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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Thursday, February 26, 2015, Vol. 16, No. 41

                            Headlines

G E R M A N Y

CAPITAL FUNDING: Fitch Upgrades Debt Rating to 'BB'
DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEFBANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Tier 2 Debt Rating
TAURUS CMBS 2007-1: DBRS Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Dsf


G R E E C E

GREECE: Eurozone Finance Ministers to Review Overhaul Plan
INTRALOT SA: S&P Puts 'B+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative


I T A L Y

FINMECCANICA SPA: Moody's Ba1 Rating Unaffected by Sale of Assets
MEDIOLEASING FINANCE: Moody's Raises Rating on B Notes to B3
MONTE DEI PASCHI: DBRS Lowers Intrinsic Assessment Rating to 'BB'
PARMA FOOTBALL: President Manenti Cancels Meeting


L A T V I A

RIGA SHIPYARD: Nordweg Ship Repair Files Insolvency Claim


N E T H E R L A N D S

HIGHLANDER EURO: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class D Notes


R U S S I A

ABH FINANCIAL: S&P Affirms 'B+' Counterparty Credit Rating
FUNDSERVICEBANK OAO: Put Under Temporary Administration
MOSCOW: Moody's Cuts Issuer & Senior Unsecured Ratings to Ba1
SBERBANK: Moody's Downgrades BFSR to D; Outlook Negative


S P A I N

FONCAIXA FTGENCAT 4: Moody's Lifts Rating on EUR6MM D Notes to B3
SANTANDER EMPRESAS 10: DBRS Cuts Series C Notes Rating to 'D'


U K R A I N E

FERREXPO PLC: Moody's Rates New US$160.7MM Senior Notes 'Caa2'
UKRAINE: Bondholders Face Large Losses as Restructuring Looms


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AYLESFORD NEWSPRINT: In Administration, Cuts 230 Jobs
ECO PLASTICS: Shortfall Incurred After Administration
LIFE STYLE CARE: Part of Portfolio Goes Into Administration
NINETY NINER: Shuts Store for the Last Time
RANGERS FOOTBALL: Goram Fears the Worst if King Coup Fails

SPECIALTECH: Enters Voluntary Liquidation, Closes
USC: Suppliers Owed GBP14 Million


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G E R M A N Y
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CAPITAL FUNDING: Fitch Upgrades Debt Rating to 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed German commercial real estate (CRE)
lender Aareal Bank AG's Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at Long-
term 'A-' with Negative Outlook and Short-term 'F1'.

At the same time, the agency has placed on Rating Watch Negative
(RWN) the 'A-' Long-term IDR and 'F1' Short-term IDR of Aareal's
smaller competitor, Westdeutsche Immobilienbank AG (WestImmo).

The rating actions follow the announcement on February 22, 2015,
of Aareal's planned acquisition of WestImmo for an all-cash
consideration of EUR350 million.

Fitch has also upgraded Aareal's Viability Rating (VR) to 'bbb+'
from 'bbb' and the Long-term IDR of Aareal's subsidiary
COREALCREDIT BANK AG to 'BBB+' from 'BBB'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - AAREAL'S IDRS, SUPPORT RATING FLOOR, SUPPORT
RATING AND SENIOR DEBT

The affirmation of Aareal's IDRs, Support Rating (SR), Support
Rating Floor (SRF) and senior debt ratings reflects our view of
the German government's propensity to support large Pfandbrief
issuers.  Fitch's view that state support is even more likely in
the short-term is reflected in Aareal's Short-term IDR of 'F1',
which is at the higher of two potential Short-term ratings that
are compatible with its 'A-' Long-term IDR.

The Negative Outlook on Aareal's Long-term IDR reflects Fitch's
view that implementation of the bank resolution framework in
Germany will reduce sovereign support for banks in the country as
in other EU member states.  Germany implemented the EU's Bank
Resolution and Restructuring Directive (BRRD) into national law
on January 1, 2015, including early adoption of the bail-in tool.
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for banks in the eurozone
will remove decision-making from national authorities from
January 1, 2016.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - AAREAL'S IDRS, SRF, SR AND, SENIOR DEBT

Aareal's IDRs, SR, SRF and senior debt ratings are sensitive to
changes in Fitch's assumptions about the availability of
extraordinary sovereign support.  The BRRD will become an
overriding factor in Fitch's support-driven ratings and senior
creditors will no longer be able to rely on sovereign support for
full repayment.  Consequently, Fitch expects to downgrade
Aareal's SR to '5' and revise downward its SRF to 'No Floor' by
end-1H15.  This will likely result in a downgrade its Long-term
IDR by one notch to the level of its VR, triggering a downgrade
of its Short-term IDR to 'F2'.  Aareal's ratings will then likely
become driven by its VR.

Aareal has a substantial buffer of subordinated debt, which Fitch
would consider sufficient to recapitalize the bank in resolution,
offering protection to senior creditors.  This in turn would
enable the agency to notch up the Long-term IDR from the VR under
its criteria.  However, Fitch would not be likely to apply this
notching in the case of Aareal because its company profile, as a
wholesale-funded, monoline CRE lender, constrains its VR and is
likely to constrain its Long-term IDR (excluding state support)
at 'BBB+'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - AAREAL'S VR

The upgrade of Aareal's VR, despite its plans to acquire
WestImmo, reflects its remarkably resilient performance
throughout the global financial crisis.  The upgrade also factors
in continuous strengthening of Aareal's capital base, which
already comfortably fulfils the fully-loaded requirements under
Basel III.  The upgrade further reflects management's public
commitment to maintaining comfortable capital buffers (at least
12.25% Tier 1 ratio and 20% total capital ratios on a fully-
loaded basis).  This is despite resuming dividend payments
following the repayment in 4Q14 of the EUR300m Tier 1 state
hybrid capital.

Aareal is the benchmark for Fitch's peer group of German
specialised CRE lenders.  It is the sole member of the peer group
that did not rely on institutional or state support or need to
restructure or amend its business model during the crisis (the
state hybrid capital received in 2009 was a precautionary rather
than a necessary measure, in Fitch's view).  Consequently, Aareal
has the highest VR of the peer group.  Its ability to buy
COREALCREDIT and WestImmo at significant discounts after lengthy
sales processes demonstrates its position of strength within a
peer group that remains largely focused on necessary
restructuring to restore adequate levels of internal capital
generation.

Fitch views the WestImmo acquisition as slightly negative for
Aareal's risk profile.  WestImmo's asset quality is somewhat
weaker than Aareal's, whose robustness was confirmed by the
European Central Bank's Asset Quality Review and stress test in
4Q14. Moreover, WestImmo's lower asset margins could, at least
initially, moderately dilute Aareal's solid operating return on
assets.  However, this is sufficiently mitigated by WestImmo's
modest size, with a CRE loan portfolio after several years of
wind-down at about one fifth the size of Aareal's, by the
reassessed fair value of acquired assets and by our expectation
that Aareal will continue to run the bank down at the current
pace.

Further mitigating factors include WestImmo's strategic fit,
notably in terms of international expertise in key markets for
Aareal, and Aareal's ability (proven most recently with
COREALCREDIT's integration) to rapidly cut fixed costs and manage
integration smoothly.  Fitch also expects that the sale agreement
will free Aareal from major contingent risks to which WestImmo
was hitherto exposed and which the current owner Erste
Abwicklungsanstalt (EAA, AAA/Stable/F1+) will retain.  This is
reminiscent of the COREALCREDIT acquisition, which was preceded
by a transfer of a large share of COREALCREDIT's non-performing
loan portfolio to its seller.

Similar to the COREALCREDIT acquisition, Aareal is acquiring
WestImmo at significant discount to its book value.  Fitch
believes that Aareal's management intends to use the estimated
resulting negative goodwill of about EUR150m to strengthen its
capitalisation rather than passing it onto its shareholders, thus
underpinning its commitment to solid capital buffers.

Given WestImmo's modest size, the likely continuation of its run-
down and the fact that its assets and liabilities are broadly
matched in their maturities, the acquisition should only
moderately reduce Aareal's liquidity, even after taking into
account the likely initial refinancing of WestImmo's existing
intragroup funding sources.  Aareal made significant progress in
2014 in expanding its stable institutional housing deposit base.
At EUR9.1bn (4Q14 average), it now accounts for about 20% of the
bank's total funding (excluding WestImmo).  A key strength
relative to peers, this deposit base enhances Aareal's ability to
absorb demands on its liquidity potentially arising from the
acquisition.

The fact that WestImmo's acquisition is mainly driven by an
opportunistic capital gain rather than long-term strategic
considerations denotes a certain risk appetite at Aareal's
management.  However, as the COREALCREDIT acquisition followed
similar considerations, this is already reflected in Fitch's
assessment of Aareal's risk appetite, which does not constrain
its VR.  On the basis of the COREALCREDIT acquisition as well as
its track record in business expansion in other countries, Fitch
believes that Aareal's robust due diligence and conservative
assumptions significantly limit the risk of unexpected negative
developments post-acquisition.

Further upgrades of Aareal's VR are unlikely as Fitch believes
that its monoline business model focusing on non-granular,
wholesale and cyclical assets are not commensurate with the 'a'
category.  Downward pressure on the VR could arise if it emerges
that Aareal has materially overestimated the net gain or
misjudged the risk from the WestImmo acquisition.

In the medium term, Aareal's VR will (similar to its peers' and
as a natural consequence of its focus on non-granular cyclical
assets) remain primarily vulnerable to asset quality
deterioration or a significant increase of funding costs.  Fitch
views the latter as highly unlikely in the short term in light of
the quantitative easing measures recently initiated by the ECB
and from which covered bond issuers should benefit.  Moreover, a
reversal of the current benign CRE market trend seems unlikely in
2015, and Aareal is only moderately exposed to the pockets of
risks that are gradually building up in the German residential
real estate market.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - WESTIMMO'S IDRS, SR,
SENIOR DEBT AND GUARANTEED DEBT

The RWN on WestImmo's IDRs and senior debt ratings reflects
Fitch's expectation that the source of institutional support for
WestImmo will shift to Aareal from EAA, once the ownership
transfer is completed.  WestImmo's IDRs had been hitherto driven
by the extremely high likelihood of support from EAA, if needed.
This support had in turn been underpinned by EAA's own extremely
high likelihood of support from the regional state of North-Rhine
Westphalia (NRW, AAA/Stable/F1+).  The six notch difference
between EAA's and WestImmo's IDRs took into account the
possibility of a sale to a private sector owner.

Fitch expects to resolve the RWN on WestImmo's ratings upon the
completion of its sale to Aareal, which is expected in 2Q15,
subject to approval from the supervisory and competition
authorities.  Once acquired, Aareal's VR will become the anchor
for WestImmo's Long-term IDR.  The decision whether to align the
latter with or notch it down from Aareal's VR will depend on
plans for integration and on Aareal's commitment to provide
support.  On the basis of Aareal's announced intentions regarding
WestImmo, it is likely that WestImmo's Long-term IDR will be
aligned with Aareal's VR, as is the case with Aareal's subsidiary
COREALCREDIT, which it acquired in early 2014.

Fitch does not assign a VR to WestImmo because it has been
operated by EAA as a wind-down institution since 2012.  The
resulting reliance of WestImmo on institutional support has
prevented a meaningful assessment of its stand-alone credit
profile.  Fitch expects Aareal to follow a similar orderly run-
down strategy with WestImmo as with COREALCREDIT, so would not
assign a VR to WestImmo.

The affirmation of WestImmo's guaranteed obligations at 'AAA'
reflects the grandfathered statutory guarantor liability
(Gewaehrtraegerhaftung) from each of the former WestLB AG's (now
Portigon, A+/Stable/F1+) owners, especially from NRW.  This
guarantor liability is unaffected by WestImmo's change of
ownership.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - COREALCREDIT'S IDRS, SR
AND SENIOR DEBT

The upgrade of COREALCREDIT's Long-term IDR and senior debt
mirrors the upgrade of Aareal's VR, with which COREALCREDIT's
ratings are aligned.  Fitch expects Aareal's strong propensity to
support COREALCREDIT to remain notably underpinned by the
existing profit-and-loss transfer agreement between both
entities.  In addition, Aareal has been increasingly managing
COREALCREDIT's capital, funding and liquidity at group level
since the acquisition, as shown most notably by COREALCREDIT's
integration within Aareal's cash pooling organisation.

Fitch does not assign a VR to COREALCREDIT, as its increasing
integration with its parent prevents a meaningful analysis of its
standalone profile.

COREALCREDIT's ratings are sensitive to a downgrade of Aareal's
VR or Fitch's reassessment of Aareal's commitment to its
subsidiary, for example by any reversal of the ongoing
integration of COREALCREDIT's activities into Aareal.  Given that
COREALCREDIT's ratings are already anchored to Aareal's VR, they
will not be affected by the expected withdrawal of systemic
support consideration from Aareal's ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUBORDINATED DEBT AND
OTHER HYBRID SECURITIES

Aareal's lower Tier 2 subordinated notes are notched down once
from its VR to reflect their higher loss severity relative to
senior debt.  The bank's legacy, non-Basel III compliant hybrid
securities issued by Capital Funding GmbH and Aareal Capital
Funding LLC (Delaware), are notched down four times from Aareal's
VR (two notches for high loss severity risk and two notches for
high non-performance risk relative to that captured in the VR) to
reflect their distributable profit trigger or annual profit
trigger combined with a regulatory capital ratio trigger.

Aareal's Basel III compliant additional Tier 1 securities are
rated five notches below its VR, ie twice for loss severity to
reflect the write-down on breach of their 7% trigger, and three
times for non-performance risk.

The rating of the lower Tier 2 subordinated notes and hybrid
instruments are primarily sensitive to changes to Aareal's VR.

The rating actions are:

Aareal Bank AG:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A-'; Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bbb+' from 'bbb'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A-'
Debt issuance program: affirmed at 'A-'/'F1'
Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A-'
Subordinated debt: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB-'

Capital Funding GmbH (DE0007070088): upgraded to 'BB' from 'BB-'

Aareal Capital Funding LLC (Delaware) (XS0138973010): upgraded to
'BB' from 'BB-'

Basel III compliant additional Tier 1 securities (DE000A1TNDK2):
upgraded to 'BB-' from 'B+'

Westdeutsche Immobilienbank AG

Long-term IDR: 'A-', placed on RWN
Short-term IDR: 'F1', placed on RWN
Support Rating: '1', placed on RWN
Senior unsecured debt: 'A-'/'F1', placed on RWN
State-guaranteed/grandfathered debt: affirmed at 'AAA'

COREALCREDIT BANK AG:

Long-term IDR: upgraded to 'BBB+' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Senior unsecured notes: upgraded to 'BBB+' from 'BBB'


DEUTSCHE PFANDBRIEFBANK: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Tier 2 Debt Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) of three German commercial real estate (CRE) lenders --
Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG (PBB), Berlin Hyp AG and Duesseldorfer
Hypothekenbank AG (DHB).  The banks' Viability Ratings (VRs) have
also been affirmed.  The rating actions are part of Fitch's peer
review of specialized German CRE lenders.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - PBB'S IDRs, SUPPORT RATING
(SR), SUPPORT RATING FLOOR (SRF) AND SENIOR DEBT

The affirmation of PBB's support-driven ratings reflects Fitch's
view that extraordinary support from the German government would
be available if needed.  This reflects PBB's indirect 100% state
ownership and its status as the largest active Pfandbrief issuer.
The 'AAA'-rated German government's strong ability to provide
short-term support drives PBB's Short-term IDR of 'F1', which is
the higher of two possible Short-term ratings compatible with its
Long-term IDR of 'A-'.

The Negative Outlook reflects our view that the propensity of
Germany to support PBB will diminish when it sells its stake
(planned by end-2015) and that the cost of resolving a failed EU
bank is increasingly likely to be taken by shareholders and
creditors, including senior creditors if necessary, rather than
governments/taxpayers.

PBB's IDRs, SR, SRF and senior debt ratings are also sensitive to
any change in our assumptions about the availability of
extraordinary sovereign support.  The Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD), which was implemented in Germany in
early 2015, will become an overriding factor in Fitch's support-
driven ratings and senior creditors will no longer be able to
rely on sovereign support for full repayment.

PBB's SR and IDRs could benefit from institutional support if it
becomes majority-owned by a strategic buyer with solid
investment-grade ratings and a proven strong ability and credible
strong willingness to support.  However, this is not our base
case.  A sale to a financial investor is highly unlikely to bring
any benefits in terms of SR as Fitch generally views such
investors' ability and commitment to support distressed
investments as unreliable.

Consequently, if PBB's re-privatization materializes as required
by the European Commission (EC), Fitch expects to revise its
Support Rating to '5' and downgrade its Long-term IDR to the
level of its VR of 'bb+'.  This would also trigger a downgrade of
its Short-term IDR to 'B'.

If the re-privatization does not materialize by end-2015, Fitch
expects the government to opt for an orderly wind-down of PBB
under the ownership of FMS Wertmanagement AoeR (FMS WM,
AAA/Stable, the government-controlled institution managing the
wind-down of HRE group's legacy assets), similar to the decision
it took on Depfa Bank plc (BBB+/Negative), PBB's former sister
bank, in 2Q14.

In this scenario, Fitch expects state support to remain likely
throughout PBB's wind-down process, albeit somewhat constrained
by the BRRD and state aid considerations.  This would probably
trigger a downward revision of the bank's SRF and a downgrade of
the Long-term IDR to the 'BBB' category.  The new rating level
would depend on details of the envisaged long-term wind-down
plan, and Fitch's assessment of its feasibility and likely
implications thereof for senior unsecured creditors.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - PBB'S VR

PBB's VR reflects the bank's gradually improving performance and
capitalization but is constrained by its low profitability and
Fitch's view of its earnings prospects.  The VR takes into
account the bank's track record of several years of solid and
stable asset quality, driven by conservative underwriting
standards and a focus on a fairly resilient CRE market.  At the
same time, asset quality still strongly benefits from the
transfer of non-performing and legacy assets to FMS WM in 2010
and from unusually benign market conditions in Germany.  PBB's VR
also reflects improving but still high concentration risk in its
large public-sector portfolios.

Solid asset quality has been essential to maintaining adequate
risk-weighted capitalization, as PBB's cash coverage of impaired
loans is now significantly lower than its peers', although this
is compensated by robust collateral in solid CRE markets, a high
portion of restructuring loans and a fairly low non-performing
loans (NPL)/total loans ratio.  Leverage has also consistently
improved, helped by shrinking legacy assets.  Leverage remains
high, however, and could somewhat constrain management's growth
plans.

The VR also reflects Fitch's expectation that operating
performance will continue to improve, but that margin pressure is
likely to remain high and internal capital generation modest due
to strong competition in German CRE lending and a high share of
the low-margin public-sector business.  A normalization of loan
impairment charges (LICs) from their currently low levels will
add pressure to profitability.

While the run-off of legacy assets will provide substantial
relief, Fitch is critical of PBB's intention to maintain
significant public investment finance as part of its strategic
activities.  These assets' low margins structurally dilute the
bank's overall modest return on assets and tie up significant
regulatory capital.

PBB has also substantially consolidated its funding profile.
Fitch expects funding costs to remain low in the short term,
driven by benign market conditions and PBB's ultimate state
ownership. However, PBB's unusually large size as an independent
monoline wholesale lender will make it significantly more reliant
than its peers on large confidence-sensitive issuance in the
public market, despite its fairly well-matched asset-liability
maturity.

PBB's stand-alone profile does not yet fulfill all the main
characteristics that Fitch generally expects from specialized CRE
banks to qualify for an investment-grade VR, especially robust
recurring internal capital generation and a crisis-proof,
standalone funding franchise.  An upgrade of the VR to investment
grade would be contingent on more evidence of PBB's long-term
ability to successfully operate as an independent lender in the
post-crisis environment without the backing of a strong owner.

Similar to most specialized CRE lenders, PBB's VR is primarily
vulnerable to asset quality issues, and a reversal of the benign
market trend seems unlikely in 2015.  A significant increase of
funding costs resulting from the re-privatization could also put
pressure on the VR in light of PBB's limited ability to pass them
on to its clients amid a highly competitive domestic CRE market
that is increasingly dominated by members of large German retail
groups with privileged access to cheap and resilient retail
funding.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - BERLIN HYP'S IDRs, SR AND
SENIOR DEBT

Berlin Hyp's IDRs are equalised with those of its ultimate
owners, the German savings banks (Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe
(Sparkassen), A+/Stable/F1+) and reflect Fitch's view that
institutional support would be forthcoming, if needed.  Following
a reorganization of Landesbank Berlin Holding AG (LBBH) at end-
2014, Berlin Hyp's ownership was transferred from Landesbank
Berlin (LBB) directly to LBBH, which is ultimately owned by the
Sparkassen.  As part of the restructuring, Berlin Hyp entered
into a profit-and-loss transfer agreement with LBBH.  Berlin Hyp
remains a member of the mutual support scheme of the German
Landesbanken and is not directly a member of the savings banks'
scheme.

The strategic separation of Berlin Hyp and LBB and Berlin Hyp's
clearer profile as a strategic partner and central provider of
CRE lending within the savings bank group underpin its Long-term
IDR as they make it a core subsidiary to the group, in Fitch's
view. Berlin Hyp's access to the substantial funding resources of
the savings banks underpins its 'F1+' Short-term IDR, the higher
of the two possible ratings for an 'A+' Long-term IDR.

Berlin Hyp's IDRs, SR and senior debt ratings are sensitive to
changes in our assessment of its ultimate owners' ability or
propensity to provide support.  A change in the IDRs of
Sparkassen would likely be reflected in Berlin Hyp's IDRs and
senior debt rating.  Berlin Hyp's IDRs are also sensitive to
changes in its ownership structure or relationships within the
savings bank sector.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - BERLIN HYP'S VR

Berlin Hyp's VR is constrained by its capitalization, which Fitch
considers weak for a monoline CRE lender in a new regulatory
environment.  Despite measures to increase its capital in recent
years it mainly relies on profit retention.  Fitch expects
forthcoming measures by the bank's owners to balance the impact
of the portfolio transfer, which will result in higher risk-
weighted assets.  However, the agency recognizes that allocation
of capital by Berlin Hyp's direct owner, LBBH, could ultimately
be constrained depending on the performance of its sister
company, LBB.

The VR also reflects the bank's established company profile and
business opportunities arising from its relationships with the
savings banks.  Its management is seasoned but strategic
decision- making can be constrained by the requirement for LBBH's
final approval and the need for Berlin Hyp to fit into the
broader strategy of the savings bank group.  The VR also factors
in concentration risks from the monoline, cyclical CRE business.
Fitch expects broadly stable performance in 2015 but sees
headwinds from the risk of declining loan prolongations or early
repayments due to a low interest rate environment.  This could
challenge Berlin Hyp's loan growth which relies on a continuous
flow of new business given its fairly short duration.

Berlin Hyp's VR also reflects the further reduced size in its NPL
portfolio and adequate coverage when considering its collateral.
The net portfolio transfer of assets from LBB to Berlin Hyp,
which is expected to be completed by end-1Q15, will in Fitch's
view only have a moderate negative impact on asset quality but
also reduce Berlin Hyp's larger exposure to the Berlin area.  In
Fitch's view, Berlin Hyp may not be able to preserve its
conservative risk appetite if it is to overcome the challenging
of an environment of lower margins and rising competition.  There
Fitch expects its risk appetite could deteriorate over time,
particularly if growth falls below expectations.

Berlin Hyp's profitability has benefited from stable net interest
income and fee income and a low level of LICs in recent years.
However, investments into staff and its repositioning mean that
its cost base will be permanently higher even as one-off items
drop off during the course of the coming year.  Fitch
nevertheless expects satisfactory earnings for 2015 while
recognizing that LICs have reached their cyclical low.  Below-
target growth could also impact Berlin Hyp profitability.

Berlin Hyp's wholesale funding is balanced by its diversified
investor base and strong placement capacity in the savings bank
sector and regular Pfandbrief issuance.  Its share of unsecured
funding issuance has risen in recent years and in 2015 is likely
to exceed its covered bond issuance for the first time.  This is
mainly due to a higher volume of maturing unsecured bonds and
demand from savings banks, which do not have to allocate risk
capital to investments in Berlin Hyp issuance.

Berlin Hyp's VR is negatively sensitive to stress in related
property markets, primarily offices and residential or large
single credit events, which could feed directly into capital.
However, Fitch does not see this as an immediate risk as long as
interest rates remain low.  Loosening of conservative
underwriting standards could also negatively impact the VR.

Berlin Hyp's VR could benefit from business growth and revenue
improvement in light of its higher cost base.  Its VR could also
be upgraded if Berlin Hyp increases its capital to bolster its
loss-absorbing capacity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - DHB'S IDRs, SR, SRF AND
SENIOR DEBT

DHB's SRF of 'BBB-' reflects the track record of systemic support
available even to small specialized German Pfandbrief issuers.
At the same time, the Negative Outlook on the bank's support-
driven Long-term IDR reflects Fitch's view that implementation of
the bank resolution framework in Germany will reduce sovereign
support for banks in the country as in other EU member states.
Germany has implemented the BRRD into national law including
early adoption of the bail-in tool.

However, Fitch expects DHB to continue to benefit from German
private sector banks' voluntary deposit protection fund's (DPF)
extensive coverage even after DHB's planned change of ownership.
In light of this, Fitch considers DPF to have strong incentives
to extend support to DHB if necessary.  Consequently, while Fitch
expects a revision of DHB's SRF to 'No Floor' by end-1H15,
sovereign support is likely to be replaced with potential
institutional support from DPF, which will likely limit the
downgrade of the bank's SR to '3' rather than '5'.

Given DHB's low VR of 'ccc', Fitch's view of the reduced support
likelihood would trigger a downgrade of its Long-term IDR to as
low as 'BB-'.  Fitch will publish shortly a special report
outlining its approach to factoring in potential support from the
DPF for small German banks in the BRRD environment.

DHB's sale to a group of European financial investors was agreed
in August 2014 and is still pending regulatory approval.  In
Fitch's view, it is highly uncertain whether this sale will
address DHB's severe capital and funding weaknesses, and the
agency generally considers financial investors' ability and
propensity to support banks as unreliable.  Therefore, Fitch does
not expect the sale to affect the bank's ratings.  The agency
believes that the combination of the bank's weaknesses and the
nature of the buyer could significantly delay the regulatory
approval of the sale.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - DHB'S VR

DHB's VR is primarily constrained by severe capital and funding
weaknesses.  The bank strengthened its thin regulatory capital in
2013 and 2015 by converting hybrid capital to equity.  However,
this measure has provided only temporary relief.

Fitch believes that DHB's recurring losses make a more
significant capital injection necessary in the medium term to
enable its transition to a viable CRE lender, and thus ensure its
viability. Otherwise, the agency expects its Basel III risk-
adjusted capitalization to fall short of regulatory and market
expectations in the next few years once its growing CRE loan book
gradually increases risk weighted assets beyond capital growth.
Leverage remains tight as the run-off of its low-risk-weighted
public-sector assets is slowing, complicating the transition to
Basel III.

DHB's VR also reflects its large exposure to the eurozone
periphery, which drives large unrealized valuation losses and
single-event risk, despite the bank's generally decreasing
exposures to low-margin, long-term legacy financial- and public-
sector assets and interest rate derivatives.  Moreover,
management will face considerable challenges in the medium term,
notably due to margin pressure, as it attempts to establish a
sustainable and profitable CRE lending franchise.   DHB has made
significant progress in focusing on CRE lending since 2010.  Its
realignment has been protracted due to the very long residual
maturities of its legacy assets, which still account for about
75% of its total assets.

DHB's asset-based lending model ensures resilient access to the
Pfandbrief market, repo and institutional deposits covered by the
DPF.  As a result, its unsecured, non-DPF covered funding needs
are modest.  Combined with its ongoing balance sheet shrinkage,
this somewhat mitigates its reliance on wholesale market funds
and its tight liquidity buffer.  However, DHB remains heavily
reliant on DPF's coverage to attract the unsecured funding
necessary to fund its Pfandbriefe's over-collateralization and
non-Pfandbrief-eligible assets.

An upgrade of DHB's VR into the 'b' category would be contingent
on a large capital injection and a restructuring of its unsecured
funding mix toward longer-term maturities.  However, the new
owners have yet to declare their intention, and their ability to
make such contributions remains untested.  An upgrade would also
be contingent on further significant risk reduction in DHB's
legacy portfolio and a return of sustained profitable
performance. Conversely, the absence of capital injection to
compensate the expected continued erosion of DHB's capital makes
failure a distinct possibility.  Operations are also highly
vulnerable to any reduced access to insured deposits by the DPF.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - PBB'S SUBORDINATED AND
HYBRID SECURITIES

PBB's lower Tier 2 subordinated notes are notched down from its
VR once to reflect their higher loss severity relative to the
bank's senior unsecured obligations.  The affirmation at 'C' of
the EUR350 million legacy hybrid Tier 1 securities issued through
Hypo Real Estate International Trust I reflects the uncertain
likelihood and timing of these securities being serviced again.
The EC's agreement to HRE group's 2008 bailout by the German
government forbids voluntary profit-driven distribution on
capital instruments (excluding SoFFin-related ones) prior to re-
privatization.  The subordinated debt and hybrid ratings are
sensitive to potential changes to PBB's VR.

The rating actions are:

Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A-', Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bb+'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A-'
Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1'
Debt issuance program: affirmed at 'A-'/'F1'
Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A-'
Short-term debt: affirmed at 'F1'
Lower Tier 2 subordinated debt: affirmed at 'BB'

Hypo Real Estate International Trust I (XS0303478118) Tier 1
securities: affirmed at 'C'

Berlin Hyp AG:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+', Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'bbb-'
Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
Senior unsecured notes: affirmed at 'A+'

Duesseldorfer Hypothekenbank AG:

Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-', Outlook Negative
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'ccc'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'BBB-'
Debt issuance program: affirmed at 'BBB-'/'F3'


TAURUS CMBS 2007-1: DBRS Lowers Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Dsf
----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has downgraded the ratings of two classes of Commercial
Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes (the Notes) issued by Taurus
CMBS (Pan-Europe) 2007-1 Limited (Taurus or the Trust), as
follows:

-- Class E to D (sf) from C (sf)
-- Class F to D (sf) from C (sf)

DBRS has also placed the ratings of the following seven classes
of Notes Under Review with Negative Implications, as follows:

-- Class A1, rated A (low) (sf)
-- Class A2, rated BBB (sf)
-- Class B, rated BB (high) (sf)
-- Class C, rated B (sf)
-- Class D, rated CCC (sf)
-- Class X1, rated AAA (sf)
-- Class X2, rated AAA (sf)

Classes A2, B, C and D also have Interest in Arrears.

The rating downgrades reflect the most recent realized losses to
the Trust.  In November 2014, the Ahouvi Leipzig loan was
liquidated from the Trust, resulting in a realized loss of
EUR2.0 million and a loss severity of 14.0%.  The loan, which had
been secured by an office property in Leipzig, Germany,
transferred to special servicing in January 2013 after the
borrower could not secure refinancing capital at maturity.

The remaining classes in the capital structure have been placed
Under Review with Negative Implications as a result of concerns
surrounding the specially serviced loan in the transaction.  The
Fishman JEC Portfolio (Fishman) loan currently represents 79.1%
of the current pool balance and is the largest of three loans
remaining in the transaction.  The Fishman loan is secured by 18
office and industrial properties located throughout France.  The
loan transferred to special servicing in May 2014 after the
borrower triggered insolvency proceedings, ahead of the
originally scheduled July 2014 maturity date.  According to the
servicer, the Safeguard Proceedings observation period ended in
January 2015, with the borrower and Judicial Administrator
currently negotiating loan resolution terms and timelines.  DBRS
has placed the aforementioned classes Under Review with Negative
Implications, while both parties determine a concrete disposition
strategy.  According to the servicer, an RIS notification
detailing a potential resolution strategy is expected in the next
quarter.  The most recent reporting from January 2014, indicates
the portfolio was 87.0% occupied, with 85.0% of the in-place net
rentable income contributed by investment-grade tenants,
including the French government.  The fourth-largest tenant,
which occupies 9.6% of the net rentable area (NRA) had a lease
expiration in January 2015; however, DBRS did not receive a
leasing update on the tenant.  The second- and fifth-largest
tenants, which combined occupy 20.9% of the NRA, also have lease
expirations in 2015.  The portfolio was last valued at EUR158.0
million in June 2013, equating to a loan-to-value ratio of 84.9%.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


GREECE: Eurozone Finance Ministers to Review Overhaul Plan
----------------------------------------------------------
James Kanter and Niki Kitsantonis at The New York Times report
that eurozone finance ministers on Feb. 24 approved Greece's plan
meant to ease the hardships created by its international bailout,
extending that loan program by four more months.

According to The New York Times, in revising the terms of the
bailout program, the new Greek government pledged to take a
disciplined approach to budgets, spending and tax collection,
while remaining committed to relieving the "humanitarian crisis"
caused by years of economic hardship and high unemployment.

But in trying to achieve that delicate balance -- to meet the
demands of its European creditors in order to keep the loan money
flowing, but without reneging on the anti-austerity campaign
promises on which it was elected in January -- the government of
Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras may find a difficult road ahead,
The New York Times notes.

The finance ministers of the 19 euro-currency countries, who had
agreed to consider an extension of Greece's EUR240 billion, or
US$272 billion, loan program, on Feb. 24 quickly approved the
subsequent plan, The New York Times relays.

But though the eurozone ministers were leading the negotiations
on behalf of their countries, the response from two of the other
creditors -- the European Central Bank and the International
Monetary Fund -- conveyed a certain skepticism of whether Greece
could live up to the terms of the new agreement, The New York
Times notes.

Even the Feb. 24 milestone is not the final one for Greece, The
New York Times states.  The plan, The New York Times says, is
expected to still require the approval of lawmakers in Greece,
Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia
before a Feb. 28 deadline, when the European portion of the
bailout program is set to expire.

Even the finance ministers who signed off on the deal Feb. 24
indicated Greece still had more homework to do, The New York
Times discloses.

There is little doubt that the lenders will continue to
scrutinize Greece's finances, and they could make additional
demands on Athens before making the next loan disbursement, which
would be EUR7.2 billion, or about US$8.2 billion -- money the
Greek government needs to meet its debt obligations, The New York
Times states.


INTRALOT SA: S&P Puts 'B+' Rating on CreditWatch Negative
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B+' rating on
Intralot S.A., a Greece-based international gaming company, on
CreditWatch with negative implications.

At the same time, S&P placed its 'B+' issue ratings on Intralot's
senior unsecured notes on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's opinion that Intralot's
earnings prospects have weakened, and could negatively affect its
credit metrics over the medium term.  The CreditWatch also
reflects S&P's opinion that Intralot's liquidity might come under
pressure if the tight covenant headroom on the EUR200 million
syndicated facility results in Intralot having to repay the
facility, thereby increasing the company's dependence on less-
liquid funds from other sources, such as dividends from joint
ventures.

Lower profitability has also reduced covenant headroom for
Intralot's EUR200 million syndicated facilities, which the
company had fully drawn by the end of 2014.  The covenant
headroom has also reduced in 2015 due to the higher interest
expenses of the additional EUR200 million of debt.  S&P now
estimates that the covenant headroom is significantly below
15% -- in fact close to zero.

S&P expects that the company will be able to address this issue
and that it will not breach the covenants on the existing
facility.  If the company is unable to pass covenant test or
renegotiate more favorable ones, it will be able to fully repay
the facility and avoid a breach, since it keeps the whole amount
drawn on its balance in the U.K.  However, the repayment of the
facility would reduce Intralot's financial flexibility, as the
approximately EUR200 million in cash the company currently has
apart from the facility proceeds is spread among multiple
subsidiaries, part of which are joint ventures, and might require
approval procedures to be paid off as dividends or transferred as
intercompany loans.  S&P thinks that Intralot's liquidity could
remain "adequate" in such an event.

"We continue to assess Intralot's business risk profile as
"fair," which reflects the company's position as a major supplier
of integrated gaming systems and services.  Our "fair" business
risk assessment also reflects Intralot's position as a licensed
gaming operator and its role as a game manager on behalf of third
parties, such as state operators.  We believe Intralot's business
risk profile is constrained, however, by its significant exposure
to emerging markets, as well as to different regulations and tax
systems.  A further constraint is the company's lack of scale in
large and relatively predictable gaming and lottery markets, such
as the U.S. and some Western European markets," S&P said.

"Our assessments of Intralot's business and financial risk
profiles result in a 'bb' anchor.  We apply two modifiers
(financial policy and comparable rating analysis) to this anchor,
resulting in a stand-alone credit profile two notches below the
anchor, at 'b+'.  The financial policy modifier reflects the
company's financial policy, which aims for significant external
growth.  The comparable rating analysis reflects the company's
relative weaker discretionary cash flow generation profile than
comparable companies, as well as the presence of significant
noncontrolling interests," S&P added.

The CreditWatch reflects a one-in-two probability of a downgrade
over the next 90 days if S&P believes that Intralot's credit
metrics are no longer commensurate with its "significant"
financial risk profile, or if the company is unable to address
the tightening covenant headroom without reducing its liquidity
sources by repaying its fully drawn facility to avoid a covenant
breach.

S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch in the next several weeks, as
the covenant situation will need to be addressed soon and will
likely be part of the company's year-end 2014 results
announcement.  A downgrade would likely be limited to one notch.

In S&P's opinion, Intralot is largely insulated from systemic
problems in the Greek banking system, since Greece accounts for
less than 5% of the company's consolidated EBITDA, and it keeps
minimal cash balances in Greek banks to fund its domestic
operations.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


FINMECCANICA SPA: Moody's Ba1 Rating Unaffected by Sale of Assets
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said that Finmeccanica S.p.A's (Ba1
negative) announced binding agreement to sell the bulk of its
transportation assets to Hitachi, Ltd. (A3 stable) is a credit
positive development for Finmeccanica but does not affect the
company's current Ba1 senior unsecured debt rating.  The rating
outlook remains negative.

"The sale further bolsters liquidity and affords some incremental
deleveraging, albeit of a still over-leveraged balance sheet,
while notably allowing management to finally focus singularly on
its core business activities as it continues with its multi-year
restructuring initiatives in an attempt to improve fundamental
profitability and asset return measures," noted Russell Solomon,
Moody's Senior Vice President and lead analyst for Finmeccanica.
"While the impetus for our 'negative' rating outlook is now
decidedly less negative proforma for the assumed successful
completion of the pending asset sale, the operating environment
remains quite challenging with end-market weakness across a
number of the company's business segments expected to persist,"
Solomon added.

Headquartered in Rome, Finmeccanica is a leading Italian
aerospace and defense company with reported revenues in excess of
EUR14 billion (EUR12 billion for the core Aerospace & Defence
business) in 2014.


MEDIOLEASING FINANCE: Moody's Raises Rating on B Notes to B3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of 8 notes, and
affirmed the ratings of 2 notes in 4 Italian asset-backed
securities (ABS) transactions:

  -- Locat Securitisation Vehicle 3 S.r.l.,

  -- Locat SV S.r.l. - Serie 2006 (LSV4),

  -- F-E Gold S.r.l. and

  -- Medioleasing Finance S.r.l.

The upgrades of the local-currency country risk ceilings to Aa2
from A2 in Italy on 20 January 2015 prompted the rating
actions.

The main drivers behind the upgrades are (1) the reduced
country risk as reflected by the increase in the maximum
achievable rating in Italy and (2), the deleveraging since the
last rating actions for these deals.

Moody's analysis incorporates the revisions, when needed, of
portfolio default assumptions taking into account the collateral
performance to-date as well as the exposure to relevant
counterparty servicers, account banks and swap providers.
Moody's cash flow sensitivity stress tests as well as borrower
concentration analysis were also taken into account in the
rating actions.

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings of the notes where the
current credit enhancement was commensurate with the current
ratings.

The country ceilings reflect a range of risks that issuers in any
jurisdiction are exposed to, including economic, legal and
political risks.  On Jan. 20, 2015, Moody's announced a six-notch
uplift between a government bond rating and its country risk
ceiling for Italy.  As a result, the maximum achievable ratings
for covered bonds and structured finance transactions were
increased to Aa2 from A2 for Italy.

Moody's has revised its volatility assumption in those
transactions given the reduced country risk while default and
recovery assumptions remain unchanged given the stable
performance of the transactions except for F-E Gold S.r.l. which
showed recent significant increase in 90+ delinquencies.

In Locat Securitisation Vehicle 3 S.r.l., the default probability
assumption on current balance of 12% together with a recovery
rate of 35% and a volatility of 45.7% corresponds to an unchanged
portfolio credit enhancement (portfolio CE) of 23.5%.

In Locat SV S.r.l. - Serie 2006 (LSV4), the default probability
assumption on current balance of 12% together with a recovery
rate of 35% and a volatility of 45.9% corresponds to an unchanged
portfolio CE of 22.5%.

In F-E Gold S.r.l., Moody's increased its DP to 18% from 16% of
the current pool balance to reflect current pool characteristics.
In particular, this transaction has high level of late
delinquencies which could translate into additional defaults in
the transaction. The portfolio CE increased from 25% to 28% as
reflected by the volatility of 46.1% and unchanged recovery rate
of 45%.

In Medioleasing Finance S.r.l., the default probability
assumption on current balance of 18% together with a recovery
rate of 45% and a volatility of 48.1% corresponds to an unchanged
portfolio credit enhancement of 25.5%.

Moody's assumed that the recovery rate would go down to 15% upon
the originators default in those four transactions.  Legal
uncertainty regarding the rights of the special purpose vehicles
to recover amounts on the lease contracts upon originator's
default drives this assumption.

Moody's incorporated the sensitivity analysis of the ratings to
borrower concentrations in the ABS deals that have collateral
pools of SME loans and small-ticket leases, and considered the
credit-enhancement coverage of the large debtors in the asset
pools.  The results of this analysis limited the potential
upgrade of the rating on the Class B Notes and C Notes of Locat
Securitisation Vehicle 3 S.r.l. to A3 (sf) as the credit
enhancement of the Class B Notes of 44.9% only nearly covers the
top ten debtors and the credit enhancement of the Class C Notes
of 6% only covers the top one debtor.

The rating actions took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as servicers, account banks or swap
providers.  Moody's considered how the liquidity available in the
transactions and other mitigants support continuity of note
payments, in case of servicer default.  Moody's also assessed the
default probability of each transaction's account bank providers.
Moody's analysis considered the risks of additional losses on the
notes in the event of them becoming unhedged, following a swap
counterparty default.

To ensure rating stability and to test the sensitivity of the
notes' ratings, Moody's ran stressed scenarios in cash flow
models before upgrading the relevant notes.

The stressed scenarios assume (1) a 25% stresses for the default
probability assumption for ABS; and (2) a 20% increase in the
portfolio CE assumption. The ratings were upgraded when the
negative rating impact resulting from the above test was within
the sensitivity tolerance. None of the transactions upgrades were
limited by the sensitivity to key collateral assumptions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating ABS Backed by Equipment Leases and Loans"
published in January 2015.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings are (1) a lower probability of high-loss scenarios owing
to an upgrade of the country ceiling; (2) performance of the
underlying collateral that exceeds Moody's expectations; (3)
deleveraging of the capital structure; and (4) improvements in
the credit quality of the transaction counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings are (1) an increased probability of high-loss scenarios
owing to a downgrade of the country ceiling; (2) performance of
the underlying collateral that does not meet Moody's
expectations; (3) deterioration in the notes' available credit
enhancement; and (4) deterioration in the credit quality of the
transaction counterparties.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: Locat Securitisation Vehicle 3 S.r.l.

  -- EUR160 million B Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR33 million C Notes, Affirmed Caa1 (sf); previously on Jun
     25, 2013 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Locat SV S.r.l. - Serie 2006 (LSV4)

  -- EUR1348 million A2 Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously
     on Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR152 million B Notes, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR64 million C Notes, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Dec
     10, 2012 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

Issuer: F-E Gold S.r.l.

  -- EUR749 million A2 Notes, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR56 million B Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR10.2 million C Notes, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

Issuer: Medioleasing Finance S.r.l.

  -- EUR300 million A Notes, Upgraded to Aa2 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR105.4 million B Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

Issuer: GAT FTGENCAT 2008, FTA

  -- EUR40.5 million C Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously
     on Jan 23, 2015 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR20.3 million D Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously
     on Jan 23, 2015 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

Issuer: GC FTGENCAT CAIXA TARRAGONA 1, FTA

  -- EUR25.7 million B Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade


MONTE DEI PASCHI: DBRS Lowers Intrinsic Assessment Rating to 'BB'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has lowered its ratings on Monte dei Paschi
di Siena SpA (BMPS or the Bank) by one notch.  The Senior Long-
Term Debt & Deposit Rating was downgraded to BBB (low) from BBB,
whereas the Short-Term Debt & Deposits Rating was changed to R-2
(low) from R-2 (middle).  Both ratings remain Under Review with
Negative Implications.  Concurrently, DBRS lowered the Bank's
Intrinsic Assessment (IA) to BB (high) from BBB (low).  The
ratings had been placed under review on October 28, 2014
following the results of the ECB comprehensive assessment.

This rating action follows publication of BMPS' year end 2014
figures which revealed a EUR5.3 billion loss, a meaningful
increase in impaired lending levels and a further deterioration
in capital.  All were worse than DBRS had expected and
contributed to the downgrade.  The ongoing review reflects the
challenges still faced by the Bank, including execution of the
now larger rights issue, further possible downside on asset
quality, the potential need to renegotiate the EU agreed
restructuring plan, implication of possible state ownership and
the pending re-election of the Board of Directors.  Despite the
increased transparency on asset quality and the speeding up of
BMPS' balance sheet clean-up and restructuring evident in the
4Q14 results, the balance of risks remains to the downside.
Positive implications for the near term are likely limited to
potential integration with a stronger partner.

Deterioration was mainly driven by incremental AQR related
adjustments taken in 4Q14 by the Bank following completion of the
ECB comprehensive assessment.  During 4Q14, BMPS widened the
scope of the portfolio subject to the ECB AQR methodology to 91%
of the total loan book from 50%.  This led to a steep increase in
provisions and reclassifications over and above those initially
reported in October 2014.  As a result, the Bank took nearly
EUR7.8 billion in provisions for the full year, of which EUR5.4
billion related to the adjustments made in 4Q14.  Gross impaired
loans increased by 8.5% quarter-on-quarter (QoQ) to EUR45 billion
and overall cash coverage improved to 48.9% from 41.8%.  Despite
higher provisions, net impaired lending remained high at EUR 23
billion, or approximately three times BMPS' Common Equity Tier 1
(CET1) capital at year end.

Concurrently, BMPS CET1 ratio deteriorated to 8.7% at year-end
2014 from 12.8% at 3Q14 which is lower than the 10.2% CET1
transitional target required by the ECB SREP (Supervisory Review
Evaluation Process).  The Board of Directors will request that
shareholders approve a higher than planned EUR3 billion rights
issue (increased from EUR2.5 billion) in order to build a capital
buffer.  On a pro-forma phased in basis, BMPS would then achieve
a CET1 ratio of 11.4%.  However, on a fully loaded basis,
including the repayment of remaining state aid, BMPS' CET1 ratio
would be lower at 9.7%.  Moreover, DBRS notes that the Bank
announced that it will pay the 2014 coupon on State Aid in shares
rather than in cash as had been planned previously.  DBRS expects
that this should trigger partial state ownership of the Bank.

In concluding the extended review of the ratings, DBRS will
evaluate the Bank's progress in meeting the challenges outlined
above.  Separate to the actions above, DBRS confirmed the A (low)
rating and Negative trend assigned to notes guaranteed by the
Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance.


PARMA FOOTBALL: President Manenti Cancels Meeting
-------------------------------------------------
football-italia.net reports that the Parma Football Club,
commonly referred to as just Parma, President Giampietro Manenti
won't meet the Mayor and bankruptcy tribunal.

The meeting was formally announced by the club for Wednesday,
Feb. 25.  President Manenti was due to be present with Mayor
Pizzarotti, the tribunal judges and Coach Roberto Donadoni,
according to football-italia.net.

However, it emerged President Manenti won't be present because
his mother needs to undergo surgery, the report notes.

The meeting postponement is yet another delay for a club that can
no longer afford to lose a minute, as it is on the verge of
bankruptcy, football-italia.net relays.

The report notes that Tuttomercatoweb also claim the players are
fed up and decided they will sue for unpaid wages stretching back
to July 2014.

This will allow the players to tear up their contracts and walk
away as free agents, the report says.

Again, the squad warned there are no guarantees they'll play
against Genoa this weekend, as they want real action to save
Parma, the report says.

Parma Football Club, commonly referred to as just Parma, is an
Italian professional football club based in Parma, Emilia-Romagna
that will compete in Serie A in the 2014-15 season, having
finished in sixth position last season.



===========
L A T V I A
===========


RIGA SHIPYARD: Nordweg Ship Repair Files Insolvency Claim
----------------------------------------------------------
Baltic Course, citing information provided by Firmas.lv, reports
that another insolvency claim has been filed against Rigas kugu
buvetava (Riga Shipyard).

The insolvency case was initiated by the Riga Northern District
Court on Feb. 20, Baltic Course says, citing information
published on the Insolvency Administration's Web site.  The claim
was filed by the foreign company Nordweg Ship Repair, Baltic
Course discloses.

The court will review the case on March 5, as LETA learned from
the court, Baltic Course notes.

According to Baltic Course, Riga Shipyard CEO Janis Skvarnovics
told LETA that the company has not received any documents from
the court, he was therefore unable to comment on the case.

Mr. Skvarnovics explained that Riga Shipyard had signed a
contract with Nordweg Ship Repair, a company which carried out
various activities as a subcontractor, Baltic Course discloses.
"A number of these activities, in our opinion, were not
accomplished, for this reason, we have filed a claim against this
company," Baltic Course quotes Mr. Skvarnovics as saying.

The Riga Northern District Court told LETA, however, it has not
yet received Riga Shipyard's claim against Nordweg Ship Repair,
Baltic Course notes.

In the spring of 2014, several insolvency claims were filed
against Riga Shipyard, Baltic Course recounts.

Riga Shipyard turned over EUR12.386 million in the first nine
months of 2014; net losses amounted to EUR1.281 million, Baltic
Course relays, citing the company's financial report submitted to
the "Nasdaq" Riga Stock Exchange.

Riga Shipyard is a shareholder in Tosmares kugubuvetava (49.72%),
and Remars Granula (partnership 49.8%).  Riga Shipyard was
founded in 1995.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


HIGHLANDER EURO: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on Highlander Euro CDO B.V.'s (primary issuer; issued the
class A-1, A-2, B, C, and D notes) notes and Highlander Euro CDO
(Cayman) Ltd.'s (secondary issuer; issued the class E notes)
notes (collectively, Highlander Euro CDO).

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Raised its rating on the class B notes; and
   -- Affirmed its ratings on the class A-1, A-2, C, D, and E
      notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the Jan. 20, 2015 trustee report
and the application of its relevant criteria.

S&P conducted its cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate (BDR) for each rated class of notes.  The BDR
represents S&P's estimate of the maximum level of gross defaults,
based on S&P's stress assumptions, that a tranche can withstand
and still pay interest and fully repay principal to the
noteholders.  S&P used the portfolio balance that it considers to
be performing, the reported weighted-average spread/coupon, and
the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considered to be
appropriate.  S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using its standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each
rating category assumed for each class of notes, combined with
different interest stress scenarios as outlined in S&P's
corporate collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.

The class A-1 notes have amortized by 91.5% of their outstanding
balance since S&P's previous review.  This has increased the
available credit enhancement for all classes of notes.  The
proportion of assets rated 'CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-' as a
percentage of the performing portfolio has reduced to 2.2% from
5.6% since S&P's previous review.

S&P's credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the available
credit enhancement for the class A-1, A-2, C, D, and E notes is
commensurate with S&P's currently assigned ratings.  S&P has
therefore affirmed its ratings on these classes of notes.  The
largest obligor test constrains S&P's rating on the class C notes
at its current rating level.  The largest obligor test--
introduced in S&P's corporate CDO criteria--measures the risk of
several of the largest obligors within the portfolio defaulting
simultaneously.

S&P's cash flow analysis results indicate that the available
credit enhancement for the class B notes is commensurate with a
higher rating than currently assigned.  S&P has therefore raised
to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'AA (sf)' its rating on the class B notes.

Highlander Euro CDO is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The transaction closed in
August 2006 and its reinvestment period ended in August 2012.
CELF Advisors LLP is the transaction's manager.

RATINGS LIST

Class        Rating            Rating
             To                From

Highlander Euro CDO B.V.
EUR500 Million Secured Floating-Rate And Subordinated Notes

Rating Raised

B            AA+ (sf)        AA (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A-1          AAA (sf)
A-2          AAA (sf)
C            BB+ (sf)
D            CCC- (sf)

Highlander Euro CDO (Cayman) Ltd.
EUR38.25 Million Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed

E            CCC- (sf)



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ABH FINANCIAL: S&P Affirms 'B+' Counterparty Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various rating actions on
43 Russia-related financial institutions.  The rating actions
take into account Standard & Poor's recent decision to lower the
foreign currency sovereign credit ratings on Russia to 'BB+/B'.
In S&P's view, risks for Russian banks have increased because of
the deteriorating economic environment, which is likely to
increase banks' credit losses and impact profitability and
capitalization.  Furthermore, S&P expects banks operating in
Russia to see increased pressure on their funding profiles.

S&P will publish individual research updates on the entities that
appear in the ratings list to provide more details on the
rationale behind each rating action.

In S&P's view, both economic risk and industry risk have worsened
for banks operating in Russia, causing S&P to lower its Banking
Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) on Russia to group '8'
from group '7'. Economic and industry risk trends remain negative
because S&P expects to see the operating environment for Russian
banks deteriorate further.  As a result, S&P has revised down its
anchor -- the starting point in assigning an issuer credit rating
to a bank -- for banks operating in Russia to 'bb-' from 'bb'.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view that economic prospects in
Russia are likely to be very weak over the next couple of years.
S&P expects Russia's GDP to contract in 2015 by 2.6% and to grow
by an average of just 0.5% in 2015-2018 -- significantly weaker
than the average of 2.4% in the previous four years.  Economic
growth prospects have been hit by several recent developments,
including:

   -- A significant decline in oil prices (S&P revised its oil
      forecast to US$55/barrel for 2015 and US$65/barrel for
      2016;

   -- Economic sanctions introduced by the U.S, EU, and certain
      other countries, which substantially limit Russian
      borrowers' access to external capital markets; and

   -- Internal and external investors' deteriorating confidence
      in Russia, which has resulted in sizable capital outflows
      and has made the Russian ruble exchange rate extremely
      volatile.

In S&P's view, Russia's very weak economic growth prospects are
likely to constrain lending growth and cause asset quality and
profitability in the banking sector to deteriorate significantly.
S&P expects nominal loan growth in 2015 to reach 10%-12%.  S&P
also anticipates that Russian banks' credit losses will increase
to 4.5%-5.5% in 2015-2016, significantly exceeding our previous
expectations.  S&P expects that problem assets in the banking
sector will grow significantly over the next few years, although
S&P might see lower-than-expected figures reported for 2015
because the regulator has recently introduced certain temporary
provisioning adjustment measures.  These could distort the
sector's problem asset figures.

Very high credit costs will substantially erode margins and
weaken banks' profitability compared with previous years.  S&P
expects net profit of the banking sector in 2015 to be at best
marginally positive, with a significant downside risk.  This, in
turn, will have a negative effect on capitalization.  As a result
of this growing pressure, S&P expects banks to become more
reliant on government and shareholders' support to sustain
capital levels, instead of retained profits.

Industry risk for Russian banks has increased as a result of
growing pressure on funding profiles and the sector's rapid
increase in reliance on ongoing and extraordinary support from
the state.  S&P expects deposit volatility to remain high as
depositor confidence in the Russian economy and Russian ruble has
weakened. A flight to quality and possible panic-driven deposit
outflows would hit smaller banks particularly hard.  S&P expects
Russian banks' access to external capital markets to remain
limited and their terms of funding to be significantly worse than
previously. S&P anticipates that the Central Bank of Russia (CBR)
will provide increasing amounts of ruble and foreign currency
liquidity to the banking sector, which should help stabilize the
sector.  At the same time, the high reliance on central bank
liquidity highlights the Russian banking sector's increasing
structural funding and liquidity gap.

State-related banks had a market share of about 60% as of end-
2014.  S&P expects this to increase further on the back of
government support, which will make smaller private banks'
business positions even more vulnerable.  There is a risk that
the Russian government's financial capacity to provide
extraordinary support to government-related entities (GREs) and
systemically important private sector banks might gradually
weaken if external conditions, including oil prices, remain
unfavorable for a prolonged period of time.

Most Russia-related banks have a negative outlook, reflecting the
deterioration in the economic environment and the increasing
vulnerability of particular banks.  This could cause S&P to lower
certain ratings in the next 12 months.

LIVE WEBCAST & Q&A

TITLE: Rating Actions Taken On Russian Banks Due To Rising
Economic Risk

DATE: Thursday, Feb. 26, 2015

Time:
2:30 p.m. Moscow Standard Time
11:30 a.m. Greenwich Mean Time
12:30 p.m. Central European Time

BICRA SCORE SNAPSHOT*

Russia                           To                 From

BICRA Group                      8                  7
Economic risk                   8                  7
   Economic resilience           5                  4
   Economic imbalances           4                  3
   Credit risk in the economy    5                  5
  Trend                          Negative           Negative

Industry risk                   8                  7
   Institutional framework       5                  5
   Competitive dynamics          4                  4
   Systemwide funding            5                  4
  Trend                          Negative           Negative

* Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) economic risk
  and industry risk scores are on a scale from 1 (lowest risk) to
  10 (highest risk).

RATINGS LIST

                               To                       From

ABH Financial Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating    B+/Negative/B       B+/Negative/B

Aljba Alliance
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/B        B/Stable/B

AO Raiffeisenbank
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/B      BB+/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA+               ruAA+

B&N Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/B        B/Developing/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB+              ruA-

Baltic Financial Agency Bank (BFA Bank)
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/B        B/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB+              ruA-

Bank for Innovation and Development
Counterparty Credit Rating    B-/Negative/C       B-/Negative/C
Russia National Scale         ruBBB-              ruBBB-

Bank of Moscow OJSC
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/B      BB+/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA+               ruAA+

Bank Otkritie Financial Co.
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB-/Watch Neg/B     BB-/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA-/Watch Neg     ruAA-

Bank Soyuz
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Stable/B          B/Stable/B
Russia National Scale         ruA-                ruA-

Bank URALSIB (OJSC)
Counterparty Credit Rating    B+/Negative/B       B+/Stable/B

Bank Vozrozhdenie
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB-/Negative/B      BB-/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA-               ruAA-

CB Intercommerz Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating    B-/Negative/C       B-/Negative/C
Russia National Scale         ruBBB-              ruBBB-

CentroCredit Bank JSC
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/B        B/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB+              ruBBB+

Commercial Bank National Standard LLC
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/B        B/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB+              ruBBB+

Commercial Bank OBRAZOVANIE
Counterparty Credit Rating    B-/Negative/C       B-/Negative/C
Russia National Scale         ruBBB-              ruBBB-

Commercial Bank Renaissance Credit LLC
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/B        B/Stable/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB+              ruA-

Credit Bank of Moscow
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB-/Negative/B      BB-/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA-               ruAA-

Development Capital Bank OJSC
Counterparty Credit Rating   B/Negative/C         B/Stable/C
Russia National Scale        ruBBB+               ruA-

Foreign Economic Industrial Bank (Vneshprombank)
Counterparty Credit Rating
Foreign currency              B+/Negative/B       B+/Stable/B
Local currency                ruA                 ruA+

Gazprombank
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/B      BB+/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA+               ruAA+

Gazprombank (Switzerland) Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/B      BB+/Negative/B

GLOBEXBANK
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB-/Negative/B      BB-/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA-               ruAA-

International Bank of Saint-Petersburg
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/C        B/Negative/C
Russia National Scale         ruBBB+              ruBBB+

Investtradebank JSC
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/B        B+/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB+              ruA

JSC AIKB Tatfondbank
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/B        B/Stable/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB+              ruA-

JSCB Peresvet Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating    B+/Stable/B         B+/Stable/B
Russia National Scale         ruA+                ruA+

Khanty-Mansiysk Bank Otkritie
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB-/Watch Neg/B     BB-/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA-/Watch Neg     ruAA-

Krayinvestbank
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/B        B/Stable/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB+              ruA-

LLC CB Koltso Urala
Counterparty Credit Rating    B-/Negative/C       B-/Negative/C
Russia National Scale         ruBBB-              ruBBB

LLC Rusfinance Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/B      BB+/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA+               ruAA+

MDM Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating    B+/Negative/B       B+/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruA                 ruA

Mezhtopenergobank OJSC
Counterparty Credit Rating    B-/Stable/C         B/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB               ruBBB+

Nota Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Negative/B        B/Stable/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB+              ruA-

OJSC Alfa-Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB/Negative/B       BB/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA                ruAA

OJSC Commercial Bank Petrocommerce
Counterparty Credit Rating    B+/Watch Dev/B      B+/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruA/Watch Dev       ruA

Promsvyazbank OJSC
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB-/Negative/B      BB-/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA-               ruAA-

Russian Standard Bank CJSC
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Stable/B          B+/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruA-                ruA

Sovcombank ICB LLC
Counterparty Credit Rating    B/Stable/C          B/Stable/C
Russia National Scale         ruA-                ruA-

Sviaz-Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB-/Negative/B      BB/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA-               ruAA

Ural Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Counterparty Credit Rating    B-/Stable/C         B/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruBBB               ruBBB+

VTB Bank JSC
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/B      BB+/Negative/B
Russia National Scale         ruAA+               ruAA+

West Siberian Commercial Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating    B+/Negative/B       B+/Stable/B
Russia National Scale         ruA                 ruA+

ZAO UniCredit Bank
Counterparty Credit Rating    BB+/Negative/B      BB+/Negative/B

N.B.--This list does not include all ratings affected.


FUNDSERVICEBANK OAO: Put Under Temporary Administration
-------------------------------------------------------
Anna Baraulina at Bloomberg News reports that Russia placed OAO
Fundservicebank under temporary administration this year as
policy makers seek to shore up the banking system after the
ruble's collapse.

The central bank said AO Novikombank, a partner of Rostec, the
state-owned industrial and defense holding company, will
participate in the temporary administration of Fundservicebank,
Bloomberg relates.

According to Bloomberg, the Bank of Russia said on Feb. 25 in a
statement on its website the Deposit Insurance Agency will
oversee Fundservicebank during an examination of its "financial
standing".

Fundservicebank is ranked 77th by assets, according to
Finmarket's Interfax-100 rating.  The lender, which lists former
spy Anna Chapman as a board member, focuses on working with
technology producers, according to its Web site.


MOSCOW: Moody's Cuts Issuer & Senior Unsecured Ratings to Ba1
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of 15 regional
and local governments (RLGs) in Russia, namely 11 Russian regions
and 4 cities, and 3 government-related issuers (GRIs) reflecting
the potential deterioration of their credit profiles in an
environment of increased systemic risk.  Concurrently, Moody's
has confirmed the ratings of 3 Russian regions and 1 city.  All
ratings -- with the exception of those of the Republic of
Tatarstan -- have negative outlooks.

This concludes the review for downgrade of these ratings that was
initiated on Jan. 20, 2015.  The rating of the Republic of
Tatarstan remains on review for downgrade as per the review
initiated on Dec. 22, 2014.

These rating actions follow the weakening of Russia's credit
profile as captured by Moody's downgrade of Russia's government
bond rating to Ba1 (negative outlook) from Baa3 (review for
downgrade) on Feb. 20, 2015.

Specifically, Moody's has downgraded by one notch the ratings of
the City of Moscow, City of St. Petersburg, SUE Vodokanal of St.
Petersburg and OOO Vodokanal Finance, OJSC "Western High-Speed
Diameter", Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Tatarstan,
Autonomous-Okrug (region) of Khanty-Mansiysk, Samara Oblast,
Republic of Komi, Krasnodar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Belgorod
Oblast, Oblast of Nizhniy Novgorod, Republic of Mordovia, Vologda
Oblast, City of Krasnodar and City of Volgograd.

Moody's confirmed the ratings of Moscow Oblast, Chuvashia
Republic, Oblast of Omsk and City of Omsk.

The downgrades of the ratings on the cities of Moscow and St.
Petersburg reflect their strong institutional links with the
federal government and their lack of special status, which
prevents them from being rated above the sovereign.  In addition,
both cities are exposed to market risks and ongoing deterioration
in the operating environment.

The downgrades of the issuer ratings of SUE Vodokanal of St.
Petersburg, the senior unsecured rating of OOO Vodokanal Finance,
and senior unsecured rating of OJSC Western High-Speed Diameter
reflect their status as government-related issuers that are fully
owned by the St. Petersburg government.

The downgrade of OJSC Western High-Speed Diameter's bond rating
reflects its link with the City of St. Petersburg and the
guarantee that the Russian government provides on its bond
principal payments.  This guarantee covers overall principal
payments (including put options) and principal acceleration.

The downgrade reflects Moody's assessment of the increase in
systemic risks following the weakening of Russia's credit
profile, as captured in the downgrade of the sovereign bond
rating.  Moody's expects Russia's economy to contract in 2015-16
due to the combined effect of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and
the collapse in oil prices and the exchange rate on Russia, which
will likely affect its economic strength as well as the
functioning of its financial markets.  As a result, Russian
regions will face increasing pressure on their financial
fundamentals while higher borrowing costs could potentially
heighten refinancing and liquidity risks.

Moody's downgrade of the ratings of the Republic of
Bashkortostan, the Republic of Tatarstan, and the Autonomous-
Okrug Khanty-Mansiysk reflects their exposure to these increased
systemic pressures, which weaken their intrinsic strength.  Given
their current credit profile, it is Moody's opinion that they
cannot be rated at the same level as the sovereign, or the cities
of Moscow and St. Petersburg.  The regions' intrinsic strength is
weaker than that of the cities due to either: i) more
concentrated economies; ii) less flexible expenses; iii) lower
liquidity or/and iv) higher debt burden.

The downgrade of the ratings of another 10 RLGs (Samara Oblast,
Republic of Komi, Krasnodar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Belgorod
Oblast, Oblast of Nizhniy Novgorod, Vologda Oblast, Republic of
Mordovia, City of Krasnodar and City of Volgograd) takes into
account weaknesses in their financial profile, which challenge
their ability to cope with a deterioration in the macroeconomic
environment.

These RLG's are vulnerable to a deterioration in the operating
environment through one or a combination of the following
factors: (1) moderate or low operating balances, translating into
moderate or weak financial flexibility; (2) significant
volatility of budgetary performance; (3) refinancing risk and/or
a high or rapidly growing debt burden in many cases; (4) modest
liquidity; and 5) vulnerability of local economies to domestic
cycles, which implies earnings volatility.

Moody's confirmation of the ratings of 4 RLGs (Moscow Oblast,
Chuvashia Republic, Oblast of Omsk, City of Omsk,) reflects these
entities' capacity to maintain credit profiles in their rating
categories despite growing systemic pressures.  Systemic
pressures can be partially mitigated by some or a combination of
the following factors: (1) moderate level of market debt; (2)
consistently adequate budgetary performance; (3) relative
stability of revenue streams due to strong local economies or/and
peculiarities of revenue structure (e.g. for cities); (4)
moderate to low refinancing risks.

The negative outlooks on the ratings of the cities of Moscow and
St. Petersburg reflect the cities' institutional and
macroeconomic linkages with the federal government which more
than offset their strong individual characteristics in an
environment of the sovereign's weakened credit quality.  As a
result, the negative outlooks mirror the negative outlook on the
sovereign government bond rating.

The negative outlooks on the ratings of SUE Vodokanal of St.
Petersburg and OOO Vodokanal Finance reflect their strong
institutional, financial and operational linkages with the city
of St. Petersburg.

The negative outlook on the rating of OJSC Western High-Speed
Diameter mirrors the negative outlook on the City of St.
Petersburg and the sovereign government bond rating.

The negative outlook on the ratings of another 16 RLGs (Republic
of Bashkortostan, Autonomous-Okrug Khanty-Mansiysk, Samara
Oblast, Komi Republic, Oblast of Nizhniy Novgorod, Republic of
Mordovia, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Chuvashia Republic, Krasnodar Krai,
Moscow Oblast, Belgorod Oblast, Oblast of Omsk, Vologda Oblast,
City of Krasnodar, City of Omsk and City of Volgograd) reflects
the potential for the further deterioration of these issuers'
credit profiles in an environment of increased systemic risk.  In
addition, the potential for a further weakening of the
sovereign's creditworthiness, as reflected in the negative
outlook on the government bond rating, could affect the federal
government's willingness and ability to provide on-going and
extraordinary support to regional and local governments.

Moody's is continuing its review for downgrade on the Republic of
Tatarstan's rating, which was initiated on Dec. 22, 2014
following increased uncertainty surrounding the ability of the
Tatarstan government to address the covenant breach of SINEK's
$250 million bond, for which it has provided a guarantee.
Moody's understands that some progress has been made by the
Republic as it provided a letter of notice to the issuer stating
its intention to increase the guarantee on the bond and received
an approval from the State Council.  At the same time, the review
continues to focus on further implementation of Tatarstan's and
SINEK management's action plan to increase the guarantee.  Any
future sharp FX rate dynamics will also be taken into
consideration during the review.

Given the negative outlooks, an upgrade of the RLG's and GRI's
ratings is unlikely.  If systemic pressures abate, the negative
outlook will likely be changed to stable, provided there is no
deterioration in the RLGs' budget performances.  Further
deterioration in the sovereign's credit quality accompanied by
the deterioration in their credit profiles could exert downward
pressure on these sub-sovereigns.

The Ratings of the Following 18 Issuers Were Downgraded:

  -- Moscow, City of: the issuer ratings and backed senior
     unsecured rating downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3, outlook
     negative.

  -- St. Petersburg, City of: the issuer ratings and senior
     unsecured rating downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 outlook
     negative.

  -- SUE Vodokanal of St. Petersburg: the issuer ratings
     downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1, outlook negative.

  -- OOO Vodokanal Finance: the backed senior unsecured rating
     downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1, outlook negative.

  -- OJSC Western High-Speed Diameter: the backed senior
     unsecured rating downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2, outlook
     negative.

  -- Bashkortostan, Republic of: issuer rating downgraded to Ba2
     from Ba1, outlook negative.

  -- Tatarstan, Republic of: issuer rating downgraded to Ba2 from
     Ba1, review for downgrade.

  -- Khanty-Mansiysk AO: issuer rating downgraded to Ba2 from
     Ba1, outlook negative.

  -- Samara, Oblast of: issuer rating downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2,
     outlook negative.

  -- Komi, Republic of: issuer rating downgraded to B1 from Ba3,
     outlook negative.

  -- Krasnodar, Krai of: issuer rating and senior unsecured
     rating downgraded to B1 from Ba3, outlook negative.

  -- Krasnoyarsk, Krai of: issuer rating downgraded to B1 from
     Ba3, outlook negative.

  -- Belgorod, Oblast of: issuer rating and senior unsecured
     rating downgraded to B1 from Ba3, outlook negative.

  -- Nizhniy Novgorod, Oblast of: issuer rating downgraded to B1
     from Ba3, outlook negative.

  -- Krasnodar, City of: issuer rating downgraded to B1 from Ba3,
     outlook negative.

  -- Mordovia, Republic of: issuer rating and senior unsecured
     rating downgraded to B2 from B1, outlook negative.

  -- Vologda, Oblast of: issuer rating downgraded to B2 from B1,
     outlook negative.

  -- Volgograd, City of: issuer rating downgraded to B2 from B1,
     outlook negative.

The Ratings of the Following 4 Issuers were Confirmed:

  -- Moscow, Oblast of: issuer rating of Ba2 confirmed, outlook
     negative.

  -- Chuvashia, Republic of: issuer rating and senior unsecured
     rating of Ba3 confirmed, outlook negative.

  -- Omsk, Oblast of: issuer rating of Ba3 confirmed, outlook
     negative.

  -- Omsk, City of: issuer rating of B1 confirmed, outlook
     negative.

Specific economic indicators as required by EU regulation are not
applicable for these entities.

On Feb. 19, 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the
ratings of the Russian sub-sovereign entities.  The main points
raised during the discussion were: The systemic risk in which the
issuers operate has materially increased.

The principal methodology used in rating Russia RLGs was Regional
and Local Governments published in January 2013. The principal
methodology used in rating Russia GRIs was Government-Related
Issuers published in October 2014.

The weighting of all rating factors is described in the
methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.


  -- BSFR was downgraded to D from D+ (now equivalent to a BCA of


SBERBANK: Moody's Downgrades BFSR to D; Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service took rating actions on the seven
Russian financial institutions -- Sberbank, Bank VTB JSC,
Gazprombank, Russian Agricultural Bank, Agency for Housing
Mortgage Lending OJSC (AHML), Vnesheconombank and Alfa-Bank.
These actions follow the weakening of Russia's credit profile, as
reflected by Moody's downgrade of Russia's government debt rating
to Ba1 from Baa3 on Feb. 20, 2015.

Specifically, Moody's downgraded the supported senior unsecured,
subordinated debt and deposit and issuer ratings of the Russian
financial institutions.  These ratings incorporate uplift based
on Moody's assessment of the likelihood of government (systemic)
support being made available to each institution, in case of
need.  The supported ratings of all seven entities have been
lowered by one notch.  The outlook on the long-term ratings of
these institutions is negative, in line with the outlook on the
sovereign rating.

In the same rating action the rating agency has also lowered the
standalone bank financial strength ratings (BFSR) of Sberbank,
Bank VTB, JSC , Gazprombank and Alfa bank. This is due to Moody's
expectation that the prolonged recessionary environment in Russia
will produce a very challenging operating environment for the
country's leading banks and thereby impact their financial
fundamentals.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade placed on
these ratings in December 2014.

The weakening of Russia's credit profile has prompted the rating
actions on the Russian financial institutions' supported ratings,
which benefit from various levels of uplift due to systemic
support assumptions.  While Moody's considers that the Russian
government will remain willing to assist these banks in the event
of need, its capacity has declined as expressed by the downgrade
of the government debt rating to Ba1 from Baa3.

The negative outlook on the supported long-term ratings of these
institutions reflects the fact that any further downgrade of the
sovereign rating could affect Moody's assessment of ratings
uplift resulting from systemic support assumptions.

The foreign-currency deposit ratings of Sberbank and Bank VTB,
JSC were downgraded to Ba2, one notch below the debt ratings at
Ba1, following the lowering of the country's foreign-currency
deposit ceiling to Ba2 from Ba1, on 20 February 2015.

Following the downgrade, the supported ratings of these seven
financial institutions will continue to benefit from the systemic
support uplift ranging from one to five notches from their
standalone BCAs.

The worsening operating environment in Russia will impact the
asset quality and profitability of Russian financial institutions
and has prompted Moody's to lower the BFSRs of Sberbank, VTB,
Gazprombank and Alfa bank.  Moody's believes that Russia is
facing the possibility of a protracted economic downturn, with
GDP contracting by 5.5% in 2015 and 3% in 2016.

Overall, Moody's expects total problem loans in the system to
double, and given the low probability of a quick recovery arrears
levels could exceed those seen during the 2008-09 crisis.  In
addition, an elevated interest-rate environment, likely to remain
in place in the near term, has increased funding costs in the
banking system. In a low-growth environment, the banks will
struggle to pass increased funding costs to their customers.
This will result in a contraction of interest margins and,
consequently, operating revenues.  Overall, the operating revenue
contraction combined with a substantially increased cost of risk
is likely to generate a loss-making year for the banking system,
although some leading banks with stronger pricing power and
established market shares could remain profitable, albeit with
substantially worse indicators compared with previous years.

As a result, Russian banks' capital buffers have already come
under pressure and could decline further in the absence of
additional injections from private shareholders and the prompt
implementation of a government support package.  However, the
timeliness and conditionality of the government support measures
remain uncertain; furthermore, it would likely be conditional on
the banks increasing their lending to key strategic industries,
thus rendering the net effect broadly neutral from the
perspective of capital ratios.

In Moody's view, FX refinancing risk in the banking system seems
contained for the near future, given the system's reliance on the
domestic funding sources, of which the Central Bank of Russia
(CBR) is one of the largest.  However, if the current situation
and constrained access to international financial markets
persists for another year, heightened funding shortages and
deleveraging pressure on the system could develop.

BFSRs of Individual Banks:

SBERBANK

Moody's expects pressures on the bank's asset quality and
profitability given the adverse trends in the operating
environment, and has thus lowered Sberbank's BFSR to D (BCA of
ba2) from D+ (ba1), with a negative outlook.

The bank's problem loans (calculated as per Moody's standard
approach and including impaired and overdue loans) worsened to
6.72% as at September 2014 from 4.7% as at end-2013, whilst
provisioning coverage of non-performing loans at 75% declined
during the year compared with historical averages.  The bank's
Tier 1 ratio, although sufficient to absorb Moody's base case
losses, declined somewhat to 10% as at September 2014 from 10.5%
as at end-2013.

The bank's net profitability, while substantially higher than
those of its Russian peers, has also come under downward pressure
in 2014 relative to the previous year and is unlikely to recover
to historical levels in the near future.

At the same time, Moody's notes that Sberbank's funding position
remains robust with limited refinancing risk in 2015.  Its
established market shares and access to customers gives it strong
pricing power within its market and a competitive edge over
domestic peers.  Therefore, despite the lower ba2 BCA, it remains
the highest compared with BCAs for other Russian-owned financial
institutions.

Given its system-wide importance, Sberbank's long-term local and
foreign-currency debt and local-currency deposit ratings benefit
from one notch of systemic support uplift from its BCA, placing
the ratings at Ba1, the same level as Russia's sovereign rating.

Bank VTB, JSC

The headwinds in the operating environment and impact on the
profitability and asset quality of the bank prompted Moody's to
lower VTB's BFSR to E+ (b1) from D-(ba3), with a stable outlook
which reflects the positioning of the ba1 BCA within the E+
category.

The bank's provisioning expenses (calculated as loan loss
provisions as a percentage pre-provision income) have increased
notably during the last year to 90% as of September 2014 from 47%
as at end-2013, prompting the bank to reach break-even net
profitability level for the same period.  However, the
provisioning coverage ratio of non-performing loans has improved
and remains above 100%, reducing the impact on capital. Moody's
expects that asset-quality pressures will continue to mount,
exerting further pressure on the bank's profitability with the
possibility of a negative return on capital in 2015.

Moody's also notes that the bank's Tier 1 capital ratio at 11% as
at September 2014 has improved following the conversion of the
existing sub-debt into a Tier 1 instrument.  Although this
conversion improves the quality of the bank's capital, given the
weaker post-provisioning profitability VTB's internal capital
generation capacity is not as strong as those of its higher-rated
peers.

In addition, with a loan-to-deposit ratio of 140%, the bank
relies heavily on wholesale funding, albeit a large proportion of
it is due to the CBR whose funding historically have high roll-
over rates.  Although Moody's considers that the bank's
refinancing risk is manageable, the high interest-rate
environment implies that this funding structure places interest
margin pressures and negatively alters its lending strategy.

As the second-largest systemically important bank, VTB's long-
term local and foreign-currency debt and local-currency deposit
ratings continues to benefit from three notches of systemic
support uplift from its BCA.

GAZPROMBANK

The adverse trends in the operating environment and their current
impact on the profitability and asset quality of the bank
prompted Moody's' to lower Gazprombank's BFSR to E+ (b1) from D-
(ba3), with a stable outlook which reflects the positioning of
the b1 BCA within the E+ category.

The bank's weakening loan portfolio quality is reflected in its
problem loans (calculated as per Moody's standard approach and
corporate impaired loans and retail overdue 90+ days loans),
which worsened to 11.2% of gross loans as of Q3 2014 relative to
only around 2% as of year-end 2013 driven by recognition of a few
large impaired loans in Ukraine and Russia.  Moody's notes that
the bank's already modest net income has weakened in 2014
compared with the previous year, and the current operating
environment will put pressure on the bank's profitability over
the next 12-18 months.  In turn, the bank's capital adequacy
ratio, although sufficient to absorb anticipated base case
losses, declined to 11.5% as of Q3 2014 from 13.2% at end-2013.

At the same time, Moody's notes that Gazprombank's funding and
liquidity positions remain strong with only limited refinancing
requirements in 2015-16.  Moody's also expects that additional
capital, which Russian state authorities could inject into the
bank during 2015, will help to absorb potential losses stemming
from deteriorating asset quality.

As the third-largest systemically important bank, Gazprombank's
long-term local and foreign-currency debt and local-currency
deposit ratings continues to benefit from two notches of systemic
support uplift from its BCA.

Alfa Bank

Although the bank's adequate capitalisation with a Tier 1 ratio
of 11.8% as at June 2014 is likely to absorb the base case
deterioration in asset quality, Moody's considers that the
adverse operating environment will weaken the bank's
profitability and overall credit profile.  Therefore Alfa bank's
BFSR was lowered to D- (ba3) from D (ba2), with a stable outlook,
which is due to its resilient position in the assigned rating
category.

The bank's problem loans (calculated as per Moody's standard
approach and including impaired and overdue loans) worsened to
4.5% as at June 2014 from 3.5% as at end-2013 and provisioning
expenses (calculated as loan loss provisions as percentage pre-
provision income) almost doubled to 62% from 32% for the same
period.  At the same time, the provisioning coverage ratio of
non-performing loans remains above 100%, reducing the impact on
capital.  Nevertheless, Moody's expects that the adverse asset-
quality trends will exert negative pressure on the bank's
profitability, reducing its hitherto high internal capital
creation rates (historically at 20%) to low single-digit levels.

In addition, Moody's believes that the bank partly depends on
external market funding sources, given its loan-to-deposit ratio
of 125%, which given the current funding conditions can be
expensive.  With limited market share compared with the larger
government-owned banks, Alfa bank remains exposed to volatility
in the corporate deposit base and, consequently, to margin
pressure, although its net interest margin remains one of the
highest compared with the peer group.  At the same time, Moody's
notes that refinancing risk is manageable and Alfa bank maintains
a conservative level of liquid assets as a percentage of total
assets (historically at 30%), one of the highest of its peer
group.

As the fifth-largest bank in Russia, Alfa bank's long-term local
and foreign-currency debt and local-currency deposit ratings
benefit from one notch of systemic support uplift from its BCA.

Russian Agricultural Bank

The standalone BFSR of Russian Agricultural Bank at E+(b3) was
not affected by this rating action and remains on a negative
outlook.

Government Related Institutions (GRIs)

The supported issuer ratings of Vnesheconombank and AHLM who are
fully owned by the Russian government with policy mandates were
downgraded in line with Russia's government debt ratings.

What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down:

Moody's considers that upward pressure on the supported ratings
of all seven Russian financial institutions is unlikely in the
near term because the key drivers of the actions relate to
the weakening of the sovereign's credit profile, as well as
deterioration in the operating environment.

As expressed by the negative outlooks on the long-term ratings of
all seven Russian financial institutions, their ratings could be
downgraded further in the event of any further downgrade of the
government debt rating.  Downward adjustments could also be
triggered by a further significant erosion of the banks'
standalone credit profiles.

Conversely, the outlooks on the ratings of these entities could
be changed to stable in the event of a corresponding change in
outlook on the current government bond rating.

LIST OF AFFECTED CREDIT RATINGS:

Sberbank:

  -- BSFR was downgraded to D from D+ (now equivalent to a BCA of
     ba2), outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term LC Deposit rating was downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3,
     outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Short-term LC Deposit rating was downgraded to NP from P-3;

  -- Long-term FC Deposit rating was downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1,
     outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term LC and FC Senior Unsecured and FC BACKED Senior
     Unsecured ratings were downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3, outlook
     was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN program rating was
     downgraded to (P)Ba1 from (P)Baa3;

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Subordinate rating was downgraded to Ba2
     from Ba1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Subordinate MTN program rating was
     downgraded to (P)Ba2 from (P)Ba1,;

  -- FC BACKED Short-term MTN program rating was downgraded to
     (P)NP from (P)P-3.

Bank VTB, JSC:

  -- BSFR was downgraded to E+ from D- (now equivalent to a BCA
     of b1), outlook was revised to stable;

  -- Long-term LC Deposit rating was downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3,
     outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC Deposit rating was downgraded to Ba2 from Ba1,
     outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Short-term LC Deposit rating was downgraded to NP from P-3;

  -- Short-term FC MTN program rating was downgraded to (P)NP
     from (P)P-3;

  -- Long-term LC and FC Senior Unsecured ratings were downgraded
     to Ba1 from Baa3, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC Senior Unsecured MTN program rating was
     downgraded to (P)Ba1 from (P)Baa3;

  -- Long-term LC Senior Unsecured Bank Credit Facility rating
     was downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3, outlook was revised to
     negative;

  -- Long-term FC Subordinate rating was downgraded to Ba3 from
     Ba2, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC Subordinate MTN program rating was downgraded
     to (P)Ba3 from (P)Ba2;

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Senior Unsecured rating was downgraded
     to Ba1 from Baa3, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN program rating was
     downgraded to (P)Ba1 from (P)Baa3.

Alfa-Bank:

  -- BSFR was downgraded to D- from D (now equivalent to a BCA of
     ba3), outlook was revised to stable;

  -- Long-term LC and FC Deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba2
     from Ba1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term LC and FC Senior Unsecured ratings were downgraded
     to Ba2 from Ba1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC Subordinate, BACKED Subordinate ratings were
     downgraded to B1 from Ba3, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Senior Unsecured rating was downgraded
     to Ba2 from Ba1, outlook was revised to negative.

Alfa MTN Invest Ltd:

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN program rating was
     downgraded to (P)Ba2 from (P)Ba1.

Alfa MTN Markets Lmited:

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN program rating was
     downgraded to (P)Ba2 from (P)Ba1.

Alfa MTN Projects Limited:

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN program rating was
     downgraded to (P)Ba2 from (P)Ba1.

Alfa MTN Issuance Limited:

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Senior Unsecured rating was downgraded
     to Ba2 from Ba1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN program rating was
     downgraded to (P)Ba2 from (P)Ba1.

Gazprombank:

  -- BSFR was downgraded to E+ from D- (now equivalent to a BCA
     of b1), outlook was revised to stable;

  -- Long-term LC and FC Deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba2
     from Ba1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term LC and FC Senior Unsecured ratings were downgraded
     to Ba2 from Ba1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC Senior Unsecured MTN program rating was
     downgraded to (P)Ba2 from (P)Ba1;

  -- Long-term FC Subordinate rating was downgraded to B2 from
     B1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC BACKED Senior Unsecured rating was downgraded
     to Ba2 from Ba1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term LC and FC Subordinate MTN program ratings were
     downgraded to (P)B2 from (P)B1.

Russian Agricultural Bank:

  -- Long-term LC and FC Deposit ratings were downgraded to Ba2
     from Ba1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term LC and FC Senior Unsecured ratings were downgraded
     to Ba2 from Ba1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC Senior Unsecured MTN program rating was
     downgraded to (P)Ba2 from (P)Ba1;

  -- Long-term FC Subordinate rating was downgraded to B2 from
     B1, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Long-term FC Subordinate MTN program rating was downgraded
     to (P)B2 from (P)B1.

Vnesheconombank:

  -- Long-term LC and FC Issuer ratings were downgraded to Ba1
     from Baa3, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Short-term LC and FC Issuer ratings were downgraded to NP
     from P-3.

Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending OJSC:

  -- Long-term LC and FC Issuer ratings were downgraded to Ba1
     from Baa3, outlook was revised to negative;

  -- Short-term LC and FC Issuer ratings were downgraded to NP
     from P-3;

  -- Long-term LC Senior Unsecured and BACKED Senior Unsecured
     ratings were downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3, outlook was
     revised to negative;

The principal methodology used in rating Agency for Housing
Mortgage Lending OJSC and Vnesheconombank was Government-Related
Issuers published in October 2014.

The principal methodology used in rating Sberbank, Bank VTB, JSC,
Gazprombank, Russian Agricultural Bank, Alfa-Bank, Alfa MTN
Issuance Limited, Alfa MTN Markets Limited, Alfa MTN Projects
Limited and Alfa MTN Invest Ltd was Global Banks published in
July 2014.



=========
S P A I N
=========


FONCAIXA FTGENCAT 4: Moody's Lifts Rating on EUR6MM D Notes to B3
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of seven notes,
confirmed the ratings of two notes and downgraded the rating of
one note in five Spanish asset-backed securities (ABS)
transactions.  The upgrades of the local-currency country risk
ceilings to Aa2 from A1 in Spain on Jan. 20, 2015 prompted the
rating actions.

Transactions affected by the rating action are five ABS backed by
SME loans:

  -- FONCAIXA FTGENCAT 4, FTA

  -- GAT FTGENCAT 2006, FTA

  -- GAT FTGENCAT 2007, FTA

  -- GAT FTGENCAT 2008, FTA

  -- GC FTGENCAT CAIXA TARRAGONA 1, FTA

The main drivers behind the upgrades are (1) the reduced
country risk as reflected by the increase in the maximum
achievable rating in Spain and (2) sufficiency of credit
enhancement in the affected transactions.

Moody's has downgraded the rating of the Class D notes in GAT
FTGENCAT 2008, FTA due to the lowering in the credit enhancement
protection under such notes, as a result of the increasing
principal deficiency in the capital structure.

Moody's has also confirmed the ratings of Class B and Class C
notes in GAT FTGENCAT 2007, FTA where the current credit
enhancement was commensurate with the current ratings.

Moody's analysis incorporates the revisions, when needed, of EL
assumptions taking into account the collateral performance to-
date as well as the exposure to relevant counterparty servicers,
account banks and swap providers.  Moody's cash flow sensitivity
stress tests as well as borrower concentration analysis were also
taken into account in the rating actions and limited the
upgrade of two notes in two deals.

The country ceilings reflect a range of risks that issuers in any
jurisdiction are exposed to, including economic, legal and
political risks.  On Jan. 20, 2015, Moody's announced a six-notch
uplift between a government bond rating and its country risk
ceiling for Spain.  As a result, the maximum achievable ratings
for covered bonds and structured finance transactions were
increased to Aa2 from A1 for Spain.

Moody's has revised its volatility assumption in those
transactions given the reduced country risk.  The rest of
assumptions remain unchanged given the stable performance of the
transactions and the stable outlook for Spanish ABS.

In FONCAIXA FTGENCAT 4, FTA the unchanged DP on the current
balance of 11.0%, together with the recovery rate of 55% and the
updated volatility of 93.2%, corresponds to an unchanged
portfolio credit enhancement of 24.5%.

In GAT FTGENCAT 2006, FTA the unchanged DP on the current balance
of 20%, together with the recovery rate of 50% and the updated
volatility of 43.0%, corresponds to an unchanged portfolio credit
enhancement of 25.8%.

In GAT FTGENCAT 2007, FTA the unchanged DP on the current balance
of 26.0%, together with the recovery rate of 55% and the updated
volatility of 47.5%, corresponds to an unchanged portfolio credit
enhancement of 28.8%.

In GAT FTGENCAT 2008, FTA the unchanged DP on the current balance
of 25%, together with the recovery rate of 45% and the updated
volatility of 35%, corresponds to an unchanged portfolio credit
enhancement of 45.9%.

In GC FTGENCAT CAIXA TARRAGONA 1, FTA the unchanged DP on the
current balance of 30.3%, together with the recovery rate of 50%
and the updated volatility of 41.2%, corresponds to an unchanged
portfolio credit enhancement of 34.3%.

Moody's has incorporated the sensitivity of the ratings to
borrower concentrations into the quantitative analysis.  In
particular, Moody's considered the credit enhancement coverage of
large debtors in GAT FTGENCAT 2006, FTA as it shows significant
exposure to large debtors.  The results of this analysis limited
the potential upgrade of the rating on the class C Notes of GAT
FTGENCAT 2006, FTA to Ba1 (sf) as credit enhancement of 18.8%
only covers top six debtors.

The rating actions took into consideration the notes' exposure to
relevant counterparties, such as servicers, account banks or swap
providers.  Moody's considered how the liquidity available in the
transactions and other mitigants support continuity of note
payments, in case of servicer default.

Moody's also assessed the default probability of each
transaction's account bank providers. Moody's analysis considered
the risks of additional losses on the notes in the event of them
becoming unhedged, following a swap counterparty default.  This
consideration limited the potential upgrades on the class B Notes
of GC FTGENCAT CAIXA TARRAGONA 1, FTA to Ba1 (sf), given the
additional credit support provided by the swap counterparty
(CECABANK S.A., Ba3/NP), which pays over a notional equal to the
outstanding balance of the notes. Given this characteristic and
the expected increase in PDL given the default assumption, the
loss on these notes in the event of becoming unhedged would be
significantly higher than for standard interest rate swaps.

To ensure rating stability and to test the sensitivity of the
note ratings, Moody's ran stressed scenarios in cash flow models
before upgrading the relevant notes.

The stressed scenarios assume (1) a 25% stresses for the default
probability assumption; and (2) a 20% increase in the portfolio
CE assumption.  The ratings were upgraded when the negative
rating impact resulting from the above test was within the
sensitivity tolerance.  The sensitivity test to key collateral
assumptions have constrained the upgrade of Class A(G) Notes in
FONCAIXA FTGENCAT 4, FTA as well as Class C Notes in GAT FTGENCAT
2008, FTA.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Global Approach to Rating SME Balance Sheet Securitizations
published in January 2015.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to an upgrade of the
ratings are (1) a lower probability of high-loss scenarios owing
to an upgrade of the country ceiling; (2) performance of the
underlying collateral that exceeds Moody's expectations; (3)
deleveraging of the capital structure; and (4) improvements in
the credit quality of the transaction counterparties.

Factors or circumstances that could lead to a downgrade of the
ratings are (1) an increased probability of high-loss scenarios
owing to a downgrade of the country ceiling; (2) performance of
the underlying collateral that does not meet Moody's
expectations; (3) deterioration in the notes' available CE; and
(4) deterioration in the credit quality of the transaction
counterparties.

List of Affected Ratings:

Issuer: FONCAIXA FTGENCAT 4, FTA

  -- EUR326 million A (G) Notes, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously
     on Jan 23, 2015 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR9.6 million B Notes, Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR7.2 million C Notes, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR6 million D Notes, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

Issuer: GAT FTGENCAT 2006, FTA

  -- EUR12.3 million C Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

Issuer: GAT FTGENCAT 2007, FTA

  -- EUR11.6 million B Notes, Confirmed at B1 (sf); previously on
     Jan 23, 2015 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

  -- EUR33.8 million C Notes, Confirmed at Caa3 (sf); previously
     on Jan 23, 2015 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
     Upgrade

Issuer: GAT FTGENCAT 2008, FTA

  -- EUR40.5M C Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jan
     23, 2015 Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

  -- EUR20.3M D Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jan
     23, 2015 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Issuer: GC FTGENCAT CAIXA TARRAGONA 1, FTA

  -- EUR25.7M B Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jan
     23, 2015 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade


SANTANDER EMPRESAS 10: DBRS Cuts Series C Notes Rating to 'D'
-------------------------------------------------------------
DBRS Ratings Limited has discontinued its rating of BBB (low)
(sf) on the Series B notes, and has downgraded to D (sf) from C
(sf) and discontinued its rating on the Series C notes issued by
F.T.A. SANTANDER EMPRESAS 10 (the Issuer).  The transaction is a
cash flow securitization collateralized primarily by a portfolio
of bank loans and credit lines originated by Banco Santander,
S.A. to Spanish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and
self-employed individuals.

The rating action reflects:
(1) The payment in full of the Series B notes as of
February 16, 2015. The remaining balance of the Series B notes
prior to the final repayment was EUr621,015,230.00
(2) The failure to pay ultimate interest and principal of the
Series C notes. After repayment of the Series B notes, the
remaining proceeds accounted for only 78.54% (EUR738,271,770.00)
of the outstanding balance (EUR940,000,000.00) of the Series C
notes.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


FERREXPO PLC: Moody's Rates New US$160.7MM Senior Notes 'Caa2'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a definitive Caa2 rating to
the new US$160.7 million of senior unsecured notes due 2019 which
Ferrexpo Finance Plc, a fully owned subsidiary of Ferrexpo Plc,
has issued pursuant to the terms of the exchange offer for
Ferrexpo's US$500 million 7.875% senior unsecured notes maturing
in April 2016. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the Caa2
corporate family rating of Ferrexpo, its Caa2-PD/LD probability
of default rating, and the Caa2 rating on the Existing Notes.

Following the completion of the exchange offer, Moody's has also
appended a limited default (/LD) designation to Ferrexpo's Caa2-
PD/LD PDR.  The agency expects to remove the "/LD" suffix after
approximately three business days following the completion of the
debt exchange.  The exchange offer was completed on February 20,
2015, with an outcome accepted by the issuer, in spite of the
minimum participation condition not being met.  Existing Notes
worth US$214.3 million were exchanged, compared to a minimum
target set by the issuer of $300 million.  Existing Notes
tendered were exchanged into the New Notes and US$53.5 million of
cash, which was paid to tendering noteholders on Feb. 24, 2015.
The outstanding residual amount of the Existing Notes following
the completion of the exchange offer, equal to US$285.6 million,
is to be repaid in April 2016.

The outlook on all ratings is negative.

The affirmation of the CFR at Caa2 reflects the agency's view
that Ferrexpo's ratings remain constrained by Ukraine's foreign
currency ceiling, because the company is exposed to Ukraine's
operating, political, legal, fiscal and regulatory environment,
given that all of its processing and mining assets are located
within the country. The corporate debt is mostly in foreign
currency which matches its income in foreign currency.  The
company's capacity to service foreign currency debt could however
be negatively affected by possible future actions the Ukrainian
government may take to preserve the country's foreign-exchange
reserves. The ratings also factor in (1) the company's exposure
to a single commodity, iron ore, for which prices have fallen
substantially during 2014 and are anticipated to remain weak over
the coming quarters; (2) the fact that the company's iron ore
resources are concentrated in a single large deposit in Ukraine,
albeit now exploited from two separate mines, which increases
production outage risk; (3) high level of customer concentration
risk, with the two main customers accounting for c.38% of the
group's revenues in the first 9 months of 2014; and (4) its
concentrated ownership structure, with a single individual, Mr.
Zhevago - who is also the CEO - retaining a 50.3% ownership
interest in the company.

The completion of the exchange offer supports the liquidity
position of the company, by partially mitigating its material
refinancing risk in 2016.  However, the rating agency believes
that Ferrexpo's liquidity remains weak.  Although Ferrexpo had a
cash balance of US$608 million as of 30 September 2014 and is
projected to start generating positive free cash flows from 2015
onwards as a result of its plan to reduce capex, it has still
US$646 million of debt maturing over the next 18 months.  A large
portion of this, equal to US$285.7 million represented by the
Existing Notes outstanding after the completed exchange offer,
will mature in April 2016.  As Ferrexpo has limited access to
international capital markets due to political instability and
geopolitical tensions in Ukraine, has currently no availabilities
under its main long-term committed credit facilities, which are
fully drawn, and has elected to retain a relatively significant
amount of cash (approximately $160m as of September 2014) at Bank
Finance & Credit (Ca, negative), a related party Ukrainian bank
currently exposed to high risk of financial distress, Moody's
estimates that a liquidity gap is possible in the second quarter
of fiscal-year 2016, based on the rating agency's conservative
assumptions on iron ore prices, volumes and cost base. Given
Moody's current assessment of a weak liquidity position for the
company over a 18 months horizon, and considering the terms of
the offer imply a diminished obligation in respect of an extended
maturity not fully balanced by the increase in the coupon, the
rating agency believes that the completed exchange offer meets
its criteria for a distressed exchange.  In accordance with the
Rating Methodology as of March 2009 entitled "Moody's Approach to
Evaluating Distressed Exchanges", a distressed exchange can be
constituted when (1) an obligor offers creditors a new or
restructured debt, or a new package of securities, cash or assets
that amount to a diminished financial obligation relative to the
original obligation and 2) the exchange has the effect of
allowing the obligor to avoid a bankruptcy or payment default in
the future.

Moody's considers that despite being considered as a distressed
exchange, the completed exchange offer is positive for creditors
as it reflects a clear management willingness to use a portion of
Ferrexpo's current substantial cash balances to service its debt,
while at the same time the threshold for dividend distributions
has become more constrained after the exchange offer, based on
the terms of the New Notes.

The negative outlook reflects the fact that a potential further
downgrade of Ukraine's sovereign rating may result in the further
lowering of Ukraine's foreign and local currency bond country
ceiling.  The outlook also reflects the current negative pressure
on liquidity due to the still challenging debt maturity profile
of the company in the next 18 months, in spite of the completed
exchange offer reducing the amount of debt due in April 2016.

Moody's has assigned a definitive Caa2 rating to the New Notes
after reviewing the final legal documentation, and assessing that
the terms of the New Notes are in line with those considered
initially for the purpose of the provisional instrument rating.
In particular, the New Notes will be pari-passu with the residual
outstanding Existing Notes, and share with them the same
structural features, ranking and guarantors.  As for the Existing
Notes, also the New Notes are unsecured guaranteed obligations
issued by Ferrexpo Finance Plc and benefit from a suretyship
provided by Ferrexpo Poltava Mining (FPM).  As at Sep. 30, 2014,
the consolidated net assets and EBITDA of the guarantors, when
aggregated, represented approximately 87% and 95% of the
consolidated net assets and EBITDA of the group, respectively.
The main difference between the New and the Existing Notes, apart
from maturity and coupon, is a more restrictive covenant for
dividend payments in the indenture of the New Notes.

Positive pressure, albeit unlikely, could be exerted on the
ratings if Moody's were to raise Ukraine's foreign-currency bond
country ceiling, provided there is no material deterioration in
the company-specific factors, including its operating and
financial performance, market position and liquidity.

Conversely, ratings are likely to be downgraded if there is a
downgrade of Ukraine's sovereign rating and lowering of the
foreign-currency bond country ceiling, or in case of a material
deterioration in the liquidity of the company.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Mining
Industry published in August 2014. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Ferrexpo Plc, headquartered in Switzerland and incorporated in
the UK, is a mid-sized iron ore pellet producer with mining and
processing assets located in Ukraine. The group has total Joint
Ore Reserves Committee Code (JORC) classified resources of 6.7
billion tonnes, around 1.5 billion tonnes of which are proved and
probable reserves.  The average grade of Ferrexpo's ore is
approximately 31% Fe.  In 2014 the group achieved a pellet
production of 11 million and in the first nine months of the same
year generated revenues of $1.1 billion.


UKRAINE: Bondholders Face Large Losses as Restructuring Looms
-------------------------------------------------------------
Lyubov Pronina at Bloomberg News reports that Ukraine's
bondholders are facing larger losses in looming restructuring as
the hryvnia plunges, Bank of America Corp. said following a
record slump in the debt.

Ukraine's currency has lost more than half of its value this
year, making it harder to meet foreign obligations, including the
US$500 million of dollar-denominated notes due in September and
Us$2.6 billion of debt maturing in 2017, Bloomberg discloses.
According to Bloomberg, Vadim Khramov, a London-based economist
at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, said this raises the
possibility the country will resort to a so-called haircut to the
face value of bonds rather than just to the coupon.

"With continued hryvnia devaluation, Ukraine faces not only
liquidity but also solvency issues," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Khramov
as saying in an e-mailed global research report on Feb. 24.  "We
see increased risk of substantial haircuts in the case of debt
restructuring."

Ukrainian bonds handed investors losses of 18% in February, the
most among 58 countries in the Bloomberg U.S. Dollar Emerging
Market Sovereign Bond Index.

"Corporations fear that more restrictions will be introduced and
the hryvnia will continue to devalue," Vladimir Miklashevsky, a
strategist at Danske Bank A/S in Helsinki, as cited by Bloomberg,
said.  "Investors are increasingly concerned about how the bond
restructuring will play out and as no money from the IMF has
come, the government's solvency is under a big question mark."



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AYLESFORD NEWSPRINT: In Administration, Cuts 230 Jobs
-----------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that Aylesford Newsprint, which employs more
than 300 people near Maidstone, applied to the courts to go into
administration.

Production has ceased and 233 staff made redundant, according to
BBC News.

The report notes that the remaining 65 staff have been retained
to help the administrators in the sale of the company's assets
and the decommissioning of the paper mill.

                        'Traumatic Blow'

Earlier union officials met bosses of the newsprint firm, the
report relates.

UNITE regional officer Tim Elliot described the news as a
"traumatic blow" to staff and the Kent economy, the report notes.

The firm had been manufacturing in Kent since 1922 and produced
more than 400,000 tons of recycled newsprint every year, the
report discloses.

Tracey Crouch, Conservative MP for Chatham and Aylesford,
requested a meeting with the business minister following the
announcement, the report notes.

Labor's parliamentary candidate for Chatham and Aylesford,
Tristan Osborne, said the "impact of this announcement will be
felt across the local area," the report relays.

"It is clear that government needs to work with the
administrators to ensure communication is clear with staff," Mr.
Osborne added.

Allan Graham -- allan.graham@kpmg.co.uk -- and Rob Croxen --
rob.croxen@kpmg.co.uk -- from KPMG have been appointed as
administrators.

Aylesford Newsprint, which supplied its newsprint to some of the
main newspaper groups, employed nearly 300 people and recorded a
turnover of GBP139 million in 2013.


ECO PLASTICS: Shortfall Incurred After Administration
-----------------------------------------------------
Eleanor Ward at Business Sale Report discloses that it is
believed that an unsecured shortfall of GBP14 million is still
owed to trade creditors and HMRC after Eco Plastics fell into
administration.

Bottle recycling firm Eco Plastics fell into administration in
December 2014 with David Riley -- david.riley@uk.gt.com -- and
Joseph McLean -- joseph.mclean@uk.gt.com -- of Grant Thornton
appointed as joint administrators, according to Business Sale
Report.   A rescue deal from Aurelius was completed after a
preferred solvent sale fell through, the report notes.

However, it has been revealed that the administrators only expect
GBP600,000 of the GBP15 million owed to unsecured creditors to be
paid, resulting in a GBP14.4 million shortfall, the report
relates.  Former suppliers are owed GBP10.8 million, while Her
Majesty's Revenue and Custom is due around GBP1.9 million, the
report says.

Plastics Eco Ltd, a subsidiary of Aurelius, was set up as part of
a rescue deal worth GBP3.56 million, the report discloses.  It
subsequently changed its name to Eco Plastics Recycling Ltd.

The report relays that the initial preferred option of a solvent
sale had previously fallen through.  Messrs. Riley and McLean had
approached 27 potential buyers in the seeking of an "accelerated
sale," the report notes.

After two offers were submitted, the board accepted one on a
solvent basis, the report says.   But primary shareholders
Ludgate Environmental Fund could not agree on the solvent sale
and the offer from Aurelius was accepted after it was deemed the
"best outcome" for the company, the report adds.


LIFE STYLE CARE: Part of Portfolio Goes Into Administration
-----------------------------------------------------------
healthinvestor.co.uk reports Life Style Care (2011) (LSC11), a
group of 23 care homes that operates under the Life Style Care
brand, has gone into administration.

Rob Harding -- robharding@deloitte.co.uk -- and Nick Edwards --
nickedwards@deloitte.co.uk -- of Deloitte have been appointed as
joint administrators of LSC11, which is made up of former
Southern Cross care homes, according to healthinvestor.co.uk.

The directors of LSC11 continue to remain with the business.

In a Deloitte press release, Mr. Harding said that his primary
concern would be to "ensure continuity of care for all residents"
in the care homes affected, the report notes.

The report relays that Mr. Harding added: "We will be conducting
a detailed review of the business and will work closely with all
key stakeholders to . . . . ensure that long-term financial
viability is restored to the business."

There are two other care home groups under the Life Style Care
brand.  These are: Life Style Care plc and Life Style Care (2010)
plc.

The report notes that a spokesperson from Life Style Care said:
"The 15 care homes within these companies were never connected
with Southern Cross and have a different landlord and creditor to
Life Style Care (2011) plc.  Therefore, Life Style Care plc and
Life Style Care (2010) plc are not affected by, and are not party
to, the administration order."

Life Style Care was founded by Ramesh Sachdev in 1987.  LSC11
employs around 2,200 staff and cares for around 1,400 residents
in the area.


NINETY NINER: Shuts Store for the Last Time
--------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Mackley at Swindon Advertiser reports that Ninety
Niner, a popular budget store, has shut up shop for the last time
in Royal Wootton Bassett, leaving another unit empty in the
town's High Street.

The landlord is now looking for a new tenant to take on the lease
of the shop now that it has become vacant, according to Swindon
Advertiser.

Estate agents Alder King, who are marketing the unit, said the
shop will be available for a new business from March, the report
notes.

"This unit is situated in the heart of the town by the war
memorial and the pedestrian alley leading to Borough Fields
shopping center, so benefits from strong footfall and profile,"
the report quoted James Gregory, partner of Alder King's Swindon
office, as saying.

"Over the past 12 months, we have seen a reduction in the number
of empty shop units across our high streets as consumer
confidence has picked up and we expect this unit to be of
interest, particularly to an independent retailer looking to tap
into the popular market town," Mr. Gregory added.

The report relates that the news has divided opinion in the
town's business community, with some welcoming the excitement of
a new outfit while others fear what it means for the future of
the High Street more generally.

The Ninety Niner is the latest independent store to leave the
town, just weeks after the parent company of the nearby Marsh
Farm Hotel announced that they had gone into administration, the
report discloses.


RANGERS FOOTBALL: Goram Fears the Worst if King Coup Fails
-----------------------------------------------------------
The Herald reports that Andy Goram has confessed he fears the
worst for Rangers Football Club PLC if Dave King fails to oust
the current board and the fans continue their protests against
the club's hierarchy.

The legendary former Ibrox goalkeeper believes the Govan outfit
could descend into a second administration if the March 6
extraordinary general meeting does not herald a new dawn for the
fallen Old Firm giants, according to The Herald.

The report notes that the 50-year-old is concerned the present
directors and major investor Mike Ashley will have devised a
secret plan to cling on to power and is worried about the
consequences should that happen.  "The EGM is going to be a
massive, massive day.  Dave King is supremely confident he's got
enough backing to get him into the club," the report quoted Mr.
Goram as saying.

"But the Ibrox board and Mike Ashley are not just going to roll
over and lie down and my fear is they've got something up their
sleeve.  So, it's going to be interesting. If the present board
and Mike Ashley stay in the club, we're stuck with that and we
have to live with that.  It's not as if we can have a right of
appeal; that's us, we're stuck with the board and Mike Ashley, so
we've got to go forward with that," Mr. Goram said, the report
notes.

"That will be difficult for the fans to accept but if the board
stays in place at Ibrox and Mike Ashley's still there they've
already voted with their feet this season.  Ibrox has been half
full for many games.  And if Dave King doesn't get in they might
vote even more with their feet and will probably boycott Sports
Direct and then that's just a downward spiral," Mr. Goram said,
the report relates.

"Then the money isn't coming into the club and that big bad word
administration comes back into it again," Mr. Goram added.

               About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv.  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.


SPECIALTECH: Enters Voluntary Liquidation, Closes
-----------------------------------------------------
bit-tech.net reports that Pembrokeshire-based PC cooling
specialist SpecialTech has announced its closure, ending its
winter sale with a message from founder Stephen Probert that the
company has entered voluntary liquidation.

"It is with a heavy heart and much regret that I have to inform
you that SpecialTech is now closed," company founder Stephen
Probert announced in a surprise update to the company's homepage,
according to bit-tech.net.

"The company has been placed into voluntary liquidation.  All
outstanding orders have been sent or refunded.  Thank you to
everyone for your support over the years, it has been a pleasure
to serve the community.  See you on the other side," the
statement added.

The report notes that Mr. Probert's statement suggests that all
ongoing business has been wrapped up, with those who have ordered
hardware either receiving their goods or a full refund -- more
than many companies which hit the rocks manage to achieve.  The
closure has also affected the company's official forum, which is
no longer available to access, the report relates.

The report notes that SpecialTech's most recent financial filings
highlighted growing liabilities, reported at nearly GBP330,000
representing a 14.44% increase year-on-year.  With only
GBP185,000 in assets and GBP9,130 in cash according to documents
published by DueDil, it seems that the enthusiast business is
getting increasingly tough for smaller businesses, the report
relays.

Dating back to 2002 and officially founded as a company in 2004,
SpecialTech made a name for itself selling liquid-cooling
hardware to enthusiasts.  The company also offered the usual
range of PC accessories, including modding suppies, cases,
components and gaming hardware, at competitive prices.


USC: Suppliers Owed GBP14 Million
---------------------------------
Drapers reports that brands stocked by young fashion retailer USC
are owed a total of GBP14.3 million following the business'
prepack administration.

A creditors report issued by administrators Duff & Phelps states
money owed to non-preferential unsecured creditors totaled
GBP15.2 million at the time of going into administration,
according to Drapers.  Of these creditors, trade and expense
creditors are owed GBP14.3 million; Her Majesty's Revenue and
Customs is owed GBP576,499 and gift vouchers issued by the firm
total GBP286,333, according to Drapers.

Brands hit hardest include Diesel, which is owed GBP1.3 million
and G-Star which is owed GBP1 million, the report relays.

Converse is owed GBP656,817, Warnaco -- parent company for Calvin
Klein -- is GBP562,881 out of pocket while Bestseller is owed
GBP417,312, the report says.  Tommy Hilfiger is owed GBP104,061.

It is understood that most of the money owed to suppliers is held
in stock and USC is dealing with brands on a case by case basis
to come to an agreement, the report relays.  All of the 90 USC
stores are still trading.

USC appointed Duff & Phelps and Gallagher Partnership as joint
administrators on January 13 before selling the company to
another Sports Direct-owned firm Republic, the report notes.

More than 200 workers at USC's warehouse in Dundonald, South
Ayrshire, were made redundant when the business went into
administration last month, the report relays.  As reported by
Drapers, workers are to take their cases to an employment
tribunal, the report says.

Meanwhile, Sports Direct founder Mike Ashley will be pulled into
a parliamentary investigation over his business practices and the
treatment of the workers, the report adds.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2015.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
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