'
   -- Return on equity remains above 6% for a sustained period.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

  Unipol Gruppo Finanziario: assigned a Long-term IDR of 'BBB-';
   Outlook Stable
  EMTN programme: assigned a 'BB+' rating

Senior unsecured debt:

  EUR299 mil. maturing Jan. 11, 2017, (XS047290617) : assigned a
   'BB+' rating
  EUR317 mil. maturing March 5, 2021, (XS041042828) : assigned a
   'BB+' rating
  EUR1 bil. maturing March 18, 2025, (XS1206977495): assigned a
   'BB+' rating

UnipolSaI

  Assigned an IFS rating of 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
  Assigned a Long-term IDR of 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable

EMTN programme:

  Senior debt: assigned a 'BBB-' rating
  Dated/undated subordinated debt: assigned a 'BB' rating

Dated subordinated debt:

  EUR 300 mil. fixed/floating rate subordinated callable notes
   due June 15, 2021, (XS013071734): assigned a 'BB+' rating

  EUR 261.7 mil. fixed/floating rate subordinated callable notes
   due July 28, 2023, (XS0173649798): assigned a 'BB+' rating

Undated subordinated debt:

  EUR750 mil. fixed/floating rate subordinated notes
   (XS01078235733): assigned a 'BB' rating



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


AIR FRANCE-KLM: Egan-Jones Lowers FC Commercial Paper Rating to B
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Egan-Jones Ratings Company downgraded the foreign currency
commercial paper rating on Air France-KLM to B from A3 on
March 29, 2016.

Air France-KLM is a Franco-Dutch airline holding company
incorporated under French law with its headquarters at Charles de
Gaulle Airport in Tremblay-en-France, near Paris.



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


NORSKE SKOGINDUSTRIER: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Rating to SD
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Norway-based Norske Skogindustrier ASA
(Norske Skog) to 'SD' from 'CC'.  S&P removed the rating from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where S&P placed it on
Nov. 17, 2015.

At the same time, S&P lowered the issue ratings on the senior
unsecured notes maturing in 2017 to 'D' from 'C'.  S&P affirmed
its 'C' issue ratings on the remaining senior unsecured notes.
The recovery rating on these notes remains unchanged at '6' and
continues to reflect S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%)
recovery in the event of a conventional default.

S&P expects to assign issue ratings to the newly issued senior
unsecured exchange notes and the perpetual notes within the
coming weeks.

The downgrade follows the completion of Norske Skog's exchange
offer on its EUR218 million senior unsecured notes maturing in
June 2017.  S&P understands that 76% of noteholders accepted to
participate in the exchange, which was above the 75% threshold
whereby the offer became binding for all noteholders.  The
noteholders will receive 46.8% of the nominal value of their
notes in exchange for notes maturing in 2026 and 36.2% of the
nominal value in exchange for junior notes maturing in 2115.  The
noteholders will also have the right to acquire new equity at a
set price.

S&P views the transaction as a distressed exchange and tantamount
to default as it was highly likely Norske Skog would enter into a
conventional default if the offer had not been accepted.  S&P
also considers that the exchange constituted less than the
original promise, because:

   -- The principal amount is less than the original amount;

   -- The new securities' maturities are later than the original
      due date;

   -- A large proportion of the new notes are ranked more junior;

   -- Interest rates are reduced; and

   -- Part of the interest has a pay-in-kind component.

S&P expects to raise the corporate credit rating in the coming
weeks to a level reflecting its view of Norske Skog's forward-
looking conventional default risk.  S&P's analysis will take into
account Norske Skog's liquidity profile and its ability to meet
the EUR108 million (about Norwegian krone 1.0 billion) of debt
maturities falling due in June 2016.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


BANK BPH: Moody's Affirms Ba2/Not Prime Deposit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Ba2/Not Prime long- and
short-term deposit ratings of Bank BPH S.A., while simultaneously
placing them on negative outlook. This action follows the recent
announcement that Bank BPH's ultimate parent, General Electric
Company (GE; A1, stable), has reached an agreement to spin off
the core business of the bank to Polish Alior Bank S.A.
(unrated).

Bank BPH's counterparty risk assessment (CRA) of Baa2(cr)/P-
2(cr), its ba3 baseline credit assessment (BCA) and its ba2
adjusted BCA which incorporates assumptions from affiliate
support of the bank's owner GE remain unaffected by today's
rating action.

RATINGS RATIONALE

--- AFFIRMATION OF DEPOSIT RATINGS

"The affirmation of the Ba2 deposit ratings reflects our
expectation of continuous moderate affiliate support from GE to
Bank BPH, which currently results in a one-notch uplift to the
deposit ratings from Bank BPH's ba3 BCA as well as the moderate
loss-given failure for Bank BPH's deposits based on Moody's
analysis of the bank's liability structure under its Advanced
Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis until the de-merger has been
executed and which does not result in further rating uplift at
present."

