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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Tuesday, January 19, 2016, Vol. 17, No. 012


                            Headlines


C R O A T I A

CROATIA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Sovereign Rating, Outlook Negative


C Y P R U S

GLOBAL MARITIME: Knowles of Dean Marine Advisors Tapped as CRO
GLOBAL MARITIME: Creditors' Panel Taps CBIZ as Financial Advisor


G R E E C E

PIRAEUS BANK: Chief Executive Steps Down Following State Pressure


I T A L Y

RHINO BONDCO: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC DE 2007-I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D'
EURO-GALAXY IV: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
* NETHERLANDS: Business Bankruptcies Down to 5,266 in 2015


P O R T U G A L

NOVO BANCO: PM Raises Concerns Over Treatment of Bondholders


R U S S I A

ROSGOSSTRAKH OOO: S&P Withdraws 'BB-' Counterparty Credit Rating


S E R B I A

SERBIA: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB-/B' Ratings


S L O V E N I A

PROBANKA: Liquidation to be Completed Ahead Of Schedule


S P A I N

ABENGOA SA: Plans to Trim Business by 30% Under Viability Plan
AYT CAJAGRANADA I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to D
CAJAMAR 1: DBRS Assigns Prov. C(sf) Rating to Series B Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BERNARD MATTHEWS: 2015 Sales Down Despite Turnaround Efforts
BLACON COMMUNITY: Places Into Liquidation
BOLTON WANDERERS: Set to Avoid Administration
CODERE FINANCE: N.Y. Court Recognizes U.K. Restructuring Scheme
MAGNI FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating to Class D Notes

TATA STEEL UK: To Cut 1,050 Jobs at Port Talbot Plant
* UK: Cos. in "Significant" Financial Distress Up 17% in 2015


                            *********


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C R O A T I A
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CROATIA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Sovereign Rating, Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB' long-term
and 'B' short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings on the Republic of Croatia.  The outlook remains
negative.

RATIONALE

"We remain concerned about Croatia's public finances because the
deficit has not been contained and general government debt as a
share of GDP continues to increase.  A period of uncertainty
followed the November 2015 parliamentary election, since neither
the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) nor the Social Democratic
Party was able to secure a majority; and a third party, MOST,
emerged.  Following weeks of negotiations, a non-partisan prime
minister designate, Tihomir Oreskovic, has been tasked with
forming a new government, which will likely consist of the
centre-right HDZ and MOST.  As the new government takes shape,
its reform priorities and the speed at which it addresses them
will be crucial factors, in S&P's view.  S&P continues to see a
risk that the policy response and the momentum of reform could be
insufficient to reverse the upward trajectory of debt.  This, in
turn, would cast further doubts on the ability of Croatia's
political institutions to implement effective policies that would
deliver sustainable public finances and promote balanced economic
growth.  S&P's affirmation of the ratings rests on the assumption
that HDZ and MOST will form a coalition government by the end of
January.

The ratings are constrained by Croatia's weak growth prospects
and the public sector's dominant and inefficient role in the
economy, due to a backlog of unimplemented structural and fiscal
reforms. In addition, high and increasing public-sector debt,
partly owing to loss-making state-owned enterprises, jeopardizes
the long-term sustainability of Croatia's public finances.

The ratings are supported by slightly decreasing external debt
because of deleveraging in the financial sector, which somewhat
offsets that of the public sector, which is mounting.  S&P's
assessment of Croatia's institutional framework as a neutral
factor derives partly from the country's EU membership, including
in particular the EU's deficit monitoring function through its
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP).  However, S&P has seen little
progress in terms of fiscal consolidation in Croatia since the
beginning of the EDP in 2013,and S&P thinks there's a high
likelihood that Croatia will not meet its EDP deficit correction
deadline in 2016.

That said, economic growth has picked up, and S&P has revised its
2015 growth forecast for Croatia to 0.9%, compared with 0.2% in
July 2015.  Croatia's recovery last year was underpinned by a
small rebound in consumption, supported by changes to the
personal income tax system, low inflation, and rising employment.
In addition, positive net exports -- helped by continued recovery
in the eurozone -- and a strong tourism season supported growth.
Nevertheless, S&P expects growth to remain relatively weak over
2016-2019 at an average of 1.4%, thereby lagging that of peers
with similar income levels.

However, S&P continues to see downside risks to its GDP forecast,
for instance, if the recovery in the eurozone, Croatia's main
trading partner, were to falter.  At the same time, deleveraging
pressures in all sectors persist and may increase the drag on
investments.

Croatia's institutions have so far been unable to effectively
respond to the mounting economic and fiscal challenges.  After
weeks of political uncertainty, a prime minister designate has
been appointed and formation of the government is underway.  S&P
anticipates that the new government will be formed this month and
will aim to address structural issues to improve Croatia's
competitiveness while containing the fiscal deficit.  In that
regard, presenting a credible 2016 budget will be an important
first step, in S&P's view.

That said, S&P does not expect Croatia will meet its target for
EDP exit in 2016, but that the budget deficit could decline
gradually toward the 3% EDP target beyond 2018.  In 2015, slow
reform momentum regarding state-owned enterprises and pre-
election measures -- such as changes to personal income tax rates
and debt relief for the very poor -- will have likely left the
deficit unchanged at over 5% of GDP, where it has been since
2009. Croatia's future consolidation path will depend on the new
government's fiscal plans.

Consistent with S&P's budgetary forecast and excluding potential
measures by the new government, it expects net general government
debt will increase to 83% by 2018.  Contingent liabilities, in
particular, resulting from the vulnerable financial situation of
state-owned enterprises, could increase this ratio, although much
of Croatia's quasi government debt is included in general
government debt under the European System of Accounts' 2010
framework.  In addition, foreign currency debt currently
represents 73% of general government debt, making Croatia
sensitive to changes in global monetary conditions and sentiment,
which could push up interest rates and result in higher debt-
servicing costs.

However, Croatia's external accounts are improving, and S&P
expects the current account to remain in surplus at least until
2018.  S&P estimates a current account surplus of 0.8% of GDP in
2015, aided by lower oil prices and stronger growth, particularly
from tourism.  The actual figure could be substantially higher
because of a much lower primary income deficit, owing to
legislation allowing conversion of Swiss-franc-denominated
mortgage loans into kuna or euro loans.  Still, S&P expects the
current account surplus will gradually decline toward zero in
2018 as domestic consumption and imports accelerate.

S&P believes Croatia's external metrics will keep strengthening
over the next several years, owing to increased export receipts
(46% of GDP in 2014 compared with 38% in 2008); a slight surplus
on the capital account stemming from EU funds, earmarked at
EUR8.6 billion or 20% of 2014 GDP in the 2014-2020 programming
period; and a slight pickup of equity and portfolio investments.
Gross external financing needs could decline to 98% in 2018 from
100% of current account receipts plus usable reserves in 2015.
But general government external debt will likely increase to an
estimated 31% of GDP in 2015, up from 14% in 2008, although
financial sector external debt remains at about 20% of GDP.

In September 2015, the government enacted legislation to enable
borrowers to convert Swiss-franc-denominated mortgage loans into
euro- or kuna-denominated loans.  Conversion is mandatory for
banks on the borrower's request.  S&P expects this step will
significantly hamper Croatian banks' profitability in the coming
years, and banks have already reported losses of Croation kuna
(HRK) 7 billion (about EUR1 billion) to HRK8 billion in 2015.
Nonperforming loans remain high at about 17% of total loans, but
conversion of Swiss-franc-denominated mortgage loans into euro
and kuna should help stabilize this ratio.  The Croatian National
Bank is committed to the kuna-euro peg, which limits monetary
policy flexibility, as does the high use of the euro in the
economy.  More than 70% of loans and 60% of deposits are
denominated in or linked to a foreign currency, usually the euro.
In addition, several years of deleveraging continue to hamper the
predominantly foreign-owned Croatian banking system.

OUTLOOK

The negative outlook reflects S&P's view that there is at least a
one-in-three possibility that it could lower its ratings on
Croatia in the next 6-12 months.

S&P could lower the ratings if government policies do not
robustly counter Croatia's entrenched fiscal and economic hurdles
after the new government is formed, which S&P expects will take
place this month.  In addition, S&P could lower the ratings if it
considered that the Croatian National Bank's effectiveness or
credibility was being undermined if increased euroization weakens
its policy transmission mechanism.

On the other hand, meaningful progress in addressing key
structural economic and budgetary challenges could lead S&P to
revise the outlook to stable, as would an increasingly
substantial and sustained return to economic growth

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and
explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating
factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant
criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were
considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

All key rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                  Rating
                                  To                 From
Croatia (Republic of)
Sovereign credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency    BB/Negative/B      BB/Negative/B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment     BBB                BBB
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign Currency                BB                 BB
Short-Term Debt
  Local Currency                  B                  B



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C Y P R U S
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GLOBAL MARITIME: Knowles of Dean Marine Advisors Tapped as CRO
--------------------------------------------------------------
GMI USA Management Inc. and its debtor-affiliates seek
authorization from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York to employ Justin Knowles of Dean Marine
Advisors as chief restructuring officer, nunc pro tunc to
September 15, 2015.

The Debtors first engaged Mr. Knowles in September 2015 to
provide services as CRO for for the Debtors.  Their decision to
appoint a CRO is primarily due to a desire to have an independent
professional engaged to manage their affairs. Mr. Knowles's
appointment as CRO is intended to provide the Court and the
Debtors' creditors with an independent party to manage and
operate the affairs of the Debtors under the auspices of the
Court where Mr. Knowles's primary fiduciary duties will be to the
Court and the Debtors' estate and its creditors.

Since that time, and in accordance with the Services Agreement,
Mr. Knowles' services include:

   (a) acting as the Debtors' CRO until further Court order;

   (b) acting as the Debtors' sole manager;

   (c) being a signatory on the Debtors' DIP Operating Accounts;

   (d) exercising authority to manage the business affairs of
       the Debtors, including, without limitation:

       -- making all decisions regarding the hiring and firing of
          personnel;

       -- making all decisions regarding the expenses incurred by
          Debtors, and the terms of disbursements made by Debtors
          for same;

       -- authorizing the repairs and maintenance of estate
          assets.

   (e) representing the Debtors at negotiation and liaison
       meetings, correspondence and calls with members of the
       Debtors' board of directors, the Debtors' management and
       employees, lenders and their advisors, the Debtors'
       creditors, and the Debtors' professional advisors.

   (f) making all reasonable efforts to consult with all secured
       creditors, unsecured creditors, parties-in-interest, the
       US Trustee, and the Committee;

   (g) making all reasonable efforts to present to the UST all
       Information required for the Initial Debtor's Conference;

   (h) making all reasonable efforts to assist bankruptcy counsel
       in preparing and filing schedules, statements of financial
       affairs, amendments thereto, and monthly operating reports
       on a timely basis;

   (i) investigating and pursuing all available chapter 5 causes
       of action and non-chapter 5 causes of action against
       creditors, whether they be insiders or non-insiders,
       members, and other potential defendants unless such
       causes of action are transferred via a chapter 11 plan to
       a creditors' trust;

   (j) causing the Debtors to pay all UST Quarterly fees on a
       timely basis;

   (k) attending court hearings, depositions, and similar
       meetings in connection with the Debtors affairs; and

   (l) making all reasonable efforts to assist bankruptcy counsel
       in facilitating an orderly wind-down of the Debtors.

Mr. Knowles's daily rate will be $5,000 per day, which may be
recorded in increments of half a day.

Mr. Knowles will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

Mr. Knowles assured the Court that his firm is a "disinterested
person" as the term is defined in Section 101(14) of the
Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any interest adverse to
the Debtors and their estates.

Mr. Knowles can be reached at:

       Justin Knowles
       DEAN MARINE ADVISERS
       9-10 St. Andrew Square
       Edinburgh, UK EH2 2AF
       Tel: +44 (0) 7562 601095
       E-mail: justin.knowles@deanmarineadvisers.co.uk

                     About GMI USA Management

GMI USA Management, Inc., Global Maritime Investments Cyprus
Limited, Global Maritime Investments Holdings Cyprus Limited,
Global Maritime Investments Resources (Singapore) Pte. Limited
and Global Maritime Investments Vessel Holdings Pte Ltd filed
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case Nos. 15-
12552 to 15-12556) on Sept. 15, 2015.

The Debtors are engaged in three segments of the dry bulk
shipping markets, utilizing Freight Forward Agreements, physical
"trading" or supplying of ships for hire, and management of a dry
bulk shipping pool on behalf of ships owned directly or
indirectly by the Debtors, as well as for third party owners.

Debtor GMI USA Management is a recently formed New York
corporation.  All of the other Debtors are foreign corporations
based in either Singapore or Cyprus.

Global Maritime Investments Holdings Cyprus Limited is a holding
company that owns 100% of the outstanding shares of each of (i)
Debtor GMI USA Management, Inc., (ii) Debtor Cyprus Tradeco,
(iii) Debtor Vessel Holdings and (iv) non-Debtor GMI Panamax Pool
Limited.

The Debtors estimated assets in the range of $1 million to $10
million and liabilities of at least $100 million.

The Debtors tapped Gardere Wynne Sewell, LLP, as counsel, and AMA
Capital Parnters as financial advisor.


GLOBAL MARITIME: Creditors' Panel Taps CBIZ as Financial Advisor
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of GMI USA
Management Inc. and its debtor-affiliates seeks authorization
from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York to retain CBIZ Accounting, Tax and Advisory of New York, LLC
and CBIZ, Inc. as financial advisor to the Committee, effective
November 25, 2015.

The Committee requires CBIZ to:

   (a) assist the Committee in its evaluation of the Debtors'
       post-petition cash flow and/or other projections and
       budgets prepared by the Debtors or its financial advisors;

   (b) monitor the Debtors' activities regarding cash
       expenditures and general business operations subsequent to
       the filing of the petition under Chapter 11, as well as
       assist the Committee in its review of monthly operating
       reports;

   (c) assist the Committee with any investigation into the pre-
       petition acts, conduct, property, liabilities and
       financial condition of the Debtor, its management, or
       creditors, including the operation of the Debtors'
       businesses, as instructed by the Committee.

   (d) analyze transactions with creditors, insiders, related
       and/or affiliated companies, subsequent and prior to the
       date of the filing of the petition under Chapter 11, as
       instructed by the Committee;

   (e) if applicable, provide financial analysis related to any
       debtor in possession financing, including advising the
       Committee concerning such matters;

   (f) if applicable, assist the Committee and its counsel in any
       litigation proceedings against other potential adversaries
       of the Debtors' estates;

   (g) assist the Committee in its review of the financial
       aspects of any proposed asset purchase agreement,
       including searching for and evaluating any competing
       offers. Evaluating the feasibility of any plan of
       reorganization/liquidation. If applicable, assist the
       Committee in negotiating are developing alternative
       recovery strategies for unsecured creditors;

   (h) attend meetings with representatives of the Committee and
       its Counsel. Prepare presentations to the Committee that
       provides analyses and updates on diligence performed; and

   (i) perform any other services that may be necessary in our
       role as financial advisors to the Committee or that may be
       requested by the Committee or its counsel.

CBIZ will be paid at these hourly rates:

       Directors and Managing Directors          $435-$750
       Managers and Senior Managers              $325-$435
       Senior Associates and Staff               $150-$325

CBIZ will also be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses incurred.

Charles Berk, managing director of CBIZ, assured the Court that
the firm is a "disinterested person" as the term is defined in
Section 101(14) of the Bankruptcy Code and does not represent any
interest adverse to the Debtors and their estates.

CBIZ can be reached at:

       Charles Berk
       CBIZ ACCOUNTING, TAX AND ADVISORY OF
       NEW YORK, LLC AND CBIZ, INC.
       5 Bryant Park
       New York, NY 10018
       Tel: (212) 790-5883
       Fax: (212) 790-5909
       E-mail: cberk@cbiz.com

                     About GMI USA Management

GMI USA Management, Inc., Global Maritime Investments Cyprus
Limited, Global Maritime Investments Holdings Cyprus Limited,
Global Maritime Investments Resources (Singapore) Pte. Limited
and Global Maritime Investments Vessel Holdings Pte Ltd filed
Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case Nos. 15-
12552 to 15-12556) on Sept. 15, 2015.

The Debtors are engaged in three segments of the dry bulk
shipping markets, utilizing Freight Forward Agreements, physical
"trading" or supplying of ships for hire, and management of a dry
bulk shipping pool on behalf of ships owned directly or
indirectly by the Debtors, as well as for third party owners.

Debtor GMI USA Management is a recently formed New York
corporation.  All of the other Debtors are foreign corporations
based in either Singapore or Cyprus.

Global Maritime Investments Holdings Cyprus Limited is a holding
company that owns 100% of the outstanding shares of each of (i)
Debtor GMI USA Management, Inc., (ii) Debtor Cyprus Tradeco,
(iii) Debtor Vessel Holdings and (iv) non-Debtor GMI Panamax Pool
Limited.

The Debtors estimated assets in the range of $1 million to $10
million and liabilities of at least $100 million.

The Debtors tapped Gardere Wynne Sewell, LLP, as counsel, and AMA
Capital Partners as financial advisor.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


PIRAEUS BANK: Chief Executive Steps Down Following State Pressure
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Kerin Hope at The Financial Times reports that Anthimos
Thomopoulos, the chief executive of Greece's Piraeus Bank,
resigned on Jan. 15, yielding to pressure from state authorities
that have taken a confrontational stance towards foreign
investors.

According to the FT, three senior bankers said government
officials had insisted Mr. Thomopoulos should leave Piraeus,
widely seen as the weakest of the country's big four banks.
About half of the loans on its balance sheet are non-performing,
the FT notes.

Mr. Paulson voiced concern about political interference in
Piraeus Bank after reports that the Hellenic Financial Stability
Fund, the country's formally independent bank rescue facility,
had passed on a government request for Mr. Thomopoulos to go, the
FT relates.  The institution holds a 25% stake in Piraeus, the FT
discloses.

In an interview last year with the FT, Mr. Paulson said he had
been working to "save" Piraeus from collapse.

One banker, as cited by the FT, said government officials were
particularly incensed by a presentation to Greek officials of a
Deutsche Bank proposal to split Piraeus into "good" and "bad"
banks and recapitalize the "good" bank with fresh funds from
abroad.

Headquartered in Athens, Piraeus Bank S.A., together with its
subsidiaries, provides various banking products and services in
the Southeastern Europe, Greece, Western Europe, and Egypt.

                           *   *   *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 8,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it revised its
long-term counterparty credit rating on Greece-based Piraeus Bank
S.A. to 'SD' (selective default) from 'D'.  S&P also raised its
issue rating on the senior unsecured debt to 'CCC+' from 'D' and
its issue rating on the subordinated debt to 'CC' from 'D' on its
EUR25 billion euro medium-term note (EMTN) program.  S&P also
raised the short-term rating to 'C' from 'D' on Piraeus' EUR25
billion EMTN program and on its EUR5 billion commercial paper
program.

The rating action follows Piraeus' completion of a EUR4.93
billion capital raising plan.  The bank has covered EUR1.94
billion through private funds, by completing a capital increase
and a distressed exchange on its senior unsecured, subordinated,
and preferred securities.  About EUR271 million consisted of
mitigating measures accepted by the ECB.  In addition, the
Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) will provide
EUR2.72 billion of the residual capital needed, of which 25% will
come through equity and 75% by acquiring contingent convertible
bonds to be issued by Piraeus.

S&P's 'SD' rating on Piraeus reflects S&P's view that the bank is
still unable to completely fulfill its deposit obligations in a
timely manner, due to the capital controls being imposed in
Greece.



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I T A L Y
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RHINO BONDCO: S&P Puts 'B' CCR on CreditWatch Positive
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on Rhino Bondco SpA, an intermediary
holding company of Italy-incorporated distributor of components
for private and commercial vehicles Rhiag-Inter Auto Parts Italia
SpA (collectively Rhiag), on CreditWatch with positive
implications.

At the same time, S&P placed its 'B' issue rating on Rhiag's
EUR265 million and EUR200 million senior secured notes on
CreditWatch positive.  The recovery rating remains at '4',
reflecting S&P's expectation of average recovery in the lower
half of the 30%-50% range.

The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement on Dec. 22,
2015, of the agreement to sell Rhiag group to the U.S.-based
replacement auto parts provider LKQ Corp. (BB+/Watch Neg/--).
The transaction values Rhiag at EUR1.04 billion including debt
and is subject to anti-trust approvals, which the company expects
to receive in the second quarter of 2016.

S&P expects that Rhiag's credit profile will benefit from the
acquisition by financially stronger LKQ Corp., which had an
adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 2.6x at the end of 2014 compared
with Rhiag's 6.0x.  S&P will need to assess Rhiag's strategic
importance to the LKQ group to form a view on its credit quality
post-transaction.

Rhiag's bond and revolving credit facility documentation contains
a change of control clause that could, however, remain
inactivated as long as the consolidated leverage post-transaction
is below 4.0x.  S&P currently don't know what Rhiag's capital
structure will be post-transaction.  However, if the change of
control clause were triggered, S&P assumes that the refinancing
would be managed in a timely manner by the parent.

S&P's current rating on Rhiag reflects S&P's view of its highly
leveraged financial risk profile and fair business risk profile.

S&P expects to resolve the CreditWatch placement over the next 90
days at which point it will need to assess any changes to Rhiag's
capital structure as well as Rhiag's status within the wider LKQ
group.  S&P thinks that the rating upside could be more than one
notch.



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N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


E-MAC DE 2007-I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'D'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from
'CCC- (sf)' its credit rating on E-MAC DE 2007-I B.V.'s class D
notes.

Cumulative losses over the original portfolio balance for E-MAC
DE 2007-I have increased to 7.15% at the end of November 2015, up
from 4.47% in May 2014.  The collateral pool's poor performance
resulted in the reserve fund being depleted in November 2013.
This has reduced the available credit enhancement for all classes
of notes.

Due to the increased cumulative net losses, E-MAC DE 2007-I's
class D notes missed their interest payments on the November 2015
interest payment date.  Consequently, S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on this class of notes in line with
its criteria.

The transaction is a true sale German residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transaction originated by GMAC-RFC Bank GmbH.
CMIS Investments B.V. is the mortgage payment transaction
provider, and Hypotheken Management GmbH acts as sub-servicer for
primary servicing, and Adaxio AMC GmbH and Paulus Westerwelle as
delinquent loan servicers.

RATINGS LIST

E-MAC DE 2007-I B.V.
EUR569.9 mil mortgage-backed floating-rate notes

                                          Rating     Rating
Class             Identifier              To         From
D                 XS0322557520            D (sf)     CCC- (sf)


EURO-GALAXY IV: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on Class F Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
Euro-Galaxy IV CLO B.V.'s class A-1D, A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C, D,
E, and F notes following the transaction's effective date as of
Nov. 11, 2015.

Most European cash flow collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
close before purchasing the full amount of their targeted level
of portfolio collateral.  On the closing date, the collateral
manager typically covenants to purchase the remaining collateral
within the guidelines specified in the transaction documents to
reach the target level of portfolio collateral.  Typically, the
CLO transaction documents specify a date by which the targeted
level of portfolio collateral must be reached.  The "effective
date" for a CLO transaction is usually the earlier of the date on
which the transaction acquires the target level of portfolio
collateral, or the date defined in the transaction documents.
Most transaction documents contain provisions directing the
trustee to request the rating agencies that have issued ratings
upon closing to affirm the ratings issued on the closing date
after reviewing the effective date portfolio (typically referred
to as an "effective date rating affirmation").

An effective date rating affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that
the portfolio collateral purchased by the issuer, as reported to
S&P by the trustee and collateral manager, in combination with
the transaction's structure, provides sufficient credit support
to maintain the ratings that S&P assigned on the transaction's
closing date.  The effective date reports provide a summary of
certain information that S&P used in its analysis and the results
of its review based on the information presented to S&P.

S&P believes the transaction may see some benefit from allowing a
window of time after the closing date for the collateral manager
to acquire the remaining assets for a CLO transaction.  This
window of time is typically referred to as a "ramp-up period".
Because some CLO transactions may acquire most of their assets
from the new-issue leveraged loan market, the ramp-up period may
give collateral managers the flexibility to acquire a more
diverse portfolio of assets.

For a CLO that has not purchased its full target level of
portfolio collateral by the closing date, S&P's ratings on the
closing date and prior to S&P's effective date review are
generally based on the application of its criteria to a
combination of purchased collateral, collateral committed to be
purchased, and the indicative portfolio of assets provided to S&P
by the collateral manager, and may also reflect its assumptions
about the transaction's investment guidelines.  This is because
not all assets in the portfolio have been purchased.

"When we receive a request to issue an effective date rating
affirmation, we perform quantitative and qualitative analysis of
the transaction in accordance with our criteria to assess whether
the initial ratings remain consistent with the credit enhancement
based on the effective date collateral portfolio.  Our analysis
relies on the use of CDO Evaluator to estimate a scenario default
rate at each rating level based on the effective date portfolio,
cash flow modeling to determine the appropriate percentile break-
even default rate at each rating level, the application of S&P's
supplemental tests, and the analytical judgment of a rating
committee," S&P said.

"In our published effective date report, we discuss our analysis
of the information provided by the transaction's trustee and
collateral manager in support of their request for effective date
rating affirmation.  In most instances, we intend to publish an
effective date report each time we issue an effective date rating
affirmation on a publicly rated European cash flow CLO," S&P
noted.

On an ongoing basis, after S&P issues an effective date rating
affirmation, it will periodically review whether, in its view,
the current ratings on the notes remain consistent with the
credit quality of the assets, the credit enhancement available to
support the notes, and other factors, and take rating actions as
S&P deems necessary.

RATINGS LIST

Euro-Galaxy IV CLO B.V.
EUR335.05 mil delayed draw and floating- and fixed-rate notes

                                    Rating         Rating
Class       Identifier              To             From
A-1D        XS1236640600            AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
A-1         XS1236641913            AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
A-2         XS1236642994            AAA (sf)       AAA (sf)
B-1         XS1236643703            AA (sf)        AA (sf)
B-2         XS1236644263            AA (sf)        AA (sf)
C           XS1236645740            A (sf)         A (sf)
D           XS1236647449            BBB (sf)       BBB (sf)
E           XS1236647951            BB (sf)        BB (sf)
F           XS1236648686            B- (sf)        B- (sf)


* NETHERLANDS: Business Bankruptcies Down to 5,266 in 2015
----------------------------------------------------------
Statistics Netherlands reports that the number of bankruptcies
rose by 5 in December 2015 relative to November.

According to Statistics Netherlands, in the previous three
months, the number of bankruptcies also increased.  In 2015, a
total of 5,266 businesses and institutions (excluding one-man
businesses) were faced with bankruptcy, i.e. a reduction by more
than one-fifth relative to 2014 and the lowest level in 7 years,
Statistics Netherlands discloses.

The total number of bankruptcies over the entire year 2015
amounts to 7,312 (including the 5,266 businesses and institutions
declared bankrupt last year), a decrease by nearly one-quarter
compared to 2014 and the lowest number in 7 years, Statistics
Netherlands states.

Just as in 2014, the highest number of bankruptcies was surveyed
in the sector trade in 2015, Statistics Netherlands says.
According to Statistics Netherlands, a total of 1,119 businesses
and institutions went bankrupt.  Wholesale trade and retail trade
were faced with 573 and 435 bankruptcies respectively, followed
by the sector financial services with 938 bankruptcies,
Statistics Netherlands relays.

The number of bankruptcies fell across nearly all sectors, but
most substantially in manufacturing industry, from 515 in 2014 to
350 in 2015, a reduction by 32%, Statistics Netherlands states.
In the sector specialized business services (law firms,
accounting firms, architectural firms and advertising agencies),
the number of bankruptcies was down by 29 percent year-on-year,
Statistics Netherlands discloses.  In the sectors trade and
construction, the number of bankruptcies fell by 21 and 18%
respectively, probably due to the recovering housing market,
Statistics Netherlands relates.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


NOVO BANCO: PM Raises Concerns Over Treatment of Bondholders
------------------------------------------------------------
Anabela Reis and Joao Lima at Bloomberg News report that
Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Costa said he was concerned by
the central bank's treatment of Novo Banco SA bondholders and the
possible impact on confidence in the nation's lenders.

Mr. Costa told lawmakers in parliament on Jan. 15 the government
was "apprehensive about the systemic effects" of imposing losses
on some senior bondholders.  He said these concerns were
expressed to the Bank of Portugal, Bloomberg notes.

The premier's comments deepen a divide between the government and
central bank regarding the transfer of about EUR2 billion (US$2.2
billion) of Novo Banco bonds to a bad bank late last month,
Bloomberg states.  The move sparked complaints from noteholders
about significant losses and unequal treatment, while the central
bank has said it focused Novo Banco losses on institutions to
shore up depositors' confidence, Bloomberg relates.

According to Bloomberg, the Bank of Portugal separately said it's
restarting efforts to sell Novo Banco, which emerged from the
2014 breakup of Banco Espirito Santo SA, once the nation's
largest lender by market value.  It will seek to "reinforce" the
team of financial advisers working on the sale after failing to
draw high enough bids last year, Bloomberg states.

Novo Banco noteholders were blindsided by the bond transfer
because the central bank had said it could fill a capital
shortfall at the lender through measures including asset sales,
Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Costa, as cited by Bloomberg, said there are "certainly" no
benefits in bondholders discovering that "what they considered to
be protected wasn't protected".

Headquartered in Lisbon, Novo Banco, S.A. provides various
financial products and services to private, corporate, and
institutional customers.

                         *     *     *

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 6,
2016, Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Caa1 from B2 the
senior debt and long-term deposit ratings of Portugal's Novo
Banco, S.A. and its supported entities.  This follows the Bank of
Portugal's (BoP) announcement on Dec. 29, 2015, that it had
approved the recapitalization of Novo Banco by transferring
EUR1,985 million of senior debt back to Banco Espirito Santo,
S.A. (BES unrated).  Moody's said the outlook on Novo Banco's
deposit and senior debt ratings is now developing.

The rating agency also downgraded to C from B2 (on review for
downgrade) the rating on Novo Banco's senior debt securities
transferred to BES (ISINs PTBEQBOM0010, PTBENIOM0016,
PTBENJOM0015, PTBENKOM0012 and PTBEQKOM0019).  Subsequently,
Moody's will withdraw the ratings on these senior bonds.  The
downgrade and withdrawal have been triggered by the transfer of
these senior debt instruments to BES, a bank which is being
liquidated and for which the BoP has asked the European Central
Bank (ECB) to revoke its banking license.

At the same time, Moody's downgraded to B2(cr) from B1(cr)
Novo Banco's counterparty risk assessment (CRA) and affirmed its
short-term deposit and senior debt ratings at Not-Prime and
short-term CRA at Not Prime(cr).  Novo Banco's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) was also confirmed at caa2.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade on Novo
Banco's ratings, which was initiated on Nov. 18, 2015.

Novo Banco's Ba1 rated senior bonds, which are guaranteed by the
Republic of Portugal (Ba1 stable), are unaffected by the rating
action.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ROSGOSSTRAKH OOO: S&P Withdraws 'BB-' Counterparty Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its 'BB-' long-term
counterparty credit and financial strength ratings on
Rosgosstrakh OOO.  S&P also withdrew its 'ruAA-' Russia national
scale rating on the company.

The withdrawal reflects that Rosgosstrakh OOO was legally merged
into former parent PJSC Rosgosstrakh on Dec. 31, 2015, and no
longer exists as a separate legal entity.

Before the merger, S&P viewed Rosgosstrakh OOO as a core
subsidiary of the Rosgosstrakh group.  S&P therefore equalized
its ratings on Rosgosstrakh OOO with those on the group, which
reflected the insurer's full integration within its parent.  As
of Sept. 30, 2015, Rosgosstrakh OOO constituted 87% of the
consolidated group's total assets, accounted for close to 80% of
its total capital, and contributed more than 80% of its gross
premiums written.

Following the merger, PJSC Rosgosstrakh became the successor on
all rights and obligations of Rosgosstrakh OOO.  All insurance
contracts with Rosgosstrakh OOO have full force and effect.  PJSC
Rosgosstrakh will be liable under these contracts.  There are no
changes to the terms and conditions of these contracts.



===========
S E R B I A
===========


SERBIA: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'BB-/B' Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on the
Republic of Serbia to stable from negative.  The 'BB-/B' long-
and short-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit
ratings on Serbia were affirmed.

RATIONALE

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that risks to Serbia's
ambitious fiscal consolidation and structural reform program have
subsided somewhat.  Amid signs of modest growth, fueled by
investments, the government continues to tackle structural issues
in the economy and public sector.  S&P expects these developments
to foster investor confidence and support Serbia's still-
significant external financing needs.

The ratings on Serbia remain constrained by mounting general
government debt, which could be exacerbated by a high share of
foreign currency borrowing should the dinar depreciate.  Further
constraints include Serbia's moderate GDP per capita, large
amount of problem assets in the banking sector, and limited
monetary policy flexibility, owing to the high euroization in the
banking system.  The country's long-term economic growth
potential, particularly if supported by continued structural
reform, supports the ratings.

Serbia's government, led by Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic of
the Serbian Progressive Party, has embarked on a path of fiscal
consolidation that is well anchored by a three-year EUR1.2
billion standby agreement from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), which the authorities want to treat as a precautionary
measure. The government has cut public-sector wages and pensions,
increased electricity tariffs by 12.2%, and removed protection
from creditor claims for several state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
In addition, the government has decided to restructure, sell, or
liquidate more than 500 SOEs.  In the medium term, S&P believes
these steps will put public finances on a more sustainable path
and reduce the state's role in the economy.  During 2015,
significant steps were taken to restructure the largest SOEs,
such as the electricity provider Elektroprivreda Srbije,
Srbijagas, Serbian Railways, and Roads and Corridors of Serbia,
including reduction of employees, tariff increases, separation of
various functions, and cost savings.  However, there has been
little success in privatizing SOEs, as shown by the failed
attempt to sell TeleKom Serbia.  This demonstrates the challenges
for these companies, and S&P expects a large proportion of non-
strategic SOEs to enter into bankruptcy.

In S&P's view, the IMF's standby agreement will help anchor
policy, even though the government does not intend to draw on it.
Successful completion of the IMF's reviews will help maintain
confidence in Serbia, particularly of international investors.
Public support for the government and its fiscal measures remains
broad, and the government has not deviated significantly from its
consolidation path in the 2016 budget, ahead of local elections
this year.

Key budget measures include reducing subsidies for two public
broadcasting companies, limiting agriculture subsidies, a modest
1.25% increase in pensions, continued reduction of public-sector
employees, and a targeted increase of public employees in
selected areas, financed by higher excise taxes.

S&P believes the government's reform efforts, if they continue,
will narrow the general government deficit over time.  In 2015,
S&P estimates the general government deficit will have narrowed
to 4.1% of GDP, with a onetime boost from non-tax revenue, mainly
retroactive dividends from SOEs.  S&P expects the general
government deficit to remain at a similar level in 2016, taking
into account onetime costs related to severance and pension
payments for public-sector employees.  In addition to the 9,000
headcount reduction at the beginning of this year, the government
has committed to reducing the number of public employees by a
further 20,000 during 2016.

Fiscal performance has been weak since 2009, with general
government deficits averaging 5.5% of GDP between 2009 and 2014.
Moreover, the headline deficit masks Serbia's even weaker fiscal
situation, since general government debt almost doubled (up by
9.7% of GDP on average) in the same period, due to additional
liabilities transferred to the government's balance sheet from
SOEs.  S&P expects the two ratios to be closer together in the
future as SOEs are restructured and hidden costs are brought onto
the government's balance sheet.

The government has said it will not provide further aid to the
SOEs during the restructuring process.  S&P expects general
government debt to peak at 78% of GDP in 2016, taking into
account further calls on state guarantees.

After contracting by 1.8% in 2014, mainly due to floods, the
Serbian economy will have shown modest growth in 2015.  The key
driver for the recovery is investment inflows, mainly from
foreign direct investment (FDI).  Net exports, although having
increased, contributed less to growth, mainly due to the import
of equipment and other investment goods.  The two largest
exporters, Fiat and Zelezara Smederevo steel mill, both increased
production in 2015. While S&P expects investment activity and
industrial production to accelerate, fiscal consolidation will
depress private and public consumption.

That said, structural reforms (namely to labor, pension,
corporate bankruptcy, and privatization laws), if implemented,
could stimulate growth further.  This underpins our expectation
of average medium-term economic growth of 2.1% between 2016 and
2018. Although S&P forecasts Serbia's average per capita growth
over this period to be slightly higher at about 2.7%, due to the
population shrinking at an estimated 0.5% per year, GDP per
capita declined to $5,300 in 2015, lower than that of Serbia's EU
neighbors, due to the dinar's depreciation against the dollar.
S&P expects GDP per capita to recover to close to $6,200 by 2018
if modest economic growth continues.  Lower wealth and income
levels also indicate Serbia's untapped growth potential,
particularly in the development of new export facilities.  The
expansion in auto production shows that foreign investment can be
channeled into transforming former state industrial assets and
leveraging Serbia's lower cost structures to build competitive
industries.

In 2015, export growth and higher remittances helped narrow the
current account deficit.  S&P estimates the deficit at about 4%
of GDP for the year and expect that FDI will have financed the
gap, in view of the 35% year-on-year increase in FDI in the first
10 months of 2015.  With the opening of two chapters of EU
accession in late 2015, S&P expects that FDI inflows will
continue.  S&P believes FDI financing to the current account is
more sustainable and stable.  However, given still-high gross
external debt (estimated at 84% of GDP in 2015), external
financing remains a constraint to Serbia's creditworthiness.
Gross external financing needs should remain roughly equal to
current account receipts (CARs) plus usable reserves.  S&P
expects narrow net external debt (gross external debt net of
financial sector assets and reserves) will decline gradually to
about 63% of CARs in 2018 from 69% in 2015.

Another external vulnerability is that 79% of general government
debt is denominated in foreign currency.  This makes Serbia's
debt-to-GDP ratio more sensitive to exchange-rate fluctuations.

Such fluctuations have prompted the central bank, National Bank
of Serbia (NBS), to pursue a more interventionist monetary policy
than its inflation targeting would suggest.  Inflation has
exceeded the NBS' target range of 2.5%-5.5% several times over
the past 10 years.  More recently, lower imported inflation,
particularly regarding oil and food, and the absence of regulated
price increases have led to lower inflation rates than targeted.

The NBS' Special Diagnostic Studies (SDS) report indicates that
the banking sector remains adequately capitalized and has
sufficient liquidity.  Nonperforming loans (NPLs) accounted for
22% of total loans at the end of September 2015, but could be
higher according to the SDS report.  Corporate NPLs have been
declining as the manufacturing sector recovers, while household
NPLs continue to climb.  Despite the central bank's accommodative
monetary policy, credit losses continue to weaken banks'
profitability and limit lending to the recovering economy.

OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that potential upside from
Serbia's stronger economic growth outlook and better fiscal
performance, if fiscal and structural reforms are implemented,
balance risks associated with still-significant external
financing needs, high general government debt, and limited
monetary policy flexibility.

S&P could raise the ratings if the government perseveres with
fiscal consolidation and implements structure reforms, builds a
track record of effective economic and fiscal management, and
continues Serbia's economic and institutional integration with
the EU.

S&P could lower the ratings if the reform momentum falters, as
shown for example by delays to restructuring the SOE sector or
rising fiscal deficits.  S&P could also consider lowering the
ratings if it saw deterioration of the conditions necessary for
Serbia to meet its external financing needs.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision. After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and
explained the recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating
factors and critical issues in accordance with the relevant
criteria. Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were
considered and discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee agreed that the external assessment and fiscal
assessment regarding debt burden had improved.  All other key
rating factors were unchanged.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                      Rating          Rating
                                      To              From
Serbia (Republic of)
Sovereign credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency          BB-/Stable/B    BB-/Neg./B
Transfer & Convertibility Assessment BB              BB
Senior Unsecured
  Foreign Currency                    BB-             BB-



===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


PROBANKA: Liquidation to be Completed Ahead Of Schedule
-------------------------------------------------------
english.sta.si reports that the controlled liquidation of
Probanka could be concluded in a matter of a few months,
according to an official of the small privately-owned bank which
collapsed under the load of bad loans during the crisis.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ABENGOA SA: Plans to Trim Business by 30% Under Viability Plan
--------------------------------------------------------------
Rodrigo Orihuela, Macarena Munoz and Charles Penty at Bloomberg
News report that Abengoa SA, the Spanish renewable energy firm
fighting to avoid bankruptcy, plans to shrink itself by about a
third under a business plan aimed at convincing creditors it can
survive as a smaller company.

According to Bloomberg, a person familiar with the matter said
the company will reduce revenue by about 30% from the EUR7.15
billion (US$7.80 billion) it recorded in 2014 while also paring
back its geographic reach as part of a viability plan to be
presented to banks and creditors.

The person, as cited by Bloomberg, said the company is also
seeking to divest assets without selling its largest
subsidiaries.

Abengoa last month received a EUR106 million credit-line from
banks to help it get it through the end of the year, Bloomberg
recounts.  It's working with auditors and financial advisers,
including KPMG and Alvarez & Marsal, on mapping its debt and
outlining a recovery plan, Bloomberg discloses.

The person said both KPMG, which is working with the banks, and
Alvarez & Marsal, working for Abengoa, have concluded that the
company needs less than EUR100 million per month in credit-lines
for the first quarter, Bloomberg notes.

Under the divestment program, Abengoa will seek to hold on to
units including Abengoa Solar and Abengoa Water, even though it
may sell assets from the units, Bloomberg says.

The person said the company will be open to selling Abengoa
Bionenergia because making biofuels isn't part of the company's
core business, Bloomberg relates.

Abengoa SA is a Spanish renewable-energy company.


                        *       *       *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 21,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'SD'
(selective default) from 'CCC-' its long-term corporate credit
rating on Spanish engineering and construction company Abengoa
S.A.  S&P also lowered the short-term corporate credit rating on
Abengoa to 'SD' from 'C'.  S&P said the downgrade reflects
Abengoa's failure to pay scheduled maturities under its EUR750
million Euro-Commercial Paper Program.


AYT CAJAGRANADA I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to D
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' from
'CC (sf)' its credit rating on AyT CajaGranada Hipotecario I
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class D notes.

The level of cumulative defaults over the original portfolio
balance increased to 5.72% on the December 2015 interest payment
date from 4.57% a year earlier.  Under the transaction documents,
the class D notes' interest deferral trigger is based on the
level of cumulative defaults over the original securitized
balance.  Due to the increase in the level of defaults over the
past year, the class D notes breached their 5.50% interest
deferral trigger on the December 2015 interest payment date.
Consequently, the class D notes' interest is unpaid.

S&P's ratings in AyT CajaGranada Hipotecario I address the timely
payment of interest and principal during the transaction's life.
S&P has therefore lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CC (sf)' its rating
on the class D notes.

AyT CajaGranada Hipotecario I is a Spanish residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transaction, which closed in June 2007.
The transaction securitizes a pool of first-ranking mortgage
loans that Caja de Ahorros de Granada (now Banco Mare Nostrum
S.A.) originated.  The mortgage loans are mainly located in the
region of Andalusia and the transaction comprises loans granted
to Spanish residents.


CAJAMAR 1: DBRS Assigns Prov. C(sf) Rating to Series B Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited (DBRS) assigned provisional ratings to the
following notes to be issued by IM BCC Cajamar 1 (Cajamar 1 or
the Issuer):

-- EUR615,000,000 Series A at A (high) (sf)
-- EUR135,000,000 Series B at C (sf) (collectively, the Notes)

The Issuer is expected to be a securitization of residential
mortgage loans secured by first- and second-ranking lien
mortgages on properties in Spain originated by Cajamar. At the
closing of the transaction, the Issuer will use the proceeds of
the Series A and Series B notes to fund the purchase of the
mortgage portfolio from the Seller, Cajamar. Cajamar will also be
the servicer of the portfolio. In addition, Cajamar will provide
a subordinated loan to fund for the initial expenses while Banco
de Credito Cooperativo will provide a subordinate loan to fund
the Reserve Fund. The securitization will take place in the form
of a fund, in accordance with Spanish Securitisation Law.

The ratings are based upon a review by DBRS of the following
analytical considerations:

-- The transaction's capital structure and the form and
    sufficiency of available credit enhancement. The Series A
    notes benefit from EUR135 million (18%) subordination of the
    Series B notes and the EUR22.5 million (3%) Reserve Fund,
    which is available to cover senior fees as well as interest
    and principal of the Series A notes until paid in full. The
    Reserve Fund target will remain at 3% of the initial balance
    of the Series A and Series B notes. The Series A notes will
    benefit from full sequential amortization, where principal on
    the Series B notes will not be paid until the Series A notes
    have been redeemed in full. Additionally, the Series A
    principal will be senior to the Series B interest payments in
    the priority of payments.

-- DBRS was provided with the provisional portfolio equal to
    EUR816 million as of December 31, 2015. At closing, the
    portfolio balance will be equal to the balance of the Notes
   (EUR750 million) by removing a random selection of covered
    bond eligible loans from the provisional portfolio. The main
    characteristics of the portfolio includes: (1) 68.7%
    weighted-average current loan-to-value (WACLTV) and 79.9%
    indexed WACLTV (INE Q3 2015); (2) the top three geographical
    concentration are in Andalucia (38.9%), Murcia (23.7%) and
    Valencia (13.2%); (3) 10.0% of the borrowers are classified
    as self-employed; (4) 4.1% of the borrowers are non-
    nationals; (5) weighted-average loan seasoning of 5.3 years;
   (6) the weighted-average remaining term of the portfolio is
    25.7 years with 50.1% of the loans having a remaining term
    greater than 30 years; and (7) 4.2% of the loans are second
    liens where the first lien is also included in the
    securitized portfolio.

-- The loans are floating-rate mortgages primarily linked to 12-
    month Euribor (97.8%). Sixty percent of the portfolio is
    subject to an interest rate cap ranging from 5.0% to 28.0%,
    but most are capped at 15.0%. The Notes are floating-rate
    liabilities indexed to one-month Euribor. DBRS considers
    there is limited basis risk in the transaction, which is
    mitigated by (1) the payment frequency of the loans of which
    97.8% are monthly, 1.4% pay semi-annually and the remainder
    either quarterly or annually and (2) the amounts credited to
    the Reserve Fund. DBRS stressed the interest rates as
    described in the DBRS methodology "Unified Interest Rate
    Model for European Securitisations."

-- The credit quality of the mortgages backing the Notes and the
    ability of the servicer to perform its servicing
    responsibilities. DBRS was provided with Cajamar's historical
    mortgage performance data separated between loans with an
    original LTV greater than 80% and loans with an original LTV
    equal to or less than 80% covering the period Q4 2010 through
    Q3 2015, as well as loan-level data for the mortgage
    portfolio. Details of the probability of default (PD), loss
    given default (LGD) and expected losses (EL) resulting from
    DBRS's credit analysis of the mortgage portfolio at A (high)
    and C (sf) stress scenarios are detailed below. In accordance
    with the transaction documentation, the servicers are able to
    grant loan modifications without consent of the management
    company within the range of permitted variations. According
    to the documentation, permitted variations for up to 10% of
    the initial portfolio balance include the reduction of the
    loan margins down to a portfolio spread equal to 1.00% and
    maturity extension up to the final payment date in September
    2055. DBRS stressed 10% of the portfolio to have a margin
    equal to 1.00% and extended the maturity up to September 2055
    in its cash flow analysis.

-- The transaction's account bank agreement and respective
    replacement trigger require Banco Santander, SA acting as the
    treasury account bank to find (1) a replacement account bank
    or (2) an account bank guarantor upon loss of an "A" rating.
    DBRS concluded that the assigned ratings are consistent with
    the account bank criteria.

-- The legal structure and presence of legal opinions addressing
    the assignment of the assets to the Issuer and the
    consistency with the DBRS "Legal Criteria for European
    Structured Finance Transactions" methodology. As a result of
    the analytical considerations, DBRS derived a Base Case PD of
    12.6% and LGD of 42.6%, which resulted in an EL of 5.5% using
    the European RMBS Credit Model. DBRS cash flow model
    assumptions stress the timing of defaults and recoveries,
    prepayment speeds and interest rates. Based on a combination
    of these assumptions, a total of 16 cash flow scenarios were
    applied to test the capital structure and ratings of the
    notes.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BERNARD MATTHEWS: 2015 Sales Down Despite Turnaround Efforts
------------------------------------------------------------
Ashley Armstrong at The Telegraph reports that sales at
Bernard Matthews have fallen by GBP30 million last year despite
an attempted turnaround by its private equity owners.

Rutland Partners, which bought a majority stake for GBP25 million
in 2013, backed a further GBP10 million cash injection into the
food business in August to help fund its restructuring amid
falling sales, The Telegraph relates.

Rutland had hired advisers at Litmus, a firm specialized in debt
financing, last May to try and attract outside investment but
after three months of searching injected the further millions
into the business, The Telegraph recounts.

Bernard Matthews has been loss-making for the past eight years,
hurt by a string of problems such as Jamie Oliver's attack on its
Turkey Twizzlers and a bird flu outbreak in 2007, The Telegraph
relays.  This company has recently suffered from higher feed
costs and an oversupply of costs, The Telegraph states.

Group sales for the year to the end of June fell to GBP276
million from GBP307 million in the prior year, dragging operating
losses to GBP2 million compared to GBP1.8 million the year
before, The Telegraph discloses.

Bernard Matthews, The Telegraph says, is hoping to revive its
business by doubling the number of chicken products it sells
alongside its turkey slices and turkey dinosaurs.

Bernard Matthews is Europe's biggest turkey producer.


BLACON COMMUNITY: Places Into Liquidation
-----------------------------------------
The Chester Chronicle reports that a community project which has
helped generations of Blacon residents over the past three
decades is about to close.

Mounting financial pressures and operational failings have been
cited as some of the reasons behind placing Blacon Community
Trust (BCT) into liquidation, according to The Chester Chronicle.

The report notes that the social enterprise was set up in 1984 to
find solutions to local problems by involving the community, and
won the Prime Minister's Big Society Award in 2011.

The report relays that David Cameron said at the time: "Blacon
Community Trust has worked incredibly hard to transform the area,
engaging local residents and organisations, and building a real
sense of community spirit."

Hailing it the 'end of an era', BCT Chairman and Blacon
councillor Reggie Jones said the decision to fold the voluntary
organization was made 'with sadness,' the report notes.

Mr. Cameron said: "BCT has suffered from increased financial
pressures due to a number of factors including high levels of
family debt," the report relays.

"The trust has continually reviewed its business areas and has
restructured its staffing levels and worked with staff to reduce
costs and increase income, however the operational failings
identified in the recent Ofsted Report combined with the decision
to suspend the Kids Community Club has resulted in a
significantly negative impact on the future sustainability of the
Trust," Mr. Cameron added.

Kids Community Club -- which has been run by the trust since 2005
-- was forced to close in December after an Ofsted inspection
criticized its senior management team, the report notes.

But Mr. Jones added that the trust's achievements over the past
31 years can be regarded with pride, the report says.

"It is the end of an era, but I think many people can look back
with pride on what has been achieved in terms of working in
collaboration with neighbourhood management and delivering
Sustainable Blacon, nursery provision and youth services," Mr.
Jones said, the report relays.

"At the centre of that are the staff and volunteers who have made
BCT work.  The trust has helped generations of Blacon residents.
The things that we have achieved over the years have been
tremendous," Mr. Jones added.

Mr. Jones added that the trust will continue to work with parents
and partner agencies to 'secure the future of childcare services
and ensure that members of staff are supported through this
difficult time,' the report says.


BOLTON WANDERERS: Set to Avoid Administration
---------------------------------------------
clubcall.com reports that The Bolton Wanderers Football Club need
to raise over GBP2 million, having been served a winding-up
petition by Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, a bill the club
had hoped to pay off through the sales of their longest-serving
player Mark Davies and young forward Zach Clough.

Offloading that pair was seen as critical to safeguarding the
Club's future ahead of a January 18 High Court date, yet both
Davies' deal to Sheffield Wednesday and Clough's move to Bristol
City collapsed last week, clubcall.com notes.  Without their
transfer fees, the fear was that Bolton would have to enter
administration and incur a 12-point penalty which would have
almost certainly consigned them to the third tier of English
football, the report relays.

However, Press Association Sport understands there is belief
around the Macron Stadium that they will not slide further into
the financial mire last week and a confidence that they can get
an extension granted at The High Court, the report discloses.

To do so, they may need to sell non-playing assets, as they did
to pay the players last month, and the car park that is situated
at the stadium and is next to the Middlebrook retail site may be
sold to balance the books and buy financial advisor Trevor Birch
more time to facilitate a takeover, the report notes.

Mr. Birch has been trying to sell the club on behalf of long-time
owner Eddie Davies, who is willing to wipe out nearly GBP200
million of debt but has pulled the plug on his long-time backing,
the report discloses.  An extension would certainly be a relief
to manager Neil Lennon, who is trying to steer Wanderers away
from trouble while the financial crisis has raged on, the report
relays.

"We're confident we can avoid administration," said the Northern
Irishman, the report relays.  "Trevor is still working on a few
things either to pay off the tax bill, or delay it, and raise
some capital to keep the thing going," he added.

Asked whether the end to their financial troubles could soon be
in sight, the Northern Irishman replied: "I hope so, it's been a
very uncertain period for us all.  There have been a lot of cuts,
a lot of worry about losing players but that hasn't happened.
Hopefully things will settle down and we can just get back to
talking about football again," he added.

The Bolton Wanderers Football Club is an English professional
football club based in Bolton. The club currently competes in the
Football League Championship, the second tier of the English
football league system.


CODERE FINANCE: N.Y. Court Recognizes U.K. Restructuring Scheme
---------------------------------------------------------------
The Hon. James L. Garrity, Jr., of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York granted the petition filed by
Codere Finance (UK) Limited seeking recognition in the United
States of a voluntary restructuring proceeding through a scheme
of arrangement with its creditors pending before the Chancery
Division (Companies Court) of the High Court of Justice of
England and Wales.

A scheme of arrangement allows companies to effect compromises or
arrangements, including restructuring their liabilities, with
their members or creditors.

David Jimenez Marquez, the duly appointed foreign representative
of Codere Finance, filed under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code to ensure that no creditors can bypass the effect of the
Scheme by commencing litigation or taking other actions in the
United States to obtain a greater recovery than other, similarly
situated creditors.

Court documents indicate that the overwhelming majority of Codere
UK's creditors are the holders of its $300,000,000 in 9.25% Notes
due 2019 and its EUR760,000,000 in 8.25% Notes due 2015.  Codere
UK has no other financial debt.

According to Mr. Marquez, Codere UK has assets in the Southern
District of New York in the form of $50,000 currently on deposit
in a Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz client trust account at the
New York, New York branch of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.  He added
that the Indentures and the Notes are, by their terms, governed
by New York law.

Codere UK is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of Codere S.A.,
which is incorporated under the laws of Spain.  Approximately
51.35% of the shares of Holdco are owned by Masampe Holding B.V.,
a Dutch private limited company, 30.87% are owned by the public,
and the remaining 17.78% are held by members of the Martinez
Sampedro family.  The business of the Group is focused on multi-
national gaming activities.

The Restructuring to be facilitated by the Scheme is proposed to
(i) provide a comprehensive solution to the financial problems
faced by the Group and (ii) maximize recovery for the
Noteholders.  Approximately 95.1% of the Noteholders have agreed
to support the Restructuring at this time, according to Court
documents.

                The Group's Financial Situation

For the 12 months ending June 30, 2015, the Group generated
operating revenue of EUR1,534.6 million and EBITDA of EUR280.5
million.  Argentina, Mexico, Italy, and Spain accounted for
EUR259.3 million, or approximately 92%, of the Group's EBITDA for
the 12-month period ending June 30, 2015.

According to Mr. Marquez, the last few years have been difficult
for the Group.  In the 12 months ending June 30, 2015, the Group
derived 44% of its consolidated adjusted EBITDA (before corporate
overhead) from operations in Argentina.  However, he said, the
operating environment in Argentina has been, and remains,
challenging and unpredictable, due principally to the unstable
macroeconomic conditions.

Mr. Marquez also said other factors that have affected the
Group's performance include the effects of the economic recession
in Europe and the introduction of anti-smoking regulations in
places where the Group has operations.

In 2013, the Group generated operating revenue of EUR1.5 billion
and EBITDA of EUR206 million, compared to EUR287 million in the
same period in 2012, an EBITDA decrease of 28%.

As a result of those events, projected short-term liquidity, and
impending debt maturities, the board of directors of Holdco filed
for protection under Article 5 bis of the Spanish Insolvency Law
(pre concurso) on Jan. 2, 2014.  Some of the Spanish sub-holding
companies within the Group also filed for such protection in
early February 2014.  This afforded those companies the time to
continue to negotiate the Restructuring without needing to file
for Spanish concurso bankruptcy immediately.  The protection
period ended in May and June 2014, and the Group has been
operating under continuing forbearance and standstill agreements,
including the Lock-Up Agreement.

          Appointment of Advisors and Negotiation of Terms

In March 2013, the Group began to work with both legal and
financial restructuring advisors to develop plans and
contingencies to seek to address its financial difficulties.

In May 2013, the Group and its advisors commenced negotiations
with respect to the terms of a restructuring with an informal ad
hoc committee of Noteholders.  The intention of those
negotiations was to reach an agreement on how to reduce the
financial pressure on the Group and ensure it could continue to
operate as a going concern.

Since that time, the Group and its advisors, on the one hand, and
the Ad Hoc Committee and its advisors, on the other hand, have
been engaged in a constant dialogue, with the aim of addressing
the unsustainable debt burden of the Group.

The Group and the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that, for various
reasons, a restructuring proceeding in Spain would be inadequate
to produce a comprehensive resolution and that a UK scheme should
be undertaken.  The Group and the Ad Hoc Committee further
determined that Holdco should create a UK subsidiary -- Codere
UK -- to facilitate the UK scheme process.

On Sept. 23, 2014, Holdco announced that key terms of a
restructuring had been agreed with the Ad Hoc Committee and
certain other Noteholders, as well as with Masampe.

                     Terms of the Restructuring

On Sept. 23, 2014, holders representing a substantial majority of
the Euro Notes and of the USD Notes entered into a Lock-up
Agreement to implement the restructuring.  The Lock-up Agreement
was amended and restated on Aug. 18, 2015.  Holders of over 95.1%
in aggregate principal amount of the Notes are currently party to
the Lock-Up Agreement.  Pursuant to the terms of the Lock-up
Agreement, the consenting Noteholders have agreed, among other
things:

   * to take all reasonable actions to support, facilitate and
     implement the Restructuring in a manner consistent with the
     terms of the Lock-up Agreement; and

   * to take all steps consistent with and reasonably required to
     implement the Restructuring.

The obligations of the parties to the Lock-up Agreement will
terminate on Dec. 31, 2015 (subject to extension (i) to March 31,
2016, by approval of Holdco, 75% of consenting Noteholders and
each party providing a backstop commitment, or (ii) to a later
date by approval of Holdco, each consenting Noteholder and each
party providing a backstop commitment).

                Commencement of the UK Proceeding

The Debtor applied to the UK Court on Oct. 29, 2015, for an order
directing it to convene a meeting for a single class of creditors
only, namely Noteholders as of the "Record Time" under the
Scheme.  The Scheme Creditors are the only creditors whose claims
will be compromised by the Scheme.  The purpose of the proposed
Scheme Meeting is to consider and, if appropriate, approve the
Scheme.

On Oct. 29, 2015, the UK Court held a hearing and subsequently
issued the Convening Court Order.  The UK Court found that it
could exercise jurisdiction over the Scheme (subject to its final
determination at the Sanction Hearing).  The Convening Court
Order also (i) confirms that the Scheme Meeting will be held on a
time and date to be advised to Scheme Creditors on no less than
20 Business Days' notice, which date shall be no earlier than
Dec. 14, 2015, and no later than Jan. 31, 2016, at the offices of
Clifford Chance LLP, 10 Upper Bank Street, London, E14 5JJ, (ii)
confirms the documents and notices that will be sent to the
Scheme Creditors, and (iii) declared that the Petitioner is
authorized to act as foreign representative in respect of the UK
Proceeding, including in any chapter 15 proceeding.

If the Restructuring is implemented, all outstanding liabilities
in respect of the existing Notes will be treated as follows:

   (a) EUR475 million will be cancelled in return for EUR150
       million of New Second Lien Notes and EUR325 million of New
       Third Lien Notes; and

   (b) all remaining and outstanding liabilities under the Notes
       will be cancelled in return for roughly 97.78% of the
       ordinary shares in Holdco, in each case, to be allocated
       pro rata to Noteholders in accordance with their holding
       of Notes, subject to the reallocations.

                        About Codere Finance

Codere Finance (UK) Limited sought Chapter 15 bankruptcy petition
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 15-13017) on Nov. 11, 2015.   David
Jimenez Marquez signed the petition as foreign representative.
The Debtor estimated assets in the range of $50,000 to $100,000
and liabilities of more than $1 billion.  Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen
& Katz represents the Debtor as counsel.


MAGNI FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'BB-sf' Rating to Class D Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Magni Finance Designated Activity
Company's notes ratings as follows:

  GBP122.8 million Class A (ISIN XS1336778953) due January 2023:
  'A-sf'; Outlook Stable

  GBP16.6 million Class B (ISIN XS1337093717) due January 2023:
  'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

  GBP28 million Class C (ISIN XS1337094285) due January 2023:
  'BB+sf'; Outlook Stable

  GBP17.2 million Class D (ISIN XS1337094525) due January 2023:
  'BB-sf'; Outlook Stable

The transaction is a securitization of a GBP185 million senior
commercial mortgage loan to six cross-collateralized and cross-
defaulted borrowers, ultimately owned by Varde Partners Inc.
(Varde, the sponsor), to acquire a portfolio of 172 secondary
retail and office assets located throughout the UK.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The collateral consists of mainly secondary and tertiary
properties purchased (mainly out of receivership) by Varde. A
significant portion of the portfolio comprises secondary high
street retail properties. Although largely well-located within
town centers, this segment continues to be hindered by structural
changes in the UK retail market. Investor demand has recovered
from recent lows, but the consolidation of national retailers
away from town centers is likely to limit growth from rental
income.

The LTV at closing was a fairly high 70%; this, combined with the
absence of scheduled amortization, signals higher refinancing
risk. This is reflected in the speculative-grade ratings on the
lower two tranches. Granularity helps spread idiosyncratic
property risk, while the robust interest coverage ratio (ICR) and
LTV cash trap/default covenants (supported by annual revaluations
and sequential cash sweep) help check performance deterioration,
particularly for senior investors.

The sponsor's business plan envisages asset liquidation with
quarterly amortization targets. Failure to meet these targets
would result in full cash trap and would also prevent the one-
year extension option from being exercised (at year three). Fitch
has tested a range of disposal scenarios, including no disposals
and early default. In summary, granularity and the narrow range
of property quality limit the scope of adverse selection.
Moreover, its effects are contained by robust release pricing,
even if debt is repaid pro-rata.

The predominantly pro-rata principal pay limits how much senior
tranches would de-leverage, should the portfolio become more
concentrated as a result of asset disposals. While property
quality is not greatly bar-belled, a highly concentrated exposure
to secondary quality UK (mainly retail) property presents
idiosyncratic risks not commensurate with a rating above the
'Asf' category, particularly given the absence of a liquidity
facility.

KEY PROPERTY ASSUMPTIONS (all by net rent)

'Bsf' weighted average (WA) capitalization (cap) rate: 7.1%
'Bsf' WA structural vacancy: 28.5%
'Bsf' WA rental value decline: 2%

'BBsf' weighted average (WA) capitalization (cap) rate: 7.4%
'BBsf' WA structural vacancy: 32.6%
'BBsf' WA rental value decline: 4.1%

'BBBsf' WA cap rate: 7.7%
'BBBsf' WA structural vacancy: 36.8%
'BBBsf' WA rental value decline: 6.4%

'Asf' WA cap rate: 8.1%
'Asf' WA structural vacancy: 40.9%
'Asf' WA rental value decline: 16.4%

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The change in model output that would apply if the capitalization
rate assumption for each property is increased by a relative
amount is as follows:

Current rating- class A/ B/ C/ D: 'A-sf'/ 'BBBsf'/ 'BB+ sf'/
'BB-sf'
Increase capitalization rates by 10% class A/ B/ C/ D: 'BBB+sf'/
'BBB-sf'/ 'BBsf'/ 'Bsf'
Increase capitalisation rates by 20% class A/ B/ C/ D:
'BBB+sf'/BB+ sf'/'B+ sf'/'B- sf'

The change in model output that would apply if the rental value
decline (RVD) and vacancy assumption for each property is
increased by a relative amount is as follows:

Increase RVD and vacancy by 10% class A/ B/ C/ D: 'BBB+sf'/
'BBB-sf'/ 'BB sf' / 'B+sf'
Increase RVD and vacancy by 20% class A/ B/ C/ D: 'BBBsf'/
'BBB- sf'/'BB-sf'/ 'Bsf'

The change in model output that would apply if the capitalization
rate, RVD and vacancy assumptions for each property is increased
by a relative amount is as follows:

Increase in all factors by 10% class A/ B/ C/ D: 'BBBsf'/ 'BBsf'/
'B+sf'/ 'B-sf'
Increase in all factors by 20% class A/ B/ C/ D: 'BB+sf'/ 'B+sf'/
'B-sf'/ 'CCCsf'

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

Fitch was provided with third-party due diligence information
from Deloitte LLP. The third-party due diligence information was
provided on Form ABS Due Diligence-15E and focused on a
comparison of certain characteristics with respect to the
properties in the portfolio. Fitch reviewed this information
which indicated no adverse findings material to the rating
analysis.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch reviewed the results of a third party assessment conducted
on the asset portfolio information, which indicated no adverse
findings material to the rating analysis.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the asset pool information relied
upon for the agency's rating analysis according to its applicable
rating methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.


TATA STEEL UK: To Cut 1,050 Jobs at Port Talbot Plant
-----------------------------------------------------
Alan Tovey at The Telegraph reports that Tata Steel has cut 1,050
jobs at sites across the country, dealing another devastating
blow to the UK steel industry.

Confirming plans revealed by The Telegraph, the company said it
would focus the redundancies at its giant "strip products" plant
at Port Talbot in Wales, the country's largest steel facility
with about 4,000 workers, The Telegraph relates.

According to The Telegraph, about 750 steel jobs are expected to
be axed at Port Talbot along with a further 200 in support roles
at the plant, which is thought to be losing about GBP1 million a
week.

A further 100 jobs will go at Tata's steel mills in Trostre, also
in Wales, and Corby and Hartlepool, The Telegraph discloses.

The company, as cited by The Telegraph, said the cuts are a cost
saving move intended to improve the competitiveness of the
business, which is suffering from "a flood of cheap imports,
particularly from China".

Tata Steel is the UK's biggest steel company.


* UK: Cos. in "Significant" Financial Distress Up 17% in 2015
-------------------------------------------------------------
New data reveals that UK companies are bracing themselves for a
difficult 2016, after finishing 2015 in a challenging financial
state, warns Begbies Traynor, the UK's leading independent
insolvency firm.

According to Begbies Traynor's Red Flag Alert research for Q4
2015, which monitors the financial health of UK companies,
268,898 UK companies closed the year suffering "Significant"
financial distress; a 17% increase compared to the same period in
the prior year (Q4 2014: 229,232 companies) and the most marked
annual rise in distress since Q2 2014.

The research reveals that all sectors of the economy saw an
increase in financial distress over the past 12 months.
Worryingly, the worst performing sectors were those that are most
influential to the UK's economic growth, with 58,955 Services
companies, 12,418 Manufacturers, 41,373 Consumer businesses and
50,122 Construction & Real Estate firms now experiencing
"Significant" financial distress, up 19%, 18%, 18% and 17%
respectively year on year.

Begbies Traynor's analysis chimes with George Osborne's warning
last week that Britain faces a "dangerous cocktail" of global
risks that could place the UK's economic recovery in danger,
adding that the country needs to be "shaken" out of its
complacency.

Julie Palmer, Partner at Begbies Traynor, says:

"Despite an improving economy, 2015 showed no shortage of
challenges for UK businesses, with a slowdown in China and
collapsing oil and commodity prices leading to stock market
turmoil during the second half of the year.  At the same time,
manufacturing weakened significantly as a result of continued
sluggish growth in Europe, while labor shortages and building
materials inflation continued to plague the construction sector.

"With so many companies beginning the New Year in an unfavorable
financial state and even the Chancellor predicting black clouds
on the horizon, 2016 looks set to be another challenging twelve
months for UK corporates."

Ric Traynor, Executive Chairman at Begbies Traynor says:

"Struggling businesses should not expect any respite in 2016,
with the UK economy facing greater headwinds this year from slow
global growth, lower levels of business investment and the
highest levels of consumer debt seen for five years.  Meanwhile
the looming EU referendum, potential interest rate rises, and
additional cost pressures, including the introduction of the new
National Living Wage in April, give cause to yet more uncertainty
for UK businesses over the coming months.

"A proactive, not reactive, approach will be crucial to
businesses' financial strength in 2016, both in terms of managing
their cost bases while also driving expansion in a low growth
environment."


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *