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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, August 7, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 155

                            Headlines

B E L A R U S

BELARUSIAN BANKS: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Ratings


F R A N C E

ALCATEL-LUCENT: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'
CFHL-2 2015: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
SPCM SA: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Stable


G E R M A N Y

ALPHAFORM AG: Unit Files For Insolvency Process
ANGLO IRISH: Two Ex-Cabinet ministers 'Aware' Anglo Was Insolvent


G R E E C E

GREECE: Nears Bailout-Out Deal with Creditors, PM Says


I R E L A N D

ALPSTAR CLO 1: Moody's Affirms B1(sf) Rating to Class E Notes


I T A L Y

GAMENET SPA: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Negative


R U S S I A

OPM-BANK LLC: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
PLATO-BANK LLC: Bank of Russia Halts Provisional Administration
PROFESSIONAL BANK: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
SIBERIAN OIL: Bank of Russia Halts Provisional Administration
SUN LIFE: Bank of Russia Cancels Pension Provision License


S E R B I A

NISKA PIVARA: Bought by Grupa Kapitalni for BGN130 Million


S L O V A K   R E P U B L I C

BRUSNO SPA: Constitutional Court Overturns Bankruptcy Ruling


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: Reschedules Meeting on Debt Deal with Creditors
UKRAINE: Insolvent Banks Owe Over UAH37BB to NBU as of June 1


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AFREN PLC: Fitch Lowers Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'D'
ARCHES: Left GBP500K Debts When it Went Into Administration
BCA OSPREY: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+', Then Withdraws Rating
CPUK FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Class B2 Notes
DSC LIMITED: Goes Into Liquidation

GENZ HOLDINGS: Placed Into Provisional Liquidation
GILBERT WEBB: Court Orders Firms Into Liquidation After Scheme
JDG PROPERTIES: High Court Orders Two Companies Into Liquidation
LB UK FINANCING: August 28 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
ROTHES FC: Could Face Liquidation by End of This Week


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: Bankruptcy and Consumer


                            *********


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B E L A R U S
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BELARUSIAN BANKS: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) of Belarusbank (BBK), Belinvestbank (BIB) and Development
Bank of the Republic of Belarus (DBRB) at 'B-' with Stable
Outlooks.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS

The Long-term IDRs, Support Ratings and Support Rating Floors of
BBK, BIB and DBRB reflect Fitch's expectation of support these
banks may receive from the government of Belarus, in case of
need. This view takes into account the banks' state ownership
(either through The State Property Committee for BBK and BIB or
the Council of Ministers in the case of DBRB) and government
control (representatives of the government sit on the banks'
supervisory boards).

Fitch also considers the banks' high systemic importance (greater
at BBK with market shares of 33% by assets and 70% by retail
deposits), policy roles (mainly for BBK and DBRB as the country's
largest providers of government program lending backed by
dedicated government funding) and the track record of support to
date.

At the same time, the ratings remain vulnerable to deterioration
of the sovereign credit profile as external financing pressures
remain high, reflected in the country's low FX reserves
(USD4.6 bil. at July 1, 2015,), a large current account deficit
(USD1.3 bil. or 7.3% of GDP in 4M15) and depreciation of the
Belarusian rouble (BYR) (by 29% against USD in 1H15 and by 24% in
2014).  The macroeconomic outlook is weak -- real GDP contracted
3% in 5M15 and the IMF forecasts Belarus economy to stagnate in
2016, mostly due to weaker external demand.

The country's reliance on Russia remains high in terms of
external debt refinancing, direct investment and preferential
trade terms, and Russia remains the country's largest trading
partner.  Fitch's base case expectation is for Russian support to
remain available to the country to help alleviate external
pressures and internal imbalances.

The banks' ratings reflect the authorities' limited financial
flexibility to provide extraordinary support to the banks at all
times, in particular in foreign currency.  This view considers
the banks' large foreign currency liabilities (a combined USD9.5
bil. at end-2014), of which the majority is customer deposits,
but a significant proportion (USD1.4 bil. at end-1Q15) is short-
term external debt maturing within 12 months.  These liabilities
are significant relative to the country's FX reserves, while FX
liquidity is tight at all three banks.  Government funding is
significant at DBRB and BBK, at 72% and 20% of liabilities,
respectively at end-2014, although limited at BIB (2%).
Liquidity shortages in local currency, if any, are likely to be
covered by the central bank (BBK, BIB) or authorities (DBRB).

The government recently provided new equity injections into BBK
(BYR10trn or 40% of end-2014 IFRS equity, through conversion of
MinFin deposits at the bank) and into DBRB (BYR1.3 bil. or 11% of
end-2014 equity, out of BYR2trn approved for 2015).  No
recapitalization plans exist for BIB; however, Fitch expects the
support propensity will remain unchanged, despite the
authorities' intention to privatize this bank.  Privatization is
likely to be a long-term project and the authorities are likely
to provide support to the bank prior to any sale, in Fitch's
view.

Viability Ratings (VRs) -- BBK, BIB

BBK's and BIB's VRs reflect the high correlation of these banks'
stand-alone creditworthiness with the sovereign credit profile.
This is due to both banks' large direct and indirect exposure to
the sovereign (end-2014: BBK: 5.3x Fitch Core Capital (FCC); BIB:
3.7x) through (i) holdings of government bonds and FX swaps with
the National Bank of Belarus (NBB) and (ii) policy lending under
government programs (BBK: 61% of loans; BIB: 24%) and loans
issued to state-owned corporates.

Reported non-performing loans (NPLs, more than 90 days overdue)
remained low at 1.5% at BBK and 4.5% at BIB at end-2014, helped
by transfers of weakly performing government program loans to
DBRB (by BBK), government subsidies on interest payments, loan
repayments under state guarantees, bullet repayment structures
and increasing rollovers.  Credit risks have increased in the
recessionary environment, and are also heightened by generally
high leverage in the corporate segment and significant FX lending
(BBK: 57%; BIB: 60%), often to unhedged borrowers, whose debt
servicing capacity would have been affected by the recent BYR
devaluation.

Regulatory capital ratios (CARs; end-1H15: BBK: 17%, BIB: 12%)
are seen as only moderate in light of their risk profiles,
although the recent equity injection at BBK and planned
additional loan transfers to DBRB or MinFin (BBK: 8% of loans;
BIB: 7%) should support CARs and asset quality management in the
near term.  Pre-impairment profitability remains reasonable, at
3.6% and 3.0% of average gross loans (net of unpaid interest
accruals), respectively, in 2014, but internal capital generation
remains low (ROAE of 5.5% and 3.7%, respectively at end-2014),
despite generally moderate loan impairment charges (LICs) so far.
Further solvency support in the form of loan transfers or capital
contributions may be in prospect if asset quality deteriorates
further.

Customer funding is the main form of funding at both banks (72%-
74% of liabilities) and highly dollarized.  Retail deposits (BBK:
44% of liabilities; BIB: 40%) tend to show volatility in periods
of market turbulence, as was the case in December 2014-January
2015, exerting pressure on the banks' liquidity and leading to
higher funding costs.  BBK's high loan-to-deposit ratio of 127%
reflects a significant share of dedicated government funding and
external liabilities (15% of the total); BIB's loans-to-deposit
ratio is more moderate, close to 100% at end-2014.  Liquidity
buffers (net of near-term wholesale debt repayments) are
generally moderate (in BYR) or tight (in FX), and liquidity
management remains highly dependent on the confidence of
depositors, refinancing of external liabilities and support from
authorities.

Fitch has not assigned a VR to DBRB due to the bank's special
status as a development institution and its close association
with the authorities.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATING FLOORS - BBK, BIB, DBRB

Changes to the banks' IDRs are likely to be linked to changes in
the sovereign credit profile.  A further weakening of the
sovereign could indicate a reduced ability to support the banks
as well as greater risk of capital controls being introduced.  A
marked reduction in Belarus's ability to refinance its external
debt could result in a significant weakening of the sovereign
profile.

VRs -- BBK, BIB

BBK's and BIB's VR's could be downgraded if the weaker operating
environment translates into a marked deterioration in the banks'
asset quality, performance and capital metrics, without support
being made available.

The potential for positive rating actions on either the IDRs or
VRs is limited in the near term, given weaknesses in the economy
and external finances.

The rating actions are:

BBK and BIB

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B-'

DBRB

Long-term IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Local-Currency Long-term IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B-'



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F R A N C E
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ALCATEL-LUCENT: S&P Raises Corporate Credit Rating to 'B+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had raised its
long-term corporate credit ratings on French-American telecom
equipment supplier Alcatel-Lucent and its subsidiary Alcatel-
Lucent USA Inc. to 'B+' from 'B'.

At the same time, S&P raised its issue ratings on the debt issued
by Alcatel-Lucent and Alcatel-Lucent USA to 'B+' from 'B'.  The
recovery rating remains at '4', indicating S&P's view of average
recovery, at the lower half of the 30%-50% range, in the event of
a payment default.

All the ratings, including S&P's 'B' short-term corporate credit
rating on Alcatel-Lucent, remain on CreditWatch with positive
implications.

The upgrade reflects S&P's expectation that Alcatel-Lucent will
report positive post-restructuring free operating cash flow
(FOCF) in the next 12 months, thanks to significant cost savings
in recent quarters and lower restructuring costs in the future.
It also reflects S&P's view that Alcatel-Lucent's liquidity has
improved to "exceptional" from "adequate."

In the second quarter of 2015, Alcatel-Lucent reported positive
FOCF for the first time since 2006.  It is on track to achieve
its fixed-cost savings target of EUR950 million by the end of
2015 compared with the end of 2012, after reducing fixed costs by
EUR746 million as of the second quarter of this year.  S&P
expects the company's cost base and restructuring outlays will
further decline in the coming quarters because S&P understands
the cost-cutting program (excluding synergies from the merger
with Nokia) will soon be completed.

Consequently, S&P expects Alcatel-Lucent to report an improved
operating margin of 6%-7% in 2015 and 2016, compared with 4.7% in
2014.  S&P also anticipates that FOCF will be positive in 2016,
after being at breakeven in 2015 and at negative EUR420 million
in 2014.  However, Alcatel-Lucent's financial risk profile
remains constrained by S&P's expectation of still-high Standard &
Poor's-adjusted gross leverage ratios, including debt to EBITDA
above 5x in 2015 and 2016, and close to break-even FOCF in 2015.

S&P's assessment of Alcatel-Lucent's business risk profile as
"weak" reflects the company's still relatively low profitability
relative to that of many peers, which is partly due to continued
restructuring needs and smaller scale in the wireless business.
In addition, the group faces volatile demand and fierce
competition, particularly in the Wireless Access division, which
in 2014 generated 36% of Alcatel-Lucent's revenues and ranked No.
4 worldwide with a 12% market share.  These weaknesses are partly
offset by Alcatel-Lucent's solid diversification in terms of
technologies and products, as well as its leading positions in
fixed-line access, internet protocol (IP), fiber optics
transmission, and core network technologies.

S&P intends to resolve the CreditWatch on Alcatel-Lucent after
its merger with Nokia closes, which S&P anticipates will occur in
the first half of 2016.  At this stage, S&P expects to equalize
its corporate credit ratings on Alcatel-Lucent with those on
Nokia after the merger.


CFHL-2 2015: Moody's Assigns Ba3(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned definitive long-term credit
ratings to notes issued by CFHL-2 2015:

EUR 787 million Class A1 Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes due
June 2055, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR 415 million Class A2-A Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes due
June 2055, Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

EUR 72 million Class B Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes due June
2055, Definitive Rating Assigned Aa1 (sf)

EUR 32.5 million Class C Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes due
June 2055, Definitive Rating Assigned A2 (sf)

EUR 27 million Class D Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes due June
2055, Definitive Rating Assigned Baa2 (sf)

EUR 27.5 million Class E Asset-Backed Floating Rate Notes due
June 2055, Definitive Rating Assigned Ba3 (sf)

Moody's has not assigned any rating to the EUR1.0 million
Subordinated Units or to the EUR300 Residual Units.

This transaction is the second public securitization by Credit
Foncier de France ("CFF", A2/P-1) since 2008 following the CFHL-1
2014 securitization last year. The portfolio consists of French
prime residential home loans backed by first economic lien
mortgages or equivalent third-party eligible guarantees ("prˆts
cautionnes"), which are well-known products by Moody's.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The ratings of the notes take into account the credit quality of
the underlying mortgage or guaranteed loan pool, from which
Moody's determined the MILAN Credit Enhancement ("MILAN CE") and
the portfolio expected loss, as well as the transaction structure
and legal considerations.

The expected portfolio loss of 2.0% of the original balance of
the portfolio at closing and the MILAN CE of 8.6% served as input
parameters for Moody's cash flow model, which is based on a
probabilistic lognormal distribution as described in the report
"The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS Analysis", published in July
2000.

The key drivers for the portfolio expected loss, which is in line
with the French prime RMBS sector average, are: (i) the
collateral performance of CFF; (ii) the performance of CFF's
previous transactions; (iii) the current macroeconomic
environment and Moody's view of the future macroeconomic
environment in France; and (iv) benchmarking with similar
transactions in the French market.

The key drivers for the MILAN CE, which is lower than the French
prime RMBS sector average, are: (i) the relatively high weighted
average (WA) current loan-to-value ratio of 80.5% of the pool;
(ii) the presence of 28.7% of loans in the portfolio guaranteed
by Credit Logement (Aa3) ("prets cautionnes") and to which we
have given benefit in the scenarios where Credit Logement is
expected to honour the guarantee, which consequently reduces the
MILAN CE; whilst in the remaining scenarios we have applied a
haircut to property values and increased the foreclosure lag and
foreclosure costs, which consequently results in an increase in
the MILAN CE in those scenarios; (iii) positive features such as
a WA seasoning of 2.8 years and months current data showing that
around 88% of loans in the pool have never been in arrears; (iv)
the absence of riskier products such as interest only loans, buy-
to-let loans, floating rate loans or loans extended to non-
residents; (v) the high proportion of loans originated through
brokers and intermediaries (76.7%), which we see as a negative
feature.

Interest Rate Risk Analysis: The transaction benefits from an
interest rate swap with CFF (A2/P-1) as swap counterparty. Under
the interest rate swap the Issuer will pay or receive the
difference between (i) the scheduled interest payments under the
loans and (ii) the sum of (a) the senior expenses of the issuer,
(b) the product of the portfolio balance as at the prior payment
period and a guaranteed excess spread of 0.50% per annum and (c)
an amount equal to 1.41% of prepayments received over the
preceding collection period. The swap counterparty will pay the
interest payable on the Class A to E notes over a notional equal
to the difference between the balance of Class A to E notes and
any unpaid PDL corresponding to those classes. The swap
documentation is substantially compliant with Moody's swap
framework, however the collateral and replacement triggers will
be set at loss of A3 and Baa1, respectively, which does not fully
de-link the notes ratings from the rating of the swap
counterparty. Moody's has therefore incorporated the increased
linkage to the swap counterparty in the provisional credit
ratings of the notes.

Transaction structure: The transaction benefits from a non-
amortizing reserve fund equal to 0.50% of the original balance of
Class A to E Notes. The general reserve fund is fully funded at
closing through the proceeds of the issuance of the notes and
units and will be replenished before the OC PDL (PDL on the
overcollateralization). This means that the reserve fund is
acting both as credit enhancement and source of liquidity for the
Class A to E Notes. The transaction also benefits from an
amortizing liquidity reserve equal to 3.0% of the outstanding
balance of Class A to E Notes. The liquidity reserve is funded
through principal collections and can be used to cover the senior
expenses of the issuer and interest payments on the Class A to E
Notes.

Reverse Turbo: on each quarterly payment date and as long as
Class B, C, D and E notes are outstanding, an amount equal to the
lower of (i) 19 bps per annum of the outstanding portfolio
balance as of the beginning of the payment period and (ii) the
aggregate outstanding balance of Class B to E notes will be
allocated to repay Class B to E notes in reverse order of
seniority. The reverse turbo amount allocated will be deeply
subordinated in the revenue waterfall and applied after cure of
the OC PDL. Moody's has taken the reverse turbo feature into
account in its cashflow modelling and incorporated it in the
ratings of the notes.

Operational Risk Analysis: The loans will be serviced by CFF
(A2/P-1). There will be no back-up servicer appointed at closing
and no rating trigger for appointing a back-up servicer. In
mitigation, the management company -- Eurotitrisation
(not rated) -- will facilitate the search for a substitute
servicer if needed. To help ensure continuity of payments both
the terms and conditions of the notes and the swap documents
contain estimation language whereby Eurotitrisation will estimate
the cashflows based on the most recent servicer reports should no
servicer report be available. The transaction also benefits from
the equivalent of slightly more than two quarters of liquidity
through the liquidity reserve and the general reserve fund.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: If the portfolio expected loss
was increased to 6.0% from 2.0% and the MILAN CE was increased to
12.0% from 8.6% the model output indicates that the Class A1 and
Class A2-A notes would still achieve Aaa assuming that all other
factors remained unchanged. Moody's Parameter Sensitivities
provide a quantitative/model-indicated calculation of the number
of rating notches that a Moody's structured finance security may
vary if certain input parameters used in the initial rating
process differed. The analysis assumes that the deal has not aged
and is not intended to measure how the rating of the security
might migrate over time, but rather how the initial rating of the
security might have differed if key rating input parameters were
varied. Parameter Sensitivities for the typical EMEA RMBS
transaction are calculated by stressing key variable inputs in
Moody's primary rating model.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity of the notes. In Moody's opinion, the
structure allows for timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal with respect to the Notes by the legal final
maturity. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors.


SPCM SA: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Corp. Credit Rating, Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' long-term
corporate credit rating on France-headquartered chemicals
producer SPCM S.A.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P revised its recovery rating on the
EUR550 million senior unsecured due 2023 and US$250 million
senior unsecured notes due 2022 to '4' from '3'.  The issue
rating is affirmed at 'BB+'.  S&P's recovery expectations are in
the higher half of the 30%-50% range.

The affirmation signifies S&P's expectation that SPCM's operating
performance will remain strong in 2015, benefiting from cheaper
raw materials, the continued single-digit volume growth in most
of its end-markets, and the weaker euro.  S&P anticipates that,
despite weaker volumes from the oil and gas sector, SPCM will
maintain a ratio of Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from
operations (FFO) to debt of about 25%, in line with the rating.

S&P has raised its assessment of SPCM's liquidity to "strong"
from "adequate" to recognize that the new revolving credit
facility (RCF) of EUR350 million further strengthens its funding
sources.

S&P revised its recovery rating because an increase in the
unsecured RCF commitment level to EUR350 million from $250
million suggests an increase in the level of debt outstanding at
default. S&P assumes that 85% of the RCF is drawn at the
hypothetical point of default.  In addition, S&P sees an increase
in debt at the subsidiary level, which it assumes will be senior
to the unsecured RCF and rated senior notes.

SPCM's "satisfactory" business risk profile is supported by the
company's world market leadership in polyacrylamide polymers to
treat municipal and industrial water and to alter the viscosity
of water injected into tight oil and gas developments.  SPCM is
the largest producer in the world of polyacrylamides and reported
a 45% share of global production capacity at year-end 2014.
SPCM's resilience to GDP cyclicality is primarily supported by
its exposure to municipal and industrial water treatment end-
markets, which should continue exhibiting single-digit expansion,
even during testing economic conditions.  More fundamentally,
SPCM's resilience is supported by the increasing scarcity of
clean water and natural resources.

SPCM's strategy continues to be growth-oriented, with planned
capacity additions to about 1,000 kilotons (kt) by the end of
2017, up from 800kt at year-end 2014.  The company currently has
four new plants under construction.  The U.K. and China plants
are due to start production in 2015, while operations in Brazil
and Russia are at an early stage of development and could
commence in 2017-2018.

Negative factors affecting SPCM's business risk profile include
its limited product diversity in what S&P views as a niche
market, ongoing sizable expansionary capex, and the presence of
several competitors, notably in China.

SPCM's "significant" financial risk profile factors in the
company's focus on growth and subsequent funding needs for capex
and working capital.  At the same time, S&P considers the highly
cash-generative nature of SPCM's business, which requires
maintenance capital of only EUR20 million-EUR30 million, less
than 10% of EBITDA.  In addition, S&P recognizes the highly
flexible and modular nature of SPCM's capex and its track record
of prompt capex curtailment if needed.

In S&P's base-case scenario, it assumes:

   -- Revenue growth of about 7%-8%, supported by favorable
      foreign exchange rate effects (from the weaker euro),
      continued strength in the core water treatment end-markets
      from which SPCM derived 45% of its revenues in 2014, and
      ongoing capacity expansions.  These would be partly offset
      by difficult conditions in the oil and gas sector (24% of
      2014 revenues), where fracking and drilling activities in
      the U.S. have been most affected.

   -- Reported EBITDA margins of about 15% in 2015, a
      historically high level, factoring in the benefit of lower
      propylene prices and S&P's belief that these will be passed
      through only partially to customers, as demonstrated in
      2009 when a similar decline in raw material prices
      occurred.  For 2016, S&P assumes a somewhat lower margin of
      14% as raw material price benefits diminish.

   -- Annual capex to support capacity expansion of about EUR260
      million-EUR270 million in 2015 and EUR210 million-EUR220
      million in 2016.  Modest dividend payments, as observed in
      past years and in line with the company's financial
      policies.

   -- Working capital outflows of about EUR30 million-EUR40
      million, reflecting revenue growth, but also an increased
      focus on efficient management of working capital.

   -- Modest acquisitions.  S&P recognizes midsized transactions
      tied to minorities may be possible by end-2016.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- FFO to debt of approximately 23%-25% in 2015, broadly
      stable in 2016.

   -- Largely negative free operating cash flow (FOCF), at
      approximately EUR70 million-EUR90 million, improving in
      2016 but remaining negative.

In addition, S&P anticipates that SPCM will report EBITDA of
about EUR340 million in 2015, benefiting from margin expansion as
a result of lower propylene prices and only partial pass-through
to customers.  At the same time, however, and in line with past
strategy, S&P forecasts that SPCM will use all operating cash
flow to support growth investments.  The company has announced an
increase in planned spending for growth to EUR270 million-EUR280
million from the EUR200 million S&P anticipated in April.  To
some extent, the increase in capex is partly offset by S&P's
slightly higher projected EBITDA (plus EUR10 million), only
moderate working capital outflows (no change to previous
assumptions), and steady interest costs despite higher debt,
thanks to refinancing completed in April 2015.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that SPCM's operating
performance will remain strong in 2015 and that its adjusted FFO-
to-debt ratio will improve to about 25%, which S&P views as
commensurate with the 'BB+' rating.  S&P's expectation of
recovery in the credit metrics primarily stems from anticipated
benefits to SPCM's profits from lower propylene prices and the
weaker euro, but also projected proactive measures from
management to reduce working capital outflows and capex if
conditions in the oil and gas industry are unsupportive.

S&P could lower the rating if there is no clear path by which
SPCM's FFO-to-debt ratio could recover to about 25% in 2015.
This could occur as a result of a decline in EBITDA due to lower
sales from the oil and gas industry, higher-than-anticipated
capex, or unforeseen acquisitions.

S&P is unlikely to raise the rating at this stage, reflecting its
forecast of negative FOCF in 2015-2016 as SPCM reinvests a
significant proportion of FFO in expansionary capex.



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G E R M A N Y
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ALPHAFORM AG: Unit Files For Insolvency Process
-----------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that Alphaform-Claho GmbH, a subsidiary of
Alphaform AG, applies for insolvency procedure.

The report relates that Alphaform-Claho applied to responsible
county court of Munich to open insolvency proceedings due to
inability to pay.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 31,
2015, the Munich District Court on July 29 appointed Dr. Hubert
Ampferl of the law practice Dr. Beck und Partner as the
provisional bankruptcy administrator for Alphaform AG.  The
company had applied for the opening of bankruptcy proceedings on
July 28 on the grounds of impending insolvency.

The administrator will quickly garner an overview of Alphaform.

Over the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, the company
intends, together with the bankruptcy administrator, to continue
to implement the restructuring efforts in accordance with IDW S6,
which were already begun with in June 2015.

The operative business at Alphaform will continue as normal.

Dr. Hanns-Dieter Aberle, Chairman of the Board at Alphaform,
explained: "Alphaform has stood for high-quality and punctual
manufacturing for years now.  The current situation will not
change this in any way whatsoever.  Our customers can continue to
rely on us as they have always done."

                        About Alphaform

Founded in 1996 and headquartered in Feldkirchen near Munich,
Alphaform AG is a g European handler for the renovation of
industrial development and production with innovative 3D printing
and rapid technologies.  Among others, Alphaform today serves the
premium manufacturers of the automotive industry, mechanical,
plant and automotive engineering, the aerospace industry, tool
making and medical technology.  Its particular areas of expertise
include complex assembly, lightweight construction and
orthopaedic implants and instruments.  It has subsidiaries in
Germany, Finland, Sweden and the UK.  Alphaform's shares are
listed in the Prime Standard segment of the Frankfurt stock
exchange (code: ATF; securities code number (WKN): 548 795).


ANGLO IRISH: Two Ex-Cabinet ministers 'Aware' Anglo Was Insolvent
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Irish Examiner reports that two former Cabinet ministers have
told the banking inquiry that they were aware that Anglo Irish
Bank was insolvent before it was nationalised in January 2009.

According to Irish Examiner, the evidence of former Green leader
John Gormley and former PD leader Mary Harney contradicts other
witnesses who said the nationalisation was due to corporate
governance issues at the bank.

Mary Harney told Pearse Doherty that she was certainly told prior
to nationalisation that insolvency was an issue, though she could
not be certain exactly when, Irish Examiner relates.

Anglo Irish Bank was an Irish bank headquartered in Dublin from
1964 to 2011.  It went into wind-down mode after nationalization
in 2009.  In July 2011, Anglo Irish merged with the Irish
Nationwide Building Society, with the new company being named the
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC).

The former Irish bank sought protection from creditors under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on Aug. 26, 2013 (Bankr.
D. Del. Case No. 13-12159).  The former bank's Foreign
Representatives are Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson.  Its
U.S. bankruptcy counsel are Mark D. Collins, Esq., and Jason M.
Madron, Esq., at Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., in Wilmington,
Delaware.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Nears Bailout-Out Deal with Creditors, PM Says
------------------------------------------------------
Szu Ping Chan at The Telegraph reports that Greece's Prime
Minister Alexis Tsipras said the country is close to reaching a
deal with its creditors to secure a EUR86 billion lifeline that
will keep it afloat for the next three years and secure its place
within the eurozone.

Mr. Tsipras said meetings between the government and Greece's
creditors had made good progress, The Telegraph relates.

"We are in the final stretch," The Telegraph quotes Mr. Tsipras
as saying.  "Despite the difficulties, we are facing we hope this
agreement can end uncertainty on the future of Greece."

Discussions between Greece and representatives from the
International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank,
European Commission and the European Stability Mechanism, or
bail-out fund, started in the last week of July, The Telegraph
relays.

Mr. Tsipras suggested that the European Parliament should also be
involved in talks, describing it as a "democratic" and
"accountable" institution, The Telegraph notes.

"It should at some point be under the control and monitoring of
the European Parliament, a democratic institution which has
accountability," The Telegraph quotes Mr. Tsipras as saying.

Jean-Claude Juncker, the head of the EC, said that an agreement
on a third bailout for Greece was likely to be agreed this month,
according to The Telegraph.

Mr. Juncker, as cited by The Telegraph, "All the reports I am
getting suggest an accord this month, preferably before the
20th," when Greece must repay some EUR3.4 billion due to the ECB.

Greece's ruling party also urged its members on Aug. 5 to back a
third bail-out deal, The Telegraph discloses.

According to The Telegraph, Nikos Filis, a spokesman for Syriza,
said Athens was seeking a full agreement so that it could receive
a first payment of EUR25 billion.  He rejected the idea of a
second bridging loan, The Telegraph notes.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ALPSTAR CLO 1: Moody's Affirms B1(sf) Rating to Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Alpstar CLO 1 Plc:

EUR33.2 million Class B Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2014
Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

EUR8.4 million Class C-1 Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2014
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

EUR6.8 million Class C-2 Deferrable Senior Secured Fixed Rate
Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2014
Upgraded to A3 (sf)

EUR10 million Class P Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa3
(sf); previously on Jun 30, 2014 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued
by Alpstar CLO 1 Plc:

EUR44.9 million Class A2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2014 Affirmed Aaa
(sf)

EUR13.2 million Class D Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2014
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

EUR13.5 million Class E Deferrable Senior Secured Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Jun 30, 2014
Affirmed B1 (sf)

Alpstar CLO 1 Plc, issued in April 2006, is a collateralized loan
obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield
European loans. It is predominantly composed of senior secured
loans. The portfolio is managed by Alpstar Management Jersey
Limited. The transaction's reinvestment period ended in April
2012.

RATINGS RATIONALE

The rating upgrades of the notes are primarily a result of the
redemption in full of the Class A1, partial redemption of the
Class A2 and subsequent increases of the overcollateralization
ratios (the "OC ratios") of all Classes of Notes. Moody's notes
that the Class A2 Notes have redeemed by approximately EUR25.7
million (or 57% of their original balance). As a result of the
deleveraging the OC ratios of the remaining Classes of Notes have
increased significantly. According to the June 2015 trustee
report, the Classes A, B, C, D and E OC ratios are 552.39%,
202.12%, 156.64%, 131.04% and 112.27% respectively compared to
levels just prior to the payment date in April 2015 of 271.55%,
162.23%, 136.98%, 120.67% and 107.57%.