"GE's commitment to Bank BPH, and the strong regulatory oversight
from the Polish Financial Supervision Authority, provide a source
of stability and an orderly processing of the de-merger during
the months ahead. Affiliates fund more than half the Bank BPH's
balance-sheet, with maturities up to 2025. It is therefore likely
that GE will continue to support its subsidiary. The sale of Bank
BPH's core assets to Alior is in line with the trend of divesting
selected assets we have observed across other regions in which GE
has been operating finance and leasing businesses. GE is engaged
in a $200 billion downsizing of its finance operations through
business and asset sales occurring through 2017."

--- OUTLOOK CHANGE TO NEGATIVE

According to the public announcements, Bank BPH will transfer all
of the existing consumer and corporate loans and deposits, while
retaining its mortgage portfolio -- the vast majority of which is
composed of legacy Swiss franc mortgages - which has been in
gradual run-down since 2011. The de-merger is subject to
regulatory approvals which are expected during the fall. In the
absence of the availability of deposit funding once the de-merger
has been executed, the bank will evolve as a wholesale funded
institution -- with funds primarily provided by affiliates and
its liability structure will change accordingly.

"As a result, the negative outlook on Bank BPH's deposit ratings
reflects 1) our expectation of a significant increase in the
bank's wholesale funding reliance (GE's commitment moderates
refinancing risk to a large extent), 2) the contingent risk for
the Swiss franc mortgage portfolio of Bank BPH, in light of the
potential for a forced conversion of foreign-currency mortgages
that could be imposed on Polish banks (which will have an adverse
impact on banks' profitability and capital); and 3) in the
absence of a meaningful deposit funding cushion a high loss-given
failure under Moody's Advanced LGF analysis which could lead to
downward notching of the deposit ratings from the bank's adjusted
BCA which currently stands at ba2."

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Given the negative outlook, upward pressure on Bank BPH's ratings
is unlikely in the near term.

"A downgrade of the bank's ratings could materialize if Bank
BPH's intrinsic financial strength weakens after the completion
of the spin-off. In addition, a diminishing parental commitment
to the bank would lead to negative pressure on the affiliate
support which we currently assign and its impact on the ratings.
A material change in the liability structure resulting in a
reduction of the level of subordination provided to senior
obligations of the bank and/or a decline in junior deposit
volumes that could elevate severity and impact our LGF analysis
could also put downward pressure on the bank's deposit ratings."

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

-- Affirmations:

-- LT Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency and Domestic Currency),
    affirmed Ba2, outlook changed to Negative from Stable

-- ST Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency and Domestic Currency),
    affirmed NP

-- Outlook Actions:

-- Outlook, changed to Negative from Stable



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


LUSITANO MORTGAGES 3: S&P Lowers Rating on Cl. B Notes to B+
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Lusitano Mortgages No. 3 PLC.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised to 'A- (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its rating on the
      class A notes;

   -- Lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' its rating on the
      class B notes; and

   -- Affirmed its 'B (sf)' and 'B- (sf)' ratings on the class C
      and D notes, respectively.

On June 9, 2015, S&P took various rating actions on certain U.K.
and German commercial banks (and their related subsidiaries)
following the introduction of well-formed bank resolution
frameworks in these countries, the ongoing regulatory impetus to
have systemic banks hold sizable buffers of bail-in capital that
the authorities could use to recapitalize them, and the
associated reduced prospects for extraordinary government
support.

Among S&P's June 9, 2015 rating actions, it lowered its ratings
on Deutsche Bank AG (London Branch; BBB+/Stable/A-2), which was
the bank account provider in this transaction, providing 'bank
account (limited)' support to the notes under S&P's current
counterparty criteria.

According to the bank account agreement, upon the loss of a 'A-1'
short-term rating, Deutsche Bank (London Branch) had to replace
itself.  On Dec. 11, 2015, S&P lowered its rating on Lusitano
Mortgages No. 3's class A notes to the same level as S&P's long-
term issuer credit rating (ICR) on Deutsche Bank (London Branch).
This was because the remedy period had elapsed and the issuer had
not implemented remedies that were in line with the transaction
documentation and S&P's current counterparty criteria.

On Jan. 21, 2016, BNP Paribas Securities Services (London Branch;
A/Stable/A-1) replaced Deutsche Bank (London Branch) as the bank
account provider.  This replacement is in line with S&P's current
counterparty criteria, and therefore, S&P's long-term ICR on the
bank account provider does not constrain its rating on the class
A notes.

Following the application of S&P's residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) criteria and considering its criteria for
rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the sovereign
foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P has determined that
its assigned rating on each class of notes in this transaction
should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped by S&P's RAS
criteria, (ii) the rating as capped by our current counterparty
criteria, and (iii) the rating that the class of notes can attain
under S&P's RMBS criteria.

In this transaction, S&P's unsolicited long-term sovereign rating
on Portugal (BB+/Stable/B) constrains its rating on the class A
notes.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as moderate.  Under these criteria, this transaction's notes
can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign rating,
if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a minimum of a
severe stress.  However, as all six of the conditions in
paragraph 44 of the RAS criteria are met, S&P can assign ratings
in this transaction up to a maximum of six notches (two
additional notches of uplift) above the sovereign rating, subject
to credit enhancement being sufficient to pass an extreme stress.

The transaction benefits from a basis swap provided by The Royal
Bank of Scotland N.V. (BBB+/Positive/A-2).  S&P considers that
the replacement language in the swap agreement complies with its
current counterparty criteria and can support up to a 'A-' rating
on all classes of notes in this transaction.  S&P's current
counterparty criteria therefore cap its ratings at 'A-'.

The class A notes have sufficient available credit enhancement to
withstand the stresses that are commensurate with a 'A' rating
level under S&P's RMBS criteria.  At the same time, the class A
notes are eligible for a four-notch uplift above the sovereign
rating under S&P's RAS criteria, to 'A-', since they can
withstand a severe stress.  Therefore, S&P has raised to 'A-
(sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its rating on the class A notes.

S&P's cash flow analysis suggests that the transaction has
limited excess spread.  S&P's cash flow modeling results are
therefore very sensitive to the assets yield assumptions.  S&P
has used the collateral yield information as of December 2015 to
update its weighted-average assets yield and spread compression
analysis.  As a result of these updates, the class B notes no
longer passes at its current 'BB- (sf)' rating level for interest
shortfalls in a number of modeled scenarios.  Based on the
available credit enhancement and in view of consistent collateral
performance, S&P has lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' its
rating on the class B notes.

S&P's analysis indicates that the available credit enhancement
for the class C and D notes is commensurate with its currently
assigned ratings, and S&P do not expect these classes of notes to
experience interest shortfalls in the next 12 months.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its 'B (sf)' and 'B- (sf)' ratings on the
class C and D notes, respectively.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 8% for one-year and three-year
horizons, respectively.  This did not result in S&P's rating
deteriorating below the maximum projected deterioration that it
would associate with each relevant rating level, as outlined in
S&P's credit stability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Portuguese residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and sluggish house price appreciation for 2016.

On the back of the weak macroeconomic conditions, S&P don't
expect the performance of the transactions in its Portuguese RMBS
index to significantly improve in 2016.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth and high unemployment.  On the
positive side, S&P expects interest rates to remain low.

Lusitano Mortgages No. 3 is a Portuguese RMBS transaction, which
closed in November 2004.  It securitizes a pool of first-ranking
mortgage loans that Novo Banco originated.  The mortgage loans
are mainly located in the Lisbon region and the transaction
comprises loans granted to prime borrowers.

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

Lusitano Mortgages No. 3 PLC
EUR1.2 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

A           A- (sf)           BBB+ (sf)

Rating Lowered

B           B+ (sf)           BB- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

C           B (sf)
D           B- (sf)



===========
R U S S I A
===========


CB ERGOBANK: Deemed Insolvent, Prov. Administration Halted
----------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Arbitration of Moscow entered a ruling dated
March 16, 2016, on case No. A40-12417/16-177-27B, on recognizing
that credit institution Commercial Bank ERGOBANK, LLC is
insolvent (bankrupt) and ordering the appointment of a receiver
for the entity.

Accordingly, by virtue of the Arbitration Court ruling, the Bank
of Russia decided (via Order No. OD-1140, dated April 8, 2016)
to terminate from April 8, 2016, the activity of the provisional
administration of ERGOBANK.

The Bank of Russia previously appointed the provisional
administration of ERGOBANK, (via Order No. OD-88, dated
January 15, 2016) following the revocation of the entity's
banking license.


FCRB BANK: Moratorium Imposed on Meeting Creditors' Claims
----------------------------------------------------------
Due to the failure to meet creditors' claims on monetary
obligations within seven days from their maturity date and guided
by Article 18938 of the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)",
the Bank of Russia imposed a moratorium on meeting creditors'
claims with respect to LLC FCRB Bank for a three-month term from
April 1, 2016.

Pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insurance of Household
Deposits with Russian Banks" the moratorium on meeting bank
creditors' claims is an insured event.  Payments to LLC FCRB Bank
depositors, including individual entrepreneurs, will start no
later than 14 days since the date the moratorium has been
imposed.  The state corporation Deposit Insurance Agency will
determine the procedure for paying indemnities.


RUSSNEFT: Moody's Confirms 'B2' Corporate Family Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the B2 corporate family
rating (CFR) and B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) of
RussNeft, a Russian oil exploration and production company. The
outlook on the ratings is stable. The action concludes the rating
review initiated by Moody's on January 22, 2016.

"We have confirmed RussNeft's B2 rating on the back of its
successful efforts to significantly reduce leverage through debt
restructuring and we expect the deleveraging to continue
throughout 2016. This has enabled the company to achieve a more
sustainable capital structure in the current period of 'lower for
longer' oil prices," says Denis Perevezentsev, a Moody's Vice
President -- Senior Credit Officer.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The confirmation of RussNeft's ratings reflects the company's
improved capital structure as a result of related party debt for
equity transactions implemented in Q4 2015, resulting in Moody's-
adjusted gross debt falling to $2.5 billion as of December  31,
2015 compared with $4.9 billion as of December 31, 2014. It also
factors in Moody's expectation that RussNeft will further reduce
debt by about $1.2 billion during 2016, which will bring its debt
down to about $1.3 billion by year-end 2016.

Following the conversion of related party debt into equity,
Glencore International AG (Baa3 stable), via its entity Rambero
Holding AG (not rated), became 46% owner of RussNeft, thereby
ceasing its ownership at the operating company level. Total
RussNeft's debt decreased to about $2.5 billion as of
December 31, 2015.

As of December 31, 2015, Russneft's debt consisted of a loan from
Bank VTB, JSC (VTB, Ba1 senior unsecured rating, on review for
downgrade) of about $2.0 billion, with the remaining debt due to
related parties controlled by Mr. Gutseriev: $154 million in
promissory notes maturing not later than 2024 due to GCM Global
Energy plc (not rated), a $300 million amortizing loan due to
Belyrian (not rated) due March 31, 2025.

RussNeft exchanged $154 million of debt owed to GCM Global Energy
into equity in Q1 2016 and plans to convert into equity $300
million of debt it owes to Belyrian in 2016. The company plans to
reduce the debt it owes to VTB by about $700 million in 2016 by
replacing this facility with related party debt, which it will
exchange into equity at a later stage.

Following the completion of its debt restructuring, RussNeft has
achieved a more sustainable liquidity profile over the next 18-24
months. The company's principal payments under its $2.0 billion
loan from VTB will not exceed $40 million a year until March
2018, providing for a comfortable debt service profile. Moody's
notes that principal amounts to be repaid will grow materially
for RussNeft starting from March 2018, when the company will have
to repay $110 million per quarter until Q1 2020 and $100 million
per quarter from Q2 2020 until the repayment of the VTB
facilities in 2023.

These amounts exceed the company's current operating cash flows.
However, in the light of expected further reduction in debt owed
to VTB in 2016, Moody's anticipates that the amounts due under
this loan facility to VTB in 2018-23 will be reduced accordingly.

RATIONALE FOR STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that RussNeft
will sustainably maintain adequate leverage metrics and
liquidity. The corporate structure of RussNeft is likely to
further evolve in the medium term, which may involve merging into
its beneficiary's other holdings (which are not within the rated
perimeter, such as Neftisa), and engaging in meaningful asset
transfer transactions with related parties.

Although debt restructuring resulted in material improvement in
the company's debt/capital structure, the rating agency notes
that the visibility over the company's future asset composition,
long-term capital structure, production profile and financial
policies, as well as information disclosure, remains very
limited.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Currently there is limited potential of any upward rating
pressure on the company's rating. Moody's could upgrade RussNeft
if it were to demonstrate (1) greater clarity and stability over
its reserves, production and cash flow generation profile,
addressing Moody's longer term liquidity concerns; (2) an ability
to maintain profitability and reserves replacement ratios
commensurate with industry levels; (3) clarity on the group's
assets composition and organisational structure; and (4) further
deleveraging.


Moody's would consider a negative rating action if RussNeft's
financial and/or operating profile were to deteriorate beyond
Moody's current expectations. Lack of transparency over future
cash flow generation capacity, including that resulting from
related-party transactions would also exert pressure on the
ratings.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINE: Verkhovna Rada Rejects No. 2286-a Creditors' Rights Bill
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the Verkhovna Rada has rejected a
bill on amending some Ukrainian laws regarding the restoration of
trust between borrowers and creditors (No. 2286-a).

The document provided measures to settle flaws in earlier
legislation used by debtors to avoid the fulfillment of their
liabilities under credits, Interfax-Ukraine discloses.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, the bill is intended to improve
the legal regulation of bankruptcy procedures and reinforce the
protection of rights of creditors in these procedures, as well as
to minimize risks of using managed bankruptcy schemes and
targeted sales of property of bankrupt companies to concrete
persons at low prices.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


A MORREY: Enters Liquidation Following a Period of Falling Sales
----------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Tindall at Commercial Motor reports that Cheshire HGV
breakdown and recovery operator A Morrey Transport has entered
liquidation.

The operator appointed insolvency practitioners at Parkins Booth
on March 22 following a period of falling sales, according to
Commercial Motor.

The Waverton-based family-run business had been operating for
more than 70 years, the report notes.  It started in coal and in
bulk milk collection, the report relates.  It later moved into
vehicle repairs and HGV recovery and had an O-licence authorising
five trucks and six trailers, the report notes.

According to liquidator Ian Brown -- ib@parkinsbooth.co.uk -- , a
decline in the number of businesses needing maintenance and a
loss of a contract meant the business began to struggle, the
report relays.

"There was a general reduction in the level of turnover," the
report quoted Mr. Brown sa saying. "It wasn't badly insolvent.
The directors decided they just wanted to finish up and call it a
day," Mr. Brown added.

Mr. Brown said that the liquidation led to three employees and
three directors losing their jobs and that it was likely
preferential creditors will receive a payment, but it was too
early to say if unsecured creditors will be paid a dividend, the
report relays.


ARROW GLOBAL: S&P Affirms 'B+' Counterparty Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it has affirmed its 'B+'
long-term counterparty credit rating on U.K.-based distressed
debt purchaser and receivables manager Arrow Global Group PLC.
The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'BB-' issue rating and
recovery rating of '2' to the proposed EUR225 million senior
secured notes issued by Arrow Global Finance PLC.  The rating on
the proposed notes is subject to S&P's review of the notes' final
documentation.

On April 13, 2016, Arrow Global announced that it intends to
issue a EUR225 million senior secured bond.  S&P understands that
the proceeds will be used to repay amounts drawn on the RCF --
drawn to fund a corporate acquisition and portfolio purchases --
and pay related fees and expenses.  Arrow Global's GBP180 million
RCF was drawn GBP75 million as of Dec. 31, 2015, and S&P
understands that the facility was also used to fund portfolio
purchases in the first quarter of 2016 and pay a corporate
acquisition consideration of GBP78.5 million.  This relates to
Arrow Global's recent announcement on April 1, 2016, confirming
its proposed acquisition of Dutch-based receivables manager
InVesting B.V.  The acquisition is subject to regulatory approval
and is expected to close in the second quarter of 2016.

S&P also understands that the notes will continue to be secured
by a first-ranking interest on all the shares of Arrow Global
Group's main subsidiaries and substantially all of its assets.
S&P considers that this security package is similar to the
package for Arrow Global Finance's existing senior secured debt.

S&P is affirming the 'B+' long-term counterparty credit rating on
Arrow Global, reflecting S&P's view that the company's leverage
and debt-servicing metrics remain in line with its existing
expectations for its financial risk profile, despite an
incremental weakening compared with S&P's previous expectations
for end-2016.  S&P's forward-looking analysis of the company's
financial risk profile results in:

   -- Gross debt to Standard & Poor's-adjusted EBITDA of 3x-4x
      (adjusted EBITDA is gross of portfolio amortization);

   -- Funds from operations (FFO) to total debt of 20%-30%; and

   -- Adjusted EBITDA coverage of interest expense of 3x-6x.

When calculating S&P's weighted-average ratios it applies a 20%
weight to year-end 2015 and 40% weights to year-end projections
for both 2016 and 2017.

S&P believes the company will continue to grow at a brisk pace
through its expansion into mainland Europe and by capitalizing on
its recent partnerships and acquisitions in Portugal and the
Netherlands.  S&P anticipates that this will result in strong
year-on-year growth of adjusted EBITDA of 15%-20%, and support
stable credit ratios as the company continues to fund growth
through drawing on its RCF.  However, S&P continues to apply a
negative one-notch adjustment, reflecting S&P's assessment of
Arrow Global's negative financial policy modifier.  S&P believes
the recent acquisition of Capquest and the proposed acquisition
of InVesting B.V. serve as evidence that there is less
predictability in the company's credit ratios, especially as S&P
expects the European industry to continue its recent phase of
consolidation around a number of larger pan-European players.

"Our assessment of Arrow Global's business risk profile remains
unchanged, and is constrained by the company's focus on the
distressed consumer debt market and our belief that it is exposed
to potential regulatory and operational risks.  Despite Arrow
Global's concentrated business model, we believe the company is
taking steps toward reducing its sensitivities to particular end-
markets within the wider industry.  In our view, the proposed
acquisition of receivables manager InVesting B.V. has the
potential to enhance the resiliency of Arrow Global's business
model.  As a result, we expect the share of revenues generated
from servicing third-party debt portfolios to increase, reducing
current concentrations stemming from its debt-purchasing
business. We also believe that Arrow Global's further
geographical diversification supports the company's existing
strategy.  However, we do not expect these developments to affect
the rating within the next 12 months, and we would need to see a
longer track record of Arrow Global's strategy sustainably
supporting its franchise," S&P said.

The stable outlook on Arrow Global reflects S&P's view that the
company's leverage and debt-service metrics will remain within
its current financial risk profile category over our 12-month
outlook horizon.  This scenario is predicated on continued growth
in total collections, the realization of synergies from the
acquisitions of Dutch-based receivables manager InVesting B.V.,
and the total amount of debt growing at a slower pace than cash
flow generation.

S&P could raise its ratings on Arrow Global if S&P saw greater
diversification in the franchise supporting the future stability
of earnings, without a weakening in leverage and debt-servicing
metrics.  This would need to coincide with S&P's view that Arrow
Global's financial metrics were sustainably predictable over our
12-month outlook horizon.  For example, if S&P believed Arrow
Global could meet its growth ambitions while maintaining gross
debt to adjusted EBITDA below 4x and FFO to gross debt above 20%.

S&P could lower the ratings if it saw a material increase in
management's leverage tolerance, a failure in Arrow Global's
control framework, or adverse changes in the regulatory
environment.


CONSOLIDATED GENERAL: Ambrian PLC Update Regarding Liquidation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Ambrian plc confirms that the final meeting of the shareholders
of Consolidated General Minerals plc held in accordance with
section 94 of the Insolvency Act 1986 was held on March 21, 2016.
The liquidators of CGM subsequently filed their account of the
winding up and return to the Registrar of Companies of the
holding of the CGM shareholders meeting at Companies House on 1
April 2016.

Companies House has therefore confirmed that CGM will be finally
dissolved on July 1, 2016.

On the date on which CGM is finally dissolved, the 9,707,102
Second Tranche Deferred Convertible Securities of GBP0.01 each
will automatically convert into 9,707,102 ordinary shares of
GBP0.01 each.  No adjustment of the conversion rate of each of
the Second Tranche Deferred Convertible Securities into a New
Ordinary Share is required.

On the date of such conversion of the Second Tranche Deferred
Convertible Securities into the New Ordinary Shares, share
certificates for Second Tranche Deferred Convertible Securities
will cease to be valid.  Entitlements to New Ordinary Shares
arising on the conversion of Second Tranche Deferred Convertible
Securities will be issued in certificated form only and share
certificates are expected to be dispatched to existing holders of
Second Tranche Deferred Convertible Securities within 7 business
days of the Conversion Date.  Holders who wish to subsequently
hold their New Ordinary Shares in CREST should follow the
standard procedures for the dematerialization of securities.

Application will be made for the New Ordinary Shares to be
admitted to trading on AIM as soon as practicable following the
Conversion Date.

A further announcement will be made by the Company on or around
the Conversion Date confirming that the Second Tranche Deferred
Convertible Securities have been converted into the New Ordinary
Shares and the scheduled date for Admission.


INSTITUTE IN HAMPSTEAD: Faces Liquidation, Classes Maybe Canceled
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Jordan Milne at Ham & High reports that classes could soon be
cancelled at The Institute in Hampstead Garden Suburb.

Last week, the Institute's trustees decided to put the adult
education provider into liquidation, according to Ham & High.

But a statement on The Institute's website states: "It has been
decided that this decision will now be taken by Institute Society
members, the report notes.

"In light of these recent events, a meeting will be held in the
next few weeks to decide the future of the Institute and whether
to run courses in the Summer Term," the statement added.

Students were encouraged to return to the website in two weeks
time for an update, the report relays.

The Institute has yet to respond to requests for comments from
the Ham&High.

Founded by pioneering philanthropist Henrietta Barnett, The
Institute opened in March 1909 and has been providing "high
quality and good value for money" adult education across North
London for over 100 years.


SANTANDER UK: Moody's Affirms Ba2(hyb) Non-Cumulative Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded Santander UK PLC's (SAN UK)'s
long-term deposit rating to Aa3 from A1 and affirmed the bank's
issuer rating at A1. At the same time, the rating agency affirmed
all the other ratings and the Counterparty Risk Assessment (CR
Assessment) of the bank and its holding company at the current
level. The bank's standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) of
a3 is unchanged as a result of this action.

RATINGS RATIONALE

RATIONALE FOR THE DEPOSIT AND ISSUER RATINGS

The upgrade of SAN UK's long-term deposit rating to Aa3 from A1
and the affirmation of the issuer rating at A1 are based on the
bank's BCA of a3 and the results of Moody's Advanced Loss Given
Failure (LGF) Analysis.

"Taking account of the group's consolidated balance sheet
structure at end-2015 and its near term funding plan, the
agency's LGF Analysis indicates that SAN UK's deposits are likely
to face very low loss-given failure, due to the loss absorption
provided by subordinated debt and, potentially, by senior
unsecured debt should deposits be treated preferentially in a
resolution, as well as the substantial volume of deposits and
senior debt themselves. This results in a Preliminary Rating
Assessment (PRA) of a1 for deposits, two notches above the BCA.
This is higher than under the previous analysis, which was based
on end-1H2015 data and resulted in a PRA of a2, because the group
has since issued significant unsecured debt from its holding
company which we believe offers more loss absorption for deposit
liabilities issued by the bank."

SAN UK's senior unsecured debt, issued at the bank level, is
likely to face low loss-given-failure due to the loss absorption
provided by its own volume and the amount of debt subordinated to
it. This results in a PRA of a2, one notch above the BCA.

Moody's assumption of a moderate probability of government
support for SAN UK's senior unsecured debt and deposits results
in a one-notch uplift, hence a long-term deposit rating of Aa3
and a long-term issuer rating of A1.

RATIONALE FOR THE CR ASSESSMENT

As part of today's action, Moody's also affirmed SAN UK's long-
term CR Assessment at Aa2(cr), four notches above the BCA of a3.
The short-term CR Assessment has been affirmed at P-1(cr). The CR
Assessment is driven by the banks' standalone assessment and by
the considerable amount of subordinated instruments likely to
shield counterparty obligations from losses, accounting for three
notches of uplift relative to the BCA, as well as one notch of
government support, in line with the agency's support assumptions
on the bank's deposits and senior unsecured debt.

RATIONALE FOR THE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook on SAN UK's deposit rating incorporates the
improvements in the bank's solvency profile and more generally in
its credit fundamentals. These elements, together with the
improvements in its franchise and balance sheet risk, should
allow for some level of deterioration in its arrears which may
result from loan seasoning and a greater proportion of SME
lending in its loan portfolio.

The positive outlook on SAN UK's issuer rating reflects the
group's near-term funding plans, which will likely involve the
issue of senior unsecured debt at the holding company level,
providing additional protection to creditors of the operating
entity.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

The BCA could be upgraded if SAN UK: (1) shows a structural
reduction in its reliance on market funding; (2) maintains its
strong asset quality despite growth in its SME lending portfolio;
and (3) continues to improve its solvency profile through
satisfactory internal capital generation. A positive change in
SAN UK's BCA would likely affect all ratings. SAN UK's deposit
and issuer ratings could also be upgraded if the bank or its
holding company were to issue significant amounts of long-term
debt and more subordinated debt.

The bank's BCA could be downgraded in the event of: (1)
significant deterioration of SAN UK's asset quality metrics; (2)
material weakening of profitability, which would reduce the
bank's loss-absorption capacity; and (3) deterioration in the
bank's funding and liquidity position, including a further
reduction in the quantity or quality of its liquidity buffer. A
downward movement in SAN UK's BCA would likely result in
downgrades of all ratings. SAN UK's ratings could also be
downgraded due to a change in the liability structure, most
likely a reduction in the volume of bail-in-able debt which would
increase their loss-given-failure.

LIST OF AFFECCTED RATINGS

Upgrades:

Issuer: Santander UK PLC

-- LT Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency and Local Currency),
    Upgraded to Aa3 Stable from A1 Stable

Issuer: Abbey National Treasury Services plc

-- LT Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency), Upgraded to Aa3 Stable
    from A1 Stable

Issuer: Alliance & Leicester plc

-- LT Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency and Local Currency),
    Upgraded to Aa3 Stable from A1 Stable

Affirmations:

Issuer: Santander UK PLC

-- LT Issuer Rating, Affirmed A1 Positive

-- ST Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency and Local Currency),
    Affirmed P-1

-- Junior Subordinated Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Baa2
    (hyb)

-- Junior Subordinated Shelf, Affirmed (P)Baa2

-- Subordinate Shelf, Affirmed (P)Baa1

-- Pref. Stock, Affirmed Baa2 (hyb)

-- Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Affirmed Baa3 (hyb)

-- Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)Baa1

-- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Baa1

-- BACKED Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Baa1

-- Senior Unsecured Shelf, Affirmed (P)A1

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Aa2(cr)

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed P-1(cr)

Issuer: Abbey National Capital LP I

-- BACKED Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Affirmed Baa3 (hyb)

Issuer: Abbey National Capital LP II

-- BACKED Pref. Stock Shelf, Affirmed (P)Baa3

Issuer: Abbey National Capital Trust I

-- BACKED Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Affirmed Baa3 (hyb)

Issuer: Abbey National Capital Trust II

-- BACKED Pref. Shelf, Affirmed (P)Baa3

Issuer: Abbey National North America LLC

-- BACKED Commercial Paper, Affirmed P-1

Issuer: Abbey National Treasury International Ltd.

-- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Affirmed (P)A1

-- BACKED Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)P-1

Issuer: Abbey National Treasury Services plc

-- BACKED Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed A1
    Positive

-- BACKED Commercial Paper, Affirmed P-1

-- ST Bank Deposits (Foreign Currency), Affirmed P-1

-- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Affirmed (P)A1

-- BACKED Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)Baa1

-- Senior Unsec. Shelf, Affirmed (P)A1

-- BACKED Preference Shelf, Affirmed (P)Baa3

-- BACKED ST Deposit Note/CD Program, Affirmed P-1

-- BACKED Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)P-1

-- BACKED Senior Unsec. Shelf, Affirmed (P)A1

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Aa2(cr)

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed P-1(cr)

Issuer: Abbey National Treasury Services plc (Paris)

-- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Affirmed (P)A1

-- BACKED Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)P-1

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Aa2(cr)

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed P-1(cr)

Issuer: Abbey National Treasury Services PLC (US Br.)

-- Commercial Paper, Affirmed P-1

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed Aa2(cr)

-- Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed P-1(cr)

Issuer: Alliance & Leicester plc

-- LT Issuer Rating (Foreign Currency), Affirmed A1 Positive

-- Senior Unsecured MTN, Affirmed (P)A1

-- Junior Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)Baa2

-- Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)Baa1

-- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Baa1

Issuer: AN Structured Issues Limited

-- BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN, Affirmed (P)A1

-- BACKED Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)P-1

Issuer: Santander UK Group Holdings plc

-- LT Issuer Rating, Affirmed Baa1 Stable

-- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Baa1 Stable

-- Subordinate Regular Bond/Debenture, Affirmed Baa1

-- Pref. Stock Non-cumulative, Affirmed Ba2 (hyb)

-- Other Short Term, Affirmed (P)P-2

-- Senior Unsecured MTN, Affirmed (P)Baa1

-- Subordinate MTN, Affirmed (P)Baa1

-- Senior Unsecured Shelf, Affirmed (P)Baa1

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Santander UK PLC

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable(m) From Stable

Issuer: Abbey National Treasury International Ltd.

-- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Issuer: Abbey National Treasury Services plc

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable(m) From Stable

Issuer: Abbey National Treasury Services plc (Paris)

-- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Issuer: Alliance & Leicester plc

-- Outlook, Changed To Stable(m) From Stable

Issuer: AN Structured Issues Limited

-- Outlook, Changed To Positive From Stable

Issuer: Santander UK Group Holdings plc

-- Outlook, Remains Stable


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The Money Wars
-----------------------------
Author: Roy C. Smith
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 370 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by David Henderson
Get your own personal today at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1893122697/internetbankrup
t
Business is war by civilized means. It won't get you a tailhook
landing on an n aircraft carrier docked in San Diego, but the
spoils of war can be glorious to behold.

Most executives do not approach business this way. They are
content to nudge along their behemoths, cash their options, and
pillage their workers. This author calls those managers "inertia
ridden." He quotes Carl Icahn describing their companies as run
by "gross and widespread incompetent management."

In cycles though, the U.S. economy generates a few business
warriors with the drive, or hubris, to treat the market as a
battlefield. The 1980s saw the last great spectacle of business
titans clashing. (The '90s, by contrast, was an era of the
investment banks waging war on the gullible.) The Money Wars is
the story of the last great buyout boom. Between 1982 and 1988,
more than ten thousand transactions were completed within the
U.S.

alone, aggregating more than $1 trillion of capitalization.
Roy Smith has written a breezy read, traversing the reader
through an important piece of U.S. history, not just business
history. Two thirds of the way through the book, after covering
early twentieth century business history, the growth of financial
engineering after WWII, the conglomerate era, the RJR-Nabisco
story, and the financial machinations of KKR, we finally meet the
star of the show, Michael Milken. The picture painted by the
author leads the reader to observe that, every now and then, an
individual comes along at the right time and place in history who
knows exactly where he or she is in that history, and leaves a
world-historical footprint as a result. Whatever one may think of
Milken's ethics or his priorities, the reader will conclude that
he is the greatest financial genius this country has produced
since J.P. Morgan.

No high-flying financial era has ever happened in this country
without the frothy market attracting common criminals, or in some
cases making criminals out of weak, but previously honest men
(and it always seems to be men). Something there is about
testosterone and money. With so many deals being done, insider
trading was inevitable. Was Michael Milken guilty of insider
trading? Probably, but in all likelihood, everybody who attended
his lavish parties, called "Predators' Balls," shared the same
information.

Why did the Justice Department go after Milken and his firm,
Drexel Burnham Lambert with such raw enthusiasm? That history has
not yet been written, but Drexel had created a lot of envy and
enemies on the Street.

When a better history of the period is written, it will be a
study in the confluence of forces that made Michael Milken's
genius possible: the sclerotic management of irrational
conglomerates, a ready market for the junk bonds Milken was
selling, and a few malcontent capitalist like Carl Icahn and Ted
Turner, who were ready and able to wage their own financial
warfare.

This book is a must read for any student of business who did not
live through any of these fascination financial eras.
Roy C. Smith is a professor of entrepreneurship, finance and
international business at NYU, and teaches on the faculty there
of the Stern School of Business. Prior to 1987, he was a partner
at Goldman Sachs. He received a B.S. from the Naval Academy in
1960 and an M.B.A. from Harvard in 1966.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *