/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/160106.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Wednesday, January 6, 2016, Vol. 16, No. 003

                            Headlines

A Z E R B A I J A N

GARANT INSURANCE: Transfers Liquidated Assets to PASHA


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

NEW WORLD: Gov't Seeks Talks with Owners on Future of Mines


I T A L Y

ITAL MEK: Four People Arrested Over Fraudulent Bankruptcy
MARZOCCHI: Tenneco Acquires Firm, Saves 70 Jobs


P O R T U G A L

BANCO ESPIRITO: ISDA Committee to Rule on Credit Event Today
NOVO BANCO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Covered Bonds to Ba1
NOVO BANCO: Moody's Cuts Senior Debt & Deposit Ratings to Caa1


R U S S I A

AMB BANK: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
BANK SODRUZHESTVO: Provisional Administration Terminated
CB BOGORODSKY: Provisional Administration Terminated
CB BOGORODSKY: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Probe Reveals
TIME BANK: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Probe Reveals


S P A I N

INMOBILIARIA CHAMARTIN: Accounting Law Changes Prompt Bankruptcy


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

B RILEY: Marts in Cumbria Faces Loses Due to Firm's Collapse


X X X X X X X X

* Private Sector Creditors to Bear Cost of EU Bank Failures


                            *********


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A Z E R B A I J A N
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GARANT INSURANCE: Transfers Liquidated Assets to PASHA
------------------------------------------------------
Anvar Mammadov at Trend News Agency reports that Azerbaijani
insurance company Garant Insurance JSC has announced its
liquidation, Vergiler (Taxes) newspaper reported Dec.30.

Its assets have been transferred to PASHA Insurance, a source on
the country's insurance market told Trend News.

The report notes the company's creditors should submit their
claims to the following address within two months: Baku,
Sarabskiy Street, 657, 6th floor, Garant Holding.

Garant Holding is one of the founders of Garant Insurance company
that has been operating since 2007, the report notes.  The
company was rendering services on 18 types of voluntary
insurance, the report relays.

The report says the authorized capital of the insurance company
reached 4 million manats.

The report adds that company's dues stood at 3.99 million manats
in January to October 2015, while the payments totaled 1.7
million, according to Azerbaijan's State Insurance Supervision
Service.



===========================
C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


NEW WORLD: Gov't Seeks Talks with Owners on Future of Mines
-----------------------------------------------------------
Ladka Bauerova at Bloomberg News reports that Industry and Trade
Minister Jan Mladek said the Czech government is seeking to
negotiate the future of New World Resources directly with its
owners rather than managers who don't have a "clear mandate" for
the talks.

According to Bloomberg, Mr. Mladek said government
representatives, scheduled to meet NWR Chairman Gareth Penny and
the mining subsidiary's Chief Executive Officer Dale Ekmark on
Jan. 14, need more clarity on the company's ownership structure
before they can discuss potential financial aid for miners likely
to lose their jobs.

"There's a clear structure of the current owners, but the problem
is that they apparently pledged their share to the bondholders
who can become owners in the future," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Mladek
as saying.  "We're not sure when it will happen and we need to
discuss their commitment with them."

The government is trying to negotiate a "soft landing" for the
company's mines, which employ about 13,000 people in the eastern
Ostrava region that has the second-highest unemployment rate in
the country, Bloomberg discloses.

"There's no future" for NWR's unprofitable Paskov pit, which will
"most likely" close down before the end of this year, Mr. Mladek,
as cited by Bloomberg, said.  The minister said the remaining
mines will gradually shut down by 2022 at the latest, Bloomberg
notes.

According to Bloomberg, the government has been reluctant to
provide aid for NWR, arguing that the company's billionaire
founder and main shareholder Zdenek Bakala should provide the
cash.  Mr. Mladek said if bondholders convert their debt and
become majority shareholders, the government may be more open to
pledge aid, Bloomberg relays.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 4,
2015, Bloomberg News related that NWR has suffered as the global
glut depressed prices, making its mines unprofitable.  The
company has gone through forced debt restructuring in 2014 and
analysts estimate it may run out of cash as early as 2016,
according to Bloomberg.

New World Resources Plc is the largest Czech producer of coking
coal.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


ITAL MEK: Four People Arrested Over Fraudulent Bankruptcy
---------------------------------------------------------
ANSA reports that four people including a former mayor were
arrested on Jan. 5 on charges of fraudulent bankruptcy.

According to ANSA, Angelo Berno, 52, the ex mayor of Tombolo near
Padua, Giuseppe La Rocca, 51, and brothers Luciano and Michele
Marin are accused of deliberately leading Ital Com and
Ital Mek -- two companies operating in the construction and metal
carpentry sectors and based in the province of Padua -- towards
bankruptcy respectively in April 2013 and May 2014 in order to
transfer their activities to new companies operating in Italy but
registered abroad.

The bankrupt companies were then assigned to foreigners or people
in situations of economic hardship or personal difficulty, who
were unable to meet creditors' demands, ANSA discloses.


MARZOCCHI: Tenneco Acquires Firm, Saves 70 Jobs
-----------------------------------------------
autoevolution.com reports that the Christmas and year's end bring
joy to the employees of Marzocchi.  Around 70 employees will keep
their jobs and remain in the city of Zola Predosa, as Italian
automotive parts manufacturer VRM bought the company from
Tenneco, according to autoevolution.com.

autoevolution.com reported on many occasions that Tenneco, the
former owner of Marzocchi, would pull the plug on the suspensions
company.  The report relays that in late October, Tenneco was
already making the final preparations for the liquidation of
Marzocchi, with $27 million (EUR23.7 mil) as funds to be spent in
severance, asset impairment, and other closure procedures.

VRM expressed their intentions to buy the suspensions
manufacturer as of July 2015, but it was only days ago that the
deal was finally perfected, the report says.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO ESPIRITO: ISDA Committee to Rule on Credit Event Today
------------------------------------------------------------
Helen Bartholomew at International Financing Review reports that
ISDA's Credit Determinations Committee will convene at 12:00 p.m.
today, Jan. 6, to determine whether the transfer of almost
EUR2 billion in nominal senior debt from Portugal's Novo Banco
into bad bank Banco Espirito Santo constitutes a credit event.

According to IFR, a ruling in favor of such an event would
trigger payouts on US$432 million net notional in credit default
swaps referencing Banco Novo.

The DC on Jan. 4 rejected similar calls to determine whether a
Restructuring Credit Event had occurred with respect to Novo
Banco, IFR relates.

On Dec. 29, the Bank of Portugal ruled that five series of senior
bonds with total notional of EUR1.985 billion would be
transferred from Novo Banco to BES to address a EUR1.4 billion
shortfall at the "good" bank, IFR discloses.

As a result of the transfer, the affected notes whose maturities
range from 2016 to 2024 lost 90% of their value in secondary
market trading, IFR states.

                  About Banco Espirito Santo

Banco Espirito Santo is a private Portuguese bank based in
Lisbon, Portugal.  It is 20% owned by Espirito Santo Financial
Group.


NOVO BANCO: Moody's Lowers Rating on Covered Bonds to Ba1
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken these rating actions on both
mortgage covered bonds issued by Novo Banco S.A. (the issuer,
Caa1 senior unsecured rating with developing outlook, caa2
baseline credit assessment, B2(cr) Counterparty Risk Assessment),
governed by the Portuguese covered bond legislation.

   -- Novo Banco S.A. - Covered Bonds: rating downgraded to Ba1
      from Baa2 on review for downgrade

   -- Novo Banco, S.A. Conditional Pass-Through Covered Bond
      Programme: rating downgraded to Baa1 from A3 on review for
      downgrade

RATINGS RATIONALE

The downgrade of the covered bond ratings referenced above
follows the rating action on Novo Banco S.A.'s Counterparty Risk
Assessment (CR Assessment).  The covered bond anchor (CB anchor)
for these programs is the CR Assessment plus one notch.

Moody's TPI framework constrains the ratings of both mortgage
covered bonds issued by Novo Banco S.A. at their current level.

KEY RATING ASSUMPTIONS/FACTORS

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a Timely Payment Indicator (TPI)
framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond.  COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the probability
that the issuer will cease making payments under the covered
bonds (a CB anchor event); and (2) the stressed losses on the
cover pool assets following a CB anchor event.

The CB anchor for both Novo Banco's covered bond programs is the
CR Assessment plus one notch.  The CR Assessment reflects an
issuer's ability to avoid defaulting on certain senior bank
operating obligations and contractual commitments, including
covered bonds.  Moody's may use a CB anchor of one notch above
the CR Assessment in the European Union, or otherwise, where an
operational resolution regime is particularly likely to ensure
continuity of covered bond payments.

Novo Banco S.A. - Covered Bonds

The cover pool losses for this program are 20.9%.  This is an
estimate of the losses Moody's currently models following a CB
anchor event.  Moody's splits cover pool losses between market
risk of 15.9% and collateral risk of 5%.

Market risk measures losses stemming from refinancing risk and
risks related to interest-rate and currency mismatches (these
losses may also include certain legal risks).  Collateral risk
measures losses resulting directly from cover pool assets' credit
quality.  Moody's derives collateral risk from the collateral
score, which for this program is currently 7.5%.

The over-collateralization (OC) in the cover pool is 32.5%, of
which the issuer provides 5.3% on a "committed" basis.  The
minimum OC level consistent with the Ba1 rating target is 0%.
These numbers show that Moody's is not relying on "uncommitted"
OC in its expected loss analysis.

Novo Banco, S.A. Conditional Pass-Through Covered Bond Programme
The cover pool losses for this program are 17.4%.  This is an
estimate of the losses Moody's currently models following a CB
anchor event.  Cover pool losses can be split between market risk
of 12.4% and collateral risk of 5.0%.

Market risk measures losses as a result of refinancing risk, or
risks related to interest-rate and currency mismatches (these
losses may also include certain legal risks).  Collateral risk
measures losses resulting directly from the credit quality of the
assets in the cover pool.  Collateral risk is derived from the
collateral score, which for this program is currently 7.5%.

The OC in the cover pool is 9.9%, of which the issuer provides
5.3% on a "committed" basis.  The minimum OC consistent with the
Baa1 rating target is 7.5%.  These numbers show that Moody's is
relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.

All numbers in this section are based on Moody's most recent
modeling, which is based on October 2015 data.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a TPI, which measures the
likelihood of timely payments to covered bondholders following a
CB anchor event.  The TPI framework limits the covered bond
rating to a certain number of notches above the CB anchor.

For Novo Banco S.A. - Covered Bonds, Moody's has assigned a TPI
of "Improbable".

For Novo Banco, S.A. Conditional Pass-Through Covered Bond
Programme, Moody's has assigned a TPI of "Probable-High".

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

The CB anchor is the main determinant of a covered bond program's
rating robustness.  A change in the level of the CB anchor could
lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the covered bonds. The TPI
Leeway measures the number of notches by which Moody's might
lower the CB anchor before it downgrades the covered bonds
because of TPI framework constraints.

Based on the current TPI of "Improbable", the TPI Leeway for Novo
Banco S.A. - Covered Bonds is zero to one notches.  This implies
that Moody's might downgrade the covered bonds because of a TPI
cap if it lowers the CB anchor by one notch, all other variables
being equal.

Based on the current TPI of "Probable-High", the TPI Leeway for
Novo Banco, S.A. Conditional Pass-Through Covered Bond Programme
is zero notches.  This implies that Moody's might downgrade the
covered bonds because of a TPI cap if it lowers the CB anchor by
one notch, all other variables being equal.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain circumstances, such as (1) a country ceiling or sovereign
downgrade capping a covered bond rating or negatively affecting
the CB anchor and the TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of the
CB anchor; or (3) a material reduction of the value of the cover
pool.

In addition, Moody's is exploring whether the court challenges
that the Bank of Portugal is facing regarding the legality of the
Resolution have any realistic prospect of success, and the
potential negative consequences for covered bondholders.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds", published in August 2015.


NOVO BANCO: Moody's Cuts Senior Debt & Deposit Ratings to Caa1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Caa1 from B2 the
senior debt and long-term deposit ratings of Portugal's Novo
Banco, S.A. and its supported entities.  This follows the Bank of
Portugal's (BoP) announcement on Dec. 29, 2015, that it had
approved the recapitalization of Novo Banco by transferring
EUR1,985 million of senior debt back to Banco Espirito Santo,
S.A. (BES unrated).  The outlook on Novo Banco's deposit and
senior debt ratings is now developing.

The rating agency has also downgraded to C from B2 (on review for
downgrade) the rating on Novo Banco's senior debt securities
transferred to BES (ISINs PTBEQBOM0010, PTBENIOM0016,
PTBENJOM0015, PTBENKOM0012 and PTBEQKOM0019).  Subsequently,
Moody's will withdraw the ratings on these senior bonds.  The
downgrade and withdrawal have been triggered by the transfer of
these senior debt instruments to BES, a bank which is being
liquidated and for which the BoP has asked the European Central
Bank (ECB) to revoke its banking license.

At the same time, Moody's has downgraded to B2(cr) from B1(cr)
Novo Banco's counterparty risk assessment (CRA) and affirmed its
short-term deposit and senior debt ratings at Not-Prime and
short-term CRA at Not Prime(cr).  Novo Banco's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) was also confirmed at caa2.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade on Novo
Banco's ratings, which was initiated on Nov. 18, 2015.

Novo Banco's Ba1 rated senior bonds, which are guaranteed by the
Republic of Portugal (Ba1 stable), are unaffected by the rating
action.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The action primarily reflects the BoP's announcement on Dec. 29,
2015, that it has taken a series of measures aimed at restoring
Novo Banco's capital, thereby preserving financial stability in
the Portuguese banking system and accomplishing the objectives of
the resolution of BES, initiated in 2014.

While no bail-in of Novo Banco's liabilities has been applied, in
Moody's opinion, the announced measures have the potential to
affect to varying degrees the loss expectations for different
debt instruments and liabilities rated by Moody's.

Following the announcement on Nov. 14, 2015, of a EUR1.4 billion
capital shortfall identified in the adverse stress test scenario
of the ECB's stress test, the bank, its owner -- the Portuguese
Resolution fund -- and other Portuguese and European authorities
prepared and approved a recapitalization plan.

Under the plan, Novo Banco's capital will be restored by
transferring EUR1,985 million of senior unsecured bonds back to
BES, thereby reportedly raising Novo Banco's Common Equity Tier 1
(CET1) ratio to around 13%.  In its announcement, BoP explained
that as part of the resolution measures applied to BES in 2014,
which resulted in the creation of the bridge bank Novo Banco, it
has been empowered to alter the overall perimeter of assets and
liabilities of both banks in its role as resolution authority.
With the re-transfer of certain senior debt instruments to BES,
both institutions' perimeters are declared to be final.
Subsequently, BES's banking license will be revoked and the
entity will be liquidated.  Further, the sale process for Novo
Banco will resume in January 2016.

BoP's announcement follows a previous communication on 21
December 2015 by the European Commission (EC), which approved
certain measures for Novo Banco that were compatible with
European State aid rules.  Such measures should maintain Novo
Banco as a going concern bank.  The EC's announcement comprised
two key elements, namely (1) the extension of the deadline for
privatizing Novo Banco (previously August 2016; no new deadline
communicated as yet); and (2) the extension of the government
guarantee for bonds issued by the bank, to ensure the bank's
liquidity position.

   -- RATIONALE FOR THE DOWNGRADE OF THE SENIOR DEBT INSTRUMENTS
TRANSFERRED TO BES

The downgrade of the five senior debt issuances transferred from
Novo Banco to BES to C from B2 (on review for downgrade),
reflects Moody's views that the affected senior bonds will be
exposed to severe losses during the protracted liquidation of
BES.  Subsequent to the downgrade, the ratings will be withdrawn.

   -- RATIONALE FOR THE RATING ACTIONS ON NOVO BANCO

The downgrade of Novo Banco's long-term debt and deposit ratings
to Caa1 from B2 and its CRA to B2(cr) from B1(cr), reflects (1)
the confirmation of the bank's BCA at caa2; (2) the result from
the rating agency's Advanced Loss-Given Failure (LGF) analysis
after considering the lower volumes of bail-inable instruments,
reducing the uplift to one notch from two notches previously for
the debt and deposit ratings and maintaining three notches of
uplift for the CRA; and (3) Moody's reassessment of government
support assumptions for Novo Banco to low from moderate, which
now result in no rating uplift.

The confirmation of Novo Banco's BCA, reflects the bank's very
weak credit profile despite the increased capital buffers after
the EUR1.985 million recapitalization and the benefits of the
extension of the government guaranteed funding.  Novo Banco's
deteriorating asset risk metrics and continued losses, could
still erode further the bank's solvency position even after the
actions approved by the BoP.

Moody's now assigns a low probability of government support to
Novo Banco's ratings.  This reassessment is based on the rating
agency's view that the likelihood of further government support
for the bank has diminished, as evidenced by the measures
approved by BoP.  The fact that the regulator has unexpectedly
opted for a private solution to recapitalize Novo Banco, raises
the probability that support in case of need, will similarly
involve senior creditors in the future rather than public money.

   -- RATIONALE FOR THE DEVELOPING OUTLOOK ON NOVO BANCO'S
RATINGS

The outlook on Novo Banco's senior debt and deposit ratings is
developing.  This reflects (1) the uncertainties prevailing
around the bank's very weak credit profile and the impact of the
restructuring plan recently submitted to the EC; and (2) the
uncertainties around the outcome of the sale process that BoP
will resume early in January 2016, which together could affect
Moody's final assessment of the senior debt and deposit ratings.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

An improvement of Novo Banco's BCA could result from a clear
strengthening in the bank's risk absorption capacity, driven by
stronger capital buffers, a reduction in the stock of problematic
assets, and a sustainable recovery in Novo Banco's recurring
profitability.

Upward pressure on Novo Banco's deposits and senior debt ratings
could also arise if the bank is acquired by a financially strong
and strategic buyer, as senior creditors could benefit from
measures aimed at strengthening the bank's financial fundamentals
as well as affiliate support.

Downward pressure on Novo Banco's BCA could develop if the bank's
financial profile deteriorates further than anticipated and/or
fails to accomplish the targeted restructuring plan.

As the bank's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the
standalone BCA, any change to the BCA would likely also affect
these ratings.  Novo Banco's senior unsecured debt and deposit
ratings could also change due to changes in the loss-given
failure faced by these securities.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Downgrades:

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

  Long-Term Deposit Rating, Downgraded to Caa1 Developing from B2
   Ratings under Review
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa1
   Developing from B2 Ratings under Review (except for ISINs
   PTBEQBOM0010, PTBENIOM0016, PTBENJOM0015, PTBENKOM0012, and
   PTBEQKOM0019)
  Long-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Downgraded to B2(cr)
   from B1(cr)

Issuer: NB Finance Ltd. (debts transferred from BES Finance Ltd).

  Backed senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to
   Caa1 Developing from B2 Ratings under Review

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., London Branch

  Long-Term Deposit Rating, Downgraded to Caa1 Developing from B2
   Ratings under Review
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa1
   Developing from B2 Ratings under Review
  Long-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Downgraded to B2(cr)
   from B1(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch

  Long-Term Deposit Rating, Downgraded to Caa1 Developing from B2
   Ratings under Review
  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to Caa1
   Developing from B2 Ratings under Review
  Long-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Downgraded to B2(cr)
   from B1(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Cayman Branch

  Long-Term Deposit Rating, Downgraded to Caa1 Developing from B2
   Ratings under Review
  Long-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Downgraded to B2(cr)
   from B1(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Madeira Branch

  Long-Term Deposit Rating, Downgraded to Caa1 Developing from B2
   Ratings under Review
  Long-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Downgraded to B2(cr)
   from B1(cr)

Downgrades and subsequent withdrawals:

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

  Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Downgraded to C from
   B2
   Ratings under Review for the following ISINs only:
   PTBEQBOM0010, PTBENIOM0016, PTBENJOM0015, PTBENKOM0012 and
   PTBEQKOM0019

Confirmations:

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

  Adjusted Baseline Credit Assessment, Confirmed at caa2
  Baseline Credit Assessment, Confirmed at caa2

Affirmations:

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A.

  Short-Term Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
  Senior Unsecured Commercial Paper, Affirmed NP
  Short-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., London Branch

  Short-Term Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
  Short-Term Senior Unsecured Deposit Program, Affirmed NP
  Short-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch

  Short-Term Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
  Short-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Cayman Branch

  Short-Term Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
  Short-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Issuer: Novo Banco, S.A., Madeira Branch

  Short-Term Deposit Rating, Affirmed NP
  Short-Term Counterparty Risk Assessment, Affirmed NP(cr)

Outlook Actions:

  Outlook, Changed To Developing From Rating Under Review for
   issuers

Novo Banco, S.A.
Novo Banco S.A., London Branch
Novo Banco S.A., Luxembourg Branch
Novo Banco, S.A., Cayman Branch
Novo Banco, S.A., Madeira Branch
NB Finance Ltd.



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R U S S I A
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AMB BANK: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
--------------------------------------------------------
Due to the ruling of the Court of Arbitration of the city of
Moscow, dated December 14, 2015, with regard to case No. A40-
151918/15-78-599B on recognizing insolvent (bankrupt) credit
institution AMB Bank PJSC and appointing a receiver in compliance
with Clause 3 of Article 18927 of the Federal Law "On the
Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia took a decision
(Order No. OD-3708, dated December 24, 2015) to terminate from
December 25, 2015, the activity of the provisional administration
of AMB Bank appointed by Bank of Russia Order No. OD-1771, dated
July 24, 2015, "On the Appointment of the Provisional
Administration to the Credit Institution AMB Bank (Public Joint-
stock company) or AMB Bank (PJSC) (the City of Moscow) Due to the
Revocation of Its Banking Licence".


BANK SODRUZHESTVO: Provisional Administration Terminated
--------------------------------------------------------
Following the Moscow Arbitration Court ruling dated December 7,
2015, on Case No. A40-202834/2015 on recognition of credit
organization OJSC Bank SODRUZHESTVO as insolvent (bankrupt) and
appointment of a receiver pursuant to Clause 3 Article 18927 of
the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia
has decided to terminate (Order No. AD-3707, dated December 24,
2015) effective December 25, 2015, the operations of the
provisional administration of Bank SODRUZHESTVO, as appointed
under BoR Order No. AD-2833, dated October 16, 2015 "On
appointment of a provisional administration to manage the credit
institution Open Joint-stock Company Bank SODRUZHESTVO JSC Bank
Sodruzhestvo (Moscow) following revocation of a banking licence."


CB BOGORODSKY: Provisional Administration Terminated
----------------------------------------------------
Following the Moscow Region's Arbitration Court ruling, dated
December 8, 2015, on Case No. A41-90487/15 on recognition of
credit institution Commercial Bank Bogorodsky Municipal Bank,
LLC, as insolvent (bankrupt) and appointment of a receiver
pursuant to Clause 3 Article 18927 of the Federal Law "On
Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia has decided to
terminate (Order No. AD-3709, dated December 24, 2015) effective
December 25, 2015, the operations of the provisional
administration of Commercial Bank Bogorodsky Municipa Bank as
appointed under BoR Order No. AD-2984, dated November 2, 2015,
"On appointment of a provisional administration to manage the
credit institution Commercial Bank Bogorodsky Municipal Bank
(Limited Liability Company) KB BMB (LLC), Moscow Oblast, Noginsk
following revocation of a banking license".


CB BOGORODSKY: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Probe Reveals
-------------------------------------------------------
During the examination of financial standing of credit
institution Commercial Bank Bogorodsky Municipal Bank, LLC, the
provisional administration appointed by Bank of Russia Order No.
OD-2983, dated November 2, 2015, due to the revocation of the
banking license revealed operations conducted by the bank's
former management bearing the evidence of moving out assets
through real estate sales with no money received.

Besides, the provisional administration revealed facts of
extending loans at the time the bank experienced creditworthiness
problems and their channelling to repay the earlier loans.  This
may be indicative of an attempt to conceal earlier operations to
take out assets from the bank.  The provisional administration
also revealed operations to inappropriately create obligations to
individual depositors and transactions, which pave the way for
preferential satisfaction of claim among creditors.

According to estimates by the provisional administration, the
asset value of CB BMB (LLC) does not exceed RUR2.7 billion, while
its liabilities to creditors amount to RUR3.1 billion.

On December 8, 2015, the Court of Arbitration of the Moscow
Region took a decision to recognize CB BMB (LLC) insolvent
(bankrupt) and to initiate bankruptcy proceedings with the state
corporation Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia has submitted the information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offences conducted
by the former management and owners of CB BMB (LLC) to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for consideration and
procedural decision making.


TIME BANK: Liabilities Exceed Assets, Probe Reveals
---------------------------------------------------
During the examination of financial standing of PJSC Time Bank,
the provisional administration appointed by Bank of Russia Order
No. OD-1724, dated July 21, 2015, due to the revocation of the
banking license revealed operations conducted by the bank's
former management bearing the evidence of moving out assets worth
RUR176 million from the bank through extending loans to companies
with dubious creditworthiness.

Besides, the former management of PJSC Time Bank failed to
provide the provisional administration with the original loan
agreements signed with legal borrowers worth RUR75 million.

According to estimates by the provisional administration, the
asset value of PJSC Time Bank does not exceed RUR988 million,
while its liabilities to creditors amount to RUR1027 million.

On October 27, 2015, the Court of Arbitration of the city of
Moscow took a decision to recognize PJSC Time Bank insolvent
(bankrupt) and to initiate bankruptcy proceedings with the state
corporation Deposit Insurance Agency appointed as a receiver.

The Bank of Russia has submitted the information on the financial
transactions bearing the evidence of criminal offences conducted
by the former management and owners of PJSC Time Bank to the
Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation, the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Investigative
Committee of the Russian Federation for consideration and
procedural decision making.



=========
S P A I N
=========


INMOBILIARIA CHAMARTIN: Accounting Law Changes Prompt Bankruptcy
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sharon Smyth at Bloomberg News, citing Expansion, reports that a
change to accounting laws forced Inmobiliaria Chamartin, which
has EUR535 million of debt, to initiate bankruptcy proceedings.

A law passed in 2008, which allowed companies to not include
losses from the depreciation of real estate assets expired last
year, Bloomberg relays.

According to Bloomberg, the company had been in talks with
creditors including Banco Popular to restructure debt.

Morgan Stanley owns 16% of the company, Bloomberg discloses.  The
largest shareholder is Cutillas family with a 39% stake in the
company, Bloomberg notes.

Headquartered in Madrid, Spain, Inmobiliaria Chamartin offers
real estate services.  The Company specializes in the
development, promotion, sale, and lease of various types of
housings, business premises, public subsidized housings, shopping
centers, office buildings, and apartments.  Inmobiliaria
Chamartin rents various properties throughout Spain.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


B RILEY: Marts in Cumbria Faces Loses Due to Firm's Collapse
------------------------------------------------------------
Maureen Hodges at News & Star reports that Cumbria's livestock
marts are facing further losses after the collapse of another
major meat wholesaler.

It is believed all six of the county's major mart companies are
owed six-figure sums from one of their major buyers, B Riley &
Sons, which has gone into administration.

The report notes Back in the summer all the marts admitted that
they had become casualties to another major buyer, Lancaster
Meats, when the company went bust.

The report relays that at that time, the county's livestock marts
were facing six-figure hits.

The report notes Mart executives said they had been aware that
Lancaster Meats had been having cash flow problems for some time
but some admitted that the meat buyer had still been a familiar
face bidding at livestock sales until days before it went into
administration.

More than 130 jobs have been lost after the Lancashire-based lamb
and beef supplier, Riley's, stopped trading as a result of cash-
flow problems, the report discloses.

The report says the abattoir and meat processing business in
Burnley went into administration on December 16, with Paul Flint
and -- paul.a.flint@kpmg.co.uk -- David Standish --
david.standish@kpmg.co.uk -- of KPMG appointed joint
administrators.

The business is one of the largest independent abattoirs in the
north of England, focusing primarily on sheep throughput for the
Halal wholesale market in the UK and EU, the report notes.

Its premises enabled them to put 12,000 sheep per week through
its abattoir facility.

The report discloses administrators are now actively seeking a
buyer for the business.

It is believed the county's livestock marts have been informed by
letter of the company's collapse, the report says.

A source said Riley's exposure was "huge" and they believed the
company owed millions to marts up and down the country, primarily
at Stirling and Lanark, although they believed it was a major
buyer at all the county's marts, the report notes.

The report discloses it is believed a creditors meeting for
Riley's has been called for February 14.

The report notes Paul Flint, associate partner at KPMG, said:
"The business is one of the largest independent abattoirs in the
north of England, holding BRC accreditation focusing primarily on
sheep throughput for the Halal wholesale market in the UK and EU,
but also having beef capabilities.

"We are seeking a buyer for the business and its assets, and
would urge any interested parties to contact the joint
administrators as soon as possible," Mr. Flint added.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Private Sector Creditors to Bear Cost of EU Bank Failures
-----------------------------------------------------------
Mehreen Khan at The Telegraph reports that Europe has called an
end to the era of mass bank bail-outs as new rules to stop
taxpayers from footing the cost of financial rescues come into
force.

According to The Telegraph, private sector creditors will be
forced to take the hit for bank failures as the EU seeks to end
the age of "too big to fail", which has cost member states more
than EUR1.5 trillion since 2008.

The measures -- which was set to come into force on Jan. 1 and
apply to eurozone states -- are designed to break the vicious
cycle between lenders and governments that bought the single
currency to its knees four years ago, The Telegraph says.

Senior bondholders and depositors over EUR100,000 will be in line
to be "bailed-in" if a bank goes bust, a departure from the mass
government-funded rescues seen in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and
Greece in the wake of the financial crisis, The Telegraph
discloses.

Brussels' tough new Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)
will require creditors to incur losses of at least 8% of their
total liabilities before receiving official sector aid, The
Telegraph states.  According to The Telegraph, Britain will not
be subject to the rules.

More than EUR1.6 trillion (GBP1.18 trillion) has been pumped into
troubled banks by member states between October 2008 and December
2012, The Telegraph relays, citing figures from the European
Commission.

A new eurozone wide insolvency fund, the Single Resolution
Mechanism, was also set to become operational on Jan 1, The
Telegraph relates.  It will build up contributions from the
banking industry over the next eight years to use in cases of
financial collapse, The Telegraph says.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2016.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *