/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/150319.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, March 19, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 55

                            Headlines


D E N M A R K

TDC A/S: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to EUR750MM Hybrids


G E R M A N Y

BACCHUS 2007-1: Moody's Lifts Rating on EUR25MM D Notes to 'B3'


H U N G A R Y

BUDA-CASH: Central Bank Revokes License, Initiates Liquidation


I T A L Y

GAMING INVEST: Moody's Alters Outlook on 'B2' CFR to Negative


L U X E M B O U R G

ENDO LUXEMBOURG: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' CFR; Outlook Stable


R U S S I A

CHELYABINSK OBLAST: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB+' ICR
SME BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Rating; Outlook Negative


S P A I N

AYT 11: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B'
BANCO DE MADRID: Spanish Court to Suspend Insolvency Proceedings
CAJA ESPANA I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B-'
GC SABADELL 1: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'BB+'
OBRASCON HUARTE: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to New Senior Notes


S W E D E N

DANNEMORA MINERAL: Files for Bankruptcy in Uppsala Court


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: Biggest Creditor Hires Adviser for Debt Restructuring


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AUBURN SECURITIES 4: Fitch Affirms 'BB+sf' Rating on Cl. E Notes
BLIPFOTO: Sale Expected to Complete By End of Week
GB GROUP: Victims Demand Probe Into Company Structure
KIBO MINING: Has Funds Despite Delay in Receiving Proceeds
MUIRFIELD CONTRACTS: Staff Let Go as Firm Winds Down

PTT DESIGN: Buyers Showing Interest to Acquire Firm
PTT DESIGN: Administrators Put Business Up for Sale
T BADEN: Flogas Britain Swoops for Hardstaff Business
VEDANTA RESOURCES: Cairn India's US$3.2BB Liability is Credit Neg


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Reviews Global Bank Ratings
* Moody's Says Ratings Will Reflect Declining Gov't. Support
* Moody's Reviews for Upgrade 69 European Covered Bond Ratings


                            *********



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D E N M A R K
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TDC A/S: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to EUR750MM Hybrids
-------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Denmark-based telecoms group TDC A/S's
(TDC) Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB' and assigned
a final rating of 'BB+' to its EUR750 million callable
subordinated capital securities (hybrids).  The Outlook on the
IDR is Negative.

TDC's rating is underpinned by the group's strong operating
profile, which is based primarily on its operations in Denmark.
The Negative Outlook reflects a potentially slower pace of
deleveraging than originally anticipated following the company's
acquisition of Norwegian cable operator GET in 4Q14, which
removed any headroom in the rating.  Stronger than anticipated
competitive and regulatory pressures impacting the domestic
business over the next two to three years are likely to weigh on
EBITDA and the rate at which TDC can reduce leverage.  Fitch now
expects funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage to fall
below 3.75x (a key leverage threshold for the 'BBB' rating) a
year later in 2017.

The final rating for the hybrids follows the successful
completion of the transaction and receipt of final documentation.
The rating is two notches lower than TDC's IDR and carries 50%
equity credit, in line with Fitch's rating methodology for hybrid
securities.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Strong Domestic Position

TDC owns both the Danish incumbent copper network and the
majority of the cable infrastructure in the country.  This gives
the company a strong fixed line position compared with all other
European incumbents and helps the company to generate best-in-
class domestic EBITDA margins of 46% in 2014 including
headquarter costs.  This is reflected in Fitch-calculated FFO-
adjusted net leverage downgrade guidance of 3.75x, which is at
the higher end of the rating category.

Increasing Competition and Regulation

Competition and regulation are expected to have a significant
negative impact on TDC's domestic business over the next three
years.  The main points of pressure are likely to be driven by a
loss of mobile virtual network operator (MVNO) contacts,
continued losses in fixed line telephony and competitive pressure
in the B2B segment.  Regulatory pressure on broadband wholesale
prices and retail roaming is expected to amount to a gross profit
loss of DKK100m-DKK150m by 2015 or approximately 0.5% of 2014
group revenues.  Cable TV regulation could add to this from 2016.

GET Acquisition

In September 2014, TDC announced the acquisition of the Norwegian
cable operator GET for EUR1.69bn.  The acquisition was funded
through a combination of debt, hybrids and a reduction in
dividend payments.  The transaction aims to improve TDC's growth
profile, increase diversification and gain greater exposure to
cable.  TDC also aims to generate revenue and cost synergies of
EUR22 million per annum by 2017.

Managing a Leverage Spike

The partially debt-funded nature of the GET transaction removed
any headroom TDC had within its 'BBB' rating.  The acquisition
increased leverage; lifting the group's FFO adjusted net debt to
4.7x in YE2014 (assuming the consolidation of GET from Nov 2014)
from 3.4x in September 2014.  Fitch expects TDC's leverage will
decline to 3.7x by 2017 and further thereafter.  Fitch expects
deleveraging to be achieved with a combination of operating cash
flow, reduced dividends and recently issued hybrids.  Given the
limited headroom within TDC's ratings, the execution of both the
company's operational and financial strategy is key to meeting
its deleveraging trajectory.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS

Fitch's key assumptions within our ratings case include:

   -- An improvement in the rate of revenue decline within TDC
      Denmark from 4% YoY in 2014 to 1% by 2016.

   -- A contraction of approximately 1.5 percentage points in
      EBITDA margin in 2015 reflecting the loss of MVNO
      contracts, regulatory and competitive pressure in Denmark.

   -- Capex of DKK4.3 billion in 2015 excluding spectrum costs
      and gradually reducing capital intensity from 18% to 17%
      over three years.

   -- FFO adjusted net leverage declining from 4.1x in 2015 to
      3.7x in 2017.

   -- A reduction in dividends in line with the company's new
      dividend policy of approximately 60% of equity free cash
      flow.

   -- Fitch does not assume any improvement in operating
      performance as a result of potential market consolidation.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

   -- Failure to meet Fitch's expectations that FFO adjusted net
      leverage is on course to reduce to below 3.75x by 2017
      could lead to a downgrade.

   -- A marked deterioration in TDC's operating environment
      and/or unfavorable regulatory decisions.

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
action include:

   -- FFO-adjusted net leverage sustainably below 3.0x, together
      with evidence of improved operational and financial
      performance could lead to an upgrade to 'BBB+'.

   -- The Outlook could be revised to Stable upon expectations
      that FFO-adjusted net leverage will fall to below 3.75x on
      a sustainable basis combined with stabilizing EBITDA trends
      and no further deterioration in competitive and regulatory
      environments.

The rating actions are:

  Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB'; Negative Outlook

  Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'BBB'

  Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F3'

  Subordinated hybrid securities: assigned final rating of 'BB+'



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G E R M A N Y
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BACCHUS 2007-1: Moody's Lifts Rating on EUR25MM D Notes to 'B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings on the following
notes issued by Bacchus 2007-1 PLC:

  -- EUR35.4 million Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
     due 2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2014
     Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

  -- EUR25.5 million Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on
     Oct 19, 2014 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  -- EUR25 million Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating
     Rate Notes due 2023, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     Oct 19, 2014 Affirmed Caa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings on the following notes issued
by Bacchus 2007-1 PLC:

  -- EUR218.2 million (currently EUR34.5M outstanding) Class A
     Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aaa
     (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

  -- EUR12.2 million (currently EUR13.9M outstanding) Class E
     Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
     Affirmed Ca (sf); previously on Oct 19, 2014 Affirmed Ca
     (sf)

  -- EUR9.094 million (currently EUR 7M outstanding) Class Z
     Combination Notes due 2023, Affirmed Aa1 (sf); previously on
     Oct 19, 2014 Affirmed Aa1 (sf)

  -- EUR88 million (currently EUR12.6M outstanding) Revolving
     Credit Facility due 2023 Notes, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
     previously on Oct 19, 2014 Affirmed Aaa (sf)

Bacchus 2007-1 PLC, issued in April 2007, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield
senior secured European loans.  The portfolio is managed by IKB
Deutsche Industriebank AG. The transaction's reinvestment period
ended in April 2013.

The rating upgrades of the notes are primarily a result of
continued deleveraging of the senior notes and subsequent
increase of the overcollateralization ratios (the "OC ratios") of
the senior Classes.  Moody's notes that as of the January 2015
trustee report, the Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) and Class A
notes have amortised by approximately EUR 259.1 million (or 84.2%
of their original balances).  As a result of the deleveraging,
the OC ratios of the senior notes have increased significantly.
According to the latest trustee report dated January 2015, the
Classes A/B and C OC ratios are 174.18% and 133.07% respectively
compared to levels just prior to the payment date in October 2014
of 142.85% and 121.33%.  Moody's expects the OC ratios to improve
further following the April 2015 payment date where at least
EUR20 million in principal proceeds will be used to redeem the
RCF and Class A notes.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers.  In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR106 million,
a weighted average default probability of 26.62% (consistent with
a WARF of 4206), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
48.86% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 16
and a weighted average spread of 3.88%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool.  The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool.  For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 96.73% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan corporate
assets upon default. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors That Would Lead to an Upgrade or Downgrade of the Rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it lowered the weighted average spread by 30 basis
points; the model generated outputs that were within one notch of
the base-case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by (1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and (2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

- Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
   portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
   conditions and have a significant impact on the notes'
   ratings. Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of
   high loan prepayment levels or collateral sales by the
   collateral manager or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-
   and-extend restructurings. Fast amortization would usually
   benefit the ratings of the notes beginning with the notes
   having the highest prepayment priority.

- Around 55.57% of the collateral pool consists of debt
   obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
   credit estimates. As part of its base case, Moody's has
   stressed large concentrations of single obligors bearing a
   credit estimate as described in "Updated Approach to the Usage
   of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions," published in
   October 2009.

- Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes
   have defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
   collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
   and the manager's decision whether to work out or sell
   defaulted assets can also result in additional uncertainty.
   Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of
   the market price or the recovery rate to account for potential
   volatility in market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's
   expectations would have a positive impact on the notes'
   ratings.

- Foreign currency exposure: The deal has exposure to non-EUR
   denominated assets. Volatility in foreign exchange rates will
   have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds
   available to the transaction, which can affect the expected
   loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



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H U N G A R Y
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BUDA-CASH: Central Bank Revokes License, Initiates Liquidation
--------------------------------------------------------------
MTI reports that the National Bank of Hungary on March 4 revoked
the license of brokerage Buda-Cash and initiated its liquidation.

According to MTI, shortfalls revealed by the central bank and
data compiled by an oversight commissioner show the brokerage
cannot settle a large amount with its clients.  The clients will
be compensated from the Investor Protection Fund (Beva), MTI
discloses.

The NBH suspended the activities of Buda-Cash and initiated a
criminal procedure, MTI relates.  It also revoked the licenses of
DRB Bank group members, which have close ties to Buda-Cash, MTI
relays.

The scandal is thought to involve some HUF100 billion, MTI notes.



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I T A L Y
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GAMING INVEST: Moody's Alters Outlook on 'B2' CFR to Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the B2 corporate family rating
and B2-PD probability of default rating of Gaming Invest S.ar.l.
(Sisal).  Moody's has also affirmed the B1 rating on the EUR275
million senior secured notes due September 2017, issued by Sisal
Group S.p.A.  The outlook on all ratings has changed to negative
from stable.

The change in outlook largely reflects Moody's expectation that
recent developments in the fiscal regime for gaming machines in
Italy will have a negative effect on Sisal's earnings and
profitability, resulting in deteriorating credit metrics and
weakly positioning the company in its rating category.  The
action also considers the uncertainty associated with the
regulatory environment in light of the upcoming reform of the
Italian gaming sector.

On December 29, 2014, the Italian government introduced a new tax
on gaming machines as part of the 2015 budget law aimed to raise
EUR500 million. Sisal's share of the tax is approximately EUR46
million and must be paid in two installments: EUR18 million by
April 30, 2015 and EUR28 million by 31 October 2015. Whilst Sisal
is more diversified in terms of revenue streams and larger in
size compared with other rated Italian peers, it is also more
vertically integrated as it directly manages half of its retail
network and owns a substantial part of its machine estate.
Therefore, the company will have to pay a significant portion of
tax because of fewer parties in the value chain. In addition to
the risk associated with a delayed or reduced tax collection,
this cost will lead to a reduction in EBITDA, which Moody's
estimates in the region of 10%, as well as in its profitability.
As a result, Moody's expects that adjusted leverage will rise
slightly above 6.5x by the end of 2015.  Whilst Sisal will
actively seek to offset the effect of the tax with cost savings
initiatives in procurement and personnel headcount, this entails
some time and a certain degree of execution risk.

Despite a declining EBITDA, intra-quarter working capital swings
exacerbated by the tax collection process and no external sources
of liquidity, Sisal's liquidity remains adequate for its near-
term requirements, including the annual debt amortization of
EUR12.6 million, as it is underpinned by EUR120 million
unrestricted cash balances at the end of December 2014, and
positive free cash flow generation aided by normalized capital
expenditures.

Moody's also acknowledges that the company operates in a volatile
regulatory environment and that the pending reform of the entire
Italian gaming sector has created further uncertainty. While the
effect on Sisal of such reform is not yet clear, the continuing
uncertainty is credit negative for the whole industry.

The negative rating outlook reflects Sisal's weak positioning in
its rating category following the introduction of the new tax on
gaming machines and pending further regulatory actions in the
Italian gaming sector.

In light of the recent fiscal developments, upward pressure on
the rating is unlikely in the medium term. However upward
pressure on the rating could develop if Sisal's operating
performance substantially improves and the impact of the new tax
is visibly offset by a timely collection and adequate cost
savings, resulting in a Moody's-adjusted leverage metric falling
sustainably below 5x, whilst maintaining positive free cash flow,
adequate liquidity and a sustained Moody's-adjusted EBIT margin
of around 13%.

Conversely, negative pressure would be exerted on the ratings if
Sisal is unable to limit the impact of the new fiscal regime,
further deteriorating its credit metrics. A downgrade could be
also occur as a result of (1) a weakening of its operational
performance; (2) acquisitions; (3) an aggressive change in its
financial policy; or (4) further adverse regulatory action.
Quantitatively, Moody's would consider a downgrade of Sisal's
ratings if (1) the company's Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio
rises above 6.5x; or (2) its Moody's-adjusted EBIT margin falls
below 6% on a sustained basis.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Gaming
Industry published in June 2014. Other methodologies used include
Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies
in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Gaming Invest S.ar.l. (Gaming
Invest) is the parent holding company of Sisal Group S.p.A.
(Sisal), which is headquartered in Milan, Italy. Operating with
legal concessions from Italy's national gaming regulator and
under license from the Bank of Italy, Sisal is one of the largest
Italian gaming and convenience payment service providers. For the
last twelve months ending September 2014, Sisal reported revenues
of EUR810 million and EBITDA of EUR177 million. All of the
company's earnings were generated in Italy.

Since 2006, Sisal has been owned by funds managed or advised by
private equity firms Apax Partners, Permira, and Clessidra
Capital Partners.



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L U X E M B O U R G
===================


ENDO LUXEMBOURG: Moody's Affirms 'Ba3' CFR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed ratings of Endo Luxembourg
Finance I Company S.a.r.l. and subsidiaries, including the Ba3
Corporate Family Rating, the Ba3-PD Probability of Default
Rating, the Baa3 senior secured rating, the B1 senior unsecured
rating, and affirmed the SGL-2 speculative grade liquidity
rating.  These actions conclude the rating review Moody's
initiated on March 12, 2015. The rating outlook is stable.

The rating confirmation follows Endo's decision to withdraw its
offer to purchase Salix Pharmaceuticals Ltd., which would have
increased Endo's financial leverage. Although the offer signaled
a more aggressive approach to acquisitions than Moody's
previously incorporated, the deal employed significant use of
equity financing and had deleveraging opportunities.  Further,
Moody's believes the deal was somewhat opportunistic and not
reflective of the acquisitions Endo is apt to pursue following
its withdrawn offer.  Although debt-financed acquisitions cannot
be ruled out, the stable rating outlook reflects Moody's
expectation that most deals can be accommodated within the
financial parameters incorporated in the Ba3 rating, including
sustaining debt/EBITDA below 4.0 times.

Confirmations:

Issuer: Endo Finance Co.

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at B1
     (LGD4)

Issuer: Endo Finance LLC

  -- Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Confirmed at B1
     (LGD4)

Issuer: Endo Luxembourg Finance I Company S.a.r.l.

  -- Corporate Family Rating, Confirmed at Ba3

  -- Probability of Default Rating, Confirmed at Ba3-PD

  -- Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Confirmed at Baa3
     (LGD2)

Affirmations:

Issuer: Endo Luxembourg Finance I Company S.a.r.l.

  -- Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, Affirmed at SGL-2

Outlook Actions:

Issuer: Endo Finance Co.

  -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Endo Finance LLC

  -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

Issuer: Endo Luxembourg Finance I Company S.a.r.l.

  -- Outlook, Changed To Stable From Rating Under Review

Endo's Ba3 Corporate Family Rating reflects its modest size and
scale relative to larger pharmaceutical peers, partially offset
by the company's solid market positioning as a niche player in
the pain and urology markets and by its revenue diversity across
branded drugs, generic drugs and medical devices.  Endo's
expertise in pain drugs and its good compliance with US Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) regulations act as high barriers to
entry, also a credit strength.  The company's organic growth
rates are constrained by pressures facing core pharmaceutical
products like Lidoderm and Opana ER, and softness in medical
procedure volumes. Further, Endo faces large cash outflows
related to product safety lawsuits involving its surgical mesh
products. Amidst these pressures, Endo is pursuing cost reduction
initiatives and an acquisition strategy focused on specialty
pharmaceutical companies, most recently including Auxilium
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Endo's publicly articulated financial
policies include sustaining debt/EBITDA within a range of 3.0 to
4.0 times.

The rating outlook is stable reflecting our expectations that
Endo will sustain gross debt/EBITDA below 4.0 times file funding
mesh litigation outflows and business development. Although not
expected in the near term, Moody's could upgrade Endo's ratings
if the company substantially increases its size, scale and
diversification, resolves its mesh litigation, and sustains
debt/EBITDA below 3.5 times. Moody's could downgrade the ratings
if gross debt/EBITDA is sustained above 4.0 times, or if Endo
performs debt-financed acquisitions, faces higher-than-expected
litigation cash outflows, or divests businesses without a
commensurate reduction in debt levels.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Pharmaceutical Industry published in December 2012.  Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Endo Luxembourg Finance I Company
S.a.r.l. ("Endo") is a subsidiary of Endo International plc,
which is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland (collectively "Endo").
Endo is a specialty healthcare company offering branded and
generic pharmaceuticals and medical devices.  Including the
predecessor company Endo Health Solutions, Inc., net revenues in
2014 were approximately US$2.9 billion.



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R U S S I A
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CHELYABINSK OBLAST: S&P Affirms Then Withdraws 'BB+' ICR
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' issuer
credit rating and 'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating on
Chelyabinsk Oblast.  S&P subsequently withdrew the ratings
because the rating engagement was not renewed.  At the time of
the withdrawal, the outlook was negative.

As defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 (EU CRA Regulation),
the ratings on Chelyabinsk Oblast are subject to certain
publication restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA
Regulation, including publication in accordance with a pre-
established calendar.  Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations
from the announced calendar are allowed only in limited
circumstances and must be accompanied by a detailed explanation
of the reasons for the deviation.  In this case, the deviation
has been caused by the nonrenewal of the rating engagement.

Rationale

The affirmation reflects S&P's view that Chelyabinsk Oblast
continues to perform in line with S&P's base-case scenario.  The
ratings were constrained by S&P's view of Russia's volatile and
unbalanced institutional framework, which limits the oblast's
weak budgetary flexibility, and by the oblast's very weak
economy, which is exposed to concentration risks.  The ratings
also reflected S&P's view that the oblast's financial management
is weak in an international context, similar to that of most
Russian peers.  S&P's expectation of average budgetary
performance and adequate liquidity was neutral for the ratings.
The ratings were supported by S&P's view of the oblast's very low
debt burden and very low contingent liabilities.  The long-term
issuer credit rating was equal to our assessment of Chelyabinsk
Oblast's stand-alone credit profile.

In 2015 to 2016, economic growth in the oblast will likely slow
compared with previous years, in line with Russia's nationwide
trend.  Chelyabinsk Oblast's economy and tax base will remain
exposed to the cyclical ferrous metallurgy industry and the
performance of the largest metals, pipe, and machinery-producing
enterprises.  S&P estimates the share of metallurgy at about 17%
of the oblast's gross regional product (GRP) in 2012-2014, and
anticipates that in the next three to five years, the
contribution of the 10 largest taxpayers, including Magnitogorsk
Metallurgical Kombinat (MMK; not rated), will equal almost 20% of
tax revenues. The oblast's economy also remains weak in terms of
wealth levels when compared with that of international peers,
with the GRP per capita at about US$7,000 in 2014.

Like most of its Russian peers, Chelyabinsk Oblast has weak
budgetary flexibility within Russia's volatile and unbalanced
institutional framework.  The federal government regulates the
national tax regime, regional revenue sources, and spending
responsibilities, and leaves regional authorities with little
leeway for managing their finances.  S&P estimates that, in 2015-
2017, more than 90% of Chelyabinsk Oblast's operating revenues
will come from state-regulated taxes and federal transfers, over
which the oblast has no control.

Nevertheless, S&P believes the oblast has some spending
flexibility within the capital program and operating
expenditures. S&P anticipates that the oblast's financial
management will maintain its cautious approach to expenditures
and implement austerity measures to limit the deficit and new
borrowing.

Indeed, in 2014, the oblast had already started cutting the
capital program.  S&P expects that it will maintain modest
capital expenditures in 2015-2017 at about 12% of total spending,
compared with 22% on average in 2011-2013.  The oblast's
financial management will also likely maintain tight control over
operating spending growth and urge its budgetary units to
decrease maintenance and other discretionary spending.

S&P therefore expects that, in 2015-2017, the oblast's budgetary
performance will remain average, on par with that of most Russian
regions.  S&P assumes in its base-case scenario that the
operating balance will decrease to 4% of operating revenues on
average over 2015-2017, from about 10% over 2012-2014.  Thanks to
austerity measures, the deficit after capital accounts will
likely improve to 4% of total revenues on average in 2015-2017,
after a one-time drop to 11% in 2013.

Due to modest deficits after capital accounts, S&P expects the
oblast will accumulate direct debt only gradually and that tax-
supported debt will remain very low by the end of 2017.  S&P
believes that the amount of guarantees, which make up about
one-half of the tax-supported debt, will decrease in 2016, when a
guaranteed bond is due to be repaid by the regional housing and
mortgage company.  S&P estimates that the oblast's tax-supported
debt will be less than 30% of consolidated operating revenues by
the end of 2017.  S&P do not expect the region to be called on to
service the guarantees or to provide new ones over the next three
years.

The oblast's contingent liabilities stemming from the municipal
sector and government-related entities are very low, in S&P's
opinion.  Municipalities are relatively healthy financially, and
service their modest commercial debt with their own funds.  The
oblast owns shares in only a few companies, which are unlikely to
require extraordinary financial support.

S&P views Chelyabinsk Oblast's financial management as weak in an
international comparison, as S&P do that of most Russian local
and regional governments.  Budgeting reliability and long-term
capital and financial planning are limited, mostly due to the
volatile institutional framework.  S&P also thinks that, although
it is gradually moving to more prudent, medium-term debt
management, the oblast lacks experience in capital market
borrowing.

LIQUIDITY

S&P views Chelyabinsk Oblast's liquidity as adequate, as defined
in S&P's criteria.  S&P bases this on its expectation that, over
the next 12 months, the oblast's average free cash net of the
deficit after capital accounts will exceed debt service.  At the
same time, S&P anticipates some volatility in the debt-service
coverage ratio beyond the 12-month horizon.  In 2016, most of the
oblast's direct debt is due to be repaid.  S&P expects that the
oblast will already need to secure refinancing in mid-2015,
although S&P views the oblast's access to external liquidity as
limited, as S&P do that of most Russian regions.  This is based
on S&P's view of the weaknesses of the domestic capital market.

S&P anticipates that, during the next 12 months, the oblast's
average free cash net of the deficit after capital accounts will
equal about Russian ruble (RUB)3.1 billion (about US$50 million).
This will exceed the oblast's low debt service in the next 12
months, which S&P estimates at RUB2.6 billion.  Debt service
consists of interest payments (less than 2% of operating
revenues) and a small RUB540 million budget loan to be repaid in
April 2015.

The oblast also plans to organize committed bank lines in excess
of its refinancing needs.  However, this will largely depend on
the improvement of the currently unfavorable market conditions.
Interest rates rose significantly in the fourth quarter of 2014.

OUTLOOK

At the time of the withdrawal, the outlook was negative,
reflecting S&P's view that it might be challenging over the next
year for Chelyabinsk Oblast to constrain spending growth and
limit direct debt accumulation.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.

The committee's assessment of the key rating factors is reflected
in the Ratings Score Snapshot.

The chair ensured every voting member was given the opportunity
to articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed
the draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee
decision. The views and the decision of the rating committee are
summarized in the above rationale and outlook.  The weighting of
all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this
rating action.

RATINGS LIST

                                       Rating   Rating
                                       To       From
Chelyabinsk Oblast
Issuer credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency           NR       BB+/Negative/--
  Russia National Scale                NR       ruAA+/--/--

Ratings Subsequently Withdrawn

Chelyabinsk Oblast
Issuer credit rating
  Foreign and Local Currency           NR        NR
  Russia National Scale                NR        NR

NR -- Not rated.


SME BANK: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Rating; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+/B' foreign
currency long- and short-term and 'BBB-/A-3' local currency long-
and short-term issuer credit ratings on Russia-based SME Bank.
The outlook is negative.

"The ratings on SME Bank reflect our view that it is a "core"
subsidiary of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a government-related entity
(GRE) with an "almost certain" likelihood of timely and
sufficient extraordinary support from the Russian Federation.  We
regard SME Bank as a "core" subsidiary because it is an integral
development-finance institution operating within the VEB group
under a specific mandate.  SME Bank bears significant
responsibility for the federal governments's program for the
development of the small and midsize enterprise (SME) sector.
This is one of the government's priorities that SME Bank takes
care of directly as a main component of VEB's larger mandate.
The "core" status also reflects the strong financial links
between VEB and SME Bank, notably with respect to funding.
Accordingly, we equalize the ratings on SME Bank with those on
VEB," S&P said.

"We classify SME Bank as a GRE with a "high" likelihood of timely
and sufficient extraordinary support from the Russian government,
its ultimate owner.  This is based on our assessment of SME
Bank's "important" role in addressing deficiencies in the SME
financing market and in decreasing interest rates for the sector.
We also incorporate our view of the bank's "integral" link with
the Russian Federation.  The state's full ownership of SME Bank
via VEB and its strong oversight of the bank's business and
financial plans will, in our view, continue over the next few
years," S&P added.

"We have revised our assessment of SME Bank's stand-alone credit
profile (SACP) to 'b+' from 'bb-', which is still one notch
higher than VEB's SACP, reflecting SME Bank's strong
capitalization.  We understand that VEB's commitment regarding
annual capital injections -- amounting to 10% of its annual
profits -- to SME Bank will continue.  However, we think such
injections are highly unlikely in 2015, and that they will depend
on whether VEB posts profits.  We now project that our risk-
adjusted capital ratio (our capital measure) for SME Bank will be
close to 13% for the next 18-24 months, which is slightly weaker
than our previous projection of just above 15%.  The lower ratio
stems from our view of worsened economic and industry risks for
banks operating in Russia and increasing credit loss provisions.
We still assess SME Bank's capital and earnings as "strong,"
taking into account VEB's capital and that SME Bank's earnings
capacity is lower than the average for Russian banks.  This stems
from its mandate not to maximize profit and its focus on the
government's aim to bridge market gaps and lower interest rates
on loans in the SME segment," S&P noted.

S&P thinks that SME Bank faces increased credit risks because of
its significant exposure to the Russian financial sector--mainly
banks, some of which are small and carry weak credit profiles.
In S&P's view, economic and industry risk trends remain negative
in Russia's banking sector, putting banks' credit quality under
pressure.  Small and midsize banks remain fragile and have faced
a large number of banking license withdrawals over the past nine
months.

Although SME Bank has more sophisticated risk-management
practices than the sector average, its credit costs rose markedly
in late 2013 and especially in the first half of 2014.  S&P
thinks this trend will likely continue in 2015, leading to even
higher credit losses.  S&P projects average credit losses for the
Russian banking system at between 4.5% and 5% of total loans in
2015.  Due to the economic slowdown in Russia and the uncertainty
about additional capital support in 2015, SME Bank's exposure to
infrastructure organizations and directly to SME clients (via a
recently established guarantee scheme under one of the
government's programs) will stay limited, in S&P's view.

Other factors that support S&P's view of SME Bank's SACP, in
addition to its "strong" capital and earnings and "moderate" risk
position, are S&P's 'bb-' anchor for a commercial bank operating
only in Russia, the bank's "moderate" business position,
"average" funding, and "adequate" liquidity, as S&P's criteria
define these terms.

The negative outlook on SME Bank mirrors the negative outlooks on
VEB and Russia.  S&P equalizes the ratings on SME Bank with those
on VEB because S&P classifies SME Bank as a core subsidiary of
VEB.  Unless SME Bank's status as a core subsidiary of VEB
changes, S&P expects its ratings and outlook on SME Bank will
continue to reflect those on VEB.

S&P might lower the ratings on SME Bank if its status within the
VEB group weakened.  This could happen if S&P considered that SME
Bank no longer fit in with VEB's larger policy mandate for the
Russian government, a scenario S&P regards as unlikely.  It could
also occur if VEB's credit profile deteriorated to an extent that
limits its ability to support SME Bank.

S&P would revise the outlook on SME Bank to stable if S&P was to
revise the outlooks on VEB and on Russia to stable.



=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT 11: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'B'
-------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'AA (sf)' from
'A (sf)' its credit rating on AyT 11 Fondo de Titulizacion
Hipotecaria's class A notes.  At the same time, S&P has lowered
to 'B (sf)' from 'A (sf)' its rating on the class B notes.

Upon publishing, S&P's updated criteria for Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria) and its updated
criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the
sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P placed
those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received in
October 2014.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of its
RMBS criteria and its RAS criteria.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as 'moderate'.  Under S&P's RAS criteria, this transaction's
notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign
rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a
minimum of a "severe" stress.  However, as all six of the
conditions in paragraph 48 of the RAS criteria are met, S&P can
assign ratings in this transaction up to a maximum of six notches
(two additional notches of uplift) above the sovereign rating,
subject to credit enhancement being sufficient to pass an
"extreme" stress.

As S&P's long-term rating on the Kingdom of Spain is 'BBB', S&P's
RAS criteria cap at 'AA (sf)' the maximum potential rating in
this transaction for the class A notes.  The maximum potential
rating for all other classes of notes is 'A+ (sf)'.

Credit enhancement has increased to 23.5%, from 5.7% at closing
in November 2002.

   Class         Available credit
                  enhancement (%)
     A                23.5
     B                 4.9

This transaction features an amortizing reserve fund, which
currently represents 4.9% of the outstanding balance of the
mortgage assets.  The cash reserve is at its target amount.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 3.1% are on average
lower for this transaction than our Spanish RMBS index.  Defaults
are defined as mortgage loans in arrears for more than 18 months
in this transaction.  Cumulative defaults, at 0.4% of the closing
balance, are also lower than in most other Spanish RMBS
transactions that S&P rates.  Prepayment levels remain low and
the transaction is unlikely to pay down significantly in the near
term, in S&P's opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and a decrease in the weighted-
average loss severity (WALS) for each rating level.

The increase in the WAFF is mainly due to higher modeled arrears,
higher province concentration, and original loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio adjustments.  The decrease in the WALS is mainly due to the
lower LTV ratio offsetting the adjustments required under
paragraph 27 of S&P's RMBS criteria to reach the minimum
projected losses.  The overall effect is an increase in the
required credit coverage for each rating level.

Following the application of S&P's RAS criteria and its RMBS
criteria, S&P has determined that its assigned rating on each
class of notes in this transaction should be the lower of (i) the
rating as capped by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that
the class of notes can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria.  In this
transaction, the rating on the class A notes is constrained by
S&P's RAS criteria.

The bank account agreement is in line with S&P's current
counterparty criteria, with the bank account provider -- Barclays
Bank PLC, Madrid branch (A/Watch Neg/A-1) -- committing to
replace itself if S&P lowers its short-term issuer credit rating
on it below 'A-1'.  Therefore, under S&P's counterparty criteria,
the bank account counterparty risk is mitigated up to a 'AAA'
rating level.

The swap counterparty provider is Cecabank S.A. (BBB/Stable/A-2).
Under S&P's counterparty criteria, the swap counterparty risk is
mitigated up to a 'BBB' rating level, unless higher ratings are
possible without giving benefit to the swap agreement.

The class A notes pass all of the conditions under S&P's RAS
criteria, and benefit from enough credit enhancement to withstand
S&P's extreme stress.  Therefore, under S&P's RAS criteria, the
class A notes can be rated up to 'AA (sf)', six notches above the
rating of the sovereign, even without benefit to the interest
rate swap.  S&P has therefore raised to 'AA (sf)' from 'A (sf)'
its rating on the class A notes.

The more severe cash flow modelling assumptions under S&P's RMBS
criteria -- particularly the minimum projected losses, high
prepayment scenarios, back-ended defaults, and delayed recession
timing -- contributed to greater overall stresses on the
transaction.  When applying these assumptions to the class B
notes, S&P considers the transactions' features, including
relatively low levels of credit enhancement and an amortizing
reserve fund (both of which we consider weaknesses), to be
commensurate with a lower rating than that currently assigned.
S&P has therefore lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'A (sf)' its rating on
the class B notes.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and house prices leveling off in 2015.

On the back of improving but still depressed macroeconomic
conditions, S&P don't expect the performance of the transactions
in its Spanish RMBS index to improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears to remain at their current levels, as
there are a number of downside risks.  These include weak
economic growth, high unemployment, and fiscal tightening.  On
the positive side, S&P expects interest rates to remain low for
the foreseeable future.

AyT 11 is a Spanish RMBS transaction, which closed in November
2002 and securitizes first-ranking mortgage loans.  Caixa
d'Estalvis de Tarragona (now Catalunya Banc S.A.), Caja General
de Ahorros de Granada (now Banco Mare Nostrum S.A.), Caja Vital
Kutxa (now Kutxabank S.A.), and Credifimo S.A. originated the
pool, which comprises loans granted to prime borrowers, mainly
located in Andalusia.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

AyT 11 Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR403 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

A           AA (sf)           A (sf)

Rating Lowered

B           B (sf)            A (sf)


BANCO DE MADRID: Spanish Court to Suspend Insolvency Proceedings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah White at Reuters reports that a Spanish court on March 16
said it was suspending insolvency proceedings at Banco de Madrid
while it waited for guidance from the country's bank
restructuring fund FROB on whether it wanted to wind down or
restructure the lender.

According to Reuters, the court said in a written ruling that
FROB had 14 days to clarify its plans and whether it would rescue
the bank.

Spanish government officials have said that no public funds would
be used at Banco Madrid, which filed for bankruptcy on March 16
after customers withdrew funds in the wake of a money laundering
scandal at its Andorran parent bank BPA, Reuters relates.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 18,
2015, The Wall Street Journal reported that Spain's central bank
on March 16 said Banco de Madrid SA, the Spanish unit of an
Andorran lender accused of laundering money for organized-crime
groups, has filed for protection from its creditors.  Banco de
Madrid has been hit by substantial client withdrawals, the
central bank, as cited by the Journal, said, which has
impacted the ability of the lender to "meet its obligations in a
timely matter."  The move comes less than a week after the Bank
of Spain hastily took control of the tiny Madrid-based private
banking unit, after The Treasury Department's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network named Banco de Madrid's parent company-Banca
Privada d'Andorra, or BPA -- a "primary money-laundering
concern", the Journal disclosed.

Banco de Madrid is a small bank in Spain's banking sector.  The
lender had 15,000 clients and 21 offices in major cities such as
Madrid and Barcelona as of March 11.


CAJA ESPANA I: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B-'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BBB (sf)' credit
rating on AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Series AyT
Colaterales Global Hipotecario Caja Espana I's class A notes.  At
the same time, S&P has lowered its ratings on the class B, C, and
D notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria) and S&P's updated
criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the
sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P placed
those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received in
November 2014.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of its
RMBS criteria, its RAS criteria, and its current counterparty
criteria.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as 'moderate'.  Under S&P's RAS criteria, this transaction's
notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign
rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a
minimum of a "severe" stress.

However, as not all of the conditions in paragraph 48 of the RAS
criteria are met, S&P cannot assign any additional notches of
uplift to the ratings in this transaction.

As S&P's long-term rating on the Kingdom of Spain is 'BBB', S&P's
RAS criteria cap at 'A+ (sf)' the maximum potential rating in
this transaction for all classes of notes.

The transaction features interest deferral triggers for the class
B, C, and D notes.  Interest on the class B, C, and D notes will
be deferred if the cumulative gross default rate exceeds 12%, 9%,
and 7%, respectively, over the initial pool balance.  In S&P's
view, the transaction is unlikely to breach its interest deferral
triggers.

Credit enhancement for the class A notes has increased to 49.5%,
from 30.0% since S&P's previous review.

Class         Available credit                     Credit
               enhancement (%)         enhancement (%)[1]
A                         49.5                       29.9
B                         22.3                       13.4
C                         15.6                        9.4
D                         11.7                        7.0

[1]As of our previous review.

This transaction features an amortizing reserve fund (subject to
conditions), which currently represents 11.7% of the notes'
outstanding balance.  The cash reserve is at its required level.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days are below 2% and are on
average lower for this transaction than S&P's Spanish RMBS index.
Defaults are defined as mortgage loans in arrears for more than
18 months in this transaction.  Cumulative defaults, at 0.08% are
also lower than in other Spanish RMBS transactions that S&P
rates. Prepayment levels remain low and the transaction is
unlikely to pay down significantly in the near term, in S&P's
opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF) and in the weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) for each rating level.

Rating level    WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
AAA                 51.9        55.9
AA                  40.0        51.9
A                   32.7        44.5
BBB                 24.2        40.2
BB                  15.8        34.9
B                   13.2        33.8

The slight increase in the WAFF is mainly due to the higher
penalty for loans with a high original loan-to-value ratio.  The
increase in the WALS is mainly due to the application of S&P's
revised market value decline assumptions.  The overall effect is
an increase in the required credit coverage for each rating
level.

Following the application of S&P's RAS criteria, its RMBS
criteria, and its current counterparty criteria, S&P has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria, (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria, and (iii) the rating as
capped by S&P's current counterparty criteria.  In this
transaction, the rating on the class A notes is constrained by
S&P's current counterparty criteria.

The transaction's swap documents comply with S&P's current
counterparty criteria.  However, based on the implemented rating
trigger levels for posting collateral and replacement, the swap
counterparty can only support ratings up to the 'BBB' rating
level.  Therefore, under S&P's current counterparty criteria, the
ratings on all classes of notes are capped at the long-term
issuer credit rating on the swap provider, Cecabank S.A.
(BBB/Stable/A-2).

Taking into account the results of S&P's updated credit and cash
flow analysis and the application of its RAS criteria and
counterparty criteria, S&P considers the available credit
enhancement for the class A notes to be commensurate with its
currently assigned rating.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'BBB
(sf)' rating on the class A notes.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class B,
C, and D notes to be commensurate with lower ratings than those
currently assigned.  S&P has therefore lowered its ratings on the
class B, C, and D notes.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and house prices leveling off in 2015.

On the back of improving but still depressed macroeconomic
conditions, S&P don't expect the performance of the transactions
in its Spanish RMBS index to improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include inflation, weak economic growth, high unemployment, and
fiscal tightening.  On the positive side, S&P expects interest
rates to remain low for the foreseeable future.

Caja Espana I is a Spanish RMBS transaction, which closed in
December 2007 and securitizes first-ranking mortgage loans.  Caja
Espana S.A. (now part of Caja Espana Duero S.A.) originated the
pool, which comprises loans granted to prime borrowers, mainly
located in Madrid, Leon, and Valladolid.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

AyT Colaterales Global Hipotecario FTA Series AyT Colaterales
Global Hipotecario Caja Espana I
EUR500 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed

A           BBB (sf)

Ratings Lowered

B           BB- (sf)          BBB- (sf)
C           B (sf)            BBB- (sf)
D           B- (sf)           BB- (sf)


GC SABADELL 1: S&P Raises Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
GC SABADELL 1, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecario's class A2, B,
and C notes.

Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Spanish residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria) and its updated
criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the
sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P placed
those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria
observation".

Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that
could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under
criteria observation.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that S&P has received as
of March 2015.  S&P's analysis reflects the application of its
RMBS criteria, its RAS criteria, and its current counterparty
criteria.

Under S&P's RAS criteria, it applied a hypothetical sovereign
default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient
credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default
and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final
maturity.

S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for
RMBS as 'moderate'.  Under S&P's RAS criteria, this transaction's
notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign
rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a
minimum of a "severe" stress.  However, as not all of the
conditions in paragraph 48 of the RAS criteria are met, S&P
cannot assign any additional notches of uplift to the ratings in
this transaction.

As S&P's long-term rating on the Kingdom of Spain is 'BBB', S&P's
RAS criteria cap at 'A+ (sf)' the maximum potential rating in
this transaction for all classes of notes.

The interest rate swap counterparty, Banco de Sabadell S.A.
(BB+/Negative/B), is ineligible under the documented swap
agreement, but hasn't posted collateral or replaced itself, and
is therefore in breach of the agreement.  Under S&P's current
counterparty criteria, it therefore caps its ratings on all
classes of notes in this transaction at S&P's long-term issuer
credit rating on Banco de Sabadell, unless higher ratings are
possible without giving benefit to the swap agreement.

The transaction features interest deferral triggers for the class
B and C notes, based on the current level of principal
deficiency. These triggers have not been breached, and S&P don't
expect them to be breached in the near future.

Credit enhancement has increased for each class of note since
closing in July
2004.

Class         Available credit
                enhancement (%)
  A2                 7.1
  B                  3.7
  C                  1.9

This transaction features an amortizing reserve fund, which
currently represents 1.9% of the outstanding balance of the
mortgage assets.  The cash reserve is funded to its target level.

Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days at 0.5% are on average
lower for this transaction than S&P's Spanish RMBS index.
Defaults are defined as mortgage loans in arrears for more than
12 months in this transaction.  Cumulative defaults, at 3.42%,
are also lower than in other Spanish RMBS transactions that S&P
rates. Prepayment levels remain low and the transaction is
unlikely to pay down significantly in the near term, in S&P's
opinion.

After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its
credit analysis results show a decrease in the weighted-average
foreclosure frequency (WAFF), at rating levels above 'BB', and an
increase in the weighted-average loss severity (WALS) for each
rating level.

  Rating level    WAFF (%)    WALS (%)
    AAA            9.9          28.3
    AA             7.5          22.3
    A              6.0          15.2
    BBB            4.4          13.0
    BB             2.9           8.3
    B              2.0           7.4

The decrease in the WAFF is mainly due to S&P's updated treatment
of loan seasoning, jumbo loans, and geographic concentrations
under S&P's updated Spanish RMBS criteria.  The increase in the
WALS is mainly due to the application of S&P's revised market
value decline assumptions.  The overall effect is an increase in
the required credit coverage for each rating level.

Following the application of S&P's RAS criteria, its RMBS
criteria, and its current counterparty criteria, S&P has
determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in
this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped
by S&P's RAS criteria, (ii) the rating that the class of notes
can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria, and (iii) the rating as
capped by S&P's current counterparty criteria.  In this
transaction, the rating on the class A2 notes is constrained by
the rating on the sovereign.

The class A2 notes have sufficient credit enhancement to
withstand the stresses commensurate with a 'BBB+' rating level
under S&P's RMBS criteria, without the benefit of the swap.
However, these notes don't pass S&P's severe RAS stresses, and is
therefore ineligible for a rating uplift above the sovereign.
S&P has therefore raised to 'BBB (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' its
rating on the class A2 notes.

If S&P gives benefit to the swap, the class B and C notes have
sufficient credit enhancement to withstand stresses commensurate
with 'AA' and 'BBB-' rating levels, respectively, under S&P's
RMBS criteria.  However, the ratings are capped at 'BB+ (sf)' by
the rating on the swap counterparty.  S&P has therefore raised to
'BB+ (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its ratings on the class B and C notes.

S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis.  To reflect
moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by
assuming additional arrears of 8% for one-year and three-year
horizons.  This did not result in S&P's rating deteriorating
below the maximum projected deterioration that it would associate
with each relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's credit
stability criteria.

In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential
mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has
therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency
assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS
criteria, to reflect this view.  S&P bases these assumptions on
its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high
unemployment, and house prices levelling off in 2015.

On the back of improving but still depressed macroeconomic
conditions, S&P don't expect the performance of the transactions
in its Spanish RMBS index to improve in 2015.

S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their
current levels, as there are a number of downside risks.  These
include weak economic growth, high unemployment, and fiscal
tightening.  On the positive side, S&P expects interest rates to
remain low for the foreseeable future.

GC SABADELL 1 is a Spanish RMBS transaction, which closed in July
2004 and securitizes a pool of first-ranking mortgage loans that
Banco de Sabadell originated.

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

GC SABADELL 1, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR1.2 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A2          BBB (sf)          BBB- (sf)
B           BB+ (sf)          BB (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)          BB (sf)


OBRASCON HUARTE: Moody's Assigns B1 Rating to New Senior Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B1 rating with a Loss Given
Default assessment of 4 (LGD4 - 51%) to the proposed issuance of
EUR425 million worth of senior notes due 2023 by Obrascon Huarte
Lain S.A. (OHL).  Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the
company's B1 corporate family rating, B1-PD probability of
default rating, as well as the B1 ratings on its existing senior
unsecured debt instruments. The outlook on all ratings remains
negative.

OHL will use the proceeds from this offering to refinance the
EUR425 million worth of senior notes due 2018.  The new notes
will rank pari passu with OHL's existing senior unsecured notes.

"The B1 rating for the proposed senior notes reflects their
senior unsecured status and pari-passu ranking with OHL's
existing senior unsecured notes," says Iv n Palacios, a Moody's
Vice President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for OHL.

"The company's ratings and outlook have been affirmed after this
offering, given that the transaction is leverage-neutral.
However, we note positively that the proposed transaction will
further extend OHL's debt maturity profile, as the company will
have no bond maturities until 2020, while at the same time, the
company will reduce its cost of debt, marginally improving future
cash flows" adds Mr. Palacios.

Moody's has affirmed OHL's B1 rating with a negative outlook
factoring the company's recently published FY2014 results and its
updated strategic guidelines for 2015-20.

OHL's FY2014 results were weaker than expected, with EBITDA
declining by 11% year-on-year owing to weakness across all
business segments. The concessions business was affected by a
weaker currency, while construction EBITDA fell by 17% and
profits from other activities dropped by 53%. As a result, OHL's
gross recourse debt/recourse EBITDA (recourse EBITDA defined as
consolidated EBITDA minus EBITDA from Concessions) as of YE2014
stood at 7x, well above the guidance for the B1 rating of between
4.5x and 5.5x.

As per OHL's updated strategic guidelines, the company's revenues
and EBITDA are expected to double over 2015-20, while keeping
capex levels low at around EUR50 million per annum. OHL plans to
concentrate on the eight "Home Markets" (Spain, Czech Republic,
US, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile), focusing on
transportation infrastructure construction contracts with a
smaller and more balanced project size. The company has also
maintained its commitment to keep the net recourse debt/recourse
EBITDA ratio below 3x at each year end.

In Moody's view, the strategic repositioning towards lower risk
geographies and smaller contracts is credit positive, as in the
past, the company had a high degree of contract concentration in
areas where it did not have the same expertise as in its home
markets. The top five contracts of the order book now represent
23% of the total backlog, compared with 44% in 2013.

Nevertheless, Moody's believes that achieving the revenue and
EBITDA goals that OHL is forecasting will be challenging owing to
the relatively low levels of capex that the company expects to
invest over this period, and the more competitive dynamics of
some of its more developed and mature home markets.

OHL's B1 CFR takes into account (1) OHL's high leverage, both on
a recourse and consolidated basis; (2) its sustained negative
free cash flow generation; (3) the weak performance of the
construction business, despite initial signs that activity in
Spain has bottomed out; (4) the group's complex debt structure,
with margin loans used extensively at intermediate holding
companies; (5) its liquidity profile, which relies on continued
access to short-term credit lines, and (6) the weakened credit
profile of Grupo Villar Mir, OHL's controlling shareholder.

However, these negatives are partially offset by OHL's (1)
position as one of Spain's leading construction and concessions
groups; (2) business diversification (construction and
concessions); (3) exposure to multiple geographies, with a
growing portfolio of international construction projects; (4)
large order backlog; and (5) equity stakes in Abertis and OHL
Mexico.

The negative outlook reflects the lack of visibility as to when
OHL's cash flow generation will start to improve following the
contribution from the new international construction contracts
and increased contribution from existing concessions. It also
reflects the continued weakness of OHL's credit metrics for the
B1 rating category, while its liquidity profile could be exposed
to margin calls if the share prices of Abertis and/or OHL Mexico
drop.

Moody's does not currently anticipate upward rating pressure in
light of the negative outlook. However, the outlook on the
ratings could be changed to stable if OHL's credit metrics
improve such that gross recourse debt/recourse EBITDA stays on a
sustained basis in the 4.5x to 5.5x range. A change in outlook to
stable would also require an expectation of positive free cash
flow generation and a solid liquidity profile.

Negative pressure on the B1 rating could develop if OHL's credit
metrics do not improve such that the company's gross recourse
debt/recourse EBITDA remains above 5.5x and fails to be on a path
to return to positive free cash flow generation on a consolidated
basis. The rating could also come under downward pressure if the
LTV ratio of OHL's equity stakes in Abertis and/or OHL Mexico
approaches 50% and margin calls are triggered, unless the company
materially strengthens its liquidity profile to mitigate this
concern.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Construction
Industry published in November 2014. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Madrid, OHL is one of Spain's leading
construction/concessions groups. The company owns a 56.14% equity
stake in OHL Mexico, a large concessions operator in Mexico, and
a 13.93% equity stake in Spanish infrastructure operator Abertis.
In 2014, OHL reported sales of EUR3.7 billion and EBITDA of
EUR1.1 billion.



===========
S W E D E N
===========


DANNEMORA MINERAL: Files for Bankruptcy in Uppsala Court
--------------------------------------------------------
Dannemora Mineral AB on March 18 filed for bankruptcy with the
Uppsala District Court.

The company has been in reorganization since May 13, 2014.  The
work involved in reorganizing the company has resulted in
significant progress being made to date and the company has been
cash flow neutral for 10 months.  No external financing has been
provided to the company since the reorganization process was
implemented.

Demand for the company's ore has exceeded production capacity,
which has meant, among other things, that prices received could
be improved significantly in relation to prices on the global
markets.  Production has increased, attaining record levels in
the first two months of the year due to streamlining and staunch
work by the company's employees.  Combined with the significantly
improved USD rate, this enabled the company to record positive
EBITDA in February despite the low, declining prices of iron ore.

For a considerable period of time, the company has sought to
procure external financing for necessary investments in increased
mass recovery, streamlining of underground logistics and
environmental measures.  The opportunities for obtaining
financing have improved recently and the company's board of
directors has been of the opinion that there was a realistic
possibility of finding a solution within a reasonable period of
time.

However, due to the uncertainty over the company's future, the
previously steady sales of the company's products have been
affected by disruptions due to the build-up of inventory in the
customer chain, which was caused by customers evaluating
alternative suppliers.  Therefore, the board anticipates a
reduction in supply volumes and, consequently, a certain increase
in the inventory of ore in the second quarter.  The company's
liquidity failed to hold up to the estimated, temporary increase
in capital tied up in inventory.

Consequently, the company's board of directors has decided (in
consultation with the administrator), for the liquidity reasons
referred to above, that there is no basis for continuing with a
reorganization.  Therefore, on March 18, the company (together
with its subsidiaries) filed for bankruptcy with the Uppsala
District Court.

The company's problems originate from 2012, when the completed
concentration plant was unable to process the mine's ore as
expected.  By means of fewer investments and streamlining, the
company was able to increase the mass recovery of finished
products from an initial 30-34% to currently approximately 40% of
crushed crude ore.  Expected mass recovery was 58%.

In 2014, the mine produced 1.2 Mton of ore, lump ore and fines.
With its manganese content and absence of phosphorus and
vanadium, the Dannemora ore has been highly rated by leading
European steel companies, and constitutes a valuable ingredient
for customers' blast furnaces.

"The Dannemora mine is operational, supplying in-demand products
to demanding customers.  We have developed cost-effective
solutions to our well-defined technical problems.  However, we
have been unable to procure the necessary financing for the
necessary investments within the requisite time.  I'm very proud
of all of our employees and it feels very dispiriting that we
were unable to give them more time to turn things around",
commented chairman of the board Lennart Falk, who founded the
company in 2005.

"In the past year, the business has developed very well, with
reduced costs and volumes over and above planned levels.  Our
customers have placed a high value on Dannemora Mineral's
products.  The company has been able to keep in the black since
the reorganization process began despite a dramatic decline in
prices on the global markets.  In order to bring about a stable
situation (even in the face of low prices), we would have had to
carry out the investments in mass recovery and the transfer of
the crusher underground for which we sought financing.  I think
it's highly regrettable that we are unable to continue with our
work, given the organization's high level of expertise, ability
to make continuous improvements, and camaraderie", commented
CEO Ralf Norden.

The bankruptcy proceedings relate to Dannemora Mineral AB (the
ultimate parent company of the Group) and subsidiaries Dannemora
Magnetit AB, Dannemora F”rvaltnings AB and Dannemora Iron Ore
Development AB.  It is proposed in the bankruptcy filing that
Lars-Olof Svensson of Wistrand Advokatbyr† act as bankruptcy
trustee.

Due to the bankruptcy, the company has requested a suspension of
all trading in its shares and bonds.

Dannemora Mineral AB is a mining and exploration company of which
the primary activity is mining operations in the Dannemora iron
ore mine.  The Company intends to engage in exploration
activities to increase the iron ore base locally and regionally.
The Company's most important asset is the iron deposit in the
Dannemora Mine, and activity is focused mainly on the mining of
this deposit at present.

The Company is listed on NASDAQ OMX First North, Stockholm, and
Oslo Axess.  The Company's Certified Advisor on First North is
Remium Nordic AB.

The Company's independent qualified person is mining engineer
Thomas Lindholm, Geovista AB, Lulea.  Thomas Lindholm is
qualified as a Competent Person, as defined in the JORC Code,
based on education and experience in exploration, mining and
estimation of mineral resources of iron, base and precious
metals.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINE: Biggest Creditor Hires Adviser for Debt Restructuring
--------------------------------------------------------------
Robin Wigglesworth at The Financial Times reports that Ukraine's
biggest creditor has formed a bloc and hired advisers to prepare
for tough talks with Kiev, after the stricken country set out
proposals to restructure its US$17 billion international debt.

Blackstone's advisory arm has been hired to advise the group,
which controls about 50% of the country's international bonds and
therefore has the power to make or break the restructuring, the
FT says, citing an insider.

According to the FT, the bondholder bloc is led by asset manager
Franklin Templeton, which is by some distance Ukraine's single
biggest creditor having snapped up about USUS$7 billion of Kiev's
debts, according to another insider, most of it before the
country's revolution and subsequent crisis.

Blackstone represented Greece's creditors in 2012, and will once
again square up to Lazard, the investment bank that advised
Athens and now acts for Ukraine's government, the FT discloses.
The restructuring is part of a new US$40 billion rescue of Kiev,
led by the International Monetary Fund, the FT notes.

Negotiations are likely to be combative, the FT says.  According
to the FT, a person close to the talks said the bondholder group
was unwilling to accept outright haircuts and believed the
targeted debt relief was too high.

Russia has indicated that it is unwilling to restructure the
debt, the FT relays.

The bondholder bloc has already started to explore options in
case the Russian government proves unwilling to restructure its
debts, the FT relates.  The IMF highlighted this as a big risk to
the success of its new program, the FT states.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AUBURN SECURITIES 4: Fitch Affirms 'BB+sf' Rating on Cl. E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Auburn Securities 4 Plc, Auburn
Securities 6 Plc and Auburn Securities 7 Plc.  The transactions
comprise buy-to-let loans originated by Capital Home Loans (CHL).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Healthy Asset Performance

All three transactions have shown improving performance, with
three months plus (3M+) arrears decreasing to 0.5%, 0.6% and 0.6%
of the current portfolio balance as of end-February 2015 from
their peak of 2.3%, 3.7% and 2.3% in 2009, respectively.  Given
the current low pipeline of late-stage arrears in these
transactions, Fitch expects possession activities and associated
losses to remain minimal in the coming year.

Auburn 6 and 7 have incurred higher sold repossessions and larger
losses on properties sold than Auburn 4, as a result of
underlying loans being originated predominantly at the peak of
the market.  To date weighted average loss severities are 34% and
36%, respectively, for Auburn 6 and 7, compared with 16% in
Auburn 4. Consequently, in its analysis Fitch has applied
additional stresses to its recovery rate assumptions in all three
transactions.

Limited Excess Spread

Annualized gross excess spread in Auburn 4, 6 and 7 currently
ranges between 10bps and 90bps of the outstanding pool balances.
The fairly low levels of excess spread offer limited protection
against period losses and led to marginal reserve fund draws in
the past year.  Given the limited volume of properties currently
in possession (0.1%, 0.3% and 0.4% of current pool balances),
Fitch expects future losses and reserve fund draws to remain
minimal.  For this reason, Fitch has affirmed the ratings of all
three transactions with Stable Outlooks.

No Impact of Un-hedged Basis Risk

The Auburn series comprises nearly 100% floating-rate loans (bank
base rate (BBR)-linked loans) whereas the notes pay a margin over
Libor.  The basis risk in each transaction is hedged by a
variable swap where CHL serves as swap counterparty and Permanent
TSB acts as swap guarantor.  Given that both entities are
unrated, the transactions are considered un-hedged in Fitch's
analysis and we have applied a haircut to the portfolio margins.
The resulting cash flow analysis concluded that the rated notes
were able to withstand the reduction in coupons under Fitch's
stressed scenarios.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Significant increases in defaults and associated losses beyond
Fitch's expectations, particularly as the portfolios continue to
deleverage, could lead to further strains on excess spread and
exacerbate the pace of reserve fund draws.  This could have a
negative impact on the credit support available to the rated
notes resulting in negative rating action.

The rating actions are:

Auburn Securities 4 plc:

  Class A2 (ISIN XS0202810064): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable

  Class M (ISIN XS0202810734): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable

  Class B (ISIN XS0202811039): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable

  Class C (ISIN XS0202811625): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook Stable

  Class D (ISIN XS0202812276): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook Stable

  Class E (ISIN XS0202812516): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
  Stable

Auburn Securities 6 plc:

  Class A (ISIN XS0329737448): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable

Auburn Securities 7 plc:

  Class A (ISIN XS0379615742): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
  Stable


BLIPFOTO: Sale Expected to Complete By End of Week
--------------------------------------------------
Gareth Mackie at The Scotsman reports that Blipfoto, which called
in liquidators after succumbing to funding issues, is set to be
acquired by a group of investors behind the Polaroid brand by the
end of this week.

According to The Scotsman, a statement said Glasgow-based Metis
Partners was instructed by Tom MacLennan of FRP Advisory,
provisional liquidator of Blipfoto, to handle the sale of the
"technological expertise and intellectual property" behind
Blipfoto.

Metis is brokering a deal that will see Blipfoto continue with
business as usual and the treasured photo journals of its users
will be maintained as part of the asset sale, The Scotsman
discloses.

A group of investors behind several of the Polaroid brand
properties -- including Jeffrey Hecktman, chief executive of
turnaround specialist Hilco Global and Bobby Sager of Gordon
Brothers -- have been named as the preferred bidder for the
assets and the sale is expected to complete by the end of the
week, The Scotsman notes.

Blipfoto is a Scots photo-sharing firm.  It allows users to post
a photo a day, was started in the capital by Joe Tree in late
2004, and entered into a partnership with Minnesota-based Optics
firm Polaroid in January 2015.


GB GROUP: Victims Demand Probe Into Company Structure
-----------------------------------------------------
Construction Enquirer reports that angry ex-employees and
subcontractors of the GB Group are demanding an investigation
into the failed firm's financial structure.

Construction Enquirer has been contacted by scores of companies
and individuals demanding that details of the firm's final few
months are made public.

GB Group Holdings and GB Building Solutions Limited were placed
in administration with the loss of 350 jobs, according to the
report.

But, some development arms including GB Development Solutions and
Oxford GB Ltd are not in administration, the report relates.

Companies House records also show that GB directors set up a new
business last September called GB Hotels London, the report
discloses.

The directors said that they were "devastated" following the
administration and the knock-on effect for former staff and
subcontractors, the report relays.

But one supplier said: "We are the ones really suffering.  It
looks like other companies will still keep on trading under the
GB name," the report notes.

Another added: "We all want to know exactly how these companies
were connected.  All the staff and subcontractors will be
outraged if other parts of GB continue working with the same
management as if nothing has happened," the report relays.


KIBO MINING: Has Funds Despite Delay in Receiving Proceeds
----------------------------------------------------------
proactiveinvestors.co.uk reports that Kibo Mining is waiting for
GBP730,500 of funds from its recent share placing to be released
as its broker heads into administration.

The share placing was conducted by Hume Capital, which has
announced its intention to appoint an administrator, according to
proactiveinvestors.co.uk.  The money is sitting safely in Hume's
ring-fenced client money account but at present, Hume is unable
to indicate when the funds will be released, the report relates.

The Tanzania-focused mineral exploration and development company
has thus far received GBP219,500 from its recent fund-raise, and
the company has sufficient cash to finance its ongoing activities
for the short to medium term, the report notes.


MUIRFIELD CONTRACTS: Staff Let Go as Firm Winds Down
----------------------------------------------------
H&V News, citing BBC News, reports that a Dundee building firm
which went into administration is being wound down at the cost of
hundreds of jobs.

Muirfield Contracts called in administrators earlier after
sending staff home amid "unsustainable" cash flow issues,
according to H&V News.

The report notes that administrators Campbell Dallas LLP have
made 258 staff redundant, and a further 110 previously engaged
sub-contractors have also lost work.

A core staff of 25 is to be kept on to help wind down the firm's
affairs, the report relates.

Administrators Derek Forsyth --
derek.forsyth@campbelldallas.co.uk -- and David Hunter --
david.hunter@campbelldallas.co.uk -- of Campbell Dallas were
appointed after the firm suspended trading.

They said the company had "effectively ceased trading" before
they arrived, and said they would work with all relevant agencies
and trade unions to support the redundant workers, the report
relays.

Business Minister Fergus Ewing said the Scottish government had
taken "immediate action to provide assistance to any affected
employees," the report adds.

Muirfield Contracts, which has offices in Dundee and Aberdeen,
had worked on a number of major projects in recent years.


PTT DESIGN: Buyers Showing Interest to Acquire Firm
---------------------------------------------------
Eleanor Ward at Business Sale Report discloses that a number of
buyers have shown an interest in a Nottingham-based luxury hotel
furniture manufacturer, administrators have confirmed.

Buyers have already expressed interest in PTT Design Ltd after it
went into administration on March 4, according to Business Sale
Report.  Nick Edwards -- nicke@pkfcooperparry.com -- and Tyrone
Courtman -- tcourtman@pkfcooperparry.com -- of PKF Cooper Parry
were appointed joint administrators.

At the time of appointing administrators, 35 members of staff
were made redundant, but the firm has continued to trade, the
report notes.

The report relays that Mr. Courtman, a restructuring partner at
PKF Cooper Parry, said that he was "very confident" that they
would secure a buyer for the company.  Mr. Courtman added: "We
are delighted to report that we have already received a number of
expressions of interest in the business which we are currently
pursuing," the report notes.

Founded over 20 years ago, PTT Design manufactures furniture for
the bathroom suites, receptions, restaurants and bars in London
hotels.  Many high profile hotels in London have used products by
PTT Design, including the London Hilton Park Lane, the Jumeirah
Lowndes Hotel and The Balmoral.


PTT DESIGN: Administrators Put Business Up for Sale
---------------------------------------------------
Tyrone S. Courtman -- tyronec@pkfcooperparry.com -- and Nicholas
J. Edwards -- nicke@pkfcooperparry.com -- Joint Administrators of
P.T.T. Design Limited, are offering for sale the business and
assets of the company.

Key features of assets to be sold include:

  -- Bespoke furniture designer and manufacturer based in
     Nottingham

  -- Projects typically include 4 and 5 star hotel bedroom
     Furniture

  -- Turnover GBP5 million for the 10 months to January 31, 2015

  -- Opportunity to acquire business and assets as a going
     concern with 29 employees remaining

  -- Assets available include freehold property, plant and
     machinery, current order book and intellectual property

For further information, see www.pttdesign.com or please contact:

          Jonathan Davis
          PKF Cooper Parry Group Limited
          Sky View
          Argosy Road
          East Midlands Airport
          Castle Donington
          Derbyshire, DE74 2SA
          Tel: 01332 411163
          E-mail: jonathand@pkfcooperparry.com


T BADEN: Flogas Britain Swoops for Hardstaff Business
-----------------------------------------------------
Insider Media Limited reports that Leicester-headquartered energy
giant Flogas Britain has snapped up Portal Gas Services from the
administrators of T Baden Hardstaff Ltd.

The Nottingham business provides liquefied natural gas (LNG) and
liquefied compressed natural gas (LCNG) station technology to
vehicle operators and formed past of the historic Hardstaff group
of companies, which went into administration last month,
according to Insider Media Limited.

Will Wright -- will.wright@kpmg.co.uk and Mark Orton --
mark.orton@kpmg.co.uk -- of KPMG were appointed joint
administrators of T Baden Hardstaff and Hardstaff Commercial
Repairs Ltd, which traded as Charnwood Truck Services.

Of the group's 232-strong workforce, 180 lost their jobs, the
report relays.  The remaining 52 were retained to assist the
administrators, the report notes.

A spokesman for KPMG confirmed that GBP228 million-turnover
Flogas Britain had acquired the business, but could offer no
further updates due to the ongoing administration, the report
adds.


VEDANTA RESOURCES: Cairn India's US$3.2BB Liability is Credit Neg
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said that Vedanta Resources Plc's Ba1
corporate family rating and Ba3 senior unsecured ratings are
under negative pressure because of a demand by Indian revenue
authorities that Vedanta's subsidiary, Cairn India Ltd (CIL,
unrated) should pay a $3.2 billion tax liability.

Moody's points out that Vedanta's credit metrics are already at
the lower end of its rating category.  Moody's revised the
company's ratings outlook to negative in January 2015 to reflect
the company's likely lower earnings due to depressed global oil
prices.

If the US$3.2 billion contingent liability fully crystallizes, it
could raise Vedanta's debt/EBITDA to 4.6x at 31 March 2015 and
5.0x at 31 March 2016, up from Moody's previous expectations of
3.9x and 4.3x, respectively.

Nonetheless, Moody's has kept Vedanta's ratings and outlook
unchanged, because Moody's believes the tax claim will not lead
to any immediate cash demand, and that the final amount could
vary, given that Vedanta is challenging the liability.

"The tax dispute comes at a time when Vedanta is already
struggling to stave off the effects of weak oil prices. If the
liability materializes, Vedanta's credit profile would be weaker
than the parameters required by its current rating, despite the
company's recent efforts to reduce capital expenditure," says
Alan Greene, a Moody's Vice President and Senior Credit Officer.

On March 13, 2015, CIL, an oil and gas producer which is 59.9%-
owned by Vedanta, said it received a INR205 billion (US$3.2
billion) tax bill from the Indian revenue authorities for its
alleged failure to deduct withholding tax on alleged capital
gains of INR245 billion made by its former parent during the
fiscal year ended March 2007.

CIL said in a notice to the Bombay Stock Exchange that the tax
demand, which stemmed from a reorganization ahead of CIL's stock
market listing in 2007, comprised INR102 billion in outstanding
tax and INR102 billion in interest.

While Moody's views CIL's almost 60% reduction of its planned
capital expenditure to $500 million from $1.2 billion for the
financial year ending 31 March 2016 as a positive development,
Brent crude oil prices remain depressed and will negatively
affect Vedanta's profitability and cash generation.

Moody's expects Brent crude oil prices to average about
$87/barrel in the year to 31 March 2015 and around $57/barrel in
the year to 31 March 2016. Zinc and aluminium prices have also
softened in recent weeks, after a mild pick up in January 2015.

The disputed tax liability could constrain the group's liquidity.
At 30 September 2014, CIL's cash balances totaled around $2.7
billion, accounting for one-third of the group's liquid assets.
In recent years, CIL has upstreamed cash to its parents through
dividends and intra-company loans while also undertaking share
buybacks.

"As long as the tax investigation is ongoing, Vedanta will need
to be judicious in its use of CIL's cash balances and such a
situation would pressure Vedanta's broader liquidity position,"
adds Greene, who is also the Lead Analyst for Vedanta.

Vedanta's ratings could come under downward pressure if:

(1) Earnings from its oil and base metal businesses weaken, as a
     result of depressed commodity prices or material
     obstructions to production;

(2) The acquisition of the Government of India's stake in HZL
     goes ahead and fails to result in Vedanta's timely direct
     access to HZL's liquid assets; and

(3) Vedanta undertakes further acquisitions, investments or
     shareholder remuneration policies that include incremental
     debt that is not readily self-liquidating.

In addition, an adverse outcome for Vedanta in relation to the
tax dispute could also lead to a ratings downgrade.

Specific credit metrics that would lead to a downgrade if such
metrics are sustained include: 1) adjusted debt/EBITDA in excess
of 3.5x-4.0x; 2) cash flow from operations less dividends)-to-
debt below 15%; 3) EBIT/interest below 3.5x; or 4) a situation
where Vedanta consistently generates negative free cash flow.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014.

Headquartered in London, UK, Vedanta Resources Plc ("Vedanta") is
a diversified resources company with interests mainly in India.
Its main operations are held by Sesa Sterlite Limited ("SSL"), a
62.9%-owned subsidiary which produces zinc, lead, silver,
aluminium, iron ore and power.  In December 2011, Vedanta
acquired control, of Cairn India Limited ("CIL"), an independent
oil exploration and production company in India, which is now a
59.9%-owned subsidiary of SSL.  Listed on the London Stock
Exchange, Vedanta is 69.9% owned by Volcan Investments Ltd. For
the year ended March 2014, Vedanta reported revenues of US$14.6
billion and EBITDA of US$4.5 billion.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Reviews Global Bank Ratings
-------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service, on March 17, 2015, announced multiple
rating actions following its publication of its new bank rating
methodology, which now is the primary methodology for Moody's
bank ratings globally.

The rating actions affect 1,021 out of 1,934 rated banking
entities, which include operating banks, holding companies,
subsidiaries, special purpose issuance conduits, branches and
other entities for which Moody's has assigned ratings to at least
one debt class.  Within this total group of entities, 856 are
assigned baseline credit assessments (BCAs), of which 147 are
affected.  These total numbers refer to the banks that are
covered under this press release, as certain bank ratings in a
small number of countries (Japan, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, and
Russia) will be discussed in separate local press releases.

Moody's has placed the following ratings and assessments on
review:

  (1) 147 BCAs: 84 for upgrade and 63 for downgrade;

  (2) 421 long-term deposit ratings: 314 for upgrade, 96 for
      downgrade and 11 direction uncertain; and,

  (3) 451 senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings: 214 for
      upgrade, 212 for downgrade and 25 direction uncertain.

At the same time, Moody's has affirmed 124 long-term deposit
ratings and 147 senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings.

"Our fundamental approach to bank ratings has not changed
dramatically, but we have introduced a number of new tools to
enhance our analysis, which has resulted in these rating
reviews," said Greg Bauer, Moody's Co-head of Global Banking.
"These reviews are prompted by our new methodology, which we are
confident will enable us to appropriately reflect the rapidly
evolving global banking environment as it continues to develop."

Additionally, Moody's has withdrawn for business reasons inputs
to ratings in the form of bank financial strength ratings (BFSRs)
and ratings for other senior obligations (OSOs).  Separate lists
of withdrawn BFSRs and OSOs are available at the bottom of this
press release.  Going forward the BCA will be the only indicator
of issuers' standalone intrinsic strength.  In a few cases where
a BFSR was previously on review, this review has now been
assigned to the BCA.

The reviews follow its March 16, 2015 publication of Moody's
updated bank rating methodology, which incorporates several new
elements designed to help accurately predict bank failures and
determine how each creditor class is likely to be treated when a
bank fails and enters resolution, reflecting insights gained from
the crisis and the fundamental shift in the banking industry and
its regulation.

Key changes include the addition of a Macro Profile, a new
Financial Profile and a Loss Given Failure (LGF) analysis
framework, all of which are described below.  The first two
elements primarily affect the positioning of a bank's BCA, while
the last one can lead, through the assessment of instrument
volume and subordination levels and of expected treatment by
resolution authorities, to changes in long-term issuer, deposit
and debt ratings.  Please refer to the press release "Moody's
publishes its new bank rating methodology," published on March
16, 2015.

Separate from the implementation of the updated bank rating
methodology, Moody's has also lowered its expectations about the
likelihood of government support for European banks in light of
the introduction of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD) in the European Union and the move toward similar
frameworks with provisions for burden-sharing with senior
creditors in Switzerland, Norway and Liechtenstein.  In
anticipation of this decline in support, on May 29, 2014, Moody's
changed the outlook for the long-term ratings on 82 European
banks to negative and maintained the outlooks for the 74 banks
that already had negative outlooks or whose ratings were on
review for downgrade.

Moody's has concluded that the probability of support to even
systemically important banks across the region has declined.
However, the impact on ratings is moderated -- and in some cases
wholly or more than offset -- by a decline in expected loss
assumptions under the new LGF framework.  Moody's will publish a
more detailed report on the diminished probability of government
support in European bank ratings.

The updated bank rating methodology published on March 16, 2015
will be the primary methodology for all Moody's bank ratings,
including ratings that have not been placed on review.  This
updated bank rating methodology is being implemented on a global
basis, except in jurisdictions where certain regulatory
requirements must be fulfilled prior to implementation.

A list of the affected credit ratings is available at
http://is.gd/IXm14v

The list is an integral part of the Press Release and identifies
each affected issuer.

Moody's updated bank rating methodology introduces several new
elements that will affect ratings to varying degrees across
countries and regions.

-- BCA: NEW BCA SCORECARD FOCUSED ON MACRO PROFILE AND CORE
    FINANCIAL RATIOS

Moody's new Financial Profile takes as its starting point five
solvency- and liquidity-related financial ratios that are
predictive of bank failure: asset risk, capital, profitability,
funding structure and liquid resources.  The Financial Profile
also incorporates a broader range of supplementary ratios,
Moody's forward-looking expectations and other relevant
qualitative considerations. Joining these as a new input in
determining the BCA is the Macro Profile, which explicitly
captures banking system-wide pressures that have been shown to be
predictive of a bank's propensity to fail.

Impact on Baseline Credit Assessments

Globally, Moody's expects the enhanced approach to have a
generally modest positive impact on banks' BCAs, with changes
concentrated among European banks. These likely changes will
generally be the result of the application of the new scorecard
framework, which provides additional tools to assess banks'
credit fundamentals. (See below for regional breakdowns.)

-- LONG-TERM RATINGS: LOSS GIVEN FAILURE, RESOLUTION AND
    GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

The LGF analysis assesses the potential impact of a bank's
failure on its various debt classes and deposits in the absence
of any government support. Under its new methodology, Moody's
applies an Advanced LGF to banks subject to operational
resolution regimes, wherein authorities can impose losses on
creditors selectively outside of liquidation, and for which
specific legislation provides a reasonable degree of clarity on
how the bank's failure could affect depositors and other
creditors. The Basic LGF analysis applies to those banks that are
not subject to operational resolution regimes.

Impact on Long-Term Ratings

(1) In the US, Moody's expects generally positive effects on
     bank deposit ratings and mixed, though net negative, effects
     on senior unsecured debt ratings, reflecting explicit
     deposit preference in resolution, which benefits depositors
     at the expense of senior unsecured debt.

(2) In the EU, Switzerland, Norway and Liechtenstein, Moody's
     expects a positive effect on long-term deposit ratings,
     albeit more modest compared to the US, and a generally
     neutral effect on senior unsecured debt ratings. For banks
     whose long-term ratings are being affirmed or placed on
     review for upgrade, in general, the separate actions taken
     related to the diminished probability of government support
     are wholly or more than offset by the benefit of instrument
     volume and subordination protecting creditors from losses in
     resolution under the Advanced LGF approach.

(3) In all other regions covered through this press release,
     Moody's will apply its Basic LGF approach, in the absence of
     regulatory-driven operational resolution regimes. However,
     Moody's expects a small negative effect on senior unsecured
     and deposit ratings in some systems, reflecting the change
     in its view that the capacity for government support is
     limited to the government's bond rating, and that going
     forward there will be little scope for other policy tools to
     provide durable support beyond this constraint.

The sections below summarize the key likely rating changes by
region following the conclusion of Moody's review for banks
covered through this press release. The affected ratings refer to
banking entities, rather than consolidated banking groups.
Following the conclusion of its reviews, Moody's expects to make
the following rating changes:

NORTH AMERICA

  -- The ratings of Canadian banks are unaffected.

  -- In the US, 290 out of 417 rated banking entities are
    affected.

- Moody's has assigned BCAs to 91 US banking entities, of which
   81 BCAs remain unchanged; for the remaining 10 banking
   entities, the BCAs of half of these are on review for upgrade
   and half are on review for downgrade.

- The long-term deposit ratings for 100 banking entities are on
   review for upgrade and one is on review direction uncertain.
   None are on review for downgrade, owing to the substantial
   volume of deposits in US banks' liability structures, which
   should result in high recovery rates.

- The senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings for 54 banking
   entities (including operating and holding companies) are on
   review for upgrade, and 69 are on review for downgrade.  The
   issuer rating for one banking entity is on review direction
   uncertain and the senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings for
   19 banking entities are affirmed.

- In general, for US banking entities subject to resolution
   under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, their bank-level senior
   unsecured debt and issuer ratings are on review for upgrade
   given the substantial loss absorbing capital subordinated to
   them as well as the reduced loss assumption of an expected
   going concern resolution under the single point of entry
   resolution framework. At the holding company level, the senior
   unsecured debt ratings of several of these firms may benefit
   from the substantial thickness of this debt tranche as well as
   the amount of debt subordinated to it.

- For most US banking entities subject to Title I resolution,
   their deposit ratings are on review for upgrade and their
   bank-level senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings are on
   review for downgrade. The deposit ratings are most influenced
   by their substantial size. The senior unsecured debt and
   issuer rating actions result from the limited amount of senior
   unsecured debt outstanding, the lack of a substantial debt
   tranche subordinated to it, and the higher loss assumption
   under a Title I receivership-based resolution approach.
   Therefore, bank-level senior unsecured debt ratings could be
   reduced to the same level as the holding company senior
   unsecured debt ratings, which are largely unaffected by this
   review.

EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER WESTERN EUROPE

- The ratings on 609 out of 800 banking entities are affected.

- A BCA is assigned to 278 banking entities. Moody's expects to
   make changes to the BCAs of some European banking entities,
   with 53 BCAs on review for upgrade and 30 on review for
   downgrade as a result of the additional tools provided in the
   new scorecard framework.  The BCAs on review for upgrade are
   concentrated in the Nordics, the United Kingdom, Germany,
   France, Spain and Luxembourg.  The BCAs on review for
   downgrade are primarily for banking entities in Austria,
   Greece and Italy.

- The bulk of long-term deposit ratings (for 187 banking
   entities) and senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings (for
   154 banking entities) are on review for upgrade, because the
   combination of instrument volume and subordination results in
   an expected loss under the LGF analysis sufficiently low to
   more than offset the diminished expectations of government
   support.  The latter will be further discussed in a more
   detailed report that will be published.

- A much smaller number of long-term deposit ratings (for 48
   banking entities) are on review for downgrade, because fewer
   banking entities are affected by the decline in government
   support compared to the benefit their deposit ratings receive
   under the LGF framework.  Nevertheless, senior unsecured debt
   and issuer ratings for 95 banking entities are on review for
   downgrade, reflecting more limited degrees of instrument
   volume and subordination compared to deposits in the banks'
   liability structures.

- Additionally, 96 banking entities' long-term deposit ratings
   and 116 banking entities' senior unsecured debt and issuer
   ratings have been affirmed, typically because the result of a
   change in government support assumption is offset through the
   LGF framework.  Some deposit ratings (for 10 banking entities)
   and senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings (for 24 banking
   entities) are on review direction uncertain.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) AND WESTERN ASIA

- Only 14 out of 149 CIS banking entities are affected by the
   review.  Moody's has assigned BCAs to 138 banking entities, of
   which five BCAs are on review for upgrade and nine are on
   review for downgrade.

- Eleven deposit ratings (including both local and foreign
   currency ratings) are on review for upgrade, and eleven are on
   review for downgrade, generally in the same direction as the
   change Moody's expects to make to the banks' BCAs.

- Similarly, the senior unsecured debt rating of one banking
  entity is on review for upgrade and for one banking entity on
  review for downgrade, again as a result of the review on the
  BCA.

ASIA PACIFIC (EXCLUDING JAPAN)

- Among the total of 290 rated banking entities in the region,
   excluding those of Japanese banks, which are covered through a
   local press release, ratings on 65 banking entities are
   affected.  Within this total group of banking entities, 158
   are assigned BCAs, of which 20 BCAs are affected: 15 are on
   review for upgrade and five are on review for downgrade.  The
   reviews for upgrade are concentrated among banks in Taiwan
   (4), the Philippines (3), Malaysia (3) and Indonesia (2), and
   are driven by the positioning of a bank's credit strength in a
   global context under the new scorecard framework.

- Long-term deposit, issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings
   are generally unaffected, given that banks in the region are
   not subject to operational resolution regimes and government
   support expectations therefore remain largely unchanged.
   However, among Asia Pacific banking entities covered through
   this press release, 17 long-term deposit and 29 senior
   unsecured debt and issuer ratings (including both local and
   foreign currency ratings) are on review for downgrade. This is
   largely driven by the change in Moody's view that the capacity
   for government support is limited to a government's bond
   rating, rather than the previous expectation that banks in
   India, Thailand and Malaysia could benefit from additional
   support through other policy tools.

- Ten banking entities' long-term deposit and five banking
   entities' senior unsecured debt and issuer ratings are on
   review for upgrade, generally reflecting the expectations of
   an increase in those banking entities' BCAs. Long-term deposit
   ratings of 28 banking entities and senior unsecured debt and
   issuer ratings of 12 banking entities are affirmed.

LATIN AMERICA

- The ratings on 32 out of 103 banking entities covered through
   this press release are affected. Moody's has assigned a BCA to
   75 banking entities, of which six BCAs are on review for
   upgrade and 12 are on review for downgrade.  Of these, three
   Brazilian banking entities' BCAs, which currently are higher
   than the government bond rating, are on review for downgrade,
   with the expectation of aligning them with the government's
   rating.  Other BCAs are generally on review for upgrade or
   downgrade as the new scorecard framework provides additional
   tools to position a bank's credit strength in a global
   context.

- Long-term deposit, issuer and senior unsecured debt ratings
   are generally unaffected.  Nevertheless, six banking entities'
   long-term deposit ratings are on review for upgrade, generally
   owing to the expectation that these banks' BCAs will be
   raised.

- Additionally, 11 banking entities' long-term deposit and 18
   banking entities' senior unsecured debt or issuer ratings are
   on review for downgrade, largely owing to the review for
   downgrade on these banking entities' BCAs and/or the change in
   Moody's view that the capacity for government support is
   limited to a government bond rating, rather than the previous
   expectation that banks in Chile, Colombia and Guatemala could
   benefit from additional support through other policy tools.

MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

- Only 11 out of 133 banking entities are affected by the
   review.  Moody's has assigned a BCA to 106 banking entities,
   of which two BCAs are on review for downgrade under the new
   scorecard framework.

- The deposit ratings of nine banking entities are on review for
   downgrade, one of which is driven by the review of the BCA.
   The other eight banking entities' long-term deposit ratings of
   the banks in Pakistan, Morocco and Jordan are on review for
   downgrade as a result of the change in Moody's view that the
   capacity of the government to provide support is limited to
   the government's own creditworthiness, as implied by its bond
   rating, rather than the previous expectation that banks could
   benefit from additional support through other policy tools.

SUBORDINATED DEBT, BANK HYBRIDS AND CONTINGENT CAPITAL SECURITIES

Changes in a bank's BCA will, in most instances, affect the
ratings of its junior securities. This reflects the general
assumption that these instrument ratings do not benefit from
government support. Therefore, for banks whose BCAs have been
placed on review, Moody's has also extended the review to the
ratings on subordinated debt, bank hybrids and contingent capital
securities. Additionally, some holding company junior instrument
ratings have been placed on review for upgrade owing to a smaller
notching differential versus the BCA under Moody's LGF analysis,
depending on the amount of issuance of the same instrument class
and the amount of more subordinated instruments.

SCOPE OF THE REVIEW

Whenever credit rating methodologies are revised, the updated
methodology is applied to all relevant credit ratings.
Accordingly, Moody's places on review the ratings of those banks
that are likely to be affected. Moody's expects to conclude the
majority of its reviews in the coming few months. During the
review period, Moody's will assess the impact of the new
methodology on rated instruments and will focus on the following
in particular:

(1) BCA analysis, which will incorporate 2014 full-year data, if
     available, and entail further assessment of fundamental
     credit trends in the context of the new scorecard;

(2) Advanced LGF analysis, which will incorporate 2014 full-year
     data, if available, and entail further analysis of banks and
     their securities for which subordination levels and volume
     thresholds are likely to lead to a change in LGF notching;
     and/or,

(3) Government support analysis, which will entail further
     analysis on Moody's revised view on potential government
     support in Europe.

LIST OF AFFECTED CREDIT RATINGS

Below is the link to access the list of Affected Credit Ratings
which includes the full list of affected ratings covered by this
press release. This list also provides guidance on the likely
outcomes for the deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings on
review.

The affirmations of long-term ratings are due to a change in the
standalone assessment or support assumption being offset through
other components of the new rating framework, such as LGF. This
particularly affects European bank long-term deposit and senior
unsecured debt ratings, where a reduction in government support
is offset by uplift through the advanced LGF.

Moody's has withdrawn its BFSRs as well as ratings on OSOs.

Moody's has withdrawn these ratings for its own business reasons.

The List of Affected Credit Ratings, which includes a list of all
affected credit ratings, and the lists of withdrawn BFSRs and
OSOs rating are an integral part of this press release and
identify each affected issuer covered by this press release:

- Overall List of Affected Credit Ratings: http://is.gd/IXm14v

- List of withdrawn BFSRs: http://is.gd/0zKA9A

- List of withdrawn ratings for OSOs: http://is.gd/Ym4Gr8

Owing to local regulatory requirements, certain bank ratings in a
small number of countries (Japan, Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, and
Russia) will be discussed in local press releases; those rating
actions are not covered by this press release.


* Moody's Says Ratings Will Reflect Declining Gov't. Support
------------------------------------------------------------
In a series of rating actions taken on March 17, 2015, Moody's
Investors Service said that its European bank ratings will now
reflect the declining probability of government support under the
European Union's (EU) Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD).   Moody's now anticipates that fewer than 5% of European
bank deposit ratings will include more than one notch of
government support, compared to around 40% at present.  However,
ratings impact will be somewhat mitigated by the potential for
lower loss rates in the event of resolution, and some by support
for senior creditors provided by buffers of subordinated debt.

The new report titled, "European Bank Ratings To Reflect Reduced
Probability of Government Support", expands on the rating
rationale outlined in Moody's recent rating action announcement,
"Moody's reviews global bank ratings".

The BRRD, which took effect in January 2015, provides a
resolution framework that is designed to minimize losses and
avoid the use of public funds to bail out failing banks.
Following a number of discussions with European authorities about
the specifics of the BRRD, Moody's is lowering its expectations
of government support for European banks.

Moody's has concluded that the BRRD establishes a broadly
credible resolution framework, which is likely to be used to deal
with failing banks.  Creditors, including senior unsecured
bondholders and junior depositors, will be expected to absorb the
cost of recapitalizing failed banks, with few permitted
exceptions.

As a result, Moody's believes that, for most European banks, the
probability of governments providing support has decreased and,
thus, will typically result in no meaningful reduction in credit
risk for senior creditors and junior depositors of banks not
considered to be systemically significant.

Moody's expects that relatively few banks that fail in the EU
will benefit from government support, although creditors of
global systemically important banks and other banks that are
likely to be seen as particularly important in domestic markets
could continue to benefit from a moderate probability of support.
This will likely amount to 1 notch of uplift in the senior
unsecured debt and deposit ratings of around 70 systemically
important banks and their domestic operating bank subsidiaries,
according to Simon Ainsworth, a VP - Senior Credit Officer at
Moody's.  However, a low probability of support and typically no
rating uplift are the more likely outcomes for junior and holding
company creditors.

Public-sector banks, with a policy mandate are likely to benefit
from a higher probability of support, which Moody's thinks could
result in roughly two to three notches of uplift to senior
unsecured debt and deposit ratings.

Moody's considers that authorities' approach to supporting banks
will be broadly consistent throughout the EU, since the BRRD
allows little national discretion. Although the BRRD does not
directly apply to Switzerland, Norway or Liechtenstein, Moody's
expectation is that their resolution frameworks will, in
practice, lead to similar treatment of failing banks and, hence,
similar rating implications.

The rating impact of reduced expectations of governments'
willingness to support banks will be mitigated somewhat by the
potential for lower loss rates in the event of resolution.  Bank
senior creditors are also more likely to be protected by capital
buffers of more junior debt, which would be used to absorb losses
and recapitalize the bank.  From a credit rating perspective,
these mitigating factors will be taken into account in the new
framework for Loss-Given Failure (LGF) discussed in Moody's
updated bank rating methodology that was published on 16 March
2015.


* Moody's Reviews for Upgrade 69 European Covered Bond Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service placed on review for upgrade the
ratings of 69 European covered bonds.  Concurrently, the rating
agency placed one rating on review for downgrade, one rating on
review with direction uncertain, and confirmed four ratings.

The rating actions follow Moody's update of its covered bond
rating methodology.  The actions have also taken into account the
rating constraints for each covered bond programme imposed by the
country ceilings and timely payment indicator (TPI) framework.

Specifically, the rating agency has changed its reference point
-- the covered bond (CB) anchor -- for determining the
probability that an issuer will cease making payments under a
covered bond, before any recourse to the covered bond collateral.
Under the updated methodology, Moody's will now use financial
institutions' Counterparty Risk (CR) Assessments, when available,
as the reference point for the CB anchor.

A list of the affected credit ratings is available at
http://is.gd/CMZRyv

The list is an integral part of the press release.

UPDATE TO THE RATING METHODOLOGY FOR COVERED BONDS:

The CB anchor will typically be the CR Assessment plus one notch
for covered bonds that fall under either (1) the EU directive on
bank resolution and recovery; or (2) a resolution regime that
Moody's believes provides an equivalent level of protection for
covered bonds. Otherwise, the CB anchor will typically be the CR
Assessment.

The ratings of 69 covered bonds were placed on review for upgrade
because Moody's expects their CB anchors to be positioned above
the current CB anchor. The rating agency also expects that it
will position the CB anchor of one covered bond below the current
CB anchor levels, and so placed it on review for downgrade.
Moody's might position the CB anchor of one covered bond either
above or below the current CB anchor level, and so has placed
this on review with direction uncertain. Lastly, the rating
agency has confirmed the rating of four covered bonds out of 23
(only 13 are part of this rating action) on review for downgrade;
the agency expects that the CB anchor of these four covered bonds
will remain at the current level.

The CR Assessments, when available, will typically be used as the
reference point to determine the CB anchor for all jurisdictions.
On March 16, Moody's introduced the CR Assessment in its revised
Bank Rating Methodology and published an update to its Rating
Symbols and Definitions, which now offers a definition of the CR
Assessment under the section "Input to Ratings Services". Moody's
has also published a Frequently Asked Questions document that
sets out the relative positioning of the CR Assessment relative
to credit ratings. For links to all three of these documents,
please refer to "Other Research" at the end of the Ratings
Rationale section of this press release.

Although Moody's will assign the CR Assessments to financial
institutions over time, the rating agency will immediately start
using approximations for CR Assessments as inputs into its credit
analysis for covered bonds. The approximate values will be used
up to the point when Moody's assigns a CR Assessment.

Moody's uses internal guidance on the CR Assessments to assess
the rating impact on outstanding covered bonds. The internal
guidance is in line with the guidance published in its updated
bank rating methodology and its responses to frequently asked
bank methodology related questions.

More specifically, the CR Assessment's position relative to the
financial institution's rated instruments will depend on that
institution's jurisdiction. In the European Union and Norway, the
CR Assessment will generally be at least as high as the deposit
rating. In Switzerland, the CR Assessment will generally be at
least as high as the senior unsecured debt rating.

Outside operational resolution regimes, the CR Assessment will
generally be no lower than the deposit rating.

In all cases, the CR Assessment will be subject to a cap of the
lower of the local-currency deposit ceiling, or the local
government bond rating plus one notch, or plus two notches where
the adjusted baseline credit assessment (BCA) is itself already
above the government bond rating.

Where relevant, the approximate CR Assessment values used in
covered bond credit analysis will factor in guidance on expected
changes to the BCA, and the senior unsecured debt and deposit
ratings.

TPI FRAMEWORK:

The rating actions have also taken into account the rating
constraints that the country ceilings and TPI framework impose on
each covered bond program.

The disclosures on each of the credit ratings affected by the
rating actions include cover pool losses, collateral risk, market
risk, collateral score, TPI, TPI leeway and the minimum over-
collateralization consistent with the current covered bond
rating.

Moody's expects to conclude the majority of the covered bond
rating reviews in the first half of 2015. The timeline to resolve
these reviews will depend on the resolution process applied to
the financial institutions' ratings, as well as the assignment of
CR Assessments.

KEY RATING ASSUMPTIONS/FACTORS:

Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the probability
that the issuer will cease making payments under the covered
bonds (a CB anchor event); and (2) the stressed losses on the
cover pool assets following issuer default.

The cover pool losses is an estimate of the losses Moody's
currently models if a CB anchor event occurs. Moody's splits
cover pool losses between market risks and collateral risks.
Market risks measure losses stemming from refinancing risks and
risks related to interest rate and currency mismatches (these
losses may also include certain legal risks). Collateral risks
measure losses resulting directly from cover pool assets' credit
quality. Moody's derives the collateral risk from the collateral
score.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a TPI to each covered bond that
indicates the likelihood that the issuer will make timely
payments to covered bondholders following a CB anchor event. The
TPI framework limits the covered bond rating to a certain number
of notches above the CB anchor.

FACTORS THAT WOULD LEAD TO AN UPGRADE OR DOWNGRADE OF THE
RATINGS:

The CB anchor is the main determinant of a covered bond's rating
robustness.  A change in the level of the CB anchor could lead to
an upgrade or downgrade of the covered bonds.

The TPI Leeway measures the number of notches by which Moody's
might lower the CB anchor before the rating agency downgrades the
covered bonds because of TPI framework constraints.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances, such as (1) a sovereign downgrade
negatively affecting both the CB anchor and the TPI; (2) a
multiple-notch lowering of the CB anchor; or (3) a material
reduction of the value of the cover pool.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-362-8552.


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