The rating of the combination notes addresses the repayment of
the rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. The
rated balance at any time is equal to the principal amount of the
combination note on the issue date minus the sum of all payments
made from the issue date to such date, of either interest or
principal. The rated balance will not necessarily correspond to
the outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 102 million,
a weighted average default probability of 25.03% (consistent with
a WARF of 3607), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
47.93% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 16
and a weighted average spread of 4.14%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% for the 94.09% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan corporate
assets upon default. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it lowered the weighted average spread by 30 basis
points; the model generated outputs that were in line with the
base-case results for Classes A, B, C and D. The Class E output
was within half a notch of the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

-- Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

-- Around 28.19% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates.

-- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


GAMENET SPA: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR, Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B' corporate
credit and issue ratings on Italy-based Gamenet S.p.A.  The
outlook is negative.

S&P removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where it had placed
them with negative implications on Feb. 17, 2015.

The ratings affirmation and removal from CreditWatch negative
reflects S&P's view that the company has managed to increase its
cash balances in the first half of this year.  The negative
outlook, however, reflects S&P's opinion that the company's
liquidity remains under significant pressure.

Gamenet operates in Italy and is one of the leading players in
the gaming machine segment (second concessionaire after GTECH
S.p.A.). The group is a licensed gaming operator for betting and
online products, although this segment is still marginal on a
consolidated basis (less than 8% of 2014 full-year consolidated
revenues).

Gamenet's geographic diversity is limited, with operations only
in Italy.  It also lacks diversification in terms of product
offering with video lottery terminals (VLTs) and amusements with
prizes (AWP) gaming machines generating most of its earnings, and
is small compared to some of its rated peers.  These factors lead
S&P to assess its business risk profile as "weak".

Gamenet's underlying financial ratios are in line with S&P's
definition of a "significant" financial risk profile.  However,
given that the company is owned by a financial sponsor and S&P
assess Gamenet's liquidity as "less than adequate," S&P caps its
financial risk profile at "highly leveraged" under its criteria.

At the end of 2014, the Italian parliament required an additional
EUR500 million from businesses involved in operating AWPs and
VLTs.  Based on the number of gaming machines connected to
Gamenet's network at the end of December 2014, Gamenet and the
parties involved in the value chain -- the gaming machine and
point-of-sale terminal owners -- have to pay EUR47 million.  They
paid 40% of the due amount in April.  The remaining 60% is due in
October.

S&P understands that Gamenet itself is only liable for EUR4.5
million of the tax.  This is because it does not own any AWPs, so
the majority of the tax will be paid by the value chain
operators. In practice, however, Gamenet has been making
voluntary payments in anticipation of amounts due by its value
chain operators, increasing the calls on its liquidity, although
S&P understands from management that Gamenet is under no
obligation to make such payments and is not liable for them.

S&P's base case assumes:

   -- Revenues will decline by 5% in 2015 due to the lower number
      of AWP machines in operation and fairly flat underlying
      growth.

   -- Capital expenditure of about EUR15 million per year in 2015
      and 2016.

   -- No sizable debt maturities until the bond is due in 2018.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at these credit measures:

   -- Free operating cash flow of EUR20 million-EUR30 million per
      year in 2015 and 2016.

   -- EBITDA interest coverage in the range of 3.5x-4.0x in 2015-
      2016.

   -- Debt to EBITDA of 2.5x-3.0x in 2015-2016.

The negative outlook reflects Gamenet's broadly flat operating
performance and limited headroom to absorb additional potential
taxation at the current rating level, for example if the Italian
government imposed additional Stability Law tax payments in 2016.
Although S&P calculates that Gamenet is only liable for a limited
amount, it is required to advance payments for the entire value
chain before collecting the cash from third parties.  S&P
therefore sees potential additional calls on cash as maintaining
a degree of pressure on Gamenet's liquidity, particularly in the
absence of any long-term committed bank facilities.  The negative
outlook reflects a one-in-three chance of a downgrade within the
next 6-12 months if Gamenet's liquidity weakens, or if its
operating performance deteriorates beyond S&P's current
expectations.

S&P would consider a downgrade if liquidity deteriorated to
"weak," as S&P's criteria defines the term.  S&P would also
likely downgrade Gamenet if its financial metrics were to
deteriorate materially from their current level.  In particular,
S&P would consider a downgrade if adjusted EBITDA interest cover
was to fall below 2x, or if free operating cash flow was to turn
negative.

An upgrade is unlikely in the short-to-medium term.  S&P could
revise the outlook to stable if Gamenet were to strengthen its
liquidity position with additional long-term credit lines, such
that S&P assessed its liquidity as "adequate" under its criteria.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


OPM-BANK LLC: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
------------------------------------------------------------
Due to the ruling of the Arbitration court of the city of Moscow,
dated July 22, 2015, on recognizing insolvent (bankrupt) credit
institution Commercial Bank OPM-Bank, LLC, and appointing a
receiver in compliance with Clause 3 of Article 18927 of the
Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia took
a decision (Order No. OD-1993, dated August 5, 2015) to terminate
from August 6, 2015 the activity of the provisional
administration of OPM-Bank, appointed by Bank of Russia Order
No. OD-1209, dated June 1, 2015, "On the Appointment of the
Provisional Administration to Manage the Moscow-based Credit
Institution Commercial Bank OPM-Bank, limited liability company,
or CB OPM-Bank LLC Due to the Revocation of Its Banking Licence".


PLATO-BANK LLC: Bank of Russia Halts Provisional Administration
---------------------------------------------------------------
Due to the ruling of the Arbitration court of the Sverdlovsk
Region, dated July 27, 2015, on recognizing insolvent (bankrupt)
the credit institution Plato-Bank, LLC, and appointing a receiver
in compliance with Clause 3 of Article 18927 of the Federal Law
"On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia took a decision
to terminate from August 6, 2015, the activity of the provisional
administration of Plato-Bank appointed by Bank of Russia Order
No. OD-1040, dated May 13, 2015, "On the Appointment of the
Provisional Administration to Manage the Yekaterinburg-based
Credit Institution Plato-Bank, Limited Liability Company, or
Plato-Bank LLC Due to the Revocation of Its Banking Licence".


PROFESSIONAL BANK: Bank of Russia Ends Provisional Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Due to the ruling of the Arbitration court of the city of Moscow,
dated July 27, 2015, on the forced liquidation of the credit
institution JSC Professional Bank and the appointment of a
liquidator in compliance with Clause 3 of Article 18927 of the
Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia took
a decision (Order No. OD-1994, dated August 5,2015) to terminate
from August 6, 2015, the activity of the provisional
administration of Professional Bank appointed by Bank of Russia
Order No. OD-1108, dated May 20, 2015, "On the Appointment of the
Provisional Administration to Manage the Moscow-based Credit
Institution Joint-Stock Company Professional Bank or JSC ProBank
Due to the Revocation of Its Banking Licence".


SIBERIAN OIL: Bank of Russia Halts Provisional Administration
-------------------------------------------------------------
Due to the ruling of the Arbitration court of the Tyumen Region,
dated July 17, 2015, on the forced liquidation of credit
institution OJSC Siberian Oil Bank and the appointment of a
liquidator in compliance with Clause 3 of Article 18927 of the
Federal Law "On Insolvency (Bankruptcy)", the Bank of Russia took
a decision to terminate from August 6, 2015, the activity of the
provisional administration of Siberian Oil Bank appointed by Bank
of Russia Order No. OD-1207 dated June 1, 2015, "On the
Appointment of the Provisional Administration to Manage the
Tyumen-based Credit Institution Open Joint-Stock Company Joint-
Stock Siberian Oil Bank or OJSC SIBNEFTEBANK Due to the
Revocation of Its Banking Licence".


SUN LIFE: Bank of Russia Cancels Pension Provision License
----------------------------------------------------------
The Bank of Russia, by its Order No. OD-1922 dated August 3,
2015, cancelled the licence to carry out pension provision and
pension insurance of JSC Non-Governmental Pension Fund Sun. Life.
Pension.

The reasons to take this decision were as follows:

   -- violation of requirements stipulated by Federal Law No. 75-
FZ, dated 7 May 1998, "On Non-Governmental Pension Funds" with
respect to failure by the Fund to discharge duty to transfer
pension savings to another insurer within the time and in the
manner, specified in Subclause d of Clause 7 of Article 6 of
Federal Law No. 351-FZ, dated December 4, 2013, "On Amending
Certain Laws of the Russian Federation on Compulsory Pension
Insurance Regarding the Right of Choice by Insured Persons of a
Pension Provision Option";

   -- repeated failure to comply with the Bank of Russia's
instructions to remedy the violations, including deposited
pension savings with credit institutions, inconsistent with the
requirements of the legislation.

   -- Due to cancelling of the license, by its Order No. OD-1923,
dated August 3, 2015, the Bank of Russia appointed a provisional
administration to manage the Sun. Life. Pension.

The Bank of Russia shall reimburse the pension savings to the
insured persons in the amount and in the manner stipulated by the
laws of the Russian Federation.



===========
S E R B I A
===========


NISKA PIVARA: Bought by Grupa Kapitalni for BGN130 Million
----------------------------------------------------------
Novinite.com reports that Nis-based Grupa kapitalni proekti has
bought Serbia's bankrupt brewery Niska pivara for BGN130 million
(EUR1.08 million).

According to Novinite.com, Miljan Damnjancevic, the chairman of
the board of creditors of Niska pivara, told Serbian news agency
Beta the owner of Grupa kapitalni proekti is a Bulgarian citizen.
Mr. Damnjancevic didn't disclose the name of the new owner who
had negotiated the deal directly with the bankruptcy manager of
the Nis-based brewery, Novinite.com notes.

Niska pivara has been insolvent since 2013, Novinite.com relays.
The first call for public bidding was held in September last year
at an initial price of BGN396 million, Novinite.com recounts.



=============================
S L O V A K   R E P U B L I C
=============================


BRUSNO SPA: Constitutional Court Overturns Bankruptcy Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
The Slovak Spectator reports that the Slovak Constitutional Court
on July 29 overturned the verdict of the Banska Bystrica District
Court from last October which imposed bankruptcy on Brusno spa,
without allowing the company a chance to appeal.

According to The Slovak Spectator, the TASR newswire reported the
constitutional court opined that the district court thus denied
the company, the administrator and the creditors their right for
a just court proceeding.

Brusno spa spokeswoman Monika Kozelova told TASR the Banska
Bystrica court has received the verdict for re-elaboration and it
also has to cover the legal charges to the spa, The Slovak
Spectator relates.  She told TASR that the spa became indebted
because of its failure to repay a loan to the Slovak Guarantee
and Development Bank at a time when the system of the state
partially re-paying the spa for procedures has changed, changing
also the categories for repayments, The Slovak Spectator relays.

The Banska Bystrica court now has to sit again and bring a new
verdict in the case, The Slovak Spectator states.

Brusno spa is based in the Slovak Republic.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINE: Reschedules Meeting on Debt Deal with Creditors
--------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that acting "in the spirit of good faith
and transparency," the Finance Ministry of Ukraine agreed to
reschedule a meeting with creditors planned for Aug. 6 upon the
request of the ad hoc creditors' committee.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, the ministry said in a statement
on Aug. 5 that a new meeting is scheduled for Aug. 10 or Aug. 11
to give the committee more time to prepare an improved and
revised proposal on debt restructuring.

"However, given the legal and timing constraints of reaching and
implementing any settlement, failure to reach an agreement at the
sovereign level early next week would force Ukraine to implement
alternative options for financing its IMF-supported program,"
Interfax-Ukraine quotes the ministry as saying.  "Due to these
constraints, it is also the last opportunity to reach a full
agreement in advance of the September and October eurobond
amortizations and next IMF review now planned for September."

The ministry says that its goal has always been to reach a
negotiated settlement with its debtholders in line with the
targets of the IMF-supported program, Interfax-Ukraine relates.


UKRAINE: Insolvent Banks Owe Over UAH37BB to NBU as of June 1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Interfax-Ukraine reports that the debt of insolvent banks to the
National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) as of June 1, 2015, totaled
UAH37.068 billion and has grown by UAH27.438 billion since early
2015, the Individuals' Deposit Guarantee Fund said in an
analytical report.

According to the report obtained by Interfax-Ukraine, the growth
of the debt was linked to the introduction of temporary
administration at these banks:

  * Nadra (the debt to the NBU as of June 1 -- UAH12.687
    billion);
  * Delta Bank (UAH9.325 billion);
  * IMEXBANK (UAH3.471 billion);
  * Zlatobank (UAH879 million);
  * bank Kyiv (UAH782 million);
  * Kyivska Rus (UAH456 million);
  * Ukrprofbank (UAH198 million; and
  * Ukrkommunbank (UAH47 million).

A total of 24 insolvent banks with assets of UAH84.53 billion
(taking into account reserves) had debts to the NBU as of early
June, while in early 2015 there were 17 insolvent banks with
debts to the central bank and UAH38.668 billion in assets,
relates Interfax-Ukraine.

According to Interfax-Ukraine, the fund said that in April-May
2015, the debt grew by only UAH155 million, and the share of
credit rates of the total sum was almost one tenth.

Interfax-Ukraine relates that the fund said that the total cost
of collateral of insolvent banks on credits issued by the NBU
reached UAH102.142 billion as of early July, including rights to
credits (UAH75.404 billion), property (UAH13.389 billion,
including own property of banks worth UAH4.619 billion and
property of bailsmen) and securities (UAH6.476 billion).
Interfax-Ukraine adds the fund said that since early 2015 a debt
of UAH279 million was paid, including UAH118 million by Forum
Bank and UAH155 million by Ukrbusinessbank.

The fund said that it is currently removing 53 banks with the
balance cost of assets of UAH316 billion from the market,
Interfax-Ukraine reports.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AFREN PLC: Fitch Lowers Long-Term Issuer Default Rating to 'D'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded UK-based energy group Afren plc's
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'D' (Default) from 'RD'
(Restricted Default), following management's announcement that it
has taken steps to put Afren Plc into administration.  The
company's senior secured rating has been affirmed at 'C', and the
Recovery Rating (RR) revised to 'RR5' from 'RR6'.

The rating actions follow Afren's announcement on July 31, that
its discussions with creditors aimed at recapitalizing the
company have failed and the board has decided to take steps to
put the company into administration.  According to Afren, the
appointment of administrators has been made with the consent of
the company's secured creditors who see this as an important step
in preserving value in Afren's subsidiaries.  No other entity in
the group is going through insolvency proceedings at present.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

'RR5' Recoveries

Fitch has affirmed Afren's senior secured rating and secured
2016, 2019 and 2020 bonds at 'C'.  The RR was revised to 'RR5'
from 'RR6' reflecting 'below average' (rather than 'poor')
recovery prospects.  Fitch's updated recovery analysis shows a
21% recovery rate for senior secured creditors, assuming the
going concern enterprise value of around USD950 million.

Lower Production, Higher Leverage

Afren's credit metrics have significantly weakened since the
beginning of 2014, reflecting lower output in 2014 and 1Q15
compared with 2013 and lower oil prices.  Its funds from
operations (FFO) adjusted gross leverage was 2.7x at end-2014
(2.2x at end-2013), and we believe it will exceed 5x in 2015,
assuming average net production of 20mbpd and Brent price of
USD55/bbl.

Reserve Revision Adds to Pressure

In January 2015, Afren announced it has revised down gross 2P
reserves at the Barda Rash field in the Kurdistan region of Iraq
by 190 million barrels of oil equivalent.  The movement in
reserves and resources is due to the 2014 reprocessing of 3D
seismic shot in 2012 and processed in 2013, as well as results
from the company's drilling campaign.  Although Fitch has not
factored in the potential production in Kurdistan in Fitch's
forecasts, this change removed a potential source of flexibility
for the company or recovery for creditors.

Concentrated Production

Afren's production remained highly concentrated.  In 1Q15, Ebok
accounted for 75% of Afren's total production, and it had no oil
output outside Nigeria.  This concentration exposes Afren to
elevated operational, regulatory and tax risks.

Tax Holiday Expires 2016

Oil companies are generally heavily taxed in Nigeria.  They pay
substantial royalties and are subject to the petroleum profit tax
(PPT), which normally varies from 50% to 85% of pre-tax profits.
Afren's Ebok field is exempt from paying PPT until May 2016,
which has significantly benefited Afren's cash flows.  Unless the
company's tax status is re-negotiated Fitch expects that Afren's
cash tax payments will materially increase in 2017.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Fitch may re-rate Afren should the administration does not result
in Afren's liquidation and Fitch has sufficient information to do
so.  Otherwise Fitch will consider withdrawing the ratings.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

   -- Oil price: USD55/bbl in 2015, USD65 in 2016, USD75 in 2017
      and USD80 thereafter
   -- Net oil production to average 20mbpd in 2015
   -- No dividend payments

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Fitch does not have sufficient information to access Afren's
liquidity position.  According to the company, the lack of
liquidity and a failure of restructuring negations with creditors
have resulted in the decision to file for bankruptcy, Fitch
therefore assumes Afren's liquidity is extremely weak.


ARCHES: Left GBP500K Debts When it Went Into Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------
dailyrecord.co.uk reports that the world-famous Arches nightclub
left a GBP500,000 trail of debt when it went into administration,
a report has revealed.

Bosses closed the Glasgow club in June after the city council cut
licensing hours over concerns about drug abuse and disorder, the
report notes.

The report relates that documents posted on Companies House by
the venue's adminstrators set out the financial aftermath of the
closure.

Two companies run the venue -- Arches Theatre and Arches Retail,
the report says.

The statement showed Arches Theatre have GBP189,665 in assets but
are GBP230,700 in the red, the report notes.

They owe staff GBP55,595 in wages and holiday pay, the report
relays.  Their unpaid bills include more than GBP10,000 to
Network Rail, GBP9756 to Culture and Sport Glasgow and nearly
GBP6500 to EDF Energy, the report notes.

Arches Retail have assets of GBP102,025 but owe GBP 273,098, with
staff due GBP23,078, the report relays.

Those owed money include GBP32,000 to a company called It's All
Food and GBP22,336 to Tennents, the report notes.

The Arches was founded in 1991 and employed 133 full and part-
time staff.  It hit the headlines last February after Regane
MacColl, 17, of Clydebank, died after reportedly taking drugs at
the club, the report says.

In April, the council cut the venue's licensed hours after they
found evidence of 200 drug-related incidents -- forcing them to
close at midnight, the report discloses.

More than 37,000 people signed a petition against the cut in
hours and 400 leading creative figures -- including novelist
Irvine Welsh and members of Franz Ferdinand -- signed an open
letter backing the venue, the report notes.

But Arches chairman Gordon Kennedy said they had no choice but to
close, the report says.


BCA OSPREY: S&P Raises CCR to 'B+', Then Withdraws Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on BCA Osprey IV Ltd., an intermediate holding
company for BCA, Europe's largest used-vehicle remarketing and
buying business, to 'B+' from 'B'.  At the same time, S&P removed
the rating from CreditWatch with positive implications, where it
placed it on May 12, 2015.  S&P subsequently withdrew the long-
term rating at BCA's request.  The outlook was developing at the
time of the withdrawal.

The upgrade follows the finalization of the group's post-IPO
capital structure, which S&P believes has resulted in
significantly reduced debt levels and stronger credit metrics.
Based on the latest publicly available information, the group has
gross reported debt of GBP275 million.  Based on Standard &
Poor's adjusted debt of around GBP490 million, it estimates that
BCA's ratio of adjusted debt to EBITDA is now around 4x-5x and
adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt is around 12%-15%.

