/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/130902.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, September 2, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 173
Headlines
B U L G A R I A
* PLOVDIV CITY: S&P Raises ICR to From 'BB+'; Outlook Positive
F R A N C E
TECHNICOLOR S.A: S&P Cuts Bank Debt & Notes Rating to 'CCC+'
G E R M A N Y
MINIMAX VIKING: Moody's Rates First Lien Facilities 'B2'
G R E E C E
* Fitch: House Price Hit May Offset Greek Repossession Resumption
H U N G A R Y
MFB HUNGARIAN: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
I C E L A N D
* UK Banks to Pay GBP1-Bil. Compensation to Icelandic Savers
I R E L A N D
DRYDEN XV: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
TRIFIK INDUSTRIAL: Enters Into Deal with Creditors; 13 Jobs Saved
I T A L Y
BANCA MARCHE: Put Under Special Administration Following Loss
BANCA POPOLARE: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
CAPITAL MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class C Notes
FIAT SPA: DBRS Lowers Issuer Rating to 'BB'
K A Z A K H S T A N
FORTEBANK JSC: S&P Affirms 'kzBB' National Scale Rating
HOME CREDIT: Fitch Assigns 'BB-(EXP)' Rating to New Local Bonds
KAZTRANSGAS JSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
SOUTH OIL: Fitch Affirms, Withdraws 'BB+' National LT Rating
L U X E M B O U R G
HAYFIN RUBY II: S&P Assigns 'BB' Ratings to Two Note Classes
P O L A N D
POLSKI KONCERN: Fitch Raises Issuer Default Rating From 'BB+'
R U S S I A
KRAYINVESTBANK: Fitch Rates RUB2-Bil. Domestic Bond 'B+(EXP)'
RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS: Fitch Withdraws BB-(EXP) Rating on 2018 Bond
SISTEMA INTERNATIONAL: S&P Retains 'BB' Rating on RUB20BB Notes
SUKHOI CIVIL: H113 Results No Immediate Impact on Fitch Ratings
* SVERDLOVSK OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
AEI CABLES: Creditors Approve Debt Rate Changes Under CVA
BRISTOL FOUNDATION: In Administration, Local Authority to Step In
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: May Face Investor Rebellion Following Loss
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Capital Raising Plan Remains Key Rating Driver
CSDM FUNDRAISING: Goes Into Administration
EUROHOME UK 2007-1: S&P Affirms 'B-' Ratings on Two Note Classes
FAB UK 2004-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class A-3E Notes to 'CC'
LONDON & REGIONAL: Moody's Reviews B3-Rated Notes for Downgrade
PUNCH TAVERNS: S&P Lowers Ratings on Three Note Classes to 'B'
* UK: Half of Street Chains at "Serious Risk of Failure"
X X X X X X X X
* Moody's: Auto Parts Suppliers' Earnings to Stabilize in 2013
* Fitch: Global Reinsurance Outlook Still Stable, Pricing to Fall
* BOND PRICING: For the Week August 26 to August 30, 2013
*********
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B U L G A R I A
===============
* PLOVDIV CITY: S&P Raises ICR to From 'BB+'; Outlook Positive
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it raised its long-
term issuer credit rating on the Bulgarian City of Plovdiv to
'BBB-' from 'BB+'. The outlook is positive.
Rationale
The rating on Plovdiv reflects S&P's view of its favorable debt
profile, its increased authority to manage revenues through tax
increases -- supporting its budgetary flexibility -- and its good
liquidity position thanks to accumulated cash reserves and very
moderate contingent liabilities. The rating is constrained by
the volatility of its budgetary performance from weaknesses in
financial management and potential changes in the consolidating
but uneven institutional framework. In addition, the city's
economic wealth is set to remain relatively low, with only slight
recovery projected for the medium term.
Despite being the second-largest city in Bulgaria, Plovdiv's
economy is relatively weak. S&P estimates the city's GDP per
capita at about a modest $5,400 in 2012. In S&P's base-case
scenario, S&P expects the city's economy to continue its slow
recovery following the contraction in 2009. S&P forecasts
Plovdiv's GDP to expand by a low 1.5% on average over 2013-2015,
which is in line with S&P's forecast for Bulgaria's economic
growth. In S&P's view, slow economic development will hold back
revenue growth and in particular the recovery of the city's real
estate market.
However, thanks to consolidation measures, good revenue
flexibility, and external financial aid, S&P expects the city's
budgetary performance to remain sound in the medium term, despite
some volatility. In 2013, the city raised real estate and
vehicle taxes, and in 2014-2015 it can use central government and
EU funding to cofinance investment projects. However, following
the high budget surpluses that the city posted in 2011-2012, S&P
projects that maintenance and personnel spending will return to
higher levels and investment in road infrastructure will
increase. In S&P's view, this will weaken the city's budgetary
performance.
The city has good budgetary flexibility, in S&P's view, owing to
its increased authority from the central government to manage its
own taxes and charges, although its ability to cut expenditure is
limited. The central government controls the tax base and sets
the floor and ceiling tax rates, but the city can raise up to 70%
of operating revenues if the tax rates are set at the maximum
level and collectability rates remain unchanged.
As a result, S&P expects the city's adjusted operating surplus
(net of state-delegated tasks and revenues) to stay sound at
about 5% of adjusted operating revenue in 2013-2015, which is
broadly similar to the average for 2009-2012.
The city plans to tackle its infrastructure spending backlog,
focusing on transport and water and sewage projects as well as
the construction of sport facilities and kindergartens. The
pressure on the city's budget should be alleviated by the
availability of financial assistance from the central government
and EU programs and the gradual implementation of investment
projects. As a result, the city's deficit after capital accounts
will be lower than S&P previously envisaged. In S&P's base-case
scenario, it projects that Plovdiv's adjusted deficit after
capital accounts will increase to about 9% of adjusted total
revenues on average in 2013-2015, compared with 16% in our
previous forecast.
Because of the city's widening deficit, S&P believes that its
debt burden will increase, but at a slower pace than we
previously expected. In S&P's current base-case scenario, it
anticipates tax-supported debt to reach a still-moderate 50% of
adjusted operating revenues by year-end 2015 from about 40% at
year-end 2012 -- compared with our previous forecast of 100%.
Because of its reliance on long-term borrowings, Plovdiv's debt
service will remain modest at below 6% of adjusted operating
revenues over 2013-2015.
In S&P's view, Plovdiv's budgetary performance will continue to
show some volatility because of uncertainty over future Bulgarian
intergovernmental reforms, large deviations between the city's
budget and actual performance, and what S&P considers to be
significant infrastructure spending.
The newly formed central government is yet to announce its policy
regarding the relationships between local governments. Given
that Bulgarian municipalities are operating under a consolidating
but uneven institutional framework, S&P cannot rule out the
possibility that there will be unexpected changes in the
distribution of revenues and state-mandated spending.
S&P also considers the city's financial management as negative
for the rating. While management prudently relies on long-term
borrowings and has demonstrated its willingness to raise taxes
and delay spending when needed, its long-term financial policy
and liquidity management lack predictability. Also, large
differences between budgeted and actual financial indicators
undermine the credibility of the annual budgeting, in S&P's view.
The city has very little involvement in the local economy.
Therefore, its contingent liabilities remain restricted mostly to
the liabilities of a few health care institutions.
Outlook
The positive outlook reflects S&P's view that the cofinancing of
infrastructure projects with EU and central government funds,
combined with the revival of the real estate market, might help
the city to stabilize its budgetary performance and liquidity
position at sound levels.
S&P could raise the rating in the next 24 months if, in line with
its upside scenario, the city stabilizes its deficit after
capital accounts at below 10% of adjusted total revenues and
retains comfortable liquidity, with average cash well exceeding
12 months' debt service. This could happen if the city applies
sustainable and predictable consolidation measures--for example
through raising taxes or moderate spending increases.
S&P could revise the outlook to stable within next 24 months if,
as in its base-case scenario, Plovdiv's budgetary performance and
liquidity position remain unpredictable and volatile.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Upgraded
To From
Plovdiv (City of)
Issuer Credit Rating BBB-/Positive/-- BB+/Positive/--
Plovdiv (City of)
Senior Unsecured BBB- BB+
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F R A N C E
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TECHNICOLOR S.A: S&P Cuts Bank Debt & Notes Rating to 'CCC+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its issue
rating on French video technologies and systems provider
Technicolor S.A.'s (formerly Thomson S.A.) outstanding
EUR282 million bank facilities and notes to 'CCC+' from 'B'. S&P
removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where it placed them with
negative implications on June 13, 2013. The recovery rating is
'6', indicating S&P's expectation of negligible (0-10%) recovery
in the event of a payment default, which translates into an issue
rating two notches below the 'B' corporate credit rating on
Technicolor.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue rating on the new
EUR838 million term loan (including the EUR200 million and
$830 million tranches) due 2020 issued by Tech Finance & Co
S.C.A. The underlying proceeds were passed on as loans to Thomson
Licensing. The proceeds loans' recovery rating is '3',
reflecting S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in
the event of a payment default. Tech Finance is a Luxembourg-
based orphan special-purpose vehicle that engages in certain
financing activities relating to Technicolor.
S&P's equalization of the issue rating on Tech Finance's new term
loans with the long-term corporate credit rating on Thomson
Licensing reflects that, despite S&P's view that the funding
structure is particularly complex, the new term loans benefit
from a direct pass through of the economic benefit of the back-
to-back proceeds loans to Thomson Licensing.
The recovery rating of '3' on the proceeds loans is initially
supported by the claim against Thomson Licensing, an entity that
S&P views as having substantial value. However, the recovery
rating on the loan is constrained by the complexity of the
funding structure and documentation, the fairly weak security
package, some prior-ranking debt in the waterfall, and S&P's view
of France, where Technicolor operates, as a relatively
unfavorable insolvency jurisdiction.
The recovery rating of '6' on the existing EUR282 million bank
facilities and notes is constrained by these facilities'
structural subordination vis-a-vis the new debt.
To determine recoveries, S&P simulates a default scenario. S&P
assumes that a default would primarily be triggered by weak
trading levels combined with the company's failure to achieve an
anticipated return on growth capital expenditure to replace
earnings from the company's patent pool that expires from 2016.
S&P's hypothetical default scenario projects a payment default in
2017.
Given the final terms of the restructuring, S&P has calculated
the company's stressed enterprise value at about EUR1 billion
under our hypothetical default scenario, using a stressed
multiple of 5.0x. Priority liabilities would comprise mainly
enforcement costs and 50% of pension deficits, although S&P notes
that most of the pension deficit is in the company's German
operations, which S&P understands do not contribute substantial
earnings to the group. Prior-ranking debt would include a fully
drawn revolving credit facility, partial drawings under the
receivables-backed facilities and six months' prepetition
interest.
After deducting these liabilities, S&P estimates that coverage
for the new term loans would be in the 50%-70% range, translating
into a recovery rating of '3'. However, S&P assumes that the
claims of the EUR280 million untendered debt would effectively
rank behind the new debt. This would result in negligible (0-
10%) recovery prospects for the outstanding untendered debt,
which translates in a recovery rating of '6'.
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G E R M A N Y
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MINIMAX VIKING: Moody's Rates First Lien Facilities 'B2'
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's assigned a definitive B2 (LGD3, 45%) rating to Minimax
Viking Group's EUR315 million and US$422 million first lien term
loan facility and the EUR40 million revolving credit facility.
The B2 corporate family rating and B2-PD probability of default
rating of Minimax Viking GmbH as well as the stable outlook
remain unchanged.
The following ratings have been assigned:
Issuer: Minimax GmbH & Co. KG
EUR44.6M Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B2
EUR44.6M Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed a range
of LGD3, 45 %
Issuer: MX Holdings US, Inc.
$422M Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B2
$422M Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed a range of
LGD3, 45 %
Issuer: MX Mercury Beteiligungen GmbH
EUR270.4M Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B2
EUR270.4M Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed a range
of LGD3, 45 %
EUR40M Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Assigned B2
EUR40M Senior Secured Bank Credit Facility, Affirmed a range of
LGD3, 45 %
Ratings Rationale:
Moody's definitive ratings are in line with the provisional
ratings assigned on August 7, 2013.
The B2 Corporate Family Rating (CFR) is supported by (i) the
group's resilience against economic cycles driven by a high share
of recurring revenues, (ii) a strong market position in core
markets reflecting its one-stop shopping approach and (iii) high
barriers to entry due to strict regulations related to fire
protection equipment.
The rating is constrained by (i) high leverage as evidenced by a
debt/EBITDA ratio pro-forma for the transaction of 6.3-6.8x as
expected per full year 2013, (ii) relatively low profitability
despite the regulated nature of its markets, a high share of
recurring service business and the group's strong market
position, (iii) limited regional diversification with 51% of
turnover generated in Europe and Germany accounting for a major
part of this, and 35% in the US, as well as (iv) a shareholder
oriented financial policy, as evidenced by the repayment of a
major part of its shareholder loan using proceeds from the recent
refinancing transaction.
Minimax' liquidity profile is considered to be good. The group
estimates a cash position of EUR78 million after the closing of
the recapitalization. Other cash sources for the 12 month period
ending June 2014 comprise FFO of around EUR55 million as well as
the new EUR40 million revolving credit facility maturing in
August 2019, which is expected to remain undrawn during the next
12 months. The senior term facilities are subjected to
conditional language. Expected cash uses totaling roughly EUR100
million for the 12-month period ending June 2014 mainly relate to
working cash required to run the business (assumed at 3% of
annual revenues), moderate working capital consumption and capex,
modest cash outflows for acquisitions as well as mandatory debt
repayment incurred by semi-annual amortization of its first lien
term loan. In addition to the cash credit facilities, Minimax
enjoys a guarantee facility of EUR141.5 million due in August
2019, supported by bilateral guarantee facilities outside the
senior facility agreement. This compares to a total of EUR168
million guarantee facilities pre re-financing. As per year-end
2012, EUR129 million of these guarantees were outstanding.
As there is no subordinated debt in Minimax' capital structure,
apart from pensions and lease rejection claims, the rating of the
first lien term loan and the RCF is in line with the CFR for the
group.
The outlook on Minimax' ratings is stable balancing the stability
of the business model with the risk resulting from the initially
high leverage. It reflects Moody's expectation that Minimax will
be able to generate a stable EBITDA margin of above 12% as
adjusted by Moody's (per 2012: 11.9%), to continue to generate
positive free cash flows and to gradually reduce leverage to
below 6.0x debt/EBITDA at the latest by the end of 2014.
A higher rating would be considered should Minimax manage to
sustainably bring EBITDA margin (as adjusted by Moody's) above
15%, to increase the generation of cash flow generation reflected
in RCF/Net debt exceeding 12% and FCF/Debt exceeding 5% and to
reduce leverage sustainably below 5.0x debt/EBITDA.
Downward pressure could arise should the EBITDA margin of the
group fall below 11% or if the group is not able to lower
leverage below 6.0x debt/EBITDA. Likewise, a deterioration of its
liquidity profile or cash flow generation weakening below a
RCF/net debt ratio of 8% or below 2% FCF/Debt could result in a
downgrade.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Manufacturing Industry published in December 2010. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.
Headquartered in Bad Oldesloe, Germany, Minimax Viking GmbH
collectively with its subsidiaries is operating internationally
in the fire protection and detection markets. The group serves
its industrial and commercial clients by developing,
manufacturing and installing tailor-made fire-protection
solutions that comply with international safety standards and
offers follow-up services post system installation. During 2012,
Minimax group, of which the majority of its shares is owned by
funds advised by IK Investment Partners, generated revenues of
EUR1.1 billion with its 6,531 employees.
===========
G R E E C E
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* Fitch: House Price Hit May Offset Greek Repossession Resumption
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Lifting the mandatory freeze on repossessions and auctions of
debtors' main residences would be positive for Greek RMBS and
cover pools, Fitch Ratings says. It would increase cash flows
from recoveries and could shorten foreclosure timing assumptions.
However, the increase in supply may prevent recovery rates and
recovery times from returning to levels associated with a less
distressed housing market.
A full assessment of the impact of lifting the moratorium would
require additional detail on the scope of any exceptions and how
they are determined. While recent comments by senior politicians
in Greece indicate that the moratorium will not be extended
beyond end-2013, this is politically contentious.
If the auction freeze were lifted, it would be credit positive
for the underlying pools in Greek RMBS transactions and covered
bond programs. It would increase cash flows from loan recoveries,
which have been limited despite the increase in residential
mortgage defaults since 2010.
From September 2010, when the moratorium was introduced,
cumulative net defaults rose and recoveries from Greek
securitized residential mortgage portfolios in Fitch-rated RMBS
transactions have not kept pace. They have fallen from around 13%
prior to the moratorium to as low as 1% since. Lifting the
moratorium would benefit Greek RMBS deals, which provision for
full loan defaults, rather than just losses. Furthermore, the
suspension on foreclosures in 2010 coincided with a substantial
increase in arrears, suggesting that moral hazard concerns are
legitimate.
However, the benefits of increased recovery cash flows would be
partly offset by the pressure that additional excess supply may
put on house prices. Lenders would probably try to strike a
balance between commencing auctions and flooding the market with
new supply. But while this might limit house price volatility, it
may counteract any benefits for average foreclosure timings
(which the moratorium has significantly increased). Foreclosure
timings may even lengthen, depending on the extent of the removal
of auction restrictions.
As a result, and depending on details and lender behavior, we
would anticipate making further adjustments to our house price
decline (HPD) or recovery timing expectations if the moratorium
were lifted. These were last updated in our Greek RMBS Criteria
Addendum in July, when we increased our base case forecast for
nominal average peak-to-trough Greek house price declines to 42%
from 33%, in light of a very weak housing market and a lack of
foreclosure data. We also lengthened our recovery timing
expectations to five from four years, in part because of the
extension of the mandatory auction freeze to end-2013.
Greek Finance Minister Yannis Stournaras said earlier in August
that the moratorium on auctions for main residences worth up to
EUR300,000 would not be extended again when it lapses at the end
of this year. However, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras said on
August 22 that the "primary residence of weak citizens and those
who can prove they cannot service their debts . . . will be fully
protected," while stressing that borrowers who could pay but
chose not to would no longer enjoy protection from foreclosure.
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H U N G A R Y
=============
MFB HUNGARIAN: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned MFB Hungarian Development Bank Plc a
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB+' with a Stable
Outlook. Fitch has not assigned MFB a Viability Rating as the
bank's business model is dependent on the support of the state.
Key Rating Drivers
MFB's IDRs, Support Rating and Support Rating Floor are based on
Fitch's opinion that the bank would very likely be supported by
the Hungarian state, if required. Fitch's view of support
reflects MFB's policy role, track record of liquidity and capital
support for the bank, full state ownership and MFB's small size.
It also takes into account dedicated legislation that governs
MFB's tasks, the scope of activities and relationship with the
state. The Stable Outlook on MFB's Long-term IDR reflects that on
the sovereign.
There are three separate statutory guarantees that cover
repayment risk (of issued bonds and loans), foreign currency risk
and credit risk up to limits defined each year in the annual
central budget act. The statutory repayment guarantee also limits
MFB's total liabilities (from issued bonds and loans) and its
amount is reviewed by the government each year. For 2013 and
(most likely) for 2014 it stood at HUF1,800 billion (about
EUR6 billion), which in Fitch's view, represents a moderate
contingent liability for the state (about 6.1% of estimated 2013
GDP).
Rating Sensitivities
MFB's ratings are equalized with those of the sovereign and
consequently are sensitive to changes in the Hungarian sovereign
ratings. Fitch believes that the state's strong propensity to
support MFB is unlikely to be revised in the foreseeable future.
In assessing the state's commitment to the bank, Fitch will
monitor the timeliness of capital injections or liquidity support
in light of the bank's very weak internal capital generation and
high refinancing needs in Q413 and 2014.
MFB is a development bank fully controlled by the Hungarian State
through the Ministry of National Development. The bank's policy
role is to provide financial services to stimulate economic
growth in Hungary.
The rating actions are:
Long-term IDR assigned at 'BB+'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR assigned at 'B'
Support Rating assigned at '3'
Support Rating Floor assigned at 'BB+'
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I C E L A N D
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* UK Banks to Pay GBP1-Bil. Compensation to Icelandic Savers
------------------------------------------------------------
BBA disclosed that on September 1, 2013, the UK's banks will make
the first of three multimillion pound payments to cover the costs
of the Icelandic banking crisis.
When the banking crisis hit Iceland, hundreds of thousands of
British customers had deposits in Icelandic banks and there was
concern that they might lose their savings. At the time, the UK
Government stepped in to ensure that no-one lost their money.
The UK's banks are now writing out checks for up to GBP1.089
billion of compensation already paid to UK customers for savings
held in the failed Icelandic banks.
The payments will be made in three installments, the first of
which will be happen on September 1. These payments fulfill the
industry's obligations to the Financial Services Compensation
Scheme (FSCS) which protects customer deposits in the event of
bank failure.
The fact that the industry is making these payments is further
evidence to show that the UK's banking industry continues to
return to strength. It also demonstrates that the FSCS system
works, is robust and will protect savers in the event of another
bank collapse. The FSCS has now been extended so that all
customers' savings, up to the value of GBP85,000, would be
protected if another bank goes into insolvency.
Commenting, BBA Chief Executive Anthony Browne said:
"The UK's banks are paying GBP1 billion to compensate for UK
savers who could have lost everything when the Icelandic banking
crisis hit. This compensation ensured that no savers who had
money in Icelandic banks lost out.
"These payments show that the system works, and we hope it gives
confidence to consumers that if there is ever another bank
failure that their savings will be protected."
The aggregated expected compensation to be paid by banks,
building societies and credit unions totals GBP1.089 billion to
be paid over the next 3 years. The payments will comprise 3
tranches of GBP363m. The compensation figure being paid is based
on the FSCS's estimated shortfall in recoveries at April 2016.
This is the date at which the FSCS will need to repay the
principal on the loan that was made by HM Treasury to the FSCS to
fund the compensation pay-outs that were made to depositors.
The compensation being paid by the banks will fund the
"shortfall" that will be created as a result of the FSCS being
unable to recover the full amount that is owed by the estates of
the Icelandic banks. The FSCS expects the ultimate recoveries
shortfall to equal approximately GBP500m which, given GBP1.089
billion will be funded by the banks under this compensation
package the FSCS is expecting the Icelandic banks to make further
payments after April 2016.
The breakdown of the current shortfall by bank is:
Bank Current Shortfalls
in funding
Icesave GBP727,844,000
Heritable Bank Plc GBP104,310,000
Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander GBP601,831,000
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I R E L A N D
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DRYDEN XV: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
DRYDEN XV - EURO CLO 2006 PLC's class A1, A2, A3, B, C, and D
notes. At the same time, S&P has affirmed its rating on the
class E notes.
The rating actions follows S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the July 2, 2013 trustee report and
S&P's application of relevant criteria for transactions of this
type.
S&P subjected the capital structure to its cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each class of
notes at each rating level. In S&P's analysis, it used the
reported portfolio balance that it considers to be performing
(EUR441,460,737), the current weighted-average spread (4.23%),
and the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P considered
appropriate. S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using alternative default patterns and levels, in conjunction
with different interest and currency stress scenarios.
Since S&P's Jan. 23, 2012 review, the portfolio's credit quality
has remained stable. However, S&P has observed that the scenario
default rates (SDRs) at each rating level have decreased
following a reduction in the transaction's weighted-average life.
Par coverage tests have increased since S&P's last review and it
has observed an increase in the aggregate collateral balance and
the weighted-average spread, which has led to an increase in the
BDR at each tranche rating level.
The results of S&P's credit and cash flow analysis indicates that
the class A1, A2, A3, B, C, and D notes' available credit
enhancement is now commensurate with higher ratings. S&P has
therefore raised its ratings on these classes of notes.
In S&P's opinion, the available credit enhancement for the class
E notes is still commensurate with the currently assigned rating,
taking into account the results of our credit and cash flow
analysis. S&P has therefore affirmed its 'BB- (sf)' rating on
the class E notes.
DRYDEN XV - EURO CLO 2006 is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms. This transaction reached the
end of its reinvestment period in April 2013.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating Rating
To From
DRYDEN XV - EURO CLO 2006 PLC
EUR422.3 Million, GBP20 Million Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Raised
A1 AA+ (sf) AA- (sf)
A2 AA+ (sf) AA- (sf)
A3 AA+ (sf) AA- (sf)
B AA- (sf) A+ (sf)
C A (sf) BBB+ (sf)
D BBB- (sf) BB+ (sf)
Rating Affirmed
E BB- (sf)
TRIFIK INDUSTRIAL: Enters Into Deal with Creditors; 13 Jobs Saved
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Herald.ie reports that the High Court's Mr. Justice Gerard Hogan
heard that Neil Hughes of Hughes Blake financial consultants had
negotiated a deal with creditors that will save at least 13 jobs
associated with Trifik Industrial Services Limited, which was
previously threatened with closure.
Barrister John Kennedy said the company had been in a position
where it had been unable to pay its debts but because of an
examinership scheme was now facing a rosier future, Herald.ie
relates.
Trifik Industrial Services Limited is a Co Kildare-based company.
The company's main activities are the hire, sale and maintenance
of forklifts and trucks for the food industry.
=========
I T A L Y
=========
BANCA MARCHE: Put Under Special Administration Following Loss
-------------------------------------------------------------
Silvia Aloisi at Reuters reports that Banca Marche has been
placed under special administration by the Bank of Italy,
becoming the biggest casualty so far of an extended round of
balance sheet inspections by the central bank.
According to Reuters, smaller lenders such as Marche are bearing
the brunt of Italy's longest recession since World War II, with
soaring bad debts stretching their finances, and analysts say
some will need more investor capital or state aid.
Banca Marche said the Bank of Italy had effectively taken over
management after it posted a net loss of EUR232 million (US$305.9
million) in the first half due to big writedowns on its loan
portfolio, Reuters relates.
The lender, the target of an extensive audit by the central bank,
said on Friday its Core Tier 1 ratio -- a key measure of
financial strength -- had fallen to 4.29% at the end of June,
making it one of the weakest in Italy, Reuters recounts.
The bank had approved a EUR300 million share issue to be carried
out by the end of this year, but said on Friday that neither its
current shareholders nor new investors had made a binding
commitment to take part in the cash call, Reuters notes.
The lender had also tried to place a bond for up to EUR100
million with a hefty 12.5% coupon by the end of July, Reuters
states. However, its Friday statement said the take-up for the
bond so far was just EUR25 million, Reuters discloses.
The unlisted 312-branch lender said the Bank of Italy had
temporarily suspended its board of directors and internal
auditors from their functions and had appointed two special
administrators who took office on Friday, Reuters recounts. It
added that the special administrators would be tasked with
putting in place the necessary steps to shore up the bank's weak
capital base, Reuters discloses.
Banca Marche, as cited by Reuters, said writedowns on loans
totaled EUR451.8 million in the first half, or EUR373 million
more than in the same period of 2012. It said that problematic
loans grew by 15% and accounted for 24% of total loans, Reuters
relates.
The lender said that writedowns were EUR170 million higher than
what the bank had forecast on August 1 and were the result of an
"extraordinary review" of the bank's loan portfolio to meet the
requests of the Bank of Italy, Reuters notes.
Banca Marche is controlled by three cash-strapped foundations
which have a combined stake in the lender of 56%. It had already
booked a net loss of EUR526 million in 2012, Reuters recounts.
Banca Marche is one of Italy's top 20 banks.
BANCA POPOLARE: S&P Lowers CCR to 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
term counterparty credit rating on Italy-based Banca Popolare
dell'Emilia Romagna (BPER) to 'BB-' from 'BB'. At the same time,
S&P affirmed the 'B' short-term counterparty credit rating on the
bank. S&P also lowered the ratings on BPER's nondeferrable
subordinated debt to 'B-' from 'B+'. The outlook on BPER is
stable.
The lowering of S&P's long-term rating on BPER follows the
deterioration of the bank's asset quality in first-half 2013,
which was significantly greater than S&P expected. In S&P's
view, the fast pace of BPER's asset quality deterioration, which
adds to the bank's already large stock of nonperforming assets
(NPAs), both in gross and net terms, increases the bank's
vulnerability to higher-than-expected credit losses and puts
pressure on its capitalization.
On Aug. 28, 2013, BPER reported a loss of EUR21 million in the
first half of 2013 as a result of higher loan loss provisions.
This was partly due to a EUR1 billion increase in gross NPAs
(2% of reported gross loans) in the second quarter of 2013 owing
to the reclassification of EUR600 million of booked loans
following an inspection by the Bank of Italy. In the first half
of 2013, net inflows of NPAs reached EUR1.6 billion, or 3.0% of
gross loans at the end of 2012--a level that is significantly
higher than S&P previously expected. BPER's total stock of gross
NPAs therefore reached a high 19% of gross loans at mid-2013.
In S&P's view, BPER's weak asset quality metrics stem mainly from
its high exposure to southern Italian regions -- where the
economic environment is significantly more depressed than for
Italy overall -- and to the construction and real estate sectors.
Given the bank's exposure to these segments on its loan book and
S&P's view of Italy's persistently weak economic and operating
environment, S&P anticipates that BPER's asset quality will
continue to deteriorate significantly. S&P now expects
additional net inflows of NPAs to be slightly over 4% cumulative
in the second half of 2013 and in 2014, which would bring gross
NPAs over 2012 gross loans to close to 23% by end-2014.
Owing to the pace of BPER's asset quality deterioration and the
magnitude of the bank's total gross and net stock of NPAs, S&P
considers that BPER is more vulnerable to higher-than-expected
credit losses. S&P has therefore revised its assessment of
BPER's risk position to "weak" from "moderate".
"We also consider that the pressure on internal capital
generation owing to higher credit losses increases the downside
risk to BPER's capital position. We understand that the bank
does not currently have capital-raising plans. We also note that
BPER's capital management policy and track record has not
included ongoing capital increases, despite the impact of the
weaker operating environment for banks operating in Italy. We
now consider it unlikely that the bank will be able to maintain a
risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio sustainably above 5% over time.
We have therefore lowered our assessment of BPER's capital and
earnings to "weak" from "moderate"," S&P said.
"As a result of our lower assessments of BPER's risk position and
capital and earnings we have revised down BPER's stand-alone
credit profile (SACP) to 'b+' from 'bb'. The impact on the
ratings on BPER of the two-notch lowering of the SACP is
mitigated in part, however, by the one notch of uplift we
incorporate into the ratings on BPER to reflect our view of the
potential for extraordinary government support. We have
therefore lowered the long-term counterparty credit rating on
BPER by one notch to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The one notch of uplift
for support reflects our view that BPER would likely receive
extraordinary financial support from the Italian government if
needed. We base this view on our assessment of BPER's "moderate"
systemic importance and Italy's "supportive" stance toward its
banking system," S&P added.
Consistent with S&P's criteria, it has also lowered the ratings
on BPER's non-deferrable subordinated debt to 'B-' from 'B+'
following the lowering of BPER's SACP.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that most of the downside
risks S&P sees for BPER's performance owing to the ongoing
difficult operating conditions in Italy are, to a large extent,
incorporated in S&P's ratings on BPER. In particular, S&P
considers that BPER would likely be able to maintain its
capitalization in line with our current assessment even if
economic and/or operating conditions in Italy were to deteriorate
further.
S&P could lower the rating on BPER, all else being equal, if it
lowered the long-term sovereign credit rating on Italy by more
than one notch. In this event, and in accordance with S&P's
criteria, BPER would no longer benefit from the one notch of
uplift in its rating to reflect the potential for extraordinary
government support.
S&P could raise the ratings if it anticipated that BPER was
likely to maintain a RAC ratio sustainably above 5% over time and
S&P expected an easing in the negative trends it sees for the
operating and economic environment for banks in Italy.
CAPITAL MORTGAGE: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class C Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded Capital Mortgage Series 2007-1's
class A notes and affirmed the class B and C notes, as follows:
Class A1 (ISIN IT0004222532): downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAsf';
Outlook Negative
Class A2 (ISIN IT0004222540): downgraded to 'Asf' from 'AAsf';
Outlook Negative
Class B (ISIN IT0004222557): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
Class C (ISN IT0004222565): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
Estimate revised to 50% from 0%
Key Rating Drivers
Non-Italian Borrowers and High LTV Loans Driving Defaults
The downgrade of the class A notes reflects Fitch's concern about
the expected performance of the underlying assets. At present,
loans in arrears by more than three months remain low at 1.0% of
the current portfolio balance in July 2013 interest payment date
(IPD). The average roll-through rate of loans in three-month plus
arrears to default over the past four quarters was around 50%.
Cumulative gross defaults (loans in arrears for more than 6
months) as a percentage of the initial pool balance stood at 9.3%
as of June 2013.
The loan-by-loan analysis of the pool showed that a significant
number of loans that are currently in arrears are to non-Italian
borrowers, which comprise around 25% of the current pool.
Furthermore, a significant portion of the current loans in
arrears have original loan-to-value (LTV) ratios between 70% and
80%, which is higher than the 63% of the performing loans. In its
analysis of the transaction, Fitch assumes such borrowers are
more likely to default on their payments in times of economic
stress and applies more conservative assumptions, as outlined in
its criteria addendum for Italy.
Low Recoveries to Date
UniCredit S.p.A. (BBB+/Negative/F2) performs the roles of primary
servicer, cash administrator, and account bank in the
transaction. During the primary servicing stage, UniCredit S.p.A.
aims only to recover the missed installment amount before
transferring the non-performing loans to special servicing. The
special servicer, UniCredit Credit Management Bank S.p.a. (RSS1-
/CSS1-), currently manages 10% of the defaulted loans (EUR19m) on
behalf of the servicer, and has achieved a recovery rate of 94%
from the full outstanding loan amount on an aggregate basis to
date. The majority of the recoveries were completed through out
of court settlement.
Declining Credit Enhancement
The deal structure includes a provisioning mechanism, whereby the
full outstanding balance of loans in arrears by more than six
months is 100% provisioned using excess revenues. Although Fitch
views provisioning mechanisms as a positive structural feature,
as it mitigates the cost of carry of defaulted loans, the high
volume of non-performing borrowers, compared with the available
excess spread, has led to a decline in the credit support
available to all rated tranches. Period defaults remain above the
level of gross excess spread generated by the transaction.
As of July 2013 IPD, the reserve fund remained fully utilized and
the outstanding balance on the class C and class B principal
deficiency ledger (PDL) stood at 100% and 9.4% of the original
tranche balance, respectively. Class C interest was not paid
after the January 2013 IPD as all the available funds were
utilized for the class B PDL. If the transaction continues to
incur defaults at the current pace, a further build-up in the
class B PDL can be expected.
Rating Sensitivities
In Fitch's view, the transaction remains highly dependent on
recoveries from defaulted loans (currently at 8.0% of the
cumulative gross default balance), the timing of which is
uncertain and may take up to seven years from the point of
default based on Fitch's criteria addendum for Italy. Also, the
timing of when a defaulted loan is transferred to special
servicing from primary servicing also affects future recovery
rates, which have a significant impact on the junior notes'
Recovery Estimate. Continued deterioration of Italian
macroeconomic fundamentals may also lead to negative rating
action.
The transaction closed in June 2007 and comprises 100%
residential loans originated by Banca di Roma (now part of the
UniCredit Group).
FIAT SPA: DBRS Lowers Issuer Rating to 'BB'
-------------------------------------------
DBRS Inc. has downgraded the Issuer Rating of Fiat S.p.A. (Fiat
or the Company) from BB (high) to BB. Concurrently, pursuant to
DBRS's Methodology regarding Recovery Ratings for Non-Investment
Grade Corporate Issuers, the instrument rating of Fiat's Senior
Unsecured Debt is also herein downgraded to BB, in-line with the
assessed recovery rating of RR4. (The BB Senior Unsecured debt
rating of Fiat Finance Canada Ltd. recognizes the unconditional
guarantee of the Company.) The ratings downgrade incorporates
the continued deterioration of Fiat's financial profile on a
stand-alone basis (i.e. excluding Chrysler) primarily as a
function of persistent (albeit recently moderating) losses in
Europe amid a significant investment program associated with the
Company's forthcoming assembly plant in Brazil (in addition to
ongoing product development). The trend on the ratings remain
Negative; significantly reflecting the challenges and
potential cash outlays involved with Fiat's continuing pursuit of
Chrysler Group LLC (Chrysler) in addition to ongoing expected
weak earnings performance (and associated cash burn) of the
Company (on a stand-alone basis). Moreover, DBRS notes further
that Brazil, (which represents stand-alone Fiat's largest
national market), faces some economic headwinds, (although
automotive sales continue to benefit from government tax
incentives that are currently slated to persist
through the end of 2013).
The Company's 2012 performance,(excluding Chrysler), continued to
deteriorate year-over-year amid ongoing losses in Fiat's native
Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) segment reflecting ongoing
severe conditions in Europe, with such exacerbated by the
Company's over-weighted exposure to the southern markets that
have been the most adversely impacted by the continent's economic
challenges. Profitability from the Latin American (LATAM) segment
was also weaker, although earnings improved notably in the second
half of 2012 following the reintroduction of government stimulus
measures in May 2012. While earnings of Fiat's luxury brands
Ferrari and Maserati improved year-over-year, this was
essentially offset by weaker performance of the Company's
components segment. Through the first half of 2013, Fiat's
performance excluding Chrysler improved marginally year-over-
year, but remained weak with the Company continuing to incur a
net loss of approximately EUR 500 million. Losses in the EMEA
segment however narrowed significantly as a function of ongoing
cost reductions and a higher product mix mostly attributable to
the introduction of the Fiat 500L compact utility vehicle. In the
LATAM segment, profits were moderately lower, although
volumes remained firm with the reduced earnings mostly a function
of adverse foreign exchange effects (in addition to some
increases in industrial costs attributable to production shifts
in response to the region's current trade barriers). DBRS also
notes that Fiat is progressively expanding in the Asia Pacific
region, (largely through Chrysler Group vehicles); DBRS views
this positively but still considers these efforts to be at an
early stage. On a consolidated basis, DBRS notes that the
majority of earnings in recent periods have been represented by
Chrysler, which continues to trend positively primarily as a
function of stronger retail sales and firmer pricing amid the
ongoing recovery of automotive conditions in the United
States, bolstered by the solid market performance of new or
enhanced models.
DBRS acknowledges that Fiat's current credit metrics (primarily
analyzed on a stand-alone basis) continue to be somewhat weak for
the assigned ratings. However, DBRS notes that the Company's
financial measures are unlikely to deteriorate further with
earnings progressively recovering going forward, albeit a
protracted rate. Moreover, the weak credit metrics are partly
offset by DBRS's more positive view of the Company's business
profile, which is analyzed on a combined basis (i.e., including
the operations of 58.5%-owned Chrysler). DBRS notes that the
addition of Chrysler has considerably bolstered Fiat's business
profile, with significant geographic and product diversification
benefits (along with associated exchanges of platforms and
technologies). Moreover, scale efficiencies through joint
purchasing activities and higher capacity utilization bode well
for the Company's cost structure going forward.
However, despite the consolidation of Chrysler (as of June 2011),
Fiat and Chrysler currently manage funding matters on an
independent basis. Accordingly, DBRS assesses Fiat's financial
profile on such basis (i.e., excluding Chrysler).
Fiat is continuing to pursue an increasing ownership position in
Chrysler and over the past twelve months has exercised three call
options to purchase a combined additional 9.9% equity interest in
Chrysler from the UAW Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association
(VEBA). However, the VEBA has disputed Fiat's calculation of the
call price. The dispute has been submitted to the Delaware
Chancery Court with the timing regarding a ruling remaining
uncertain; (while a final ruling has yet to be made, DBRS notes
that the Delaware court has granted Fiat judgment on the
pleadings of two of the most significant issues). Fiat remains
in negotiation with the VEBA over the latter's 41.5% equity
interest in Chrysler. Eventually, an initial public offering
(IPO) of Chrysler may serve as a benchmark to value Chrysler's
stock, although an IPO (if at all executed) is unlikely
before early 2014. In any event, DBRS notes that Fiat's ultimate
aim is to attain full ownership and control of Chrysler. In the
interim, Chrysler revised its term loan and revolving credit
facilities in June of this year, such that the conditions of
these financings more closely match those of its bond agreements.
As a result of the above, while Chrysler still remains
significantly ring-fenced, Fiat's access to Chrysler's cash has
somewhat increased, with the Company being potentially able to
access close to $1.7 billion of Chrysler's cash.
While the cash burn of Fiat (on a stand-alone basis) was
substantial in 2012 at EUR2.8 billion (as calculated by DBRS),
DBRS notes that this is expected to moderate significantly in
2013. Liquidity of the industrial operations of (stand-alone)
Fiat as of June 30, 2013, was fairly solid at EUR10.9 billion
(including available credit lines). As noted previously, the
Company would also potentially be able to access approximately
EUR1.25 billion from Chrysler in the near-term. However, Fiat's
liquidity stands to be significantly depleted depending on how
much the Company would eventually have to pay in order to attain
full ownership and control of Chrysler. DBRS notes
that the estimates of such payments vary substantially (depending
on the ruling of the Delaware Chancery Court as well as other
measures Fiat may pursue) and roughly range from $2 billion to $6
billion (as estimated by DBRS). DBRS notes further that even in
the event of full ownership / control, Fiat's access to
Chrysler's cash could remain restricted, pending the prepayment
or renegotiation of the latter's various financings.
The Negative trend on the ratings underscores the ongoing weak
projected performance of Fiat, excluding Chrysler, over the near-
term, combined with significant uncertainties associated with
Fiat's increasing ownership position. In the event that the
Company (on a stand-alone basis) reverts to at least breakeven
free cash flow that is deemed sustainable, the trend on the
ratings could be changed to Stable. Notwithstanding the Negative
trend, DBRS notes that any substantial development with respect
to Fiat's efforts in acquiring VEBA's stake in Chrysler would
likely trigger an event-driven review of the ratings.
===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================
FORTEBANK JSC: S&P Affirms 'kzBB' National Scale Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'kzBB'
Kazakhstan national scale rating on Kazakhstan-based ForteBank
JSC.
The affirmation reflects S&P's view of the balance between the
bank's adequate capital and focused and solid management team,
and its clear strategy to grow in the small and midsize (SME)
segment, diversify its client base, and reach sufficient
profitability in its core banking activities.
"We believe that ForteBank's business position is weaker than the
system average, reflecting its limited market share and customer
franchise. We also we take into account uncertainty over the
implementation of the new strategy--the transition period has
ended and a strong management team is in place but the bank has
not yet succeeded in expanding its client base, notably its loan
portfolio. Acquiring new and creditworthy borrowers in the SME
segment is difficult due to the challenging operating environment
in Kazakhstan and increasing competition, mainly from midsize
banks, which impairs margins. We don't expect major shifts in
the bank's strategy over the next 12-24 months. Still, we
believe the bank needs time to gradually diversify its business
model, improve the granularity of its asset base, and demonstrate
stable earnings in core banking activities," S&P said.
"Our assessment of ForteBank's capital and earnings is a neutral
rating factor, reflecting the balance between its strong capital
base and notable assets growth with its still-fragile earnings
capacity. At the end of 2012, the bank's risk-adjusted capital
(RAC) ratio was 13.2% before adjustment and we expect it to trend
downward in the next two years, falling to the 8%-8.5% range by
the end of 2014. However, internal capital generation capacity
is low and insufficient to support further rapid business
expansion while keeping capitalization at the existing level. We
note rapidly falling margins over the past three years,
reflecting intense competition in the SME segment, with banks
having higher pricing power. We assume high operating expenses
and loan-loss reserves growth," S&P added.
"Our assessment of ForteBank's risk position is a negative rating
factor and reflects planned strong loan growth, existing single-
name concentration counterbalanced by good credit quality of new
loans, and limited open currency positions. The top 20 borrowers
account for 63.6% of total exposure or 206% of total adjusted
capital (TAC), higher than the sector average. The loan book is
fairly diversified by industry, except for real estate which
comprises one loan for Kazakh tenge (KZT)8.8 billion ($58
million) fully covered by cash deposits from a third party. We
forecast credit costs for newly generated loans of about 1%
annually, in line with growth plans and lower than the system
average," S&P noted.
ForteBank's funding and liquidity are neutral rating factors.
The bank's customer deposits represented 82% of the total funding
base with a loan-to-deposit ratio of 65.9% as of Dec. 31, 2012,
due to currently low loan leverage. Current liquidity is ample,
with liquid assets covering short-term wholesale funding 9.8x, so
the bank is not exposed to a loss in market confidence. S&P also
notes that all the short-term wholesale funding is related to
interbank deposits with KassaNova Bank JSC, which is owned by the
same shareholders. S&P consequently sees interbank deposits a as
non-market-sensitive liquidity source.
HOME CREDIT: Fitch Assigns 'BB-(EXP)' Rating to New Local Bonds
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Kazakhstan-based SB JSC Home Credit
and Finance Bank's (HCK) upcoming local bonds an expected Long-
term rating of 'BB-(EXP)' and an expected National Long-term
rating of 'BBB+(kaz)(EXP)'. The issue's total amount and final
maturity are yet to be determined.
Key Rating Drivers
The issue's Long-term rating and National long-term rating
correspond to HCK's Long-term local currency Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) of 'BB-' and National Rating of 'BBB+(kaz)'. HCK's
Long-term IDRs, National Rating and Support Rating reflect the
moderate probability of the bank receiving support if needed from
its parent, Russia's Home Credit and Finance Bank (HCFB,
'BB/Stable; bb'). Fitch's view on the probability of support is
based on the bank's full ownership by HCFB, its small size
relative to the parent (HCK accounts for 5% of HCFB's assets,
limiting the cost of any potential support) and reputational risk
for HCFB in case of the bank's default.
The one-notch difference between HCFB and HCK's ratings reflects
the cross-border nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship,
HCK's so far limited track record of operations and some
uncertainty about the long-term commitment of HCFB to support HCK
in case of a prolonged deterioration of the operating environment
in Kazakhstan.
Rating Sensitivities
An upgrade or a downgrade of HCK's Long-term local currency IDR
will result in a similar action on the issue's ratings. Any
positive or negative action on the parent's Long-term IDRs would
likely be matched by a similar action on HCK's Long-term IDRs.
This would also impact the National Rating and could result in a
change in the Support Rating.
HCK's ratings are:
Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR: 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR: 'BB-'; Outlook Stable
National Long-term Rating: 'BBB+(kaz)'; Outlook Stable
Viability Rating: 'b'
Support Rating: '3'
KAZTRANSGAS JSC: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed KazTransGas JSC (KTG) and its fully-
owned subsidiaries Intergas Central Asia JSC (ICA) and
KazTransGas Aimak JSC (KTGA) Long-term Issuer Default Ratings
(IDRs) at 'BB+'. The Outlook is Stable.
KTG and its subsidiaries (KTG or the group) are the state-owned
monopoly engaged in natural gas transit, transportation and
distribution in Kazakhstan (BBB+/Stable). It is the national gas
operator and derives most of its profits through the transit of
Central Asian gas to Russia. The group's ratings include a one-
notch uplift for its close ties with the state-owned parent JSC
National Company KazMunayGas (NC KMG, BBB/Stable), and are
constrained by high customer concentration, evolving tariff-
setting environment and increasing leverage.
Key Rating Drivers
Kazakh Gas Monopoly
KTG's ratings reflect its monopoly position as the operator of
the Kazakh gas pipeline network, the only transit route for
Central Asian gas to Russia and Europe. The group is the national
gas operator, which means that it has the pre-emptive right to
purchase natural gas produced in Kazakhstan at cost plus and
resell it domestically and for export. ICA, which is responsible
for trunk pipeline gas transit, generates most profits -- in
2012, it accounted for 60% of the group's consolidated EBITDA. In
our rating case, we forecast stable gas transportation volumes
and tariffs for the group until at least 2017.
High Customer Concentration
OAO Gazprom (BBB/Stable) is the group's key customer, accounting
for 76% of 2012 transit revenues. In 2011, Gazprom and ICA signed
a new five-year contract for 28 billion cubic meters (bcm) of
Central Asian gas. "Ship-or-pay" clauses cover 80% of negotiated
transit volumes. However, tariffs are agreed annually and may be
subject to political pressure. "We believe that Gazprom's
purchase volumes of Central Asian gas and transportation tariffs
will remain flat over the medium term, which will allow the group
to generate stable operating cash flows. High customer
concentration is the principal rating constraint for KTG," Fitch
said.
Fully Regulated Tariffs
The group's profitability is driven by cost-plus domestic tariffs
and regulated gas prices set by Kazakhstan's Agency for
Regulation of Natural Monopolies (AREM). "We view Kazakhstan's
tariff-setting environment as developing. Historically, gas
prices and transit tariffs have been sufficient for KTG to
maintain adequate profits and finance its moderate maintenance
capex. We expect this to continue under our rating case. However,
in an economic recession AREM may face political pressure to
limit tariff increases, which could force KTG to raise its
leverage beyond our expectations," Fitch said.
Manageable Capex
"We view as manageable the group's plans to upgrade the ageing
gas network in south Kazakhstan and provide gas to several Kazakh
regions, including Almaty. KTG's 2013-2017 investment program
amounts to KZT235 billion and will be partially debt-funded, but
we expect the group's credit metrics to remain commensurate with
the current rating. In addition, we do not expect any significant
impact on KTG's credit metrics from the Beineu-Bozoy-Shymkent
pipeline and Line C of the Asian Gas Pipeline from Central Asia
to China, which are undertaken and financed by KTG's JVs with
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC, A+/Stable) and are
guaranteed by CNPC and NC KMG."
Moderately Rising Leverage
"At end-2012, KTG's funds from operations (FFO) adjusted gross
leverage was 1.9x, and we expect it to reach about 2.7x in 2013-
2017 due to KTGA's high capex. We forecast that the group's FFO
interest coverage will deteriorate to 6x, down from 10x at end-
2012, which is still adequate for the current ratings," Fitch
said
Rating Sensitivities
Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include:
-- Customer diversification - enhancement of the business
profile through diversification of the customer base, whilst
maintaining solid credit metrics would be positive for KTG's
ratings.
Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include:
-- Lower transit volumes - a large drop in volumes of Central
Asian gas transit with a simultaneous failure by Gazprom to
honour ship-or-pay obligation would be negative for KTG's
ratings;
-- Large capex - aggressive capex resulting in significant and
sustained deterioration of credit metrics, including FFO
gross leverage above 3x, would also be rating negative.
Liquidity and Debt Structure
Adequate Liquidity, Comfortable Repayments
At June 30, 2013, KTG had KZT47bn in cash and cash equivalents,
which was sufficient to cover short-term maturities of KZT15
billion. Debt repayment is well balanced with a peak in 2017 when
ICA's USD540 million Eurobonds fall due.
List of Rating Actions
KazTransGas JSC
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Stable
Local currency Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-Term rating: assigned at 'AA-(kaz), Outlook
Stable
Senior unsecured Long-Term rating: assigned at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured National Long-Term rating: assigned at 'AA-
(kaz)'
Intergas Central Asia JSC
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Stable
Local currency Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-Term rating: assigned at 'AA-(kaz)', Outlook
Stable
Senior unsecured Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured National Long-Term rating: assigned at 'AA-
(kaz)'
KazTransGas Aimak JSC
Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Stable
Local currency Long-Term IDR: affirmed at 'BB+', Outlook Stable
Short-Term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
National Long-Term rating: assigned at 'AA-(kaz), Outlook
Stable
Senior unsecured Long-Term Rating: affirmed at 'BB+'
Senior unsecured National Long-Term rating: assigned at 'AA-
(kaz)'
SOUTH OIL: Fitch Affirms, Withdraws 'BB+' National LT Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and simultaneously withdrawn South Oil
LLP's National Long term rating of 'BB+(kaz)' with a Stable
Outlook.
The rating has been withdrawn as the agency no longer has
sufficient information to maintain it because South Oil has
chosen to stop participating in the rating process. Fitch will no
longer provide ratings or analytical coverage for South Oil.
South Oil is a Kazakh small private oil producer, with 2012
output of 15 thousand barrels of oil per day, less than 1% of the
country's total.
===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================
HAYFIN RUBY II: S&P Assigns 'BB' Ratings to Two Note Classes
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has assigned its credit
ratings to HAYFIN RUBY II LUXEMBOURG S.C.A.'s variable funding
note (VFN) and class A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, C-1, C-2, D-1, D-2, E-1,
and E-2 notes. At closing, HAYFIN RUBY II LUXEMBOURG also issued
unrated class F-1 sub and F-2 sub notes.
S&P has assessed the collateral portfolio's credit quality. As
of closing, the portfolio is well diversified, primarily
comprising euro- and British pound sterling-denominated
speculative-grade senior secured and second-lien loans and bonds.
"Our ratings reflect the available credit enhancement for the
rated notes through the subordination of cash flows that are
payable to the junior classes of notes. We subjected the capital
structure to our cash flow analysis to determine the break-even
default rate for each rated class of notes. We used the target
par amount, the covenanted weighted-average spread, and the
covenanted weighted-average recovery rates in our cash flow
analysis. We applied various cash flow stress scenarios, using
four different default patterns, in conjunction with different
interest rate stress scenarios and foreign currency stresses for
each liability rating category," S&P said.
"Our credit and cash flow analysis shows that the available
credit enhancement for each class of notes was sufficient to
withstand the defaults that we applied in our supplemental tests
(excluding excess spread) outlined in our 2009 corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria," S&P added.
In S&P's analysis, it considered that the transaction documents'
replacement and remedy mechanisms adequately mitigate the
transaction's exposure to counterparty risk under its current
counterparty criteria.
Following the application of S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria,
it considers that the transaction's exposure to country risk is
sufficiently mitigated at the assigned rating levels. This is
because the concentration of the pool comprising assets in
countries rated lower than 'A-' is limited to 5% of the aggregate
collateral balance.
The transaction's legal structure is bankruptcy-remote, in line
with S&P's European legal criteria.
HAYFIN RUBY II LUXEMBOURG is a refinancing of the HayFin Ruby
Luxembourg transaction that we rated in October 2011. The
transaction is a European cash flow multicurrency CLO,
securitizing a revolving pool of euro- and British pound
sterling-denominated senior secured and second-lien loans and
bonds. Haymarket Financial LLP is the collateral manager.
Therefore, in addition to acquiring currency call options and
purchasing any additional collateral obligations at closing, the
issuer used the net issuance proceeds to redeem the notes issued
under the note issuance facility and the subordinated note
issuance facility under the previous Hayfin Ruby Luxembourg
transaction. At closing, the issuer used these net proceeds to
repay and cancel all outstanding liabilities and claims owed
under the previous transaction.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.
The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1716.pdf
RATINGS LIST
HAYFIN RUBY II LUXEMBOURG S.C.A.
EUR211.892 Million, GBP158.806 Million Senior Secured Variable
Funding Notes
Class Rating Amount
(mil. EUR)
VFN[1] AAA (sf) 50.00
A-1 AAA (sf) 81.90
A-2[1] AAA (sf) 81.90
B-1 AA (sf) 26.00
B-2[1] AA (sf) 26.00
C-1 A (sf) 11.50
C-2[1] A (sf) 11.50
D-1 BBB (sf) 10.24
D-2[1] BBB (sf) 10.24
E-1 BB (sf) 13.00
E-2[1] BB (sf) 12.87
F-1 sub NR 31.00
F-2 sub[1] NR 31.60
VFN - Variable funding note.
[1] British pound sterling-denominated notes (converted into euro
at the initial foreign exchange rate).
NR - Not rated.
===========
P O L A N D
===========
POLSKI KONCERN: Fitch Raises Issuer Default Rating From 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Polski Koncern Naftowy ORLEN S.A.'s
(PKN) Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to
'BBB-' from 'BB+'. The Outlook is Stable.
The upgrade reflects PKN's improved financial profile, in
particular a substantial reduction of debt and better financial
flexibility, which support the company's creditworthiness in
light of the still difficult conditions for the European oil
refining sector. The upgrade also reflects PKN's strategic focus
on the company's financial standing and maintaining credit ratios
at moderate levels, which mitigates the high business risk
stemming from the cyclicality of PKN's two main business units,
refining and petrochemicals. PKN has an ambitious capex plan for
2013-2017, which may be scaled down if financial results are
weaker than expected. Our projections show that PKN's credit
ratios are mainly dependent on its capex.
Key Rating Drivers
Better Financial Profile
The ratings reflect PKN's improved financial profile thanks to
several measures taken by management to reduce leverage,
including the disposal of Polkomtel S.A. in 2011 (after-tax
proceeds of PLN3.2 billion (US$1 billion)), its modest capex in
2011-2013 following a capex-intensive period in 2007-2010. This
supports PKN's creditworthiness in the still difficult conditions
for the European oil refining sector due to overcapacity and weak
demand.
Strategy Implementation
Fitch views PKN's strategy update announced in November 2012 as
supporting the company's credit profile. One of PKN's strategic
targets is to maintain credit ratios at a safe level, including
the gearing ratio below 30% and covenant net debt-to-EBITDA below
1.5x. While the capex plan for 2013-2017 of PLN22.5 billion is
large (about 50% higher than in 2008-2012), the company also
expects an increase in EBITDA by about 60% in this period partly
due to investments. Fitch views positively the fact that PLN6.9bn
of the planned capex for 2013-2017 is discretionary (mostly in
the upstream and energy segments) and may be deferred or
cancelled if cash flows are weaker than expected.
In line with the updated strategy, PKN reinstated dividend
payments in 2013 after not paying them in 2009-2012. The company
plans a gradual increase in the dividend payout in the next few
years in order to reach up to 5% dividend yield. However,
dividends will depend on the company's financial standing and the
macro environment.
Improved Financial Flexibility
Fitch believes that PKN has much greater flexibility to reduce
its capex if cash flows are weaker than in 2007-2010, when it was
conducting some major committed investments. The agency views
positively PKN's proven ability to manage its working capital
changes in line with changes in its financial position. This
could provide additional flexibility for the company should
industry conditions weaken, leading to a deterioration of
reported credit ratios potentially close to the covenant level
defined in the main bank loan agreements.
In H113 PKN reported positive changes in working capital of
PLN1.7bn, which together with low capex of PLN1 billion, resulted
in a relatively low net debt level and leverage ratio despite
weaker market conditions in refining.
Cyclical Sectors
Most of PKN's EBITDA is generated in two highly cyclical sectors:
oil refining and petrochemicals (each generating about 40% of
2011-2012 EBITDA before inventory holding gains/losses and before
impairments). The remaining 20% of EBITDA comes from the more
stable fuel retailing business. Fitch views PKN as a refining
company with high business diversification in light of its
substantial petrochemical operations and a strong position in
fuel retail sales. Diversification may help mitigate cash flow
cyclicality, as seen in 2011 and H113 results, where solid
performance in the petrochemicals segment supported PKN's cash
flow at a time of weaker refining profits.
Rating Sensitivities
Positive: Rating upside potential is currently limited. Positive
rating action would likely require a material improvement in the
company's business profile resulting in lower cyclicality of
operating cash flows with funds flow from operations (FFO)
adjusted net leverage of up to 2.0x. This credit ratio is
calculated by Fitch excluding the effect of inventory holding
gains/losses and reversing the sale of compulsory crude oil
inventory to third parties.
Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
actions include:
-- A deterioration in cash flows and credit metrics (an
increase in FFO adjusted net leverage (excluding inventory
holding gains/losses and compulsory crude stock sales) to
above 2.5x on a sustained basis) due, for example, to
substantially weaker than expected conditions for refining
and petrochemicals operations
-- Capex substantially above FFO resulting in highly negative
free cash flow in the medium term
-- Aggressive dividend policy
Liquidity and Debt Structure
Ample Liquidity and Sufficient Funding Until 2016-2017
At end-June 2013 short-term debt of PLN2.8 billion was covered by
cash of PLN4.6 billion, and unused committed medium and long-term
bank facilities of about PLN10 billion, which mostly expire
between 2016 and 2018. PKN's debt maturity profile is not
onerous, with no major repayments due until 2016. Given its large
available committed long-term funding, the company has no need to
raise new external funding until 2016. The company had sufficient
headroom within its financial covenants at end-June 2013.
Good Access to Debt Markets
PKN has good access to the bank loan and domestic bond markets.
The company recently extended the maturity of its EUR2.6 billion
syndicated bank loan facility, PKN's main funding source, to 2017
(EUR1.55 billion) and 2018 (EUR0.6 billion) from 2016. It also
issued four-year domestic bonds of PLN0.4 billion in May-June
2013. The bond issue was placed among retail investors with a
coupon of WIBOR plus 150 bps, which is comparable with bond
coupons paid by some Polish electric utilities rated in the 'BBB'
category.
Bank Loans Dominate Debt Structure
PKN group's debt of PLN9.7 billion at end-June 2013 mostly
comprised bank loans (82% of total debt) and bonds (18%). The
company plans to increase the share of bonds in the funding
structure in the next few years through the issue of domestic
bonds and eurobonds.
Full List of Ratings
-- Long-term foreign currency IDR upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+';
Stable Outlook
-- Long-term local currency IDR upgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BB+';
Stable Outlook
-- Short-term foreign currency IDR upgraded to 'F3' from 'B'
-- Short-term local currency IDR upgraded to 'F3' from 'B'
-- Foreign currency senior unsecured rating upgraded to 'BBB-'
from 'BB+'
-- Local currency senior unsecured rating upgraded to 'BBB-'
from 'BB+'
-- National Long-term rating upgraded to 'A-(pol)' from
'BBB+(pol)'; Stable Outlook
-- National senior unsecured rating upgraded to 'A-(pol)' from
'BBB+(pol)'
===========
R U S S I A
===========
KRAYINVESTBANK: Fitch Rates RUB2-Bil. Domestic Bond 'B+(EXP)'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Krayinvestbank's (KIB) upcoming RUB2
billion BO-03 Series domestic bond issue an expected Long-term
local currency rating of 'B+(EXP)' and a National Long-term
rating of 'A-(rus)(EXP)'. The bond's expected Recovery Rating is
'RR4(EXP)'. The bonds have a maturity of six years, a semi-annual
coupon and a 1.5 year put option.
KIB has a Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR)
of 'B+' with Stable Outlook, a Short-term IDR of 'B', a Long-term
local currency IDR of 'B+' with Stable Outlook, a National Rating
of 'A-(rus)' with Stable Outlook, a Viability Rating of 'b-' and
Support Rating of '4' .
Key Rating Drivers
The issue ratings correspond to KIB's 'B+' Long-term local
currency IDR, which reflects the limited probability of support
that KIB may receive if needed from Krasnodar Region (KR,
BB+/Stable), which directly owns a 98.04% stake in the bank.
Fitch's view of the propensity to provide support is based on
KR's majority ownership and a track record of assistance to date.
However, Fitch considers there is some uncertainty in respect of
support in light of the bank's limited systemic importance for
the region and some corporate governance issues.
Rating Sensitivities
Any changes to KIB's Long-term local currency IDR would impact
the issue ratings. Downside pressure on KIB's Long-term foreign
and local currency IDR could arise from any major weakening in
the relationship between KR and the bank, for example, as a
result of changes in key senior regional officials. Upside
potential for KIB's Long-term local currency IDR is limited in
the near term, but a reduction in construction exposure which may
be largely related to KR and its officials would be credit
positive.
RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS: Fitch Withdraws BB-(EXP) Rating on 2018 Bond
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Russian Helicopters Finance Limited's
proposed 2018 guaranteed bond of up to US$500 million 'BB-(EXP)'
expected rating.
In accordance with Fitch's policy, the expected ratings have been
withdrawn because the notes have not been issued.
Russian Helicopters Finance Limited is an Ireland-registered
corporation, intended to be the principal bond issuing entity
within the JSC Russian Helicopters (RH; BB/Stable) group. RH is a
Russia-based manufacturer of civil and military helicopters.
SISTEMA INTERNATIONAL: S&P Retains 'BB' Rating on RUB20BB Notes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised upward to
'3' from '4' the recovery ratings on Russia-based operating
holding company Sistema's senior unsecured notes (RUB20 billion
notes due August 2014, and RUB19 billion notes due November
2016), indicating that S&P now expects meaningful (50%-70%)
recovery prospects in the event of a payment default. The issue
rating of 'BB' on these notes is unchanged.
At the same time, S&P also revised upward to '3' from '4' the
recovery rating on the US$500 million loan facility issued to
Sistema by its orphan special-purpose vehicle Sistema
International Funding S.A. The issue ratings on the loan
facility and on Sistema International Funding's US$500 million
senior unsecured notes are unchanged at 'BB'.
The revision of S&P's recovery ratings reflects its revised
default scenario, which envisages a default in early 2017. The
scenario contemplates Sistema defaulting as a result of a
weakening macroeconomic environment and volatile equity markets
in Russia, where Sistema has most of its assets, combined with
the company being unable to extract sufficient dividends from its
investments to service its debt obligations.
S&P values Sistema on the basis of the stressed value of its
asset portfolio. S&P applied a reduction of up to 50% to the
current market equity value of oil company Bashneft and other
Sistema subsidiaries to reflect a projected deterioration in
economic conditions, volatility in equity markets, and the
likelihood that the distressed sale of assets will take place at
a discount.
S&P estimates the gross enterprise value of Sistema's assets at
default to be about US$4.2 billion. From this, S&P deducts about
US$290 million of enforcement costs. The residual value exceeds
100% of the total outstanding unsecured debt of about $2.1
billion (assuming six months' prepetition interest).
Although recovery prospects exceed 70% under S&P's valuation, the
recovery rating is capped at '3' because of its view of the
notes' unsecured nature, Russia's insolvency regime--which S&P
considers unfavorable for creditors--and the volatile value of
the holding company's equity stakes in various businesses.
S&P bases its analysis on Sistema's current capital structure
(unsecured debt instruments raised at the holding company level),
which could change materially on the path to default owing to the
weak protection in the transaction documents (particularly
against raising new debt). Any significant change in the group's
capital structure--such as additional debt raised at the same
level as or above these unsecured debt instruments--could impair
recovery prospects for noteholders and lead to S&P revising down
the recovery ratings.
SUKHOI CIVIL: H113 Results No Immediate Impact on Fitch Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that JSC Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Corporation's
(SCAC, BB/Stable) recently reported H113 financial results under
Russian accounting standards, whilst worse than expected and
likely resulting in breaches of financial covenants, will have no
immediate impact on the group's ratings of the group for three
key reasons.
Firstly, SCAC's ratings are linked to those of its ultimate
majority shareholder, the Russian Federation (BBB/Stable). Due to
its shareholding, Fitch expects SCAC to continue to receive
indirect support from the Russian state via additional equity
injections over and above what has already been contributed to
date. However, any waning, or perceived waning, of that support
is likely to lead to SCAC's ratings being further notched down
from those of the sovereign.
Secondly, SCAC has regularly breached its loans' financial
covenants in recent years and has always successfully obtained
waivers to them. Fitch believes that this will also occur in this
instance, should a breach of covenant be confirmed. The breaches,
stemming from ongoing operating losses leading to a weak equity
position, are the result of a slower than expected ramp up in
production of the flagship SSJ 100 regional jet as well as cost
overruns related to the initial production stage of the aircraft.
Fitch expects SCAC to continue to incur losses in 2013 and 2014
as a result of these issues, before generating a modest operating
profit from 2015 onwards.
Thirdly, the company has adequate liquidity and is assumed to
continue to have access to new sources of funding; therefore it
is unlikely to face immediate debt servicing pressure. At end-
H113, SCAC had cash of approximately US$26 million and available
credit lines of over US$300 million. The H212 acquired credit
line of US$1 billion from Vnesheconombank as well as the expected
shareholder equity injections of around US$200 million in 2013
serve as evidence of ongoing operational support the group is
receiving.
In the next two months, Fitch will meet with SCAC's management to
discuss the expected ongoing support from the Russian State, as
well as the group's operating plan and liquidity position.
Negative rating action, although not expected at this stage, may
follow if Fitch believes that previous assumptions relating to
these factors are no longer valid.
* SVERDLOVSK OBLAST: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Issuer Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' long-term
issuer credit rating on the Russian region, Sverdlovsk Oblast.
The outlook is stable.
Rationale
The rating on Sverdlovsk Oblast, which is located in the Urals
Federal District of the Russian Federation, is constrained by the
"developing and unbalanced" public finance system in Russia, a
relatively concentrated economy, limited budget predictability
and flexibility, and what S&P regards as management quality
somewhat below the international average.
The oblast's creditworthiness benefits from moderate budgetary
performance, a low debt burden, strong liquidity, and moderate
contingent liabilities.
Like many other Russian regions, Sverdlovsk Oblast's financial
policy lacks predictability and stability due to the weak
institutional system. In addition to its low flexibility, the
oblast's budget revenues are volatile because of its dependence
on metallurgy and pipe production, which are driven by global
commodity markets and economic cycles and together contribute
about 25% of the oblast's tax revenues. S&P factored these risks
into its previous base-case scenario, and they materialized in
the first half of 2013 when weak metal markets resulted in a drop
in corporate profit tax by 15% against the first half of 2012.
S&P expects some weakening of Sverdlovsk's operating budgetary
performance in the medium term, based on the slowing rates of tax
growth and higher operating spending pressures related to
federally-mandated salary increases. However, the oblast's
cautious approach to spending and the uptick in revenues in
2014-2015 thanks to moderate economic recovery and relatively
high inflation will likely support Sverdlovsk Oblast's operating
surpluses at a still-strong level of about 6% of operating
revenues on average in 2013-2015, against a solid average of 9%
in 2010-2012.
Sverdlovsk Oblast's capital city, Yekaterinburg, was named as one
of the host cities for the Federation Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) 2018 World Cup. This has put significant
pressure on the oblast to make substantial investments in
transport, utilities, and sports facilities to meet FIFA
requirements.
The precise budget for the World Cup preparations is not yet
clear, and the regions are still negotiating the exact list of
necessary infrastructure with the federal government. However,
according to the oblast's initial estimates, it could amount to
as much as Russian ruble (RUB) 100 billion (US$3 billion). Based
on announcements by the federal authorities, S&P assumes that at
least one-half of the required spending will likely be cofinanced
from the federal budget. Under this scenario, Sverdlovsk
Oblast's deficits after capital accounts are unlikely to exceed
5%-6% of revenues on average in 2013-2015, with capital spending
making up about 15% of total expenditures in the medium term.
S&P consequently expect only a moderate expansion of tax-
supported debt in the medium term. The oblast's currently low
tax-supported debt of 15% of consolidated operating revenues,
which also includes guarantees and debt of non-self-supporting
government-related entities (GREs), is not likely to exceed a 30%
threshold by 2015, according to S&P's base-case scenario.
Sverdlovsk Oblast's contingent liabilities are moderate and are
mostly represented by accumulated payables of the GREs, including
those of the gas-distribution company. Although the oblast is
not directly responsible for these, it might provide financial
aid if needed.
S&P views Sverdlovsk Oblast's financial management as a
"negative" factor for its creditworthiness, as S&P do for most
Russian local and regional governments (LRGs), mainly due to the
lack of reliable long-term financial planning. At the same time,
S&P thinks the oblast compares well with its peers in terms of
debt and liquidity management, as well as transparency and
disclosure.
LIQUIDITY
S&P regards Sverdlovsk Oblast's liquidity position as "positive"
according to its criteria. S&P's base-case scenario assumes that
free cash in the oblast's account will exceed annual debt service
in the medium term.
The oblast's cash reserves will likely reduce following the
expected moderate weakening of budgetary performance in 2013-
2015. However, cash levels are likely to stay relatively strong,
at on average RUB9 billion-RUB10 billion, which should exceed
payments on debt interest and principal.
Based on Sverdlovsk Oblast's established track record, S&P's
base-case scenario factors in a smooth debt repayment profile in
the medium term, which would translate into average debt service
of a modest 5% of operating revenues. The oblast's debt burden
will mostly consist of direct obligations, including medium-term
bonds and bank loans.
Nevertheless, because the Russian capital market is volatile, S&P
adjusts its assessment of Sverdlovsk Oblast's liquidity position
by its opinion of its "limited" access to external liquidity, as
S&P do with all other Russian LRGs. The weaknesses of the
domestic banking sector are reflected in S&P's Banking Industry
Country Risk Assessment score for Russia of '7', with '1' being
the lowest risk and '10' being the highest.
OUTLOOK
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that the cautious spending
policies of Sverdlovsk Oblast's management and the region's
likely economic recovery after 2013 will counterbalance volatile
and weaker corporate profit tax revenues and significant spending
needs. S&P thinks this will translate into a "strong" liquidity
position and a modest debt burden.
Positive rating actions would hinge on Sverdlovsk Oblast's
ability to improve its medium-term financial planning and
institutionalize reserve and liquidity policies, which would
offset revenue volatility risks and cover future debt service.
Sverdlovsk Oblast's ability to maintain budgetary performance
levels achieved in 2010-2012, thanks either to stronger revenues
on the back on economic growth or tight spending controls, could
also lead to positive actions.
Negative rating actions would result if the oblast's management
team failed to absorb existing expenditure pressure, in
particular related to salary hikes and 2018 World Cup-related
investments, leading to a significant increase in operating and
capital spending in 2013-2014 and thereafter. In this case, the
oblast's budgetary performance would structurally deteriorate in
line with S&P's downside scenario, resulting in tax-supported
debt greater than 30% of operating revenues.
In accordance with S&P's relevant policies and procedures, the
Rating Committee was composed of analysts that are qualified to
vote in the committee, with sufficient experience to convey the
appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of the
methodology applicable. At the onset of the committee, the chair
confirmed that the information provided to the Rating Committee
by the primary analyst had been distributed in a timely manner
and was sufficient for Committee members to make an informed
decision.
After the primary analyst gave opening remarks and explained the
recommendation, the Committee discussed key rating factors and
critical issues in accordance with the relevant criteria.
Qualitative and quantitative risk factors were considered and
discussed, looking at track-record and forecasts. The chair
ensured every voting member was given the opportunity to
articulate his/her opinion. The chair or designee reviewed the
draft report to ensure consistency with the Committee decision.
The views and the decision of the rating committee are summarized
in the above rationale and outlook.
RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed
Sverdlovsk Oblast
Issuer Credit Rating BB+/Stable/--
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
AEI CABLES: Creditors Approve Debt Rate Changes Under CVA
---------------------------------------------------------
Robert Gibson at Journal Live reports that the future of AEI
Cables has been secured after its creditors accepted changes to
the rate at which it pays off its debts.
In 2011, AEI Cables, which employs over 200 people at its factory
at Birtley could have faced administration and has since been
kept afloat through a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA),
Journal Live notes.
However, tough trading conditions meant the 84-year-old firm had
to ask creditors to approve a more a manageable arrangement,
Journal Live discloses.
At a meeting on Aug. 28, each of the resolutions the firm put
forward was approved in a vote by an excess of around 80%,
Journal Live relates.
Under the CVA, the company had been allowed to trade under the
control of the directors, while handing over 65% of its net
profits to the joint supervisors Peter Kubik and Michael Kiely of
UHY Hacker Young accountants, over a five-year period, Journal
Live discloses.
It was originally estimated this would equate to GBP30,000 per
month, but the agreement would only be completed when all
unsecured non-preferential creditors had received a minimum
dividend of 30p in the pound, Journal Live states.
Mr. Kubik explained these conditions had been result of
modifications made by the company's largest creditor, The Inland
Revenue, and had gradually become unsustainable, Journal Live
relates.
According to Journal Live, a recent report from Hacker Young said
AEI reported a loss of GBP377,000 for the year ended March 31,
2012, while turnover dropped from GBP54.7 million to GBP28.8
million.
During the period, the business "experienced further aggressive
competitive pressure, particularly in the house wiring cables
market" while margins were hit by "a combination of low priced
imported cables and volatile copper prices", Journal Live
discloses.
In the year ending March 31, 2013, then, AEI reported a loss of
GBP2.4 million, Journal Live says. Turnover, meanwhile, dropped
from GBP28.8 million to GBP23.9 million, Journal Live notes.
AEI also predicted it would have a negative cashflow balance of
over GBP9.2 million by June 2014, with the projected loss for the
year June 2013 to June 2014 being GBP629,000, Journal Live
relates.
The creditors agreed to scrap the divided and profit percentage
requirements, accepting instead a GBP10,000-per-month
contribution for the remaining three years of the CVA, Journal
Live states.
Mr. Kubik, who will be continuing to review AEI's financial
position regularly, said the agreement was based on the company's
current financial projections and would not require a new
strategy, Journal Live notes.
AEI Cables is a North East cable manufacturer. It employs over
200 people at its factory at Birtley. The business, which was
established in 1929, currently provides cabling for numerous
industries, including construction, defense, mining, oil, gas,
fire protection and rail.
BRISTOL FOUNDATION: In Administration, Local Authority to Step In
-----------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that a housing charity in Bristol has gone into
administration prompting the local authority to step in.
Bristol Foundation Housing specializes in "exempt accommodation"
where tenants receive extra support, making them exempt from
normal limits on housing benefit, according to BBC News.
The charity provides accommodation for 149 tenants in the city.
BBC News notes that Bristol City Council will provide assistance
to tenants following the decision to call in administrators.
"We have met with the administrators and have continued to make
appropriate payments of housing benefit . . . . This allows the
organisation to operate while we work with them to resolve the
situation and, if necessary in the longer term, find alternative
accommodation for tenants. . . . Our number one concern will be
safeguarding vulnerable tenants and we will always work to
prevent homelessness and protect those in need," the report
quoted the authority Angie Ridgwell as saying.
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: May Face Investor Rebellion Following Loss
-------------------------------------------------------------
Harry Wilson at The Telegraph reports that senior fund managers
have warned the Co-operative Bank that it risks a full-scale
investor rebellion if it does not begin engaging with its
bondholders ahead of the launch of a controversial GBP1.5 billion
emergency recapitalization of its banking arm.
According to The Telegraph, major hedge funds with holdings in
bonds issued by the Co-op Bank have told the mutual it is in
"cloud cuckoo land" after refusing to hold talks with investors
following the release of half-year results that revealed a loss
at the lender of GBP559 million.
In a letter to the senior officials at the bank, one fund wrote
that its actions were not appropriate for an institution that was
in such a parlous state, The Telegraph relates.
Bondholders are being told they must take haircuts on the value
of their investments to help raise GBP500 million of the capital
the Co-op Bank must raise by the end of the year to avoid going
out of business, The Telegraph discloses.
However, despite disclosing a further GBP496 million write down
on the value of its loan portfolios last week the bank has
insisted investors will have to wait until the end of October to
see the details of the so-called "exchange offer", The Telegraph
notes.
According to The Telegraph, in particular, funds and City
analysts have become concerned in the wake of last week's results
at the performance of the Co-op Bank's "core" operations, which
comprise its "good bank".
The Telegraph relates that sources close to the Co-op have argued
the mutual does not want to begin talks on the offer until it has
finalized the details. They also point out that they are
redefining the "good" and "bad" parts of the bank in readiness
for producing the exchange offer prospectus, which will be in
effect a business plan for the Co-op Bank, according to The
Telegraph.
Sources said that the offer would reveal the many good aspects of
the bank, which wants to become focused on younger customers as
well as small business lending, The Telegraph notes.
They also warned that if bondholders insisted on increasing their
stake in the newly listed bank so that Co-op Group was no longer
a majority owner, the Co-op Bank name would come under threat,
The Telegraph discloses.
Under the offer, bondholders are expected to receive new shares
in the Co-op Bank, which will be listed on the London market, The
Telegraph says. The Co-op Group has said it will not allow
itself to be a minority investor, The Telegraph recounts.
The Co-op Bank core business reported a surprise loss of GBP102
million last week after writing down the value of its loan
portfolios by GBP166 million, The Telegraph recounts.
The bank also admitted that even with a GBP1 billion capital
injection it will now no longer meet the UK regulator's 3pc
leverage ratio requirement by the end of the year, adding that it
would also miss its own 9% core capital target as well, The
Telegraph relates.
If the exchange offer is successful, the Co-op has pledged to
inject a further GBP500 million into the bank next year using the
proceeds of the sale of parts of its insurance business, The
Telegraph states.
Euan Sutherland, the chief executive of Co-op Group, which wholly
owns Co-op Bank at present, said that there was "no plan B" and
the bail-out would have to go ahead or the bank would be forced
into resolution, The Telegraph relates.
That could mean bondholders losing the value of all their
investments, The Telegraph notes.
Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872. The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment. It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.
Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.
* * *
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior
debt ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from
A3/Prime 2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1. The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Capital Raising Plan Remains Key Rating Driver
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that Co-operative Bank plc's (Co-op, BB-
/Rating Watch Evolving (RWE)) GBP1.5 billion capital raising plan
remains the key rating driver. Around GBP1 billion of capital is
to be raised in Q413 by way of an exchange offer for junior debt,
with another GBP500 million to be injected by the bank's parent
(The Co-operative Group) in 2014, conditional upon a successful
execution of the exchange offer. Fitch expects to resolve the RWE
on completion of the exchange offer.
The substantial losses announced by the bank for H113 were
primarily driven by loan impairment charges relating to legacy
commercial real estate loans. These charges reduced the bank's
core Tier 1 ratio to 4.9% (FY12: 8.8%) and fully loaded Basel III
Common Equity Tier 1 ratio to 3.2% at H113. Separately, the UK
Prudential Regulation Authority announced today that the Co-op's
results do not affect its assessment that the bank has a capital
shortfall of GBP1.5 billion relative to its end-2013 7% core
equity capital (after adjustments) requirement for major UK
banks.
Given the Co-op's strategic shift, it has accelerated plans to
separate the business into core and non-core divisions and the
amount of assets designated as non-core increased in the six
months to H113, with valuation adjustments made accordingly. Co-
operative Asset Management will manage the effective wind down of
assets in the non-core book.
The recent results clearly demonstrate the poor asset quality of
the legacy assets, which will continue to report losses for
several years. They also highlight challenges for management in
the longer term to return its core business to sustainable
profitability. This will be dependent on effective cost-reduction
programs, improving operating margins and a credible long-term
management strategy.
CSDM FUNDRAISING: Goes Into Administration
------------------------------------------
David Ainsworth at Third Sector News reports that CSDM
Fundraising went into administration on June 28. The
administration was confirmed by Justin Brown, administrators MB
Insolvency. The entity was set up by Chris Stoddard after the
closure in 2010 of his previous company.
Mr. Stoddard, Third Sector News notes, said a new company, CS
Fundraising, would take on all the "clients, contracts and
obligations" of CSDM Fundraising. All staff will continue to be
employed, he said.
The report relates that Mr. Stoddard blamed his decision to go
into administration on the actions of an unnamed third-party
subcontractor that "failed to meet its obligations."
"The losses from this event are still being assessed but are
estimated at some GBP300,000 . . . . It is not possible to
comment further on this as the matter is subject to legal
proceedings," the report quoted Mr. Stoddard as saying.
Mr. Stoddard said that "relatively few creditors" remained on
CSDM Fundraising's purchase ledger, the report relates.
Mr. Stoddard set up CSDM Fundraising after the closure of his
previous company, CSDM, in June 2010, the report notes. CSDM
owed GBP1.4 million to creditors and is now in liquidation, the
report discloses.
Mr. Stoddard said that CSDM had also been shut down because of
the actions of a third-party subcontractor, in this case a
mailing company that did not deliver CSDM's letters, the report
says.
Creditors have previously told Third Sector they expect to
receive little of the money owed, the report relays.
CSDM Fundraising was set up in June 2010 and initially employed
the same staff as CSDM. Like Mr. Stoddard's previous companies,
it lists its address as an industrial unit in Ross-on-Wye,
Herefordshire. It was previously known as CSDM Fundraising
Directors.
The total debts of CSDM Fundraising are not known.
The report says that the firm's most recent accounts, made up to
December 2011 and filed with Companies House, show that it owed
GBP338,000. The same accounts show that the firm made a profit
of GBP92,000 in the year, the report adds.
EUROHOME UK 2007-1: S&P Affirms 'B-' Ratings on Two Note Classes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-1 PLC and Eurohome UK
Mortgages 2007-2 PLC.
Specifically, S&P has:
-- Lowered to 'A (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative its ratings on Eurohome UK Mortgages
2007-1's class A notes and Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-2's
class A2 notes;
-- Affirmed its ratings on Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-1's
class M1, M2, B1, B2, and C notes; and
-- Affirmed its ratings on Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-2's
class A1A, A1B, A3, M1, M2, B1, B2, and C notes.
The rating actions follows S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent information that it has received for these
transactions (June 2013). S&P's analysis reflects the
application of its U.K. residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) criteria and its current counterparty criteria.
On July 2, 2013, S&P lowered its long-term issuer credit rating
(ICR) on Deutsche Bank AG to 'A' from 'A+'.
The liquidity facility agreement held with Deutsche Bank does not
comply with S&P's current counterparty criteria. Therefore,
without the benefit of the liquidity facility, S&P's current
counterparty criteria cap the maximum achievable ratings in both
transactions at 'A (sf)'--i.e., at S&P's long-term 'A' ICR on
Deutsche Bank. Consequently, on July 26, 2013, S&P placed on
CreditWatch negative its ratings on Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-
1's class A notes and Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-2's class A2
notes. S&P's analysis without the benefit of the liquidity
facility indicates that a direct rating link is still
appropriate.
As cumulative losses in both transactions have breached the
documented trigger of 1.25%, the transactions continue to pay
principal sequentially and will continue to do so for the
remainder of their lives.
EUROHOME UK MORTGAGES 2007-1
Reported total delinquencies remain lower than S&P's U.K.
nonconforming RMBS index and have declined marginally to 17.73%
from 19.79% since S&P's June 1, 2012 review. However, loan-level
data show that arrears have previously been capitalized. Where
this is the case, S&P believes that the probability of default is
higher than for loans not in arrears.
S&P considered 18.76% of the loans to be in arrears. However,
because this is lower than the total arrears reported in S&P's
previous review, its weighted-average foreclosure frequency
(WAFF) assumptions have decreased. S&P's weighted-average loss
severity (WALS) assumptions have also slightly decreased.
Rating WAFF WALS
level (%) (%)
AAA 62.13 49.10
AA 48.67 44.78
A 40.32 36.64
BBB 31.90 31.83
BB 23.18 28.28
B 20.26 24.89
Cumulative losses have been increasing since September 2012 and
remain high (4.80% in June 2013). The excess spread after
considering the post-swap yield (available interest funds after
payments to and receipts from the swap counterparty) was
insufficient to account for these losses. As a result, the
reserve fund was drawn for two quarters, in December 2012 and
March 2013. The reserve fund began increasing in June 2013, and
is currently funded to 88% of the documented required amount. As
a result, the available credit enhancement for the class B1 and
B2 notes has decreased since March 2012. Since the transaction
is paying principal sequentially, the improved subordination
levels for the class A, M1, and M2 notes has offset the decreased
credit enhancement from the reserve fund. Consequently,
available credit enhancement for the class A, M1, and M2 notes
has increased since March 2012.
Although arrears have dropped marginally and the available credit
enhancement for the class A, M1, and M2 notes has increased since
S&P's June 2012 review, cumulative losses have been increasing
and the reserve fund remains below its documented target amount.
Given these factors and based on the results of S&P's cash flow
analysis, it has affirmed its ratings on the class M1 and M2
notes.
S&P's current counterparty criteria cap the maximum achievable
rating on the class A notes at our long-term ICR on Deutsche
Bank, as these notes do not pass its cash flow stresses at a
higher rating level without the benefit of the liquidity
facility. Therefore, S&P has lowered to 'A (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)'
and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on the class A
notes.
Despite the decreased available credit enhancement for the class
B1 and B2 notes, S&P believes that it is commensurate with their
current rating levels. Excess spread repays the class C notes'
principal and the notes are currently paying interest. However,
the class C notes have not paid down principal since December
2012, as the reserve fund is not at the required amount. S&P
expects the reserve fund to build up within the next three
quarterly payment dates, if the transaction's performance does
not deteriorate meaningfully, and therefore expect the class C
notes to start redeeming principal payments from March 2014.
Further, the interest coverage on the class B1, B2, and C notes
is still sufficient; we do not expect these notes to suffer
interest shortfalls in the next 12 to 18 months. Therefore, S&P
has affirmed its ratings on the class B1, B2, and C notes.
EUROHOME UK MORTGAGES 2007-2
Reported total delinquencies remain higher than S&P's U.K.
nonconforming RMBS index and have increased to 31.47% from 30.46%
since S&P's June 1, 2012 review. However, loan-level data show
that arrears have previously been capitalized. Where this is the
case, S&P believes that the probability of default is higher than
for loans that are not in arrears. S&P therefore considered
32.26% of the loans to be in arrears.
All of the loans in the pool are seasoned for more than 60
months. Despite the higher level of arrears, the seasoning credit
that S&P applied to the loans has decreased its WAFF assumptions,
compared with its June 2012 review. S&P's WALS assumptions have
also slightly decreased.
Rating WAFF WALS
level (%) (%)
AAA 69.63 49.64
AA 58.97 45.49
A 50.49 37.61
BBB 41.98 33.02
BB 33.55 29.67
B 30.17 26.47
The transaction has been generating excess spread due to higher
margins on the loans compared with Eurohome U.K. Mortgages
2007-1. Therefore, the post-swap yield has remained high and
sufficient to account for the increasing cumulative losses,
currently 6.29%. As a result, the reserve fund--which was not at
the required documented amount at our previous review--was at its
required amount on the September 2012 interest payment date
(IPD).
As the transaction is paying principal sequentially, and given
that the reserve fund has increased to its required amount, the
available credit enhancement has increased for all classes of
notes.
S&P's current counterparty criteria cap the maximum achievable
rating in the transaction at 'A (sf)'--its long-term ICR on
Deutsche Bank. Nonetheless, due to the high available credit
enhancement in the structure, the class A1 notes are able to
withstand 'AAA' stresses, even without the benefit of the
liquidity facility. Moreover, taking into consideration the
principal payments on the class A1 notes over the past year, S&P
expects them to be redeemed on the next IPD. Therefore, S&P has
affirmed its 'AAA (sf)' ratings on the class A1A and A1B notes.
However, the class A2 notes do not pass the cash flow stresses
that S&P applied at their current rating level without giving
benefit to the liquidity facility. Therefore, S&P has lowered to
'A (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its
rating on the class A2 notes.
Although the available credit enhancement has increased for all
classes of notes, arrears and cumulative losses have been rising.
In view of this and based on the results of S&P's cash flow
analysis, it has affirmed its ratings on the class A3, M1, and M2
notes.
The increased available credit enhancement for the class B1 and
B2 notes is marginal at their current rating levels, compared
with the amount for the senior and mezzanine notes, but continues
to be sufficient.
The class C notes benefit from the excess spread and are
currently receiving both interest and principal. Nonetheless,
since the class C notes do not benefit from any credit
enhancement, any deterioration in the transaction's performance
will immediately defer the payment of principal to this class.
The interest coverage on the class B1, B2, and C notes is still
sufficient; as such, S&P do not expect these notes to suffer
interest shortfalls in the next 12 to 18 months. Given these
factors and based on the results of S&P's cash flow analysis, it
has affirmed its ratings on these classes of notes.
Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-1 and 2007-2 securitize U.K.
residential mortgages by Deutsche Bank's U.K. mortgage
origination arm, DB mortgages. The transactions closed in 2007.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating
To From
Eurohome U.K. Mortgages 2007-1 PLC
GBP354.725 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Plus An
Over-Issuance Of
Excess Spread Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Rating Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative
A A (sf) A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
M1 BBB+ (sf)
M2 BB (sf)
B1 B (sf)
B2 B- (sf)
C B- (sf)
Eurohome UK Mortgages 2007-2 PLC
EUR70 Million, GBP460.5 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate
Notes
Rating Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative
A2 A (sf) A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Ratings Affirmed
A1A AAA (sf)
A1B AAA (sf)
A3 BBB+ (sf)
M1 BBB (sf)
M2 BB (sf)
B1 B (sf)
B2 B- (sf)
C B- (sf)
FAB UK 2004-1: Fitch Lowers Rating on Class A-3E Notes to 'CC'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed six classes of FAB UK 2004-1 Limited's
notes and downgraded one, as follows:
Class A-1E Notes (ISIN: XS0187962104): affirmed at 'BBsf';
Outlook Negative
Class A-1F Notes (ISIN: XS0187962369): affirmed at 'BBsf';
Outlook Negative
Class A-2E Notes (ISIN: XS0187962799): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
Negative
Class A-3E Notes (ISIN: XS0187962872): downgraded to 'CCsf' from
'CCCsf'
Class A-3F Notes (ISIN: XS0187963094): affirmed at 'CCsf'
Class S1 Combination Notes (ISIN: XS0187963334): affirmed at
'BBsf'; Outlook Negative
Class S2 Combination Notes (ISIN: XS0187963508): affirmed at
'CCsf'
Key Rating Drivers
The affirmations reflect the notes' levels of credit enhancement
relative to the portfolio's credit quality. The portfolio's
credit quality has improved since the previous review in October
2012, with assets rated 'B-sf' or below representing 14.3% of the
performing portfolio, down from 17.3%. The asset performance has
remained stable as cumulative defaults have increased to EUR21.1
million from EUR20.9 million at the previous review. The
structure is deleveraging sequentially with the class A-1E and A-
1F notes (ranked pari passu) having a note factor of 59.0%
compared with 65.0% at the previous review. As a result, credit
enhancement for the rated notes has increased.
The class A-3E and A-3F notes rank pari passu for interest and
principal distributions and should therefore have the same
rating. Fitch has corrected the rating of class A-3 E notes to
'CCsf', in line with the class A-3F notes' rating. The agency
believes the credit enhancement level for the class A-3 notes
(6.7%) is commensurate with the 'CCsf' rating level. Furthermore,
the 'CCsf' rating also reflects the failure of the class A
interest coverage test, which results in principal proceeds being
used to pay interest on the class A notes.
All over-collateralization (OC) tests as of the July 2013
investor report are out of compliance and as a result the unrated
class BE and C notes are deferring interest. The transaction is
out of its re-investment period and the transaction documents do
not allow the manager to re-invest unscheduled principal proceeds
post re-investment.
The underlying assets have yielded limited principal paydowns
over the past year. The class A-1 notes received a combined
principal paydown of GBP9.43 million since the previous review.
If the asset paydowns follow a similar trend to that of the past
12 months, the deleveraging of the class A-1 notes is likely to
extend beyond ten years from now (assuming asset performance
remains stable)
Fitch believes that a material risk for the transaction is that
the portfolio assets' maturity may extend beyond their reported
weighted-average expected life. The Negative Outlooks on the
rated notes notes reflect the extension risk of the portfolio
assets, which may prolong the risk horizon of the portfolio.
The two largest industry sectors in the portfolio are RMBS with
70.0% of the portfolio and CMBS with 18.0%. All the assets are
concentrated in the UK.
The class S1 combination notes' rating reflect the ratings of its
component classes i.e. the EUR7.5 million class A-1F notes and
EUR2.5 million class C notes, total distributions to date (which
count towards reducing the rated balances) and future
distributions expected on each of the component classes.
The class S2 combination notes' rating reflect the ratings of its
component classes i.e. EUR4.7 million class A-3F notes and EUR2.3
million class C notes, total distributions to date (which count
towards reducing the rated balances) and future distributions
expected on each of the component classes.
Rating Sensitivities
Applying a 1.25x default rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of one rating category for
the rated notes from the current rating levels.
Applying a 0.75x recovery rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of one to two notches for
the rated notes from the current rating levels.
LONDON & REGIONAL: Moody's Reviews B3-Rated Notes for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade the Class A, Class B and Class C Notes (the "Notes")
issued by London & Regional Debt Securitization No. 2 plc (the
"Issuer") (amounts reflecting the initial outstanding amount):
GBP190M A Notes, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Oct 5, 2012 Downgraded to A2 (sf)
GBP16M B Notes, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Oct 5, 2012 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)
GBP50M C Notes, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade; previously on Oct 5, 2012 Downgraded to B3 (sf)
Ratings Rationale:
The rating action is driven by (i) the current limited visibility
with respect to the debt restructuring proposal made by the
Borrower to the bondholders and the junior lender in light of the
upcoming loan maturity in October 2013, (ii) the lack of clarity
about the trigger to switch the pro-rata application of payments
amongst the three Classes of Notes to sequential following a loan
default, and (iii) the further capital value decline since last
review, which translates into a U/W loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of
140% for the whole loan at the maturity date.
The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties
securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a
loss expectation for the securitized pool.
In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. There may
be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline
in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels
due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realized losses.
Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) lending
will remain constrained over the next years, while subject to
strict underwriting criteria and heavily dependent on the
underlying property quality, (ii) strong differentiation between
prime and secondary properties, with further value declines
expected for non-prime properties, and (iii) occupational markets
will remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly
recover in the medium term in line with anticipated economic
recovery. Overall, Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
for the world's largest economies is for only a gradual
strengthening in growth over the coming two years. Fiscal
consolidation and volatility in financial markets will continue
to weigh on business and consumer confidence, while heightened
uncertainty hampers spending, hiring and investment decisions. In
2013, Moody's expects no growth in the Euro area and only slow
growth in the UK.
Moody's Portfolio Analysis
London & Regional Debt Securitization No. 2 plc closed in July
2006 and represents the securitization of one commercial mortgage
loan advanced to a borrower which is part of the London &
Regional Group. The securitized loan is the senior portion of a
senior/ junior loan structure, of which the outstanding junior
balance is approximately GBP104.4 million. The loan is currently
secured by a portfolio of 24 properties located throughout the
UK. The portfolio exhibits average concentration in terms of
property type with 38% of the portfolio (by underwriter's market
value) secured by hotel properties, 31% by leisure (mainly
nightclubs and casino) properties, 22% by office and the
remaining 9% by retail/mixed-use properties. Eighty-one percent
of the portfolio is located in the Greater London area.
Moody's will conclude its review of the Notes once it has (i)
more clarity on the impact of a potential work-out scenario of
this large single borrower transaction considering the absence of
a third-party servicer in the structure and (ii) an updated view
on the current and future performance of the underlying property
portfolio.
Rating Methodology
The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio
Analysis (MoRE Portfolio) published in April 2006.
Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2013 Central Scenarios published in February 2013.
The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior assessment is summarized in a press
release dated October 2012. The last Performance Overview for
this transaction was published on May 2013.
In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
ABSROM to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for each
tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying
portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated
in MoRE Portfolio is then used in ABSROM, where for each loss
scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated taking into account the structural features
of the notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.
Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.
PUNCH TAVERNS: S&P Lowers Ratings on Three Note Classes to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
the class A1(R), A2(R), M1, and M2N notes issued by U.K. Pub
Securitization Punch Taverns Finance PLC (Punch A). At the same
time, S&P affirmed its ratings on the class B1, B2, B3, C(R), and
D1 notes. The outlook remains negative.
The downgrades of the class A and M notes follows S&P's downward
revision of Punch A's business risk profile to "weak" from
"fair." In the past, S&P has observed that Punch A's operational
performance has been stronger than that of related entity Punch
Taverns Finance B Ltd. (Punch B), likely because of a higher
proportion of core versus non-core pubs in Punch A's portfolio.
However, S&P's downward revision equalizes our assessment of
Punch A's business risk profile with that on Punch B.
The downward revision of Punch A's business risk profile reflects
S&P's view that the cash flow generation capabilities of the
securitized estate have weakened. This is because Punch A is
facing industry challenges, and largely depends on the timely
disposal of its non-core pubs, as well as operational
improvements, to stabilize its earnings. S&P believes that the
disposals are likely to weaken not only the cash flow generating
capabilities of the securitized portfolio, but also Punch A's
competitive position in the tenanted pub industry. This could
result in Punch A losing its economies of scale and its
eligibility for material discounts from suppliers, thereby
further affecting profitability. In 2017, S&P understands that
Punch A's portfolio will likely be half as big as it was 2007,
and a similar size to the portfolios of other industry players.
Punch A is facing declining demand for its core product, on-trade
beer, a situation that is exacerbated by weak consumer
discretionary spending. The company's ability to adjust its
tenants' offering to changing consumer tastes is constrained by
the inefficiencies and limitations of its tenancy contracts, and
by underinvestment in its pub portfolio. In addition, it remains
uncertain how potential regulatory changes could affect the
profitability of pub companies operating under a beer tie (a
contractual obligation for pubs to buy beer only from the pub
property owners, in exchange for the leasehold of the pubs).
In the 12 months to May 25, 2013, Punch A's total EBITDA
excluding parental help declined by 6.6% to GBP138 million year
on year. However, Punch A reported growth in EBITDA per pub of
2.6% to GBP54,800, thanks to the disposal in the 12-month period
of 215 pubs, representing 7.8% of the total portfolio. In the 12
months to Aug. 31, 2013, S&P forecasts that EBITDA per pub will
increase to about GBP55,000 -- subject to the disposal of a
further 45 pubs in the quarter ending Aug. 31, 2013 -- but total
EBITDA will decline further to GBP136 million, a 6.2% decline
year on year. S&P anticipates that EBITDA generation will only
stabilize once the company disposes of about 600 additional pubs,
which it plans to achieve by 2017.
However, Punch A is currently seeking to restructure the
securitization and S&P understands that negotiations with the
various stakeholders are ongoing. In S&P's view, while the
proposed debt restructuring may not have a direct bearing on
Punch A's trading and operations, it could weaken Punch A's
ability to dispose of pubs within the above timeframe.
"We consider that the free operating cash flow generated by Punch
A's estate remains insufficient to cover debt service on the
class B, C, and D notes. However, the parent company is
currently supporting the securitization to prevent a breach of
the default covenant. Therefore the current rating on the class
B, C, and D notes reflects our view that absent a restructuring,
these classes of notes are vulnerable to a default.
Consequently, our revised view of Punch A's medium- to long-term
cash flow generation capabilities only marginally affects our
analysis on the class B, C, and D notes. For this reason, we are
affirming our ratings on these classes of notes," S&P said.
"In our opinion, Punch A's free operating cash flows are barely
sufficient to service the class M notes. We therefore believe it
is questionable that the class M notes will be repaid in a timely
manner, either when the amortization profile steps up or under
stress scenarios. We believe that the likelihood of the class M
notes being serviced in a timely fashion in receivership depends
on factors such as the core estate's trading performance and
disposal proceeds from the sale of pubs. Our forecast of lower
cash flows in future reinforces our opinion that the class M
notes could default, albeit later than the class B, C, and D
notes. We are therefore downgrading the class M notes to 'B
(sf)' from 'B+ (sf)'," S&P added.
On the other hand, S&P views more positively the likelihood that
Punch A will make interest and scheduled amortization payments on
the class A notes in a timely manner using operating cash flows.
This is despite the historic underperformance of the estate, and
the need for parent support. The securitization's relatively low
leverage, the current stand-alone debt service coverage ratio
(DSCR) of 1.17x, and the position of the class A notes in the
payment waterfall all indicate that the cash flow generated by
the estate can support debt service on the class A notes.
As a result, S&P analyzes the class A notes over a longer time
horizon and place more weight on the notes' ability to withstand
its medium- to long-term cash flow stresses. This assumes that
the administrative receiver is in place and takes account of the
potential cash flow burden that could arise in a reorganization,
for example due to the renegotiation of supply contracts and
insolvency costs.
"Our revision of Punch A's business risk profile to "weak" means
that the class A notes have to withstand more severe cash flow
stresses than under the previous classification of "fair." Our
analysis indicates that at a rating higher than 'BBB', the
additional cash flow stresses, in conjunction with the potential
effect on cash flow of insolvency proceedings, would prevent the
class A notes being paid in a timely fashion. We are therefore
downgrading the class A notes to 'BBB (sf)' from 'A- (sf)'," S&P
noted.
The negative outlook reflects the borrower's public
acknowledgement that continued parent support is unsustainable in
the long term. S&P also anticipates that in the course of the
proposed restructuring, certain classes of noteholders could be
offered terms that S&P would consider as constituting a
distressed exchange under S&P's criteria, leading to them
receiving less value than they were originally promised.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating Rating
To From
Punch Taverns Finance PLC
GBP2.65 Billion Asset-Backed Fixed- And Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Lowered; Outlook Negative
A1(R) BBB(sf)/Negative A-(sf)/Negative
A2(R) BBB(sf)/Negative A-(sf)/Negative
A2(R) (SPUR) BBB(sf)/Negative A-(sf)/Negative
M1 B(sf)/Negative B+(sf)/Negative
M2N B(sf)/Negative B+(sf)/Negative
M2N (SPUR) B(sf)/Negative B+(sf)/Negative
Ratings Affirmed; Outlook Negative
B1 CCC(sf)/Negative CCC(sf)/Negative
B2 CCC(sf)/Negative CCC(sf)/Negative
B3 CCC(sf)/Negative CCC(sf)/Negative
B3 (SPUR) CCC (sf)/Negative CCC(sf)/Negative
C(R) CCC (sf)/Negative CCC(sf)/Negative
D1 CCC (sf)/Negative CCC(sf)/Negative
* UK: Half of Street Chains at "Serious Risk of Failure"
--------------------------------------------------------
James Hall and Graham Ruddick at The Telegraph report that a
major report on the future of British retailing will claim this
week half of all high street chains in Britain are at "serious
risk of failure".
According to The Telegraph, Bill Grimsey, the former chief
executive of Wickes and Iceland, will release the report on
Wednesday and say that Britain's high streets are in a "deep
decline" and there is an "arms race for new ideas". However he
says that there is a "frustrating sense of policy being conducted
in the margins", The Telegraph notes.
Mr. Grimsey will say that previous initiatives such as
Mary Portas's government-backed review into the high street were
too "nostalgic" and failed to grasp the extent to which the
internet has changed shopping patterns, The Telegraph discloses.
Mr. Grimsey will warn that small retail chains across Britain are
"horribly stressed financially", The Telegraph notes.
According to The Telegraph, the report will say that 47% of the
country's retail companies -- over 20,000 businesses -- are in
financial difficulty, based on detailed financial analysis of
their accounts.
Around a quarter of these are likely to fail within the next
three years, according to an analysis by Company Watch, The
Telegraph states. Meanwhile, 16,000 supply chain companies --
which feed the retailers -- are also at risk, The Telegraph says.
Mr. Grimsey plans to meet ministers following the release of the
self-funded review, The Telegraph discloses. It contains 31
recommendations, including six fully costed suggestions for
reforming punitive business rates on shops, The Telegraph notes.
For example, it suggests that retailers who open in shops that
have been vacant for a year should receive 50% rate relief for
two years, The Telegraph says.
It also suggests that councils use their capital reserves to help
fund small businesses, The Telegraph states.
More than 11% of shops in Britain, or 40,000 units, currently
stand empty, The Telegraph discloses.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* Moody's: Auto Parts Suppliers' Earnings to Stabilize in 2013
--------------------------------------------------------------
Most European auto parts suppliers will maintain their current
ratings, as long as markets outside Europe continue to grow and
offset the falling demand in Europe says Moody's in its latest
special comment on the European automotive parts suppliers sector
titled "European Automotive Parts Suppliers: First-Half Results
Suggest Earnings Will Stabilize in 2013."
"New product development and a bigger presence in faster-growing
markets will continue to offset declines in European markets.
European auto parts suppliers' revenues were generally higher in
the first half of 2013 compared with a year earlier," says Oliver
Giani, a Vice President - Senior Analyst in Moody's Corporate
Finance Group and author of the report. "Suppliers that were able
to grow their business in North America and China in particular,
such as Valeo S.A. (Baa3 stable) and Faurecia SA (B1 stable),
will continue to achieve above-average revenue growth."
Despite modest revenue growth in the first half, most Europe-
based suppliers' operating profit fell compared with 2012. This
was mainly the result of the continued decline of European
automotive production, higher restructuring charges and an
expanded R&D programs. Autoliv ASP Inc. (Prime-2 stable) was an
exception, reporting an increase in operating profit, as the
company accelerated aligning capacity and demand by moving
production to lower-cost countries and incurred much higher
restructuring costs last year.
Moody's expects that free cash flow will remain constrained.
Despite slightly stronger operating cash flow in H1 for some
suppliers, especially Faurecia and Michelin, which were helped by
improved working capital, Moody's expects that most European
suppliers' free cash flow will remain inhibited during the next
12 to 18 months, as investments in innovation and geographic
expansion remain high, which will drive future growth and enable
auto suppliers to follow their OEM customers' geographic
expansion programs.
Most European auto parts suppliers have confirmed their guidance
for organic sales growth between 0%-4% for full-year 2013. They
are also expecting improving profitability in the second half,
leading to stable or slightly higher operating profit compared
with last year. This is in line with Moody's expectation that the
deterioration of market conditions in Europe will ease in the
second half, whereas Moody's market outlook for North America and
China remains positive. Moody's expects that most European auto
parts suppliers will maintain their current ratings, as long as
markets outside Europe continue to grow and offset the falling
demand in Europe. Moody's forecasts 5% growth of production
volumes in North America and 10% in China in 2013.
* Fitch: Global Reinsurance Outlook Still Stable, Pricing to Fall
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings' outlook for global reinsurance sector ratings
remains stable, with the agency expecting to affirm the majority
of its current reinsurance ratings in 2014. Supporting factors
include capital strength and continued profitability. In the
absence of a major catastrophe, a persistent, low-yielding
investment environment and softening (falling) prices are the key
factors that could lead to a deterioration of the sector's credit
profile.
"The investment environment is likely to provide the greatest
challenge to the reinsurance sector in 2014," says Martyn Street,
co-head of Reinsurance at Fitch. "We expect continued low
interest rates, which will make it more challenging for
reinsurers to achieve similar 2014 profitability to that forecast
for 2013."
Fitch expects broader softening of prices at the key 1 January
2014 renewal and beyond, assuming no significant loss events take
place, due to surplus underwriting capacity. While premium growth
is likely to continue into 2014, in the absence of a major loss
event, prices are expected to fall.
"There is likely to be a disparity in overall pricing movements,
but soft market conditions are likely to broaden to more product
classes," says Brian Schneider, co-head of Reinsurance at Fitch.
"While Fitch expects prices to remain adequate across major
classes, underwriting discipline will be tested. We also expect
continued competition between traditional and alternative
reinsurance."
Fitch expects reserves to develop favorably overall, but the
level of surplus is expected to decline somewhat, adding pressure
to run-rate profitability.
In order to trigger a sector outlook revision from stable to
negative, a single loss event of USD60bn, coupled with a sudden
spike in interest rates of 300bp or more and an inability for
reinsurers to replenish lost capital would be necessary. This
would likely result in negative rating actions. Fitch considers
such a combination to be rare.
More than 94% of the reinsurers rated by Fitch have a Stable
Outlook, with the remainder having a Positive Outlook. Fitch
rates more than 65 reinsurers globally. The stable outlook on the
reinsurance industry means that Fitch expects to affirm the
majority of reinsurers' ratings over the next 12-24 months.
* BOND PRICING: For the Week August 26 to August 30, 2013
---------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13
IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62
BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94
TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62
ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33
FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45
INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15
NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56
PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36
GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49
COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71
COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48
COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77
COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74
COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 7.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 71.50
DZ BANK AG 15.500 10/25/2013 EUR 71.05
DZ BANK AG 15.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.86
DZ BANK AG 15.750 7/26/2013 EUR 71.21
DZ BANK AG 15.000 7/26/2013 EUR 75.00
DZ BANK AG 6.000 7/26/2013 EUR 69.50
DZ BANK AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.36
DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.28
DZ BANK AG 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.43
DZ BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.14
DZ BANK AG 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.07
DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 61.83
DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 57.11
DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 15.42
DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 59.63
DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 43.33
DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 56.77
DZ BANK AG 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.81
DZ BANK AG 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.74
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.16
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.95
DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.97
DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.07
DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.29
DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 68.17
DZ BANK AG 9.750 3/8/2013 EUR 73.96
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.66
DZ BANK AG 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 72.63
DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.25
DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 44.10
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.38
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.88
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.66
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 71.94
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.43
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.27
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 68.24
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 67.09
DZ BANK AG 11.500 11/23/2012 EUR 74.94
DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 63.46
DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 41.34
DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 69.68
DZ BANK AG 9.750 12/14/2012 EUR 66.05
DZ BANK AG 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 74.23
DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 71.10
DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 65.09
DZ BANK AG 16.250 1/2/2013 EUR 68.65
DZ BANK AG 10.500 1/11/2013 EUR 66.00
DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.04
DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 53.41
DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 3/20/2013 EUR 74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 17.000 3/20/2013 EUR 73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 16.000 6/26/2013 EUR 74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 15.000 12/28/2012 EUR 71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS 25.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS 30.000 6/28/2013 EUR 46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 3/22/2013 EUR 41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.000 3/22/2013 EUR 52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.000 3/22/2013 EUR 53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.500 3/22/2013 EUR 43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN 5.500 12/23/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 7/26/2013 EUR 74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 6.000 8/23/2013 EUR 74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 8/23/2013 EUR 72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 9/27/2013 EUR 74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 11/23/2012 EUR 46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 2/22/2013 EUR 62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 2/22/2013 EUR 55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT 13.250 1/2/2013 EUR 67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT 18.000 12/14/2012 EUR 63.38
Q-CELLS 6.750 10/21/2015 EUR 1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE 6.750 3/22/2013 USD 4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 0.58
TAG IMMO AG 6.500 12/10/2015 EUR 9.73
TUI AG 2.750 3/24/2016 EUR 56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 3/22/2013 EUR 68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 3/22/2013 EUR 55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.050 3/22/2013 EUR 62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.700 3/22/2013 EUR 71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.700 3/22/2013 EUR 42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 3/22/2013 EUR 50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 3/22/2013 EUR 40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 3/22/2013 EUR 39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.450 12/31/2012 EUR 56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.100 12/31/2012 EUR 50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.050 12/31/2012 EUR 54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 12/31/2012 EUR 60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.700 12/31/2012 EUR 71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.450 12/31/2012 EUR 73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.350 12/31/2012 EUR 57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.150 12/31/2012 EUR 63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.100 12/31/2012 EUR 71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.050 12/31/2012 EUR 72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.900 12/31/2012 EUR 73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.750 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 12/31/2012 EUR 57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.950 12/31/2012 EUR 74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.700 12/31/2012 EUR 73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 12/31/2012 EUR 63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.450 12/31/2012 EUR 53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.100 12/31/2012 EUR 74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.550 12/31/2012 EUR 57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.500 12/31/2012 EUR 61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.150 12/31/2012 EUR 70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 12/31/2012 EUR 67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.900 12/31/2012 EUR 50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.800 12/31/2012 EUR 46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.250 12/31/2012 EUR 68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 12/31/2012 EUR 61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 12/31/2012 EUR 68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.750 12/31/2012 EUR 55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.700 12/31/2012 EUR 61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.600 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.450 12/31/2012 EUR 54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.400 12/31/2012 EUR 58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 12/31/2012 EUR 72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.900 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.500 12/31/2012 EUR 41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.050 12/31/2012 EUR 63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.650 12/31/2012 EUR 70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.350 12/31/2012 EUR 72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.250 12/31/2012 EUR 41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.150 12/31/2012 EUR 73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.050 12/31/2012 EUR 73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.650 12/31/2012 EUR 66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.900 3/22/2013 EUR 72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.750 3/22/2013 EUR 73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.200 12/31/2012 EUR 65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.700 12/31/2012 EUR 62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 23.600 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 4.000 6/28/2013 EUR 44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.700 12/31/2012 EUR 67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.400 12/31/2012 EUR 55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.550 6/28/2013 EUR 74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.250 12/31/2012 EUR 53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 6/28/2013 EUR 72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.389 11/25/2013 EUR 44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.100 4/14/2014 EUR 32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.950 12/31/2012 EUR 68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.300 12/31/2012 EUR 66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.000 12/31/2012 EUR 69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.850 12/31/2012 EUR 72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.150 12/31/2012 EUR 68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.250 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.700 12/31/2012 EUR 66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.700 12/31/2012 EUR 43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 26.050 12/31/2012 EUR 69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 27.600 12/31/2012 EUR 40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 28.250 12/31/2012 EUR 38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 2/1/2013 EUR 55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.650 3/1/2013 EUR 35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.100 3/8/2013 EUR 74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.650 3/22/2013 EUR 68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.550 3/22/2013 EUR 61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.850 3/22/2013 EUR 73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.200 3/22/2013 EUR 65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 3/22/2013 EUR 70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.150 3/22/2013 EUR 59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.050 12/31/2012 EUR 64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.300 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.350 3/22/2013 EUR 73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 46.30
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/28/2012 EUR 59.08
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/21/2012 EUR 66.08
WGZ BANK 5.000 12/28/2012 EUR 73.18
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/28/2012 EUR 67.75
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/28/2012 EUR 63.10
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/21/2012 EUR 74.00
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/21/2012 EUR 68.47
GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY 8.020 3/1/2013 EUR 56.54
BKB FINANCE 10.950 5/10/2013 CHF 62.57
BKB FINANCE 10.150 9/11/2013 CHF 73.89
BKB FINANCE 13.200 1/31/2013 CHF 50.08
BKB FINANCE 9.450 7/3/2013 CHF 68.52
BKB FINANCE 11.500 3/20/2013 CHF 59.30
BKB FINANCE 8.350 1/14/2013 CHF 54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/13/2012 EUR 73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.000 11/13/2012 EUR 64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.830 11/19/2012 CHF 70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.300 11/20/2012 CHF 64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.500 11/20/2012 EUR 55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.800 11/20/2012 EUR 65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.250 11/27/2012 CHF 68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 11/27/2012 CHF 64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/27/2012 CHF 31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 11/27/2012 EUR 59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.750 12/3/2012 CHF 72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.750 12/6/2012 CHF 35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.500 12/14/2012 CHF 58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.250 12/14/2012 EUR 66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.500 12/14/2012 EUR 62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.300 12/21/2012 CHF 64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.900 12/21/2012 CHF 64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.600 12/21/2012 CHF 64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.830 12/28/2012 USD 57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 1/9/2013 EUR 52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.000 1/15/2013 CHF 27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.250 1/15/2013 CHF 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 1/15/2013 GBP 73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.500 1/15/2013 CHF 28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 1/15/2013 CHF 74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.500 1/18/2013 CHF 50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.800 1/23/2013 CHF 69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.050 2/20/2013 USD 74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR 15.000 3/1/2013 CHF 71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 3/6/2013 USD 71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.250 12/27/2012 GBP 67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 4/2/2013 CHF 63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 4/4/2013 CHF 23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.530 4/16/2013 EUR 49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.000 4/19/2013 EUR 55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.000 4/26/2013 CHF 66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.500 4/30/2013 EUR 28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.200 6/7/2013 EUR 71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.500 8/27/2013 CHF 51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.400 9/30/2013 CHF 63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.000 10/3/2013 GBP 74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.160 4/25/2014 EUR 71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.850 10/14/2014 CHF 57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 CHF 56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 EUR 57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.000 11/13/2012 USD 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.750 3/19/2013 USD 71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.670 12/28/2012 CHF 70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN 11.500 1/24/2013 CHF 59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN 17.000 2/22/2013 EUR 59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.128 3/7/2013 CHF 64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN 13.575 4/10/2013 CHF 74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN 7.340 4/16/2013 CHF 70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.500 7/5/2013 CHF 70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.200 8/23/2013 CHF 67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.000 9/11/2013 CHF 69.23
ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING 0.800 2/15/2011 EUR 26.50
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 21.66
NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV 12.000 2/10/2015 USD 24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV 5.250 5/8/2013 EUR 5.89
KPNQWEST NV 10.000 3/15/2012 EUR 0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 9/13/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.600 2/22/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 2/14/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 12/15/2011 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 12.000 7/4/2011 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 1/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 12/31/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 11/16/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 10/12/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.500 8/9/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 5/30/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.750 3/1/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2010 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 1.750 2/7/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.800 12/27/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.800 8/21/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 8/3/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.500 8/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.500 7/6/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 6/29/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 6/17/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.750 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.500 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 6/13/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 15.000 6/4/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 17.000 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.500 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.200 5/14/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.850 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 4/14/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 3/17/2009 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 0.500 2/16/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.750 1/30/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.432 1/8/2009 ILS 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 12/26/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 11/28/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.442 11/22/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.100 11/12/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 11/9/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.150 10/30/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/28/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 10/24/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/24/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.000 10/24/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 10/23/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 10/22/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/8/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.250 10/6/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 18.250 10/2/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.375 9/20/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 23.300 9/16/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 9/15/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.000 9/12/2036 JPY 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/30/2012 USD 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 8/23/2012 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 7/25/2012 EUR 22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 1.375 4/30/2012 EUR 26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 5.750 5/26/2014 EUR 26.88
RENEWABLE CORP 6.500 6/4/2014 EUR 61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM 6.500 5/1/2016 EUR 51.72
SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber 6.000 6/30/2016 SEK 66.00
SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER 8.700 8/5/2013 CHF 60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER 15.000 5/31/2013 USD 69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 13.000 5/31/2013 USD 70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.000 4/9/2013 CHF 56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 10.750 3/13/2013 EUR 66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER 17.300 2/1/2013 EUR 54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 9.700 12/20/2012 CHF 75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER 11.500 2/20/2013 CHF 47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.200 12/5/2012 EUR 54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/26/2014 CHF 65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/13/2014 CHF 63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/24/2014 CHF 55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/11/2014 CHF 54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 18.400 12/20/2013 EUR 74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 11/26/2013 CHF 64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 4.500 8/13/2014 CHF 48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 16.500 9/23/2013 USD 57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/23/2013 CHF 50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 3.250 9/16/2013 CHF 49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.500 11/13/2012 CHF 58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/13/2012 CHF 74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.250 11/12/2012 CHF 73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 8/27/2014 CHF 55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/10/2014 CHF 51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 10/15/2014 CHF 57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 5.250 8/6/2014 CHF 51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.000 7/22/2013 CHF 72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.000 6/10/2013 CHF 70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/31/2013 CHF 55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 6.500 4/26/2013 CHF 58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/25/2013 CHF 59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/18/2013 CHF 74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 3/1/2013 USD 74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 9.000 2/14/2013 CHF 66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 11.500 2/13/2013 EUR 57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 1/24/2013 CHF 66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.750 1/15/2013 CHF 68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.250 12/17/2012 CHF 61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/17/2012 EUR 67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 12/14/2012 EUR 72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/14/2012 CHF 36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.000 11/23/2012 CHF 47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.125 11/19/2012 CHF 58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/16/2012 CHF 58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 8.900 3/25/2013 EUR 57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 10.500 9/9/2013 CHF 66.05
S-AIR GROUP 0.125 7/7/2005 CHF 10.63
SARASIN CI LTD 8.000 4/27/2015 CHF 68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.600 2/17/2014 CHF 71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.200 1/23/2013 EUR 72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 15.200 12/12/2012 EUR 73.12
UBS AG 11.870 8/13/2013 USD 4.68
UBS AG 9.600 8/26/2013 USD 15.21
UBS AG 10.200 9/20/2013 EUR 61.15
UBS AG 12.900 9/20/2013 EUR 57.98
UBS AG 15.900 9/20/2013 EUR 55.99
UBS AG 17.000 9/27/2013 EUR 73.19
UBS AG 17.750 9/27/2013 EUR 73.50
UBS AG 18.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.56
UBS AG 19.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.84
UBS AG 20.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.19
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 74.87
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.43
UBS AG 21.750 9/27/2013 EUR 72.53
UBS AG 22.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.57
UBS AG 22.500 9/27/2013 EUR 70.55
UBS AG 22.750 9/27/2013 EUR 67.91
UBS AG 23.000 9/27/2013 EUR 72.72
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.81
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.35
UBS AG 24.000 9/27/2013 EUR 69.47
UBS AG 24.750 9/27/2013 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 8.060 10/3/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 13.570 11/21/2013 USD 16.25
UBS AG 6.980 11/27/2013 USD 34.85
UBS AG 17.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.48
UBS AG 17.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 73.31
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.28
UBS AG 19.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.10
UBS AG 20.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.53
UBS AG 20.500 1/3/2014 EUR 71.30
UBS AG 20.750 1/3/2014 EUR 71.59
UBS AG 21.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.44
UBS AG 22.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 23.000 1/3/2014 EUR 71.55
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.29
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.57
UBS AG 24.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.95
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 68.40
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.18
UBS AG 6.440 5/28/2014 USD 51.67
UBS AG 3.870 6/17/2014 USD 38.08
UBS AG 6.040 8/29/2014 USD 35.22
UBS AG 7.780 8/29/2014 USD 20.85
UBS AG 11.260 11/12/2012 EUR 47.13
UBS AG 11.660 11/12/2012 EUR 34.35
UBS AG 13.120 11/12/2012 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 13.560 11/12/2012 EUR 36.51
UBS AG 13.600 11/12/2012 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 13.000 11/23/2012 USD 62.55
UBS AG 8.150 12/21/2012 EUR 72.14
UBS AG 8.250 12/21/2012 EUR 74.88
UBS AG 8.270 12/21/2012 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 8.990 12/21/2012 EUR 72.49
UBS AG 9.000 12/21/2012 EUR 69.13
UBS AG 9.150 12/21/2012 EUR 71.84
UBS AG 9.450 12/21/2012 EUR 74.42
UBS AG 9.730 12/21/2012 EUR 70.24
UBS AG 9.890 12/21/2012 EUR 66.37
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 72.98
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 69.64
UBS AG 10.160 12/21/2012 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 10.490 12/21/2012 EUR 68.12
UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 71.60
UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.85
UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 67.59
UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.14
UBS AG 11.270 12/21/2012 EUR 70.63
UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53
UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67
UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02
UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09
UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07
UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39
UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51
UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64
UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85
UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41
UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18
UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29
UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44
UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53
UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58
UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59
UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81
UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88
UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41
UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51
UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10
UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18
UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09
UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69
UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84
UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83
UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52
UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33
UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40
UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63
UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95
UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39
UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32
UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69
UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58
UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54
UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23
UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99
UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92
UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21
UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94
UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05
UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65
UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55
UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34
UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54
UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04
UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86
UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90
UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35
UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96
UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23
UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02
UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24
UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00
UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30
UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20
UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16
UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16
UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45
UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44
UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63
UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43
UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24
UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21
UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17
UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77
UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39
UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84
UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50
UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06
UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75
UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90
UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12
UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60
UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70
UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00
UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17
UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43
UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83
UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98
UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05
UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54
UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91
UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62
UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86
UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83
UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15
UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94
UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97
UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96
UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87
UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62
UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50
UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82
UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26
UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53
UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76
UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64
UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66
ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62
MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *