/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/150828.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R E U R O P E Friday, August 28, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 170 Headlines A N D O R R A BANCA PRIVADA: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Ratings to 'D' G R E E C E GREECE: Vassiliki Christopoulou Named Interim Prime Minister I R E L A N D MERCATOR CLO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B-2 Notes to Ba3 I T A L Y FALLIMENTO BOMISA: Trustee Puts Chinese Subsidiary Up for Sale SIENA BIOTECH: Sept. 7 Deadline Set for Expressions of Interest N E T H E R L A N D S LEOPARD CLO V: Moody's Affirms 'Caa3(sf)' Rating on Class F Notes MAXEDA DIY: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Corporate Family Rating ROYAL IMTECH: Techim Acquires Two Dutch Units, 248 Jobs Secured R O M A N I A ASTRA ASIGURARI: Regulator Withdraws Operating License R U S S I A CB BTB: Put Under Provisional Administration, License Revoked EUROMET PJSC: Under Provisional Administration, License Revoked URALKALI PJSC: Moody's Says Share Buyback Program Credit Negative T U R K E Y ALTERNATIFBANK AS: Moody's Assigns 'ba3' Standalone BCA Rating U K R A I N E PRIVATBANK: Minority Investor Group Agrees to Debt Proposals U N I T E D K I N G D O M AVANTI COMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Rates US$125MM Sr. Sec. Notes Caa1 IENERGIZER LTD: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B' CCR PUNCH TAVERNS: Agrees to Sell 158 Non-Core Outlets to Cut Debt UNITED KINGDOM: North Sea Oil Industry Faces Precarious Situation X X X X X X X X * BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History ********* ============= A N D O R R A ============= BANCA PRIVADA: Fitch Lowers Issuer Default Ratings to 'D' --------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has downgraded Banca Privada d'Andorra's (BPA) Long- and Short-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'Default' (D) from 'Restricted Default' as its resolution is now underway. KEY RATING DRIVERS IDRs and VR The rating action follows the approval of the resolution plan by the Andorran resolution authority (AREB) and subsequent steps taken to implement the plan, including the conclusion of the valuation of BPA under resolution and liquidation scenarios. According to Fitch's rating definitions, 'D' ratings indicate an issuer has entered into bankruptcy filings, administration, receivership, liquidation or other formal winding-up procedure, or which has otherwise ceased business. The process is conducted in accordance with the Andorran Restructuring and Resolution of Banking Entities 8/2015 Law. The plan contemplates the transfer of those assets and liabilities of BPA that are not at risk of being illicit into a new bank, Vall Banc, created in July, following an independent review of BPA's customers focusing on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing. Fitch understands from the AREB that it is the intention for the new bank to be sold before year-end. BPA's 'f' Viability Rating, in place since March 18, 2015, reflects Fitch's view that the bank has failed as temporary restrictions on account movements represent a default on a material category of BPA's third-party, private sector senior debt. SUPPORT RATING and SUPPORT RATING FLOOR The bank's Support Rating of '5' and Support Rating Floor of 'No Floor' reflect Fitch's view that support cannot be relied upon, as reflected in the resolution plan. RATING SENSITIVITIES IDRS, VR, SUPPORT RATING and SUPPORT RATING FLOOR Fitch will withdraw BPA's ratings on the start of the transfer of its assets and liabilities to Vall Banc. The rating actions are: Long-term IDR downgraded to 'D' from 'RD' Short-term IDR downgraded to 'D' from 'RD' Viability Rating affirmed at 'f' Support Rating affirmed at '5' Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'No Floor' =========== G R E E C E =========== GREECE: Vassiliki Christopoulou Named Interim Prime Minister ------------------------------------------------------------ Nektaria Stamouli at The Wall Street Journal reports that Greece on Aug. 27 officially entered the pre-election period for the second time this year, as the head of the country's Supreme Court Vassiliki Thanou Christopoulou has been named caretaker Prime Minister, with the task to lead the country to elections. Greece's President Prokopis Pavlopoulos "is obliged to give the mandate for the formation of the government with the widest possible acceptance in order to hold elections to the President of the Supreme Court Mrs. Vassiliki Thanou," the Journal quotes the presidency as saying in a statement. Elections are expected to take place on Sept. 20, though the date will be officially announced today, Aug. 28, after the swearing in of the interim government, the Journal notes. A presidential decree for the dissolution of parliament and the announcement of the election is expected to be posted today, Aug. 28 outside the Greek parliament, the Journal states. Mrs. Thanou, 65, is the first woman to serve as Greece's Prime Minister, the Journal discloses. After Greece's outgoing Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras resigned last week in a bid to trigger a snap election in late September, Mr. Pavlopoulos mandated opposition New Democracy leader Evangelos Meimarakis and then Mr. Lafazanis with the task to muster a coalition, the Journal relays. No alternative majority excluding Syriza would be plausible, but both parties decided to make use of all the time the constitutionally required procedure offers in an effort to delay the election date, according to the Journal. In his last interview before handing over PM's office on Aug. 26, Mr. Tsipras, as cited by the Journal, said he hopes to return to power with an absolute majority. ============= I R E L A N D ============= MERCATOR CLO II: Moody's Raises Rating on Class B-2 Notes to Ba3 ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following notes issued by Mercator CLO II Plc: EUR25.5 million Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf) EUR25 million Class A-3 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Upgraded to A1 (sf) EUR25.5 million Class B-1 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf) EUR19.5 million Class B-2 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Affirmed B1 (sf) Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued by Mercator CLO II Plc: EUR274 million (Current balance outstanding EUR68.8M) Class A-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 18, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf) Mercator CLO II Plc, issued in January 2007, is a multi-currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans. The portfolio is managed by NAC Management (Cayman) Limited, and this transaction ended its reinvestment period in February 2014. RATINGS RATIONALE The rating action on the notes is primarily a result of deleveraging of the Class A-1 notes and subsequent increase in the overcollateralization (the "OC") ratios. Moody's notes that on the August 2015 payment date, the Class A-1 notes were paid by EUR29.27 million (or 10.7% of their original balance) which takes the total amortization of the Class A-1 notes, since the last rating action in February 2014, to EUR178.3 million (or 65.1% of their original balance). As a result of this deleveraging, the OC ratios of the notes have increased. As per the latest trustee report dated August 2015, the Class A-2, Class A-3, Class B-1 and Class B-2 OC ratios are 171.46%, 142.6%, 121.72% and 109.46% respectively, versus May 2015 levels of 160.74%, 137.16%, 119.30% and 108.50%. Furthermore the August 2015 trustee report, in its calculation of OC levels, it is not accounting for the latest payment to Class A-1 notes of EUR29.27 which has further increased the OC levels of the notes. The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR177.3 million and GBP22.8 million, no defaulted assets, a weighted average default probability of 21.48% (consistent with a WARF of 2887 with a weighted average life of 4.78 years), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.33% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 24 and a weighted average spread of 3.97%. The GBP denominated assets are fully hedged with a macro swap, which Moody's also modelled. The default probability derives from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 98.08% of the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 15%. In each case, historical and market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing. Methodology Underlying the Rating Action: The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in February 2014. Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating: In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes, for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it lowered the weighted average recovery rate of the portfolio by 5%; the model generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-case results. This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional parties because of embedded ambiguities. Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following: 1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority. 2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over- collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on the notes' ratings. 3) Around 12.5% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing a credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions", published in October 2009 and available at http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBC_120461. In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can influence the final rating decision. ========= I T A L Y ========= FALLIMENTO BOMISA: Trustee Puts Chinese Subsidiary Up for Sale -------------------------------------------------------------- Carlo Pagliughi, the bankruptcy trustee for Fallimento BoMiSa Srl., bankruptcy proceeding no. 578/2015, Court of Milan (Italy), is placing on sale, with an open auction, the 100% of the share of capital of the Chinese subsidiary "BoMiSa China Co. Ltd.," addressed in LuDu town, Taicang city, Suzhou, Jiangsu province, P.R. China. For more information concerning the announcement, the guidelines and confidentiality agreement, please contact Sophia Huang -- huang@bomisa.com, c.c. carlo.pagliughi@studiopagliughi.it The data room is on site (China) and will be accessible only subject to the execution of the confidentiality agreement provided. SIENA BIOTECH: Sept. 7 Deadline Set for Expressions of Interest --------------------------------------------------------------- Dott.ssa Silvana Carlone, the official receiver for the bankruptcy proceedings relating to Siena Biotech S.p.a., is seeking via a competitive bidding process regulated under Italian bankruptcy law, a party or parties interested in the management contract for the Medicine Research Center located in Siena, Italy on Strada del Petriccio e Belriguardo n. 35, identified by the NCEU (the Nuovo Catasto Edilizio Urbano, meaning the City Property/Land Registry Office) as being on Foglio 12, Particella 1183, sub. 1, 2 e 3, e sub. 5, and comprising buildings, installations, apparatus and functional furnishings relating to research activity in the sphere of medicine (a "Medicine Research Centre"). Any contract entered into will have inter alia the following minimal conditions attached: (1) a duration to at least June 14, 2018 and until no longer than June 14, 2019 (2) an annual fee, payable to the Curato of Siena Biotech s.p.a., of no less than EUR750,000,00, plus Value Added Tax (IVA) if due Those interested in making a competitive bid are kindly requested to email this certified email (PEC) address -- sif222015@procedurepec.it -- in order to see in full the complete requirements needed to make an expression of interest. Expressions of interest will not be considered which appear either incomplete or which do not conform to the minimum requirements for bidding. Offers of interest must be made no later than September 7, 2015. This invitation to express interest does not constitute a public offer as defined by Article 1336 of the Italian Civil Code. ===================== N E T H E R L A N D S ===================== LEOPARD CLO V: Moody's Affirms 'Caa3(sf)' Rating on Class F Notes ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the following notes issued by Leopard CLO V B.V.: EUR28 million Class B Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf) EUR13 million Class C-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Upgraded to A2 (sf) EUR7 million Class C-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Upgraded to A2 (sf) EUR26 million Class D Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Affirmed Ba2 (sf) EUR5 million Class W Combination Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf) Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes: EUR168 million (current outstanding balance of EUR23.68M) Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf) EUR13 million Class E-1 Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Affirmed B3 (sf) EUR3 million Class E-2 Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed B3 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Affirmed B3 (sf) EUR7 million (current outstanding balance of EUR7.74M) Class F Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Affirmed Caa3 (sf) EUR100 million (current outstanding balance of EUR9.94M) Multicurrency Senior Secured Floating Rate Variable Funding Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 17, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf) Leopard CLO V B.V., issued in May 2007, is a multi-currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield senior secured European loans managed by M&G Investment Management Limited. This transaction passed its reinvestment period in July 2013. The majority of the transaction's assets and rated liabilities are denominated in EUR; GBP assets are naturally hedged by GBP drawings under Variable Funding Notes. RATINGS RATIONALE The upgrades to the ratings are primarily the result of the substantial deleveraging that has occurred over the last two payment dates since last rating action in September 2014 which was based on July 2014 data. Over the last two payment dates the Multicurrency Variable Funding Notes (VFN) and the Class A Notes have amortized approximately by EUR25.6 million and EUR62.5 million, respectively. As a result the over-collateralization (OC) ratio has increased. As per the trustee report dated July 2015, the Class A (Senior), Class B, and Class C, Class D, class E and Class F OC ratios are reported at 209.2%, 157.1%, 133.3%, 111.4%, 101.2% and 97.0% compared to July 2014 levels of 147.1%, 127.8%, 116.8%, 105.0%, 98.9% and 96.5%, respectively. Despite the OC increase the class E and class F are still failing their over-collateralization tests. Moody's notes that the July 2015 principal payments are not reflected in the OC ratios reported. The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class W the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee. The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par, weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR140.2 million and GBP26.6 million, defaulted par of EUR1.7 million, a weighted average default probability of 20.4% (consistent with a WARF of 2,813), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 47.3% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 22 and a weighted average spread of 3.9%. The default probability derives from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% for 92.4% of the portfolio exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon default and of 15% for the remaining non-first-lien loan corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is analyzing. Methodology Underlying the Rating Action: Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating: In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes, for which it assumed a lower weighted average recovery rate for the portfolio. Moody's ran a model in which it reduced the weighted average recovery rate by 5%; the model generated outputs that were unchanged for the VFN, class A and class B and within one to two notches of the base-case results for Classes C, D and E. This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional parties because of embedded ambiguities. Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following: -- Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales the collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest prepayment priority. -- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over- collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on the notes' ratings. -- Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on the notes' ratings. -- Foreign currency exposure: The deal has a significant exposure to non-EUR denominated assets. Volatility in foreign exchange rates will have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available to the transaction, which can affect the expected loss of rated tranches. In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, can influence the final rating decision. MAXEDA DIY: Moody's Assigns 'B2' Corporate Family Rating -------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive B2 corporate family rating (CFR) and a B3-PD Probability of Default Rating (PDR) to Maxeda DIY Holding B.V. ('Maxeda'). Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a definitive B2 rating to the EUR519 million senior secured bank facilities made available to Maxeda DIY B.V. The outlook remains stable. RATINGS RATIONALE Moody's definitive ratings for the CFR and senior secured facilities are in line with the provisional ratings assigned on May 28, 2015. Moody's rating rationale was set out in a press release on that date. The final terms of the facilities were in line with the drafts reviewed for the provisional instrument rating assignments. RATING OUTLOOK The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation that: (1) Maxeda will be successful in implementing its ongoing commercial initiatives; (2) market conditions will support at least some overall sales growth and stable margins; and (3) the company will maintain an adequate liquidity profile. It also reflects Moody's expectation that the leverage will not rise above 5.75x. WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP The company is relatively weakly positioned in the B2 rating category at this point and as such, an upgrade is unlikely in the short term. However, positive pressure on the ratings could result from a sustained improvement in operating performance resulting in solid top line growth and improving margins, positive free cash flow, and leverage falling towards 4.5x on a sustained basis. WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING DOWN Negative pressure could be exerted on Maxeda's ratings if: (1) operating performance were to deteriorate e.g. due to negative like-for-like sales or reduced margins, such that Moody's adjusted EBITDA would reduce from the current level on a sustained basis; or (2) free cash flow remained negative for an extended period of time; or (3) its liquidity profile were to weaken. CORPORATE PROFILE Headquartered in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, Maxeda is a leading DIY retailer, with networks of over 150 stores in Belgium and more than 220 stores in The Netherlands. For the financial year ending January 31, 2014 the company reported Revenues of EUR1.3 billion. ROYAL IMTECH: Techim Acquires Two Dutch Units, 248 Jobs Secured --------------------------------------------------------------- On August 25, 2015, the Imtech financiers, in their capacity as the pledgees, have sold the shares in Imtech Industry International B.V., with its head offices in Coevorden, and Ventilex B.V., including participations, to Techim B.V. These companies have a combined workforce of 248 employees. The transaction involving Imtech Industry International B.V. has released sufficient funds to enable the associated company Imtech Nederland B.V. to carry out its shared services centre activities for the Benelux arm until 28 September 2015. These activities are carried out for various Dutch subsidiaries and the (future) buyers of same. This involves around 125 employees. After September 28, 2015, depending on the buyers, as many of these employees as possible will be transferred to the various Dutch operating companies up for sale. The assets and activities of the bankrupt company Imtech Building Services B.V. will be sold in parts. Unica has acquired the contracts for the Sprinkleractiviteiten (sprinkler activities), Beheer en Onderhoud (management and maintenance) and Klein Specifiek Werk (small specific work) activities, with a total turnover value of EUR150 million per annum. Depending on the yet to be demonstrated willingness of clients to do business with Unica from this point onwards, this will secure the jobs of several dozen to around 200 Imtech employees. The trustees are in exclusive negotiations with private equity firm Endless LLP and the Imtech management regarding Imtech Ireland. Endless LLP wishes to acquire the shares in Imtech Suir Engineering Limited and its subsidiaries Imtech Suir M.E.C. Limited, Imtech Suir Saoudi Arabia LLC and Imtech Suir Quatar LLC. Endless LLP is also interested in the activities of Imtech UK. A non-disclosure agreement has been signed with five parties in connection with the negotiations on the sale of the shares in the Spanish operating companies. These have around 1,900 employees. The trustees expect to complete this process this coming weekend. The proceeds from the transactions will not result in any substantial payments to creditors at N.V. level. Also, the shareholders of Royal Imtech N.V. should not expect any proceeds. The share transactions do have a positive impact on the employment of Imtech employees, which remains completely unchanged and intact, and on the position of the creditors of said acquired Imtech subsidiaries. At the level of Royal Imtech N.V., the share transactions prevent the addition of extra creditors. Trustee Jeroen Princen is pleased with the progress: "We are hopeful that we can conclude the sale of divisions before next Monday. It is important that clients and employees have clarity as quickly as possible. We are working day and night and doing our utmost to make that happen." Royal Imtech N.V. is a European technical solutions provider in the fields of electrical and mechanical solutions and automation. With around 22,000 employees working in seven divisions, Imtech achieves annual revenue of approx. 4 billion euro. Imtech holds attractive positions in the buildings and industrial markets in the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany (Insolvency), Austria, Eastern Europe, Sweden, Norway, Finland, UK, Ireland and Spain, as well as in the European market for traffic & infra and in the global marine market. Royal Imtech N.V. related that, upon the request of administrators, the Rotterdam District Court has declared it bankrupt ('failliet') as of August 13, 2015. In addition, Imtech Capital B.V., Imtech B.V. and Imtech Group B.V. also have been declared bankrupt as of August 13, 2015. The administrators during the suspension of payments have been appointed as trustees in bankruptcy. Royal Imtech N.V. was granted suspension of payments ('surseance van betaling') on August 11, 2015. ============= R O M A N I A ============= ASTRA ASIGURARI: Regulator Withdraws Operating License ------------------------------------------------------ Luiza Ilie at Reuters reports that Romania's financial regulator ASF withdrew the operating license of Astra Asigurari on Aug. 26 and said it will start the process of declaring it insolvent. The company has been under special administration since early 2014, Reuters notes. ASF chief Misu Negritoiu, as cited by Reuters, said a KPMG report on the insurer showed Astra Asigurari, which is unlisted, was unable to pay its debt with existing funds and that its capital requirement ratio had fallen to less than half the legal minimum requirement. "Structural problems could not be corrected," Reuters quotes Mr. Negritoiu as saying. "All three conditions that define insolvency have been met." He added the ASF's underwriting fund for the insured would cover compensation claims from Astra's roughly 2.5 million insurance policies, which he estimated at some RON700 million, Reuters relays. Astra Asigurari is Romania's second-largest insurer. =========== R U S S I A =========== CB BTB: Put Under Provisional Administration, License Revoked ------------------------------------------------------------- The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2270, dated August 27, 2015, revoked the banking license of Yadrin-based credit institution Commercial Bank Business-to-Business (limited liability company) or CB BTB (LLC). The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of the banking license -- due to the credit institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations, and due to repeated violations within one year of the requirements stipulated by Article 7 (excluding Clause 3 of Article 7) of the Federal Law "On Countering the Legalisation (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and the Financing of Terrorism", taking into account the application of measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)" as well as considering a real threat to the bank's creditors and investors. CB BTB (LLC) placed funds into low-quality assets and did not create loan loss provisions adequate to the risks assumed. Creation of sufficient loan loss provisions resulted in a substantial loss of the bank's capital. Besides, CB BTB (LLC) failed to comply with legislation requirements in terms of proper notification of the authorized body about operations subject to obligatory control and identification procedure of its clients. Both management and owners of the credit institution did not take any effective measures to bring its activities back to normal. The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2271, dated August 27, 2015, appointed a provisional administration to CB BTB (LLC) for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the Federal Law "On the Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities". In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit institution's executive bodies are suspended. CB BTB (LLC) is a member of the deposit insurance system. The revocation of the banking license is an insured event as stipulated by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On the Insurance of Household Deposits with Russian Banks" in respect of the bank's retail deposit obligations, as defined by legislation. As of August 1, 2015, CB BT (LLC) was ranked 630th by assets in the Russian banking system. EUROMET PJSC: Under Provisional Administration, License Revoked --------------------------------------------------------------- The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2268, dated August 27, 2015, revoked the banking license of Moscow-based credit institution public joint-stock company Joint-stock Commercial Bank European Bank for Development of the Metallurgical Industry or PJSC JSCB EUROMET. The Bank of Russia took such an extreme measure -- revocation of the banking license -- because of the credit institution's failure to comply with federal banking laws and Bank of Russia regulations, capital adequacy below 2%, decrease in equity capital below the minimal amount of the authorized capital established as of the date of the state registration of the credit institution, and application of supervisory measures envisaged by the Federal Law "On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)". PJSC JSCB EUROMET implemented high-risk lending policy connected with placement of funds into low-quality assets. As a result of meeting the supervisor's requirements on creating provisions adequate to the risks assumed, the credit institution lost its equity capital. Besides, PJSC JSCB EUROMET has actually stopped servicing its customers from the second half of August 2015. The management and owners of the credit institution did not take measures to normalize its activities. In these circumstances, pursuant to Article 20 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities", the Bank of Russia revoked the banking licesce from the credit institution. The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-2269, dated August 27, 2015, appointed a provisional administration to PJSC JSCB EUROMET for the period until the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)" or a liquidator under Article 23.1 of the Federal Law "On Banks and Banking Activities". In accordance with federal laws, the powers of the credit institution's executive bodies are suspended. PJSC JSCB EUROMET is a member of the deposit insurance system. The revocation of banking license is an insured event envisaged by Federal Law No. 177-FZ "On Insurance of Household Deposits with Russian Banks' regarding the bank's obligations on deposits of households determined in accordance with the legislation. According to the financial statements, as of August 1, 2015, PJSC JSCB EUROMET ranked 255th by assets in the Russian banking system. URALKALI PJSC: Moody's Says Share Buyback Program Credit Negative ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service said that Uralkali PJSC's (Uralkali, Ba1 negative) announcement that it will initiate an additional share buyback program worth up to US$1.32 billion is credit negative, but there is no immediate impact on its Ba1 corporate family rating. The outlook on the rating remains negative. On August 24, 2015, Uralkali's Board of Directors approved a share buyback program worth up to US$1.32 billion, a second this year, which will be executed by mid-October and funded with available cash reserves and external debt. Despite the company's healthy profitability and cash flow generation, supported by the rouble devaluation, and material cash reserves, the program is viewed by Moody's as credit negative, as it will reduce Uralkali's financial flexibility and slow down its deleveraging efforts amid a prolonged weakening of potash markets. Uralkali noted that the program is aimed at enhancing shareholder returns at a time when there is a lack of new investment opportunities and given the technical limitations on dividend distributions. The tender offer enables it to repurchase up to 14% of share capital worth US$1.32 billion (US$16 per Global Depository Receipt (GDR) and US$3.2 per common share). In the event of a further decrease in the free float of GDRs on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), the board may consider delisting of the GDRs from the LSE, which is no longer considered a strategic priority for the company. In its press release the company stated that potential delisting will not be accompanied by a further share repurchase. The transaction is expected to be funded with new borrowings from Russian state banks in the amount of up to US$800 million and the remaining to be funded with the existing cash balance. Depending on the RUB/USD exchange rate, Moody's believes this could result in Uralkali's adjusted leverage (total debt/EBITDA) increasing to around 3.5x by FYE 2015 from about 3.1x as of June 2015, although Moody's would expect this metric to fall to below 3x by FYE 2016 with scheduled debt reductions and growth in profits. This remains higher than Moody's guidance for the rating, although in our view it is mitigated at this time by the company's high cash balance of US$2.5 billion as of June 2015 and the expectation that Uralkali will retain substantial cash reserves in the medium term. On a pro-forma basis for the share buyback, Moody's expects that adjusted net leverage (net debt/EBITDA) will range between 2.1x -- 2.5x during 2015-16 versus 1.8x for 2014. While the program will slow the deleveraging that had been factored into the current rating and negative outlook, Uralkali's Ba1 credit profile remains supported by the company's very strong business fundamentals, namely (1) the leading market position in the global potash market, and (2) the cost leadership position, which is strengthened by the rouble depreciation as the company generates about 86% of its revenues from exports while more than 80% of operating costs and capital expenditures are rouble denominated. The rating is also supported by strong liquidity, in the form of material cash cushion, continued robust cash flow generation and access to funding. The company continues to maintain its own leverage target (net debt/EBITDA of 2.0x) which it anticipates to get close to by end 2016. The negative outlook on the rating reflects the fact that metrics are expected to remain weak for the current rating at least until 2016, with very limited headroom for further shareholder returns, following $2.4 billion in share buybacks that are expected to be completed this year. The rating is likely to be downgraded if there are signs of weakening liquidity or lack of progress towards deleveraging. Any further creditor-unfriendly corporate actions or changes in financial policy will also put negative pressure on the rating. =========== T U R K E Y =========== ALTERNATIFBANK AS: Moody's Assigns 'ba3' Standalone BCA Rating -------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service assigned Baa3 long-term deposits ratings and Prime-3 short-term deposits ratings to Alternatifbank A.S. (ABank). Moody's has also assigned a ba3 standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA). The outlook on the long-term foreign currency deposit rating is negative while on the long-term local currency deposit rating the outlook is stable. Moody's also assigned a national scale rating (NSR) of A1.tr/TR-1 and a Counterparty Risk Assessment (CRA) of Baa2(cr)/ P-2(cr). The long term NSR carries a stable outlook. RATINGS RATIONALE The bank's ba3 BCA benefits from a three-notch uplift, resulting in an adjusted BCA of baa3, due to Moody's assumption of a very high probability of affiliate support from ABank's Qatari parent, The Commercial Bank (Q.S.C.) (CBQ; A1, stable/baa2), in case of need. Moody's bases this view on (1) CBQ's majority ownership of ABank, with CBQ's management control; (2) ABank's status as a material subsidiary of CBQ, with a cross default clause in one of CBQ's senior issuances; (3) CBQ's high incentive to diversify outside its domestic markets, on the back of limited domestic opportunities; and (4) the bank's recent re-branding, which will have a closer affiliation with CBQ. ABank's Baa3 deposit rating is in line with its adjusted BCA because it does not incorporate any additional notches of rating uplift, owing to Moody's assumption of low public support from the government of Turkey (Baa3 negative), reflecting the bank's low market share in the Turkish banking system. ABank's ba3 BCA reflects (1) Turkey's 'Moderate' Macro Profile; (2) the bank's adequate asset quality, with non-performing loans at 5.0% of total loans at end-2014, moderated by substantial borrower concentration risks and its unseasoned loan book, which has been growing on average by 28% year-on-year between 2012-2014; (3) the bank's satisfactory, albeit declining, capitalization with TCE to risk weighted assets (RWAs) at 9.3% at end-2014, and which is supported by good profitability reflected by the bank's return of average assets (RoAA) at 1.26% for the year 2014 and (4) the bank's significant reliance on market funding at 36% of total liabilities and a high loan--to-deposit ratio of 157%, with a moderate level of intergroup funds from the majority shareholder bringing stability and a satisfactory liquid asset position. The NSR is a direct mapping of its Global Local Currency (GLC) deposit rating, in the NSR scale. The NSR is positioned in the lower of the two mapping available for the bank's GLC deposit rating in our NSR scale, reflecting the relatively low position of the bank's BCA and the high degree of affiliate support incorporated in the deposit rating. RATIONALE FOR ASSIGNING COUNTERPARTY RISK ASSESSMENT CR assessments are opinions of how counterparty obligations are likely to be treated if a bank fails and are distinct from debt and deposit ratings in that they (1) consider only the risk of default rather than both the likelihood of default and the expected financial loss suffered in the event of default; and (2) apply to counterparty obligations and contractual commitments rather than debt or deposit instruments. The CR assessment is an opinion of the counterparty risk related to a bank's covered bonds, contractual performance obligations (servicing), derivatives (e.g., swaps), letters of credit, guarantees and liquidity facilities. The long term CR assessment is positioned at Baa2 and therefore above deposit ratings, reflecting Moody's view that its probability of default is lower than that of deposits. Moody's believes senior obligations represented by the CR assessment will be more likely preserved in order to limit contagion, minimize losses and avoid disruption of critical functions. The CR assessment does not benefit from systemic support, in line with Moody's support assumptions on deposits. RATING OUTLOOK The stable outlook on ABank's domestic currency long term deposit rating reflects Moody's view of the bank's resilient financials, as well as the high probability of parental support and the stable outlook on the parent's ratings. The negative outlook on the foreign currency deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the Turkish government bond rating. WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP / DOWN Upward rating pressure on ABank's GLC ratings could develop through a combination of (1) a strengthening of the bank's core capitalization; (2) improvements in efficiency translating into higher profitability; and (3) a sustained improvement in the domestic operating environment. Any upgrade of CBQ's BCA could result in the upgrade of ABank's GLC deposit rating. Downward pressure would be exerted on the GLC deposit ratings in the event of (1) weakening in ABank's BCA; (2) any adverse changes in Moody's affiliate support assumptions; or (3) significant weakening of CBQ's creditworthiness. Downward pressure could be exerted on ABank's BCA in the event of (1) deterioration in its capital metrics; (2) weakening of the bank's profitability and efficiency indicators; (3) material deterioration in asset quality or a significant increase in risk appetite; and (4) an increased reliance on wholesale funding. A lower ceiling for foreign currency deposits, as well as a significant downgrade of ABank's ratings, would exert downward pressures for the foreign currency deposit rating. LIST OF ASSIGNED RATINGS: -- Global foreign currency long term deposit rating: Baa3; outlook negative -- Global local currency long term deposit rating: Baa3; outlook stable -- Short-term foreign currency and local currency deposit ratings: Prime-3 -- Baseline credit assessment: ba3 -- Adjusted baseline credit assessment: baa3 -- Counterparty Risk Assessment: Baa2(cr)/P-2(cr) -- Long term national scale rating: A1.tr; outlook stable -- Short term national scale rating: TR-1 ============= U K R A I N E ============= PRIVATBANK: Minority Investor Group Agrees to Debt Proposals ------------------------------------------------------------ Michael Turner at IFR reports that PrivatBank could finally make a breakthrough with its creditors after a minority holdout group of investors that has previously blocked the Ukrainian lender's attempts to restructure its debts said it will agree to the latest set of proposals. "We will now support this latest consent solicitation," IFR quotes Daniel Freifeld, founder of Washington-based Callaway Capital Management, an asset manager that heads the creditor committee, as saying. PrivatBank has had to soften its restructuring terms to get bondholders to agree to a deal, IFR notes. Callaway Capital heads a creditor committee that holds around 25% of PrivatBank's outstanding US$200 million September 2015s -- the debt being restructured -- but still managed to slam the brakes on two attempts to extend the debt's maturity to January 2018, IFR states. For its restructuring, Privat proposed a new amortizing bond but in the first two offers, investors were unhappy with the repayment schedule, which was back-loaded, IFR relays. With its third offer, Privat is proposing a more regular repayment timetable with 20% of the debt due in August 2016, another 20% in February 2017 and 15% each in May, August, and November of 2017, IFR discloses. PrivatBank, IFR says, will repay the remaining 15% in January 2018. A loan linked to the bonds will also be repaid with the same schedule, according to IFR. The consent solicitation deadline is Sept. 2, IFR discloses. A bondholder meeting is scheduled for Sept. 7, IFR says. PrivatBank is the largest commercial bank in Ukraine, in terms of the number of clients, assets value, loan portfolio and taxes paid to the national budget. PrivatBank has its headquarters in Dnipropetrovsk, in central Ukraine. =========================== U N I T E D K I N G D O M =========================== AVANTI COMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Rates US$125MM Sr. Sec. Notes Caa1 ----------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service assigned a Caa1 rating to USD125 million new Senior Secured Notes, maturing 2019 issued by Avanti Communications Group plc (Avanti or the company). The existing ratings are unaffected and the outlook on the ratings remains stable. RATINGS RATIONALE The new notes totaling USD125 million, which were issued without an intermediary at a price of 92, add to Avanti's USD370 million six year non-call five, senior secured bond sold in September 2013 with a 10% coupon. The new notes, together with an ordinary share issuance to raise some GBP7.2 million, which follows a share issuance of USD92.8 million earlier this year represent the final capital raise sufficient to complete the financing of Avanti's new, fifth satellite, Hylas 4 which is expected to cost around USD300 million in total. The company plans to launch Hylas 4 in Q1 2017, slightly earlier than originally planned. Moody's recognizes that the construction and launch of Hylas 4 will provide Avanti with significantly increased Ka-band service capacity and increase the collateral value of the company's assets, which with the exception of its investment in Artemis comprises a relatively young satellite fleet with long residual lives. Nevertheless, the increased amount of debt and higher interest costs at this time will further constrain the company's financial flexibility and significantly increase the amount of leverage, which is already high compared to peers, at a still vulnerable point in the company's development. Following the add-on financing, Moody's-adjusted leverage is expected to remain significantly above 10x for the duration of FY2016 and FY2017 with interest coverage below 1.0x. Additionally, free cash flow is not expected to turn positive until FY2018 or FY2019 at the earliest as a result of significant growth in EBITDA following the launches of Hylas 3 and Hylas 4 due to the high operational gearing of the business. The stable outlook reflects our expectations that Avanti will continue to execute its business plan, driving improved financial metrics over the next 12 to 18 months. RATING OUTLOOK The stable outlook reflects our expectations that Avanti will continue to execute its business plan, driving improved financial metrics beyond the next 18 months. WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - UP Given the small scale of Avanti's business, upward pressure on the rating would be dependent upon a sustained reduction in leverage, driven by strong EBITDA growth and FCF turning positive. We would also expect to see continued growth in the backlog and reducing customer concentration. WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING - DOWN Avanti's rating could experience downward pressure if the company significantly deviates from its projected growth path. Specifically, if FCF remains negative and leverage remains above 10x, the expected subordinated capital fails to materialize, or the company experiences the total loss of a satellite. IENERGIZER LTD: S&P Revises Outlook to Neg. & Affirms 'B' CCR ------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its outlook on iEnergizer Ltd. to negative from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating on the Guernsey-based business process outsourcing (BPO) company. S&P also affirmed its 'B' long-term issue rating on iEnergizer's U.S. dollar-denominated secured bank loan. "We revised the outlook because we anticipate that iEnergizer's operating performance could deteriorate, possibly increasing covenant pressure over the next six to 12 months," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Katsuyuki Nakai. "Our view of the increased risk of a covenant breach is based on a likely step-up in covenant requirements at the end of 2015." "We believe recovery prospects for iEnergizer's financial performance remain uncertain, given severe business conditions. The company's earnings in fiscal 2015 (year ended March 31, 2015) were weaker than our expectation mainly due to loss of business, including that from its largest client. The revenue from this client declined significantly to US$7.4 million in fiscal 2015, from US$24.5 million in fiscal 2014. In addition, the revenue loss was in the high-margin banking, financial services, and insurance (BFSI) segment. As a result, iEnergizer's ratio of funds from operations (FFO) to debt declined to 10.4% from 17.1% and ratio of debt to EBITDA deteriorated to 4.6x from 3.5x. The company has intensified its strategic efforts toward customer development and cost reduction, including trimming the workforce in the BFSI segment. However, we expect that iEnergizer's financial performance could face volatility, given the competitive nature of the business. In addition, the lack of stability in the management structure adds to the uncertainty. The company's CEO resigned in December 2014 and its CFO left in July 2015," S&P noted. In S&P's view, iEnergizer could face heightened risk of a covenant breach in the coming quarters, given the uncertainty about the company's operating performance and the step-up in covenant requirements. The requirement for the debt-to-EBITDA covenant will increase to 3.0x as of Dec. 31, 2015, from 3.5x as of March 31, 2015, and that for the EBITDA interest coverage covenant will go up to 3.5x from 3.3x. In March 2015, iEnergizer raised US$3.3 million of equity from its parent EICR (Cyprus) Ltd. to alleviate the high risk that it would breach these covenants as of March 31, 2015. EICR is ultimately owned by its founder Mr. Anil Aggarwal. S&P's base-case assumption is that iEnergizer's EBITDA margin will recover to about 20% in fiscal 2016, from 17.7% in fiscal 2015. This reflects the company's efforts toward reducing costs and improving operating efficiency. As a result, S&P's base case assumes that the company will become compliant with its financial covenants in Sept. 2015. In addition, S&P believes Mr. Aggarwal is committed to support iEnergizer and to provide further financial support to meet the company's covenant requirements, if necessary. "The affirmed rating reflects iEnergizer's small size, limited customer and geographical diversification, and aggressive financial policy," said Mr. Nakai. "These weaknesses are partly offset by the company's niche position, repeat business, and likely positive free cash flows." S&P could lower the rating if it lowers its assessment of iEnergizer's liquidity to "weak." This could happen if the company's weak earnings make near-term covenant compliance highly unlikely and S&P sees little chance of the covenants being relaxed. S&P could also lower the rating if the likelihood of Mr. Agarwal's support to iEnergizer becomes uncertain. In addition, S&P may downgrade the company if it loses another major customer. S&P may revise the outlook back to stable if the pressure on covenants recedes. This requires stability in iEnergizer's operating performance, such that the company's financial recovery is steady with the ratio of FFO to debt exceeding 20% on a sustainable basis. PUNCH TAVERNS: Agrees to Sell 158 Non-Core Outlets to Cut Debt --------------------------------------------------------------- Martin Flanagan at The Scotsman reports that Punch Taverns has agreed to sell 158 non-core outlets across England and Wales for GBP53.5 million to NewRiverRetail, a real estate investment trust focused on the retail sector. The company, which has not divulged which pubs are being sold at this stage, as cited by The Scotsman, said: "This agreement is consistent with Punch's strategy to sell the non-core estate at a rate of approximately 200 pubs per year." Punch said the price would be paid in cash, would be used to reduce debt, and that the deal should complete on Sept. 11, The Scotsman relates. After the transaction, the core pub estate will comprise about 2,900 pubs and the non-core estate will have about 550, The Scotsman notes. Debt Restructuring As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 4, 2015, The Financial Times disclosed that in October 2014, Punch completed a two-year process to restructure its GBP2.3 billion of debt, a deal that cut the amount owed to GBP1.6 billion and left the bondholders in charge of 85% of the equity after a heavy dilution of existing shareholders. Punch was highly leveraged in the early 2000s as it sought rapid expansion of its estate, a situation that left it heavily exposed when the smoking ban, beer duties and the global downturn hit the pub industry, the FT related. Punch Taverns plc is a United Kingdom-based pub company. The Company is engaged in the operation of public houses under either the leased model or as directly managed by the Company. The Company operates in two business segments: punch partnerships, a leased estate and punch pub company, a managed estate. UNITED KINGDOM: North Sea Oil Industry Faces Precarious Situation ----------------------------------------------------------------- Kristy Dorsey at The Scotsman reports that North Sea investment and jobs are suffering as cheap crude continues to flood the market. Oil majors around the globe are struggling to make the best of a bad situation, but at the moment the return on every project shelved and job shed seems to be yet more adversity, The Scotsman says. The Saudis stopped supporting oil prices in November, opting instead to flood the market in an attempt to drive out rivals, The Scotsman relays. This has forced the shelving of high-cost projects in areas such as the Arctic, the deep waters of the mid- Atlantic and the Canadian tar sands, where up to US$200 billion of spending has been deferred, The Scotsman notes. According to The Scotsman, while some have likened the downturn to the crash of 1986 -- when oil prices plunged from US$30 to US$10 as OPEC flooded the market -- Bob Ruddiman of Pinsent Masons says the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) is "now a more complex picture" than it was then. High costs, maturing fields and the looming expense of decommissioning make for a more precarious situation in the North Sea than elsewhere, The Scotsman states. The North Sea is now the most expensive offshore basin in the world, with unit operating costs rising to a record GBP18.50 per barrel last year, The Scotsman says. Total operating expenditure was 8% higher at GBP9.6 billion, The Scotsman discloses. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History ---------------------------------------------------- Posted on January 29, 2015 by tope_editor Author: Alfred L. Malabre, Jr. 106 Publisher: Beard Books Softcover: 256 pages List Price: $34.95 Review by Henry Berry Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/KNTLyr Alfred Malabre's personal perspective on the U.S. economy over the past four decades is firmly grounded in his experience and knowledge. Economics Editor of The Wall Street Journal from 1969 to 1993 and author of its weekly "Outlook" column, Malabre was in a singular position to follow the U.S. economy in recent decades, have access to the major academic and political figures responsible for economic affairs, and get behind the crucial economic stories of the day. He brings to this critical overview of the economy both a lively, often provocative, commentary on the picture of the turns of the economy. To this he adds sharp analysis and cogent explanation. In general, Malabre does not put much stock in economists. "In sum, the profession's record in the half century since Keynes and White sat down at Bretton Woods [after World War II] provokes dismay." Following this sour note, he refers to the belief of a noted fellow economist that the Nobel Prize in this field should be discontinued. In doing so, he also points out that the Nobel for economics was not one originally endowed by Alfred Nobel, but was one added at a later date funded by the central bank of Sweden apparently in an effort to give the profession of economists the prestige and notice of medicine, science, literature and other Nobel categories. Malabre's view of economists is widespread, although rarely expressed in economic circles. It derives from the plain fact that modern economists, even hugely influential ones such as John Meynard Keynes, are wrong as many times as they are right. Their economic theories have proved incomplete or shortsighted, if not basically wrong-headed. For example, Malabre thinks of the leading economist Milton Friedman and his "monetarist colleagues" as "super salespeople, successfully merchandising.an economic medicine that promised far more than it could deliver" from about the 1960s through the Reagan years of the 1980s. But the author not only cites how the economy has again and again disproved the theories and exposed the irrelevance of wrong- headedness of the policy recommendations of the most influential economists of the day. Malabre also lays out abundant economic data and describes contemporary marketplace and social activities to show how the economy performs almost independently of the best analyses and ideas of economists. Malabre does not engage in his critiques of noted economists and prevailing economic ideas of recent decades as an end in itself. What emerges in all of his consistent, clear-eyed, unideological analysis and commentary is his own broad, seasoned view of economics-namely, the predominance of the business cycle. He compares this with human nature, which is after all the substance of economics often overlooked by professional and academic economists with their focus on monetary policy, exchange rates, inflation, and such. "The business cycle, like human nature, is here to stay" is the lesson Malabre aims to impart to readers interested in understanding the fundamental, abiding nature of economics. In Lost Prophets, in language that is accessible and jargon-free, this author, who has observed, written about, and explained economics from all angles for several decades, persuasively makes this point. In addition to holding a top position at The Wall Street Journal, Malabre is also the author of the books, Understanding the New Economy and Beyond Our Means, which received the George S. Eccles Prize from the Columbia Business School as the best economics book of 1987. ********* Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co- published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2015. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552. * * * End of Transmission * * *