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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Wednesday, August 14, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 160

                            Headlines



F R A N C E

LAFARGE SA: Moody's Alters Outlook to Negative & Affirms Ba1 CFR


G E O R G I A

* GEORGIA: Fitch Says Economic Expansion to Slow Sharply in 2013


G E R M A N Y

CINEPOSTPRODUCTION: Files for Bankruptcy Protection
CONERGY AG: Hopes to Reach Deal on Manufacturing Sale by October
CONTINENTAL AG: Good Performance Cues Moody's to Lift CFR to Ba1
KUKA AG: Improving Finances Prompt Moody's to Upgrade CFR to Ba3
SUNSELEX GERMANY: Files for Insolvency Following Liquidity Woes

* Renewable Energy Policies Pressure German Electricity TSOs


G R E E C E

AEK FC: Melissanidis In Talks with Potential Investors
EXCEL MARITIME: Christiana Trust Named Member of Creditors' Panel
EXCEL MARITIME: Creditors' Panel Wants End of Exclusivity Period
EXCEL MARITIME: Sells 2 Vessels for US$43.2MM to Credit Suisse


I R E L A N D

FLEET STREET: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on EUR96.9MM Cl. D Notes


I T A L Y

SESTANTE FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C2 Notes to 'B-'
TELECOM ITALIA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Jr. Subordinated Debt


K A Z A K H S T A N

BTA BANK: Attempts to Recover U$6 Billion From Ablyazov


N E T H E R L A N D S

WOOD STREET CLO II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'


P O L A N D

POLIMEX-MOSTOSTAL SA: Emtech Files Bankruptcy Petition in Warsaw


R O M A N I A

RAPID BUCHAREST: CAS Relegates Club from Romanian 1st Division


R U S S I A

SUEK FINANCE: Moody's Rates RUB10-Bil. Senior Bonds '(P)Ba3'
* VOLGOGRAD REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Currency Ratings


S P A I N

TDA IBERCAJA: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class B Notes


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

EUROSAIL 2007-1: Fitch Lifts Rating on Class FTc Notes to 'CCC'
HEARTS OF MIDLOTHIAN: BDO Close to Announcing Preferred Bidder
INSIGHT COMMODITIES: High Court Enters Wind Up Order
KAUPTHING SINGER: Pension Trustees Win High Court Ruling
LBG CAPITAL: Moody's Raises Rating on Capital Notes to 'Ba2'

MISYS NEWCO 2: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR
NICOLE FARHI: Owed Almost GBP20MM to Creditors, Report Shows
PANTHEON REALTY: Land Investment Firms in Provisional Liquidation
RAILCARE LIMITED: Staff Won't Get Wages After Collapse
SOUTHERN WATER: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on GBP500MM Bonds

* Sports Club and Facilities Insolvencies Fall Post-Olympics


U Z B E K I S T A N

UZPROMSTROYBANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Ratings


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F R A N C E
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LAFARGE SA: Moody's Alters Outlook to Negative & Affirms Ba1 CFR
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on all ratings
of Lafarge SA to negative from stable. Concurrently, Moody's has
affirmed Lafarge's Ba1 corporate family , Ba1-PD probability of
default rating , Ba1/(P)Ba1 senior unsecured ratings, as well as
the provisional (P)Ba2 rating on the company's subordinated euro
medium-term note (EMTN) program.

"The negative outlook on Lafarge's ratings was prompted by its H1
2013 results, which have caused the company's credit metrics to
deteriorate below our expectations for the Ba1 rating," says
Stanislas Duquesnoy, a Moody's Vice President -- Senior Credit
Officer and lead analyst for Lafarge.

Ratings Rationale:

The change of outlook to negative on Lafarge's ratings was
prompted by the company's weak H1 2013 results. Lafarge posted a
2% decline in revenues and a 9% decline in EBITDA in H1 2013,
both on a like-for-like basis. The deterioration in the company's
operating performance abated in Q2 2013, with flat top-line
growth and a 3% decline in EBITDA (both like-for-like). Arguably,
the weak performance was partially due to the very cold weather
in North America and Europe in March and flooding in Q2 2013, but
underlying market conditions have remained weak in Western and
Eastern Europe. As a result, Lafarge's credit metrics have
deteriorated versus year-end 2012 levels, with net debt/EBITDA
increasing to 4.6x in H1 2013 from 4.3x and retained cash flow
(RCF)/net debt dropping to 9.4% from 11.3%.

These ratios are below Moody's expectations for the Ba1 rating,
which include RCF/net debt of at least 10%. Indeed, Lafarge's
metric levels would still be below Moody's expectations for the
rating if the rating agency were to adjust for seasonal working
capital build-up (EUR446 million) and disposal proceeds to be
received by the group in H2 2013 (around EUR1.2 billion). This is
because in Q3 2013, Lafarge will double the size of its dividend
payout to EUR290 million, which will lower the group's retained
cash flow.

The change of outlook also reflects the fact that Lafarge has
failed to improve its leverage metrics since Moody's downgraded
the group to non-investment grade in August 2011. Moreover,
Lafarge's credit metrics have not improved since 2009, despite
the group's efforts to restore a stronger financial profile
notably through asset disposals (around EUR4 billion of cash
proceeds since 2009 and EUR1.2 billion to be received in H2
2013). The Ba1 rating has always incorporated Moody's expectation
of gradually improving leverage and profitability, driven by
Lafarge's deleveraging strategy (the company's reported net debt
decreased by EUR5.6 billion between December 2008 and December
2012 and will further decrease by the end of 2013). However, the
success of the company's disposal policy, and hence the reduction
in its net debt, has constantly been offset by lower EBITDA and
cash flow generation (the company's Moody's-adjusted EBITDA has
declined to EUR3.1 billion on a last-12-months basis per end of
June 2013 from EUR3.6 billion in 2009). In light of the still
challenging and volatile operating environment, coupled with the
significantly increased dividend payout in 2013, it will be
challenging for Lafarge to improve its credit metrics in the next
three to four quarters to levels that are more in line with a Ba1
rating, hence the negative outlook.

Moody's considers that Lafarge's liquidity profile is strong for
the next 12 months, largely supported by the group's high and
stable balances of cash and marketable securities (of EUR2.629
billion per end of June 2013), as well as expected funds from
operations. The rating agency notes that a portion of Lafarge's
cash balances is owned by subsidiaries that have minority
interests (Egypt) and are subject to possible dividend leakage,
or where access to cash balances is slow due to local processes
and regulations. Therefore, the major external source of
liquidity likely to be available to the group -- even in a stress
scenario -- is its unused and committed EUR1.2 billion syndicated
long-term credit line (fully available as of June 30, 2013), the
maturity of which has been extended to July 2015. Moody's
considers this facility to be a good source of liquidity, given
the absence of a repeating material adverse change (MAC) clause
and that it has only one covenant. The sole covenant is an
optional exit mechanism, on an individual basis, which would be
triggered if the consolidated net debt/EBITDA ratio is higher
than 4.75x and is not defined as an event of default.

Additionally, Lafarge has approximately EUR2.2 billion in unused
bilateral and committed credit lines. Moody's takes comfort from
the long average maturity of these bilateral lines, which are
well spread over 2014 to 2018, and from the absence of a
repeating MAC clause and specific financial covenants. Overall,
the average maturity of Lafarge's EUR3.4 billion of committed
credit lines was 2.4 years at June 30, 2013.

Moody's believes that Lafarge's cash sources are more than
sufficient to cover cash outflows such as debt repayments, capex,
working capital changes and dividends during the next 12 months.
This view is based on the assumption that Lafarge needs around 3%
of its turnover as cash for day-to-day needs, equal to around
EUR464 million, and that its cash outflows from working capital
changes will be modest, reflecting slightly higher volumes and
prices.

What Could Change The Rating Down/Up:

Failure to improve RCF/net debt above 10% in 2013 and towards 15%
at the end of 2014 would lead to negative pressure on the
ratings.

Given the negative outlook, Moody's does not currently expect
positive rating pressure. However, Lafarge could achieve an
investment-grade rating if the company were able to improve
RCF/net debt towards 20% and net debt/EBITDA to below 3.5x.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Building Materials Industry rating methodology, published in July
2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA, published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Paris, France, Lafarge S.A. (Lafarge; Ba1
negative) is one of the world's leading building materials
suppliers, and one of the three largest cement producers
worldwide, with an installed annual production capacity of 223
million tons at year-end 2012. The company's major activities are
organized into two divisions: cement (66% of 2012 sales) and
aggregates & concrete (34%). During 2011, Lafarge disposed of its
gypsum operations in Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe,
Latin America and Asia, which together contributed EUR1.2 billion
to the group's revenues in 2011.

Lafarge operates in 64 countries and generated sales of EUR15.8
billion for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2012.



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G E O R G I A
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* GEORGIA: Fitch Says Economic Expansion to Slow Sharply in 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------
Georgia's H113 GDP figures support Fitch Ratings' view that
economic expansion will slow sharply this year, Fitch Ratings
says. This is thanks largely to a fall in both public and
private-sector investment following the change in government last
year. However, results year-to-date suggest that the slowdown
will not put near-term pressure on Georgia's public or external
finances.

The National Statistics Office's preliminary GDP estimate last
month showed 1.8% growth in H113 from a year earlier. This is in
line with our forecasts that growth will halve to 3% in 2013 from
6.1% last year, thanks partly to policy uncertainty on issues
such as the Labour Code and its effects on investment.

Tensions between Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili and President
Mikheil Saakashvili have persisted since Ivanishvili's Georgian
Dream coalition unexpectedly won power from Saakashvili's United
National Movement in October 2012's parliamentary elections.

However, the near-term implications for Georgia's credit profile
are limited. The slowdown has shrunk tax revenues yoy in H113,
undershooting government projections. But capital spending has
fallen by half, as the government reviews investment projects. As
a result, the government is running a higher cash surplus than in
the same period of 2012, and the slowdown is unlikely to create a
large fiscal deficit (which we forecast at 3.3% of GDP in 2013).

Similarly, the deceleration and pause in investment has seen
imports fall 6.6% in H113, while export earnings are up 8.6% and
will benefit from the resumption of exports to Russia from June.
Georgia's current account deficit, which averaged 11.4% of GDP in
2009-2012 and has been a key weakness in its sovereign credit
profile, halved yoy in Q113. FDI fell during 2012, and is playing
less of a role in financing the deficit, although Q113 inflows
were the strongest since Q112.

The National Bank of Georgia has continued to accumulate foreign-
currency reserves, which stood at US$2.83 billion at the end of
July, up from US$2.65 billion at end-2012, maintaining external
liquidity while making net repayments to the IMF for balance of
payments support in 2008-2011.  Georgia has a precautionary
Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF until April 2014.

The breakdown of growth contributors in Q113 show resilient
agriculture and manufacturing, while construction output fell 9%
yoy -- probably linked to the fall in public investment. We
forecast real GDP growth will recover to 5% in 2014 and 6% in
2015. A forthcoming Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
with the EU, scheduled to be signed in November, should ease
access to Georgia's largest export market and help medium-term
growth.

"Our forecasts are not without risks, including political risks.
Georgian Dream's candidate is expected to win presidential
elections that are due on October 27 but a period of uneasy
cohabitation between Prime Minister and President will continue
until then. In 2014, Mr. Ivanishvili may carry out a recent
promise to leave front-line politics but continue to influence
policy," Fitch says.

Combined with constitutional changes, which come into force after
the presidential election, this could increase uncertainty and
further weigh on policy formation and confidence. A departure
from prudent policy making that damaged the economy and
interrupted inflows of capital needed to finance the deficit is a
low risk, but it would put pressure on Georgia's 'BB-'/Stable
rating if it materialized.

Continued GDP growth, fiscal discipline and moderation of
external imbalances would put upward pressure on the rating.



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G E R M A N Y
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CINEPOSTPRODUCTION: Files for Bankruptcy Protection
---------------------------------------------------
Scott Roxborough at The Hollywood Reporter reports that
CinePostproduction has filed for bankruptcy protection, the
latest in a long line of VFX houses to go bust as the entire
industry struggles to find a workable business model.

The German bankruptcy follows similar problems at effects houses
worldwide, with such major postproduction groups as Digital
Domain, which worked on Ender's Game, and Rhythm & Hues, a VFX
Oscar winner for Life of Pi, going bust and being auctioned off,
The Hollywood Reporter relates.

Last month, the Visual Effects Society released a white paper
outlining the problems facing the industry and making several
recommendations, including proposing adopting alternative models
to fixed price bidding, The Hollywood Reporter recounts.

CinePostproduction is one of Germany's largest postproduction
firms, with offices in Munich, Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne and
Halle.  The Munich-based company is a subsidiary of the CineMedia
group.


CONERGY AG: Hopes to Reach Deal on Manufacturing Sale by October
----------------------------------------------------------------
John Parnell at pv-tech.org reports that Conergy AG has said it
hopes to agree deals for the sale of its PV module and mounting
manufacturing units by October.

pv-tech.org relates that Conergy said it is in talks with
domestic and international companies interested in buying its
manufacturing subsidiaries.

"We have already been in promising talks with several potential
investors," the report quotes preliminary insolvency
administrator Sven-Holger Undritz, from the law firm White &
Case, as saying.

"This is an important signal to the market and especially to the
more than 500 employees in Brandenburg. Within the recently
started sales process we want to drive the negotiations forward
and, if possible, complete them by the beginning of October,"
Mr. Undritz added.

Conergy started insolvency proceedings at the start of July after
a move to introduce a new investors was turned down by creditors,
pv-tech.org notes.

Last month, pv-tech.org recalls, it was revealed that the company
had a buyer for its brand, sales operations and administrative
infrastructure with US-based Kawa Capital Management the
preferred choice. Manufacturing operations were excluded from the
deal, the report notes.

Manufacturing proceedings were halted for a few weeks after the
insolvency proceedings began but resumed on July 22, the report
adds.

Conergy AG is a Hamburg-based solar panel manufacturer.

The Company filed for insolvency on July 5 and stopped its module
production in Frankfurt an der Oder near the Polish border after
a delay in payments from a large project and the failure of
executives to bridge the financial gap, Bloomberg New reported.
Conergy said in a separate statement that manufacturing at its
insolvent Conergy SolarModule GmbH & Co. KG will resume on
Systems GmbH in Rangsdorf near Berlin continue, Bloomberg noted.
Conergy's sales last year dropped 37% to EUR473.5 million while
the net loss widened to EUR99 million, Bloomberg disclosed.


CONTINENTAL AG: Good Performance Cues Moody's to Lift CFR to Ba1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded Continental AG's corporate
family rating to Ba1 from Ba2 and its probability of default
rating to Ba1-PD from Ba2-PD. Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded
Continental's senior notes issued by Continental AG, Conti-Gummi
Finance BV and by Continental Rubber of America Corporation to
Ba1, with a loss given default assessment (LGD) of LGD3/48% from
Ba2 as well as the rating of Continental's EMTN program to (P)Ba1
from (P)Ba2. The outlook on all ratings is stable.

"The upgrade to Ba1 was prompted by Continental's strong credit
metrics during recent quarters," says Falk Frey, a Moody's Senior
Vice President and lead analyst for Continental. "These metrics
are actually in line with investment-grade rating levels on a
standalone basis, however the rating is constrained by
uncertainty about a potential combination of the company with its
major shareholder, Schaeffler," says Falk Frey, a Moody's Senior
Vice President and lead analyst for Continental," adds Mr. Frey.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects that throughout this year, Continental
has exhibited strong credit metrics that are commensurate with
investment-grade rating levels on a standalone basis. However,
the rating is constrained by the uncertainty associated with the
possible form and pace of a potential combination of Continental
and its major shareholder, Schaeffler AG (B1 positive), which
reportedly has a high debt level following its investment in
Continental. At the same time, Moody's considers that such a
transaction is unlikely over the medium term, given Schaeffler's
gradual reduction in its shareholding in Continental over the
past four years, to 49.9% currently from 89% in 2009. Given that
it now appears unlikely that a combination will take place in the
medium term, and that the form of such a combination could be
less drastic than previously indicated, this, in Moody's view,
justifies the widening of the difference in the two companies'
CFRs to three notches from two previously.

Continental's current leverage, with debt/EBITDA of 2.2x, and
profitability, with EBIT margins of 10% for the last 12 months
ended June 30, 2013, would indicate a higher rating, in the low
to mid-Baa category, than the currently assigned Ba1 rating.
However, given the high volatility of Continental's results
during the financial crisis, an upgrade to investment-grade
levels would also require a somewhat longer track record of the
company operating in a less favorable environment.

At this time, Moody's expects the potential risk to noteholders
from any action initiated by Schaeffler will be mitigated
primarily by financial covenants in Continental's bond and loan
documentation that restrict the company's ability to (1) dispose
of its rubber activities; (2) merge with entities of the
Schaeffler group, unless certain interest coverage and leverage
tests are met with regard to metrics pro forma for the respective
transactions; and (3) pay out sizeable dividends.

Nonetheless, Moody's does not anticipate any change in
Schaeffler's position to have an impact on Continental's dividend
payout and thus debt repayment capacity.

Rationale For Stable Outlook

The stable rating outlook incorporates Moody's expectation that
(1) Continental will continue to generate positive free cash flow
(FCF) in the coming years and use this to reduce debt; and (2)
the company's operating performance and cash flow generation in
the current year will be close to last year's levels and will
improve from 2014, mainly driven by stronger growth in revenues
and the continued turnaround in the powertrain division. Overall,
this should lead to further improvements to Continental's
leverage ratio.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

For Moody's to consider a further upgrade of Continental's
ratings, the company would need to maintain its capital structure
and leverage ratings, even in the event of a possible weakening
of the overall economic environment. Therefore, Moody's could
upgrade Continental's ratings if (1) the company sustainably
reduces its leverage to below 2.0x debt/EBITDA, as adjusted by
Moody's; (2) it generates sustainably positive FCF, as measured
by FCF/debt, of a minimum of 4.5%; and (3) its interest coverage
remains above 3.5x on a sustainable basis. An upgrade of
Schaeffler's CFR could also result in an upgrade of Continental's
rating, as could a further material reduction in Schaeffler's
stake in Continental to below 30%.

Downward rating pressure could develop if Continental's operating
performance and leverage deteriorate materially below 2010
levels, exemplified by (1) Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA
approaching 3.0x; (2) free cash flow generation below EUR200
million; and (3) a decline in the company's reported adjusted
EBIT margin below 8%. Downward rating pressure could also arise
if Continental were to re-leverage as a result of a combination
with Schaeffler.

Liquidity

As of June 30, 2013, Continental's liquidity needs for the next
12 months consisted of debt maturities as well as cash outflows
for capital expenditure, working capital, dividend payments and
day-to-day needs. These requirements were covered by the
company's sizable cash position (around EUR1.6 billion as of
June 30, 2013), the proceeds from its recent bond issuance of
EUR750 million in July 2013, and its EUR3.0 billion revolving
credit facility, with conditionality language and covenants with
ample headroom.

Structural Considerations

Continental's notes outstanding, issued by Continental AG, Conti-
Gummi Finance B.V. and Continental Rubber of America, Corp., and
the debt outstanding under the company's syndicated facility
agreement all benefit from upstream guarantees. The outstanding
bonds rank in line with all unsecured creditors, trade debtors
and pension obligations, as well as lease rejection claims, and
are therefore rated at the same level as the CFR. The commercial
paper notes outstanding do not benefit from upstream guarantees
and thus rank behind in the debt waterfall.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Automotive Supplier Industry published in May 2013. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Hanover, Germany, Continental AG is one of the
world's top automotive suppliers in the areas of brake systems,
systems and components for powertrains and chassis,
instrumentation, infotainment solutions, vehicle electronics and
technical elastomers. It is also the world's fourth-largest
manufacturer of passenger and commercial vehicle tires. In 2012,
Continental generated consolidated sales of approximately EUR32.7
billion.


KUKA AG: Improving Finances Prompt Moody's to Upgrade CFR to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded KUKA AG's corporate family
rating and probability of default rating to Ba3 and Ba3-PD from
B1 and B1-PD, respectively. Concurrently, Moody's has upgraded
the rating on the company's senior secured notes due 2017 by two
notches, to Ba3 from B2. In addition, the rating outlook has been
changed to stable from positive.

Ratings Rationale:

"We have upgraded KUKA's CFR because we believe that there has
been a structural improvement in the company's margins and cash
flow generation, both in terms of higher levels and lower
volatility through the cycle, as a result of its operational
restructuring following the 2008-09 global economic downturn,"
says Martin Fujerik, Moody's lead analyst for KUKA. This is
further underpinned by KUKA's proactive management of its balance
sheet, with the company currently exhibiting a healthy capital
structure. In the course of 2013, KUKA has issued around EUR150
million of convertible bonds with an interest rate of 2%, the
proceeds of which Moody's understands the company will apply to
the repayment of its EUR202 million bond by November 2014 at the
latest, when a call option can be exercised. This repayment will
not only reduce KUKA's refinancing risk and improve its maturity
profile, but will also improve the company's interest cover
metrics over time, as its interest expense will decrease.

As a result of continued growth in its sales and margins in the
first half of 2013, KUKA reported very healthy metrics at the end
of June 2013, including a Moody's-adjusted last-12-months EBITA
margin of 7.5%, gross debt/EBITDA of 2.8x and free cash flow
(FCF) of around EUR130 million. However, Moody's cautions that
KUKA may be unable to sustain these metrics, which have been
supported by very favorable market dynamics during recent
quarters. Moody's expects that negative pressure could be exerted
on the company's margins and FCF generation as a result of (1)
growth in KUKA's sales slowing over the medium term as the rating
agency anticipates; (2) the company experiencing increasing price
pressure from competitors; (3) the continuous need for the
company to support innovation; and (4) the need for it to
strengthen its position in general industry in order to reduce
its dependency on the automotive industry. As a result Moody's
expects that over the next 12-18 months, KUKA will maintain its
EBITA margin of around 6%-7% and FCF generation in the low double
digits in terms of millions of euros, which is commensurate with
the Ba3 rating.

Moody's considers that underlying market conditions in the
automotive industry remain positive overall, given that light
vehicle production in emerging markets is expected to grow
further and the ongoing trend towards automated work processes in
the production for cars, which should benefit KUKA. Furthermore,
the group is developing business opportunities with other sectors
such as the aerospace, healthcare and logistics, which should
help reduce its reliance on the automotive industry. Still, a key
risk remains KUKA's vulnerability to the inherent cyclicality of
the automotive industry. This can cause very volatile operating
profits and cash flow through the economic cycle, and requires
the maintenance of a sizeable liquidity cushion in order to cope
with cyclical downturns. In addition, the group will need to
maintain a tight control over cost efficiency and working capital
in a competitive environment.

The Ba3 CFR remains constrained by KUKA's high level of customer
concentration, limited diversification both in terms of industry
as well as geography, and the very strong and powerful
competitors in its markets, such as ABB. Moreover, the rating
considers the high cyclicality of KUKA's business, which had
historically resulted in periods of weak earnings and negative
FCF generation.

More positively, the Ba3 rating is supported by KUKA's leading
competitive position in its relevant markets with, according to
the company, a market-leading position in robotics for the
automotive industry worldwide and a no. 2 position in systems
(body-in-white) in Europe and the US, which KUKA has been able to
protect over time. The rating also reflects KUKA's high level of
innovation and technology leadership as well as its long-standing
customer relationships. The rating is further supported by the
company's adequate liquidity profile and sufficient financial
covenant headroom under its EUR200 million syndicated facility
agreement maturing in Q1 2014. It also assumes that the extension
of the maturity of this facility will be concluded over the next
couple of weeks.

KUKA's current debt structure mainly consists of (1)
approximately EUR180 million of senior secured notes due November
2017; and (2) around EUR150 million of unsecured convertible
bonds and a EUR50 million revolving credit facility under the
company's EUR200 million syndicated senior facilities agreement
due March 2014, which has a super-senior ranking. Moody's
decision to align the rating on the notes with the CFR reflects
the increased level of unsecured debt at the holding company
level in KUKA's capital structure. This provides for reduced
losses for secured lenders in the event of a default.

Rationale For Stable Outlook:

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation that over
the next 12-18 months, KUKA will maintain its EBITA margin of
around 6%-7% and FCF generation in the low double digits in terms
of millions of euros, which is commensurate with the Ba3 rating.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down?

A further upgrade of KUKA's CFR is currently unlikely and would
require the company to further improve its diversification and
cost structure, as exemplified by (1) EBITA margins moving
towards 10% (7.5% in last-12-months to June 2013); (2) sustained
positive FCF generation at all times; and (3) gross debt/EBITDA
maintained below 2.0x (2.8x). In addition, a solid liquidity
cushion would be a prerequisite for an upgrade given that,
historically, the company's results have been highly volatile.

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if the company's gross
leverage increases above 3.0x (2.8x in last-12-months to June
2013). However, Moody's nevertheless recognizes that KUKA's gross
leverage will be artificially inflated until the company has
repaid its outstanding secured notes. This high leverage will be
driven by the pre-financing that KUKA has already undertaken by
issuing EUR150 million worth of convertible bonds.

In addition, negative rating pressure could result if (1) KUKA's
profitability deteriorates below 6%, with negative FCF for a
prolonged period of time; (2) the company's short-term liquidity
deteriorates; or (3) it takes a more aggressive approach with
regard to shareholder distribution or debt-financed growth.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Heavy Manufacturing Rating Methodology published in November
2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Augsburg, Germany, KUKA AG focuses on robot-
supported automation of manufacturing processes and is active in
the mechanical and plant engineering sector. The company operates
under two divisions: KUKA Robotics (approximately 40% of group
revenues) and KUKA Systems (approximately 60% of group revenues).
In 2012, KUKA generated revenues of EUR1.7 billion. KUKA is
publicly listed, with Grenzebach Maschinenbau GmbH, Germany,
being its largest shareholder, with a 24.4% stake.


SUNSELEX GERMANY: Files for Insolvency Following Liquidity Woes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Colthorpe at PV-Tech reports that Sunselex Germany has filed
for insolvency owing to a possible loss of liquidity.

The Magistrate Court in Munich, where the filing was made on
Aug. 1, appointed Philip Heinke, of JAFFE attorneys as interim
insolvency administrator, PV-Tech discloses.  The company
released a statement citing an inability of the core mechanical
business unit to operate at a profit in Germany, PV-Tech relates.

According to PV-Tech, Sunselex referred to "the desolate solar PV
market situation in Germany" and despite efforts to cut costs,
including workforce, had forced the management to pull out of
that market.  The interim insolvency manager of the German office
would be liaising with the Swiss sales and distribution office
with a view to handing over much of the business and assets to
Sunselex in Zurich, PV-Tech says.

Various other international Sunselex subsidiary companies are not
expected to be adversely affected by the insolvency, PV-Tech
notes.

Sunselex Germany is a photovoltaic systems provider.


* Renewable Energy Policies Pressure German Electricity TSOs
------------------------------------------------------------
Whilst German regulated energy networks have so far benefited
from changes to the industry's incentive-based regulatory regime,
the focus of the national energy policy on renewable energy
generation may exert negative pressure on electricity
transmission system operators (TSOs), says Moody's Investors
Service in a report on the sector entitled "German Regulated
Energy Networks: Regulatory Changes Have Proved Beneficial to
Date but Affordability Issues May Exert Negative Pressure on
Electricity TSOs."

While the rating agency does not expect any immediate rating
pressures, any future regulatory or political decisions, which
may defer cost recovery for TSOs, could impact their credit
quality negatively.

"Changes to the German incentive-based regulatory regime for
energy networks since its introduction in January 2009 have
resulted in greater certainty of earning a timely return on new
expansion investments for regulated network operators in Germany,
a credit positive," says Stefanie Voelz, an Assistant Vice
President - Analyst in Moody's Infrastructure & Project Finance
Group and author of the report. "In particular, the two-year time
lag before capital expenditure investments would earn a return
has been removed, allowing companies to re-coup the funding costs
of investments from the start."

In addition, for the transmission system operators (TSOs) facing
large investment requirements into offshore connections, changes
to the risk-share mechanism have created more planning security
and reduced the exposure to potential delay damages claims from
owners of offshore wind generation capacity.

However, in the medium to long term, Moody's sees particular
challenges in relation to the continued focus of the national
energy policy on renewable energy generation. The increasing
costs related to various aspects of the renewable regime include
(1) subsidies for the developers and associated guaranteed feed-
in tariffs; (2) liquidity buffers needed to support the marketing
of the renewable energy by the transmission network operators;
and (3) the pass-through of potential costs in relation to delays
in offshore wind farm connections.

These increasing costs, which are initially borne by the
electricity TSOs, are ultimately passed on to customer bills and
weigh heavily on German households. This effect can only be
expected to increase given the planned additional developments in
renewable energy generation.

"Affordability for end-consumers may receive growing political
attention with the upcoming national elections, and the risk of
government intervention to the detriment of the German
electricity TSOs cannot be completely excluded," continues Ms.
Voelz. "Whilst we do not think that there is a risk that
substantial costs may not be recovered at all, we believe that
there is a clear possibility that returns may be deferred to ease
any increase in customer bills in the short to medium term."

For German electricity TSOs, a strong regulatory regime that (1)
remains independent of political pressure; and (2) has clear
principles for timely cost recovery and a track record of
consistent application of these principles will be a key mitigant
of such risks. A delay in recovering the potential prefunding of
renewable subsidies would primarily have a negative impact on
those TSOs that carry a large share of the national subsidy
through the level of consumption in their area. Amprion GmbH (A3
stable) is one example, although Moody's notes that the company
has a prudent financial policy and ample liquidity arrangements
in place to cover the current risks. TenneT TSO GmbH, a
subsidiary of TenneT Holdings B.V. (A3 stable), and to a lesser
extent 50Hertz Transmission GmbH, a subsidiary of Eurogrid GmbH
(Baa1 stable), will be investing in offshore wind connections and
may require additional liquidity if they find themselves subject
to future delay damage claims from offshore wind farms that
cannot immediately be recovered through customer charges.

Overall, although recognizing recent improvements, Moody's
believes that the German system of economic regulation still has
some relative weaknesses in comparison with other, more
transparent and established regimes across Europe. For example,
regulatory decisions and determinations with regard to the
calculation of tariffs and performance of companies are not
publicly disclosed. Also, being a relatively new form of
regulation that is still undergoing material changes, the outcome
of future developments is less predictable.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


AEK FC: Melissanidis In Talks with Potential Investors
------------------------------------------------------
Nektaria Stamouli at The Wall Street Journal reports that the bad
economy is hurting soccer clubs around Europe, but for Greece's
storied but troubled AEK FC, the fall has been especially steep.

Ignominiously ousted from the country's Super League in April,
the beloved club slid into bankruptcy -- the result of years of
what fans roundly criticized as bad management and excessive
spending, compounded by the country's deep recession, the Journal
recounts.

Now as the government in Athens hangs on with an international
bailout, AEK has found what it hopes to be a local savior: oil
and shipping magnate Dimitris Melissanidis, the Journal notes.

"We are starting from scratch and we are fated to succeed," the
Journal quotes the billionaire as saying at a July news
conference where he introduced his new managers and the start of
ticket sales for next season. He also predicted the club would be
back in the Super League after two years, the Journal relates.

Yet as training camp started in late July, Mr. Melissanidis was
still negotiating with other potential investors and he has yet
to say how much he will put up himself, the Journal states.
Meanwhile, authorities have been questioning four former club
presidents over what police listed as EUR170.8 million (US$224
million) in tax arrears and penalties, the Journal discloses.

Unlike Greece, which still struggles to pay off its debts and
stay in the euro zone, the team is trying to fill its depleted
roster and make a clean start outside the Super League, the
Journal notes.

AEK posted a EUR15.8 million loss in the 2008-2009 season,
compared with a EUR12 million profit from the previous season,
the Journal recounts.  The club bounced from owner to owner, each
with fresh promises of revival, the Journal discloses.

AEK's losses widened as television revenue fell and money from
the state gambling monopoly OPAP dissipated, the Journal
recounts.

By the end of the 2011-12 season, AEK had accumulated losses of
EUR60 million, the Journal says, citing a survey published by
Direction Business Reports.  That was almost a quarter of the
EUR264.7 million in losses racked up by the 14 first-league teams
put together, the Journal notes.

By mid-2012, with Greece gripped by protests against painful
austerity, AEK couldn't pay its players and released them from
their contracts; most left, the Journal recounts.   The team drew
a new squad from young, cheaper amateurs - who were soon
delivering another disappointing season, the Journal discloses.

AEK was relegated to the second division because of the loss,
the Journal notes.  It was also declared formally bankrupt, which
knocked it down one more notch to the third, amateur division --
but also allowed it to cancel its debts, the Journal relates.

Nevertheless, in March police issued arrest warrants for former
team presidents Andreas Dimitrelos, Demis Nikolaidis, Nikos
Thanopoulos and Stavros Adamidis, the Journal discloses.  They
voluntarily submitted to questioning regarding the back taxes,
police said, adding that they have denied any wrongdoing, the
Journal notes.

Established in 1924 in Athens, AEK is one of Greece's three big
teams and arguably the one with the deepest emotional pull.  Its
name is the Greek acronym for Athletic Union of Constantinople
because the club was formed by Greek refugees who fled from
Istanbul during wartime.  AEK claims 28 national titles and has
over the years regularly placed well in European competitions.


EXCEL MARITIME: Christiana Trust Named Member of Creditors' Panel
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Tracy Hope Davis, the U.S. Trustee for Region 2, replaced
Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas with Chistiana Trust as
member of the official committee of unsecured creditors in the
Chapter 11 cases of Excel Maritime Carriers LTD., et al.

The Committee members are:

   1. Zazove Associates, LLC
      235 Montgomery Street, Suite 440
      San Francisco, California 94104
      Attn: Nicholas Brown, CFA
      Telephone: (847) 239-7100

   2. Christiana Trust,
      A Divistion of Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB
      500 Delaware Avenue, 11th Floor
      Wilmington, Delaware 19899
      Attn: Patrick J. Healy, Director of Global Bankruptcy &
            Restructuring Services
      Telephone: (302) 888-7420

   3. Fidelity Investments
      82 Devonshire Street, V13H
      Boston, Massachusetts 02109
      Attn: Nate Van Duzer, Managing Director
      Telephone: (617) 392-8129

   4. Silverback Asset Management, LLC
      1414 Raleigh Road, Suite 250
      Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27517
      Attn: Jason Ham, Analyst
      Telephone: (919) 969-9300

   5. Kayne Anderson Capital Advisors, L.P.
      1800 Avenue of the Stars
      Los Angeles, California 90403
      Attn: Eri Nosaka, Research Analyst
      Telephone: (310) 284-6461

                       About Excel Maritime

Based in Athens, Greece, Excel Maritime Carriers Ltd. --
http://www.excelmaritime.com/-- is an owner and operator of dry
bulk carriers and a provider of worldwide seaborne transportation
services for dry bulk cargoes, such as iron ore, coal and grains,
as well as bauxite, fertilizers and steel products.  Excel owns a
fleet of 40 vessels and, together with 7 Panamax vessels under
bareboat charters, operates 47 vessels (5 Capesize, 14 Kamsarmax,
21 Panamax, 2 Supramax and 5 Handymax vessels) with a total
carrying capacity of approximately 3.9 million DWT.  Excel
Class A common shares have been listed since Sept. 15, 2005, on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) under the symbol EXM and,
prior to that date, were listed on the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) since 1998.

The company blamed financial problems on low charter rates.

The balance sheet for December 2011 had assets of US$2.72 billion
and liabilities totaling $1.16 billion.  Excel owes US$771
million to secured lenders with liens on almost all assets.
There is US$150 million owing on 1.875 percent unsecured
convertible notes.

Excel Maritime, filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case
No. 13-bk- 23060) on July 1, 2013, in New York after signing an
agreement where secured lenders owed US$771 million support a
reorganization plan filed alongside the petition.

Excel, which sought bankruptcy with a number of affiliates, has
tapped Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, as counsel;
Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC, as investment banker; and Global
Maritime Partners Inc., as financial advisor.

A five-member official committee of unsecured creditors was
appointed by the U.S. Trustee.


EXCEL MARITIME: Creditors' Panel Wants End of Exclusivity Period
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors asks the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York to end the
exclusivity period granted to Excel Maritime Carriers LTD., et
al., to allow other interested parties to propose their
reorganization plans for the Debtors.

The Creditors' Committee complains that the Debtors' prepackaged
plan only benefits the secured lenders and controlling
shareholders.  The prepackaged plan would give ownership of the
company to secured lenders owed US$771 million, although the
lenders will allow current owner Gabriel Panayotides to maintain
control least initially and buy the company back later.  The
Committee is opposed to the aspect of the plan where the current
owner can retain an interest while unsecured creditors receive
"nominal to no distribution."

As previously reported by The Troubled Company Reporter, the
Committee has hinted that a group of holders of convertible notes
will be submitting a competing plan to reorganize the Debtors.
The Committee said in court papers that "certain" holders of
convertible notes are working on a competing plan to "infuse
capital" including no commitment for a "specific management
team."  The creditors said the competing plan will "comply with
applicable bankruptcy law," in contrast to the company plan they
find defective.

The Creditors' Committee proposes to retain as bankruptcy counsel
Michael S. Stamer, Esq. -- mstamer@akingump.com -- Sean E.
O'Donnell, Esq. -- sodonnell@akingump.com -- and Sunish Gulati,
Esq. -- sgulati@akingump.com -- at AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD
LLP, in New York; and Sarah Link Schultz, Esq. --
sschultz@akingump.com -- at AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP,
in Dallas, Texas.

                       About Excel Maritime

Based in Athens, Greece, Excel Maritime Carriers Ltd. --
http://www.excelmaritime.com/-- is an owner and operator of dry
bulk carriers and a provider of worldwide seaborne transportation
services for dry bulk cargoes, such as iron ore, coal and grains,
as well as bauxite, fertilizers and steel products.  Excel owns a
fleet of 40 vessels and, together with 7 Panamax vessels under
bareboat charters, operates 47 vessels (5 Capesize, 14 Kamsarmax,
21 Panamax, 2 Supramax and 5 Handymax vessels) with a total
carrying capacity of approximately 3.9 million DWT.  Excel
Class A common shares have been listed since Sept. 15, 2005, on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) under the symbol EXM and,
prior to that date, were listed on the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) since 1998.

The company blamed financial problems on low charter rates.

The balance sheet for December 2011 had assets of US$2.72 billion
and liabilities totaling $1.16 billion.  Excel owes US$771
million to secured lenders with liens on almost all assets.
There is US$150 million owing on 1.875 percent unsecured
convertible notes.

Excel Maritime, filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case
No. 13-bk- 23060) on July 1, 2013, in New York after signing an
agreement where secured lenders owed US$771 million support a
reorganization plan filed alongside the petition.

Excel, which sought bankruptcy with a number of affiliates, has
tapped Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, as counsel;
Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC, as investment banker; and Global
Maritime Partners Inc., as financial advisor.

A five-member official committee of unsecured creditors was
appointed by the U.S. Trustee.


EXCEL MARITIME: Sells 2 Vessels for US$43.2MM to Credit Suisse
--------------------------------------------------------------
Judge Robert Drain of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York approved the sale of Excel Maritime Carrier
LTD., et al.'s two vessels, the M/V Mairouli and the M/V July M,
for US$43.2 million to Credit Suisse, as the stalking horse
bidder.

The Stalking Horse Bidder credit bid approximately US$43.2
million, comprising all of the Debtors' indebtedness to it.

As previously reported by The Troubled Company Reporter, prior to
commencement of the Chapter 11 cases, the Debtors began
negotiating with Credit Suisse to restructure and settle the
obligations under the Odell/Minta Facility, including possibly
via an agreed foreclosure proceeding or the Debtors' formal
abandonment of the vessels to Credit Suisse, pursuant to Section
554 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Debtors and Credit Suisse ultimately reached an agreement
whereby the Company will sell 100% of its stock ownership of
Odell and Minta, pursuant to a sale under section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code. In short, Credit Suisse has agreed to credit
bid, pursuant to Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code, up to the
maximum amount of its secured claim against the vessels securing
the Odell/Minta Facility.  The transaction will be effectuated by
a transfer by Excel Maritime Carriers of the shares in Odell and
Minta, with Credit Suisse directing the stock to Blueberry
Shipping.

                       About Excel Maritime

Based in Athens, Greece, Excel Maritime Carriers Ltd. --
http://www.excelmaritime.com/-- is an owner and operator of dry
bulk carriers and a provider of worldwide seaborne transportation
services for dry bulk cargoes, such as iron ore, coal and grains,
as well as bauxite, fertilizers and steel products.  Excel owns a
fleet of 40 vessels and, together with 7 Panamax vessels under
bareboat charters, operates 47 vessels (5 Capesize, 14 Kamsarmax,
21 Panamax, 2 Supramax and 5 Handymax vessels) with a total
carrying capacity of approximately 3.9 million DWT.  Excel
Class A common shares have been listed since Sept. 15, 2005, on
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) under the symbol EXM and,
prior to that date, were listed on the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) since 1998.

The company blamed financial problems on low charter rates.

The balance sheet for December 2011 had assets of US$2.72 billion
and liabilities totaling $1.16 billion.  Excel owes US$771
million to secured lenders with liens on almost all assets.
There is US$150 million owing on 1.875 percent unsecured
convertible notes.

Excel Maritime, filed a Chapter 11 petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case
No. 13-bk- 23060) on July 1, 2013, in New York after signing an
agreement where secured lenders owed US$771 million support a
reorganization plan filed alongside the petition.

Excel, which sought bankruptcy with a number of affiliates, has
tapped Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, as counsel;
Miller Buckfire & Co. LLC, as investment banker; and Global
Maritime Partners Inc., as financial advisor.

A five-member official committee of unsecured creditors was
appointed by the U.S. Trustee.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


FLEET STREET: Fitch Affirms 'CC' Rating on EUR96.9MM Cl. D Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Fleet Street Finance Two plc's class B
notes and affirmed the class C and D notes, as follows:

EUR55.5m class B (XS0268933487) upgraded to 'BBsf' from 'Bsf';
Outlook Stable

EUR140.1m class C (XS0268934451) affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
Estimate (RE) 100%

EUR96.9m class D (XS0268934618) affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE 100%

Key Rating Drivers The upgrade of the class B notes is driven by
a significant repayment of EUR330 million, which redeemed the
class A notes and reduced the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) to 35.4%
from 56.2% at the July 2012 IPD. The repayment was the combined
effect of property disposals, cash sweep and an exceptional
release of EUR28.5 million from a fee and liquidity reserve
account (FLRA). The FLRA was established at the time of the debt
extension to protect the class A notes from the expiry of the
original liquidity facility, scheduled for July 2014.

As the class B notes stand a good chance of being repaid from
disposal proceeds and cash sweep before the liquidity facility
expires, an upgrade is warranted by declining leverage. However
the class C and D notes are likely to remain outstanding for much
longer, which substantially ties their fortunes to those of the
sole tenant, Karstadt.

The German department store operator became insolvent in June
2009, triggering a major restructuring of the CMBS. The tenant,
which is unrated, was bought out of insolvency in June 2010,
although reportedly faces continued operating headwinds. Its
recent operating history implies risk of rental default, which
would also be negative for the portfolio of German department
stores, much of whose value will depend on their continued use.

With the FLRA now effectively withdrawn, any failure of the
tenant to meet its rental obligations would almost certainly
interrupt debt service on the class C and D notes, potentially
irreparably, as reflected in their speculative grade ratings. The
class B notes are not immune from concerns surrounding liquidity,
particularly if they remain outstanding after July 2014. This
risk precludes an investment grade rating at present.

The borrower has made good progress with the sales process,
measured both by pricing and timing, and since Fitch's last
rating action, 11 properties have been sold. Sales have been
skewed towards small-to-medium sized properties at the higher end
of the quality spectrum, and less is known about investor appeal
for properties larger than 15,000 sq. m. (representing 75% of the
remaining portfolio by market value). Disposing of the remaining
40 properties (the majority four-five storey department stores)
will likely be more challenging.

Fitch expects the collateral value to be sufficient to repay the
loan, as reflected in the Recovery Estimates. However, because
the loan margin is lower than the class D notes margin, a
piecemeal sell-down exposes this tranche to an irrecoverable
interest shortfall (i.e. default). The high RE for the class D
notes reflects the solid prospects of principal repayment.
However, any delay in finalizing recovery could still impose a
material loss of interest.

Rating Sensitivities

Slow progress with sale of the portfolio would exert downwards
pressure on the ratings of all the notes, which would assume
greater dependency on the tenant (and with it liquidity risk). A
default of Karstadt would be detrimental for all the notes, with
the class C and D notes being most exposed.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


SESTANTE FINANCE: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C2 Notes to 'B-'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Sestante Finance S.r.l.'s series 2.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its
      'A+ (sf)' rating on series 2's class A notes;

   -- Affirmed its 'A (sf)' rating on the class B notes; and

   -- Lowered its ratings on the class C1 and C2 notes.

The rating actions follows S&P's review of the transaction's
performance, its credit and cash flow analysis of the residual
collateral portfolio, and its assessment of counterparty risk
under its current counterparty criteria.

On June 13, 2013, following the downgrade of the transaction's
swap counterparty, Commerzbank AG, S&P kept on CreditWatch
negative its rating on the class A notes to assess if it could
withstand its cash flow stresses without the swap's support in
light of the increased available credit enhancement.

The transaction's performance has deteriorated over the past
year. Severe delinquencies (of 90 days or more) amounted to 5.98%
on the July 2013 interest payment date (IPD).  This is
substantially higher than S&P's Italian residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) index, at 1.80%.

Furthermore, on the July 2013 IPD, the amount of new defaults
increased to EUR1,642,083 (equal to 0.77% of the current
performing portfolio) from EUR1,553,299 on the April 2013 IPD.
Consequently, the unpaid principal deficiency ledger (PDL)'s
balance increased to EUR4,379,499 from EUR3,799,076 over the same
period, as the transaction has not been able to generate enough
excess spread to account for the unpaid PDL balances.  This has
increased the class C1 notes' undercollateralization to
EUR4.1 million.

The increasing unpaid PDL balance affects the repayment rate of
the class C2 excess spread-backed notes, since the issuer repays
principal on these notes after the amount recorded in the PDL.

S&P's cash flow analysis indicates that the class C1 and C2 notes
cannot withstand its stresses at the currently assigned rating
levels, following its observations of performance deterioration,
the class C1 notes' increasing undercollateralization, and the
lack of any excess spread to repay the class C2 notes.  S&P has
therefore lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)', and to 'B- (sf)'
from 'B+ (sf)' its ratings on the class C1 and C2 notes,
respectively.

In S&P's cash flow analysis, it has incorporated a commingling
stress equal to one month's collection of interest and principal
(including a certain amount of assumed prepayments).  S&P applied
this stress as the Italian collection bank account provider,
Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna S.C., is no longer eligible to
support S&P's ratings on the class A and B notes.

"We have affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative our
'A+ (sf)' rating on the class A notes because our cash flow
analysis indicates that it can withstand our stresses at the
currently assigned 'A+' rating level without giving benefit to
the swap.  Our long-term 'A-' issuer credit rating (ICR) on
Commerzbank therefore no longer constrains our rating on the
class A notes under our current counterparty criteria, removing
the weak link to the swap counterparty," S&P said.

"As in our June 2013 review, our current counterparty criteria
constrain our rating on the class B notes at one notch above our
long-term 'A-' ICR on Commerzbank.  This is because when we
conducted our cash flow analysis of the class B notes without
giving benefit to the swap agreement, the notes passed at lower
ratings.  We have therefore affirmed our 'A (sf)' rating on the
class B notes," S&P added.

Sestante Finance's series 2 is a securitization of Italian
residential mortgages that Meliorbanca SpA originated.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating                  Rating
            To                      From

Sestante Finance S.r.l.
EUR647.2 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Series 2

Rating Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A             A+ (sf)               A+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

B            A (sf)

Ratings Lowered

C1            B (sf)               BB+ (sf)
C2            B- (sf)              B+ (sf)


TELECOM ITALIA: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Jr. Subordinated Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had revised its
outlook on Telecom Italia SpA, Italy's largest telecommunications
operator, to negative from stable.  At the same time, S&P
affirmed its 'BBB-' long-term and 'A-3' short-term corporate
credit ratings on Telecom Italia and the 'BB' issue ratings on
Telecom Italia's junior subordinated debt.

The outlook revision follows Telecom Italia's lower earnings
guidance for 2013, due to the difficult domestic economic
environment, fierce competition, and strong regulatory pressure
on revenues.  Telecom Italia now expects a mid-single-digit
organic EBITDA decline for the group, rather than the low-single-
digit decline it previously expected.  The organic EBITDA decline
for the group in first-half 2013 was -6.8%, and -10.9% at its
domestic operations, according to Telecom Italia.

S&P continues to assess Telecom Italia's business risk profile as
"satisfactory" and its financial risk profile as "significant",
under its criteria.

The negative outlook reflects the possibility that S&P could
lower the long-term rating by one notch within the next 12 months
if the Telecom Italia group's Standard & Poor's fully adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA ratio exceeds 3.3x (and 3.5x including Brazil on a
pro rata basis), due to continued weak operating results and
limited deleveraging prospects.  In addition, failure to increase
its funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio to 24%-26% by the
end of 2014 could trigger a downgrade.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if it saw leverage
sustainably decline to less than 3.3x, FFO to debt return to the
25%-30% range, and group EBITDA (excluding the Argentinian
operations) stabilize in 2014.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


BTA BANK: Attempts to Recover U$6 Billion From Ablyazov
-------------------------------------------------------
EurasiaNet.org reports that now that Kazakhstani oligarch Mukhtar
Ablyazov has been apprehended, banking officials in Kazakhstan
are striving to recover as much as they can of the US$6 billion
he is accused of embezzling.  Meanwhile, officials in Astana are
pressing for Mr. Ablyazov's extradition while his supporters
contend he would not receive a fair trial in Kazakhstan, the
report discloses.

Mr. Ablyazov, who is wanted for alleged financial misdeeds in
Kazakhstan and other formerly Soviet states, and who is also a
fugitive from British justice, was finally tracked down in
southern France and arrested on July 31, EurasiaNet.org says.  He
is now in a French jail facing two extradition bids, one from
Ukraine, the other from Kazakhstan, where he is seen as public
enemy number one by President Nursultan Nazarbayev's
administration, EurasiaNet.org discloses.

In addition to being wanted in Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia,
Mr. Ablyazov faces legal problems in Britain, where last year he
fled after being convicted of contempt of court stemming from a
USS$6 billion fraud case brought against him by Kazakhstan's BTA
Bank, EurasiaNet.org notes.

BTA managing director Pavel Prosyankin on Aug. 1 welcomed
Mr. Ablyazov's arrest, saying the bank was "optimistic" about
recovering "more of the assets which the court has authorized us
to seize" from Mr. Ablyazov to compensate for the missing
billions, EurasiaNet.org recounts.

According to EurasiaNet.org, BTA representatives said they tipped
off authorities in Paris about Ablyazov's whereabouts, indicating
that the bank had hired the private detectives.  They tracked the
fugitive down by trailing legal representative and Ablyazov
associate Olena Tyshchenko (ex-wife of his Ukrainian former
business partner, Sergey Tyshchenko) from a London court hearing
in July, EurasiaNet.org relates.  She accidentally led them to
Mr. Ablyazov's hideout in the south of France, where he was
flitting between luxury residences, EurasiaNet.org discloses.

On Aug. 1, a French judge ordered Mr. Ablyazov held in jail amid
legal wrangling over an extradition request lodged by Ukraine,
EurasiaNet.org relates.  The following day Astana filed a
separate request for Ablyazov's extradition to Kazakhstan, where
he faces up to 13 years in prison if convicted of theft, fraud
and money laundering charges, EurasiaNet.org recounts.

Mr. Ablyazov's supporters fear that if extradited to Kazakhstan,
he faces political persecution, EurasiaNet.org states.  On
July 31, his son and daughter appealed to French officials not to
extradite their father, saying he was "in grave danger" and they
feared for his life, EurasiaNet.org relates.  "Kazakhstan's
pursuit of him is purely political," EurasiaNet.org quotes Madina
Ablyazova and Madiyar Ablyazov as saying.

EurasiaNet.org relates that Amnesty International has urged Paris
to ensure Mr. Ablyazov "has a full and fair extradition process"
and is not sent to any state that may extradite him to
Kazakhstan, "where he will be at risk of torture and an unfair
trial."

                          About BTA Bank

BTA Bank JSC, a Kazakhstan-based financial institution, again
filed for creditor protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 12-12-13081) on July
16, 2012, in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan.  BTA Bank is
asking the U.S. court to recognize the proceeding in the
Specialized Financial Court of Almaty City in the Republic of
Kazakhstan as a "foreign main proceeding."

BTA Bank estimated both debt and assets of more than $1 billion.

BTA Group -- comprised of BTA Bank and its subsidiaries and
affiliated companies -- is one of the leading banking groups in
the Commonwealth of Independent States and has affiliated banks
in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and
Turkey.

As of May 1, 2012, BTA Bank was the third largest bank in the
Republic of Kazakhstan by total assets with a market share of
10.9%, serving approximately 710,218 retail customers, 73,200
small and middle business customers and 1,397 corporate
customers, most of which reside or are registered, or maintain
their operations, inside Kazakhstan.  As of May 1, 2012, the Bank
employed 5,290 people inside and 2 people outside Kazakhstan.

In 2009, investigations and proceedings were launched in the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in
relation to fraudulent and unlawful transactions entered into by
the Bank's former management prior to February 2009 which, it
transpires, caused the Bank very significant losses.

On Oct. 7, 2009, the Bank applied to the Financial Court for an
order to commence a restructuring.  The foreign representative in
2010 filed a petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 10-10638) in
Manhattan and the judge granted a petition for recognition of the
Kazakhstan proceeding as "foreign main proceeding.

The Kazakhstan proceedings were closed in August 2010 after all
distributions were made.  The Chapter 15 case was closed in
January 2011.  Creditors whose claims were restructured received
a mixture of cash, senior debt, subordinated debt, other forms of
debt, equity and so-called recovery units  in consideration for
the restructuring of their claims.

Since the beginning of 2011, the Bank's financial situation,
however, has deteriorated despite measures undertaken by
management.  A high cost of funding and fierce competition among
Kazakhstan banks for business led to a steep deterioration in the
Bank's net interest margin, the measure of the difference between
the interest income generated by the Bank and the amount of
interest paid out to its lenders, relative to the amount of its
(interest-earning) assets.  Due to the subdued business
environment and cumbersome legal procedures, recoveries on non-
performing loans were considerably lower than expected. As a
result, the Bank showed a total negative equity under
International Financial Reporting Standards of KZT 216 billion
(US$1.5 billion) by June 30, 2011, which worsened to an estimated
IFRS consolidated equity deficit of KZT 367 billion (US$2.5
billion) at year end and has continued to worsen in 2012.

Considering the Bank's financial situation and the need to
restore the IFRS Tier 1 capital position, the Bank commenced
discussions with its creditors in order to effect a second
restructuring of all or part of its financial indebtedness under
Kazakhstan laws.

The Bank on April 5, 2012, formally agreed to the creation of a
steering committee of creditors to coordinate further discussions
in relation to the Restructuring.  The Steering Committee
selected Houlihan Lokey and Deloitte as joint financial advisers
and Baker & McKenzie as legal adviser.

On April 25, 2012, the Bank's board of directors resolved to
initiate the Restructuring.  On April 28, the Bank entered into
an agreement on restructuring with the National Bank of
Kazakhstan pursuant to Article 59-3(3) of the Kazakhstan Banking
Law.  On April 28, after obtaining a review and comments from the
Steering Committee's advisers, the Bank submitted a draft
restructuring plan to the National Bank of Kazakhstan. After the
National Bank of Kazakhstan completed its review, the way was
clear for the Bank to seek a Financial Court order opening a
restructuring proceeding under Kazakhstan law.

The Bank made an application for restructuring under the Banking
Law, the Civil Procedural Code and the Amending Law on May 2,
2012.

The second restructuring will be effected through the
restructuring of the existing claims arising from the financial
instruments issued during the first restructuring.  The
Restructuring is expected to be completed by Sept. 27, 2012.

The Chapter 15 petition was filed to prevent creditors from
seeking to take action against the Bank or its assets in the
United States.  The Bank's principal assets in the United States
are balances in accounts of correspondent banks located in New
York City.  Its major American creditors are financial
institutions, such as Deere Credit Inc, Goldman Sachs Lending
Partners LLC, LM Moore, L.P., PNC Bank N.A. (formerly National
City Bank Cleveland).

The Steering Committee of Creditors comprises Ashmore Investment
Management Limited (as agent for and on behalf of certain funds
and accounts for which it acts as investment adviser), the Asian
Development Bank, D.E. Shaw Oculus International, Inc. and D.E.
Shaw Laminar International, Inc., Gramercy Funds Management LLC,
J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd., Nomura International plc, The Royal
Bank of Scotland plc, SAM Salute Advisors Ltd., Swedish Export
Credits Guarantee Board - EKN and VR Capital Group Ltd. in its
capacity as General Partner of VR Global Partners, L.P

BTA Bank is represented in the U.S. by Evan C. Hollander, Esq.,
at White & Case LLP.

Judge James M. Peck oversees the Chapter 11 case.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


WOOD STREET CLO II: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'AAA (sf)' from
'AA+ (sf)' its credit ratings on Wood Street CLO II B.V.'s class
A-1 and A-2 notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its
ratings on the class B and C notes, and lowered its ratings on
the class D and E notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance, using data from the latest available trustee report,
as well as its credit and cash flow analysis.  S&P has taken into
account recent transaction developments and have reviewed it
under its relevant criteria.

Since S&P's March 5, 2012 review, EUR60.983 million of the class
A-1 and A-2 notes have amortized.  The collateral pool's
weighted-average spread has increased to 4.25% from 3.57% since
S&P's previous review.  At the same time, the pool's weighted-
average life has reduced to 4.10 years from 4.75 years.

The proportion of assets that S&P considers to be rated in the
'CCC' category (rated 'CCC+', 'CCC' or 'CCC-') in the portfolio
has dropped to 6.35% from 11.97%.  The proportion of defaulted
assets (rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD', and 'D') has increased to 3.65%
from 3.13%.

The available credit enhancement for the class A-1, A-2, B, and C
notes has increased.  However, it has decreased for the class D
and E notes.

"We have subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis
to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each rated
class.  In our analysis, we have used performing portfolio
balance, the principal cash balance, the current weighted-average
spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that we consider
to be appropriate.  We have incorporated various cash flow stress
scenarios using various default patterns and levels for each
liability rating category, in conjunction with different interest
rate stress scenarios," S&P said.

"Our ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes are constrained by
the application of the largest obligor test, a supplemental
stress test that we introduced in our 2009 corporate cash flow
collateralized debt obligation criteria.  This test addresses
event and model risk that might be present in the transaction.
Although the BDRs generated by our cash flow model indicated
higher ratings, the largest obligor test results constrain our
ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes," S&P said.

"Taking into account the results of our credit and cash flow
analysis, we have raised to 'AAA (sf)' from 'AA+ (sf)' our
ratings on the class A-1 and A-2 notes due to their partial
redemption and increased available credit enhancement.  We have
affirmed our ratings on the class B and C notes, and have lowered
our ratings on the class D and E notes because the largest
obligor test results constrain our ratings on these classes," S&P
added.

Wood Street CLO II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation
(CLO) transaction backed primarily by leveraged loans to
speculative-grade corporate firms.  The reinvestment period ended
in March 2011 and the transaction is managed by Alcentra Ltd.

           STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class               Rating
             To               From

Wood Street CLO II B.V.
EUR400 Million Senior Secured And Deferrable Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1          AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)
A-2          AAA (sf)         AA+ (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

B            A+ (sf)
C            BBB+(sf)

Ratings Lowered

D            B+ (sf)          BB (sf)
E            CCC+ (sf)        B+ (sf)



===========
P O L A N D
===========


POLIMEX-MOSTOSTAL SA: Emtech Files Bankruptcy Petition in Warsaw
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Maciej Martewicz at Bloomberg News reports that Emtech filed a
motion in Warsaw court asking for Polimex-Mostostal's bankruptcy.

According to Bloomberg, Polimex-Mostostal is in talks with Emtech
and plans "legal steps" that would lead to withdrawing the
motion.

Last month, the Polimex-Mostostal said another creditor, DAAS,
also filed motion for its bankruptcy, Bloomberg recounts.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 2,
2013, Bloomberg News related that Polimex failed to pay interest
on its debt by the June 28 deadline.  The company signed in
December a deal with creditors allowing it to restructure
outstanding debt and raise new capital, Bloomberg disclosed.

Polimex-Mostostal is a Polish engineering and construction
company that has been on the market since 1945.  The Company is
distinguished by a wide range of services provided on general
contractorship basis for the chemical as well as refinery and
petrochemical industries, power engineering, environmental
protection, industrial and general construction.  The Company
also operates in the field of road and railway construction as
well as municipal infrastructure.  Polimex-Mostostal is a large
manufacturer and exporter of steel products, including platform
gratings, in Poland.



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


RAPID BUCHAREST: CAS Relegates Club from Romanian 1st Division
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that Rapid Bucharest was relegated
August 9 from Romania's top division by the Court of Arbitration
for Sport, which ordered Concordia Chiajna to be reinstated two
weeks after the season kicked off.

According to the report, CAS said its judge ruled that the
Romanian football federation was wrong to offer financially
troubled Rapid a place in a playoff match, which it won, against
Concordia last month.

"Rapid did not have a license to participate . . . (and) the
knockout game was organized without any regulatory basis," the
court said in a statement, AP relays. "The appeal of Concordia
Chiajna is upheld, meaning that it is eligible to compete in Liga
1 for the 2013-2014 season in lieu of Rapid."

A Steaua-Rapid derby match in Bucharest scheduled for August 10
was canceled.

AP says Concordia, which finished 15th last season, asked CAS for
a reprieve, arguing that Rapid -- which finished in the middle of
the table -- should have been automatically relegated over
financial problems.

The federation had refused to grant Rapid a license after the
three-time champion filed for insolvency in November. Rapid's
financial issues also led UEFA in May to impose a one-season
suspension from European club competitions and a $130,500 fine,
relates AP.

However, the RFF then granted the unusual option of a playoff
match rather than uphold its own licensing rules, the report
adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 20,
2012, Reuters said troubled Romanian soccer club Rapid
Bucharest said they had filed for insolvency after running up
huge debts.

"We opened insolvency proceedings to save the club," Reuters
quoted Rapid's majority shareholder George Copos as saying.
"We're doing everything in our power to save Rapid."

Reuters noted that three-time Romanian champions Rapid and city
rivals Dinamo, who have won the league 18 times, are among nine
European clubs facing punishment from UEFA over payment arrears
to other teams, their staff or tax authorities.

According to the news agency, Rapid, who played in the Romanian
Cup final in May, have spent heavily in recent years but their
players have not been paid for several months.

"The difference between revenue and expenditure goes to
EUR5 million (US$6.54 million) per year," Reuters quoted Rapid
president Constantin Zotta as saying. "It's terrible."

Reuters noted that the move could mean the end of professional
football for Rapid as Romanian soccer regulations do not allow an
insolvent club to have a first-division license.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


SUEK FINANCE: Moody's Rates RUB10-Bil. Senior Bonds '(P)Ba3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba3
rating (with a loss-given default assessment of LGD4, 52%) to the
RUB10 billion (about $306 million) of proposed senior unsecured
rouble-denominated bonds issued by SUEK Finance, a limited
liability company incorporated under the laws of the Russian
Federation and a 100% subsidiary of SUEK OAO (SUEK, Ba3 stable).
The rating outlook is stable.

SUEK Finance is issuing the bonds for the sole purpose of
financing a loan to SUEK plc. (unrated), a parent holding company
of SUEK, which is the main asset of SUEK plc.

The bondholders of the proposed bond, as well as SUEK's existing
rouble-denominated bond maturing in 2020 (around US$64 million
outstanding as of June 30, 2013), will benefit from a surety
provided by SUEK and from SUEK plc.'s irrevocable offer to
acquire bonds in the case of a breach of payment obligations by
SUEK Finance, to prevent the event of default on the bonds.

The provision of the irrevocable offer to acquire bonds is
intended to provide the same level of support to the bondholders,
once the company's corporate restructuring, which is currently
under way, is completed. As a result of this restructuring,
certain assets relating to SUEK's brown coal deposits will be
spun off and will be owned directly by SUEK plc. SUEK's
management estimates that this restructuring will be completed by
the end of 2013. Given this and the surety provided by SUEK and
irrevocable offer provided by SUEK plc., bondholders are relying
on the creditworthiness of both entities to service and repay the
debt. SUEK will use the proceeds of the loan to repay existing
indebtedness and for general corporate purposes.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities, and these ratings represent only the rating
agency's preliminary opinion. Upon a conclusive review of the
transaction and associated documentation, Moody's will assign
definitive ratings to the bonds. A final rating may differ from a
provisional rating.

"The assigned (P)Ba3 rating to the proposed rouble-denominated
bonds is at the same level as SUEK's corporate family rating,
which balances the company's limited diversification as a result
of its exposure to a single commodity, steam coal -- a sector
that carries a negative outlook -- with its sizeable share of the
domestic steam coal market and low production costs," says Denis
Perevezentsev, a Moody's Vice President - Senior Analyst and lead
analyst for SUEK.

Ratings Rationale:

The assigned rating on the bonds is at the same level as SUEK's
corporate family rating, and SUEK's current rated rouble bond
instrument maturing in 2020. Moody's ranks the proposed bonds
pari passu with SUEK's other unsecured debt. The surety provided
carries the risks associated with the developing nature of the
Russian legislation and short history of Russian commercial law,
including risks associated with doing business in Russia.

The Ba3 CFR reflects (1) SUEK's limited diversification as a
result of its exposure to a single commodity, steam coal,
international prices for which are volatile and currently at a
low level, as well as the company's exposure to railway tariffs
and international freight rates; (2) the uncertainty as to
whether the Russian government will reduce subsidies on natural
gas consumption; (3) inefficiencies and capacity limitations on
the Russian rail network, which could lead to a bottleneck and
require the company to make higher investments; (4) the company's
foreign exchange risk; (5) the ongoing need for the company to
participate in competitive auctions for new and expansion-related
mining licenses; (6) SUEK's high level of dependency on external
financing, primarily due to the volatile seasonal nature of the
company's working capital needs, sizable debt service burden and
capex; and (7) the risks related to the company's concentrated
ownership structure including related-party transactions and/or
pro-shareholder finance policies.

However, more positively, the Ba3 CFR also reflects (1) the
company's growing role as a global thermal coal producer; (2) its
competitive operating costs; (3) its vast coal reserves and
fairly simple geology; (4) its well-diversified domestic and
international customer base; (5) the stability of its domestic
sales on account of the proximity of its mines to its power
generation customers and the essential nature of electricity; (6)
its control over a considerable portion of its transportation
infrastructure (including ports in Vanino and Murmansk) such that
it is positioned to move coal efficiently to the Pacific and
European export markets; and (7) the relative resilience of steam
coal prices compared with other bulk commodities in the currently
challenging market.

The rating incorporates uncertainty surrounding the global steam
coal market, which will remain under pressure during 2013-14 due
to demand/supply imbalance as oversupply constrains price
recovery.

Rationale For Stable Outlook

The stable rating outlook reflects (1) SUEK's low-cost
operations; (2) the stability associated with the Russian
electric power industry; and (3) the synergistic relationship the
company has with many of its domestic customers given the
location of its mines.

The outlook also reflects Moody's view that SUEK's financial
metrics will hold up fairly well even in the currently
challenging macroeconomic environment. In addition, the outlook
incorporates the rating agency's expectation that the company
will maintain sufficient liquidity.

What Could Change The Rating Up/ Down

Positive rating pressure could develop if SUEK is able to
continue demonstrating a good operating performance -- unit costs
and operating margins -- while also consistently achieving a
ratio of (CFO less dividends)/debt in the mid- to high twenties
in percentage terms and leverage, measured as debt/EBITDA, of
below 2.5x. Positive rating pressure would also be dependent on
there being further improvement in SUEK's corporate governance
practices, on the company's curtailment of related-party
transactions and ability to maintain a sound liquidity profile.

Conversely, negative pressure could be exerted on the rating as a
result of any of the following: (1) SUEK's gross debt/EBITDA
exceeds 3.5x; (2) its operating margins decline to under 12%; (3)
it cannot generate positive free cash flow; or (4) it experiences
difficulty refinancing its maturing debt. Any corporate
restructuring and/or reorganization that would lead to weaker
operational or financial metrics could also have a negative
impact on the rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Mining Industry published in May 2009. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

SUEK is Russia's largest producer of thermal coal and one of the
world's top thermal coal producers. SUEK has 5.9 billion tons of
proven and probable reserves, or approximately a 50-year reserve
life. In 2012, it sold 91.7 million tons (2011: 88.9 million
tons) of coal; of this figure, 42% (2011: 38%) represented
exports, 58% of which were to the Asia-Pacific market and 42% to
the Atlantic market. On a revenue basis, the company's exports in
2012 represented approximately 70% (2011: 69%) of its net sales
of coal.

SUEK currently operates 17 opencast and 12 underground mines in
seven geographic regions in Siberia and the Russian Far East. In
addition, the company owns rail infrastructure, rail rolling
stock, and a coal terminal at the port of Vanino in the Sea of
Japan. In 2012, SUEK also bought a 49.9% stake in the ice-free
port of Murmansk in the northwest of Russia. Effective April 30,
2011, SUEK's demerged its power-generating assets from its coal-
mining assets and, subsequently, simplified its shareholding and
legal structure. Sales to its former power segment (Kuzbassenergo
and TGC-13) made in accordance with long-term contracts comprised
around 12% of SUEK's revenue in 2012. The company's principal
ultimate beneficiary is Mr. Andrey Melnichenko.


* VOLGOGRAD REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB-' LT Currency Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia's Volgograd Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency ratings at 'BB-', with Stable
Outlooks, and its Short-term foreign currency rating at 'B'. The
agency has also affirmed the region's National Long-term rating
at 'A+(rus)' with Stable Outlook.

The rating action also affects the region's outstanding senior
unsecured domestic bonds of RUB13.8 billion.

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmation reflects the developed local economy, the
moderate debt burden with low immediate refinancing risk and
operating performance improvement in 2012-H113. However, the
ratings also factor in weak debt coverage ratios, and volatile
budgetary performance with a continuous budget deficit during the
past four years.

Fitch expects an improvement in the region's operating
performance in 2013 due to operating revenue growth driven by tax
base expansion and changes in allocation of corporate income tax
(CIT) proceeds. According to recent changes, companies start
paying CIT in proportion to fixed assets and salary fund placed
in the region. The operating balance is expected to more than
double to RUB4 billion in 2013 from RUB1.3 billion in 2012.
Current balance will turn to a positive 3.1% of current revenue
after negative results in 2011 and 2012. Fitch expects the
region's operating margin to consolidate at about 6% during 2013-
2015.

The region recorded a notable deficit during the past four years,
which peaked at 12.2% of total revenue in 2012. As a result, the
region's direct risk increased by 2.7x at end-2012 compared to
2010. Nevertheless, it stayed moderate in relative terms at below
40% of current revenue. Fitch expects a narrowing of the deficit
to 2.3% in 2013, which will limit debt growth.

Despite growing direct risk, the debt maturity profile is long
term in the national context, expanding until 2018. The region is
not exposed to high immediate refinancing risk as a significant
proportion of its debt is long-term domestic bonds and bank loans
due in 2014-2016. However a weak payback ratio (direct
risk/current balance) makes the region dependent on access to the
market for refinancing maturing debt and capex finance in the
medium term.

The local economy recovered relatively fast in 2010-2012 after
the economic downturn severely affected the region in 2009.
Investment in fixed capital was the main driver of the growth and
administration forecasts economic growth will continue at about
4% yoy during 2013-2015. The region has an industrial economy,
which provides a strong tax base and leads to low dependence on
federal financial aid but high tax concentration.

The region's tax base is highly concentrated as the 10 largest
taxpayers contributed 47% of total tax revenue in 2012.
Volatility of income taxes hit the budget in 2011 and 2012 when
corporate income tax proceeds fell below 2010's level. Unstable
tax proceeds coupled with growing operating and capital
expenditure resulted in significant deficit before debt variation
in 2011 and 2012.

Rating Sensitivities

Improving performance and debt stabilization would be positive
A sustainable improvement in the region's budgetary performance
with an operating margin about 10% coupled with the stabilization
of direct risk below 50% of current revenue could lead to an
upgrade.

Increasing refinancing risk negative

High refinancing risk due to the growth of short-term borrowing
coupled with weak, close to zero, operating balance and growing
direct risk would lead to a downgrade.



=========
S P A I N
=========


TDA IBERCAJA: S&P Affirms 'D' Rating on Class B Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to 'AA- (sf)' from
'A- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its credit rating
on TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria's
class A(G) notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its 'D
(sf)' rating on the class B notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the transaction's
performance and its structural features, based on the trustee's
latest available investor report (dated April 2013), and the
application of S&P's relevant criteria for conducting its credit,
cash flow, and counterparty and sovereign risk analysis.

Banco Santander S.A. (BBB/Negative/A-2) is the swap provider in
TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO.  The swap agreement states that the swap
counterparty, Banco Santander, must be replaced if its short-term
rating falls below 'A-1'.  On Feb, 15, 2013, S&P placed on
CreditWatch negative its rating on TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO's class
A(G) notes, as the remedy period specified in the swap agreement
had elapsed and Banco Santander had not remedied the breach.

                        COUNTERPARTY RISK

In July 2013, the issuer amended the transaction documents
relating to the swap counterparty to comply with S&P's current
counterparty criteria.  According to the amended transaction
documents, Banco Santander will take remedy actions within the
specified timeframe.  The documents state that if the swap
provider does not have the minimum rating that enables the
transaction to achieve the maximum potential rating on the notes,
it will have 10 days to post collateral that will guarantee the
swap counterparty's obligations.  If the swap is further
downgraded, it will have 60 days to replace itself or find a
guarantor.

Therefore, under S&P's current counterparty criteria, it can give
benefit to the swap.  Therefore, the maximum potential rating
that the notes in this transaction can achieve is 'AA- (sf)'.

                   CREDIT AND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

Even though total delinquencies have increased to 1.87% in April
2013 from 0.68% in May 2011, in S&P's view, credit performance
has been stable.  As of the May 31, 2013 payment date, the
reserve fund has not been used and available credit enhancement
remains stable compared with our Feb. 15, 2013 review.  As of the
last interest payment date, the reserve fund remained at its
required level and represents 12.59% of credit enhancement over
the outstanding balance of the class A(G) notes.

According to the April 2013 trustee report, all arrears buckets
have deteriorated, particularly the younger ones.  In April 2013,
60-90 days arrears increased to 0.81% from 0.27% in May 2011.
Over the same period, 90+ days arrears increased to 0.20% from
0.10%.  Cumulative defaults (defined in this transaction as loans
in arrears for more than 18 months) remain low at 0.10% of the
original portfolio balance.  Given the deterioration in
delinquencies, S&P expects the younger arrears to roll over into
long-term arrears in the next 12 months.  Due to the increase in
arrears and projected arrears, S&P has consequently increased its
surveillance assumptions for the portfolio's weighted-average
foreclosure frequency.

The portfolio is highly concentrated in the regions of Madrid and
Aragon (77.38%) and does therefore not benefit from regional
diversification, in S&P's opinion.  Additionally, 100% of the
portfolio comprises subsidized Vivienda de Proteccion Oficial
(VPO) loans which benefit from, among other things, a subsidy on
monthly loans installments.  In order to assess if this
transaction could withstand scenarios in which payments from the
state are no longer received and the borrowers are solely
responsible for making the payments (in such a scenario S&P would
expect the level of arrears and defaults to rapidly increase from
the levels seen in the past), S&P assumes in its portfolio credit
analysis that loans with these features are more likely to enter
a foreclosure process.

Despite the observed portfolio deterioration, S&P's cash flow
analysis shows that there is sufficient available credit
enhancement to support a 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A notes.
This is mainly due to the current level of available credit
enhancement for the notes, which the performing collateral
balance and the cash reserve provide.

                           SOVEREIGN RISK

S&P's non-sovereign ratings criteria classify the underlying
assets in this transaction as having "low" country risk.  Under
S&P's criteria, the maximum rating differential between S&P's
investment-grade rating on the sovereign in which the underlying
assets are based (Spain) and its ratings in the transaction is
six notches.  Therefore, S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria caps
the maximum potential rating in this transaction at 'AA- (sf)'.

Taking into account the observed and expected portfolio credit
quality deterioration, the transaction's structural features, and
counterparty and sovereign risks, S&P has raised to 'AA- (sf)'
from 'A- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating
on the class A(G) notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed its
'D (sf)' rating on the class B notes as this class of notes,
which at closing funded the reserve fund, is still in default.

TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO is a Spanish residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transaction, backed mostly by subsidized
mortgage loans originated by Ibercaja Banco S.A. under the ICO-
FTVPO subsidy program.  Under this program, the Spanish Ministry
of Housing and local authorities give borrowers the ability to
buy a first residential property, which, due to their economic
situation, they might not be able to afford without this subsidy.
The subsidy for this type of borrower is two-fold: The subsidized
VPO properties are cheaper than those on the free market, and the
Spanish Ministry of Housing pays to the originator up to 40% of
the installment on the borrower's behalf.  TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO
closed in July 2009.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating           Rating
            To               From

TDA IBERCAJA ICO-FTVPO, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR447.2 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A(G)        AA- (sf)          A- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

B           D (sf)



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


EUROSAIL 2007-1: Fitch Lifts Rating on Class FTc Notes to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded 18 and affirmed 228 tranches of 31 UK
Non-Conforming RMBS transactions. The agency has also revised the
Outlook on three Great Hall 2006 tranches. The reviewed
transactions are from the Eurosail, ResLoc UK, RMS, Newgate,
Leek, Great Hall and Uropa.

Key Rating Drivers

Divergence in Asset Performance
The affirmations reflect the predominantly stabilized performance
and credit support available to each of the rated tranches in the
transactions. The Leek and Great Hall series continue to perform
relatively better compared with the rest of the UK non-conforming
RMBS transactions with arrears levels in the three months plus
bucket (3M+ arrears) ranging between 3.7% and 6.1%. The
performance of the ResLoc and two Uropa transactions has been
stable with 3M+ arrears ranging between 7.8% and 9.4% of the
current portfolio balance. Meanwhile, 3M+ arrears for the
Eurosail portfolios (which have ranged between 12% and 28%) have
deteriorated as a result of the recent tightening in Acenden's
litigation policies, which has limited the number of properties
taken into possession.

3M+ arrears levels in theRMS and Newgate series have been in most
cases exceeding 20% of the current pool (except for Newgate 2007-
3 with 3M+ levels at 13%). Despite the higher arrears levels, the
RMS series have reported higher collection rates for loans in
arrears than the Newgate series (around 90% for RMS compared with
approximately 70% for Newgate), which suggests a higher
propensity for RMS borrowers to clear arrears. In its calculation
of foreclosure frequency for loans in arrears for certain
transactions, Fitch adjusted its assumptions for the roll-through
to default rate of loans in arrears based on the collection rate
provided.

The good performance of the underlying assets in the Great Hall
series has led to upgrades of the mezzanine and junior notes of
Great Hall 2007-1 to 'A-sf', 'BBsf' and 'Bsf', while the Outlooks
on the class D and E tranches of Great Hall 2007-1 have been
revised to Positive from Stable. The improved performance and
sufficient credit enhancement available to support higher ratings
led to the upgrade of the class B1 notes of RMS 21, and class B1
and B2 notes of RMS 22 to 'BBBsf', 'BBsf' and 'Bsf',
respectively. Weaker asset performance for Eurosail has driven
the revision of Outlook to Stable from Positive on the class B1a,
B1c C1a and C1c of Eurosail 2006-1. The stable performance of
ResLoc and the two Uropa transactions has resulted in the
affirmation of all collateralized tranches of these transactions.

Fully-funded Reserve Funds Support Transactions
The reserve funds of the more seasoned RMS transactions, as well
as those of the Great Hall series are fully funded, while the
notes continue to pay down sequentially due to breach of pro-rata
triggers, allowing for a further build-up of credit enhancement
available to the rated notes in upcoming payment dates.

Uncollateralized Tranches Supported by Excess Spreads
Given the healthy levels of excess spread within respective
transactions, Fitch expects most of the uncollateralized notes
outstanding to pay down in the next 12 months and has therefore
upgraded the class Q notes of Newgate 2006-3, class FTc notes of
Eurosail 2006-3, the class ETc notes of Eurosail 2007-1, the
class E2b and the class F1b notes of ResLoc to 'Bsf', while the
class FTc notes of Eurosail 2007-1 have been upgraded to 'CCCsf'.

Rating Sensitivities

Fitch believes that even a modest increase in interest will put a
strain on borrower affordability, triggering increased arrears
and default levels thereafter. Given the weaker profile of the
underlying borrowers in these pools, refinancing opportunities
are expected to remain limited, leaving the junior tranches
exposed to future losses.

The agency also believes UK house price declines beyond Fitch's
current expectations could increase loss severities on foreclosed
loans which could cause additional stress on the underlying
portfolio cash flows.


HEARTS OF MIDLOTHIAN: BDO Close to Announcing Preferred Bidder
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dale Miller at Edinburgh Evening News reports that it has been
revealed a preferred bidder for debt-stricken Hearts of
Midlothian Football Club is on the verge of being announced.

Administrator Bryan Jackson said BDO was close to announcing
which organization will be given the status -- allowing the body
to go it alone in a quest to buy Hearts, Edinburgh Evening News
discloses.

The financial chief offered the strongest indication yet that
fans-driven Foundation of Hearts (FoH) would win the race for
priority, saying the consortium appeared the "most likely" bidder
for the club, Edinburgh Evening News notes.

He made the revelation after a group of creditors, including
solicitors representing Lithuanian firms Ukio Bankas and UBIG,
unanimously agreed they all wanted to enter a creditors voluntary
arrangement needed to sell Hearts and avoid liquidation,
Edinburgh Evening News relates.

Ukio -- the club's biggest creditor -- is owed GBP15 million of
Hearts' total GBP28.5m debt and have Tynecastle Stadium as
security, Edinburgh Evening News discloses.

Mr. Jackson, as cited by Edinburgh Evening News, said the small
landmark achieved at Monday's meeting -- along with Hearts'
rousing 1-0 derby victory over Hibs -- were morale-lifters for
Jambos fans.

The derby result eats away at a portion of the 15-point penalty
handed out to Hearts by the Scottish Football Association as
punishment for going into administration, Edinburgh Evening News
states.

Confidentiality clauses prevent BDO from discussing the status of
the GBP4 million bid submitted by Italian Angelo Massone,
Edinburgh Evening News says.  However, the Massone bid appears to
be floundering, with FoH having rejected an offer to unite for a
joint takeover of Tynecastle, Edinburgh Evening News states.

Mr. Massone's Five Stars Football Ltd. is one of the two
remaining bidders for the Tynecastle club, Edinburgh Evening News
dislcoses.  A deadline to provide administrators with proof of
cash expired last Friday, Edinburgh Evening News recounts.

The foundation submitted proof of their own funding to BDO a
fortnight ago and have GBP3.75 million to run Hearts for the next
three years, Edinburgh Evening News discloses.

"We remain hopeful that the bid submitted on behalf of Foundation
of Hearts will be named as BDO's preferred option.  We are
convinced that we present the best bid with the lowest risk for
creditors," Edinburgh Evening News quotes Foundation spokesman
Lawrence Broadie as saying.

Hearts of Midlothian Football Club, more commonly known as
Hearts, is a Scottish professional football club based in Gorgie,
in the west of Edinburgh.


INSIGHT COMMODITIES: High Court Enters Wind Up Order
----------------------------------------------------
John Brazier at InsolvencyNews reports that Insight Commodities
Ltd has been wound up by the High Court in London in the public
interest.

Following an investigation by The Insolvency Service, Insight
Commodities Ltd was wound up on July 17, 2013, after raking in
over GBP1 million from approximately 100 investors.

"I consider this to be a completely fraudulent business. The
investigators have found no evidence that the company has taken
any steps to ensure that the company acquired any such land," the
report quotes Registrar Jones as saying.

"What it appears to be is that people are selling purported
investment with the aim of providing no return. That is plainly a
fraud that needs to be investigated as soon as possible by the
Official Receiver under a compulsory winding up".

According to InsolvencyNews, the investigation found Insight was
one of a number of interconnected companies that promoted a bio-
fuel project based on the cultivation of the Moringa Olyfeira
tree in Mozambique to investors.

Insight promised prospective investors "double-digit returns on
investment" on its website, but there was no evidence that the
project even existed, the report notes.

InsolvencyNews notes that the company's role in the scheme was to
contract with investors and take payment from them although the
company had no UK office and used a firm of notaries in London to
prepare and process the contract paperwork and take payments.

The only remaining recorded director of Insight, Soloman Gambrah,
claimed he had never agreed to become a director and knew nothing
about the company or its accounts.

Insight Commodities Ltd offered investments in an untraceable
biofuel project in Mozambique.


KAUPTHING SINGER: Pension Trustees Win High Court Ruling
--------------------------------------------------------
Steve Tolley at MoneyMarketing reports that a law firm has warned
collapsed firms with large pension deficits will face an "uphill
struggle" to reassess the debt after it has been certified by
auditors at the point of insolvency after a High Court ruling
this week.

In 2008, MoneyMarketing recalls, a GBP2 million fund was
transferred by Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander, a UK subsidiary of
failed Icelandic bank Kaupthing, to the Bank of England in a
ringfenced pot.

MoneyMarketing relates that when the bank became insolvent there
was confusion as to how the money was to be distributed between
potential beneficiaries, including its pension scheme. A
subsequent judgment of the court of appeal held that the scheme
was the beneficiary, the report notes.

In a fresh ruling on the case earlier last week, MoneyMarketing
says, the High Court ruled against the administrators of the
bank, and found the GBP2 million deposit held on trust for the
pension scheme could not be deducted from the administrators'
debt to the scheme.

According to the report, High Court chancellor Sir Terence
Etherton ruled that it would be "unprincipled" to "go behind" the
actuary's section 75 certificate, which establishes the level of
statutory debt as a "single, indivisible debt".

"By freezing the calculations of assets and liabilities at the
point at which the insolvency event occurs, the calculation of
the debt does not need to be endlessly revisited in the light of
changing circumstances," the report quotes Pinsent Masons'
pensions partner Alastair Meeks as saying. "This ruling means any
firm wanting to do so would really face an uphill struggle."

However, the chancellor's ruling said it could be possible to
reasses the debt in exceptional circumstances, for example in
cases where there is evidence of fraud, the report adds.


LBG CAPITAL: Moody's Raises Rating on Capital Notes to 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of Lloyds'
lower Tier two enhanced capital notes (ECNs) issued by LBG
Capital No1 plc. and LBG Capital No2 plc. to Ba2 (hyb) from B1
and Ba1(hyb) from Ba3, respectively. The rating outlook for the
ECNs is stable.

Ratings Rationale:

The upgrade is in line with Moody's revised Global Banks
methodology for rating bank hybrid securities, contractual non-
viability securities (which are one type of contingent capital
securities or CoCos), and subordinated debt. The relevant Lloyds'
ECNs are dated subordinated debt containing a conversion trigger
to ordinary shares in whole (and not in part) occurring if Lloyds
Banking Group's consolidated Core Tier 1 ratio is lower than 5%.
Lloyds reported an increase on its current regulatory Core Tier 1
ratio to 13.7% as of June 30, 2013 from 12% at the end of 2012,
reducing the probability of a conversion.

Lloyds has reported a significant improvement in statutory profit
before tax to GBP2.1 billion in H1 2013, compared with a loss
before tax of GBP456 million in H1 2012. In addition, in 2012,
the bank was able to resume the payments of coupons of its non-
cumulative preference shares. Moody's believes that Lloyds'
improved financial metrics and the resumption of payments on
other junior debt instruments support a view that a conversion
event for the ECNs has become less likely and that the ratings of
these instruments should be aligned with the normal notching
practice for CoCos as set out in Moody's Global Banks
methodology.

The ratings reflect the potential uncertainty associated with the
timing to equity conversion by rating the securities one notch
lower than "plain vanilla" subordinated debt. The rating of the
ECNs issued by LBG Capital No1 is positioned two notches below
the adjusted BCA, in line with Moody's standard notching guidance
for contractual non-viability subordinated debt. The ECNs issued
by LBG Capital No1 plc. -- guaranteed by Lloyds Banking Group (A3
negative) -- are rated one notch lower than the ECNs issued by
LBG Capital No2 plc. guaranteed by Lloyds TSB Bank (A2 negative,
C-/baa2 stable) to reflect the structural subordination of the
holding company (Lloyds Banking Group) to its operating
subsidiary.

What Could Move The Ratings Down/Up

The ECNs ratings will likely move in line with the baseline
credit assessment (BCA) of Lloyds TSB Bank. Upward pressure could
be exerted on Lloyds' standalone BCA if the bank is able to (1)
continue reducing the impact of non-core assets and conduct
remediation on its profitability and return to stable net income;
and (2) complete the ongoing improvements to its funding profile,
by further reducing its use of wholesale funding.

Downwards pressure might develop on Lloyds' standalone BCA if
operating conditions in the UK worsen beyond Moody's
expectations, or funding conditions worsen significantly for an
extended period.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Banks
published in May 2013.


MISYS NEWCO 2: S&P Revises Outlook to Stable & Affirms 'B' CCR
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on U.K. software company Misys Newco 2 S.a.r.l. (Misys)
to stable from negative.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its
'B' long-term corporate credit rating on Misys.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on Misys' first-
lien bank facilities and revolving credit facility (RCF).  The
recovery rating on these facilities is unchanged at '2',
indicating S&P's expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.

Finally, S&P affirmed its 'CCC+' issue rating on Misys' second-
lien loan.  The recovery rating on this loan is unchanged at '6',
indicating S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.

The rating actions reflect S&P's view of the meaningful
improvement in Misys' operating performance in the financial year
ended May 30, 2013 (financial 2013), and S&P's forecast of
further EBITDA growth, albeit at a slower pace, in financial
2014.  S&P forecasts that Misys's EBITDA (excluding capitalized
development software) will continue to increase to the 32%-34%
range, and that EBITDA cash interest coverage will exceed 1.5x in
financial 2014.

The corporate credit rating on Misys continues to reflect S&P's
assessment of the company's business risk profile as "fair" and
its financial risk profile as "highly leveraged."

Misys' "fair" business risk profile continues to benefit from its
strong brand and meaningful presence in the fragmented treasury
and risk management software solutions market.  Further benefits
are Misys' high recurring revenues and client retention rates of
well above 90%.  S&P believes that the integration risks related
to Misys' recent merger with trade and risk management software
provider Turaz Global S.a.r.l. have declined significantly in
view of the company's solid performance one year into the
integration.

Misys achieved significant cost synergies of about $88 million in
financial 2013 (representing over $120 million on an annualized
basis), and benefitted from meaningful recovery in its high-
margin initial license fees (ILFs), with about 31% revenue growth
year on year.  Overall, this has resulted in EBITDA margin
expansion to about 29% in financial 2013, and EBITDA growth of
about 93%.

In S&P's view, Misys will continue to deleverage through modest
EBITDA growth and EBITDA cash interest coverage will remain above
1.5x.  S&P also believes that the company has some flexibility to
curtail operating expenditure in the event of top-line
underperformance.

Downward rating pressure could arise if EBITDA growth is negative
in 2014, undermining S&P's base-case assumption of continued
deleveraging.  Negative EBITDA growth would imply EBITDA cash
interest coverage at or below 1.5x and adjusted leverage,
excluding preferred equity certificates, above 7x, ratios that
S&P do not see as commensurate with the current rating.  However,
S&P do not see this as a likely scenario because it believes that
even if ILF revenues were to decline, the effect on EBITDA could
be more than offset by the remaining savings from the company's
cost-cutting implemented in 2013.

A decline in covenant headroom to less than 10% could put
pressure on liquidity and therefore could also trigger a
downgrade. Finally, negative free operating cash flow generation,
excluding items that S&P considers one-off in nature, may also
put pressure on the rating.

S&P sees limited rating upside over the next 12 months, in view
of Misys' very high leverage on the balance sheet and currently
low cash flow generation.


NICOLE FARHI: Owed Almost GBP20MM to Creditors, Report Shows
------------------------------------------------------------
According to The Telegraph's Graham Ruddick, the administrator's
report into Nicole Farhi's failure shows that the company
collapsed with debts of almost GBP20 million, including more than
GBP500,000 to the taxman.

Nicole Farhi owed GBP15.7 million to its owner Kelso Place Asset
Management, which had lent the retailer funds, while unsecured
creditors stand to lose GBP2.9 million, the Telegraph discloses.

HMRC is one of the unsecured creditors alongside model agencies
such as Storm Model Management, which represents Cara Delevingne,
the Telegraph notes.

Nicole Farhi called in Zolfo Cooper as administrators in early
July following a tumble in sales, as it battled challenging
conditions on the high street, the Telegraph recounts.

According to the Telegraph, the statement of administrator's
proposals said that the company had suffered a period of
"sustained losses" and needed "significant further funds" to be
able to stock its autumn and winter collection.

Within three weeks, Maxine Hargreaves-Adams, the daughter of
Matalan founder John Hargreaves, agreed a deal to buy the brand,
the Telegraph relates.

The administrator's report shows the deal with Ms. Maxine
Hargreaves -- Adams was worth GBP5.4 million -- which will not be
enough to repay the creditors in full -- and was one of six
offers for the company, the Telegraph notes.
The deal included the company's flagship store on Conduit Street
in London, as well as the head office, three further stand-alone
stores and two outlet stores, the Telegraph states.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 4,
2013, The New York Times said Nicole Farhi ran into trouble
because of dwindling demand from consumers as some opted for less
expensive fashion items during a difficult economic environment.

Nicole Farhi is an upmarket fashion chain.


PANTHEON REALTY: Land Investment Firms in Provisional Liquidation
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Five connected companies that marketed land for investment have
been ordered into provisional liquidation following confidential
enquiries carried out by Company Investigations, part of the
Insolvency Service.

The order to place the companies -- all overseas land investment
companies: Pantheon Realty Consultants Limited, Pantheon Realty
Consultancy Limited, Pantheon Realty Limited, Pantheon Limited
and PR Group Limited ("the companies") -- into provisional
liquidation follows a petition presented by the Secretary of
State for Business, Innovation & Skills to wind up the companies
in the public interest.

The Official Receiver has been appointed by the High Court as
provisional liquidator ("the provisional liquidator") of the
companies on the application of the Secretary of State. The role
of the provisional liquidator is to protect the assets and
financial records of the companies pending determination of the
petitions.

The provisional liquidator also has the power to investigate the
affairs of the companies insofar as it is necessary to protect
their assets including any third party or trust money or assets
in the possession of or under the control of the companies.

As the matter is before the court no further information will be
made available until the petition is determined. The petition is
listed for hearing on Oct. 9, 2013.

The petitions to wind up the companies were presented in the High
Court on July 24, 2013 under the provisions of section 124A of
the Insolvency Act 1986.

The Official Receiver was appointed provisional liquidator of the
companies by Mrs. Justice Rose on July 30, 2013.


RAILCARE LIMITED: Staff Won't Get Wages After Collapse
--------------------------------------------------------------
John Brazier at InsolvencyNews reports that staff at Railcare
Limited will not receive wages for the month leading up to the
company's administration.

Joint administrator Kim Rayment confirmed on August 7 that staff
would be paid advanced wages between August 1 and August 10 on
August 9.

"Monies have started to be received for work going forward, and
as a result the joint administrators are in a position to pay
staff advance wages for the period between 1st and 10th August,"
the report quotes Mr. Rayment as saying.

"These wages will be paid on Friday and we are hopeful of being
able to confirm further wage advances next week. Staff wages are
the primary concern of the joint administrators.

"At present, there are insufficient funds to be able to pay staff
wages in arrears for the month leading up to administration. We
understand that this will have caused hardship.

"This is why the joint administrators are committed to paying
staff promptly for the work they are currently doing to the
extent that circumstances allow.

"The joint administrators are doing everything possible to
stabilise the business and are in discussions with a number of
interested prospective buyers, who will be able to secure
Railcare's future."

InsolvencyNews says the company was forced into administration
through a short-term cash flow crisis and on August 2 over 150
job losses -- representing around 40% of the company's total
permanent staff -- were announced across Springburn and Wolverton
sites.

Glasgow-based Railcare Limited is a rail fleet repairs and
refurbishment company.  Ian Gould, Kim Rayment and Bryan Jackson
of BDO LLP were appointed Joint Administrators of the Company on
July 31, 2013.  The Company employs over 500 staff.


SOUTHERN WATER: Moody's Affirms 'Ba1' Rating on GBP500MM Bonds
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the Baa2 corporate family
rating of Southern Water Services Limited. Concurrently, Moody's
has affirmed the Baa1 ratings on the approximately GBP3.1 billion
Class A bonds and the Ba1 ratings on the GBP500 million Class B
bonds issued by Southern Water's finance subsidiary, Southern
Water Services (Finance) Limited, and guaranteed by Southern
Water. The outlook on all ratings remains negative.

Ratings Rationale:

Southern Water's Baa2 CFR is an opinion of the Southern Water
group's ability to honor its financial obligations and is
assigned to Southern Water as if it had a single class of debt
and was a single consolidated legal entity. The Baa1 rating of
the Class A bonds reflects their structural seniority relative to
the Class B bonds, and the Ba1 rating of the Class B bonds
reflects there structural subordination to the Class A bonds.

The Baa2 CFR reflects (1) a low business risk profile that is
underpinned by the stable cash flows generated from monopoly
water and sewerage services provided under a very transparent and
predictable regulatory regime in the UK; (2) a substantial amount
of debt leverage as evidenced by net debt to regulatory capital
value (RCV) of around 80% and an adjusted interest cover ratio of
1.2x; and (3) the hedging profile and structural enhancements
embedded within Southern Water's debt structure, and its relative
weaknesses compared to similar transactions.

Southern Water's CFR is rated one notch lower than comparable UK
water transactions. This largely reflects additional risks
embedded in the company's derivative portfolio. Moody's
understands that the GBP1.3 billion of existing swap arrangements
(equivalent to around 30% of the company's RCV as at March 2013)
provide for a pay down of the ongoing accretion for inflation
changes at five-yearly intervals. Whilst these long-dated swaps
are not all subject to break clauses and provide Southern Water
with inflation protection, they result in only a temporary
improvement in the company's financial profile as the accretion
is paid down during the life of the swap. Therefore, Moody's
regards the cash flow benefit of the swaps to be short-lived and
believe that they will not provide a similar level of financial
flexibility as long-dated index-linked debt. Consequently, the
adjusted interest cover ratio as calculated by Moody's does not
factor in the benefit of these swaps. Furthermore, Moody's
considers that these instruments reduce the value of the
financial covenants, thus undermining the robustness of the
financing structure, which is a key factor in justifying ratings
that are one notch higher for comparable transactions.

Ratings Outlook:

The negative outlook reflects the company's comparatively highly
leveraged capital structure and embedded cost of debt, which
leaves the company more exposed to the risk of a challenging
regulatory price determination than many of its peers.

Nevertheless, Moody's notes the good progress Southern Water's
management has made in successfully tackling problems in
operational areas which has gone a long way to considerably
improving the company's cash flow generation over the past 12
months.

The industry is fast approaching the next price review in 2014
(PR14) for the five-year period commencing April 1, 2015. Moody's
believes that PR14 will be very challenging for the UK water
utilities, with a significant reduction in the cost of capital
allowance a very likely outcome. This will increase the pressure
to perform well against other regulatory measures and targets to
avoid negative implications on the financial performance and
overall ratings. Whilst all UK water companies are exposed to the
regulatory risk entailed in the price review process, Southern
Water has a relatively high embedded cost of index-linked debt
when compared with its peers, partially created by its extensive
index-linked swap program.

Given this, Moody's believes that Southern Water is one of the
companies that would be most exposed to a significant reduction
in the allowed cost of capital at the next regulatory price
review or a settlement that sought to overly stretch the company
with regard to operational or capital efficiencies. However,
Moody's believes that PR14 would have to be at the more severe
end of its current estimate of the range of outcomes for Southern
Water to exhibit a financial profile that would be commensurate
with a CFR lower than Baa2. The rating agency also notes that the
company is continuing to deleverage over the current regulatory
period, underpinned by management's decision not to distribute
any equity dividends to shareholders. Moody's expects that this
policy, if continued, will help Southern Water in accommodating a
challenging price review within the current ratings.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down:

Given the negative outlook, upward rating pressure is not
envisioned in the near term. However, the outlook could be
stabilized if it becomes evident that management's measures will
create additional financial headroom to better address the
potential challenges of the upcoming price review and/or the
ultimate outcome of the final determination is more benign than
Moody's currently expects, so that the company would be able to
maintain an adjusted interest cover ratio (as calculated by
Moody's) of at least 1.2x on a sustainable basis during the next
price review period and beyond. In considering a stable outlook
Moody's will further take into account the continuing evolution
of management's performance, the company's financial policies and
its continuing use of derivative instruments.

Southern Water's ratings could come under downward pressure if it
appears likely that the company's adjusted interest cover ratio
(as calculated by Moody's) would fail to remain at or above 1.2x
on a sustainable basis over the medium term. Downward pressure
could also arise as a result of: (1) increased use of derivatives
and increased risks associated with these arrangements; (2)
unexpected, severe deterioration in operating performance that
results in the company's debt protection measures remaining
persistently in breach of the distribution lock-up triggers of
net debt to RCV of 85% and adjusted interest cover (as defined
under the terms of the financing) of 1.2x for the senior debt and
1.4x for the Class A debt; (3) a materially unfavorable change in
the regulatory framework for the UK water sector, leading to a
significant increase in the company's business risk; or (4)
unfavorable market conditions that would affect the company's
ability to refinance its activities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Regulated Water Utilities published in December 2009.

Southern Water Services Limited is the seventh-largest of 10
water and sewerage companies in England and Wales by RCV,
providing water and sewerage services to a population of
approximately 2.4 and 4.5 million, respectively, in the south-
east of England, including the counties of Kent, East Sussex and
West Sussex, Hampshire and the Isle of Wight. Since October 2007,
Southern Water's ultimate parent company has been Greensands
Holdings Limited, which is in turn owned by a consortium of
specialist funds, including IIF International SW UK Investments
Limited (advised by JP Morgan) and UBS Global Asset Management
(UK) Ltd.

For the financial year ended March 31, 2013, Southern Water had a
RCV of around GBP4.3 billion and reported revenues of GBP779
million and operating profit of GBP331 million.


* Sports Club and Facilities Insolvencies Fall Post-Olympics
------------------------------------------------------------
The number of sports clubs and facilities entering formal
insolvency procedures has fallen 33% in the year since the 2012
Olympic summer, from 123 in 2011-12 to 82 in 2012-13*, according
to research by R3, the insolvency trade body.

The drop in the number of failing sporting companies coincides
with a remarkable year of sporting success for British athletes
and teams that included London hosting the Olympics from 27 July
2012.

By comparison, the total number of UK corporate insolvencies fell
just 12% over a similar period**.

R3 president Liz Bingham says: "Regular British sporting success,
as well as the feel-good glow of the Olympics, may well have
encouraged both children and adults to try new sports, join local
teams, or keep on going with their gym membership. Extra interest
-- and income -- will always be a welcome boost for sports clubs
and facilities throughout the country."

"The 'legacy' of London 2012 has attracted a lot of attention. It
would certainly be a positive Olympic legacy if any burst of
grassroots interest in sport were to be sustained and translated
into financially healthier sports clubs and facilities."

The research, compiled by R3 using Bureau van Dijk's 'Fame'
database of company information, also shows that sports-related
insolvencies are now 42% lower than they were five years ago when
the UK entered recession.

R3 adds that despite the fall in sporting corporate failures,
many sports clubs and facilities are still financially hard-
pushed.

Liz Bingham explains: "Since the recession, many people will have
cut back on discretionary spending like club memberships or trips
to the gym. Sports facilities, gyms, and clubs are also
vulnerable to seasonal changes in weather or lengthy gaps between
playing seasons, which can make cash flow tricky to manage.
Expensive space requirements, high insurance costs, and finance
requirements for new equipment quickly add up too."

"On top of this, early periods of economic recovery, as we are
experiencing now, can be dangerous for businesses on the edge.
Corporate insolvencies have historically increased in this
situation. Businesses that cut back on investment to survive the
recession may find they are unable to cope with the stresses of
expansion and increased demand that economic recovery brings."

Liz Bingham adds: "In this context, any boost that clubs have
received from the Olympics is particularly welcome."

Corporate failures uncovered by the research include those of
multiple Football League and Premier League clubs, local football
clubs, golf clubs, snooker halls, local stables, motor-racing
clubs, tennis clubs, and gyms.



===================
U Z B E K I S T A N
===================


UZPROMSTROYBANK: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Issuer Default Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Long-term foreign currency Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs) of Uzbekistan's Uzpromstroybank (UzPSB),
Asakabank and Microcreditbank at 'B-' and Long-term local
currency IDRs at 'B'. The Outlooks are Stable. Fitch has also
affirmed OJSC Agrobank's Long-term IDRs at 'B-' with Stable
Outlooks and upgraded the bank's Viability Rating (VR) to 'ccc'
from 'f'.

KEY RATING DRIVERS -IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS, SUPPORT RATING FLOORS

UzPSB, Asakabank and Microcreditbank's 'B' Long-term local
currency IDRs reflect Fitch's view of potential support from the
government of Uzbekistan, if needed, based on the government's
majority direct and indirect ownership and significant policy
roles of the banks. Fitch expects the government and state-
controlled entities to continue providing new equity and funding
to match banks' growth plans, mainly associated with state-
directed and policy lending.

The government's ability to provide support is underpinned, in
Fitch's view, by the currently only moderate cost of support
potentially required given the small size of the banking sector,
its low indebtedness and Uzbekistan's solid external and fiscal
finances. However, Fitch's credit assessment of Uzbekistan
remains constrained by the economy's structural weaknesses,
including the difficult business environment and vulnerability to
external shocks (see 'Uzbek Banks: Growing Without External
Leverage' at www.fitchratings.com).

The affirmation of Agrobank's Long-term local currency IDR at 'B-
', reflects that since 2010, government capital support has not
been sufficient to fully restore the bank's solvency. However,
the bank's rating positively considers the track record of timely
liquidity support by the authorities, regulatory forbearance and
gradual contributions to the bank's capital.

Fitch caps all Uzbek banks' foreign currency IDRs at 'B-'
reflecting the high transfer and convertibility risks present in
Uzbekistan due to the country's tightly regulated FX market.
Accordingly, Fitch believes that support in foreign currency to
state-controlled banks might be provided in some circumstances in
a less timely manner compared with that in the local currency.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, SUPPORT RATINGS, SUPPORT RATING
FLOORS

An upgrade or downgrade of Uzpromstroybank, Asakabank and
Microcreditbank's Long-term local currency IDRs would be possible
in case of a strengthening or weakening of Uzbekistan's credit
profile. Agrobank's Long-term local currency IDR could be
upgraded following the potential full restoration of its capital
position.

All banks' Long-term foreign currency IDRs could be upgraded or
downgraded as a result of liberalization or further tightening of
Uzbekistan's FX market regulation.

KEY RATING DRIVERS -UZPSB's AND ASAKABANK's VRs

UzPSB and Asakabank VRs at 'b-' reflect Uzbekistan's difficult
operating environment as well as the banks' poor corporate
governance and risk management, limited commercial franchises and
weaknesses in credit underwriting and investment policies
resulting from the banks' policy roles. However, liquidity
positions and asset quality are currently satisfactory.

The level of reported non-performing (NPLs; more than 90 days
overdue) and restructured loans at the two banks remained at
single-digit levels relative to gross loans at end-2012. However,
unreserved IFRS impaired loans were a material 33% of Fitch core
capital (FCC) at UzPSB and 56% of FCC at Asakabank at end-2012.

Significant volumes of foreclosed property, fixed assets and non-
banking equity investments at UzPSB and Asakabank on aggregate
made up 66% and 53% of the respective banks' FCC at end-2012.
Fitch believes that divesting the non-banking equities would
require the underlying assets to start performing better than
previously.

At end-2012, the FCC/weighted risks ratio was a moderate 11% at
UzPSB (after being supported by low risk weights on 70% of gross
loans covered by government guarantees) and a more solid 17% at
Asakabank. However, capitalization may come under pressure as a
result of both banks' playing an increasingly important role in
the government's industrial development program if new loans are
not matched by guarantees or new equity. Profitability is
moderate as a result of tight margins on the banks' policy
lending.

Liquidity profiles benefit from stable funding sources, including
the funds of the government, state agents (mostly Uzbekistan's
Fund for Reconstruction and Development), state-controlled
companies and state-guaranteed long-term foreign funding, which
on aggregate accounted for 77% and 61% of UzPSB's and Asakabank's
total funding, respectively, at end-2012.

The liquidity cushion at end-2012 was considerably stronger at
UzPSB, albeit due to pre-funding for anticipated projects during
2013. Both banks seek to mitigate FX conversion risks (mainly
arising with respect to trade finance operations with clients) by
taking 100% cash collateral in foreign currencies and placing
this liquidity with investment-grade foreign banks.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - MICROCREDITBANK's VR

Fitch has assigned Microcreditbank a VR as the agency now
considers the bank's commercial franchise to have become more
material relative to the bank's overall profile. The VR reflects
the bank's credit exposure to the high risk agriculture and small
business sectors, and still limited franchise and track record.
However, the VR also considers currently satisfactory asset
quality and capital ratios, the latter consistently higher than
at peers.

At end-July 2013, 45% of the bank's gross loans reportedly
relating to state-directed seasonal agricultural loans and 22%
relating to business and social micro loans extended on non-
market terms. These exposures were funded with special-purpose
government deposits and equity. Long-term loans on commercial
terms were mainly funded with short-term local bank loans and on-
demand customer deposits, resulting in a material maturity
mismatch.

Microcredit's FCC/weighted risks was still approximately 20% at
end-July 2013, notwithstanding the seasonal peak in lending.
Reported NPLs were below 1%, although in Fitch's view the loan
book is quite unseasoned. Performance is weak, as quite high
margins are offset by weak efficiency, reflecting the large
branch network and small scale of operations.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - AGROBANK's VR

The upgrade of Agrobank's VR reflects its somewhat improved
capital position and liquidity.

As a result of additional equity contributions in H113 from the
state and state-controlled companies, Agrobank's FCC, net of an
UZS250 billion unreserved receivable from former employees,
improved to around 4% of risk-weighted assets from a negative
number at end-2012. The receivable relates to the
misappropriation of funds in 2010, and the absence of a reserve
against this exposure results in the auditors' opinion in the
bank's financial statements being qualified.

Capital continues to be burdened by non-banking equity
investments (58% of adjusted FCC at end-July 2013), and
unreserved NPLs and other IFRS impaired loans (50%). However,
Agrobank's 'ccc' VR also factors in Fitch's expectation of
further capital improvement and the fact that reported loan
impairment remains low despite a slump in international prices
for cotton (the main sector of Agrobank's borrowers) in recent
years.

The adjusted FCC ratio could further grow (potentially close to
8%) by end-2013 as a result of an anticipated UZS13 billion
equity injection from a state-affiliated company during H213 and
a reduction of short-term seasonal loans to the agricultural
sector (about 40% of gross loans at peak level at end-July 2013).

Agrobank's liquidity is currently reasonable given the high
proportion of funding from the government and state-controlled
agricultural companies (60% of total liabilities at end-July
2013), the comfortable level of liquid assets, the bank's
improving retail funding position and the track record of
liquidity support from state-controlled banks.

Liquid assets (including sizeable FX cash and bank placements)
were equal to 22% of third-party deposits at end-July 2013, with
only a negligible proportion of customer funds being denominated
in foreign currency. Liquidity should also somewhat benefit from
seasonal loan repayments closer to year end, although this would
ultimately be used to repay the related government funding.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - ALL BANKS' VRs

Upgrades of the VRs of UzPSB, Asakabank and Microcreditbank would
require Uzbekistan's business environment to substantially
improve, and a higher proportion of non-policy related business
in the banks' operations. Agrobank's VR could be upgraded to 'b-'
as a result of the full restoration of its capital base.

Downward pressure on the banks' VRs could arise from a marked
deterioration of asset quality, if this was not offset by equity
injections.

The rating actions are:

UzPSB
Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable
Short-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B-'

Asakabank
Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable
Short-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating affirmed at 'b-'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B-'

Microcreditbank
Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B'; Outlook Stable
Short-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating assigned at 'b-'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B-'

Agrobank
Long-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term foreign currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term local currency IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating upgraded to 'ccc' from 'f'
Support Rating affirmed at '5'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B-'


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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