/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/150313.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R E U R O P E Friday, March 13, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 51 Headlines F I N L A N D TALVIVAARA MINING: Audley to Acquire Bankrupt Operational Unit F R A N C E BANQUE PSA: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' CCRs Over Santander Partnership CREDIPAR: S&P Raises LT CCR to 'BB+' Over Santander Partnership G E R M A N Y TELE COLUMBUS: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating I R E L A N D AQUILAE CLO II: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes I T A L Y WIND ACQUISITION: Fitch Rates Proposed Sr. Sec. Bonds 'BB-(EXP)' L U X E M B O U R G ELEX ALPHA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+' M A L T A CITIES ENTERTAINMENT: Took Almost EUR300,000 Worth of Furniture N E T H E R L A N D S GATEWAY II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B-1 Notes to 'CCC+' P O R T U G A L BANCO BPI: S&P Revises CreditWatch on 'BB-' Rating to Developing R U S S I A MECHEL OAO: Debt Settlement Plan May Help Avert Bankruptcy S P A I N TDA IBERCAJA: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class B Notes U N I T E D K I N G D O M ANYSTAFF RECRUITMENT: In Administration After No Buyer Found ATMOSPHERE BARS: Broadway Boulevard Could Sell for GBP1 CELESTE MORTGAGE 2015-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating to F Notes KEY HOMES: Berkeley Homes Takes Over Abandoned Woolwich Hotel MASTERTON LTD: Unprofitable Contracts Prompt Administration MUIRFIELD CONTRACTS: In Administration, Staff Put on Leave PT MCWILLIAMS: Creditors May Lose GBP25MM After Administration X X X X X X X X * BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History ********* ============= F I N L A N D ============= TALVIVAARA MINING: Audley to Acquire Bankrupt Operational Unit -------------------------------------------------------------- Kati Pohjanpalo and Kasper Viita at Bloomberg News report that a group of investors led by Audley Capital Advisors will acquire Talvivaara Mining Co.'s bankrupt operational unit. Finland's Economy Ministry said in an e-mailed statement Audley signed a conditional agreement to acquire Talvivaara Sotkamo's operations from its bankruptcy estate, Bloomberg relates. It also signed an investment deal with the Finnish state's Terrafame Oy, Bloomberg notes. According to the investment agreement, Audley will hold an 85% stake in a new mining company that will operate the nickel mine in northern Finland, with Terrafame owning the remaining 15%, Bloomberg relates. The companies are planning to invest more than EUR200 million (US$212 million) to restart operations at the mine and agreed to share environmental risks, Bloomberg discloses. Economy Minister Jan Vapaavuori, as cited by Bloomberg, said the value of the deal is less than the EUR40 million the Finnish government has spent after the operational unit's bankruptcy in November. The company suffered from falling nickel prices, a slow ramp-up at its mine as well as environmental issues and pollution caused by excess water, Bloomberg relays. Mr. Vapaavuori said the state will continue to spend about EUR10 million per month until the new owner takes over, Bloomberg notes. The ministry, as cited by Bloomberg, said funding for the deal, as well as approval by authorities, are still pending and the target date for the arrangement was set at "summer" 2015. About Talvivaara Mining Talvivaara Mining Co. Ltd. is a Finnish nickel producer. It filed for a corporate reorganization on Nov. 15, 2013, to raise funds and avoid bankruptcy. The company suffered from falling nickel prices and a slow ramp-up at its mine in northern Finland, forcing it to seek fundraising help from investors and creditors. =========== F R A N C E =========== BANQUE PSA: S&P Affirms 'BB/B' CCRs Over Santander Partnership -------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed the long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on European auto manufacturer Peugeot S.A.'s captive finance company, France-based Banque PSA Finance (BPF) at 'BB/B'. S&P's outlook on BPF's long- term counterparty credit rating is positive. On July 10, 2014, BPF and Santander Consumer Finance (SCF), the consumer finance subsidiary of Spanish bank Banco Santander (Santander), signed a framework agreement to establish joint- partnerships between the two groups in 11 European countries. On Feb. 2, 2015, BPF announced that its 50/50 partnership with SCF had obtained regulatory approvals to start operating in France and in the U.K. S&P expects the remaining transactions to close during 2015 and early 2016. S&P does not view the BPF-SCF partnership as having consequences for BPF's degree of insulation from its 100%-owner Peugeot. S&P continues to consider BPF as a "core" and "insulated" subsidiary of Peugeot and S&P caps its long-term rating at two notches above its parent under S&P's group rating methodology. Previously, the two-notch differential also reflected S&P's view of BPF's systemic importance to the French government, which S&P has now revised to "low" from "moderate." In S&P's view, BPF's reduced balance sheet size going forward means that a default is not likely to weaken the French financial system. In the meantime, although BPF will continue to oversee the financial services operations of Peugeot, the ability of the group to provide financing solutions to its customers (and potentially preserving employment in France) is in itself enhanced through the joint- ventures. BPF will directly supervise its existing financing activities in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and Russia, while providing commercial, information technology (IT), and operational services for the 11 joint-ventures for a fee. S&P now analyzes BPF as a member of a wider group, the BPF group, that provides car financing for Peugeot and that includes 50% of the joint-ventures. This is to better reflect the credit strength of the combined operations by allowing S&P to capture the benefits brought by the joint-ventures to BPF's overall credit profile. S&P assess the group credit profile of the BPF group before extraordinary support (unsupported GCP). S&P then assess the potential extraordinary support BPF might receive, together with its degree of insulation from Peugeot, to derive its issuer credit rating (ICR). S&P assess the unsupported GCP at 'bb+'. Based on this, S&P rates BPF at 'BB'. The starting point for S&P's unsupported GCP assessment is the anchor for the BPF group, which S&P assess as 'bbb+'. The anchor factors in the full lending activities of BPF in Latin America, CEE, and Russia, and 50% of the loan book exposure of the joint- ventures. S&P does not expect the group to restore its business model resilience until 2016, given Peugeot's weak sales growth momentum. However, S&P expects the group's loan book to stabilize and operating revenues to rise in 2015. In 2014, the group's operating performance remained satisfactory and broadly in line with S&P's expectations, despite weak business volumes and high cost of funding, in S&P's view. S&P expects BPF group to remain adequately capitalized. S&P forecasts its RAC ratio (calculated at the level of BPF's regulatory perimeter) will progressively decrease, but stabilize at slightly above 7% by year-end 2016. S&P anticipates a sharp decrease as it expects significant dividends and equity to be upstreamed to Peugeot and S&P's model includes a 1,250% risk- weight for BPF's minority equity holding in the joint ventures. S&P considers that BPF group's credit exposure is low risk, despite its high concentration in the auto dealership sector. The group's credit risk performance in 2014 was comparable with that of captive peers and the banking industry in general. In S&P's view, the ongoing funding and liquidity support the joint-ventures receive from SCF balances the less-secured funding structure for BPF subsidiaries in Latin America, CEE, and Russia. Under the partnership with SCF, although each joint-venture will need to find and diversify its own sources of funding, SCF will provide additional financing to close any funding gaps. The positive outlook mirrors that on Peugeot. S&P would likely raise the long-term rating on BPF if we upgraded Peugeot, all else remaining equal. S&P would consider revising the outlook to stable if it revised the outlook on Peugeot to stable. CREDIPAR: S&P Raises LT CCR to 'BB+' Over Santander Partnership --------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has raised its long-term counterparty credit rating on the French captive finance company of European auto manufacturer Peugeot S.A., Credipar to 'BB+' from 'BB'. S&P's outlook on Credipar's long- term counterparty credit rating is positive. S&P also affirmed its short-term counterparty credit ratings on Credipar and its sister company Sofira at 'B'. On July 10, 2014, BPF and Santander Consumer Finance (SCF), the consumer finance subsidiary of Spanish bank Banco Santander (Santander), signed a framework agreement to establish joint- partnerships between the two groups in 11 European countries. On Feb. 2, 2015, BPF announced that its 50/50 partnership with SCF had obtained regulatory approvals to start operating in France and in the U.K. S&P expects the remaining transactions to close during 2015 and early 2016. "In our view, the French joint-venture would likely receive extraordinary support from Santander in case of need, but if Peugeot experienced financial stress, it would likely affect the joint-venture's creditworthiness. As a result, we could factor up to one notch of group support from Santander into our long- term rating on the French joint-venture, but we would cap it at three notches above the long-term rating on Peugeot. Under our group rating methodology, we define the French joint-venture as a "moderately strategic" subsidiary of Santander and an "insulated" subsidiary of Peugeot. Among other things, this reflects SCF's 50% ownership, its full consolidation for accounting and regulatory purpose, the long-term nature of the partnership, and the contractual agreement from SCF to provide liquidity support if needed," S&P said. The French joint-venture consists of Credipar, its sister company Sofira, and their unrated direct parent SOFIB, all of which operated before the BPF-SCF partnership and were owned by BPF. Now, BPF and SCF each own 50% of SOFIB, which directly owns Credipar and Sofira. All three companies operate exclusively in France: Credipar handles the financing of Peugeot's end- customers, Sofira handles the financing of the dealers' network, and SOFIB will book the deposit business. The long-term rating on Credipar and the short-term ratings on Credipar and Sofira reflect S&P's assessment of the creditworthiness of the French joint-venture. S&P analyzes Credipar as a member of a wider group, the BPF group, that provides car financing for Peugeot and that includes 50% of the joint-ventures. This is to better capture the close links, in S&P's view, between the joint-ventures and their 50% owner BPF. S&P assess the group credit profile of the BPF group before extraordinary support (unsupported GCP). S&P then assess the potential extraordinary support Credipar might receive, together with its degree of insulation from Peugeot, to derive its issuer credit rating (ICR). S&P assess the unsupported GCP at 'bb+'. Based on this, S&P has assessed the ICR of Credipar at 'BB+'. The French joint-venture is exclusively focused on car finance and auto leasing for Peugeot in France, which S&P views as a rating weakness. In the meantime, S&P anticipates that its capitalization will remain at an adequate level, and consider that its credit exposure is low risk, although highly concentrated on the auto dealership sector. S&P understands that, under the partnership, SCF will close any funding gaps, although the joint-venture will need to maintain its own diversified sources of funding. The positive outlook mirrors that on Peugeot. S&P would likely raise the long-term rating on Credipar if S&P upgraded Peugeot, all else remaining equal. S&P would consider revising the outlook to stable if it revised the outlook on Peugeot to stable. ============= G E R M A N Y ============= TELE COLUMBUS: S&P Assigns 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating --------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its 'B+' long-term corporate credit rating to German cable operator Tele Columbus AG. The outlook is stable. S&P also assigned its 'B+' issue rating to the company's EUR500 million senior facilities, consisting of a EUR375 million term loan, a EUR75 million capital expenditure facility, and a EUR50 million revolving credit facility (RCF). The recovery rating on these facilities is '4', indicating S&P's expectation of 30%-50% recovery in the event of a payment default. S&P's recovery expectations are in the upper half of the 30%-50% range. These ratings are in line with the preliminary ratings that S&P assigned on Oct. 6, 2014. The corporate credit rating is constrained by Tele Columbus' still-significant reliance on third-party cable-TV networks and the need to successfully execute its ambitious network modernization program, which is necessary to upgrade its technology to the highest industry standards. The company's limited scale and diversity also constrain the rating, as do huge investment outlays and significant execution risks as it seeks to accelerate its transition away from basic cable-TV offerings toward the model of its successful European and German peers. If it manages to do so, the transition should support customer retention, increase bundle penetration, and lift its average revenues per user (ARPU) through upselling activity. The sheer level of investments involved in the various projects related to this transformation, spanning technical upgrades, own network extension, and commercial initiatives, generates a risk, including timing uncertainty, which could materially affect overall performance in a very competitive environment. In S&P's view, there is a risk that, on renewal dates, housing-association direct customers would move to larger and generally more-advanced cable providers Kabel Deutschland or Unitymedia, or to competing products from Deutsche Telekom, if Tele Columbus cannot offer upgraded and converged services. However, the long-term nature of the housing-association contracts provides the company with some visibility and leeway to deploy its investment plan. S&P also acknowledges that the company has been able to significantly increase its broadband market share against incumbent Deutsche Telekom in the recent past and that it boasts leading local cable market shares in Eastern Germany, testifying to the company's successful commercial achievements within its own upgraded footprint, and also reflecting the technical edge of an upgraded cable offer over inferior ADSL technology. S&P thinks the company has had a good operational track record in the recent past, benefiting from a well-seasoned new management team, and that it will continue to shift an increasing portion of its ultimate customers to its own broadband-enabled network. This should allow customers to increasingly benefit from its high-speed broadband offers based on data over cable service interface specification (DOCSIS) 3.0 technology, reduce the risk of losing customers to the competition, and increase the prospects for higher ARPU as subscribers take up triple-play bundles. Good operating efficiency and an increasing proportion of customers served over the company's own network should provide some margin upside, in S&P's view. S&P's financial risk and management and governance assessments reflect its assumption that historical shareholders no longer control the company after the IPO, as a result of the injection of EUR367 million of fresh capital and the planned post-IPO liquidation of Tele Columbus Management and Tele Columbus Holdings S.A., two entities through which former shareholders used to fully control the company. S&P takes into account management's intention to maintain unadjusted net debt to EBITDA of about 3x-4x in the future and to not pay dividends for financial years 2014 and 2015. The stable outlook reflects S&P's assumption that the company will maintain its high operating efficiency in the next two years, successfully renegotiate maturing housing-association contracts, and continue to deliver its operational targets, which should be illustrated by revenue growth of more than 4% in 2015 and 2016 and improving EBITDA margins. In addition, S&P anticipates FOCF will improve from negative EUR30 million before IPO-related one-time items in 2015 to positive in 2017, adjusted debt to EBITDA will remain below 4x, and liquidity will remain adequate. Rating downside would stem from evidence of rising churn levels and loss of customers, which could come from delays or setbacks in the company's network investment program, various execution issues, or customer losses to Deutsche Telekom or other cable providers on contract renewal dates. In addition, heavy capital outlays not properly matched by revenues could adversely affect liquidity. Therefore, while S&P sees Tele Columbus as adequately funded to match its network upgrade program over the next two to three years, S&P would likely see rating pressure build if Tele Columbus depleted its cash balances and started to draw on its RCFs because revenues or EBITDA failed to increase. Given the company's cash-generation profile, adjusted leverage staying at about 4x could also put downward pressure on the rating. Rating upside appears limited for the next two to three years, but could occur if the company successfully executes its investment plan and manages to migrate an increasing portion of its customers to its own network and bundled offers, while maintaining leverage below 4x and strengthening free cash flow generation to about 10% of adjusted debt. ============= I R E L A N D ============= AQUILAE CLO II: S&P Affirms 'CCC+' Rating on Class E Notes ---------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on Aquilae CLO II PLC's class A, B, and C notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class D and E notes. The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the transaction using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 7, 2015 and the application of S&P's relevant criteria. S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes. The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults, based on S&P's stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay the noteholders. S&P used the portfolio balance that it considers to be performing, the reported weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considered to be appropriate. S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using S&P's standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for each class of notes, combined with different interest stress scenarios as outlined in S&P's criteria. S&P's review of the transaction highlights that the class A notes have amortized by more than 75% since S&P's Oct. 26, 2012 review. Overall, the deleveraging of the class A notes has resulted in increased available credit enhancement for all classes of rated notes. S&P's cash flow results show that the available credit enhancement for the class A and B notes is now commensurate with 'AAA (sf)' ratings. S&P has therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' its rating on the class A notes, and to 'AAA (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' its rating on the class B notes. In addition, the transaction's exposure to 'CCC' rated assets is now lower than in S&P's previous review. These assets now account for EUR0.943 million (equivalent to 0.74% of the performing portfolio). In S&P's previous review, EUR13.65 million assets had 'CCC+', 'CCC' or 'CCC-' ratings, representing 5.19% of the performing balance at the time. Predominantly driven by the class A notes' amortization, S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class C notes to be commensurate with a higher rating than that currently assigned. While S&P's credit and cash flow results indicate a rating that is at least equal to 'AA' for the class C notes, S&P has raised its rating on this class of notes to 'A+ (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' as the application of S&P's largest obligor supplemental test constrains its rating at this level. Similarly, S&P's credit and cash flow results indicate higher rating levels for the class D and E notes than those currently assigned. However, the application of S&P's largest obligor supplemental test constrains its ratings at their currently assigned levels. S&P has therefore affirmed its 'BB+ (sf)' and 'CCC+ (sf)' ratings on the class D and E notes, respectively. Aquilae CLO II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in November 2006 and securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade corporate firms. RATINGS LIST Aquilae CLO II PLC EUR316.5 mil floating-rate and deferrable floating-rate notes Rating Class Identifier To From A 03842EAA3 AAA (sf) AA+ (sf) B 03842EAB1 AAA (sf) A+ (sf) C XS0272303776 A+ (sf) BBB+ (sf) D XS0272304154 BB+ (sf) BB+ (sf) E XS0272304238 CCC+ (sf) CCC+ (sf) ========= I T A L Y ========= WIND ACQUISITION: Fitch Rates Proposed Sr. Sec. Bonds 'BB-(EXP)' ---------------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has assigned proposed new euro-denominated floating rate notes due 2020 issued by Wind Acquisition Finance S.A. (WAF) and guaranteed by Wind Telecomunicazioni SpA (B+/Stable) (Wind) an expected 'BB-(EXP)'/RR2(EXP)' rating. The proposed bond will effectively be a senior secured obligation of Wind ranking pari passu with other senior secured debt. The 'BB-(EXP)'/RR2(EXP)' expected rating reflects Fitch's expectation of high recoveries for secured creditors. The new bond is a part of EUR600 million offering, in a combination with a tap issue of WAF's currently outstanding euro- denominated 4% senior secured notes due 2020 ('BB-'/RR2) also guaranteed by Wind. The new issue proceeds, along with the tower sale proceeds and the recently announced new term loans, will be used for repayment of the existing EUR1.7bn term loans. The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final documents conforming to information already received. On a standalone basis, Wind's rating corresponds to 'B'/Stable. Wind's Issuer Default Rating is lifted by one notch to 'B+' for potential parental support. Wind is the number-three mobile operator in Italy with a subscriber market share of approximately 25% and the second-largest alternative fixed-line/broadband provider with a subscriber market share of approximately 16% at end-2014. Its leverage is high, reported at 5.9x net debt/EBITDA at end-2014. KEY RATING DRIVERS Challenging Operating Environment The Italian mobile market continues to contract in revenue terms. However, there are signs that the pricing war may be over. Key operators expect less direct tariff competition, with network quality issues coming to the fore. Wind demonstrates strong relative outperformance slowly increasing its subscriber market share, but this is not sufficient to protect it from absolute revenue and EBITDA declines. The weak economic environment in Italy continues to weigh on customer sentiment. Stable Fixed-Line Wind has significantly improved profitability in its fixed-line segment which Fitch believes should be sustainable with continuing focus on more profitable direct customers. Fibre roll-out in Italy is likely to be slow, protecting Wind's position as the largest alternative fixed-line operator in Italy. High Leverage Wind's leverage is high, reported at 5.9x net debt/EBITDA at end- 2014. Fitch estimates that the impact of the tower sale on leverage will be marginally positive as the reduction in net debt on the back of cash proceeds will be muted by increased rent expense, which Fitch capitalizes at a multiple of eight and adds to the total debt for funds from operations (FFO) adjusted net leverage calculation. The refinancing would improve the company's maturity profile and lead to interest savings. Deleveraging is likely to be slow. At above 5.5x net debt/EBITDA, Wind's leverage is sensitive to even minor EBITDA pressures. Fitch expects the company's free cash flow (FCF) to remain positive in the medium term but modest in absolute terms on average with less than EUR250m per year available for debt reduction in 2015-2017. Shareholder Support Positive but Limited Wind's ratings benefit from potential support from its sole ultimate shareholder, Vimpelcom Ltd., whose credit profile remains significantly stronger than Wind's. However, Fitch believes that a further rise in Wind's leverage may diminish Vimpelcom's propensity to provide support. An increase in leverage to above 6x net debt/EBITDA will no longer likely be consistent with expectations of any parental support. Vimpelcom's support has been modest so far. A EUR500m cash contribution in conjunction with PIK-notes refinancing in 1H14 was insufficient to materially reduce Wind's leverage, given its limited size relative to Wind's total debt of approximately EUR10bn. Vimpelcom has not committed itself to any additional support. No Short-Term Refinancing Risks Wind does not face any material refinancing risks before 2019 when the bulk of its debt comes due. Post-refinancing, the maturity profile is expected to improve. KEY ASSUMPTIONS -- Continuing modest revenue declines tempering from mid- single digit territory in 2015 to low-single digits afterwards. -- EBITDA margin stabilising at above 37%. -- Interest rate savings on the back of refinancing in 2014. -- Substantial on-going network investments with capex to revenue ratio of above 15% in the medium-term. -- No common dividends. -- No equity injection from the parent. RATING SENSITIVITIES Negative: Future developments that may individually or collectively lead to negative rating action include: -- A deterioration in leverage beyond 6x net debt /EBITDA and/or FFO adjusted net leverage sustainably above 6.5x. -- Continuing operating and financial pressures leading to negative FCF generation. Positive: Future developments that may individually or collectively lead to positive rating action include: -- Tangible parental support such as equity contribution or debt refinancing via intercompany loans leading to a material reduction in Wind's leverage. -- Net debt/EBITDA sustainably below 5.5x and FFO adjusted net leverage sustainably below 6x. -- Stabilization of operating and financial performance resulting in stronger and less volatile FCF generation. =================== L U X E M B O U R G =================== ELEX ALPHA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+' -------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on eleX Alpha S.A.'s class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes. At the same time, S&P has lowered its rating on the class E notes. The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the transaction using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 26, 2015 and the application of S&P's relevant criteria. S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes. The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults, based on S&P's stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay the noteholders. S&P used the portfolio balance that it considers to be performing, the reported weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considered to be appropriate. S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using its standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for each class of notes, combined with different interest stress scenarios as outlined in S&P's criteria. S&P's review of the transaction highlights that the class A-1 and A-2 notes have amortized by nearly 80% of the initial balance since closing. S&P's cash flow results show that the available credit enhancement for these classes of notes is commensurate with a 'AAA (sf)' rating. S&P has therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' its ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes. As of the January 2015 trustee report, the portfolio's weighted- average life has increased to 3.98% from 3.92% since S&P's previous review. All else being equal, an increase in the weighted-average life would result in an increase in scenario default rates (SDRs) at each rating level. The SDR is the minimum level of portfolio defaults that S&P expects each CDO tranche to be able to support the specific rating level using CDO Evaluator. S&P then determine whether the BDRs pass their SDRs at the assigned rating levels. Assets rated in the 'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', 'CCC-', and 'CC') have decreased to EUR9.8 million from EUR15.05 million since S&P's previous review. Defaults have also decreased to EUR6.4 million from EUR13.1 million over the same period. The concentration risk has peaked, compared with S&P's previous reviews, but will continue to increase as the transaction amortizes. S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class B, C, and D notes to be commensurate with higher ratings than those previously assigned. S&P has therefore raised its ratings on the class B, C, and D notes. S&P's cash flow results indicate that the available credit enhancement for the class E notes is commensurate with a lower rating than that currently assigned. Additionally, the weighted- average recovery rate at the 'B' and 'CCC' rating levels has decreased to 67.8% from 70.5% since S&P's previous review, which has caused the class E notes' BDR to pass its SDR at lower rating than that currently assigned. S&P has therefore lowered to 'CCC+ (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its rating on the class E notes. eleX Alpha is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade corporate firms. The transaction closed in December 2006. Since the reinvestment period ended in March 2013, the issuer has used all scheduled principal proceeds to redeem the notes in the transaction's documented priority of payments. RATINGS LIST Class Rating Rating To From eleX Alpha S.A. EUR300 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes Ratings Raised A-1 AAA (sf) AA+ (sf) A-2 AAA (sf) AA+ (sf) B AA+ (sf) AA- (sf) C AA (sf) A (sf) D BBB- (sf) BB+ (sf) Rating Lowered E CCC+ (sf) B+ (sf) ========= M A L T A ========= CITIES ENTERTAINMENT: Took Almost EUR300,000 Worth of Furniture --------------------------------------------------------------- Maltatoday reports that Former Cafe Premier owners Cities Entertainment were allowed to take almost EUR300,000 worth of office furniture and equipment after the company was liquidated. Addressing parliament, Nationalist MP Jason Azzopardi said it was "scandalous" that a company facing liquidation was also allowed to take the assets with it, according to Maltatoday. MP Azzopardi explained that through liquidation, owners would use all their assets to pay some of their debts, the report notes. The report relates that Mr. Azzopardi said a copy of the most recent audited accounts of Cities Entertainment were dated December 31, 2012, with a disclaimer that the audit evidence was not sufficient. The report by the National Audit Office, requested by the Opposition, was spurred on by MaltaToday's first report back in February 2014 when it broke the story that the Government Property Department (GPD) had withdrawn legal action for the rescission of CE's lease, despite having fallen back on some EUR250,000 in ground rent. Instead, on the advice of former GPD director and advisor to the Prime Minister, John Sciberras, the Cabinet approved a EUR4.2 million bailout to buy back the 65-year lease on the cafe in Old Theatre Street, Valletta; which money was used to pay the State back on outstanding rents, energy bills, VAT and tax, as well as Banif Bank loans of EUR2 million and a EUR210,000 fee to CE's shareholder Mario Camilleri for brokering the deal with John Sciberras, the report says. The NAO found a "lack of rigorous and documented consideration of other options" such as the legally justified rescission of the lease; "poor governance" with the Prime Minister's negotiating team failing to involve the GPD from the initial stages of negotiations; an absence of documentation to sustain government claims that there was a danger to the overlying National Library by gas cylinders in the cafe; and that a 5% commission for CE's shareholder was "unsubstantiated and . . . inappropriately included in the agreement," the report adds. ===================== N E T H E R L A N D S ===================== GATEWAY II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B-1 Notes to 'CCC+' ---------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating actions in Gateway II Euro CLO B.V. Specifically, S&P has: -- Raised its ratings on the class A1-E, A-1R, A-2, and A-3 notes; and -- Lowered its ratings on the class B-1 and B-2 notes. The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the transaction using data from the trustee report dated Jan. 9, 2015 and the application of S&P's relevant criteria. S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes. The BDR represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults, based on S&P's stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand and still fully repay the noteholders. S&P used the portfolio balance that S&P considers to be performing, the reported weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considered to be appropriate. S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using S&P's standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each rating category assumed for each class of notes, combined with different interest stress scenarios as outlined in S&P's criteria. S&P then compare the BDRs with the scenario default rates (SDRs). S&P generates the SDRs by using its CDO Evaluator and taking into account the obligors in the portfolio, S&P's ratings, industries, maturities, and countries in which the obligors operate. Obligor concentration has increased since our Feb. 24, 2012 review, mainly due to asset amortization. Assets rated in the 'CCC' category have decreased to 3.28% from about 8.00% over the same period. Defaults have also decreased to 0.80% from 1.84%. S&P also notes that British pound sterling assets are now greater than liabilities. The transaction's weighted-average life has decreased as it is nearing its maturity. The class A1-E and A1-R notes (together class A1 notes) have amortized by nearly 79% of their outstanding balance since the end of the reinvestment period that ended in July 2013. With higher available credit enhancement and lower SDRs, S&P's cash flow analysis shows that credit enhancement is commensurate with 'AAA' ratings. S&P has therefore raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' its ratings on the class A1-E andA1-R notes. Due to the class A1 notes' amortization, lower SDRs, and a higher recovery rate, S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class A-2 and A-3 notes to be commensurate with higher ratings than previously assigned. S&P has therefore raised to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' and to 'A (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its ratings on the class A-2 and A-3 notes, respectively. While the available credit enhancement for the B-1 and B-2 notes has also increased since S&P's previous review, the results of S&P's cash flow analysis indicate that the notes are able to sustain defaults at rating levels which are lower than those currently assigned. S&P has therefore lowered to 'B+ (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' and to 'CCC+ (sf)' from 'B (sf)' its ratings on the class B-1 and B-2 notes, respectively. Gateway II Euro CLO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade corporate firms. The transaction closed in April 2007 and is currently amortizing. Since the end of the reinvestment period, the issuer has used all scheduled principal proceeds to redeem the notes in the transaction's documented priority of payments. RATINGS LIST Class Rating To From Gateway II Euro CLO B.V. EUR413 Million Floating-Rate Notes Ratings Raised A-1E AAA (sf) AA+ (sf) A-1R AAA (sf) AA+ (sf) A-2 AA+ (sf) A+ (sf) A-3 A (sf) BBB+ (sf) Ratings Lowered B-1 B+ (sf) BB+ (sf) B-2 CCC+ (sf) B (sf) =============== P O R T U G A L =============== BANCO BPI: S&P Revises CreditWatch on 'BB-' Rating to Developing ---------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised the CreditWatch status to developing from positive on its 'BB-' long- term rating on Portugal-based Banco BPI S.A. (BPI) and its core subsidiary Banco Portugues de Investimento S.A. S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term rating on both BPI and Banco Portugues de Investimento. The CreditWatch developing placement follows the recommendation of BPI's board of directors that the shareholders decline the recent tender offer from Caixabank S.A. S&P believes that the possible failure of Caixabank's tender offer could lead to material changes to BPI's current ownership structure and strategic direction, and could put pressure on the ratings on BPI. When Caixabank launched the offer in February, S&P only contemplated the possibility of a positive impact on the long-term ratings on BPI if the tender offer were successful, or a neutral impact if it were to fail. BPI's board of directors' recommendation primarily reflects their view that the tender offer price does not reflect the bank's fair value. Caixabank responded that it considered the price offered to be appropriate and its plans beneficial for BPI and its shareholders. Santoro Finance-Prestacao de Servi‡os S.A., BPI's second-largest shareholder with a stake of about 19%, has suggested that BPI explore strategic alternatives, in particular the possibility of a merger with Banco Comercial Portugues S.A. (Millenium bcp). These developments make the deal with Caixabank more uncertain and indicate the divergence of views among shareholders on BPI's strategy. S&P considers it feasible that if Caixabank's offer is not accepted, this could lead to material changes in BPI's ownership structure (with Caixabank potentially reducing its interest in the bank) and, as a result, in the bank's strategic direction. S&P understands that the next step will be the decision of BPI's shareholders at their general meeting regarding the removal of existing limitations on voting rights. The outcome of this decision is, in S&P's view, a key determinant of whether the tender offer will proceed as Caixabank's offer is conditional on these limitations being removed. S&P understands that the general shareholders' meeting could take place in April. At that point, S&P expects to be able to have greater visibility on the likelihood of the tender offer progressing and the implications of the likely subsequent scenarios for BPI. The revision of the CreditWatch placement on Banco Portugues de Investimento S.A., a core subsidiary of BPI, mirrors that on its parent. The affirmation of the short-term rating reflects that, at present, S&P considers the upside or downside potential for the long-term counterparty credit ratings to be likely limited to one notch. The CreditWatch developing placement reflects the possibility of the long-term ratings on BPI being raised, affirmed, or lowered depending on the outcome of Caixabank's tender offer and subsequent developments, and S&P's assessment of their likely impact on the bank's business and financial profiles. S&P could raise the long-term rating by one notch if Caixabank acquires BPI and S&P considers BPI to be at least moderately strategic to its parent (which S&P believes is likely if the acquisition goes ahead). In that case, the ratings on BPI could benefit from one notch of uplift, capped at the level of the sovereign credit rating on Portugal, reflecting S&P's view of the likelihood of BPI receiving financial support from its parent if needed. (Under S&P's criteria, any uplift it applies for potential group support cannot lift the issuer credit rating on a subsidiary that is not "core" higher than the sovereign rating on the host country.) S&P could lower the long-term rating on BPI if the failure of Caixabank's tender offer were to lead to meaningful changes in the bank's shareholder structure--which has been stable and supportive in the past--as well to its strategic direction, resulting in higher risks for the bank. Finally, S&P could affirm the ratings if Caixabank's tender offer is declined, but BPI maintains a cohesive, supportive shareholding structure, and a strategy that S&P believes will entail contained business and financial risks. =========== R U S S I A =========== MECHEL OAO: Debt Settlement Plan May Help Avert Bankruptcy ---------------------------------------------------------- PRIME reports that Andrei Kostin, CEO of the country's second largest bank VTB Bank, said in an interview with Bloomberg released on March 11 Mechel OAO may still avoid bankruptcy if the company offers a real debt settlement plan to its creditors. According to PRIME, Mr. Kostin said VTB needs a real program aimed at gradually redeeming the debt and not just a five- to 10- year delay with no obvious sources of financing or any progress in the situation. Mr. Kostin, as cited by PRIME, said that there is still a possibility to settle the situation with Mechel's debt and he plans to meet with the company's main owner Igor Zyuzin in the week starting from March 16 to discuss the issue. The Russian government is monitoring the dialogue between Mechel and VTB, Industry and Trade Minister Denis Manturov told reporters, adding that he hopes that the sides will come to an agreement, PRIME relays. Mechel, PRIME says, has been in debt restructuring talks with its core creditors -- Sberbank, Gazprombank and VTB, for several months. On Feb. 24, Mechel said it plans to ask the government for help under an anti-crisis plan, while on March 7, VTB notified other creditors that it is going to file a bankruptcy suit against the company, PRIME recounts. Mechel OAO is a Russian metals and mining group. ========= S P A I N ========= TDA IBERCAJA: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class B Notes ----------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'A+ (sf)' from 'AA (sf)' its credit rating on TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria's class A(G) notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class B notes. Upon publishing S&P's updated criteria for Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS criteria) and its updated criteria for rating single-jurisdiction securitizations above the sovereign foreign currency rating (RAS criteria), S&P placed those ratings that could potentially be affected "under criteria observation". Following S&P's review of this transaction, its ratings that could potentially be affected by the criteria are no longer under criteria observation. The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of the most recent transaction information that S&P has received dated October 2014. S&P's analysis reflects the application of its RMBS criteria and its RAS criteria. Under S&P's RAS criteria, S&P applied a hypothetical sovereign default stress test to determine whether a tranche has sufficient credit and structural support to withstand a sovereign default and so repay timely interest and principal by legal final maturity. S&P's RAS criteria designate the country risk sensitivity for RMBS as "moderate". Under S&P's RAS criteria, this transaction's notes can therefore be rated four notches above the sovereign rating, if they have sufficient credit enhancement to pass a minimum of a "severe" stress. The transaction has an amortizing reserve fund, which is set at the minimum of 9.2% of the initial balance of the class A(G) notes and 18.4% of the outstanding principal balance of the class A(G) notes. The reserve fund is at its required level and represents 14.8% of the class A(G) notes' outstanding balance. Severe delinquencies of more than 90 days are at 0.21%. They are, on average, lower than S&P's Spanish RMBS index. Defaulted loans are defined as loans in arrears for a period equal to or higher than 18 months, or those considered so by the administrator. Cumulative defaults are 0.21% of the initial pool balance, lower than in other Spanish RMBS transactions that S&P rates. Prepayment levels remain low and the transaction is unlikely to pay down significantly in the near term, in S&P's opinion. After applying S&P's RMBS criteria to this transaction, its credit analysis results show an increase in the weighted-average foreclosure frequency (WAFF) at all rating levels, since S&P's previous review. The weighted-average loss severity (WALS) has increased at each rating level in this transaction. Rating WAFF (%) WALS (%) AAA 25.76 16.22 AA 19.10 10.91 A 15.53 3.98 BBB 11.27 2.00 BB 7.06 2.00 B 5.86 2.00 The increase in the WAFF is mainly due to adjustment factors that S&P has applied to the original loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, the different adjustments that S&P applies to seasoned loans, and the geographical province concentration adjustments under S&P's RMBS criteria. The increase in the WALS is mainly due to the application of S&P's revised market value decline assumptions under S&P's RMBS criteria. The overall effect is an increase in the required credit coverage for each rating level since S&P's previous review. Following the application of S&P's RAS criteria and its RMBS criteria, S&P has determined that its assigned rating on each class of notes in this transaction should be the lower of (i) the rating as capped by S&P's RAS criteria and (ii) the rating that the class of notes can attain under S&P's RMBS criteria. The notes redeem sequentially and there are no pro rata conditions or interest deferral triggers. The transaction has an interest rate swap to mitigate the mismatch between the reference index on the asset pool and that on the notes. S&P's rating on the class A(G) notes is constrained by S&P's RAS stresses and this class of notes can be rated up to four notches above S&P's rating on the sovereign to reach 'A+ (sf)' (Kingdom of Spain [BBB/Stable/A-2]). S&P has therefore lowered to 'A+ (sf)' from 'AA (sf)' its rating on the class A(G) notes. S&P has affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class B notes because this class of notes first missed an interest payment in 2012, which was used at closing to fund the reserve fund. S&P also considers credit stability in its analysis. To reflect moderate stress conditions, S&P adjusted its WAFF assumptions by assuming additional arrears of 4% and 8% for one-year and three- year horizons, respectively. This did not result in S&P's rating deteriorating below the maximum projected deterioration that S&P would associate with each relevant rating level, as outlined in S&P's credit stability criteria. In S&P's opinion, the outlook for the Spanish residential mortgage and real estate market is not benign and S&P has therefore increased its expected 'B' foreclosure frequency assumption to 3.33% from 2.00%, when S&P applies its RMBS criteria, to reflect this view. S&P bases these assumptions on its expectation of modest economic growth, continuing high unemployment, and that the falls in house prices which we observed in 2014, will level off in 2015. On the back of improving but still depressed macroeconomic conditions, S&P doesn't expect the performance of the transactions in its Spanish RMBS index to improve in 2015. S&P expects severe arrears in the portfolio to remain at their current levels, as there are a number of downside risks. These include weak economic growth, high unemployment, and fiscal tightening. On the positive side, S&P expects interest rates to remain low for the foreseeable future. TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO is a Spanish RMBS transaction, which securitizes a portfolio of first-ranking mortgage loans granted to Spanish residents. The transaction closed in July 2013. RATINGS LIST Class Rating Rating To From TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria EUR447.2 Million Floating-Rate Notes Rating Lowered A(G) A+ (sf) AA (sf) Rating Affirmed B D (sf) =========================== U N I T E D K I N G D O M =========================== ANYSTAFF RECRUITMENT: In Administration After No Buyer Found ------------------------------------------------------------ Recruiter reports that Anystaff Recruitment has called in the administrators after amassing a "significant" number of debts. In a statement released March 11, insolvency practitioners SFP announced they had been appointed administrators to Anystaff, which has subsequently ceased trading, despite an "intensive" search for a possible buyer, Recruiter relates. According to Recruiter, the statement adds the loss of one of the firm's clients "severely" affected turnover leading to mounting HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) arrears. A Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) was agreed but breached, while a payment plan with HMRC was rejected, Recruiter recounts. The CVA supervisor petitioned for the winding up of the company, and subsequently SFP's Simon Plant and Daniel Plant were appointed as joint administrators on February 20 2015, Recruiter relays. SFP adds that it along with valuation agents actively marketed the business for sale and spoke to three interested parties, Recruiter discloses. Having contacted the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (GLA), the administrators continued to run the business to maximize returns for creditors, Recruiter notes. However, Anystaff ceased trading on Feb. 27 after confirmation from its largest customer, which represented 80% of the firm's turnover, that it had taken its business elsewhere, Recruiter recounts. Anystaff is a food industry recruiter. ATMOSPHERE BARS: Broadway Boulevard Could Sell for GBP1 ------------------------------------------------------- Owen Hughes at The Daily Post reports that a nightclub in the seaside resort is set to go to auction in London with no reserve price attached to the listing as owners look to finally dispose of the former theatre. Llandudno nightclub Broadway Boulevard is set to go to auction -- and could sell for GBP1, according to The Daily Post. The report notes that the nightspot closed in June 2013 after parent company Atmosphere Bars and Clubs went into administration. It was initially put on the market for GBP750,000 but this was reduced GBP500,000 last year, the report relates. The former Grand Theatre then went up at auction in December but failed to meet the reserve price, the report says. Last month, the Daily Post revealed an offer had been accepted for the club but the deal was not completed. Now, the site is to go to auction with Allsops in London on March 25, the report relays. There is no reserve price so even if the highest bid is GBP1, it will sell on the day -- although the buyer will then take on any liabilities on the Grade II listed site, the report discloses. Solicitors from Edwards Duthie Solicitors, acting for the client, confirmed if GBP1 was the highest bid it would sell for that price, the report relates. Llandudno Seaside Buildings Preservation Trust are campaigning to save and reopen the site as part of a community interest company, the report notes. But Chairman of the Trust, John Lawson-Reay said the group will not be bidding at the auction due to potential liabilities, the report adds. CELESTE MORTGAGE 2015-1: S&P Assigns Prelim. B Rating to F Notes ---------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary credit ratings to Celeste Mortgage Funding 2015-1 PLC's class A, B, C, D, E, and F notes. At closing, Celeste Mortgage Funding 2015-1 will also issue unrated notes. At closing, the issuer will purchase the beneficial interest in a portfolio of U.K. residential mortgages from the beneficial title seller (Basinghall Mortgage Finance No.1 Ltd.), using the proceeds from the issuance of the rated and unrated notes. The proceeds will also be used to fund a credit reserve fund. The GBP254.67 million preliminary pool (as of Dec. 31, 2014) comprises first-lien U.K. buy-to-let residential mortgages owned by Basinghall Mortgage Finance No.1. The originators are Basinghall Finance Ltd. (96.3%) and GMAC RFC Ltd. (3.7%). The collateral pool comprises first-lien U.K. buy-to-let residential mortgage loans, 1.86% of which have previous county court judgments (CCJ). The portfolio's weighted-average current loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 77.68% (according to S&P's methodology, which includes haircuts to valuations when the valuation method was not a full surveyor valuation). The class A to F notes' interest rate is equal to three-month British pound sterling LIBOR plus a class-specific margin. As the notes' interest will be based on an index of three-month sterling LIBOR, there is a basis risk mismatch. This is because the underlying collateral contains loans that are linked to the seller's standard variable rate, the Bank of England Base Rate (BBR), or three-month sterling LIBOR (that resets at a different reset date to the notes). As a result, S&P stress the historical difference between the index paid on the assets and the liabilities. S&P's analysis then uses the percentiles of the resulting distribution according to table 20 of S&P's U.K. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria. This transaction will not benefit from a swap to hedge interest rate or basis risk. The issuer will pay interest according to the interest payment priority. Under the transaction documentation, interest payments on all classes of notes (excluding the senior class of notes), can be deferred if the issuer has insufficient funds. Consequently, any interest deferral would not constitute an event of default. However, S&P's preliminary ratings address the timely interest and ultimate principal payments on the notes. While all classes of notes were able to pass our cash flow stresses under these assumptions, if a class of notes were to defer interest, S&P would lower its rating on that class of notes to 'D (sf)'. S&P's preliminary ratings reflect its assessment of the transaction's payment structure, cash flow mechanics, and the results of S&P's cash flow analysis to assess whether the notes would be repaid under stress test scenarios. Subordination and the credit reserve fund available amount provide credit enhancement to the notes. Taking these factors into account, S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the notes to be commensurate with the assigned preliminary ratings. RATINGS LIST Celeste Mortgage Funding 2015-1 PLC British Pound Sterling-Denominated Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Class Prelim. Prelim. rating amount (mil. GBP) A AAA (sf) TBD B AA (sf) TBD C A (sf) TBD D BBB (sf) TBD E BB (sf) TBD F B (sf) TBD G NR TBD H NR TBD Subordinated notes NR TBD TBD--To be determined. NR--Not rated. KEY HOMES: Berkeley Homes Takes Over Abandoned Woolwich Hotel ------------------------------------------------------------- newsshopper.co.uk reports that a Woolwich hotel site which was left abandoned midway through construction has been bought by Berkeley Homes. The shell of the six-storey Beresford Street building was built several years ago before owners Key Homes Group went into administration, according to newsshopper.co.uk. The report relates that now Berkeley Homes, which is developing the Royal Arsenal, has purchased the site and is looking for a hotel operator to complete it. Once finished, the hotel will provide 130 bedrooms with the promise of up to 35 new jobs, the report discloses. "Local residents have had to put up with years of uncertainty over this building so we are delighted to have completed the purchase and be able to offer it a positive future," the report quoted Divisional managing director of Berkeley Homes Karl Whiteman as saying. "We will be working hard over the coming months to identify the right operator to ensure that it complements the new development at Royal Arsenal Riverside. We will keep the community updated on progress through the course of this year," Mr. Whiteman added. MASTERTON LTD: Unprofitable Contracts Prompt Administration ----------------------------------------------------------- Scott McCulloch at Daily Record reports that Masterton Ltd. has gone into administration. The company, a division of Blackwell Group, had employed 140 people at its peak, though it had been forced to scale back its operations due unprofitable contracts, Daily Record relates. In recent years, the company had been predominantly focused on industrial dismantling and decommissioning work in the petrochemical and industrial sectors, Daily Record notes. PwC, as cited by Daily Record, said 28 staff had been laid off prior to administrators being appointed, with a "small number" retained to service remaining contracts. The directors of Masterton were reported to have sought a Company Voluntary Agreement (CVA) with creditors in August of last year in a bid to continue trading, Daily Record relays. However, the CVA attempt failed and joint administrators from PwC have now been appointed, Daily Record discloses. Masterton Ltd. is a Grangemouth-based demolition contractor. MUIRFIELD CONTRACTS: In Administration, Staff Put on Leave ---------------------------------------------------------- thecourier.co.uk reports Dundee building firm Muirfield Contracts has called in administrators and placed its staff on indefinite gardening leave. Contractors complained of being locked out of the company's headquarters as management spent hours in crisis talks hoping to stave off the threat of administration, according to thecourier.co.uk. However, workers were given letters confirming the firm is to call in administrators, the report relates. Staff were also told they are being placed on gardening leave, the report notes. Only office workers and management were allowed to attend the meeting at Muirfield's headquarters on George Buckman Drive, the report discloses. Office workers were later seen leaving Muirfield's offices with what appeared to be the contents of their desks, the report notes. However, they declined to speak to the press, the report adds. PT MCWILLIAMS: Creditors May Lose GBP25MM After Administration -------------------------------------------------------------- Insider Media reports that creditors look set to lose out on more than GBP25 million as a result of the administration of PT McWilliams. According to Insider Media, a report to creditors has also revealed a dispute with two main contractors over payments totaling GBP2.7 million contributed to the collapse. Michael Jennings -- michael.jennings@bdo.co.uk -- and Brian Murphy -- brian.murphy@bdo.co.uk -- of BDO Northern Ireland were appointed joint administrators on Feb. 13 after the company experienced cash flow difficulties, Insider Media relates. At the date of the administration, trade ceased from all sites with the exception of a single contract, Insider Media recounts. A total of 60 employees were made redundant prior to the administration, Insider Media discloses. Jennings and Murphy believe about GBP27 million is owed to unsecured creditors, including trade creditors which were involved with PT's company voluntary arrangement (CVA) in 2011, Insider Media says. However, it is unlikely there will be any cash available to repay them, Insider Media states. According to Insider Media, CVA trade creditors are owed GBP20.9 million in total. It comes after PT McWilliams agreed to a CVA in 2011 after entering administration as it was deemed the "optimum route" to enable it to continue with a number of profitable contracts, Insider Media notes. HSBC also looks set to lose out on about GBP670,000 of its GBP2.63 million investment in the company, Insider Media says. The CVA was approved in October 2011 by a majority of the company's unsecured creditors and the administration concluded on March 7, 2012, Insider Media recounts. PT McWilliams is a Omagh-based civil engineering firm. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * BOOK REVIEW: Lost Prophets -- An Insider's History ---------------------------------------------------- Author: Alfred L. Malabre, Jr. Publisher: Beard Books Softcover: 256 pages List Price: $34.95 Review by Henry Berry Order your personal copy today at http://is.gd/KNTLyr Alfred Malabre's personal perspective on the U.S. economy over the past four decades is firmly grounded in his experience and knowledge. Economics Editor of The Wall Street Journal from 1969 to 1993 and author of its weekly "Outlook" column, Malabre was in a singular position to follow the U.S. economy in recent decades, have access to the major academic and political figures responsible for economic affairs, and get behind the crucial economic stories of the day. He brings to this critical overview of the economy both a lively, often provocative, commentary on the picture of the turns of the economy. To this he adds sharp analysis and cogent explanation. In general, Malabre does not put much stock in economists. "In sum, the profession's record in the half century since Keynes and White sat down at Bretton Woods [after World War II] provokes dismay." Following this sour note, he refers to the belief of a noted fellow economist that the Nobel Prize in this field should be discontinued. In doing so, he also points out that the Nobel for economics was not one originally endowed by Alfred Nobel, but was one added at a later date funded by the central bank of Sweden apparently in an effort to give the profession of economists the prestige and notice of medicine, science, literature and other Nobel categories. Malabre's view of economists is widespread, although rarely expressed in economic circles. It derives from the plain fact that modern economists, even hugely influential ones such as John Meynard Keynes, are wrong as many times as they are right. Their economic theories have proved incomplete or shortsighted, if not basically wrong-headed. For example, Malabre thinks of the leading economist Milton Friedman and his "monetarist colleagues" as "super salespeople, successfully merchandising.an economic medicine that promised far more than it could deliver" from about the 1960s through the Reagan years of the 1980s. But the author not only cites how the economy has again and again disproved the theories and exposed the irrelevance of wrong-headedness of the policy recommendations of the most influential economists of the day. Malabre also lays out abundant economic data and describes contemporary marketplace and social activities to show how the economy performs almost independently of the best analyses and ideas of economists. Malabre does not engage in his critiques of noted economists and prevailing economic ideas of recent decades as an end in itself. What emerges in all of his consistent, clear-eyed, unideological analysis and commentary is his own broad, seasoned view of economics-namely, the predominance of the business cycle. He compares this with human nature, which is after all the substance of economics often overlooked by professional and academic economists with their focus on monetary policy, exchange rates, inflation, and such. "The business cycle, like human nature, is here to stay" is the lesson Malabre aims to impart to readers interested in understanding the fundamental, abiding nature of economics. In Lost Prophets, in language that is accessible and jargon-free, this author, who has observed, written about, and explained economics from all angles for several decades, persuasively makes this point. In addition to holding a top position at The Wall Street Journal, Malabre is also the author of the books, Understanding the New Economy and Beyond Our Means, which received the George S. Eccles Prize from the Columbia Business School as the best economics book of 1987. ********* Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co- published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA. Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2015. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at 202-362-8552. * * * End of Transmission * * *