/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/140403.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Thursday, April 3, 2014, Vol. 15, No. 66

                            Headlines

C R O A T I A

CRIMEA: S&P Lowers ICR to 'D' on Missed Coupon Payment
SUNCANI HVAR: ORCO Germany Buys Receivables of Two Creditor Banks


F R A N C E

BELVEDERE SA: Krzysztof Trylinski Handed 87% Stake to Creditors


G E R M A N Y

JBS INVESTMENTS: Fitch Rates Sr. Unsecured Notes 'BB-'


G R E E C E

ALPHA BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B' Mortgage Covered Bonds Rating
GREECE: May Use EUR11BB of Int'l. Aid for Banks to Cut Debt


I R E L A N D

* S&P Affirms 'BB+' Ratings on 7 Insurance-Linked Securities


I T A L Y

PIAGGIO & C: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'BB-' CCR


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZAKHSTAN: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'RD'


L U X E M B O U R G

DEVIX MIDCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable


N E T H E R L A N D S

DEUTSCHE ANNINGTON: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Hybrid Notes
GRESHAM CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class F Notes to Caa3
HYDE PARK: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on EUR11.5MM Class E Notes
SILVER BIRCH: Moody's Lifts Rating on EUR7.5MM Cl. E Notes to B2
SKELLIG ROCK: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on EUR13.5M Cl. S Notes


P O R T U G A L

BRISA CONCESSAO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Senior Unsecured Rating
* Fitch Affirms Ratings on Six Covered Bond Programs


R O M A N I A

ASTRA SA: FSA Puts Firm Into Special Administration


R U S S I A

ALROSA OJSC: S&P Retains 'BB-' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
BASHNEFT JSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Rating
MECHEL: Moody's Lowers National Scale Rating to 'Ba3.ru'
RED&BLACK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+sf' Rating on Class C Notes
SOVCOMFLOT JSC: Moody's Places 'Ba2' CFR on Review for Downgrade


S L O V E N I A

NOVA REVIJA: Forced Into Administration by DURS' Proposal
SLOVENIA: Seeks Bid for Majority Stake in Telekom Slovenije


S P A I N

KUTXABANK SA: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba1 Ratings to Stable
MADRID RMBS IV: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CC(sf)'
MAPFRE SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on EUR700MM Senior Debt


U K R A I N E

MERLIN ENTERTAINMENTS: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3; Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BARINBROOK LIMITED: Goes Into Administration
COOPER GAY: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR & Revises Outlook to Negative
PUNCH TAVERNS: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'BB-'
UK COAL: Appeals for Government Support to Avert Collapse


                            *********


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C R O A T I A
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CRIMEA: S&P Lowers ICR to 'D' on Missed Coupon Payment
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term issuer
credit rating on the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to 'D' from
'CCC', and the national scale rating to 'D' from 'uaB-'.  S&P
then withdrew its ratings on Crimea at the issuer's request.

As defined in EU CRA Regulation 1060/2009 [EU CRA Regulation]),
the ratings on Crimea are subject to certain publication
restrictions set out in Art 8a of the EU CRA Regulation,
including publication in accordance with a pre-established
calendar.  Under the EU CRA Regulation, deviations from the
announced calendar are allowed only in limited circumstances and
must be accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for
the deviation.  In this case, the deviation has been caused by
Crimea's failure to make a coupon payment on its outstanding
UAH133 million bond.

Rationale

The downgrade follows Crimea's missed coupon payment on its
UAH133 billion (US$12 million) bond and incorporates S&P's view
that Crimea is currently unable to pay its debt obligations.

In the past, Crimea has generally made interest payments on its
debt obligations from its budgeted general fund held at the
Republic of Ukraine's treasury.  According to information S&P has
received from Crimean government officials that we understand are
managing Crimea's debt, Crimea had sufficient cash on the coupon
payment date in the general fund, and had submitted the necessary
documents to make the payment to the Ukrainian treasury in
advance.  Based on information from the Crimean government
officials, however, the Ukrainian treasury has not made the
coupon payment.

In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable.  At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.

After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts.  The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion.  The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.

RATINGS LIST

Downgraded; Ratings Withdrawn
                                 Withdrawn  To   From
Crimea (Autonomous Republic of)
Issuer Credit Rating            NR         D    CCC/Negative/--
Ukraine National Scale Rating   NR         D    uaB-/--/--

NR-Not rated.


SUNCANI HVAR: ORCO Germany Buys Receivables of Two Creditor Banks
-----------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that ORCO Germany said on Wednesday it is
acquiring receivables of two creditor banks of Suncani Hvar.

"The ORCO Germany total investment of EUR24 million (US$33.1
million) has been achieved with a material discount to the
nominal value," SeeNews quotes the German company as saying in a
statement.

According to SeeNews, ORCO Germany said that all the receivables
are secured by pledges on Suncani Hvar assets, mainly on Amfora,
Adriana and Riva hotels.

The real estate company also said it plans to participate in the
financial restructuring of Suncani Hvar, SeeNews relates.

ORCO Germany is a subsidiary of ORCO Property Group.

Suncani Hvar is a Croatian hotel operator.



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F R A N C E
===========


BELVEDERE SA: Krzysztof Trylinski Handed 87% Stake to Creditors
---------------------------------------------------------------
Julie Miecamp at Bloomberg News reports that Krzysztof Trylinski
brought a five-year battle for control of Belvedere SA to an end
in March 2013 with a deal that handed control of the French
vodka-maker to bondholders.

Belvedere's Trylinski handed an 87% stake in the maker of
Sobieski vodka to creditors in last year's restructuring deal,
Bloomberg recounts.  The Beaune, France-based company sought
court help after breaching terms of its debt, triggering years of
legal battles in courts across France, the U.K. and Poland,
Bloomberg relates.

The spirits company sought protection using "Sauvegarde" rules
introduced two years earlier, Bloomberg relays.

Belvedere SA -- http://www.belvedere.fr/-- is a France-based
company engaged in the production and distribution of beverages.
The Company's range of products includes vodka and spirits,
wines, and other beverages, under such brands as Sobieski,
William Peel, Marie Brizard, Danzka and others.  Belvedere SA
operates through its subsidiaries, including Belvedere Czeska,
Belvedere Scandinavia, Belvedere Baltic, Belvedere Capital
Management, Sobieski SARL and Sobieski USA, among others.  It is
present in a number of countries, such as Poland, Lithuania,
Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Spain, Russia, Ukraine, the United
States and others.  In addition, the Company holds a minority
stake in Abbaye de Talloires, involved in the hotel and wellness
center.

Belvedere filed for pre-insolvency protection in 2008 after
breaching the floating rate note covenant by repurchasing more of
its stock than terms allowed.  In July 2011, a commercial court
in Nimes in southeastern France granted the company creditor
protection.



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G E R M A N Y
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JBS INVESTMENTS: Fitch Rates Sr. Unsecured Notes 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned an expected rating of 'BB-' to
proposed benchmark-size senior unsecured notes offering by JBS
Investments GmbH.  These notes will be unconditionally guaranteed
by JBS S.A. and JBS Hungary Holdings Kft.  The notes will rank
equally in right of payment with all other present and future
senior unsecured obligations of the issuer and of the guarantors.

The proceeds are expected to be used to refinance shorter-
maturity indebtedness and for general corporate purposes.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

HIGH LEVERAGE, BUT DELEVERAGING

Fitch expects JBS's net debt to EBITDA ratio to organically fall
to around 3.0x or lower by the end of 2014 due to the company's
strong free cash flow (FCF) generation.  Nevertheless, given the
acquisitive nature of the company, the existing rating categories
build in an expectation that debt-financed transactions could
lead to this ratio being closer to 3.5x.  In FYE13, JBS reported
strong performance, notably in its US poultry division business.
Total group EBITDA grew 39% year-on-year at BRL6.1 billion and
reported net leverage was at 3.7x.  Annualizing 4Q'13 EBITDA,
which includes Seara results, leverage ended the period at 3.17x.

TURNAROUND OF SEARA

JBS made significant initial cash investments in working capital
in order to strengthen Seara's operations.  The group has
communicated to the market good progress in terms of integration
of Seara since the acquisition in September 2013 and expect to
report strong 1Q'14 results.  JBS has rationalized the
administrative and financial activities of Seara, improved
logistics, product delivery rates and worked on the reformulation
of Seara products with a focus on quality and better product mix.

SOLID BUSINESS PROFILE

JBS's credit ratings are supported by a strong business profile.
The company is the world's largest beef and leather producer.
With the acquisition of Seara Brasil, JBS has become the second
largest processed meats producer in Brazil.  The company's
product and geographic diversification help to mitigate risks
related to disease and trade restrictions.

NO MAJOR ACQUISITIONS ANTICIPATED

Fitch does not foresee any transformational acquisitions in the
next 18 months as JBS's management will need to focus on the
integration of Seara.  However, Fitch factors in its ratings some
bolt-on transactions as JBS aims to reinforce its production and
distribution capacity.

ADEQUATE LIQUIDITY

As FYE13, about 29% of JBS debt -- or BRL9.4 billion -- was
classified as short-term.  This figure compares with BRL9 billion
of cash and cash equivalents and USD1.5 billion of available
committed lines at JBS USA.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

A downgrade could be precipitated by further increase of the
group's leverage ratios, or a sharp contraction in the group's
operating margin and FCF generation in the next 18 months.

An upgrade could result from an increase in the group's capacity
to generate strong FCF. Expanding operating margin over a
sustained period of time and consistent leverage ratios in the
range of 2.0x to 2.5x would also be viewed positively.

Fitch Rates the following:

JBS S.A.:

-- Foreign & local currency IDR 'BB-';
-- Notes due 2016 'BB-';
-- National scale rating 'A-(bra)'.
-- Debentures 'A-(bra)'.

JBS USA LLC:

-- Foreign and local currency IDR 'BB-';
-- Term loan B facility due in 2018 'BB'
-- Notes due 2020, 2021 'BB-'.

JBS USA Finance, Inc:

-- Foreign and local currency IDR 'BB-';
-- Bonds due 2020 'BB-';
-- Notes due 2021 'BB-'.

JBS Investments GmbH

-- Notes due 2023 'BB-'.

JBS Finance II Ltd:

-- Foreign and local currency IDR 'BB-';
-- Notes due 2018 'BB-'.



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G R E E C E
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ALPHA BANK: Fitch Affirms 'B' Mortgage Covered Bonds Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlooks on four Greek covered bond
programs to Positive and another to Stable.  The ratings of the
five covered bonds programs have also been affirmed.  At the same
time, the agency is maintaining the rating of one Cypriot covered
bond program on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

These rating actions follow the implementation of the agency's
revised Covered Bonds Rating Criteria dated March 10, 2014 on
programs issued by Greek and Cypriot banks.  As part of its
updated covered bonds analysis, the agency has assigned IDR
uplift to each program, where applicable.

Key Rating Drivers

The rating of the mortgage covered bonds issued by Alpha Bank
A.E. (Alpha, B-/Stable/B) has been affirmed at 'B' and the
Outlook has been revised to Positive from Negative.  The change
in the Outlook indicates the potential for a rating upgrade based
on the bank's IDR of 'B-', an IDR uplift of '1', an unchanged
Discontinuity Cap (D-Cap) of '3' (moderate high discontinuity
risk) and the asset percentage (AP) that Fitch takes into account
in its analysis and which provides more protection than the
breakeven AP for a-B rating.

The rating of the mortgage covered bonds issued by Eurobank
Ergasias S.A. (Eurobank, B-/Stable/B) has been affirmed at 'B'
and the Outlook has been revised to Positive from Negative.  The
change in the Outlook indicates the potential for a rating
upgrade based on the bank's IDR of 'B-', an IDR uplift of '1', an
unchanged D-Cap of '0' (full discontinuity risk) and the AP that
Fitch takes into account in its analysis, and which provides more
protection than the breakeven AP for a 'B' rating.

The rating of the mortgage covered bonds Programme I issued by
National Bank of Greece S.A. (NBG, B-/Stable/B) has been affirmed
at 'B+' and the Outlook has been revised to Stable from Negative.
The change in the Outlook indicates that, although there is the
potential for a rating upgrade based on the bank's IDR of 'B-',
an IDR uplift of '1', an unchanged D-Cap of '0' (full
discontinuity risk) and the AP that Fitch takes into account in
its analysis and which provides more protection than the
breakeven AP for a 'B+' rating, the rating of NBG Programme I is
constrained by the Country Ceiling of the Greek sovereign, which
is currently at 'B+'.

The rating of the mortgage covered bonds Programme II issued by
NBG has been affirmed at 'B' and the Outlook has been revised to
Positive from Negative.  The change in the Outlook indicates the
potential for a rating upgrade based on the bank's IDR of 'B-',
an IDR uplift of '1', an unchanged D-Cap of '3' (moderate high
discontinuity risk) and the AP that Fitch takes into account in
its analysis and which provides more protection than the
breakeven AP for a 'B' rating.

The rating of the mortgage covered bonds issued by Piraeus Bank
S:A. (Piraeus, B-/Stable/B) has been affirmed at 'B' and the
Outlook has been revised to Positive from Negative.  The change
in the Outlook indicates the potential for a rating upgrade based
on the bank's IDR of 'B-', an IDR uplift of '1', an unchanged D-
Cap of '3' (moderate high discontinuity risk) and the AP that
Fitch takes into account in its analysis and which provides more
protection than the breakeven AP for a 'B' rating.

The 'B' rating of the mortgage covered bonds issued by Bank of
Cyprus Public Company Ltd (BoC; IDR 'Restricted Default', RD) has
been maintained on RWN although the covered bond program benefits
from an IDR uplift of '1'.  The RWN reflects the uncertainty
around the direction of the bank's IDR and the impact of the
current difficult economic environment on the performance of the
residential mortgage portfolio.

The IDR uplift expresses Fitch's judgment of the degree of
protection in the event of a bank's resolution that would be
available to prevent the source of covered bonds payments
switching from the issuer to the cover pool.  It is derived from
the following factors: Fitch's opinion of the relative ease and
motivations for resolution methods other than liquidation, the
importance of covered bonds to the financial markets in a given
jurisdiction and the extent of buffer offered by senior unsecured
debt.

Fitch's view on the use of resolution methods other than
liquidation contributes to the IDR uplift assigned to the Greek
and Cypriot programs based on their large size in their domestic
market.

Rating Sensitivities

The 'B'/Positive rating of the mortgage covered bonds issued by
Alpha, Eurobank, NBG Programme II and Piraeus may be upgraded
once the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive is passed by the
European Parliament and provided the AP that Fitch relies upon in
its analysis is commensurate with the breakeven level for the new
rating.

The 'B+'/Stable rating of the mortgage covered bonds Programme I
issued by NBG may be affected by changes to the Country Ceiling
of the Greek sovereign. The rating of NBG Programme I would be
vulnerable to downgrade if NBG's IDR is downgraded by two or more
notches.

The 'B'/RWN rating of the mortgage covered bonds issued by BoC
may be affected by changes to BoC's IDR.  The rating of the
covered bonds is also vulnerable to a deterioration of the
performance of the residential mortgage portfolio.  Additionally,
should Cyprus's Country Ceiling be downgraded below 'B', the
covered bonds rating may be downgraded.


GREECE: May Use EUR11BB of Int'l. Aid for Banks to Cut Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jonathan Stearns at Bloomberg News reports that Greece may use
EUR11 billion (US$15.2 billion) of international aid earmarked
for banks to reduce the nation's debt, adding momentum to the
government's planned return to international bond markets.

Greece has used EUR25 billion of a EUR50 billion European bank-
rescue package to bolster its biggest lenders, Bloomberg
discloses.  Some EUR14 billion went to restructure smaller banks,
Bloomberg notes.  According to Bloomberg, Finance Minister
Yannis Stournaras said that the remaining EUR11 billion may not
be needed should Greek banks find private investors.

Greece may hire banks to sell bonds this year as it weans itself
off EUR240 billion in emergency aid granted since early 2010,
when investors shunned the nation's debts because of alarm over a
budget deficit that was five times the European Union limit,
Bloomberg News says.  According to Bloomberg, three officials
said the government plans to sell EUR2 billion of bonds by mid-
year.

Greece, whose debt load is close to 180% of gross domestic
product, or about EUR326 billion, has narrowed its budget deficit
as part of the terms of the rescue program, Bloomberg News
relates.  The government and EU predict that Greece will emerge
in 2014 from six years of recession, Bloomberg News states.



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I R E L A N D
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* S&P Affirms 'BB+' Ratings on 7 Insurance-Linked Securities
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its
ratings on seven insurance-linked securities issued by four
different issuers.

For the Kortis and Vita issues, the affirmation follows S&P's
reappraisal of the attachment probabilities.  S&P assess that
these probabilities remain commensurate with the current ratings
on the notes.  In addition, for these issues, S&P reviewed the
creditworthiness of the ceding company, Swiss Reinsurance Co.
Ltd. (AA-/Stable/A-1+), and the ratings on the collateral that
will be used to redeem the principal on the redemption date.  For
these issues, the collateral is 'AAA' rated notes issued by the
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

In the case of the Avondale issues, S&P reviewed the extent of
the support agreement from the Bank of Ireland (BB+/Stable/B).
This agreement obligates Bank of Ireland to meet, under certain
conditions, payments due on the notes net of potential tax
liabilities and costs from servicing the policies.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Affirmed

Avondale Securities S.A.
Class A-1                      BB+ (sf)
Class A-2                      BB+ (sf)

Kortis Capital Ltd.
Series VI Class E              BB+ (sf)

Vita Capital IV Ltd.
Series V Class D               BBB- (sf)
Series VI Class E              BB+ (sf)

Vita Capital V Ltd.
Series 2012-1 Class D-1        BBB- (sf)
Series 2012-1 Class E-1        BB+ (sf)



=========
I T A L Y
=========


PIAGGIO & C: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative & Affirms 'BB-' CCR
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it revised its outlook on
Italian manufacturer of scooters, motorcycles, and light
transportation vehicles Piaggio & C. SpA to negative from stable.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-' long-term corporate
credit rating on Piaggio.

The outlook revision follows the poor performance that Piaggio
reported in 2013, which has triggered and could continue to
prompt deteriorating credit ratios -- namely funds from
operations (FFO) to debt and debt to EBITDA -- while pushing up
the company's debt.

"We base the affirmation on our assumption that, in 2014,
Piaggio's credit ratios will likely strengthen gradually from the
very low end of our 'aggressive' category for the company's
financial risk profile.  At the end of 2013, FFO to debt was 12%
and debt to EBITDA stood at 5.1x.  We think the potential modest
improvement in these ratios will stem from Piaggio's low revenue
growth and an EBITDA margin that we anticipate will stay at least
at 12%, matching that achieved in 2013," S&P noted.

"After about seven years of contraction, demand for two-wheel
vehicles in Europe could start to slowly edge up already in 2014
and gather speed in 2015, in our opinion.  Europe is still
Piaggio's No. 1 market, representing about 55% of 2013 revenues.
In the group's presentation of its new 2014-2017 business plan,
revenues in Europe will likely still amount to at least 50% in
2017.  Some support could come from the East Asian markets,
though.  Revenues in Vietnam have lagged behind the company's and
our expectations in past years, but we nevertheless expect some
improvement in these revenues this year.  In addition, Vietnam in
our view offers a good base from which Piaggio could expand
exports into neighboring countries.  India is probably going to
still be a mixed story, in our opinion.  Light transportation
vehicle (LTV) revenues will likely remain sluggish this year,
potentially posting zero growth, while demand for two-wheel
vehicles should inch up slightly.  We take into account Piaggio's
very low starting point in this market, which it entered with
Vespa scooters only two years ago," S&P said.

"We continue to assess Piaggio's business risk profile as 'fair,'
based on the company's fair competitive position, supported by
its solid market share in scooters in Europe; and geographic
diversification mainly in Vietnam and India, which should
guarantee better medium- and long-term growth opportunities.
However, Piaggio is exposed to stagnant demand in Europe's mature
markets and volatile demand in its developing markets.  The two-
wheel and LTV markets are highly competitive, as well," S&P
noted.

The volatility in Piaggio's profitability is very low compared
with peers' in the auto and truck industry.  Its EBITDA margin is
generally in the upper end of the average range for peers in the
same sector.

In S&P's base case, it assumes:

   -- 2014 GDP growth of 0.9% in the eurozone (European Economic
      and Monetary Union), 3% in the U.S., 5.1% in India, and
      5.4% in Vietnam. 2015 GDP growth of 1.3% in the eurozone,
      3.2% in the U.S., 6.0% in India, and 5.5% in Vietnam.

   -- Revenue growth of about 2.5% in 2014 and at least 3% in
      2015.

   -- EBITDA margin at 12% for both years.

   -- EUR100 million of annual capital expenditures.

   -- No dividends in 2014 and EUR15 million in 2015.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
metrics:

   -- FFO to debt at about 12% in 2014 and close to 13% in 2015.

   -- Some free operating cash flow in 2014 and 2015.

The negative outlook flags the 30% possibility of a downgrade of
Piaggio if S&P thought that the company would not maintain credit
ratios in line with its assessment of its financial risk profile
as "aggressive" or if S&P considered that its liquidity had
weakened to below its "adequate" assessment.  In S&P's base-case
scenario, it assumes that Piaggio will benefit from a very mild
rebound in demand in Europe's two-wheel market in 2014 and 2015.
In the same period, S&P expects LTV demand in India to remain
glum while Vietnam and neighboring countries show limited growth
for two-wheel vehicles.  Based on these assumptions, S&P assumes
that Piaggio will increase revenues in the low single digits this
year; maintain reported EBITDA margin at about 12%, at least in
line with the 2013 figure; and generate low free operating cash
flow at year-end 2014.

S&P could consider lowering the rating on Piaggio if it observed
persistent weak demand in Europe that would in turn jeopardize
the expected improvement in revenues, performance, and credit
ratios that S&P assumes in its base-case scenario.  As regards
Piaggio's activities outside Europe, although S&P anticipates
very moderate revenue growth in 2014, both India and Vietnam have
been tough markets in recent years, owing to economic growth
swings and fierce local competition.  S&P could also downgrade
Piaggio if it didn't maintain liquidity in line with our
guidelines for an "adequate" assessment.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if Piaggio improved its
financial risk profile through healthy cash flow generation that
it then used to reduce debt.  Sound cash flow generation could
stem from increased unit sales and revenues, on the back of a
sustained rebound in demand in Europe or strong growth in
countries outside Europe.  Concurrently, S&P would anticipate FFO
to debt between 15% and 20%.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZAKHSTAN: Fitch Lowers LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'RD'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Kazakhstan's Alliance Bank JSC's
Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'RD' (Restricted
Default) from 'C' and Viability Rating (VR) to 'f' from 'c'.

Key Rating Drivers

The downgrades reflect Fitch's view that the bank has experienced
an uncured default on its senior debt obligations, following the
failure to pay a coupon due on March 25.  Fitch understands that
Alliance has no plans to make the outstanding payment during the
10-day grace period given the ruling of the financial court of
Almaty on March 3.  This ruling authorized the restructuring of
the bank's debt and ordered suspension of payments on these
obligations.

In January 2014, the bank stated its intention to materially
reduce its liabilities under its senior and subordinated debt
obligations relative to original contractual terms in order to
improve its capitalization.  Fitch therefore expects that
implementation of the restructuring will involve a material
reduction of terms relative to the original contractual terms,
which Fitch classifies as a restricted default in accordance with
its "Distressed Debt Exchange Criteria"

The affirmation of the senior and subordinated debt at 'C'
reflects the fact that these were already at the lowest level
possible for instrument ratings.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch expects to review Alliance's ratings following completion
of the bank's restructuring. Any upgrades will depend on the
extent to which the restructuring restores Alliance's viability,
and in particular, solvency.

The rating actions are as follows:

  Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: downgraded to 'RD'
  from 'C'

  Short-term foreign and local currency IDRs: downgraded to 'RD'
  from 'C'

  Support Rating: affirmed at '5'

  Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'No Floor'

  Viability Rating: downgraded to 'f' from 'c'

  Senior unsecured debt rating: affirmed at 'C'; Recovery Rating
  'RR4'

  Subordinated debt rating: affirmed at 'C'; Recovery Rating
  'RR6'


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


DEVIX MIDCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
preliminary 'B' long-term corporate credit rating to Devix Midco
S.A., a Luxembourg-registered, France-based manufacturer of rigid
plastic packaging and delivery solutions for the health care
industry.

At the same time, S&P assigned its preliminary 'B' issue rating
to the proposed senior secured first-lien facilities, comprising
a US$380 million first-lien term loan due in 2021 and a
US$65 million undrawn committed revolving credit facility (RCF).
The preliminary recovery rating on these facilities is '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery
prospects for lenders in the event of a payment default.

S&P also assigned its preliminary 'CCC+' issue rating to the
proposed US$175 million senior secured second-lien term loan due
2022.  The preliminary recovery rating on the proposed second-
lien term loan is '6', indicating S&P's expectation of negligible
(0%-10%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.

The ratings on Devix Midco reflect S&P's assessment of the
group's "fair" business risk profile and "highly leveraged"
financial risk profile, as S&P's criteria define these terms.
Devix Midco comprises the devices and prescription retail
packaging divisions of Rexam PLC's health care business.  On
Feb. 3, 2014, Rexam announced that it had received a binding
offer of EUR805 million for these divisions from Montagu Private
Equity.

S&P's business risk profile assessment reflects Devix Midco's
leading position in the health care packaging market, where it
enjoys long-term contracts with leading health care companies,
pharmacies, and wholesalers.  S&P also takes into account the
company's above-average profitability and high cash conversion.
A high proportion of the group's contracts with its customers
include clauses that enable it to pass through any increase in
the cost of raw materials.  This offers Devix Midco some
protection from volatile input costs.  S&P's assessment is
constrained to a degree by Devix Midco's relatively limited scale
and scope compared with its rated peers, and its singular focus
on plastic packaging for the health care industry.

The market for health care packaging is relatively consolidated,
where the top players, including Devix Midco, enjoy long-term
contracts with customers.  Packaging usually consists of only a
small portion of a pharmaceutical company or pharmacy's cost.
Companies in the health care industry are risk-averse and prefer
to work with two to four trusted packaging suppliers, whose
products meet tough regulatory requirements.  Contractual
pass-through agreements allow packagers to pass on a large
portion of raw material costs to the customer.  However, given
that the health care industry is dominated by a few big global
pharmaceutical companies and U.S. pharmacies, customer
concentration is high.  Customers have significant pricing power
over providers of packaging, especially when renegotiating
contracts.

S&P assess Devix Midco's financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged," owing to its high absolute debt burden and private
equity ownership.  This assessment incorporates approximately
US$283 million of net shareholder loans in Standard & Poor's-
adjusted debt. Although these loans lack a cash interest
component, which supports the rating, and the loans are outside
the restricted group, S&P consolidates them into Devix Midco's
adjusted debt as per its criteria.

S&P's base-case operating scenario for Devix Midco in 2014-2016
assumes:

   -- Organic revenue growth of low-to-mid single digits, from
      solid volume growth in own-IP (intellectual property)
      products and contractual manufacturing in the devices
      division, and flat or slightly negative revenues in the
      prescription retail division.

   -- Adjusted EBITDA margins that remain at about 20%.  S&P
      expects EBITDA margins to improve in the devices division
      due to the growth in own-IP products -- although this will
      be offset by a lower share from the prescription retail
      division.

Based on these assumptions, S&P arrives at the following credit
measures:

   -- An adjusted ratio of debt to EBITDA of between 9.2x-9.7x in
      2014-2016 (about 6x excluding shareholder convertible
      debt).

   -- Adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt below 2% (8%
      excluding shareholder convertible debt) over the next three
      years.

   -- FFO cash interest coverage of about 2x.

S&P assess Devix Midco's liquidity as "adequate" under its
criteria.  S&P forecasts that available cash and committed lines
will comfortably cover limited short-term uses of liquidity by
more than 1.2x.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Devix Midco's credit
metrics will remain commensurate with a "highly leveraged"
financial risk profile assessment in the near term.  S&P's base
case assumes consistent positive free operating cash flow
generation over the next two to three years, although S&P do not
anticipate any material improvement in adjusted credit metrics
when factoring in accruals in shareholder loans.

S&P could consider raising the rating if Devix Midco shows better
improvements in EBITDA and cash flow generation and stronger
credit metrics than S&P expects, to levels that S&P considers
commensurate with an "aggressive" financial risk profile.
However, S&P views the likelihood of an upgrade as limited in the
near term because of Devix Midco's private equity ownership and
its very high adjusted leverage.

S&P could lower the ratings if Devix Midco experiences margin
pressure or weaker cash flow, leading to materially weaker credit
metrics or liquidity.  S&P could also lower the ratings if Devix
Midco undertakes any significant debt-financed acquisitions or
establishes new debt-like shareholder instruments, resulting in
significantly higher adjusted leverage or weaker interest
coverage.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


DEUTSCHE ANNINGTON: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Hybrid Notes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has assigned its
'BB+' long-term issue rating to the proposed 60-year, optionally
deferrable, subordinated hybrid notes to be issued by Deutsche
Annington Finance B.V., under the subordinated guarantee of the
parent, German residential real estate company Deutsche Annington
Immobilien SE (DAI; BBB/Stable/A-2).

The completion and size of the transaction will be subject to
market conditions, but S&P anticipates that it will be benchmark
size. DAI plans to use the proceeds to fund its announced
EUR2.4 billion property acquisitions.

S&P classifies the proposed notes as having "intermediate" equity
content until their first call dates in 2019 because they meet
S&P's criteria in terms of their subordination, permanence, and
optional deferability during this period.

Consequently, in S&P's calculation of DAI's credit ratios, it
will treat 50% of the principal outstanding and accrued interest
under the hybrids as equity rather than debt.  S&P will also
treat 50% of the related payments on these notes as equivalent to
a common dividend.  Both treatments are in line with S&P's hybrid
capital criteria.

S&P arrives at its 'BB+' issue rating on the proposed notes by
deducting two notches from our 'BBB' issuer credit rating (ICR)
on DAI.  Under S&P's methodology:

   -- It deducts one notch for the subordination of the proposed
      notes, because the ICR on DAI is investment grade (that is,
      'BBB-' or above); and

   -- S&P deducts an additional notch for payment flexibility to
      reflect that the deferral of interest is optional.

The latter is only one notch because S&P considers that there is
a relatively low likelihood that DAI will defer interest
payments. Should S&P's view on this likelihood change, it may
significantly increase the number of downward notches that it
applies to the issue ratings.


GRESHAM CLO: Moody's Raises Rating on Class F Notes to Caa3
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings on the
following notes issued by Gresham CLO III B.V:

  EUR60M Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded to
  Aa2 (sf)

  EUR51M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011 Upgraded to A2
  (sf)

  EUR34M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2027, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
  Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

  EUR31M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2027, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
  Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

  EUR33M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2027, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 15, 2011
  Upgraded to B3 (sf)

  EUR12M (currently EUR 14.8M outstanding) Class F Senior Secured
  Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2027, Upgraded to Caa3 (sf);
  previously on Jul 15, 2011 Confirmed at Ca (sf)

Moody's has also affirmed the ratings on the following notes:

  EUR114.2M Class A-1E Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
  2027, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2007 Definitive
  Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR150M Class A-1R Senior Secured Revolving Floating Rate Notes
  due 2027, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2007
  Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR60M Class A-1S Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2027,
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Feb 2, 2007 Definitive Rating
  Assigned Aaa (sf)

Gresham CLO III B.V issued in December 2006, is a collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield
senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Investec Bank UK Ltd. The transaction exited its reinvestment
period in March 2012.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of
significant deleveraging following the two most recent payment
dates in September 2013 and March 2014. Here Class A/B OC levels
increased by approximately 25%. The notes additionally benefit
from Moody's modelling assumptions for transactions in their
amortization period.

Since September 2013, classes A-1E, A-1R and A-1S notes have paid
down EUR26.9 million (24% of initial balance), 11.95 million (8%
of initial balance) and EUR31.27 million (52% of initial balance)
respectively resulting in significant increases to over-
collateralization levels. As of the March 2014 trustee report,
Class B, C, D, E and F observed over-collateralization levels of
145.62%, 128.17%, 115.54%, 104.58% and 100.3% respectively,
compared with 133.3%, 120.3%, 110.4, 101.6% and
98.1%,respectively in September 2013. The March 2014 trustee
report however does not factor in the large deleveraging that
occurred during the recent payment date in March 2014. This
deleveraging has been taken into account in our analysis.

In light of reinvestment restrictions during the amortization
period, and therefore the limited ability to effect significant
changes to the current collateral pool, Moody's analyzed the deal
assuming a higher likelihood that the collateral pool
characteristics would maintain an adequate buffer relative to
certain covenant requirements. In particular, Moody's assumed
that the deal will benefit from a shorter amortization profile
and higher spread levels than it had previously assumed.

The reported weighted average rating factor ("WARF"), weighted
average spread ("WAS"), and diversity score has remained stable
since September 2013.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
WARF, diversity score and the weighted average recovery rate, are
based on its published methodology and could differ from the
trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed
the underlying collateral pool as having a performing par and
principal proceeds balance of EUR337.6 million, defaulted par of
EUR1.6 million, a weighted average default probability of 24.4%
(consistent with a WARF of 3621), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 43.7% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 32 and a weighted average spread of 3.8%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 83% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan corporate
assets upon default. In each case, historical and market
performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower credit quality in the portfolio to
address refinancing risk. Loans to European corporates rated B3
or lower and maturing between 2014 and 2015 make up approximately
8.5% of the portfolio, which could make refinancing difficult.
Moody's ran a model in which it raised the base case WARF to 3769
by forcing ratings on 50% of the refinancing exposures to Ca; the
model generated outputs that were consistent with the base-case
results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy and 2) the concentration of lowly-rated debt
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

(1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in
this transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

(2) Around 45% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates.

(3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Recoveries
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

(4) Foreign currency exposure: The deal has significant exposures
to non-EUR denominated assets. Volatility in foreign exchange
rates will have a direct impact on interest and principal
proceeds available to the transaction, which can affect the
expected loss of rated tranches.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


HYDE PARK: Moody's Affirms B1 Rating on EUR11.5MM Class E Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Hyde Park CDO B.V.:

  EUR29.5M Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2011 Upgraded to
  Aa2 (sf)

  EUR14M Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2022,
  Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2011 Upgraded to
  Aa2 (sf)

  EUR42.5M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2022, Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2011
  Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

  EUR21.9M (Current Rated Balance of EUR13.6M) Class T
  Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on
  Oct 25, 2011 Upgraded to Aa3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by Hyde Park CDO B.V.:

  EUR265M (Current Outstanding Balance of EUR139.7M) Class A-1
  Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on Feb 27, 2006 Definitive Rating Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR62.5M (Current Outstanding Balance of EUR32.9M) Class A-2
  Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on Feb 27, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR20M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2022, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2011
  Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  EUR11.5M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2022, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 25, 2011 Upgraded
  to B1 (sf)

Hyde Park CDO B.V., issued in February 2006, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high
yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Blackstone Debt Advisors L.P. The transaction's reinvestment
period ended in June 2012.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
improvement in over-collateralization ratios following the
December 2013 payment date. The Class A-1 and Class A-2 notes
amortized by EUR59.8M and EUR14.1M, respectively, or 22.5% of
their original outstanding balances.

As a result of the deleveraging, over-collateralization has
increased. As of the trustee's February 2014 report, the Class
A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E had over-collateralization
ratios of 144.1%, 120.5%, 111.8% and 107.4% compared with 128.2%,
113.85%, 108.15% and 105.13%, respectively, as of the trustee's
February 2013 report.

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class T,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Notes on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of
all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either
through interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score and the weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its published methodology and could differ
from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's
analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of approximately EUR308.4M,
defaulted par of EUR21.2M, a weighted average default probability
of 19.18% (consistent with a WARF of 2,859), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48.28% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 29 and a weighted average spread of
3.90%.

In its base case, Moody's addresses the exposure to obligors
domiciled in countries with local currency country risk bond
ceilings (LCCs) of A1 or lower. Given that the portfolio has
exposures to 3.23% of obligors in Italy and Ireland, whose LCC is
A2 and 9.97% in Spain, whose LCC is A1, Moody's ran the model
with different par amounts depending on the target rating of each
class of notes, in accordance with Section 4.2.11 and Appendix 14
of the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure to peripheral countries and the target ratings of the
rated notes, and amount to 1.28% for the Class A-1, Class A-2,
Class B-1, Class B-2 and Class T notes and 0.8% for the Class C
notes.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 93.96% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the 4.45% remaining non-first-lien loan
corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analysis on key parameters for the
rated notes, which includes deteriorating credit quality of
portfolio to address the refinancing risk. Approximately 3.2% of
the portfolio is European corporate rated B3 and below and
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. Moody's considered a model run where the
base case WARF was increased to 2,908 by forcing ratings on 50%
of refinancing exposures to Ca. This run generated model outputs
that were consistent with the base case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy 2) the concentration of lowly- rated debt
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted
either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's investment
strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

Around 29.28% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates.

Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


SILVER BIRCH: Moody's Lifts Rating on EUR7.5MM Cl. E Notes to B2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has taken a variety of rating actions on the following
notes:

Issuer: Silver Birch CLO I B.V.

  EUR18M (current outstanding balance of EUR 9.08M) Class B
  Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on Oct 15, 2013 Upgraded to Aaa (sf)

  EUR21M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2013
  Upgraded to A1 (sf)

  EUR18M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2020, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2013
  Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

  EUR7.5M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
  due 2020, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 15, 2013
  Upgraded to B3 (sf)

The rating on Class A notes has been withdrawn following the full
redemption of that class in January 2014.

Silver Birch CLO I B.V. issued in August 2005, is a
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Alcentra Limited. This transaction has ended the
reinvestment period in August 2010.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of
deleveraging of the senior notes and subsequent significant
improvement of over-collateralization ratio since the last
payment date in January 2014.

Moody's notes that the outstanding of EUR23.53 million of the
class A note have been paid down completely and the class B note
have been paid down approximately by EUR8.92M (50%) since the
last rating action in October 2013. As a result of the
deleveraging the overcollateralization have increased. As of the
latest trustee report dated February 2014 the Class A/B and Class
C overcollateralization ratios are reported at 610.74% and
184.38% respectively, as compare to 211.96% and 140.78%
respectively in October 2013. Moody's note that following its
analysis based on the January 2014, the latest trustee report in
February has become available. Moody's took into consideration
the latest report.

The key model inputs Moody's uses in its analysis, such as par,
weighted average rating factor, diversity score and the weighted
average recovery rate, are based on its published methodology and
could differ from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base
case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR72.61
million, defaulted par of EUR5.30 million, a weighted average
default probability of 30.31% (consistent with a WARF of 4570
with a weighted average life of 3.77 years), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 43.59% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 11 and a weighted average spread of
3.65%.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that a recovery of 50% of the 93.42% of the
portfolio exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets
upon default and of 15% of the remaining non-first-lien loan
corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base-case analysis, Moody's conducted
sensitivity analyses on the key parameters for the rated notes,
for which it assumed lower credit quality in the portfolio to
address refinancing risk. Loans to European corporates rated B3
or lower and maturing between 2014 and 2015 make up approximately
15.23% of the portfolio, which could make refinancing difficult.
Moody's ran a model in which it raised the base case WARF to 4827
by forcing ratings on 50% of the refinancing exposures to Ca; the
model generated outputs that were within one notch of the base-
case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy and 2) the large concentration of lowly- rated
debt maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges
for issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be
impacted either positively or negatively by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in the legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to because of embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

1) Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

2) Around 45.55% of the collateral pool consists of debt
obligations whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using
credit estimates.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that, at transaction
maturity, the liquidation value of such an asset will depend on
the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Liquidation values
higher than Moody's expectations would have a positive impact on
the notes' ratings.

5) Lack of portfolio granularity: The performance of the
portfolio depends to a large extent on the credit conditions of a
few large obligors with Caa1 or lower/non-investment-grade
ratings, especially when they default. Because of the deal's low
diversity score and lack of granularity, Moody's supplemented its
typical Binomial Expansion Technique analysis with a simulated
default distribution using Moody's CDOROMTM software and an
individual scenario analysis.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.


SKELLIG ROCK: Moody's Affirms B2 Rating on EUR13.5M Cl. S Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of the
following notes issued by Skellig Rock B.V.:

  EUR38M Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Upgraded to
  Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012 Upgraded to Aa2 (sf)

  EUR34M Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
  2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012 Upgraded
  to A3 (sf)

  EUR27M Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
  2022, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012
  Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

  EUR8M (Current Rated Balance: EUR5.1M) Class T Combination
  Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Oct 16,
  2012 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

  EUR7M (Current Rated Balance: EUR4.8M) Class Q Combination
  Notes due 2022, Upgraded to A2 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012
  Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by Skellig Rock B.V.:

  EUR101M (Current Outstanding Balance: EUR49.5M) Class A-1
  Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on Dec 22, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR130M (Current Outstanding Balance: EUR47.1M) Class A-2a
  Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf);
  previously on Dec 22, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR32.5M Class A-2b Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
  Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to Aaa
  (sf)

  EUR6.5M (Current Outstanding Balance: EUR3.2M) Class A-3 Senior
  Fixed Rate Notes due 2022, Affirmed Aaa (sf); previously on Dec
  22, 2006 Assigned Aaa (sf)

  EUR13.5M Class E Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
  2022, Affirmed B2 (sf); previously on Oct 16, 2012 Confirmed at
  B2 (sf)

  EUR10M (Current Rated Balance: EUR3.5M) Class S Combination
  Notes due 2022, Affirmed B1 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011
  Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Skellig Rock B.V., issued in November 2006, is a Collateralised
Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high
yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is managed by
GSO Capital Partners International LLP. The transaction's
reinvestment period ended in November 2012.

Ratings Rationale

The rating actions on the notes are primarily a result of the
improvement in over-collateralization ratios following the
November 2013 payment date. The Class A-1, Class A-2a and Class
A-3 notes amortized by EUR 25.4M, EUR 40.9M and EUR 1.6M,
respectively, or 25%, 31% and 25%, respectively, of their
original outstanding balances.

As a result of the deleveraging, over-collateralization has
increased. As of the trustee's January 2014 report, the Class
A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E had over-collateralization
ratios of 150.1%, 125.2%, 110.5% and 104.5% compared with 130.7%,
117.5%, 108.8% and 104.9%, respectively, as of the trustee's
January 2013 report.

The ratings on the combination notes address the repayment of the
rated balance on or before the legal final maturity. For the
Class Q notes, the 'rated balance' at any time is equal to the
principal amount of the combination note on the issue date times
a rated coupon of 0.25% per annum accrued on the rated balance on
the preceding payment date, minus the sum of all payments made
from the issue date to such date, of either interest or
principal. For the Class S and Class T, the rated balance at any
time is equal to the principal amount of the combination note on
the issue date minus the sum of all payments made from the issue
date to such date, of either interest or principal. The rated
balance will not necessarily correspond to the outstanding
notional amount reported by the trustee.

The key model inputs Moody's uses, such as par, weighted average
rating factor, diversity score and the weighted average recovery
rate, are based on its published methodology and could differ
from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's
analyzed the underlying collateral pool as having a performing
par and principal proceeds balance of approximately EUR260.8M,
defaulted par of EUR11.1M, a weighted average default probability
of 23.9% (consistent with a WARF of 3,663), a weighted average
recovery rate upon default of 48.08% for a Aaa liability target
rating, a diversity score of 28 and a weighted average spread of
4.01%.

In its base case, Moody's addresses the exposure to obligors
domiciled in countries with local currency country risk bond
ceilings (LCCs) of A1 or lower. Given that the portfolio has
exposures to 9.9% of obligors in Ireland, whose LCC is A2 and
12.2% in Spain, whose LCC is A1, Moody's ran the model with
different par amounts depending on the target rating of each
class of notes, in accordance with Section 4.2.11 and Appendix 14
of the methodology. The portfolio haircuts are a function of the
exposure to peripheral countries and the target ratings of the
rated notes, and amount to 4.74% for the Class A-1, Class A-2a,
Class A-2b, Class A-3 and Class B notes, 2.92% for the Class C
and Class T notes and 1.11% for Class Q notes.

The default probability derives from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The estimated average recovery rate on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed a recovery of 50% of the 94.52% of the portfolio
exposed to first-lien senior secured corporate assets upon
default and of 15% of the 5.48% remaining non-first-lien loan
corporate assets upon default. In each case, historical and
market performance and a collateral manager's latitude to trade
collateral are also relevant factors. Moody's incorporates these
default and recovery characteristics of the collateral pool into
its cash flow model analysis, subjecting them to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability it is
analyzing.

Methodology Underlying the Rating Action:

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
February 2014.

Factors that would lead to an upgrade or downgrade of the rating:

In addition to the base case analysis described above, Moody's
also performed sensitivity analysis on key parameters for the
rated notes, which includes deteriorating credit quality of
portfolio to address the refinancing risk. Approximately 6.7% of
the portfolio are European corporates rated B3 and below and
maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may create challenges for
issuers to refinance. Moody's considered a model run where the
base case WARF was increased to 2,788 by forcing ratings on 50%
of refinancing exposures to Ca. This run generated model outputs
that were up to one notch lower than the base case results.

This transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively affect the ratings on the
note, in light of 1) uncertainty about credit conditions in the
general economy given that the portfolio has 22.1% exposure to
obligors located in Ireland and Spain 2) the concentration of
lowly- rated debt maturing between 2014 and 2015, which may
create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in the legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Additional uncertainty about performance is due to the following:

Portfolio amortization: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio, which can vary significantly depending on market
conditions and have a significant impact on the notes' ratings.
Amortization could accelerate as a consequence of high loan
prepayment levels or collateral sales by the collateral manager
or be delayed by an increase in loan amend-and-extend
restructurings. Fast amortization would usually benefit the
ratings of the notes beginning with the notes having the highest
prepayment priority.

Around 47.2% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality Moody's has assessed by using credit
estimates.

Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
trustee-reported defaulted assets and those Moody's assumes have
defaulted can result in volatility in the deal's over-
collateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and
the manager's decision whether to work out or sell defaulted
assets can also result in additional uncertainty. Moody's
analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
price or the recovery rate to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Recoveries higher than Moody's expectations would
have a positive impact on the notes' ratings.

In addition to the quantitative factors that Moody's explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in the transaction, its recent performance given the
market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation
features, the collateral manager's track record and the potential
for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to
rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from
other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments
regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the
transactions, can influence the final rating decision.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BRISA CONCESSAO: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' Senior Unsecured Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Ba2 senior secured
rating of Brisa Concessao Rodoviaria S.A. (BCR). Moody's has also
affirmed the provisional (P)Ba2 rating of BCR's euro medium-term
note program. The outlook on the ratings has been changed to
stable from negative.

Ratings Rationale

The change of outlook to stable on BCR's Ba2 ratings is prompted
by improvement in the traffic trends coupled with proactive
management of upcoming debt maturities, which mitigates the
refinancing risk over the medium term.

In 2013, BCR's network continued to see a decline in traffic
volumes of 2.8% but the rate of decrease was significantly less
than in the previous year. The volume declines eased in H2 2013
as the major adjustment had already taken place and the economy
started to recover. Better traffic performance coupled with
tariff increases and materially adjusted investments translated
into an improvement in free cash flow generation, which was used
to pay down some of the outstanding debt. Consequently, BCR
managed to reduce its leverage to 6.44x on a Net debt/ EBITDA
basis, which is below the trigger level of 6.5x and comfortably
away from the default covenant of 8.0x as at 31 December 2013.
Similarly, the interest cover ratio improved and stood at 3.16x
compared with the trigger level of 2.25x. This improvement in
financial profile is positive as it puts BCR back in compliance
with its financial covenants before these become more demanding
over time.

BCR's financial profile remains highly leveraged but the recent
traffic trends should be supportive of the company's credit
profile in the context of BCR's refinancing needs. In this
context Moody's notes the prudent approach demonstrated by BCR in
managing its debt maturities in the context of the terms of its
financing structure. The recent issuance of the EUR300 million
note due in 2021 will bolster the company's liquidity and
mitigate to a certain extent refinancing risk associated with the
bullet debt maturities in the near to medium term. BCR will need
to continue to extend its liquidity to cover in full the EUR600
million bond due in December 2016 but the funding gap is now
significantly smaller.

Moody's assessment of BCR's credit quality continues to reflect
(1) the large size and importance of its network for Portugal's
transport system; (2) the transparency of the concession and
regulatory framework; (3) the company's modest capital investment
program, which should support free cash flow generation; (4) the
covenant package and other creditor protections incorporated
within BCR's debt documentation; and (5) a policy of prudent
financial management. However, BCR's rating remains constrained
by (1) the volatile nature of traffic on BCR's network, with
significant traffic volume declines since the start of the
financial crisis; (2) high leverage; (3) the risks of being based
in Portugal (Government of Portugal rating is Ba3 stable).

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation that BCR
will continue to prudently manage its liquidity position and that
improved traffic trends will translate into a financial profile
which will be in line with the terms of the company's financing
structure. Given the company's domestic focus, the rating is not
likely to be higher than one notch above the government's rating.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Moody's sees potential for upward pressure on BCR's ratings if
there is an upgrade of the sovereign rating combined with (1)
continued improvement in the company's financial position in the
context of the terms of its financing structure; and (2) the
company continuing to demonstrate strong liquidity.

The rating could come under downward pressure if (1) there are
material declines in traffic volumes in the short to medium term;
(2) the company fails to comply with event of default covenants
under the terms of its financing; or (3) liquidity concerns
arise.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Operational
Toll Roads published in December 2006.

Headquartered in Lisbon, Brisa Concessao Rodoviaria S.A, the
largest subsidiary of Brisa-Auto-Estradas de Portugal S.A.
(Brisa), is the operator of Portugal's largest toll road network
with 11 motorways covering a total of 1,099 km. The network is
operated under the terms of a concession granted by the
Portuguese Republic, which ends in 2035.


* Fitch Affirms Ratings on Six Covered Bond Programs
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the ratings of six Portuguese covered
bond programs with Negative Outlook, following the implementation
of the agency's revised Covered Bonds Rating Criteria on programs
issued by Portuguese banks.

For all programs except that of Banco Santander Totta, S.A., the
rating action also takes into account the relevant Negative
Outlooks on banks' Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) announced by
Fitch on March 26, 2014.

As part of its updated covered bonds analysis, the agency has
assigned IDR uplifts to each program, where applicable.

Key Rating Drivers

The rating of Obrigacoes Hipotecarias (OH) issued by Banco BPI
(BPI; BB+/Negative/B) is affirmed at 'BBB+'/Negative, based on
the bank's IDR of 'BB+', a newly assigned IDR uplift of '0', an
unchanged D-Cap of '0' (full discontinuity risk) and a breakeven
overcollateralization (OC) of 32.5% for a 'BBB+' rating.  The
Negative Outlook on the OH reflects that on the bank's IDR and
risks to the evolution of the Portuguese residential mortgage
market.

The rating of OHs issued by of Banco Comercial Portugues S.A.
(BCP; BB+/Negative/B) is affirmed at 'BBB-'/Negative, based on
the bank's IDR of 'BB+', a newly assigned IDR uplift of '1', an
unchanged D-Cap of '0' (full discontinuity risk) and a breakeven
OC of 26% for a 'BBB-' rating.  The Negative Outlook on the OH
reflects that on the bank's IDR and that a potential downgrade of
the IDR may not be entirely compensated by the IDR uplift. The
Outlook also factors in risks to the evolution of the Portuguese
residential mortgage market.

The rating of OH issued by Caixa Economica Montepio Geral
(Montepio; BB/Negative/B) is affirmed at 'BBB'/Negative, based on
the bank's IDR of 'BB', a newly assigned IDR uplift of '0', an
unchanged D-Cap of '0' (full discontinuity risk) and a breakeven
OC of 26% for a 'BBB' rating.  The Negative Outlook on the OH
reflects that on the bank's IDR and risks to the evolution of the
Portuguese residential mortgage market.

The rating of OH issued by Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A.'s (CGD;
BB+/Negative/B) is affirmed at 'BBB'/Negative, based on the
bank's IDR of 'BB+', a newly assigned IDR uplift of '2', an
unchanged D-Cap of '0' (full discontinuity risk) and a breakeven
OC of 20.5% for a 'BBB' rating. The Negative Outlook on the OH
reflects that on risks to the evolution of the Portuguese
residential mortgage market.

The rating of Obrigacoes sobre o sector public (OSP) issued by
Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A.'s (CGD; BB+/Negative/B) is affirmed
at 'BBB-'/Negative, based on the bank's IDR of 'BB+', a newly
assigned IDR uplift of '2', an unchanged D-Cap of '0' (full
discontinuity risk) and a breakeven OC of 45% for a 'BBB-'
rating. The Negative Outlook on CGD's OSP takes into account that
the current level of OC would not be sufficient to withstand
stresses at rating levels significantly above the IDR of the
Portuguese sovereign (BB+/Negative/B) and reflects the Outlook on
the Portuguese sovereign.

The rating of OH issued by Banco Santander Totta S.A. (Totta;
BBB-/Negative/F3) is affirmed at 'BBB'/Negative, based on the
bank's IDR of 'BBB-', a newly assigned IDR uplift of '0', an
unchanged D-Cap of '0' (full discontinuity risk) and a breakeven
OC of 12% for a 'BBB' rating.  The Negative Outlook on the OH
reflects that on the bank's IDR and risks to the evolution of the
Portuguese residential mortgage market.

The IDR uplift expresses Fitch's judgment of the degree of
protection in the event of a bank's resolution that would be
available to prevent the source of covered bonds payments
switching from the issuer to the cover pool.  It is derived from
the following factors: Fitch's opinion of the relative ease and
motivations for resolution methods other than liquidation, the
importance of covered bonds to the financial markets in a given
jurisdiction and the extent of buffer offered by senior unsecured
debt.

Fitch's view on the use of resolution methods other than
liquidation contributes to the IDR uplift assigned to the
programs of BCP and CGD based on their large size in their
domestic market.

Protection from the level of senior unsecured debt is also
reflected in the IDR uplift assigned to the mortgage covered
bonds of CGD.  This is based on Fitch's estimate of long-term
non-retail placed senior unsecured debt exceeding 5% of total
adjusted assets on the latest available financial information.

Portugal is not considered by Fitch to be a covered bond-
intensive jurisdiction.

Rating Sensitivities

BPI OH:
The 'BBB+' rating of the OH is vulnerable to a downgrade if among
others the bank's IDR is downgraded by one or more notches..

BCP OH:
The 'BBB-' rating of the OH is vulnerable to a downgrade if among
others the bank's IDR is downgraded by two or more notches.

Montepio OH:
The 'BBB' rating of the OH is vulnerable to a downgrade if among
others the bank's IDR is downgraded by one or more notches.

CGD OH:
The 'BBB' rating of the OH is vulnerable to a downgrade if among
others the bank's IDR is downgraded by three or more notches.

CGD OSP:
The 'BBB-' rating of the OSP is vulnerable to a downgrade if
among others any of the following occurs: (i) the bank's IDR is
downgraded by three or more notches; (ii) the Portuguese
sovereign is downgraded by one notch.

Totta OH:
The 'BBB' rating of the OH is vulnerable to a downgrade if among
others the bank's IDR is downgraded by one or more notches.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


ASTRA SA: FSA Puts Firm Into Special Administration
---------------------------------------------------
Reactions.net reports that Romanian Financial Supervisory
Authority (FSA) has placed insurer and reinsurer Astra SA into
special administration, and has opened financial recovery
proceedings against the company.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ALROSA OJSC: S&P Retains 'BB-' CCR on CreditWatch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating on Russian diamond miner Alrosa OJSC
remained on CreditWatch negative where it was placed on Feb. 14,
2014.  The 'B' short-term corporate credit rating was affirmed.

Alrosa is seeking to improve its liquidity management in the near
term through the issuance of long-term debt.  It currently does
not have unutilized committed lines in place and its cash balance
is relatively low, but S&P understands that Alrosa is looking to
set up three-year and five-year financing with Russian and
international banks to repay its short-term debt and improve its
debt maturity profile.  Alrosa believes that these lines will be
put in place by May 2014.  Notwithstanding the ongoing
instability in Russia's financial markets, S&P views the
company's plan to raise long-term bank funding as having a
reasonable probability of success, bearing in mind its majority
state ownership and its continued strong operating performance,
with supportive diamond prices.

S&P's concerns about Alrosa's liquidity relate to its continued
high short-term debt, which at the end of March 2014, totaled
US$1.32 billion, including a US$500 million Eurobond due in the
fourth quarter of 2014.  Alrosa expected these maturities to be
repaid from the US$1.3 billion sale of oil and gas assets to
Rosneft.  The sale was to take place before year-end 2013, but
has been delayed because Rosneft is studying the asset quality of
certain fields and potentially renegotiating the price of oil and
gas assets.  S&P understands that the timing of the sale
therefore remains uncertain.  This, together with potentially
constrained access to the markets following the events in
Ukraine, has led Alrosa's management to change its liquidity
management and look for alternative funding sources to repay its
debt.

Ultimately, S&P believes that Alrosa continues to have access to
financing from a state-owned bank, given that the government owns
a majority stake in the company.  S&P believes, however, that in
the current conditions, state-owned banks might demonstrate lower
support for Alrosa, due to potentially weaker support from the
Russian state.

S&P now intends to resolve the CreditWatch by the end May, when
Alrosa's management expects to have committed long-term bank
facilities in place, which should be sufficient to refinance the
short-term bank debt maturing in June and cover the Eurobond
maturity later this year, even in the absence of a payment from
Rosneft related to the delayed oil and gas asset sale.

Given that management is seeking to adopt a more prudent
liquidity approach, S&P could affirm the ratings if Alrosa is
successful in obtaining long-term funding in the coming months.

If it is not able to secure long-term funding, S&P would lower
the rating by one notch.


BASHNEFT JSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based Joint Stock Oil Company
Bashneft's Long-Term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
at 'BB' with a Positive Outlook.  The rating action follows
Bashneft's acquisition of Western Siberia's Burneftegaz (BNG), a
small oil producer with significant oil resources for USD1
billion (RUB35.6 billion), including debt.

While Fitch believes that the transaction should benefit
Bashneft's upstream in the medium term, it will also increase its
leverage.  Fitch expects Bashneft's funds from operations (FFO)
net leverage to approach 2.3x in 2016, up from around 1x at end-
2013, leaving the company with little scope for further debt-
funded acquisitions on its current ratings trajectory.

Bashneft is a second-tier Russian oil producer that accounts for
3% of oil production and 8% of oil refining output in the
country, with assets located mainly in the Republic of Bashkiria.
Its ratings reflect concentrated reserves, increasing leverage,
high capex and generous dividends but also stable upstream and
downstream operations and solid operating cash flows.

The Positive Outlook reflects Bashneft's progress with the
development of the Trebs and Titov (T&T) oilfields in the north
of Russia and our expectation that T&T will start generating
positive free cash flows after 2017-2018.  Bashneft's ratings
include a two-notch discount to reflect Russia-specific and
regulatory risks, in line with our approach to Russian issuers.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Acquisition Drives Leverage Higher

In 2013, BNG produced 6 thousand barrels of oil per day (mbbl/d),
or 2% of Bashneft's total.  It has 390 million barrels of C1+C2
reserves and resources under the Russian standards.  While the
BNG acquisition improves Bashneft's upstream operations Fitch
conservatively expects it to be cash-neutral in the medium term
due to incremental development capex required to boost
production.

Fitch expects the acquisition to increase adjusted net leverage
to 1.9x-2.3x in 2014-2018 from an estimated 1x at end-2013, based
on its conservative production and oil price assumptions.
Bashneft's FFO interest cover, in its turn, may decrease to 7x-
8x, down from an estimated 11x in 2013.

Stable Brownfield Production

In 2013, Bashneft's crude production reached 321 mbbl/d, up 4%
yoy, compared with the Russian average growth of 1%.  Production
from Bashkiria, the company's stronghold, contributed one half of
this increase.  Fitch recognises Bashneft's efforts in boosting
upstream output by applying the latest oil recovery techniques,
but believes that it has limited potential to further increase
oil output from Bashkiria's brownfields.

T&T Benefits Upstream

Fitch views Bashneft's strategy of upstream diversification as
key to achieving its long-term production targets.  Bashneft
continues to develop its T&T oilfields in a joint venture (JV)
with OAO LUKOIL (BBB/Negative), in which it has a 75% stake.
T&T's aim is to balance Bashneft's lagging upstream with its more
sizable downstream. In 2013, T&T produced 291,000 tons of oil,
averaging 14mbbl/d in 4Q13. Bashneft expects to achieve peak
production of 95mbbl/d by 2019-2020.  Over the next three to four
years, Fitch does not expect cash flows from the JV to be
available to service Bashneft's debt as the JV will need to
finance its own capex first.

Competitive Reserves and Costs

Bashneft's proved reserves of 2 billion barrels of oil at end-
2013 imply a 17.5-year reserve life, in line with that of its
Russian peers.  In 9M13, its lifting costs were USD7.9 per barrel
of oil (bbl), below that of most international peers but above
that of the Russian majors, due to Bashneft's smaller, more
mature oilfields.  Fitch expects that company's operational
metrics will remain sound in the medium term.

Strong Downstream and Retail

Bashneft is the fourth largest refiner in Russia; its three
Bashkiria-based refineries have 480mbbl/d total primary capacity
and a Nelson index of 8.65.  In 9M13, refining and marketing
contributed around 35% to the company's EBITDA.  The company's
9M13 EBITDA per barrel of oil produced of USD28/bbl is one of the
highest among Russian peers, partially due to its downstream
volumes being 35% larger than upstream volumes in 9M13.

In 2015, the Russian government plans to increase export duty on
dark oil products, eg, fuel oil and vacuum gasoil.  This will
have a negative effect on Bashneft's downstream profits, which
should not exceed 15%-20% of its EBITDA, in Fitch view.
Bashneft's planned refinery upgrades should improve its refining
complexity, increase light product yield and partially offset the
negative effect of higher duties.

Uncapped Standalone Ratings

Fitch rates Bashneft on a standalone basis and assess its linkage
with its majority shareholder Sistema Joint Stock Financial Corp.
(Sistema; BB-/Positive) as moderate. Bashneft remains a key asset
for Sistema, along with OJSC Mobile TeleSystems (BB+/Positive).
Although Bashneft's ratings are not constrained, they cannot be
more than two notches above Sistema's under Fitch's criteria.

Corporate Governance and Dividends

Bashneft continues to improve its transparency. In December 2013
it announced that it would eliminate cross ownership with ZAO
Sistema Invest, a subsidiary of Sistema.  This would moderately
increase Bashneft's leverage, because it has an obligation to buy
back its own shares for up to RUB18 billion, as per Russian law.
Bashneft also has related-party transactions, which Fitch views
as a low-to-moderate risk, as the scale of these transactions is
diminishing.

In 2013, Bashneft paid RUB51 billion in dividends, including 2012
full-year dividends and 9M13 interim dividends but not taking
into account the amounts subsequently returned by Sistema Invest.
The gross dividends paid out in 2013 corresponded to 97% of
Bashneft's 2012 profits, up from 37% in the year before.  In
Fitch rating case it assumes an average dividend payout of 30% in
the medium term, for leverage to remain within Bashneft's
internal guidance.

Rating Sensitivities

Positive: Future developments that may result in positive rating
action include:

   -- FFO net adjusted leverage below 2.5x and FFO interest cover
      equal to or higher than 8x on a sustained basis;

   -- Production growth at T&T throughout 2014;

   -- Progress with integration and development of BNG, with
      incremental development capex being mainly financed by its
      operating cash flows;

   -- Refinancing of short-term maturities falling due in 1H15 by
      end-2014

Negative: Future developments that may result in negative rating
action include:

   -- Failure to maintain crude production at current levels;

   -- Sustained deterioration of credit metrics, ie, FFO net
      adjusted leverage above 2.5x and FFO interest cover below
      8x on a sustained basis, owing to higher capex and
      dividends;

   -- Considerable delays and/or cost overruns at T&T and BNG;

   -- Inability to refinance 1H15 maturities by end-2014

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

Stretched Liquidity

At Sept. 30, 2013, Bashneft had cash of RUB16bn compared with
short-term debt of RUB15bn.  The company also has RUB30bn in
committed credit lines falling due in 1H15, some of which may
have been used to finance the BNG acquisition.  Fitch believes
that Bashneft should be able to refinance its upcoming maturities
on the domestic capital market.

Rouble Depreciation Marginally Positive

The recent rouble depreciation has had a marginally positive
effect on Bashneft, as it would have resulted in higher cash
flows from higher USD-pegged revenues against fairly flat RUB-
denominated operating expenditure.  However, these higher cash
flows would have been partially offset by higher gross debt (in
rouble terms), as at end-2013 around 25% of Bashneft's debt was
denominated in US dollars.  Generally, a weakening rouble should
have a moderately positive effect on Russian oil companies, as
their export and domestic revenues positively correlate with the
foreign exchange rate.

List of Rating Actions

Joint Stock Oil Company Bashneft

Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB', Outlook Positive
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Local currency Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB', Outlook Positive
Local currency Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'AA-(rus)', Outlook
  Positive
Senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'BB'
National senior unsecured rating: affirmed at 'AA-(rus)'


MECHEL: Moody's Lowers National Scale Rating to 'Ba3.ru'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has downgraded Mechel's national
scale rating (NSR) to Ba3.ru from Baa3.ru. The outlook on the
rating is negative. Moody's Interfax is majority-owned by Moody's
Investors Service (MIS).

Ratings Rationale

Moody's Interfax's downgrade of the NSR of Mechel follows MIS's
downgrade of the company's corporate family rating to Caa1 with a
negative outlook.

Mechel is a vertically integrated mining and metals company. Its
business comprises four segments: mining, steel, ferroalloys and
power. The group produces coal, iron ore, ferrosilicon, as well
as long (rebar, wire rod, structural shapes, etc), and carbon
flat-rolled steel products, engineered steel, hardware and other
high value-added steel products.

In the first nine months of 2013, Mechel reported revenue of
US$6.7 billion (a 19% decrease year-over-year) and EBITDA of
US$0.6 billion (a 55% decrease year-over-year). Mechel is
majority owned by its Chairman of the Board of Directors Mr. Igor
Zyuzin, who controls 67.42% of the voting shares. After its
initial public offering in 2004, 32.58% of the company's shares
are in free float.


RED&BLACK: Fitch Affirms 'BB+sf' Rating on Class C Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has taken rating actions on Red & Black Prime
Russia MBS No.1 Limited (Red&Black) and Russian Mortgage Backed
Securities 2006-1 S.A (Russian MBS), as follows:

Red & Black Prime Russia MBS No.1 Limited

  Class A (ISIN: XS0294882823): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook
   revised to Negative from Stable

  Class B (ISIN: XS0294883987): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Outlook
   revised to Negative from Stable

  Class C (ISIN: XS0294884282): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
   Stable

Russian Mortgage Backed Securities 2006-1 S.A

  Class A (ISIN: XS0254447872): affirmed at 'A-sf'; Outlook
   revised to Negative from Stable

  Class B (ISIN: XS0254451395): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
   Stable

  Class C (ISIN: XS0254451551): affirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Outlook
   Stable

Key Rating Drivers

Sovereign Rating Cap
The revision of Outlook to Negative from Stable on three tranches
rated at or above Russia's Country Ceiling (BBB+) follows the
revision of Outlook on Russia's sovereign issuer default rating
(IDR) to Negative from Stable

The class A notes of Red&Black and Russian MBS are capped at one
notch above Russia's Country Ceiling because their structures
include offshore liquidity facilities, which cover at least six
months of senior expenses and class A interest payments,
mitigating transfer and convertibility (T&C) risk.  The ratings
of other tranches are capped at Russia's Country Ceiling,
reflecting T&C risk, as these tranches do not benefit from the
offshore liquidity facilities.

Sound Asset Performance
The affirmation of ratings reflects sound performance of both
transactions and sufficient credit enhancement (CE) available to
withstand the tranches' respective rating stresses.

The underlying assets of these transactions have continued to
perform well with limited arrears and defaults, despite a
weakening economy and political uncertainty in Russia.  As of
end-February 2014, loans in arrears by more than three months
(excluding default) stood at 0.3% and 2.3% of the current pool
balance for Red&Black and Russian MBS respectively.

CE for all tranches of both transactions has more than doubled,
in particular, to 40% for Red&Black class A notes since closing
in 2007 and 54% for Russian MBS's class A notes since closing in
2006.  The notes of Red&Black are paying down pro-rata and will
revert to sequential amortization once the outstanding balance of
the notes as at previous payment date reaches less than 10% of
the initial balance.  Fitch expects Russian MBS to revert to
sequential amortization in the next interest payment date,
leading to faster CE build-up for the most senior rated notes.
Currently, the outstanding note balance is 15% and 9.8% of
initial note balance for Red&Black and Russian MBS, respectively.

Rating Sensitivities
A change in Russia's IDR and Country Ceiling may result in a
revision of the highest achievable ratings.

Depreciation of the Russian rouble in relation to USD may put
pressure on borrower affordability as the underlying loans in
these transactions are denominated in USD while borrowers
generate income in the local currency.

Political uncertainty, combined with a contracting economy, may
adversely affect borrower affordability which may lead to
increasing arrears and defaults.


SOVCOMFLOT JSC: Moody's Places 'Ba2' CFR on Review for Downgrade
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade the
Ba2 corporate family rating (CFR) and the Ba2-PD probability of
default rating (PDR) of Sovcomflot JSC. Concurrently, Moody's has
placed on review for downgrade Sovcomflot's Ba3 senior unsecured
issuer rating and the Ba3 senior unsecured rating, assigned to
the $800 million Eurobond issued by SCF Capital Limited, which is
a 100% indirect subsidiary of Sovcomflot (Sovcomflot guarantees
the Eurobond).

Ratings Rationale

The rating action primarily reflects Moody's concern that
Sovcomflot may not be able to restore its financial metrics to
levels commensurate with its Ba2 CFR over 2014, because of (1)
the continuing deterioration of Sovcomflot's financial metrics,
reflected by an increase in its adjusted debt/EBITDA to 7.5x and
a decline in its funds from operations (FFO) interest coverage to
2.6x as of year-end 2013 (from 7.0x and 3.2x, respectively, a
year earlier); (2) negative free cash flow generation resulting
from the company's continued significant investment in fleet
expansion; (3) Moody's expectation that trading conditions in the
global tanker market will remain challenging for the next 12-18
months; (4) the weakening of Russia's economic strength, as the
conflict with Ukraine and the related uncertainty over future
policy actions further weigh on Russia's already impaired
investment climate and medium-term economic outlook, which may
affect Sovcomflot's operating performance; and (5) Russia's
heightened susceptibility to geo-political event risk resulting
from the conflict in Ukraine, which may affect Sovcomflot's
position in the international market.

Although Moody's rating action follows Moody's placement of
Russia's Baa1 government bond rating on review for downgrade on
28 March 2014, a downgrade of the sovereign would be expected at
this point to have the potential to only modestly erode the
probability of Sovcomflot receiving support from the sovereign.

The review for downgrade will focus on Moody's assessment of
Sovcomflot's ability to improve its operating performance and
financial metrics over the course of 2014, such that to reduce
its adjusted debt/EBITDA to 6.5x and improve adjusted FFO
interest coverage to 3.0x, which are the thresholds for its Ba2
CFR, on a sustainable basis. In addition, Moody's will routinely
reassess the Russian government's support to Sovcomflot in the
event of financial distress, although the rating agency expects
that this support will remain strong. At this point, a downgrade
of Sovcomflot's CFR, if any, would be expected to be limited to
one notch.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Upward pressure on Sovcomflot's ratings is unlikely at present,
given the current review for downgrade. Moody's could confirm the
ratings if the company's financial metrics were to demonstrate a
clear improvement trend, with adjusted debt/EBITDA trending
towards 6.5x and adjusted FFO interest coverage to 3.0x in the
course of 2014, while maintaining adequate liquidity.

Moody's could downgrade Sovcomflot's ratings if (1) it expected
that the company's adjusted debt/EBITDA will remain above 6.5x
and adjusted FFO interest coverage below 3.0x as of year-end 2014
and beyond; (2) Sovcomflot's liquidity were to weaken materially;
or (3) Moody's were to revise downwards its assessment of the
probability of the government providing extraordinary support to
the company in the event of financial distress.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Shipping Industry published in February 2014. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009 and the Government-Related Issuers: Methodology Update
published in July 2010.

Sovcomflot is the leading Russian energy shipping group,
servicing around 25% of all seaborne hydrocarbons exports from
Russia. The company is 100% state-owned. In 2013, Sovcomflot
generated revenues of US$1.3 billion. The company ranks among the
world's top five energy shipping players by deadweight tonnage
(DWT), with a fleet of 136 own vessels for a total of 11.7
million DWT as of year-end 2013. In addition, five ordered
buildings, totalling 0.7 million DWT, are to be delivered in
2014-15.



===============
S L O V E N I A
===============


NOVA REVIJA: Forced Into Administration by DURS' Proposal
---------------------------------------------------------
sta.si news reports that Nova revija has been forced into
receivership at the proposal of the Tax Administration (DURS).

Nova revija has filed a request for a postponement of a decision
on the proposal for receivership, but failed to put forward the
required paperwork on time, according to sta.si news.

The report notes that a notification by the Agency for Public
legal records (AJPES) said DURS data shows the publisher was on
the list of companies owing between EUR500,000 and EUR1,000,000
in tax as of January 25.

AJPES data also shows the publisher had its accounts blocked
since December 6, 2010, the report relates.  The company
generated a minimum profit in 2012 on net revenue of EUR 487,794,
the report discloses.

The publisher was established in 1990 from the namesake journal,
which was initiated by six Slovenian intellectuals and backed by
60 signatories in the daily Delo in 1980.


SLOVENIA: Seeks Bid for Majority Stake in Telekom Slovenije
------------------------------------------------------------
Boris Cerni at Bloomberg News reports that Slovenia is seeking
bids for a majority stake in Telekom Slovenije d.d., the most
valuable of 15 companies the government wants to sell and raise
cash after a EUR3.2 billion (US$4.4 billion) bank bailout.

Slovenska Odskodninska Druzba, the agency managing state assets,
said in an e-mailed statement yesterday it is offering 75.6% of
Telekom Slovenije with a deadline for bids set for April 23,
Bloomberg relates. Telekom Slovenije's enterprise value is 1.2
billion euros, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Slovenia's debt soared to about72% of gross domestic product at
the end of last year from 23% in 2008, Bloomberg News recounts.
It is set to advance to 81 percent of GDP by the end of 2014,
Bloomberg says, citing the Slovenian statistics office.  The
budget gap widened to about 15% of GDP last year as the
government spent EUR3.2 billion to bail out unprofitable banks,
Bloomberg News discloses.



=========
S P A I N
=========


KUTXABANK SA: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba1 Ratings to Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to stable from negative the
outlook on the Ba1 long-term senior debt and deposit ratings of
Spain's Kutxabank, S.A. and its subsidiary. Concurrently, the
long-term ratings were affirmed. The change in outlook and
affirmation of the Ba1 ratings follow the corresponding outlook
change to stable from negative of the bank's standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) at D -- equivalent to a ba2
baseline credit assessment (BCA). The bank's short-term ratings
remain unchanged at Not Prime.

Ratings Rationale

Rationale For Changing The Outlook To Stable

The change in outlook of Kutxabank's debt and deposit ratings to
stable from negative reflects the change in outlook of its
standalone rating.

The change in outlook of Kutxabank's standalone D BFSR to stable
from negative reflects Moody's view that the downside risks to
the bank's standalone rating have diminished. Throughout the
Spanish banking crisis and taking into account also the
acquisition of troubled savings bank Cajasur, Kutxabank has
demonstrated a continuing ability to generate capital internally
despite significant growth of its non-performing assets (non-
performing loans (NPLs) and real estate assets) and subdued
business activities. In view of the somewhat diminishing
challenges from the operating environment, Moody's expects that
any further deterioration in asset quality and related
provisioning requirements is likely to be limited and
commensurate with a ba2 standalone risk profile. The outlook
change to stable for the bank's standalone rating reflects the
combination of this track record and resilience of Kutxabank's
credit profile and the stabilizing economic backdrop.

Rationale For Affirmation Of Kutxabank's Ratings

The affirmation of Kutxabank's ratings has been driven by Moody's
view that the bank's risk absorption capacity remains resilient
despite pressure stemming from Spain's still weak operating
environment. In affirming the ratings, Moody's has taken into
account Kutxabank's demonstrated capacity to generate capital
from internal resources throughout the Spanish banking crisis,
and despite the strong provisioning effort in recent years. At
end-December 2013, the bank had increased its core capital by
187bps, reaching a core Tier 1 ratio of 11.97%. Furthermore, the
bank disclosed a leverage ratio of 7% (fully loaded and as per
the European Commission's Fourth Capital Requirements Directive
(CRD-IV) criteria), and a fully loaded Common Equity Tier 1
(CET1) ratio of 10.8% as at end-December 2013. Moody's notes,
that in view of these capital cushions, it expects that
Kutxabank's standalone baseline credit assessment of ba2 will
remain resilient even if further moderate increases in NPLs
materialize as the Spanish economy stabilizes (i.e., Moody's
forecasts GDP growth of 0.7% for 2014).

In Moody's view, the moderate recovery of the domestic operating
environment should underpin the resilience of Kutxabank's
financial fundamentals in 2014. The changes in asset quality
trends are already visible in the bank's performance, as gross
NPLs stabilized during 4Q 2013. Moody's expects bottom-line
profitability to start benefiting in 2014 from a lower level of
credit impairments as asset quality pressures start to ease.
However, the rating agency acknowledges that Kutxabank's pre-
provision income is likely to remain at modest levels because of
the maintenance of very low interest rates and subdued business
levels.

At 123% of shareholders' equity and loan loss reserves,
Kutxabank's problematic exposures (broadly defined as NPLs, real-
estate assets and refinanced loans) remain high, a key factor
constraining the standalone BCA at ba2.

Kutxabank's debt ratings have been affirmed at Ba1, benefiting
from a one notch of uplift from its BCA of ba2, and based on
Moody's assessment of a moderate probability of support from the
Spanish government (Baa2, positive) in case of need.

Subordinated Debt

In line with the affirmation of Kutxabank's BFSR, Moody's has
affirmed the bank's senior subordinated debt at Ba3, and changed
the outlook to stable from negative.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

Kutxabank's standalone BCA could be raised if the bank is able to
(1) work out its asset-quality challenges, with a notable decline
in provisioning requirements, and (2) achieve a sustainable
recovery in its recurring earnings, with improved profitability
metrics (i.e., pre-provision income as % of risk weighted assets
consistently above 1.5%-2%).

Downward pressure could be exerted on the standalone BFSR by (1)
an acceleration in the trend of formation of NPLs, both on an
absolute level and in relation to the system average; (2)
weakening of Kutxabank's internal capital generation and risk-
absorption capacity; and/or (3) any worsening in operating
conditions beyond Moody's current expectations, (i.e., a broader
economic recession beyond the rating agency's current GDP
forecast of 0.7% GDP growth for 2014).


MADRID RMBS IV: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CC(sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
MADRID RMBS IV, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class D notes
to 'CCC (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' and on the class E notes to 'CC
(sf)' from 'B- (sf)', respectively.

The downgrades follow the breach of the class E notes' interest
deferral trigger on the Feb. 24, 2013 interest payment date
(IPD), and reflect S&P's expectations of a breach of the class D
notes' interest deferral trigger in the medium term.  Therefore,
the class D and E notes are at greater risk of untimely payment
of interest, in S&P's opinion.

MADRID RMBS IV's existing interest deferral triggers divert
interest in the transaction so that, if the collateral's credit
quality deteriorates, the more senior notes amortize before the
payment of the interest on the subordinated classes of notes.

The trustee's data for the February 2014 IPD show that the
outstanding balance of defaulted assets (net of recoveries) over
the pool's initial balance is 8.35%.  This is above the class E
notes' 8.19% interest deferral trigger.  If this ratio increases
to 9.60% of the initial collateral balance, the class D notes
will breach their interest deferral trigger.

The defaulted assets' outstanding balance (net of recoveries)
over the pool's initial balance increased to 15.13% in 2013.  If
the transaction's performance remains stable, S&P assumes that
this ratio will continue to increase and that the class C notes
could therefore breach their interest deferral trigger within the
next 12 to 18 months.  Consequently, S&P has lowered to 'CCC
(sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' its rating on the class D notes.

While the class E notes breached their interest deferral trigger,
S&P notes that they did not default on their interest payment on
the February 2014 IPD.  However, S&P considers that the class E
notes are currently highly vulnerable to nonpayment.  This is
because, due to the breach, their interest payment has been
deferred to a more junior place in the transaction's priority of
payments.  The issuer will now pay the class E notes' interest
after the principal amortization of all other classes of notes.
Consequently, S&P has lowered to 'CC (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' its
rating on the class E notes.

The reserve fund has been drawn since October 2008, reducing the
available credit enhancement in the transaction. As of the latest
IPD, the reserve fund is at 51.64% of its required balance.

MADRID RMBS IV is a securitization of a portfolio of first-
ranking residential mortgage loans granted to individuals
resident in Spain. Bankia S.A. originated the loans between 1995
and 2007.

RATINGS LIST

Ratings Lowered

MADRID RMBS IV, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR2.4 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class             Rating
            To               From

D           CCC (sf)         B+ (sf)
E           CC (sf)          B- (sf)


MAPFRE SA: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' Rating on EUR700MM Senior Debt
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Mapfre SA's core subsidiaries' Insurer
Financial Strength (IFS) ratings to 'BBB+' from 'BBB'.  At the
same time, the agency has affirmed Mapfre's Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) at 'BBB-'.  The Outlook on all ratings is Stable.

Key Rating Drivers

The upgrade reflects the stabilization of Spain's operating
environment. Fitch affirmed Spain's Long-Term Issuer Default
Rating at 'BBB' on Nov. 1, 2013 and revised the Outlook to Stable
from Negative.  Consequently, Fitch considers Mapfre's operating
environment as lower risk than in the previous year.

The IFS ratings are now one notch higher than the implied Long-
term IDRs of the core operating subsidiaries, reflecting Fitch's
standard notching to allow for the priority of policyholder
claims and the strong capital regime for insurers in Spain.
Previously the IFS ratings were capped at the level of their
implied Long-term IDRs.

Mapfre's credit fundamentals are underpinned by its solid capital
adequacy (Solvency I ratio of 246% at end-2013), increasing
consolidated shareholders' funds (EUR7.8 billion at end-2013
excluding minorities) and strong underwriting performance.  In
2013, Mapfre's non-life technical performance continued to
perform strongly, reflected in a 95.2% Fitch-calculated combined
ratio (2012: 93.9%) and a net return on assets of 1.4% (2012:
1.2%), which compares favorably with peers.

The sovereign rating of Spain (BBB/Stable) continues to weigh on
the group's ratings.  With 56% of the group's financial assets
invested in Spain, Mapfre remains substantially exposed to the
Spanish economy.

The ratings also reflect Mapfre's strong franchise and access to
distribution in Spain and Latin America.  Mapfre remains a market
leader in Spain, with a 13% market share, and a strong player in
Latin America, with a 9.5% share.

The Stable Outlook reflects Fitch's expectation that Mapfre will
continue to maintain strong underwriting performance in the next
12-18 months and robust capital adequacy.

Fitch considers Mapfre's level of financial leverage as low and
supportive of the current ratings, and expects it to remain
stable in 2014.  Mapfre's Fitch-calculated financial leverage
declined to 21% at end-2013 from 24% at end-2012, compared with
its peak of 33% at end-9M12.

Rating Sensitivities

Mapfre's ratings could be downgraded if its exposure to the
Spanish insurance market or sovereign debt results in investment
losses with a material impact on capital.  Mapfre's ratings could
also be downgraded if the Spanish sovereign rating is downgraded.

Factors that could trigger an upgrade include an upgrade of the
rating of Spain, alongside strong group capitalization (as
measured by, for example, the regulatory Solvency I ratio
remaining above 200%), or exposure to Spanish debt falling below
100% of group shareholders' funds (currently 115%).

The rating actions are as follows:

Mapfre Familiar; Mapfre Global Risks Cia De Seguros Y Reaseguos;
Mapfre Vida SA De Seguros Y Reaseguros; and Mapfre Re Compania De
Reaseguros S.A

   -- IFS ratings upgraded to 'BBB+' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
      Mapfre SA

   -- Long-term IDR affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook Stable

   -- EUR1bn 5.125% senior unsecured debt due 2015 affirmed at
      'BB+'

   -- EUR700m 5.91% subordinated debt due 2037 with step-up in
      2017 affirmed at 'BB-'



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


MERLIN ENTERTAINMENTS: Moody's Raises CFR to Ba3; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded to Ba3 from B1 the
corporate family rating (CFR) and to B1-PD from B2-PD probability
of default rating (PDR) of Merlin Entertainments, which is the
ultimate holding company for Merlin Entertainments group and its
operating subsidiaries. The rating of the credit facilities has
also been upgraded to Ba3 from B1. The outlook is stable.

At the same time, Moody's has re-assigned the Group CFR at Merlin
Entertainments PLC, which is the ultimate holding company for
Merlin Entertainments group and its operating subsidiaries; and
withdrawn the previous CFR at Merlin Entertainments S.ar.l, as
that entity's shares were transferred to Merlin Entertainments
PLC as part of the IPO process. In addition, the rating of the
credit facilities has been withdrawn at Merlin Entertainments
Group Luxembourg 2 S.ar.l. and re-assigned at Merlin
Entertainments PLC, which has become the new parent obligor for
those facilities.

"The upgrade reflects the combination of Merlin's successful IPO
launch in October 2013, the proceeds of which were used largely
towards debt reduction, as well as strong underlying earnings
growth in 2013, which has improved metrics to a level within our
previous guidance for an upgrade", says Richard Morawetz, a
Moody's Vice President - Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst
for Merlin.

Ratings Rationale

In October 2013, the company listed on the London Stock Exchange
with a 33% free float, for which it obtained net proceeds of
GBP194 million, used largely for debt reduction. Reported net
debt fell to GBP1 billion from GBP1.28 billion in 2012. In
addition, Merlin reported underlying EBITDA growth of 12.8% at
GBP390 million (i.e., before mainly IPO-related costs), with all
three operating groups reporting double-digit EBITDA growth. The
particularly strong growth of 18.7% at the Midway Attractions
benefited from a revival in 2013 after the negative effects for
Merlin of the London Olympic Games in 2012. As a result of both
of these developments, Moody's estimates the company's gross
adjusted leverage, before IPO-related costs, to be about 4.7x,
which is within previous guidance for an upgrade. Moody's further
notes the high cash balance at FYE2013, which represents
additional financial flexibility contributing to the solid rating
positioning. Moody's also believes that the trajectory of this
metric will mainly depend on the company's own financial
policies. The company has stated its intention to initiate a
dividend policy of 35%-40% of net income (based on a normalized
expected tax rate). In 2013 the reduction in net debt also
benefited from a scaling back of acquisition spend; although the
company has also indicated that it will continue to pursue
acquisitions where suitable.

The company's liquidity is deemed strong, with a cash balance of
GBP264 million as of FYE2013, and an undrawn revolving credit
facility (RCF) of GBP150 million. After refinancing its bank
facilities in June 2013, the company has no significant debt
maturities prior to the RCF and term loans maturing in 2018 and
2019. The term loans and RCF contain the same financial covenants
for leverage and interest coverage, for which headroom remained
strong as of December 2013. The term loans are multi-currency
(GBP, EUR, USD and AUD), to largely mirror the company's earnings
structure by currency.

The CFR of Ba3 reflects Merlin's strong position as a global
operator of theme parks and attractions, with operations in 22
countries and just under 60 million visitors in 2013. While its
size remains small relative to companies in the broader services
industry, with a still fairly leveraged capital structure, Merlin
is the second-largest operator of visitor attractions globally
after The Walt Disney Company (A2 stable). It owns
internationally recognized brand names including Madame Tussauds,
The Dungeons, Alton Towers, LEGOLAND, SEA LIFE, Gardaland and the
London Eye. The company's mixture of theme parks and 'midway'
attractions (i.e., city centre or resort-based attractions with a
1-2 hour dwell time), as well as indoor and outdoor activities
(the latter accounting for approximately 42% and 58% of revenues,
respectively), has proven fairly resilient to external shocks in
recent years. Moody's nevertheless believes that the nature of
the company's activities will leave it exposed to risk factors
such as the weather or exceptional events such as the London
Olympics, both of which dampened demand in 2012.

Rationale For The Stable Outlook

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that the company
will likely continue to post largely stable earnings growth and
to generate free cash flows, but will use these sporadically to
continue its growth ambitions, as it has done in recent years. As
such, Moody's does not anticipate any significant change in
metrics over the medium term, barring any further changes to the
capital structure.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

An upgrade would become likely if a further deleveraging trend
develops, with adjusted debt/EBITDA moving below 4.0x.
Conversely, a more aggressive financial policy, or a significant
industry downturn, neither of which Moody's expects at this time,
could lead to negative ratings pressure if gross leverage were to
rise sustainably beyond 5.0x, taking into consideration that
excess cash may mitigate any increase in gross leverage. Although
currently not expected, the emergence of liquidity risks could
also exert downward pressure on the rating.

Merlin Entertainments PLC's ratings were assigned by evaluating
factors that Moody's considers relevant to the credit profile of
the issuer, such as the company's (i) business risk and
competitive position compared with others within the industry;
(ii) capital structure and financial risk; (iii) projected
performance over the near to intermediate term; and (iv)
management's track record and tolerance for risk. Moody's
compared these attributes against other issuers both within and
outside Merlin Entertainments PLC's core industry and believes
Merlin Entertainments PLC's ratings are comparable to those of
other issuers with similar credit risk. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Based in Dorset, the UK, Merlin Entertainments Group is the
largest European, and second-largest global, operator of visitor
attractions in terms of attendance. The company reported about
GBP1.2 billion in revenues and underlying EBITDA of GBP390
million for year-end 2013, and attracted nearly 60 million
visitors to its 99 locations in that year. The company's owners
include Kirkbi, a Danish investment fund (29.9%); two private
equity partners (Blackstone (21.1%) and CVC Capital Partners
(11.6%); and management (4.4%), with the remainder as free float.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BARINBROOK LIMITED: Goes Into Administration
--------------------------------------------
Comet24 reports that Barinbrook Limited confirmed that it had
gone into administration.

Zolfo Cooper appointed joint administrators over the company
yesterday.

Peter Holder, partner at Zolfo Cooper, said: "We are assessing
the available options and would like to thank the staff for their
continued support and professionalism during this process," the
report notes.

Barinbrook Limited, the leaseholder for The Cromwell Hotel on
High Street, Stevenage.  The hotel has a total of 76 bedrooms, a
bar, a restaurant and six function rooms.


COOPER GAY: S&P Affirms 'B' CCR & Revises Outlook to Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating on London-based global
wholesale and reinsurance broker, Cooper Gay Swett & Crawford
Ltd. (CGSC). As the same time, S&P revised the outlook to
negative from stable. S&P also affirmed the 'B' issue-level and
'3' recovery ratings on CGSC's US$380 million first-lien credit
facility, which consists of a US$305 million term loan due 2020
and a US$75 million revolver due 2018.  S&P affirmed the 'CCC+'
issue-level and '6' recovery rating on its US$120 million second-
lien term loan due 2020.

"The negative outlook reflects the decline in CGSC's operating
performance relative to our expectations," said Standard & Poor's
credit analyst Ying Chan.  The worse-than-expected performance
was primarily caused by challenges in the company's Latin
American and London reinsurance brokerage businesses, and were
partially offset by continued strong performance in North
American wholesale brokerage.  The outlook change also reflects
S&P's belief that CGSC will continue to face economic and
industry-specific headwinds, specifically related to global
reinsurance pricing, which will cause uncertainty in revenues and
earnings growth prospects.  As a result, S&P now assess CGSC's
business risk profile (BRP) as weak. Due to a deteriorated
earnings base, S&P's adjusted debt-to-EBITDA ratio was
approximately 9.2x as of year-end 2013, resulting in a highly
leveraged assessment of the company's financial risk profile
(FRP).  Despite the deteriorated leverage, the company has been
proactive in its efforts to bring operating performance back to
historical levels by recruiting new management that is more
focused on cost reduction, tactical sales strategies, and
targeted acquisition-related growth.  Most recently, the company
used balance-sheet cash to fund the acquisitions of Newman Martin
and Buchan, a U.K.-based energy broker; and Epsilon Insurance
Brokering, an Australian-based managing general agent.  S&P
expects these initiatives to drive improved performance results
in 2014 and into 2015.

The negative outlook reflects CGSC's deteriorated operating
performance in 2013 and S&P's expectation that weak reinsurance
pricing, a tepid economy, and increased competition will continue
to pressure the ratings on the group.  However, S&P expects
continued healthy performance in North American wholesale
brokerage, expense management, and acquisition-related earnings
to lead to improved credit metrics that are more consistent with
the current rating.

During the next 12 months, S&P do not expect to raise the
ratings. However, S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the
company can improve revenues and earnings generation, resulting
in improved credit metrics that are more in line with its 'B'
rated peers. This would include adjusted EBITDA margins of 18%-
20% and a debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 7.0x or less on a sustained
basis.

S&P could lower the ratings on CGSC if the company sustains its
leverage profile at current levels.  This could occur if the
company cannot grow its earnings base enough to improve its
leverage profile to a debt-to-EBITDA ratio of less than 7.0x
during the next 12 months.  S&P would also consider downgrading
the company within the outlook horizon if earnings deteriorate
further, or if the company is unsuccessful in integrating its
current and future acquisitions.


PUNCH TAVERNS: S&P Lowers Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'BB-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'BB- (sf)' from
'BBB (sf)' and placed on CreditWatch negative its credit ratings
on Punch Taverns Finance PLC's (Punch A) class A1(R) and A2(R)
notes.  At the same time, S&P has placed on CreditWatch negative
its ratings on Punch A's class M1, M2(N), B1, B2, B3, C(R), and
D1 notes, and its ratings on Punch Taverns Finance B Ltd.'s
(Punch B) class A3, A6, A7, A8, B1, B2, and C1 notes.

Since S&P last reviewed these transactions:

   -- Operational cash flow is reducing as Punch A and Punch B
      are disposing of pubs, without a corresponding application
      of sale proceeds to reduce leverage.  S&P do not give any
      credit to disposal proceeds in its cash flow analysis as
      S&P do not consider them to be internal cash generated by
      the assets.  Equally, S&P do not consider the buildup of
      disposal proceeds in the disposal account as a source of
      cash for debt service as S&P cannot discount the
      possibility that the borrower could apply disposal proceeds
      to non-debt service payments.

   -- In S&P's view, further parental support from outside the
      securitizations has continued to reduce the effectiveness
      of a number of structural protections (triggered by
      declining EBITDA), including the appointment of an
      administrative receiver.

The combination of these factors reduces the options available to
creditors for repayment if an enforcement scenario occurs
following a borrower event of default.

In S&P's view, the unresolved restructuring negotiations between
the parent company (Punch Taverns) and investors have exacerbated
the weaker debt repayment prospects, with the most recent
resolution attempt in February 2014 proving to be unsuccessful.
The parent company has announced no subsequent proposal.
However, S&P understands that, as contemplated in the parent
company's recent announcement, a covenant breach under the
transaction documents would likely occur on the next reporting
date for one or both of the securitizations unless a consensual
restructuring occurs by then.  S&P understands that a borrower
event of default would occur if this breach is not remedied over
30 days, leading to the appointment of an administrative
receiver.

S&P considers that the postponement of the appointment of an
administrative receiver -- combined with declining cash flow
generation -- has pushed the transaction beyond the point where
under our assumptions repayment of the debt would be viable from
operational cash flows alone.  As such, S&P sees the issuer's
ability to meet its obligations as largely correlated to a series
of short-term factors including:

   -- The decision to appoint an administrative receiver and
      imposition of a moratorium on debt payments.

   -- The administrative receiver's ability to enact a disposal
      plan for non-core assets.

   -- The ability to draw on the liquidity facility or
      guarantees.

   -- The availability of funds in the operational accounts.

   -- Increased costs associated with the borrower's default and
      the actions taken by the administrative receiver.

Therefore, S&P sees the probability of default for all classes of
notes in both transactions as far more closely tied to that of
the borrower than S&P did in its previous reviews.  While
recognizing the benefit of being able to control the securitized
assets and keep the notes current for a certain period of time
with the support of the liquidity facility, S&P is adjusting its
analytical approach to place far greater emphasis on the
borrower's underlying credit quality and each tranche's recovery
prospects, as determined by S&P's corporate recovery analysis.

S&P estimates that the adjustment of our approach will take one
month.  However, given S&P's previous review of Punch A, where
the senior class of notes relied on medium- to long-term cash
flows, it sees an immediate rating impact from the application of
its revised approach on this class.  S&P has therefore lowered
its ratings on Punch A's class A1(R) and A2(R) notes to 'BB-
(sf)' from 'BBB (sf)' and have placed all of its ratings in Punch
A and Punch B on CreditWatch negative while S&P completes its
analysis under the revised approach.

An alternate route to resolve the CreditWatch placements would be
the agreement of a revised restructuring proposal, at which point
S&P will consider the impact on the classes of notes then
outstanding.

Punch A and Punch B are corporate securitizations backed by a
portfolio of tenanted public houses.

RATINGS LIST

Class                  Rating
             To                     From

Punch Taverns Finance PLC
GBP2.65 Billion Asset-Backed Fixed- and Floating-Rate Notes
(Punch A)

Ratings Lowered and Placed On CreditWatch Negative

A1(R)        BB- (sf)/Watch Neg     BBB (sf)/Negative
A2(R)        BB- (sf)/Watch Neg     BBB (sf)/Negative
A2(R) (SPUR) BB- (sf)/Watch Neg     BBB (sf)/Negative

Ratings Placed On CreditWatch Negative

M1           B (sf)/Watch Neg       B (sf)/Negative
M2N          B (sf)/Watch Neg       B (sf)/Negative
M2N (SPUR)   B (sf)/Watch Neg       B (sf)/Negative
B1           CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)/Negative
B2           CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)/Negative
B3           CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)/Negative
B3 (SPUR)    CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)/Negative
C(R)         CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)/Negative
D1           CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)/Negative

Punch Taverns Finance B Ltd.
GBP1.574 Billion Fixed- And Floating-Rate Asset-Backed Notes

Ratings Placed On CreditWatch Negative

A3           B+ (sf)/Watch Neg      B+ (sf)/Negative
A6           B+ (sf)/Watch Neg      B+ (sf)/Negative
A7           B+ (sf)/Watch Neg      B+ (sf)/Negative
A7 (SPUR)    B+ (sf)/Watch Neg      B+ (sf)/Negative
A8           B+ (sf)/Watch Neg      B+ (sf)/Negative
A8 (SPUR)    B+ (sf)/Watch Neg      B+ (sf)/Negative
B1           CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)/Negative
B2           CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)/Negative
C1           CCC (sf)/Watch Neg     CCC (sf)/Negative


UK COAL: Appeals for Government Support to Avert Collapse
---------------------------------------------------------
Andrew Bounds at The Financial Times reports that UK Coal is
appealing for government support to stave off a collapse that
would cost 2,000 jobs.

The company was rescued last year by the Pension Protection Fund,
which preserves the pensions of employees whose companies go
bust, the FT recounts.  But it is on the brink of insolvency
again, the FT notes.

Hargreaves Services, the only other domestic large scale miner,
is also in talks to invest in the business, according to people
familiar with the situation, the FT discloses.  Its proposal to
buy UK Coal for GBP20 million was rejected by administrators last
year in favor of the PPF rescue, the FT relays.

According to the FT, in case that bid fails, UK Coal is asking
for GBP10 million of government funding to close two of the past
three deep pits in Britain and sell off its surface mines.  The
business, which is burning cash reserves because of the low price
of coal internationally, could otherwise become insolvent, the FT
states.

UK Coal, which owns Thoresby in Nottinghamshire and Kellingley in
Yorkshire, said that the strong pound and cheap imports had
affected its sales, the FT relates.  Coal contracts are priced in
dollars and shale gas in the US has dislodged coal mined there to
the UK, depressing prices, the FT says.

Kellingley has decades worth of reserves while Thoresby is set to
close in 2018, according to the FT.  Without investment, both
would shut by late 2015, the FT notes.

UK Coal plc -- http://www.ukcoal.com/-- is a United Kingdom-
based company engaged in surface and underground coal mining,
property regeneration and management, and power generation.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, and Peter A. Chapman,
Editors.

Copyright 2014.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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