S&P capped the upgrade at one notch because it do not know the
full terms of the group's new facilities and have limited insight
into any changes to financial policy or strategy following the
IPO.  To date, S&P do not have information about the latest
trading period.

S&P raised its financial risk profile assessment to "aggressive"
from "highly leveraged" and the anchor to 'b+' from 'b'.  S&P
applied a one-notch downward adjustment to the anchor to account
for S&P's "negative" comparable rating analysis, as it felt that
BCA's financial risk profile was at the weaker end of the
category.

The developing outlook at the time of the withdrawal reflected
the possibility that over the next year, S&P could have lowered
or raised the rating depending on the group's financial policy
and strategy following the IPO.


CPUK FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to Class B2 Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned a final rating of 'B' to CPUK Finance
Ltd.'s issue of class B2 notes and affirmed the existing class
A2, A3 and A4 notes at 'BBB'.  The Outlooks are Stable.

The transaction is a partial refinancing of the CPUK Finance Ltd
whole business securitization (WBS) of five purpose-built holiday
villages in the UK.  The GBP560 million class B2 notes fully
refinance the existing GBP280 million class B notes, and
partially fund the acquisition of Center Parcs by Brookfield.
The issue increases CPUK Finance's outstanding principal by
GBP280 million to GBP1,490 million.

Fitch calculates that financial year ended April 2015 EBITDA pro
forma leverage, adjusted for the B2 issue, is 8.0x versus 6.5x
prior to the partial refinancing, and 7.6x at transaction close
in 2012.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that the
relatively good quality estate and proactive, experienced
management will continue to deliver steady performance over the
medium term.

SUMMARY OF CREDIT

The holiday villages are Sherwood Forest in Nottinghamshire;
Longleat Forest in Wiltshire; Elveden Forest in Suffolk, Whinfell
Forest in Cumbria and Woburn Forest in Bedfordshire.

PARTIAL REFINANCING ANALYSIS

The partially refinanced structure has been compared to the pre-
class B refinancing and original (closed in 2012) transaction
structures primarily through synthetic (due to the lack of
scheduled amortization) debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)
metrics, deleveraging profile and ultimate forecast repayment
date in addition to stress testing via breakeven analysis.

As per our original analysis in 2012, Fitch assumes under its
base case that the class A and B notes are not refinanced at
expected maturity.  Fitch assumes cash sweep amortization after
that. Notably, the class A2, A3 and A4 notes also benefit from a
full cash lock-up one year prior to their expected maturity.
However, this feature falls away from the class A3 and A4 notes
if there is a qualifying IPO and Fitch has therefore only given
credit to the class A2 lock-up in its base case.

The increase in debt results in the synthetic DSCR metrics being
weaker than under the structure pre-refinancing (1.56x vs.
1.77x), however, they are only marginally weaker than under the
original structure.  In terms of deleveraging, the class B notes
also demonstrate a weaker profile than under the pre-refinancing
structure -- being ultimately repaid four years later by 2034.
However, repayment under the Fitch base case is only two years
later than under the original transaction.  As the repayment
dates are far in the future, the difference in years is viewed as
a significant credit negative for the class B notes due to the
greater uncertainty.  At this level, the rating is also
inherently more sensitive and hence more volatile.  Under the
breakeven analysis, the class B2 notes are fully repaid by 2042
with a decline in cumulative Fitch base case free cash flow (FCF)
of 20.2% vs. 31.4% under the pre-refinancing structure and 24%
under the original structure.  Additionally, the limited trading
data (44 weeks) available for Woburn introduces greater
uncertainty to the cash flow projections, and the slightly weaker
structural features (eg, class B restricted payment condition
(RPC) reduced to 1.75x from 1.90x) also weigh down the rating.

FITCH BASE CASE

Woburn Cannibalization Adjustment

To estimate how the opening of the Woburn site might affect the
performance of the other four sites, Fitch extrapolated the
average daily rate (ADR) for the four existing sites based on the
first 44 weeks of Woburn trading data provided by management.
The resulting growth rates for each site were then used to adjust
the Fitch base case ADR projections for the first few years of
the projected period.

Woburn Adjustment

Based on the first 44 weeks of Woburn weekly trading data for
occupancy and ADR, Fitch adjusted the occupancy assumption to 95%
from 96%.  Analysis showed that ADR had started off at a high
level but has subsequently fallen, which coincided with an
increase in occupancy.  However, it is likely that seasonality
has some impact and it is also possible that the absence of the
'Winter Wonderland' attraction at Woburn this year (which will be
present next year) may also have contributed to this.  The
management case set Woburn's ADR at GBP189.8.  After adjusting
for recent trends, Fitch set Woburn's ADR at a lower level, but
at a 10% premium over the average of the other sites (around
GBP170). This premium remains justified by the site's proximity
to London where the median gross annual earnings are 37.4% higher
than the average for the rest of the UK.  Part of this premium in
wages is absorbed by higher living costs but a 10% premium is
expected to be sustainable.

Combined EBITDA Projection

EBITDA (after head office costs) is assumed to grow at a CAGR of
negative 0.1% but the actual EBITDA generated is higher than the
CAGR would suggest (with EBITDA growing until 2028 at a CAGR of
0.6%).  This reflects the nature of the industry risk for Center
Parcs Limited (CPL; the operating and borrower group company),
whereby recent historical performance has been strong, leading to
stronger growth in the early years.  However, beyond 10 years,
revenue visibility reduces, resulting in a subsequent forecast
decline over the longer term.

Combined FCF Projection

FCF is forecast to grow at a long-term CAGR of negative 0.7% but
the actual projected FCF is slightly uneven due to variable tax
expenses.  Growing tax and capex amounts contribute to the lower
projected growth rate of FCF in comparison with revenues and
EBITDA.  As sales growth slows over the life of the transaction,
the positive working capital cash contribution also falls.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Industry Profile: Weaker

Fitch views the operating environment as 'weaker'.  The UK
holiday parks sector has both price and volume risks, which makes
the projection of long-term future cash flows challenging.  It is
highly exposed to discretionary spending, and to some extent
reliant on commodity and food prices.  Event risk and weather
risks are also significant.  The regulatory environment is viewed
as stable with moderate reliance on regulatory barriers.  Fitch
views the operating environment as a key driver of the industry
profile, resulting in its overall 'weaker' assessment.

Fitch considers barriers to entry as 'midrange'.  There is a
scarcity of suitable, large sites near major conurbations, which
is a credit-positive.  Sites also require significant development
time and must adhere to stringent planning permission processes.
The cost of development is also prohibitively high.  However, the
wider industry is competitive and switching costs are viewed as
fairly low.

Fitch views the sustainability of the sector as 'midrange'.  A
high level of capital spending is required to maintain the
quality of the sites.  The offering is also exposed to changing
consumer behavior (e.g. holidaying abroad or in alternative UK
sites). However, technology risk is low and gradual UK population
growth should benefit the industry.

Company Profile: Stronger

Fitch views financial performance as 'stronger'.  CPL has
demonstrated strong revenue growth despite past difficult
economic environments, having generated seven-year revenue and
EBITDA CAGRs to 2015 of 3% and 5.5% (not including Woburn),
respectively. Growth has been driven by villa price increases,
bolstered by committed development funding upgrading villa
amenities and increasing capacity.  An aspect of revenue
stability is the high repeating customer base with around 60% of
guests returning over a five-year period and 35% within 14
months.

The company's operations are viewed as 'stronger'.  CPL is the
UK's leading family-orientated short break holiday village
operator, offering around 850 villas per site set in a forest
environment with significant central leisure facilities.  There
are no direct competitors and the uniqueness of its offer
differentiates the company from more basic camping and caravan
offerings or overseas weekend breaks.  Management has been
stable, with the current CEO having been in place since 2000 and
there are no known corporate governance issues.

CPL benefits from a high level of advance bookings, which helps
operations.  Operating leverage is moderate with fixed costs
estimated at around 50%.  Fitch views CPL as a medium-sized
operator with FY15 EBITDA of GBP180.2 million, but it benefits
from some economies of scale.  The Center Parcs brand is also
fairly strong and the company benefits from other brands operated
on a concession basis at its sites.

Fitch considers transparency as 'stronger'.  As the business is
largely self-operated, insight into underlying profitability is
good.  Despite an increasing portion of food and beverage
revenues that are derived from concession agreements, these are
mainly fully turnover-linked, thereby still giving some
visibility on underlying performance.

Fitch views dependence on operator as 'midrange'.  Only a few
alternative operators are generally thought to be available.

Asset quality is viewed as 'stronger'.  Within the UK holiday
parks sector, Fitch considers the quality of the assets as
stronger.  CPL is heavily reliant on fairly high capex to keep
its offer current.  Fitch views it as a well-invested business
with around GBP380 million of capex since 2007 (around GBP225
million of investment/refurbishment capex).  As of end-4QFY15
refurbishments are on track with 84% of accommodation units
having been upgraded since 2008.  The upgrade of a further 106
lodges at Sherwood and Whinfell is expected to be completed in
August 2015.

Debt Structure: Class A - Stronger, Class B - Weaker

Fitch considers the debt profile as 'stronger' for the class A
notes and 'weaker' for the class B notes.  All principal is fully
amortizing via cash sweep and the amortization profile under
Fitch's base case is commensurate with the industry and company
profile.  There is an interest-only period in relation to the
class A notes, but no concurrent amortization.  The class A notes
also benefit from the deferability of the junior-ranking class B.
Additionally, the notes are all fixed-rate, avoiding any
floating-rate exposure and swap liabilities.

The class B notes are sensitive to small changes in operating
stress assumptions and particularly vulnerable towards the tail
end of the transaction, as large amounts of accrued interest may
have to be repaid, assuming the class B notes are not repaid at
their expected maturity.  This sensitivity stems from the
interruption in cash interest payments upon a breach of the class
A notes' RPC covenant (at 1.35x FCF DSCR) or failure to refinance
any of the class A notes one year past expected maturity (all for
the benefit of the class A notes).

Fitch views the security package as 'stronger' for the class A
notes and 'weaker' for the class B notes.  The transaction
benefits from a comprehensive WBS security package, including
full senior-ranking asset and share security available for the
benefit of the noteholders.  Security is granted by way of fully
fixed and (qualifying) floating security under an issuer-borrower
loan structure.

The class B noteholders benefit from a topco share pledge
(structurally subordinate to the borrower group), and as such
would be able to sell the shares upon a class B event of default
(e.g. failure to refinance in 2020).  However, as long as the
class A notes are outstanding, only the class A noteholders are
entitled to direct the relevant trustee with regard to the
enforcement of any borrower security (e.g. if the class A notes
cannot be refinanced one year after their expected maturity).

The structural features are viewed as 'stronger' for the class A
notes and 'weaker' for the class B notes.  Fitch views the
covenant package as slightly weaker than other typical WBS deals.
The financial covenants are only based on interest cover ratios
(ICR) as there is no scheduled amortization of the notes as
typically seen in WBS transactions.  The lack of DSCR-based
financial RPC and covenants is compensated to a large extent by
the full cash sweep features triggered until the final redemption
of the class A notes if they do not get refinanced at their
expected maturity.

In addition, the class A2, A3 and A4 notes benefit from full cash
lock-up one year prior to their expected maturity (however, this
falls away for the class A3 and A4 notes if there is a qualifying
IPO).  However, the class B notes also benefit from a
performance-dependent RPC.  As expected, as of end-April 2015,
the class B notes' cumulative ICR at 1.86x was still below its
RPC at 1.9x, so no dividends were being paid (except management
fees) and cash was being locked up.  Notably, following the class
B refinancing, this covenant has been reduced to 1.75x, but this
reduction is mitigated to some extent by the addition of a 7.5x
gross WBS leverage partial lockup covenant.  At GBP80 million,
the liquidity facility is appropriately sized covering 18 months
of the class A notes' peak debt service.  The class B notes do
not benefit from any liquidity enhancement.

On a standalone basis, the structural features directly
associated with the class B notes are fairly weak, being more
akin to high-yield notes.  However, they benefit indirectly from
certain class A features such as the operational covenants, but
only while the class A notes are outstanding.

Peer Group

The most suitable WBS comparisons are (i) pubs, and (ii)
Roadchef, a WBS transaction of motorway service stations.  CPL
has proven to be less cyclical than Roadchef and the leased pubs
with strong performance during major economic downturns (helped
by a lower retail revenue contribution of around 10%).  However,
with just five sites (within the securitized group) CPL is
considered less granular than WBS pub transactions.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Class A notes

Negative: Deterioration in performance could result in negative
rating action, particularly if Fitch-estimated synthetic FCF DSCR
metrics fall below around 2.0x, in combination with deterioration
in the expected leverage profile.

Positive: Any significant improvement in performance above
Fitch's base case, with a resulting improvement in the Fitch-
estimated synthetic FCF DSCR to above 2.6x, in addition to
further deleveraging could result in positive rating action.  The
class A notes are unlikely to be rated above 'BBB+'.  This is
mainly due to the sector's substantial exposure to consumer
discretionary spending and uncertainty as to whether the CPL
concept will remain in favor over the long term.

Class B notes

Negative: Under Fitch's base case, the class B notes are expected
to be repaid by around 2034, with a median synthetic FCF DSCR of
around 1.6x.  Any significant deterioration in these metrics
could result in negative rating action.

Given the sensitivity of the class B notes to variations in
performance due to its deferability, they are unlikely to be
upgraded above the 'B' category in the foreseeable future.


DSC LIMITED: Goes Into Liquidation
----------------------------------
Saffron Walden Reporter says that DSC Limited, trading as
International Villas, based in Jubilee House, Hill Street, was an
internet-based firm specialized in renting out luxury villas in
Ibiza and other Spanish islands, including Majorca.  It closed on
July 30.

The company was not registered with ABTA, the Association of
British Tour Agents, according to Saffron Walden Reporter.

It is understood to have had some 50 properties on its books.

There are reports that at least three British families have
turned up at their holiday home expecting their dream holiday to
find they couldn't get in, Saffron Walden Reporter relates.

The report notes that a message on International Villa's Web site
originally read: "It is with great sadness due to unforeseen
circumstances, that the company has now ceased to trade and the
directors have instructed Sharma & Co to assist with a view to
placing the company into creditors' voluntary liquidation."

However, the message has now been updated and reads:
"International Villas has ceased trading from Thursday, July 30."

While the liquidators are making the necessary arrangements, to
wind down the company, concerns are emerging that British
holidaymakers are being affected by the problems, the report
discloses.

Letting agencies in Ibiza have reported calls from anxious
families trying to find other accommodation at the height of the
season, the report notes.

The report notes that Ms. Sharma confirmed at the end of the day
yesterday (Wednesday) that the business was going into
liquidation after a rescue deal could not be found.

Ms. Sharma said she understood that property owners had not been
paid the rents for the villas and were therefore refusing to let
the holiday-makers move in, the report relays.  They were
arriving to find they had nowhere to stay.

International Villas rented out luxury exclusive properties, with
multiple bedrooms and their own salt-water swimming pools in
secluded locations, the report discloses.  Some rents thought to
be as high as GBP50,000 a week.

A creditors meeting has been scheduled for Tuesday, August 25,
the report adds.


GENZ HOLDINGS: Placed Into Provisional Liquidation
--------------------------------------------------
A group of three London companies, Genz Holdings Ltd, Gafo Me UK
Ltd and Greens LD Ltd, reportedly having assets of GBP445 million
worldwide have been ordered into provisional liquidation
following petitions presented by the Secretary of State for
Business, Innovation & Skills to wind up the companies in the
public interest.

The petitions were issued following confidential inquiries
carried out by Company Investigations, part of the Insolvency
Service.

The Official Receiver has been appointed by the Court as
provisional liquidator of the companies on the application of the
Secretary of State. The role of the Official Receiver is to
protect the assets and financial records of the companies pending
determination of the petitions.

The provisional liquidator also has the power to investigate the
affairs of the companies insofar as it is necessary to protect
their assets including any third party or trust monies or assets
in the possession of or under the control of the companies.

Chris Mayhew, Company Investigations Supervisor, said: "As the
matter is before the Court no further information will be made
available about the case until the petitions -- listed for
hearing on Sept. 17, 2015 -- are determined."

The petitions to wind up the companies were presented in the High
Court on July 22, 2015, under the provisions of section 124A of
the Insolvency Act 1986 following confidential enquiries carried
out by Company Investigations under section 447 of the Companies
Act 1985, as amended.

On July 30, 2015, on the application of the Secretary of State,
with notice to the companies, Mr R Englehart QC sitting as a
Deputy Judge, appointed the Official Receiver as provisional
liquidator of the companies.

Genz Holdings Ltd was incorporated on Oct. 28, 2010. The company
operated a website www.genzholdings.co.uk

Gafo ME UK Ltd was incorporated on Dec. 3, 2010, in the name Gafo
Energy UK Limited. The name of the company was subsequently
changed on Aug. 22, 2011, July 16, 2012 and June 24, 2013,
respectively to Gafo Telecom UK Limited, Gafo Energy NZ &
Aviation Ltd and to its present style.

The company operated a website www.gafo.me.uk with links to:

Gafo Air www.gafoair.com
Gafo Aviation www.gafoaviation.com
Gafo Beity www.gafobeity.com
Gafo Construct www.gafoconstruct.com
Gafo Energy www.gafoen.com
Gafo Foods www.gafofoods.eu
Gafo Pro www.gafopro.com
Gafo Telecom www.green-telephone.com

Greens LD Ltd was incorporated on Oct. 7, 2011, in the name Green
Tel Limited. The name of the company was changed to its present
form on April 9, 2014. The company operated a website
www.gtctelecom.net that describes the company as 'GTC Telecom.'


GILBERT WEBB: Court Orders Firms Into Liquidation After Scheme
--------------------------------------------------------------
builderandengineer.co.uk reports that two Liverpool companies
found to be the 'bookends' of the transactions to sell plots of
undeveloped land to investors, one company being the land owner
and the other being the 'develop', have been ordered into
liquidation in the High Court on grounds of public interest
following an investigation by the Insolvency Service.

The court heard how the land owner JDG Properties Limited
benefited by 100% from each plot of land mis-sold by a marketing
company called Gilbert Webb Estates Ltd and how Tithebarn Trading
Ltd encouraged those sales by appearing to be a developer of the
site, according to builderandengineer.co.uk.

The report notes that JDG Properties Limited traded under the
umbrella of 'Liverpool Investment Solutions' and had bought land
in Cheshunt Hertfordshire connected with a Carl Ballard in April
2011 for GBP130,000.  It retained a quarter of the site and
divided the rest into 390 plots for sale to the public.

The plots were marketed and sold to the public by Gilbert Webb
Estates Ltd and was ordered into liquidation on grounds of public
interest on December 18, 2014, the report discloses.

The 'development compan' Tithebarn Trading Ltd entered into 5
year option agreements for 50p with some investors to buy back
their plots of land at a price of GBP52.43 per square foot
equating to a supposed overall site value of over GBP20 million,
the report relays.

The companies' director Elster admitted in court that planning
permission for the site was unlikely and that obtaining it would
be like him 'winning the lottery,' the report says.

The report notes that welcoming the court's winding up decisions
Chris Mayhew, company investigations supervisor, said: "Whil[le]
neither of Elster's companies was directly involved in the sale
of plots of land to members of the public, they were symbiotic to
the land banking scheme and fortified the mis-selling of plots of
land by Gilbert Webb Estates Ltd enabling all involved in the
scheme to profit apart from investors.

"The scheme made no commercial sense and was once more calculated
to part honest people from their money.  The Insolvency Service
will not allow companies to operate in this way and will
investigate abuses and close down companies if they are found to
be operating against the public interest," the report quoted Mr.
Mayhew as saying.


JDG PROPERTIES: High Court Orders Two Companies Into Liquidation
----------------------------------------------------------------
Two Liverpool companies found to be the 'bookends' of the
transactions to sell plots of undeveloped land to investors, one
company being the land owner and the other being the 'developer',
have been ordered into liquidation in the High Court on grounds
of public interest following an investigation by the Insolvency
Service.

The court heard how the land owner JDG Properties Limited
benefited by 100% from each plot of land mis-sold by a marketing
company called Gilbert Webb Estates Ltd and how Tithebarn Trading
Ltd encouraged those sales by appearing to be a developer of the
site.

JDG Properties Limited traded under the umbrella of 'Liverpool
Investment Solutions' and had bought land in Cheshunt
Hertfordshire connected with a Mr Carl Ballard in April 2011 for
GBP130,000. It retained a quarter of the site and divided the
rest into 390 plots for sale to the public.

The plots were marketed and sold to the public by Gilbert Webb
Estates Ltd and was ordered into liquidation on grounds of public
interest on Dec. 18, 2014.

The 'development company' Tithebarn Trading Ltd entered into 5
year option agreements for 50p with some investors to buy back
their plots of land at a price of GBP52.43 per square foot
equating to a supposed overall site value of over GBP20 million.

The companies' director Mr Elster admitted in court that planning
permission for the site was unlikely and that obtaining it would
be like him 'winning the lottery'.

Welcoming the court's winding up decisions Chris Mayhew, Company
Investigations Supervisor, said:

"While neither of Mr Elster's companies was directly involved in
the sale of plots of land to members of the public, they were
symbiotic to the land banking scheme and fortified the mis-
selling of plots of land by Gilbert Webb Estates Ltd enabling all
involved in the scheme to profit apart from investors.

"The scheme made no commercial sense and was once more calculated
to part honest people from their money.

"The Insolvency Service will not allow companies to operate in
this way and will investigate abuses and close down companies if
they are found to be operating against the public interest."

The petitions to wind up each company were presented in the High
Court on July 30, 2014, (together with the related matter of
Gilbert Webb Estates Ltd) under the provisions of section 124A of
the Insolvency Act 1986 following confidential enquiries carried
out by Company Investigations under section 447 of the Companies
Act 1985, as amended. Gilbert Webb Estates Ltd was ordered into
liquidation in the High Court on Dec. 18, 2014.

The grounds to wind up JDG Properties Limited and Tithebarn
Trading Ltd were their lack of commercial probity by making
misleading and unfounded statements and their involvement in
trading contrary to the public interest.


LB UK FINANCING: August 28 Proofs of Debt Deadline Set
------------------------------------------------------
Pursuant to Rule 2.95 of the Insolvency Rules 1986, D.A. Howell,
A.V. Lomas, S.A. Pearson, G. Bruce and J.G. Parr, the Joint
Administrators of LB UK Financing Limited, intend to make a
distribution (by way of paying a final dividend) to the
preferential creditors (if any) and to the unsecured, non-
preferential creditors of LBUKF.

Proofs of debt may be lodged at any point up to (and including)
August 28, 2015, the last date for proving claims, however,
creditors are requested to lodge their proofs of debt at the
earliest possible opportunity.

Persons so proving are required, if so requested, to provide such
further details or produce such documents or other evidence as
may appear to the Joint Administrators to be necessary.

The Joint Administrators will not be obliged to deal with proofs
lodged after the last date for proving but they may do so if they
think fit.

The Joint Administrators intend to make such distribution within
the period of two months from the last date for proving claims.

For further information, contact details, and proof of debt
forms, please visit http://is.gd/tx6oyh

Please complete and return a proof of debt form, together with
relevant supporting documents to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 7
More London Riverside, London SE1 2RT marked for the attention
of Claire Taylor.  Alternatively, you can email a completed proof
of debt form to lehman.affiliates@uk.pwc.com

Rule 2.95(2)(c) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 requires the Joint
Administrators to state in this notice the value of the
prescribed
part of LBUKF's net property which is required to be made
available for the satisfaction of LBUKF's unsecured debts
pursuant to section 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986.  There are
no floating charges over the assets of LBUKF and accordingly,
there shall be no prescribed part.  All of LBUKF's net property
will be available for the satisfaction of LBUKF's unsecured
debts.

                       About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com-- was the
fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For more
than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the global
financial markets by serving the financial needs of corporations,
governmental units, institutional clients and individuals
worldwide.

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Sept. 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy
petition
disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in debts,
effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the largest in
U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed thereafter.

Affiliates Merit LLC, LB Somerset LLC and LB Preferred Somerset
LLC sought for bankruptcy protection in December 2009.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Evan Fleck, Esq., and Dennis O'Donnell,
Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in New York, serve
as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc., is the Committee's
investment banker.

On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered an
order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens was appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.

The Bankruptcy Court approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase of
Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capital
markets operations and supporting infrastructure for US$1.75
billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage house in
Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2 plus the
retention of most of employees.  Nomura also bought Lehman's
operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

Lehman emerged from bankruptcy protection on March 6, 2012, more
than three years after it filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S.
history.  The Chapter 11 plan for the Lehman companies other than
the broker was confirmed in December 2011.

As of Oct. 2, 2014, Lehman's total distributions to unsecured
creditors have amounted to $92.0 billion.  As of Sept. 30, 2014,
the brokerage trustee has substantially completed customer claims
distributions, distributing more than $106 billion to 111,000
customers.


ROTHES FC: Could Face Liquidation by End of This Week
-----------------------------------------------------
Ben Hendry and Dave Edwards at The Press and Journal reports that
Rothes Football Club could face liquidation by the end of the
week following an emergency meeting.

The clock is ticking on a Moray Highland League football club's
survival fight after an emergency meeting last night failed to
find a way out of its financial crisis, according to The Press
and Journal.

The report notes that Rothes FC has until the end of this week to
pay GBP20,000 towards an unpaid tax bill -- or face liquidation.

And last night, it emerged that the beleaguered Speysiders owe HM
Revenue Customs GBP33,000 -- after failing to pay any tax since
July 2009.

Club representatives will appear at Elgin Sheriff Court to try to
argue down the size of the bill, the report notes.

However, there are fears Rothes may not survive into next week,
the report relays.

Hundreds of supporters flocked to the summit at the Mackessack
Park social club, where the club's dire straits were laid bare,
the report relays.

It follows the revelation earlier this month that it had been
served with a winding-up order after years of financial
mismanagement, the report notes.

Chairman Robbie Thomson, who had previously vowed to fight to
ensure Rothes FC's future, announced his resignation, the report
says.

However, his wife Anne said she would continue in her role as
club treasurer -- at least until the Speysiders' next annual
meeting, the report discloses.

The report notes that Mrs. Thomson said: "I was unable to attend
last night's meeting due to work commitments, but I can confirm
that my husband has decided to step down as chairman.  I don't
know if the decision will be taken out of my hands, but I intend
to stay on in my role as club treasurer."

It is understood that the base sum owed by the club to Her
Majesty's Revenue and Customs is GBP20,000, while the additional
GBP13,000 comprises fines and penalties, the report notes.

Local millionaire businessman Richard Forsyth, who owns the
Fortsyths fabrication group, was among those at last night's
meeting, the report relays.

Supporters said he pledged assist the crisis-stricken club, but
expressed some reservations over the financial "black hole" it
was facing, the report adds.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: Bankruptcy and Consumer
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Authors: Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren,
& Jay Westbrook

Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 370 Pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by: Susan Pannell
Order your personal copy today at
http://www.beardbooks.com/beardbooks/as_we_forgive_our_debtors.ht
ml

So you think you know the profile of the average consumer
debtor: either deadbeat slouched on a sagging sofa with a
threeday growth on his chin or a crafty lower-middle class type
opting for bankruptcy to avoid both poverty and responsible debt
repayment.

Except that it might be a single or divorced female who's the
one most likely to file for personal bankruptcy protection, and
her petition might be the last stage of a continuum of crises
that began with her job loss or divorce. Moreover, the dilemma
might be attributable in part to consumer credit industry that
has increased its profitability by relaxing its standards and
extending credit to almost anyone who can scribble his or her
name on an application.

Such are among the unexpected findings in this painstaking study
of 2,400 bankruptcy filings in Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Texas
during the seven-year period from 1981 to 1987. Rather than
relying on case counts or gross data collected for a court's
administrative records, as has been done elsewhere, the authors
use data contained in the actual petitions. In so doing, they
offer a unique window into debtors' lives.

The authors conclude that people who file for bankruptcy are, as
a rule, neither impoverished families nor wily manipulators of
the system. Instead, debtors are a cross-section of America. If
one demographic segment can be isolated as particularly
debtprone, it would be women householders, whom the authors found
often live on the edge of financial disaster. Very few debtors
99 (3.7 percent in the study) were repeat filers who might be
viewed as abusing the system, and most (70 percent in the study)
of Chapter 13 cases fail and become Chapter 7s. Accordingly, the
authors conclude that the economic model of behavior -- which
assumes a petitioner is a "calculating maximizer" in his in his
decision to seek bankruptcy protection and his selection of
chapter to file under, a profile routinely used to justify
changes in the law -- is at variance with the actual debtor
profile derived from this study.

A few stereotypes about debtors are, however, borne out. It is
less than surprising to learn, for example, that most debtors
are simply not as well-off as the average American or that while
bankrupt's mortgage debts are about average, their consumer
debts are off the charts. Petitioners seem particularly
susceptible to the siren song of credit card companies. In the
study sample, creditors were found to have made between 27
percent and 36 percent of their loans to debtors with incomes
below $12,500 (although the loans might have been made before
the debtors' income dropped so low). Of course, the vigor with
which consumer credit lenders pursue their goal of maximizing
profits has a corresponding impact on the number of bankruptcy
filings.

The book won the ABA's 1990 Silver Gavel Award. A special 1999
update by the authors is included exclusively in the Beard Book
reprint edition.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *