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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, October 30, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 215

                            Headlines

F R A N C E

CASAVITA: S&P Affirms, Then Withdraws 'B' Corp. Credit Rating


G E R M A N Y

TECHEM GMBH: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB-'


K A Z A K H S T A N

BANK OF ASTANA: Fitch Assigns 'B' Issuer Default Rating
BANK CENTERCREDIT: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B'


N E T H E R L A N D S

GLASSTANK BV: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to 'B3'
SRLEV NV: Moody's Hikes Jr. Subordinate Debt Ratings to Ba2(hyb)


N O R W A Y

NORSKE SKOG: Ends Debt Refinancing Talks with Bondholders


R O M A N I A

ROMANIAN BANKS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 4 Institutions


R U S S I A

DELOPORTS LLC: Fitch Says Bond Issue Rating Impact Neutral
OGK-2: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Issuer Default Rating, Outlook Stable
TRANSAERO AIRLINES: To File for Bankruptcy, Owes RUR250 Billion


S P A I N

ALMIRALL SA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable
BBVA RMBS 11: Moody's Cuts Class C Notes Rating to 'Caa2(sf)'


S W I T Z E R L A N D

BANK HOTTINGER: Losses, Legal Issues Prompt Liquidation


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE MORTGAGE NO.1: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class B Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CIRIS LANGUAGE: Quantuma Appointed as Liquidators
EMBLEM FINANCE 2: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on CLP5.08BB Notes
FOUR SEASONS: Asserts Ability to Repay GBP26MM Interest
KENSINGTON MORTGAGE 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on 2 Notes
LIGHTPOINT PAN-EUROPEAN: S&P Lifts Rating on Cl. E Notes From BB-

MCCLURE NAISMITH: Debts Estimated at More Than GBP5 Million
P CLARKE: Owed GBP14-Mil. to Creditors at Time of Administration


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The Story of The Bank of America


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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CASAVITA: S&P Affirms, Then Withdraws 'B' Corp. Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on CasaVita, the holding company of
France-based private elderly care home operator DomusVi.  S&P is
subsequently withdrawing the rating on CasaVita and assigning a
'B' long-term corporate credit rating to HomeVi, a parent company
of DomusVi.  The outlook is stable.

In addition, S&P affirmed the 'B' issue rating on DomusVi's senior
secured notes.  The recovery rating on these notes is unchanged at
'4', indicating S&P's expectation of average recovery, in the
lower half of the 30%-50% range.

At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B+' issue rating on DomusVi's
super senior revolving credit facility (RCF) maturing in 2021.
The recovery rating on this RCF is unchanged at '2', indicating
S&P's expectation of substantial recovery, in the higher half of
the 70%-90% range.

The rating actions follow DomusVi's completion of its acquisition
of Spanish nursing home provider Geriatros from Spanish private
equity fund Magnum, via its subsidiary HomeVi.  The transaction
was financed with a EUR125 million tap on its existing senior
secured notes due 2021 and the issuance of EUR90 million of
additional equity.

The withdrawal of the rating on CasaVita, a group financing arm,
and the assignment of the corporate credit rating to HomeVi, a
holding company that issues consolidated group accounts covering
the entire perimeter of group operating assets, reflects the
changes in the organizational structure of the group after the
closing of the recent leveraged financing transaction.  The 'B'
corporate credit rating continues to equal the 'b' group credit
profile (GCP).  HomeVi is also the issuer of the rated
EUR480 million senior secured notes.  S&P will continue to treat
the unrated EUR45 million payment-in-kind note issued by CasaVita
as a debt-like obligation ultimately falling within the scope of
the GCP, which S&P incorporates in its adjustments to credit
metrics.

S&P believes that the transaction will result in increased group
leverage by year-end 2015; however, S&P expects to see the
Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio return to 2014
levels of 6.5x-7.0x by year-end 2016.  S&P anticipates that this
quick turnaround in adjusted leverage metrics will be driven by
Geriatros' strong profitability, which, in S&P's view, will
bolster the group's future earnings levels.  S&P understands that
Geriatros benefits from well-invested facilities with only a small
proportion secured on a leasehold basis.  As such, S&P expects the
fixed-charge coverage to remain at 1.3x, with only a marginal
improvement in 2016-2017.

S&P views the acquisition of Geriatros as supportive of S&P's
assessment of the group's "fair" business risk profile.  The
combined entity will benefit from its increased size, in S&P's
view, as well as from the potential for better revenue
diversification as Geriatros brings access to Spain and
consequently to a different reimbursement regime.  S&P sees the
Spanish market as highly fragmented and consider that it offers
opportunities for growth, owing to its aging population and long
waiting lists for publicly funded beds.

However, S&P considers the Spanish market to be riskier than the
French market.  The Spanish preference for publicly funded beds
limits incremental rates for private beds, only a limited part of
the population can fund themselves privately, and there is a lack
of pass-through contracts in Spain, which are typical in the
French nursing home market.

A large portion of Geriatros' assets are operated on a freehold
basis, which is beneficial for its EBITDA margin and will improve
that of the group.  S&P projects that, in 2016, Geriatros will
account for about 25% of the combined group's reported EBITDA of
EUR110 million.

S&P continues to base its assessment of the combined group's
business risk profile on the performance of DomusVi.  This is
because DomusVi continues to generate the majority of the group's
revenues and profits.  In S&P's view, DomusVi's operating
environment is stable and provides relatively good visibility,
thanks to an aging population and high barriers to entry.
Furthermore, the government's well-defined reimbursement regime,
mainly via pass-through contracts, should continue to mitigate
risk.  The French government covers the majority of dependence and
medical care costs, reducing the effect of potential policy
changes on DomusVi's profitability.

S&P notes that DomusVi's revenue mix benefits from the large
contribution of private revenues.  Private funding mainly covers
the accommodation fee, which is set by each nursing home for new
residents, and allows operators to defend their margins.  S&P
expects DomusVi's revenues to rise at least in line with the
market, mainly on the back of increasing average daily rates for
accommodation and associated services, given that occupancy is
already near maximum.

DomusVi leases a large portion of its real estate.  S&P views this
type of cost structure negatively because rents represent
additional fixed costs.  In S&P's view, this could weigh on
DomusVi's profitability because S&P considers that the industry
offers low growth prospects, assuming flat to slightly increasing
volumes but decreasing tariffs and higher costs that at least
reflect inflation.  However, DomusVi's lessor base is fragmented,
due to individual ownership of properties, and this should help
the company negotiate future rent levels.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- GDP growth in France of 1.3% in 2015 and 1.6% in 2016, with
      GDP growth in Spain at 2.2% and 2.4% for the same period.
      S&P expects the French government to continue its efforts
      to curb health care expenditures, in accordance with
      deficit-cutting measures.

   -- That GDP indicates the state's willingness to pay for
      health care, given the sector's nondiscretionary nature.

   -- Revenue growth at DomusVi will increase substantially
      following recent acquisitions, including DomusVi Domicile
      and Geriatros, and should achieve a compound annual growth
      rate of approximately 16% between 2014 and 2016.  S&P
      expects growth rates to outpace GDP thereafter, but to
      remain in the low single digits, fueled by higher occupancy
      rates at mature-resident medical homes, reflecting its
      marketing initiatives.

   -- Occupancy levels will increase with some recovery in
      pricing, while group profitability will be enhanced
      following the acquisition of Geriatros, which has a greater
      proportion of private payers.

   -- Maintenance capital expenditures (capex) of 1%-2% of
      revenues per year.

   -- No dividends or acquisitions besides add-on transactions,
      which will be financed through capex.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Adjusted debt-to-EBITDA of 7.5x in 2015, falling to 6.5x in
      2016; and

   -- An average fixed-charge coverage ratio of 1.3x over the
      next three years.

S&P assesses DomusVi's liquidity position as "adequate," under
S&P's criteria, reflecting its expectations that the ratio of
liquidity sources should cover liquidity uses by more than 1.2x
over the next 12 months.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that DomusVi will
successfully integrate Geriatros into the group, continue to
operate in a stable and predictable operating environment, and
maintain its track record of adjusting its fees and successfully
rolling out new services.

By doing so, S&P believes that DomusVi will be able to improve its
profitability, despite the restricted potential for organic volume
growth in France, as it will benefit from higher growth rates in
Spain.  The outlook also reflects S&P's view that DomusVi should
be able to continue covering its capex and maintain an adjusted
fixed-charge coverage ratio of about 1.3x, thereby enabling it to
comfortably make its interest and rent payments.

S&P could lower the rating on HomeVi if the combined entity
experienced significantly weaker adjusted EBITDA margins owing to
the competitive environment and an inability to implement an
optimal pricing strategy for its service offerings.  If the
company were unable to maintain strong profitability metrics, S&P
could revise down its business risk assessment, leading to a
downgrade.

S&P could also consider a downgrade if DomusVi is unable to
generate positive free cash flow, or faces potential liquidity and
structural operational problems.  Such issues could include an
increasing mismatch between reimbursement receipts, projected
volume growth, and operating costs, given DomusVi's high fixed-
cost base, which could lead to a sustained deterioration of the
adjusted fixed-charge coverage ratio to below 1.3x.

S&P considers a positive rating action unlikely over the next 12
months because it projects that DomusVi's core debt-protection
metrics are likely to remain commensurate with a "highly
leveraged" financial risk profile.  This is underpinned by the
company's substantial debt levels in the capital structure and
significant lease obligations required to carry out its core daily
operations.  However, S&P could take a positive rating action if
DomusVi improved and maintained its fixed-charge coverage ratio
higher than 2.2x.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


TECHEM GMBH: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB-'
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on German energy services provider Techem GmbH to
'BB-' from 'B+'.  The outlook is stable.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'B' short-term corporate credit rating on the
company.

S&P also raised its issue rating on the company's EUR1,225 million
senior secured debt to 'BB-' from 'B+'.  This debt includes the
company's EUR410 million senior notes, the upsized EUR555 million
term loan, the upsized additional capital expenditure (capex)
facilities of up to EUR210 million, and a EUR50 million revolving
credit facility (RCF).  The '3' recovery rating on all of Techem's
senior secured debt remains unchanged, indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful recovery in the event of a payment
default, in the lower half of the 50%-70% range.

At the same time, S&P raised its issue rating on Techem's senior
subordinated notes to 'B' from 'B-'.  The '6' recovery rating on
these notes remains unchanged, indicating S&P's expectation of
negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

The upgrade primarily reflects S&P's expectation that Techem will
continue to improve its credit metrics through solid revenue and
EBITDA growth in the next 24 months and that the recent amendments
to and extension of its senior credit facilities only temporarily
delays its deleveraging path.  Techem has indicated it is seeking
to replace its existing EUR450 million term loan, of which EUR425
million is outstanding, and its existing EUR50 million capex
facility with a new EUR555 million term loan due 2020 and to
upsize its additional capex facility to up to EUR210 million from
EUR60 million currently.

Techem's "satisfactory" business risk profile mainly reflects its
leading market share and long-standing experience in the stable
German heat and water sub-metering market (representing most of
its EBITDA), underpinned by its technological leadership and large
installed meter base.  The business risk profile is further
supported by S&P's favorable view of the industry environment for
energy sub-metering in Germany, which is supported by German law
and trends in energy efficiency.  The essential nature of energy
sub-metering and long-term customer contracts with low switching
incentives are key factors leading to stable revenues and cash
flow over time, in S&P's view.  Sub-metering costs generally
represent less than 5% of a tenant's utility bill.

These strengths are offset by limited growth prospects for energy
sub-metering in the favorable German market and exposure to the
less profitable energy contracting business.  S&P also considers
Techem's relatively small size and concentrated business to be a
constraint compared with larger and more diversified business
service companies, because this makes it vulnerable to changes in
regulation or technology that can disrupt the business.  Although
S&P acknowledges that the potential for energy sub-metering growth
in the EU is large after the introduction of a common framework
for energy sub-metering, S&P thinks this step represents future
upside potential in several years' time.

S&P's view of Techem's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged" primarily reflects the company's still-high leverage
(including shareholder loans) and subdued cash flow generation,
partly offset by relatively favorable cash interest coverage
metrics.  Nevertheless, S&P expects Techem's credit metrics will
improve meaningfully thanks to solid revenue and EBITDA growth
prospects.  In addition, S&P notes that Techem's near-term free
cash flow generation is partly constrained by growth-related
investments due to strong demand for smoke detectors.  In S&P's
base case for Techem in fiscal 2016-2018, S&P forecasts that debt
to EBITDA, as adjusted by Standard & Poor's, will decline toward
5x, with funds from operations (FFO) to debt gradually converging
toward 12%.

In calculating S&P's adjusted debt, it includes shareholder loans
at Techem's parent, holding company MEIFII Sarl, which amounted to
EUR358 million (including accrued interest) on June 30, 2015.

In its base case for Techem, S&P assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of 4%-6% in fiscals 2016 and 2017, supported
      by increased demand for supplementary services such as
      smoke detectors, price increases, and revenue growth in
      Techem's international operations;

   -- Reported EBITDA margins of 34%-36% in fiscal 2016 and 35%-
      37% in fiscal 2017 after 34% in fiscal 2015, supported by
      improvements in Techem's revenue mix and the ongoing
      reorganization of the company's sales model in Germany;

   -- Capex at between EUR120 million and EUR135 million in
      fiscal 2016, temporarily increased by strong demand in
      Techem's smoke detector business, and between EUR110
      million and EUR120 million in fiscal 2017; and

   -- Shareholder distributions of EUR70 million-EUR85 million in
      fiscal 2016, gradually rising thereafter, with
      distributions partly made through the shareholder loan.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures
for Techem:

   -- Debt to EBITDA, as adjusted by Standard & Poor's, of 5.6x-
      5.8x at the end of fiscal 2016, after 5.7x in fiscal 2015,
      improving to 5.2x-5.4x by the end of fiscal 2017.

   -- FFO to debt, as adjusted by Standard & Poor's, between 8%
      and 10% in fiscals 2016 and 2017, reduced by sizable
      interest expenses of more than EUR130 million annually,
      including interest on the shareholder loan.

   -- FFO cash interest coverage, as adjusted by Standard &
      Poor's and excluding discretionary interest payments on the
      shareholder loans, of 3.0x-3.2x in fiscals 2016 and 2017.

S&P's stable outlook reflects its expectation that Techem is
likely to post mid-single-digit revenue growth and improving
EBITDA margins over the next 12-18 months, enabling it to reduce
Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA to sustainably below
5.5x by the end of fiscal 2017.  In addition, S&P assumes that
Techem's Standard & Poor's-adjusted FFO cash interest coverage
ratio, excluding discretionary interest payments on the
shareholder loans, will stabilize at above 3.0x in fiscal 2016 and
that Standard & Poor's-adjusted free operating cash flow (FOCF) to
debt will gradually improve toward 5%.

S&P could raise the rating if Techem strengthened its credit
metrics more meaningfully than S&P currently foresees, for example
through stronger-than-expected revenue or EBITDA growth, resulting
in Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA of sustainably below
4.5x and FFO to debt sustainably above 15%.  In addition, a higher
rating would be supported by a Standard & Poor's-adjusted FOCF to
debt ratio of about 10%.

S&P could lower the rating if Techem did not strengthen its credit
metrics as S&P currently expects, for example due to lower-than-
expected revenues from supplementary services or expansion outside
Germany, difficulties with realizing efficiency gains in its
operations, or excessive shareholder remuneration.  Specifically,
rating pressure would result if Standard & Poor's-adjusted FFO
cash interest coverage ratio for Techem, excluding discretionary
interest payments on the shareholder loans, deteriorated to less
than 3.0x for more than a temporary period, or if S&P observed
material deviations from the company's anticipated leverage
reduction path, undermining prospects for Standard & Poor's-
adjusted debt to EBITDA to decrease to sustainably below 5.5x by
the end of fiscal 2017.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


BANK OF ASTANA: Fitch Assigns 'B' Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Bank of Astana JSC (BoA) Long-term
Issuer Default Ratings of 'B' with a Stable Outlook.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, VIABILITY RATING (VR), NATIONAL LONG-
TERM RATING

BoA's Long-term IDRs of 'B' are driven by its standalone credit
profile, as reflected in its 'b' VR.  The latter is currently
constrained by the bank's small, albeit growing, franchise (below
1% of sector assets and loans), high concentrations on both sides
of the balance sheet, and a short track record (since 2013) of
operations under new shareholders and with the revised SME/retail-
focused strategy.

BoA's current asset quality metrics are somewhat better than
sector averages, but its loan book is highly unseasoned following
the recent rapid growth (63% CAGR for 2012-2014).  At end-1H15,
NPLs (loans more than 90 days overdue) stood at around 7.3% of
gross loans and were 84% covered by reserves.  However,
restructured loans (mostly in the agriculture and services
sectors) amounted to a further 7% at the same date.

The corporate loan book is highly concentrated, with the 25
largest exposures comprising around 66% of gross corporate loans
(2.3x FCC) at end-4M15.  Loans to construction companies accounted
for at least 21% of the gross corporate book, or 0.7x FCC.  Fitch
considers these to be relatively risky due to high non-completion
risks and, in some instances, rather weak collateral.

Foreign currency loans amounted to 32% of gross loans at end-8M15
and may be subject to deterioration as a result of recent tenge
devaluation, as most borrowers do not have foreign currency
revenues.

BoA's capitalization is adequate, with a total regulatory capital
adequacy ratio of 11.7% at end-8M15 (capital is almost entirely
composed of Tier 1).  These figures already take into account the
devaluation-driven boost of risk-weighted assets.

Fitch estimates that at end-8M15 BoA's additional loss absorption
capacity was modest at around 5% of gross loans.  However, given
BoA's moderate growth plans for 2016 and the planned KZT4.5
billion equity injection in December 2015 (around 24% of end-8M15
equity), its capital should be preserved, at least in the near
term.

BoA's profitability is reasonable, with 1.8% ROAA and 12% ROAE in
1H15 (annualized), but weakened somewhat, as the cost of funding
increased (to 5.2% in 1H15 from 2.5% in 2013).  BoA's pre-
impairment profit provides solid loss-absorption capacity (around
3% of average gross loans in 1H15, annualized).  The bank made a
moderate gain on devaluation due to a small long foreign currency
position.

BoA's funding profile is undermined by very high concentrations
and low diversification.  At end-4M15, the bank's 20 largest
customers provided around 94% of total customer funding or 72% of
liabilities.  State companies accounted for at least 58% of the
total customer funding or 45% of total liabilities at that date.
At end-8M15, BoA's total available liquidity covered around one-
third of its customer accounts.  At the same time, Fitch views the
bank's liquidity as only moderate due to high concentrations in
its deposit base.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - SUPPORT RATING (SR) AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR
(SRF)

BoA's SRF of 'No Floor' and '5' Support Rating reflect its limited
scale of operations and market share.  Thus any extraordinary
direct capital support from the Kazakhstani authorities cannot be
relied upon, in Fitch's view.  Support from the bank's private
shareholders also cannot be relied upon, in the agency's view.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, VR, NATIONAL LONG-TERM RATING

An extended track record of sound performance under new
shareholders and successful implementation of the new strategy
would be credit positive.  A strengthening of BoA's franchise
while maintaining reasonable asset quality and margin of safety
would also be positive for the bank's ratings.  A downgrade could
result from a notable deterioration of asset quality, capital
depletion, and/or liquidity squeeze.

SUPPORT RATING (SR) AND SUPPORT RATING FLOOR (SRF)

Changes to the bank's SRF and SR are unlikely in the foreseeable
future, although the SR could be upgraded in case of the
acquisition of BoA by a stronger financial institution (not
Fitch's base case expectation at the moment).

The rating actions are:

  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: assigned at 'B',
  Outlook Stable

  Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: assigned at 'B'

  National Long Term Rating: assigned at 'BB(kaz)', Outlook Stable

  Viability Rating: assigned at 'b'

  Support Rating: assigned at '5'

  Support Rating Floor: assigned at 'No Floor'


BANK CENTERCREDIT: S&P Cuts Counterparty Credit Rating to 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had lowered its
long-term counterparty credit rating on Kazakhstan-based Bank
CenterCredit JSC (BCC) to 'B' from 'B+'.  The outlook is stable.
S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term counterparty credit rating.

At the same time, S&P lowered its Kazakhstan national scale rating
on BCC to 'kzBB+' from 'kzBBB'.

The rating actions stem from S&P's concerns about BCC's
continuously poor earnings, which are placing further pressure on
its capital buffers.  S&P therefore considers that BCC's business
position has weakened to "moderate" from "adequate," given its
track record of very low profitability over the past seven years.
BCC's poor performance is an outlier compared with that of its
peers.  Contrary to S&P's previous expectations, it believes it is
highly unlikely that BCC's profitability will increase to that of
peers within the next two years, due to more difficult operating
conditions in the Kazakh banking sector.

S&P expects that stagnating economic growth in Kazakhstan, with
GDP growth forecast at 1.5%-2% in 2015-2016 compared with 6% on
average over the past five years, and the tenge's devaluation by
more than 30% since August 2015 would reduce business prospects,
new business generation, and profitability for all Kazakh banks,
including BCC.  S&P do not expect material improvements in BCC's
core profitability (excluding one-time items) over the next two
years.

Despite BCC's management's efforts to increase operating
efficiency and profitability following losses in 2009 and 2010,
BCC's net income remained very low from 2011 until the first half
of 2015.  The bank's annual return on average assets of about
0.07% over the past three and a half years is clearly
significantly below the average of 1.3% reported by rated peers.
In S&P's view, BCC's peers are banks we rate that have an adequate
business position in countries with banking industry risk
comparable with that in Kazakhstan, such as Russia, Uzbekistan,
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria.

BCC's long history of poor profitability is inconsistent with
S&P's assessment of an "adequate" business position, especially in
comparison with that of peers.  In S&P's view, BCC's profitability
will likely continue to lag that of the peer group over the next
two years.

S&P views BCC's marginal earnings generation in the context of its
weak capitalization.  S&P projects that the risk-adjusted capital
(RAC) ratio for BCC, according to Standard & Poor's methodology,
will continue declining, reaching less than 4% in 2015-2016 after
4.2% at year-end 2014 and 4.7% at year-end 2013.  Shareholder Tier
1 capital injections are unlikely in the next 18 months;
therefore, the bank's earnings are crucial to augment its slim
capital buffer.

S&P expects that credit costs for BCC and the wider Kazakh banking
system will increase over the next 18 months, owing to a moderate
deterioration in asset quality, which S&P anticipates will come
from seasoning of loans amid more difficult operating conditions
and from the weak tenge.

BCC's funding costs will likely remain elevated, due to the need
to obtain tenge liquidity and hedge a mismatch between assets and
liabilities in foreign currency that has widened significantly in
the past 12 months.

S&P's assessment of other bank-specific factors is unchanged.  The
long-term counterparty credit rating is one notch higher than
BCC's stand-alone credit profile, which S&P places at 'b-'.  The
uplift reflects S&P's belief that BCC would likely receive support
from the government if required, due to its moderate systemic
importance for the Kazakh banking sector.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that BCC's business
and financial profiles will remain balanced at the current rating
level over the next 12 months.  S&P expects the bank to maintain
its market shares in loans and deposits and its moderate systemic
importance in the Kazakh banking system.

S&P could take a negative rating action if significant additional
provisions to address asset quality deterioration put material
pressure on the bank's capitalization, resulting in S&P's forecast
RAC ratio declining below 3%.  Inability to manage a growing
mismatch between foreign currency assets and liabilities,
resulting in insufficient liquidity in tenge, could also trigger a
negative rating action in the next 12 months.

Upside potential is limited over the next 12-18 months because it
would require substantial strengthening of the bank's loss-
absorption capacity, either through larger capital buffers or
stronger bottom-line earnings.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


GLASSTANK BV: Moody's Hikes Corporate Family Rating to 'B3'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the corporate family rating
('CFR') to B3 from Caa1 and probability of default rating ('PDR')
to B3-PD from Caa1-PD of Glasstank B.V. Concurrently, Moody's has
upgraded to B3 from Caa1 the rating on the EUR185 million senior
secured notes due May 2019.

The outlook for all ratings is stable.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade to B3 reflects the significant progress the company
has made upgrading its manufacturing plants to improve its
operating performance, which Moody's expects will result in a
build-up of cash and gradually improving credit metrics in the run
up to 2019 when the senior secured notes are due. Moody's expects
EBITDA to increase significantly over the next 12-18 months
reducing Moody's adjusted leverage towards 4.0x by the end of FY
2016. Increasing positive free cash flow will reduce the company's
reliance on its short term local facilities.

The upgrade program will materially increase Glasstank's furnace
output capacities and improve the efficiency of the company's
production facilities primarily through lower energy consumption.
These benefits will be supported by energy and labor costs that
are among the lowest in Europe, providing the company with a
significant barrier to entry in its home markets and a competitive
advantage further afield. The upgrade program is due to complete
in Q1 2016 following the reconstruction of the one remaining
furnace at the company's Drujba Glassworks site and the
reconstruction of the New Glass furnace, both of which are located
in Bulgaria. No further furnace upgrades are expected before 2021.

Glasstank produced an encouraging set of H1 2015 trading results
over the same period a year earlier with strong revenue growth of
14.1%, EBITDA of EUR27.6 million, up from EUR21.9 million and an
EBITDA margin of 30.7% up from 27.8%. Improvements were driven by
a positive combination of higher volumes, price increases,
efficiencies from the recent furnace upgrades as well as lower
natural gas prices.

The short term nature of the company's local credit facilities and
weak liquidity remain factors constraining the rating. The company
relies on its rolling 12 month credit facilities that comprise a
material proportion of the group's funding to finance its
operations. This reliance is expected to reduce as cash generation
increases with the completion of the furnace upgrade program,
resulting in improving liquidity. These local facilities are
secured on trade receivables and therefore dilutes the security
available to lenders of the senior secured notes.

STABLE OUTLOOK

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Glasstank
will utilise the anticipated build-up of cash in reduction of
drawings on its short term, local facilities and not enter into
debt-financed M&A activity, or fund dividend payments. It also
incorporates Moody's expectation that the company's profitability
will continue to improve and this is reflected in improving credit
metrics.

What could change the rating -- UP

Positive ratings pressure could result if the company materially
reduces the reliance on its short term credit facilities,
maintains positive free cash flow such that FCF/debt increases
towards 15% and maintains adjusted debt/EBITDA below 3.5x.

What could change the rating -- DOWN

Downward pressure on the rating could develop if the company
remains reliant on its short term credit facilities, generates
negative free cash flow, or Moody's adjusted leverage is not
reduced below 5.0x.

Glasstank B.V., registered in The Netherlands, is a supplier of
glass packaging containers based in Romania and Bulgaria. The
group's reported net sales and EBITDA for the year ended 31
December 2014 were EUR157 million and EUR45.1 million
respectively.


SRLEV NV: Moody's Hikes Jr. Subordinate Debt Ratings to Ba2(hyb)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the backed subordinated and
junior subordinate debt ratings of SRLEV NV to Ba2(hyb) from
Ba3(hyb). SRLEV is one of the main insurance operating companies
of VIVAT NV (previously called REAAL N.V., unrated). All the debt
ratings carry a positive outlook.

The Insurance Financial Strength Rating (IFSR) of SRLEV and REAAL
Schadeverzekeringen NV are unaffected by this rating action.
Moody's considers the combined operations of all the insurance
companies of VIVAT as one analytical unit.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The upgrade on the hybrid debt ratings follows VIVAT's
announcement last Friday on the resumption of coupon payments on
the subordinated bonds issued by SRLEV NV following the EUR1.35
billion capital injection to VIVAT by its parent, Anbang Insurance
Group Co., Ltd. (Anbang, unrated). As a result, the Ba2(hyb)
hybrid debt ratings on the subordinated debt issued by an
operating company currently reflect a standard two notches from
the previous wider three notches in relation to the IFSR.

SRLEV has deferred coupon payments on its outstanding hybrid debt
since 2013. First, the European Commission had imposed a coupon
ban on SRLEV's hybrids following the nationalization of the SNS
REAAL Group in 2013. Subsequently, following the announcement of
the sale agreement with Anbang in February 2015, the European
Commission coupon ban was lifted. However, SRLEV exercised its
optional coupon deferral until both the sale and the capital
injection from Anbang materialized.

Following the capital injection, SRLEV will resume coupon payments
on its outstanding external hybrids -- EUR400 million junior
subordinated debt and CHF105million undated callable subordinated
bonds. VIVAT's Solvency II ratio will increase to above 150%
without transitional measures and based on a standard formula pro-
forma figures as at H1 2015 (YE2014: estimated at 100%).

Moody's Baa3 IFSR of VIVAT insurance companies reflect their
market position on retail and SMEs businesses and low asset risk.
These strengths are offset by (i) VIVAT's weak economic operating
profitability due to spread deficiency challenges -- with an
investment yield being insufficient to meet highly guaranteed
rates in existing policies -- together with a moderate economic
duration mismatch, (ii) high levels of volatility in economic
capitalization historically, although we note that management
actions have been taking to address this more recently; and (iii)
continuing high financial leverage, notwithstanding the reduction
in leverage metrics following the capital injection.

OUTLOOK

The positive outlook on the subordinated debt ratings is aligned
with the positive outlook of SRLEV's Baa3 IFSR. The positive
outlook continues to reflect the potential improvement in the
consolidated VIVAT's financial profile following the recent
capital injection. As part of the positive outlook, Moody's will
also assess the strategy that Anbang intends to pursue for VIVAT
as well as Moody's view on Anbang's credit quality.

Moody's expects that the IFSR and debt ratings of VIVAT will
continue to reflect the standalone fundamentals of the company,
the benefits of the regulatory protection from the Dutch regulator
and Moody's view of the credit quality of Anbang.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN

The following factors could exert upward pressure on the IFSR: (1)
substantial improvement in VIVAT's financial profile by reducing
the volatility in economic capitalization to interest rate
movements and remediating the large duration mismatch and spread
deficiency problem, (2) meaningful improvement in VIVAT's
operating profitability; and (3) improvement in market position in
life and non-life, both of which have been under pressure as a
result of the problems faced by the insurer.

The rating is on positive outlook and it is unlikely the ratings
will be downgraded in the next 12-18 months. However, the rating
could be stabilized if: (1) substantial deterioration in VIVAT's
long-term economic capitalization either from a sustained material
reduction in Solvency II position, increased volatility or
material reduction in the quality of capital, (2) financial or
total leverage exceeding 50% ; and (4) continuing pressures on
market position in the Dutch market insurance market.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

The following ratings have been upgraded with positive outlook

-- SRLEV NV's backed subordinated debt rating upgraded to
    Ba2(hyb) from Ba3(hyb)

-- SRLEV NV's backed junior subordinated debt rating upgraded to
    Ba2(hyb) from Ba3(hyb)



===========
N O R W A Y
===========


NORSKE SKOG: Ends Debt Refinancing Talks with Bondholders
---------------------------------------------------------
Luca Casiraghi at Bloomberg News reports that Norske
Skogindustrier ASA said it ended negotiations with two material
holders of unsecured bonds due 2016 and 2017 without agreement on
terms for a possible refinancing.

According to Bloomberg, the company said it's considering "several
options" to address its upcoming bond maturities and high
financial leverage.

The loss-making company met bondholders representatives this month
to discuss restructuring EUR320 million (US$353 million) of bond
repayments due in the next two years, Bloomberg relates.

"The discussions have concluded without any agreement being
reached at this time," Bloomberg quotes the company as saying in a
statement on Oct. 27.  "Norske Skog will continue to investigate
available options."

Norske Skog, as cited by Bloomberg, said the bondholders will no
longer be subject to restrictions on trading securities related to
the company under confidentiality agreements.

People familiar with the matter said this month Blackstone Group
LP's GSO Capital Partners, the largest owner of Norske Skog's
EUR218 million of unsecured bonds due 2017, proposed extending
their holdings until after 2019, while a group of secured
bondholders presented competing plans to swap debt for equity,
Bloomberg relays.

Norske Skogindustrier ASA or Norske Skog, which translates as
Norwegian Forest Industries, is a Norwegian pulp and paper
company based in Oslo, Norway and established in 1962.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 10,
2015, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it has raised its
long-term corporate credit rating on Norwegian paper producer
Norske Skogindustrier ASA to 'CCC+' from 'SD' (selective
default).  S&P said the outlook is negative.

On March 2, 2015, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe
reported Moody's Investors Service affirmed Norske Skogindustrier
ASA's  long term corporate family rating at Caa2 and upgraded the
Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Caa2-PD/ LD (limited
default) from Ca-PD.  The action follows the completion of the
debt exchange offer, as announced on Feb. 23, 2015, which
qualifies as distressed exchange under Moody's definition.
Moody's said the outlook is negative.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


ROMANIAN BANKS: Fitch Affirms Ratings on 4 Institutions
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings of
Banca Comerciala Romana S.A. and UniCredit Bank S.A. (UCBRO) at
'BBB', BRD Groupe Societe Generale S.A. at 'BBB+', and Banca
Transilvania S.A. at 'BB'.  The Outlooks are Stable.

The agency has also upgraded BCR's Viability Rating (VR) to 'bb-'
from 'b+', and affirmed the VRs of UCBRO at 'bb-' and BT at 'bb'.

The upgrade of BCR's VR reflects the bank's progress in resolving
its large stock of legacy non-performing loans (NPLs), the
increase in coverage of impaired loans with IFRS reserves, and a
return to operating profitability in 2015, following full year
losses in 2014.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRs AND SUPPORT RATINGS

BCR, BRD, UCBRO

The IDRs and Support Ratings of BCR, BRD and UCBRO reflect the
high likelihood of support from their parents.  BCR is Erste Group
Bank AG's (Erste; BBB+/Stable/bbb+) 93.6%-owned Romanian
subsidiary, UCBRO is 95.6%-owned by UniCredit S.p.A (UC;
BBB+/Stable/bbb+) and BRD is 60%-owned by Societe Generale (SG;
A/Stable/a).

Fitch views the Romanian subsidiary banks, and the wider CEE
region, as strategically important for the parent banks, despite
recent weak performance.  Their importance is evidenced by support
track record to date (in terms of funding and emergency liquidity
support lines) and by substantial operational and management
integration within the group.  In addition, the potential cost of
support would be manageable, given the small size of the Romanian
subsidiary banks relative to parent group assets.

The IDRs of BCR and UCBRO are notched once from their parents
IDRs, reflecting their strategic importance.  The Stable Outlooks
reflect those on their parents.  Fitch would rate BRD's Long-Term
IDR one notch below that of SG if country risks allowed.
Currently, BRD's IDR is constrained by Romania's Country Ceiling
(BBB+) and the Stable Outlook reflects that on the Romanian
sovereign.

BT

BT's IDRs are driven by the bank's VR, and therefore share the
same key rating drivers.  The Support Rating of '5' and Support
Rating Floor of 'No Floor' reflect Fitch's view that sovereign
support, while possible, can no longer be relied upon for BT, as
for most other commercial banks in the European Union.

VRs

BCR

The upgrade of BCR's VR reflects the bank's progress in resolving
its large stock of legacy NPLs, the increase in coverage of
impaired loans with IFRS reserves, and a return to operating
profitability in 2015, following full year losses in 2014.  BCR's
impaired loans ratio fell to 23.1% at end-1H15 (EBA NPE
definition) from 30.8% at end-1H14, driven by write-offs, NPL
sales and recoveries.  Fitch expects this ratio to improve
further, in line with a positive outlook for recoveries -- given
the bank's investments in its recovery function as well as a
positive outlook for Romanian economic growth -- and for further
NPL portfolio sales, and given that new inflows of impaired loans
are currently low.  Nevertheless, the VR also reflects headline
asset quality indicators that remain weak, still high levels of
loan concentrations (top 25 loans net of provisions accounted for
a high 105% of FCC), and a declining but high share of EUR lending
(55% of gross loans at end-1H15).

Coverage of impaired loans with IFRS reserves had increased to a
comfortable 77% of impaired loans at end-1H15, further to the high
loan impairment charges (LICs) booked mostly in 3Q14.  This has
significantly reduced net (unreserved) impaired loans to a more
adequate 42% of Fitch Core Capital at end-1H15, which supports our
view that BCR's capital (FCC of 15.7% at end-1H15) provides
reasonable loss absorption capacity if needed.

BCR's return to operating profitability in 1H15 follows full year
losses in 2014.  Operating performance in 2015 is supported by
cyclically low LICs, which are not expected to normalize at this
level.  Pre-impairment operating performance shows some resilience
to pressures on earnings from a fall in net interest income, and a
high proportion of low-yielding liquid assets (mostly cash and
Romanian government securities).  Unencumbered liquid assets
(including mandatory reserves) net of all wholesale funding were
equivalent to 21% of customer deposits at end-1H15.  The bank's
adequate funding profile is supported by the increasing portion of
customer deposits to 72% of BCR's total non-equity funding at end-
1H15, and the bank's leading franchise in retail deposits.  The
loans to deposits ratio had improved to 100% at end-1H15.

BT

BT's VR reflects its strong deposit funding base and liquidity
position, stable profitability and internal capital generation,
low loan concentrations, a lower share of foreign-currency lending
than at peers and reasonable coverage of impaired loans (high
coverage of 90 day past due loans) by reserves.  However, the
rating also reflects BT's still weak asset quality.  The
acquisition of VBRO did not materially change the bank's credit
profile.

BT's funding profile is a rating strength.  At end-1H15, customer
deposits accounted for a high 94% of total funding.  They were
granular and predominantly (59% of the total) retail.  At end-
1H15, BT's liquidity position was ample.  Unencumbered liquid
assets (including mandatory reserves) net of wholesale funding
maturing over the next 12 months were equivalent to 46% of
customer deposits.  The loan to deposit ratio deteriorated
somewhat to 76% (2014: 68%) but remained comfortable and in line
with BT's targets.

Fitch considers BT's capitalization strong given its Fitch Core
Capital (FCC) ratio of 21.3% at end-1H15 (2014: 17.5%).
Improvement over 2014 was driven by reasonable internal capital
generation and almost flat risk-weighted assets (RWA).  The VBRO
acquisition resulted in significant one-off gains that were much
higher than the increase of RWA and the capital requirement due to
the transaction.  These gains, booked in 1H15, are already
included in the FCC calculation but were not yet reflected in
regulatory capital at mid-year (1H15 Tier 1 ratio: 12:0%).  Fitch
expects the Tier 1 regulatory ratio and FCC to converge at around
20% at year end.

The fall of the coverage ratio to 57% (2014: 71%) and increase of
net impaired loans to FCC to 34.8% (2014: 28.8%) partly reflects
marginally lower coverage of NPLs in VBRO's loan book and does not
materially change the quality of BT's capital.

Asset quality, as measured by the impaired loans ratio, marginally
improved over 1H15 to 17.1% (2014: 18.4%), reflecting the fair
value treatment of the VBRO portfolio, significant clean-up of the
VBRO loan book before the transaction and quite substantial write-
offs.  Loans over 90 days past due are still relatively high at
9.1%, but are 85% covered with specific provisions and fully
covered by IFRS reserves.

UCBRO

UCBRO's VR reflects Fitch's view of the bank's weak asset quality,
its only just adequate capital levels and the ongoing constraint
on operating profitability from LICs, given that coverage of
impaired loans by IFRS reserves is below Fitch-rated peers.
However, the VR also factors in the bank's solid pre-impairment
operating performance and its ample liquidity.

UCBRO's headline impaired loans ratio (17.8% of gross loans at
end-1H15) reflects a relatively conservative identification of
potentially problematic exposures.  Regulatory NPLs of 12.5% at
end-1Q15 compare well with the sector average, with DPD90
exposures somewhat lower at 8.5%.  The difference between impaired
loans and the NPL/DPD90 ratios is mainly driven by some large,
potentially problematic restructured commercial real estate
exposures.

Fitch views UCBRO's capitalization, with a FCC ratio of 13.3% at
end-1H15, as only adequate.  This reflects the high, albeit
decreasing, level of unreserved impaired loans, at end-1H15
amounting to 67% of FCC.  Operating performance continues to be
constrained by high loan impairment charges, a contracting net
interest margin and high levels of liquid assets.  Unencumbered
liquid assets (including mandatory reserves) were equivalent to
31% of total non-equity funding at end-1H15.  Parent funding
remains substantial for UCBRO (38% of total non-equity funding at
end-1H15), and drives the bank's high loans to deposits ratio of
173% at end-1H15.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS

BCR and UCTB's IDRs are sensitive to changes in their parents'
ratings, or in Fitch's view of the commitment on the part of Erste
and UC to their respective subsidiaries, or to the wider CEE
region.

A downgrade of BRD's IDR would require SG's IDR to be downgraded
to 'BBB+' or below, or a downward revision of the Romanian Country
Ceiling, both of which Fitch currently considers unlikely.  An
upward revision of the Romanian Country Ceiling could lead to an
upgrade of BRD's IDR, but limited to one notch.  The IDRs and SR
are also sensitive to a change in Fitch's view of the propensity
of SG to provide support to BRD, which we currently consider
unlikely.

BT's IDRs are driven by the bank's VR and therefore share its key
rating sensitivities.

VRs

A further upgrade of BCR's VR would require BCR to complete its
resolution of legacy NPLs, while maintaining a tight risk
appetite, ensuring good asset quality on new loan production, and
maintaining current levels of capital.

An upgrade of BT's VR is unlikely in the near term.  Over the
medium term, an upgrade would require the smooth integration of
VBRO, a material improvement in asset quality, and maintenance of
strong capital and liquidity positions.  A downgrade could result
from a material increase in risk appetite, further deterioration
of asset quality or materially weaker capitalization.

An upgrade of UCBRO's VR would require a material reduction in
impaired loan volumes and higher levels of coverage with IFRS
provisions.  Asset quality deterioration, and/or an increase in
unreserved net impaired loans relative to capital could result in
a downgrade.

The rating actions are:

Banca Comerciala Romana S.A.

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
   Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
  Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bb-' from 'b+'

Banca Transilvania S.A.

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB', Outlook
   Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'
  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

UniCredit Bank S.A.:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Outlook
   Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb-'

BRD-Groupe Societe Generale S.A.

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at BBB+'; Outlook
   Stable
  Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
  Support Rating: affirmed at '2'



===========
R U S S I A
===========


DELOPORTS LLC: Fitch Says Bond Issue Rating Impact Neutral
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says it expects LLC DeloPorts' (DeloPorts;
BB-/Stable) planned bond issue of RUB3 bil. to have a neutral
rating impact.  Fitch will conduct a full review of the rating
following the bond issuance to reflect the revised debt structure
and the company's expected performance in its analysis.

DeloPorts expects to issue rouble-denominated bonds of RUB3
billion (approximately USD46 million) and has registered a bond
prospectus.  The bonds will have a bullet repayment with maturity
of up to 10 years and will be unsecured.

When Fitch assigned DeloPorts' rating, the holding company had no
debt.  Fitch noted that new debt issued by DeloPorts that would be
subordinated to the existing debt of the subsidiaries and/or would
result in our assessment of the debt structure as Weaker could be
negative for the rating.

Based on a review of the anticipated bond terms, Fitch does not
expect any negative rating impact from the bond issuance.  The
bond will represent about 35% of the consolidated group's debt at
YE2015, with the other 65% made up of bank loans at the operating
subsidiaries NUTEP and KSK.  The group's overall debt structure
becomes somewhat weaker with the bond due to the bullet repayment
style and associated refinancing risk, as well as the weakening of
the covenant package.  Positively, the bond's interest rate will
be fixed, reducing the exposure of the overall debt to floating
interest rate.  On balance, Fitch continues to regard the group's
debt structure as Midrange.

The rating of the holding company DeloPorts is notched down from
the consolidated profile (assessed at BB) by one notch in
accordance with Fitch's 'Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage'
criteria. This reflects the holding company debt's structural
subordination and the legal ties between DeloPorts and its
subsidiaries that are not sufficiently strong.

The group's financial performance based on actual 6M15 results and
revised management's budget for the whole year is within Fitch's
expectations.  Consolidated debt/EBITDA is expected at 1.8x at
YE15 with the issuance of the bond under Fitch's rating case.


OGK-2: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Issuer Default Rating, Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russia-based electricity generator
Public Joint-Stock Company The Second Generating Company of
Wholesale Power Market (OGK-2), a Long-term foreign currency Issue
Default Rating of 'BB' with Stable Outlook.

OGK-2's 'BB' rating incorporates a one-notch uplift to its 'BB-'
standalone rating for parental support from its ultimate majority
shareholder, PAO Gazprom (BBB-/Negative).

OGK-2's standalone rating is underpinned by its position as one of
the largest power generators in Russia and cash flow generation
from capacity sales under the Capacity Supply Agreements (CSA).
Fitch currently expects the postponement of commissioning of
certain new units under CSA and therefore leverage metrics are
unlikely to improve to below 4x before end-2016.  The standalone
rating is constrained by high regulatory risk and the company's
exposure to price and volume risk.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's view of the company's ability
to commission its new units and transfer the 420MW unit of
Serovskaya GRES to PJSC Inter RAO (BBB-/Negative) in line with the
updated schedule.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

One-Notch Uplift For Parental Support

OGK-2's 'BB' rating benefits from a one-notch uplift reflecting
our view of likely support from PAO Gazprom, which indirectly owns
77.24% of OGK-2 through OOO Gazprom Energoholding (GEH).  Fitch
assess the strategic, operational and to a lesser extent legal
ties between OGK-2 and its parent company as moderately strong
under Fitch's Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage methodology.

Moderately Strong Ties

The strength of the ties is supported by OGK-2's integral role in
Gazprom's strategy of vertical integration and its substantial
share in GEH's operations.  OGK-2's installed capacity covered
about 48% of GEH's total installed capacity at end-2014.  Its gas-
fired power plants are reliant on Gazprom's gas supplies, which
accounted for about 76%-92% of the company's gas consumption over
2012-2014.  Fitch expects timely financial support to be available
if the need arises, as has been the case in the past.  In 2013,
OGK-2 received capital injections of RUB22.3 bil. through
additional share issues, mainly in order to fund a large-scale
investment program.  Another means of support is the payment terms
extension for OGK-2's gas purchases from Gazprom that has been
done in the past, similarly to PJSC Mosenergo (BB+/Stable).
Additionally, about 94% of OGK-2's total outstanding debt at end-
1H15 was loans from Gazprom.

Strong Market Position

OGK-2's 'BB-' standalone rating is underpinned by the company's
market position as one of the largest power generating companies
in Russia.  With 18.4GW of installed electric capacity and
68.7 bil. kWh of electricity generation, OGK-2 was responsible for
about 7% of Russia's installed capacity and electricity generation
in 2014.  OGK-2 operates 11 power plants across Russia.  The
operation of multiple assets should moderate the risk of cash flow
volatility (i.e driven by unexpected outage).  The company is
mainly involved in the production and sale of electricity on the
wholesale market. In contrast to its large international peers
that are involved in various power generation types, OGK-2 is
focused on thermal power generation.  Revenue from heat sales is
immaterial (about 4% in 2014).

CSAs Support EBITDA

Similarly to rated Russian peers, stable earnings and a guaranteed
return for capacity sales under the CSA are the key factors that
mitigate the company's exposure to the market risk, support
stability of its cash flow generation and enhance its business
profile.  The company estimates that the newly commissioned units
under the CSAs contributed about 35%-40% to its EBITDA over 2012-
2014.  It expects their share to increase to about 50%-55% of
EBITDA over 2016-2020 once all new capacity under the CSA
framework is commissioned.  Fitch assumes that the company will
commission new capacities as per the revised schedule including
new units of Ryazanskaya GRES from Jan. 1, 2016, previously
expected from Nov. 1, 2015, and Serovskaya GRES from April 1,
2016, previously expected from Dec. 1, 2015, Troitskaya GRES and
Novocherkasskaya GRES from April 1, 2016, previously expected from
Jan. 1, 2016.

Deleveraging Unlikely Before 2017

In addition to high capex, Fitch expects OGK-2's EBITDA margin to
weaken to around 8% in 2015 due to the rise in fuel costs and
decline in revenue from electricity sales.  As a result, Fitch
expects funds from operations (FFO) net adjusted leverage to
increase to about 6x in 2015 from 2.8x in 2014.  However, Fitch
anticipates that the expected commissioning of new units at
Serovskaya GRES, Troitskaya and Novocherkasskaya GRES with
combined capacity of 1,410MW in April 2016, which will operate
under the CSA framework, will boost 2016 EBITDA.

Nevertheless, the expected acquisition of a 90.5046% stake in OGK-
Investproekt from PJSC Mosenergo for about RUB5.6 bil. in 1H16 may
result in OGK-2's leverage remaining elevated at above 3.5x at
end-2016, as OGK-Investproekt's outstanding debt was about RUB12bn
including RUB1bn owed to OGK-2.  OGK-2 expects to fund the
acquisition with own and external funds.  According to management,
420MW of Cherepovetskaya GRES is the main asset of OGK-
Investproekt that was commissioned in March 2015 and operates
under CSA.

Not All Rent Expenses Capitalized

Fitch does not capitalize the rent expenses that are represented
by rent payments made by OGK-2 in relation to Adlerskaya TPP and
420MW unit of Cherepovetskaya GRES.  These rent expenses were
RUB2.2 bil. in 1H15 or about 86% of total rent expenses.
According to the company, these expenses are largely pass-through
payments made by OGK-2 to OOO Gazprom Investproekt, a 100%
subsidiary of Gazprom, and OOO OGK-Investproekt, a JV between OGK-
2 (9.49%) and Mosenergo (90.51%) which are both part of GEH.  OOO
Gazprom Investproekt and OOO OGK-Investproekt funded the
construction of the Adlerskaya TPP and the new unit at
Cherepovetskaya GRES, respectively.  These rent payments are
calculated as the difference between the revenue generated by
these power plants and corresponding costs incurred by OGK-2,
which serves as the operator of these power generating units and
is a party to the respective CSA agreements.  The rent agreements
are renewed annually, which should limit OGK-2's financial
exposure in case of operational disruptions at the plants.
However, Fitch may revise its treatment of these rent payments if
the payments under the rental agreements substantially exceed the
cash flows generated by the respective power plants.  Fitch
expects rent payments in relation to 420MW unit at
Chereprovetskaya GRES to discontinue in 2H16 if the acquisition of
OGK-Investproekt by OGK-2 is carried out.

Negative Free Cash Flow in 2015

Fitch expects OGK-2 to generate cash flow from operations of
around RUB11.4 bil. on average over 2015-2018 following
commissioning of new capacity under CSA, which stipulated tariffs
are 3.0x-3.5x higher on average than those for existing
facilities.  However, Fitch expects negative free cash flow (FCF)
in 2015 due to ambitious investment plans of RUB23 bil.  Fitch
expects OGK-2 to rely on new borrowings to finance cash
shortfalls.

FCF may turn positive in 2016 if new 420MW unit at Serovskaya GRES
is transferred to Inter RAO and therefore will not require any
capex outflow in 2016 and beyond that will result in lower capex
expectations in addition to expected increase in EBITDA.

Less Efficient Than Rated Russian Peers

Fitch believes OGK-2 is less efficient in terms of fuel
utilization than Inter RAO and Mosenergo.  The latter is
considered the top quartile performer in the thermal generation
among Russian generating companies.  OGK-2's electricity fuel rate
slightly improved to 345 gfe/kWh in 2014 from 354 gfe/kWh in 2011.
The company's strategy envisages an improvement in operational
efficiency through the introduction of more efficient new capacity
and decommissioning of old and less efficient assets as well as
modernization of existing facilities.

Gas Dominates Fuel Costs

OGK-2's operating costs are dominated by fuel expenses, which made
up over two-thirds of the company's operating costs on average
over 2011-2014.  The company's profitability is consequently
highly sensitive to changes in fuel prices.  Its fuel mix is
dominated by natural gas (65% in 2014) followed by coal (35%).
Although Gazprom group companies covered about 76%-92% of OGK-2's
gas needs over 2012-2014, we do not view the supplier
concentration as a credit risk, as OGK-2 is majority indirectly
owned by Gazprom, which makes it an integral part of Gazprom
Group, supports stability of gas supplies and provides certain
elements of vertical integration.  Gazprom may extend the payment
terms for gas supplies if the need arise, as was the case in the
past.

Volume and Price Risk Exposure

OGK-2 generates most of its revenue from electricity and capacity
sale (about 70%) on the free market exposing the company to volume
and price risks with the remaining sales made on the regulated
market.  Price risk may be exacerbated by the regulatory changes
affecting tariffs.  Fitch believes volumes and price risks are
moderated by cash flow generation from new capacity sales under
the CSA with favorable economics.

Unpredictable Regulatory Regime

Like other Russian utilities, OGK-2 is exposed to regulatory risk,
reflected in frequent modifications of the regulatory regime and
political interventions.  This undermines the predictability of
the regulatory framework, which is necessary for utilities to make
long-term investment decisions.

In 2014, the government cancelled index-linked price increases in
the competitive capacity market for 2015, indexation of regulated
tariffs for electricity and capacity sales in 2014 as well as
capacity price indexation for newly commissioned nuclear and hydro
power plants for 2014-2015.  While abolishing capacity price
indexation was related to new capacity of nuclear and hydro power,
it remains to be seen whether this change of the CSAs' terms will
also be extended to thermal power plants.

Guaranteed payments under the CSAs are currently considerably
higher than capacity payments for the old capacity, but have not
been significantly altered so far.  Any significant revision of
the CSAs will weigh heavily on utilities' financial profiles and
increase cash flow risk as the CSA framework was developed to
ensure long-term investments in ageing power assets.  However,
Fitch's financial projections for OGK-2 are based on the
assumption that the fundamentals of the CSA framework will remain
unchanged.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our rating case for the issuer
include:

   -- Domestic GDP decline of 4% and inflation of 15.5% in 2015,
      in 2016 GDP growth of 0.5% and CPI of 9%
   -- Electricity consumption to decline slower than GDP
      contraction in 2015
   -- Electricity tariffs to increase below inflation
   -- Inflation-driven gas price increase
   -- Capital expenditure in line with management's expectations
   -- Dividend payments of 15%-20% of IFRS net income over 2016-
      2018

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:

   -- Improvement in financial profile due to, among other things,
      higher than expected growth in tariffs and/or volumes
      supporting FFO net adjusted leverage below 3x and FFO
      interest coverage above 6.5x on a sustained basis.

   -- Stronger parental support.

   -- Increased predictability of the regulatory and operational
      framework in Russia.

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:

   -- Inability to improve credit metrics so that FFO net
      adjusted leverage remains above 4x and FFO interest
      coverage stays below 3x on a sustained basis due to, among
      other factors, failure to commence operations at the new
      units in line with schedule, lower volumes of electricity
      and capacity sales, lower tariffs or margin squeeze driven
      by the rise of fuel prices not fully compensated by the
      electric prices growth, weak working capital management,
      M&A transaction resulting in higher debt levels and/or
      intensive capex program.

   -- Weakening of parental support may result in a removal of
      the one-notch uplift to OGK-2's standalone rating.

   -- Deterioration of the regulatory and operational environment
      in Russia.

LIQUIDITY

Manageable Liquidity

Fitch assesses OGK-2's liquidity as manageable within Gazprom
group context.  At end-1H15 OGK-2's cash and cash equivalents were
RUB6.7 billion and sufficient to cover upcoming short-term debt
maturities of RUB6.6 billion.  The majority of debt at end-1H15
(about 94%) was capex-related loans from Gazprom, OGK-2's ultimate
parent.  The company has access to uncommitted credit lines of
about RUB24 billion mainly from major Russian banks due over 2015-
2020. However, OGK-2 does not pay commitment fees under unused
credit facilities, which is common practice in Russia.  OGK-2 is
also considering placing a local bond in 4Q15 of about RUB15
billion under the bond program that envisages bonds issuance of up
to RUB30 billion or its equivalent in foreign currency.   Fitch
notes that OGK-2's investment program has little or no
flexibility, which increases short term funding needs.

Limited FX Exposure

OGK-2's FX exposure is limited to capex projects that encompass a
foreign currency component.  The company estimates that about
RUB5.8 billion of capex over 2015-2016 relating to purchases of
equipment is denominated in foreign currencies or about 14% of
total capex spending over the same period.  According to
management, FX-denominated capex expenses were translated assuming
RUB80 per EUR1.  Fitch notes that at end-1H15 OGK-2 had a portion
of cash in US dollars (about RUB2bn).  At end-2015 all of OGK-2's
debt was local currency denominated.  FX exposure may increase if
the company issues foreign currency debt.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

  Long-term foreign currency IDR assigned at 'BB', Outlook Stable

  Long-term local currency IDR assigned at 'BB', Outlook Stable

  Short-term foreign currency IDR assigned at 'B'

  Short-term local currency IDR assigned at 'B'

  National Long-term Rating assigned at 'AA-(rus)', Outlook
  Stable

  Expected local currency senior unsecured rating assigned at
  'BB(EXP)'


TRANSAERO AIRLINES: To File for Bankruptcy, Owes RUR250 Billion
---------------------------------------------------------------
DPA reports that Transaero notified the federal court system that
it intends to file for bankruptcy.

Transaero, crippled by a domestic recession and currency
devaluation, owes a total of about RUR250 billion (US$4 billion)
to numerous creditors including state banks Sberbank, VTB, VEB and
Gazprombank, DPA discloses.

The value of Russia's national currency nearly halved last year
when the economy buckled under the pressure of Western sanctions
over the Ukraine crisis and relatively low prices for oil,
Russia's main export, DPA recounts.

The devaluation left Transaero struggling to pay for a fleet of
aircraft leased in hard currency, DPA says.

The Federal Air Transport Agency said last week that it was
revoking Transaero's license because its unstable financial
condition raised safety concerns, DPA relays.  The company was no
longer allowed to operate flights as of Oct. 26, DPA notes.

OJSC Transaero Airlines is a Russian airline with its head office
in Saint Petersburg.  It operates scheduled and charter flights
to 103 domestic and international destinations.



=========
S P A I N
=========


ALMIRALL SA: S&P Affirms 'BB-' CCR, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB-' corporate
credit rating on Spain-based pharmaceutical company Almirall S.A.
The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' issue rating on
Almirall's EUR325 million senior unsecured notes.  The recovery
rating on the notes remains at '3', indicating S&P's expectation
of meaningful recovery in the event of payment default, in the
higher half of the 50%-70% range.

S&P's view of Almirall's business risk profile is unchanged
following the company's agreement to divest the rights of
Constella, one of its gastrointestinal drugs, to Allergan for a
total of EUR64 million, as part of its refocusing on dermatology
initiated in November 2014.  The business risk profile
incorporates S&P's assessment of "low" risk for the pharmaceutical
industry, as well as the company's predominant exposure to the
European region.  The company operates primarily in Spain and
several other European countries, as well as in the U.S.

S&P also takes into account these elements that constrain the
group's competitive position:

   -- A small scale of operations compared with big pharma
      competitors.  S&P believes that Almirall's lack of critical
      mass impairs its ability to bring new products to market.
      Increased concentration in dermatology, where it enjoys a
      sound niche market position.

   -- A relatively small product pipeline in its core therapeutic
      focus, dermatology, compensated by limited exposure to
      further patent expiration in the coming years.

S&P believes the disposal of flagship product Eklira and other
respiratory pipeline assets to AstraZeneca -- as well as the
Constella divestment to a smaller extent -- decreases the
company's potential for future revenue growth.  However, the
change in operating model toward specialty pharma should allow
Almirall to improve its profitability, boosted by structurally
lower research and development (R&D) expenses as well as lower
sales and marketing costs.

In S&P's view, Almirall's recent asset disposals and the emergence
of a royalties income stream, combined with the contribution from
future dermatology portfolio in-licensing, could help EBITDA
margins to settle sustainably above 20%.  However, there is still
a certain level of uncertainty related to execution of the group's
strategy and refocusing on dermatology.

"After incorporating our projections on future acquisitions, we
believe that the group will maintain credit metrics consistent
with the "intermediate" category, compared with "minimal"
previously.  In particular, we estimate debt to EBITDA of less
than 3x on a sustainable basis (compared with our previous
forecast of less than 1.5x), factoring in EUR1 billion of
acquisitions until the end of 2017, in our base-case scenario.
However, we expect the company to increase its cash flow
generation, reflecting its improved profitability and shifted
focus toward the dermatology specialty model.  The dermatology
division was strengthened by Almirall's acquisition of U.S.-based
Aqua Pharmaceuticals in December 2013.  We expect the EBITDA
margin increase to translate into annual free operating cash flow
(FOCF) above EUR50 million, with no change in our forecast annual
capital expenditure of about EUR50 million," S&P said.

The rating on Almirall results from the combination of S&P's
assessments of the group's "weak" business risk profile and
"intermediate" financial risk profile.  This leads to an anchor of
'bb'.  S&P's final rating on Almirall is once notch below the
anchor, reflecting S&P's negative view of the company's financial
policy, related to the execution risk of sizable acquisitions in
the dermatology therapeutic field, as well as the risk that these
debt-funded acquisitions could be above S&P's base-case
expectations.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Almirall will pursue
large acquisitions in the next 12-18 months, consuming the large
cash amount received from the sale of respiratory assets to
AstraZeneca in November 2014 and from the Constella divestment in
October 2015.  In S&P's base-case scenario, it expects the company
to generate positive discretionary cash flow, along with a total
of EUR1 billion in acquisitions from now until the end of 2017.

S&P could take a negative rating action if the company embarked on
large debt-financed acquisitions of above EUR1 billion -- higher
than the total disposal proceeds of the respiratory business and
Constella -- thereby exceeding a Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-
to-EBITDA ratio of 4x.

S&P could take a positive rating action if it believed that the
company would follow a measured pace in exercising future
acquisitions with the result of the company's financial risk
profile sustainably staying at least in the "intermediate"
category (debt to EBITDA below 3x).  A positive rating action
would also be contingent on the company's successful transition
toward higher margins, as management forecasts.  S&P would also
look for control over potential product and integrated risks that
could arise from acquisitions.


BBVA RMBS 11: Moody's Cuts Class C Notes Rating to 'Caa2(sf)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of BBVA RMBS 11,
FTA's classes A, B and C notes. These rating actions follow
Moody's review of the recent structural changes to BBVA RMBS 11,
FTA and concluded that these amendments have a negative impact on
the ratings of all classes of notes:

Issuer: BBVA RMBS 11, FTA

  EUR1204 million Class A Notes, Downgraded to Aa3 (sf);
  previously on Jul 10, 2015 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR119 million Class B Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously
  on Jul 10, 2015 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  EUR77 million Class C Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously
  on Jul 10, 2015 Affirmed Ba3 (sf)

RATINGS RATIONALE

The structural amendments relate to a reduction of the size of the
principal reserve fund from 12.75% of the initial amount of the
notes at closing to 5.0% of the initial amount of the notes at
closing.

Additionally, the secondary reserve fund to cover shortfalls of
interest of class A notes during the life of the transaction and
principal of all classes at maturity, amounting to 3.0% of the
initial amount of the notes at closing, has been fully removed.

Accordingly, classes A, B and C do not benefit from sufficient
credit enhancement to maintain the ratings of the notes.

In reaching this conclusion, Moody's has taken into consideration
the characteristics of the mortgage pool, the current level of
credit enhancement and the level of credit enhancement that will
be present in the transaction after the amendments have taken
place, together with the amount of liquidity within the
transaction given by the new reserve fund level. However, Moody's
opinion addresses only the credit impact associated with the
amendment, and Moody's is not expressing any opinion as to whether
the amendment has, or could have, other non-credit related effects
that may have a detrimental impact on the interests of note
holders and/or counterparties.

The key collateral assumptions have not been updated as part of
this restructuring.

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the exposure
to key transaction counterparties, including the roles of servicer
and account bank provided by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.
(Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)).

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a quantitative/model-
indicated calculation of the number of rating notches that a
Moody's structured finance security may vary if certain input
parameters used in the initial rating process differed.

The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged and is not
intended to measure how the rating of the security might migrate
over time, but rather how the initial rating of the security might
have differed if key rating input parameters were varied.
Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS transaction are
calculated by stressing key variable inputs in Moody's primary
rating model.

At the time the deal was restructured, the model output indicated
that the class A notes would have achieved an Aa3 if the expected
loss was as high as 8.9% and the MILAN CE was 22.5% and all other
factors were constant.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach To Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in
January 2015.

The analysis undertaken by Moody's at the initial assignment of
ratings for RMBS securities may focus on aspects that become less
relevant or typically remain unchanged during the surveillance
stage.

Moody's will continue monitoring the ratings. Any change in the
ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.

The rating addresses the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest with respect of
the class A and ultimate payment of principal by the legal final
maturity. Moody's ratings only address the credit risk associated
with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not been
addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.

TRANSACTION FEATURES

The transaction is a securitization of Spanish prime mortgage
loans originated by Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A.
(Baa1(cr)/P-2(cr)) to obligors located in Spain. The portfolio
consists of high Loan To Value ("HLTV") mortgage loans secured by
residential properties.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the ratings:

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of these
ratings include (1) further reduction in sovereign risk, (2)
performance of the underlying collateral that is better than
Moody's expected, (3) deleveraging of the capital structure and
(4) improvements in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of these
ratings include (1) an increase in sovereign risk, (2) performance
of the underlying collateral that is worse than Moody's expects,
(3) deterioration in the notes' available credit enhancement and
(4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


BANK HOTTINGER: Losses, Legal Issues Prompt Liquidation
-------------------------------------------------------
Giles Broom at Bloomberg News reports that Bank Hottinger & Cie,
the Swiss private bank of one of Europe's oldest financial
dynasties, was forced into liquidation on Oct. 26 after failing to
recover from losses and legal issues.

The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority initiated
proceedings against Bank Hottinger & Cie. after the company had
"sustained losses" and "unresolved litigation," Bloomberg relays,
citing a statement on Oct. 26 by the organization known as FINMA.

The bank has assets of about CHF145 million (US$148 million),
Bloomberg discloses.

"As the minimum capital requirements are no longer met and there
is no prospect of restructuring, the bank has to be liquidated,"
Bloomberg quotes Finma as saying in the statement.

The statement said Bank Hottinger, based in Zurich with other
offices in Switzerland and in New York, has 50 employees serving
about 1,500 clients and is now in the hands of liquidator Wenger
Plattner, Bloomberg relates.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINE MORTGAGE NO.1: Fitch Affirms BB- Rating on Class B Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ukraine Mortgage Loan Finance No.1
plc's class B notes (ISIN: XS0285819123) at 'BB-sf' with Stable
Outlook.

The transaction is a securitization of Ukrainian residential
mortgages originated by PJSC CB Privatbank.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Fitch downgraded the originator to Restricted Default (RD) from
'C' on Sept. 18, 2015, following completion of the bank's USD200
million Eurobond restructuring (see Fitch Downgrades Ukraine's
Privatbank to 'RD').  The agency expects to review and upgrade
Privatbank's IDR once sufficient information is available on its
post-restructuring credit profile.  However, the ratings will
likely remain very low, given high country risks and Ukraine's
'CCC' Country Ceiling.

Fitch's emerging markets structured finance criteria allow a
rating of up to six notches above the originator's Issuer Default
Rating (IDR).  The agency has affirmed the notes' rating because
even an upgrade to the lowest possible rating (C) would be
sufficient to support the 'BB-sf' rating of the note.

The performance of the underlying assets since the last review in
December 2014 has deteriorated.  The cumulative default rate has
increased to 7.7% from 5.9% of the initial pool balance (in
absolute terms total defaults equal USD13.8 million), while the
cumulative loss rate is currently 3.8% (USD6.8 million) compared
with 2.0% in Dec. 2014.

However, the class B notes have built up a high level of credit
support, provided by overcollateralization and the cash reserve.
This means that the notes can withstand even a material
deterioration in portfolio performance and, consequently, asset
performance is no longer a driver of the rating.  Due to this,
Fitch has not conducted an asset analysis according to its EMEA
RMBS criteria.

The loans are US dollar-denominated.  However, the majority of the
borrowers receive their income in the national currency (hryvna).
The hryvna has depreciated significantly over the past year.
Together with a weakening economy and political uncertainty, this
has had a negative impact on the borrowers' ability to service
their loans.  However, the observed losses are still significantly
below the available credit protection.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A revision of Ukraine's Country Ceiling could result in a revision
of the highest achievable rating for the class B notes.

Further depreciation of the local currency in relation to the US
dollar, continuing political uncertainty and rising unemployment
could lead to a further increase in portfolio losses.  However,
the large credit protection for the class B notes would enable
them to survive even a material performance deterioration.

In the event of Privatbank's default as servicer, the reserve fund
provides liquidity coverage for a lengthy period.  Fitch expects
that during this time a replacement servicer would be found to
enable the transfer of collections to the issuer's account.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's initial
closing.  The subsequent performance of the transaction over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall, Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the
agency's rating analysis according to its applicable rating
methodologies indicates that it is adequately reliable.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CIRIS LANGUAGE: Quantuma Appointed as Liquidators
-------------------------------------------------
Richard Crump at AccountancyAge reports that Quantuma is handling
the liquidation of a school in Cardiff providing English language
programmes for foreign students, which has ceased to trade after
hitting financial difficulties.

Graham Randall and Mark Roach from Quantuma were appointed joint
liquidators on Oct. 21, 2015, AccountancyAge says.

AccountancyAge relates that Ciris Language School Limited, which
traded as inlingua Cardiff, mainly taught students provided by
Middle Eastern embassies. The company was historically successful,
achieving annual profits in excess of GBP200,000. However changes
in visa requirements imposed by the UK Border Agency resulted in
an unsustainable reduction in student numbers, the report says.

According to the report, Quantuma said the company also
encountered serious structural problems with its former trading
premises last year that did not get resolved, resulting in losses
and a move to more suitable premises.

"With falling student numbers resulting from changes in visa
requirements and the recent illness of the managing director, the
company was forced to consider its options," the report quotes
Mr. Graham as saying.  "The directors made the difficult decision
to close the school as trading showed no signs of immediate
improvement and the joint liquidators are taking all possible
steps to mitigate losses to students and we are seeking to
maximise recoveries for the benefit of all creditors."


EMBLEM FINANCE 2: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on CLP5.08BB Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the rating and revised the Rating
Outlook for Emblem Finance Company No. 2 as follows:

-- CLP5,082,000,000 credit-linked notes at 'BBsf'; Outlook
    revised to Negative from Stable.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The rating action follows Fitch's revision of the Outlook for the
reference entity, Votorantim Participacoes S.A. (VPAR). Fitch
monitors the performance of the underlying risk-presenting
entities and adjusts the rating accordingly through application of
its credit-linked note (CLN) criteria, 'Global Rating Criteria for
Single- and Multi-Name Credit-Linked Notes' dated March 9, 2015.

The rating considers the credit quality of VPAR's current Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'BBB' with a Negative Outlook as the
reference entity, JPMorgan Chase & Co.'s IDR of 'A+' with a Stable
Outlook as the swap counterparty, and HSBC Holdings Plc's
subordinated notes rating of 'A+' with a Stable Outlook as the
qualified investment. The Rating Outlook reflects the Outlook on
the main risk driver, VPAR, which is the lowest-rated risk-
presenting entity.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The rating remains sensitive to rating migration of each risk-
presenting entity. A downgrade of VPAR would likely result in a
downgrade to the notes.

Emblem No. 2 is a single-name CLN transaction designed to provide
credit protection on VPAR with a reference amount of
CLP5,082,000,000 (USD10 million). This protection is arranged
through a credit default swap (CDS) between the issuer and the
swap counterparty, JPMorgan Chase & Co. Proceeds from the issuance
of the notes were used to purchase USD10 million HSBC Holdings Plc
subordinated notes as a collateral asset for the CDS. The notes
are rated to the payment of interest and principal per the
transaction documents. All payments are made in USD amounts
adjusted according to both the value of the Undidad de Fomento
(UF) and the CLP/USD exchange rate as outlined in the transaction
documents.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.


FOUR SEASONS: Asserts Ability to Repay GBP26MM Interest
-------------------------------------------------------
Michael Pooler at The Financial Times reports that Four Seasons
has insisted that it can meet an upcoming GBP26 million interest
payment, following speculation over a potential deal with lenders
to reduce its debt pile.

The financial difficulties at Four Seasons -- which operates 470
homes with a total of 22,500 beds -- became clear when it
appointed advisers to carry out an emergency review of its
finances, the FT relates.  It said "all options" were being
considered, the FT notes.

At present, the lossmaking business has debts of more than GBP500
million and has to find annual interest payments of GBP50 million,
the FT discloses.

However, a spokesman, as cited by the FT, said there had been no
talks with creditors over a possible financial restructuring, and
insisted the company had "sufficient medium-term financial
flexibility" to make the interest payment due in December.

His comments followed a report in the Sunday Times that HCP, a US
property investment trust that is a lender to Four Seasons, had
hired Rothschild and City law firm Freshfields as advisers for
debt restructuring negotiations, the FT recounts.

Industry sources quoted in the report said a debt-for-equity swap
could wipe out the shareholding of Four Seasons' owner Terra
Firma, the private equity group run by Guy Hands, the FT relays.
They also claimed that a number of US hedge funds had started
buying up chunks of Four Season's senior secured debt in
anticipation of a deal, according to the FT.

Four Seasons has attributed its troubles to sharp cuts in fee
payments from local authorities, as well as higher staff costs
because nursing shortages have forced it to use expensive agency
staff, the FT discloses.

It reported a pre-tax loss of GBP25 million for the second
quarter, compared with a GBP17 million loss for the same period
last year, the FT recounts.

Four Seasons is Britain's largest provider of care homes.


KENSINGTON MORTGAGE 2007-1: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on 2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Kensington Mortgage Securities Plc -
Series 2007-1 (KMS).

KMS is a securitization of non-conforming residential mortgage
loans originated by Kensington Group Plc.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Improving Asset Performance

In recent periods, the transaction has continued to report
improved performance, driven by the current low interest rate
environment positively impacting borrower affordability.  In
September 2015, loans in arrears by more than three months stood
at 16.5%, compared with 19.4% a year ago.

The portion of second-lien loans has reduced to 6.1% of the
current outstanding balance, having fallen from 11.4% at
transaction close.  The presence of second-lien borrowers in the
portfolio, who tend to pay higher margins than first-lien
borrowers (currently 883bps compared with 481bps), has been the
driver of KMS's weaker performance compared with peers.  The
second-lien loans also continue to be associated with much higher
cumulative weighted average loss severities compared with first-
lien loans.  In its analysis, Fitch has applied more conservative
recovery assumptions and concluded that the rated tranches have
sufficient credit enhancement to withstand their respective
stresses.

Pro-rata Amortization

KMS is currently amortizing pro-rata, due to loans in arrears by
more than three months being below the trigger of 22.5% of the
current portfolio balance.  Pro-rata amortization will be
beneficial for the mezzanine and junior notes, but will slow down
the pace of credit enhancement build-up.  Given the transaction's
seasoning, the portfolio has amortized substantially, leading to a
significant increase in credit enhancement across the structure.

Unhedged Interest Rate Risk

KMS comprises loans linked to the Kensington Variable Rate (KVR)
and Money Partners Variable Rate (MVR).  The mismatch between the
KVR/MVR received on the loans and the Libor-paying notes is left
unhedged.

Fitch believes that the KVR/MVR margin over Libor will be
compressed in a rising interest rate scenario, as the servicer may
not be able to increase the KVR/MVR at the pace at which Libor is
expected to rise.  In its analysis, Fitch has stressed the excess
spread to account for this risk and found the credit enhancement
available to the rated notes is sufficient to withstand such
stresses, as reflected in the notes' affirmation.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

In Fitch's view, an expected increase in interest rates before
end-2016 will put a strain on borrower affordability, particularly
given the weaker profile of non-conforming borrowers.  If defaults
and associated losses increase beyond the agency's stressed
assumptions, the junior tranches may be downgraded.

DUE DILIGENCE USAGE

No third party due diligence was provided or reviewed in relation
to this rating action.

DATA ADEQUACY

Fitch has checked the consistency and plausibility of the
information it has received about the performance of the asset
pool and the transaction.  There were no findings that were
material to this analysis.  Fitch has not reviewed the results of
any third party assessment of the asset portfolio information or
conducted a review of origination files as part of its ongoing
monitoring.

Fitch did not undertake a review of the information provided about
the underlying asset pool ahead of the transaction's initial
closing.  The subsequent performance of the transaction over the
years is consistent with the agency's expectations given the
operating environment and Fitch is therefore satisfied that the
asset pool information relied upon for its initial rating analysis
was adequately reliable.

Overall and together with the assumptions referred to above,
Fitch's assessment of the information relied upon for the agency's
rating analysis according to its applicable rating methodologies
indicates that it is adequately reliable.

MODELS

The models below were used in the analysis.

EMEA RMBS Surveillance Model.

The rating actions are:

  Class A3a (ISIN XS0292638920): affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook
   Stable
  Class A3b (ISIN XS0292652756): affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook
   Stable
  Class A3c (ISIN XS0292640660): affirmed at 'AAAsf', Outlook
   Stable
  Class M1a (ISIN XS0292639225): affirmed at 'Asf', Outlook Stable
  Class M1b (ISIN XS0292651196): affirmed at 'Asf', Outlook Stable
  Class M2b (ISIN XS0292639654): affirmed at 'BBB-sf', Outlook
   Stable
  Class B1a (ISIN XS0292639902): affirmed at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable
  Class B1b (ISIN XS0292651436): affirmed at 'Bsf', Outlook Stable
  Class B2 (ISIN XS0292640157): affirmed at 'CCCsf', Recovery
   Estimate 100%


LIGHTPOINT PAN-EUROPEAN: S&P Lifts Rating on Cl. E Notes From BB-
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'BBB-(sf)' from
'BB-(sf)' its credit rating on Lightpoint Pan-European CLO 2007-1
PLC's class E notes.

The upgrade reflects the application of S&P's revised corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

Upon publishing S&P's updated corporate CDO criteria, it placed
those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".  Following S&P's review of this transaction, its
ratings that could potentially be affected by the criteria are no
longer under criteria observation.

S&P's corporate CDO criteria incorporate supplemental tests
intended to address both event risk and model risk that may be
present in rated transactions.

These consist of (1) the "largest obligor default test," which
assesses whether a CDO tranche has sufficient credit enhancement
to withstand specified combinations of underlying asset defaults
based on the ratings on the underlying assets, and (2) the
"largest industry test," which assesses whether or not it can
withstand the default of all the obligors in the largest industry
category.

The updated criteria do not change the calculation of the loss
amounts for the supplemental tests.  However, the criteria now
allow the loss amounts calculated for the largest obligor default
test to be run through S&P's cash flow model to take into account
excess spread and to ensure that the tranche subject to the test
receives timely interest and ultimate principal in S&P's analysis.

The application of the largest obligor default test, based on the
criteria, can now support a higher rating on the class E notes.
S&P has therefore raised to 'BBB- (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' its rating
on the class E notes.

Lightpoint Pan-European CLO 2007-1 is a cash flow collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to
primarily speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction
closed in Nov. 2007, and its reinvestment period ended in
Feb. 2014.  Neuberger Berman Fixed Income LLC. is the transaction
manager.


MCCLURE NAISMITH: Debts Estimated at More Than GBP5 Million
-----------------------------------------------------------
ScottishLegal.Com reports that it is estimated that defunct law
firm McClure Naismith could have owed creditors more than
GBP5 million.

ScottishLegal.Com says the Glasgow-based firm went into
administration in August but about 80 jobs were saved with
partners and staff moving to rivals including Burness Paull,Maclay
Murray & Spens, Harper Macleod and others.

According to the report, administrators at insolvency practice FRP
Advisory said creditors include the landlord of its premises, HMRC
and former partners - with the estimated debt being around
GBP4.5 million. The landlord's claim is said to be GBP1.35
million.

The Bank of Scotland had a GBP1.65 million floating charge over
the firm's assets. It is expected to be between GBP548,000 and
GBP1.05 million out of pocket.

ScottishLegal.Com relates that the assets are expected to generate
between GBP729,000 and GBP1.36 million.  However, administrators
said ordinary creditors are unlikely to receive more than a small
dividend of GBP149,000.

They added that the deals resulting in partners and staff securing
jobs with other firms meant that the overall return to creditors
was higher and the value of the work in progress could be
realized, ScottishLegal.Com relays.

Each partner's work in progress was sold to acquiring firms and
while it is unknown how much the sale of such work will generate
it is estimated to be between GBP196,000 and GBP356,000, reports
ScottishLegal.Com.

McClure Naismith is a law firm founded in Glasgow in 1826.

Thomas Campbell MacLennan and Alexander Iain Fraser of FRP
Advisory LLP were appointed Joint Administrators of McClure
Naismith LLP on Aug. 28, 2015.


P CLARKE: Owed GBP14-Mil. to Creditors at Time of Administration
----------------------------------------------------------------
John Mulgrew at Belfast Telegraph reports that P Clarke and Sons
owed almost GBP14 million to more than 500 creditors when it
entered administration.

The business's trade and assets were finally sold off as a
pre-pack administration to Co Londonderry engineering and concrete
firm FP McCann for GBP3.35 million, Belfast Telegraph discloses.

According to Belfast Telegraph, a total of seven businesses put in
formal bids between GBP2.5 million and GBP3 million to take over
the Lisnaskea firm.  It kept on 58 of the firm's staff, but around
30 jobs were lost, Belfast Telegraph relays.

And P Clarke and Sons' bank debts included more than GBP11 million
to secured creditor Danske Bank, which the report says is
"unlikely" to be "discharged in full", Belfast Telegraph notes.

A detailed breakdown from administrators BDO, filed with Companies
House on Oct. 26, shows that around 500 small businesses and
individuals were owed money as a result of its administration,
amounting to more than GBP6 million, Belfast Telegraph discloses.

But the report states "it is anticipated that insufficient funds
will be available to pay a dividend to unsecured creditors",
Belfast Telegraph relates.

P Clarke and Sons had said its administration was due to increased
pressure on the firm's cash reserves, hit by a weak euro, cuts in
Government contracts and "several unprofitable contracts", Belfast
Telegraph recounts.

The administrators BDO, as cited by Belfast Telegraph, said they
were "satisfied" the best value had been obtained for the business
assets.

Unsecured creditors, who are bottom of the pecking order when a
company goes bust, are owed more than GBP6 million in total,
Belfast Telegraph states.

BDO had been taken on by the firm to provide advice on insolvency,
before the administration, Belfast Telegraph says.

P Clarke and Sons is a Co Fermanagh family quarry firm.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The Story of The Bank of America
-----------------------------------------------
Author: Marquis James and Bessie R. James
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 592 pages
List Price: $31.80
Order your personal copy today at
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1587981459/internetbankrupt

The Bank of America began as the Bank of Italy in 1904.
A. P. Giannini was motivated to found the Bank out of his
indignation over the neglect by other banks of the Italian
community in San Francisco's North Beach area. Local residents
were quickly drawn to Giannini's new type of bank suited for their
social circumstances, financial needs, and plans and aspirations.

Before Giannini's Bank of Italy, the field was dominated by large,
well-connected, and politically influential banks typified by the
magnate J. P. Morgan's House of Morgan catering to corporations
and the wealthy industrialists and their families of the Gilded
Age.

Giannini's Bank proved to be a timely enterprise with great
potential far beyond its founder's original aims. The early 1900s
following the Gilded Age was a time of spreading democratization
in American society with large numbers of immigrants being
assimilated. It was also a time of considerable industrial growth
after the heyday of the tycoons such as Morgan, Rockefeller, and
Carnegie in the latter 1800s. Giannini's idea was also helped by
the growth of California in its early stages of becoming one of
the most prosperous and most populous states. As California grew,
so did the Bank of America.

A. P. Giannini was the perfect type of individual to oversee the
growth of a bank that stood in sharp contrast to the House of
Morgan and which reflected broad changes in American society and
business. Giannini followed the quick success of his North Beach
bank with Bank of Italy branches elsewhere in San Francisco. With
the success of these followed branches throughout California's
agricultural valleys and Los Angeles as Giannini reached out to
populations of other average persons generally ignored by the
traditional banks. Throughout the rapid growth of his bank,
Giannini never lost touch with his original motive for creating a
bank suited for the average individual. When he died at 80 years
of age in 1949, he lived in the same house as he did when he
opened the original Bank of Italy; and his estate was less than
half a million dollars.

Throughout all the stages of the Bank of America's growth,
business recessions and depressions, and changes in American
society, including increased government regulation, the Bank
continued to reflect its founder's purposes for it. In the 1920s,
the Bank of Italy became a part of the corporation Transamerica.
In 1930, the Bank was merged with the Bank of America of
California. The newly formed bank was given the name the Bank of
America National Trust and Savings Association, with Giannini
appointed as chairman of the committee to work out the details of
the merger. In 1930, he selected Elisha Walker to head
Transamerica so he could be free to pursue his interest of
establishing a national bank with the same goals and nature as his
original Bank of Italy. But becoming alarmed over Walker's
proposed measures for dealing with the pressures of the
Depression, Giannini waged a battle involving board members,
stockholders, and allies he had worked with in the past to regain
control of Transamerica. In 1936, A. P. Giannini's son, Lawrence
Mario, succeeded his father as president of Bank of America, with
A. P. remaining as chairman of the board.

The story of Bank of America is largely the story of A. P.
Giannini: his ideas, his values, his ambitions, his goals, his
personality. The co-authors follow the stages of the Bank's growth
by focusing on the genteel, yet driven and innovative, A. P.
Giannini. There's a balance of basic business material such as
stock prices, rationale of momentous business decisions, and
balance-sheet data, with portrayals of outsized characters of the
time. Among these, besides Giannini, are the federal government
official Henry Morgenthau and Charles Stern, California's
superintendent of banks in the early 1900s. With this balance, The
Story of the Bank of America is an engaging and informative work
for readers of more technical business books and human-interest
business stories alike.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look like
the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short.
Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at historical cost
net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's
assets.  A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for
liabilities that may never materialize.  The prices at which
equity securities trade in public market are determined by more
than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of
interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for members
of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or
balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *