/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/130729.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, July 29, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 148
Headlines
A R M E N I A
PROMETEY BANK: Moody's Withdraws B1 Deposit Ratings & E+ BFSR
A U S T R I A
UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR25MM Notes to 'Ba1'
C R O A T I A
H1 TELEKOM: Files for Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement
G E O R G I A
VTB BANK: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws BB Issuer Default Rating
G E R M A N Y
KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' CFR for Upgrade
PRAKTIKER AG: Max Bahr Units File for Insolvency in Hamburg Court
G R E E C E
* GREECE: Fitch Updates Mortgage Assumptions; No Rating Impact
H U N G A R Y
E-STAR ALTERNATIVE: Appeals Court Ruling on Bankruptcy Protection
I R E L A N D
BALLANTYNE RE: Fitch Affirms, Then Withdraws 'C' Ratings on Notes
SMURFIT KAPPA: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Sr. Sec. Facilities
THOMAS CROSBIE: Court Appoints Creditors' Nominee as Liquidator
I T A L Y
MANUTENCOOP FACILITY: Moody's Rates EUR450MM Notes Issue '(P)B2'
* ITALY: Moody's Says Building Sector Most at Risk of Default
K A Z A K H S T A N
KAZINVESTBANK: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
KAZTRANSGAS AIMAK: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
L I T H U A N I A
UKIO BANKO INVESTICINE: Enters Bankruptcy in Lithuania
L U X E M B O U R G
OXEA SARL: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'B'; Outlook Stable
R U S S I A
MOBILE TELESYSTEMS: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB+'
POWER MACHINES: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' CFR; Outlook Stable
SEVERSTAL OAO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm Issuer Default Rating
* S&P Applies Revised Insurance Criteria to 11 Insurance Groups
S P A I N
BANCO DE VALENCIA: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' Deposit Ratings
HIPOTECARIO XVI: Fitch Assigns 'CCC' Rating to Class B Notes
TDA IBERCAJA 7: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
* SPAIN: Fitch Says Mortgage Arrears Stable in Second Quarter
T U R K E Y
* TURKEY: Still Vulnerable to Market Sentiment Shifts, Fitch Says
U K R A I N E
CREATIV GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
ANDERSON PRECISION: In Administration; 38 Jobs Affected
BEATBOX BARS: Goes Into Administration, Closes Fire Island Bar
CP GROUP: Two Bailiff Bridge Sites For Sale Amid Administration
JAGUAR LAND: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
KITSONS ENVIRONMENTAL: Bought Out Of Administration
PREMIER WASTE: In Liquidation; Owes GBP19 Million to Creditors
X X X X X X X X
* New Pension Trends Credit Positive for European Insurers
* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 22 to July 26, 2013
*********
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A R M E N I A
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PROMETEY BANK: Moody's Withdraws B1 Deposit Ratings & E+ BFSR
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn Prometey Bank's B1 long-
term local and foreign-currency deposit ratings, not prime short-
term local and foreign currency deposit ratings, and E+
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR), equivalent to a
b1 baseline credit assessment. The bank's long-term deposit
ratings had a negative outlook, while the BFSR and short-term
deposit ratings had a stable outlook at the time of the ratings
withdrawal.
Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.
Headquartered in Yerevan, Armenia, Prometey Bank reported total
assets of $137.2 million and net income of $3.7 million,
according to its audited financial statements prepared under
IFRS.
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A U S T R I A
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UNICREDIT BANK: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR25MM Notes to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of the
following credit linked notes issued by UBS AG:
Ser 174, EUR25m FIX Credit-Linked Step-Up Euro Medium Term Notes,
Downgraded to Ba2; previously on Jun 6, 2012 Downgraded to Ba1.
Ratings Rationale:
Moody's explained that the rating action is the result of a
rating action on UniCredit Bank Austria AG, whose subordinated
rating was downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 on July 15, 2013.
The transaction is a credit linked note issued by UBS AG
referencing the subordinated debt of UniCredit Bank Austria AG.
No cash flow, sensitivity analysis or stress scenarios have been
conducted as the rating was directly derived using the ratings of
UniCredit Bank Austria AG and UBS. Moody's analysis also includes
stresses on the default probability and severity of the UniCredit
Bank Austria AG subordinated debt in order to take into account
the widely defined credit event definitions and deliverable
obligations.
The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities" published in April
2010.
Moody's quantitative analysis of Repacks is designed to estimate
the expected loss "EL" borne by the Repack investor, given the
transaction structure, the Collateral and any other credit risks
arising under the transaction. To this end, Moody's relies on an
EL analysis in which it identifies and attaches probabilities to
events that might give rise to losses to Repack noteholders.
Moody's EL calculation assesses the probability and severity of
each possible loss-inducing event happening at discrete
(typically one-year) intervals through the life of the
transaction. The EL for each of these time points can then be
aggregated to provide a weighted-average EL for the rated notes.
Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) more specifically, any
uncertainty associated with the underlying credits in the
transaction could have a direct impact on the repackaged
transaction.
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C R O A T I A
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H1 TELEKOM: Files for Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement
-----------------------------------------------
SeeNews, citing news daily Poslovni Dnenvik, reports that H1
Telekom has filed a pre-bankruptcy settlement, following in the
footsteps of another two of its local peers, Optima Telekom and
Metronet.
According to SeeNews, the news daily said that the total debt of
H1 Telekom stands at HRK297.4 million (US$51.5 million/EUR39.5
million), mostly incurred as a result of investments in
infrastructure and advanced technological solutions.
SeeNews relates that Poslovni said setting the pre-bankruptcy
proceedings in motion is H1 Telekom's first step towards
financial restructuring and its management is planning to wrap up
the process within a short timeframe.
Earlier this month, Wirtschaftswoche quoted Telekom Austria CEO
Hannes Ametsreiter as saying the company is interested in H1
Telekom as part of an acquisitional drive in Southeast Europe,
SeeNews recounts.
H1 Telekom is a Croatian alternative carrier.
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G E O R G I A
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VTB BANK: Fitch Affirms & Withdraws BB Issuer Default Rating
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Fitch Ratings has affirmed JSC VTB Bank Georgia's (VTBG's) Long-
term issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB'. At the same time, the
agency has withdrawn the ratings as the bank has chosen to stop
participating in the rating process. Therefore, Fitch will no
longer have sufficient information to maintain the ratings.
Accordingly, the agency will no longer provide ratings or
analytical coverage for VTBG.
KEY RATING DRIVERS: VTBG'S SUPPORT RATING AND IDRS
The affirmation of VTBG's Long-term IDR at 'BB'/Stable, and its
Support Rating at '3', reflects Fitch's continued view of the
likelihood of shareholder support from its 96%-owner, JSC Bank
VTB (VTB, 'BBB'/Negative), the state-controlled, second-largest
bank in Russia. In Fitch's view, VTB would have a high propensity
to support its Georgian subsidiary, given VTBG's small size, the
significant amount of funding VTBG receives from VTB, the track
record of capital support from its parent and the banks' common
branding. At the same time, VTBG's ability to receive and utilize
parent support could be restricted by transfer and convertibility
restrictions, the risk of which is reflected in Georgia's Country
Ceiling ('BB').
KEY RATING DRIVERS: VTBG'S VR
The affirmation of VTBG's VR at 'b-' reflects the bank's small
size and modest franchise (about 3.9% of end-2012 sector assets),
concentrated balance sheet, limited track record of reasonable
credit underwriting and significant proportion of foreign
currency lending. In addition, pre-impairment profitability has
declined due to margin pressure and cost growth. Capitalization
has also weakened but should increase thanks to a planned
GEL12.25m capital injection (equal to about 17.5% of end-2012
equity), Fitch is informed. Liquidity is adequate and is
underpinned by a moderate pool of liquid assets and a committed
credit line from VTB although it should be considered in light of
significant concentration in the deposit base.
The rating actions are:
JSC VTB Bank (Georgia):
Long-term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
Stable,
rating withdrawn
Short-term Foreign Currency IDR affirmed at 'B', rating
withdrawn
Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-', rating withdrawn
Support Rating: affirmed at '3', rating withdrawn
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G E R M A N Y
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KABEL DEUTSCHLAND: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' CFR for Upgrade
--------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed its review of Kabel
Deutschland's ratings to "review for upgrade" (from "review with
direction uncertain").
Ratings impacted are the Ba2 Corporate Family Rating and Ba2-PD
Probability of Default Rating of Kabel Deutschland Holding AG as
well as the instrument ratings at KDH and its subsidiary Kabel
Deutschland Vertrieb & Service GmbH.
Ratings Rationale:
The action follows recent public statements by John Malone,
Chairman of Liberty Global plc. (Ba3 under review for possible
downgrade), suggesting that Liberty Global will not attempt to
acquire KDH. Moody's now believes that a takeover of KDH by
Vodafone (A3, under review for possible downgrade) is the most
likely outcome.
Moody's would regard a takeover of KDH by Vodafone as credit
positive for KDH, as KDH would be owned by a much larger and
significantly higher rated company, which could refinance debt at
its more favorable rates, if it so chooses. KDH's final rating
will incorporate its standalone credit profile, as well as some
possible uplift that will depend on the degree of explicit or
implicit support from Vodafone.
Moody's continues to acknowledge the solid growth momentum of
KDH's cable business, strong operating leverage and good growth
potential for its internet, phone and premium TV services. In the
fiscal year ended March 31, 2013 the group's revenues and
adjusted EBITDA increased by 7.7% and 8.4% respectively,
underpinned by strong demand in the company's internet and phone
services.
The deal remains subject to shareholders acceptance with a
minimum threshold of 75% and regulatory approval. Moody's aims to
close the review once there is sufficient clarity regarding the
completion of the acquisition.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Pay Television - Cable and Direct-to-Home Satellite Operators
published in April 2013. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
Kabel Deutschland Holding AG is the largest Level 3 cable TV
operator in Germany by customers. In fiscal year 2012/13 ending
March 31, 2013, KDH generated EUR1.8 billion in reported revenues
and approximately EUR862 million in adjusted EBITDA (as reported
by the company).
PRAKTIKER AG: Max Bahr Units File for Insolvency in Hamburg Court
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Julie Cruz at Bloomberg News reports that Praktiker AG's Max Bahr
do-it-yourself stores filed for insolvency after suppliers lost
their insurance cover, joining its home-improvement retailing
parent company in bankruptcy proceedings.
According to Bloomberg, Hamburg's higher regional court said in a
statement on Friday that Attorney Jens-Soeren Schroeder will be
the insolvency administrator for three Max Bahr units and
Christopher Seagon will oversee proceedings for a fourth.
Mr. Seagon is also the administrator for the Praktiker-branded
businesses that filed for bankruptcy protection in mid-July,
Bloomberg notes.
Bloomberg relates that Praktiker said late Thursday because of a
lack of insurance, a "steady supply of goods to Max Bahr stores
is no longer guaranteed."
The filing "is negative for the company, but it doesn't
necessarily mean that all Max Bahr stores will close," Bloomberg
quotes Anna Patrice, an analyst at Berenberg Bank in London, as
saying. "It all depends on the company's majority investors
now."
As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 15,
2013, Bloomberg News said Praktiker AG filed for insolvency after
the sale of a division collapsed, and said it will focus on
restructuring the business. According to Bloomberg, Praktiker
said units that own the Praktiker and Extra-Bau+Hobby stores and
online outlets applied at Hamburg's local court for protection
from creditors.
Praktiker AG is a German home-improvement retailer.
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G R E E C E
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* GREECE: Fitch Updates Mortgage Assumptions; No Rating Impact
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has updated its criteria assumptions for assessing
credit risk in Greek residential mortgage loan pools. The updated
assumptions are not expected to have any impact on the existing
Greek RMBS and covered bond ratings.
The continued strains in the Greek economy underpin the mortgage
criteria revision, with the main change relating to worsening
house price assumptions in light of a very weak housing market.
In addition, Fitch's default expectations on Greek mortgage pools
have increased, mainly as a consequence of the agency's
recalibration of the probability of default (PD) matrix, and to a
lesser extent as a reflection of further deterioration in the
performance of the Greek assets. Furthermore, Fitch has
lengthened its recovery timing assumption for Greek mortgages to
five years and introduced specific treatment for loans that have
been subject to restructuring.
House prices in Greece have declined by 30% on average from their
2008 peak. Fitch expects Greek house prices to suffer a further
decline of almost 18% over the medium term, in the context of the
severe recession the country is going through and the uncertainty
surrounding the real estate taxation framework. Fitch has revised
upwards its average peak-to-trough house price decline
expectation for Greece to 42% from 33% in nominal terms.
Fitch has increased its frequency of foreclosure (FF) assumptions
for a 'Bsf' rating to 16% from 7%. This is mainly attributed to a
recalibration of the agency's PD matrix based on the performance
of vintages originated post-2005, and is largely offset by lower
origination vintage adjustments. Post-2005 vintages continue to
perform substantially worse than seasoned ones. In addition,
there are still notable disparities in performance by vintage of
origination and by originator. To reflect this, Fitch will
continue to apply vintage adjustments according to the year of
origination. These typically range between 0.5x-1.2x of the
standard loan FF.
Fitch believes that borrowers who have experienced problems
servicing their mortgages and who have thus opted for a
"restructuring" package are more susceptible to macroeconomic
shocks. As such, the agency has introduced a FF floor in the
range of 40%-60% for loans that have been subject to a
restructuring.
The report entitled "EMEA Criteria Addendum - Greece: Mortgage
Loss and Cash Flow Assumptions", replaces the report of the same
name dated 8 August 2012. The report should be read together with
"EMEA RMBS Master Rating Criteria", "EMEA Residential Mortgage
Loss Criteria", and "EMEA RMBS Cash Flow Analysis Criteria",
dated June 6, 2013, for a comprehensive understanding of Fitch's
approach to rating Greek RMBS.
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H U N G A R Y
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E-STAR ALTERNATIVE: Appeals Court Ruling on Bankruptcy Protection
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews reports that E-Star Alernative said on Friday it has
appealed against a decision of the Budapest Municipal Court
rejecting a request to approve an agreement the company reached
with its creditors and ending its bankruptcy protection.
According to MTI-Econews, E-Star's latest report shows that the
company had total assets of EUR57.5 million on March 31.
Liabilities came to EUR57.8 million, MTI-Econews discloses.
E-Star filed for bankruptcy protection in December 2012,
MTI-Econews recounts.
E-Star Alternative is a Hungarian energy services company.
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I R E L A N D
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BALLANTYNE RE: Fitch Affirms, Then Withdraws 'C' Ratings on Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed and subsequently withdrawn ratings for
the Ballantyne Re Plc for these tranches:
-- Class A-1 notes affirmed at 'CCsf, Recovery Estimate RE40%;
-- Class B-1 notes affirmed at 'Csf, Recovery Estimate RE0%;
-- Class B-2 notes affirmed at 'Csf, Recovery Estimate RE0%.
Fitch has decided to discontinue the ratings, which are no longer
considered by Fitch to be relevant to the agency's coverage.
Key Rating Drivers
Fitch's rating rationale is based on the significant mark-to-
market losses Ballantyne Re has experienced in its investment
portfolio of residential-mortgage-backed (RMBS) and asset-backed
securities (ABS). Ballantyne Re's liabilities exceed the current
book value of its assets by a significant margin.
Interest payments on class A-1 are current, and Fitch expects
interest on class A-1 to remain current for the foreseeable
future. Absent a remarkable recovery in RMBS/ABS values, however,
Fitch believes it is probable that Ballantyne Re will eventually
be unable to pay interest or full principal on the class A-1
notes. Based on current market values, Fitch expects a principal
recovery of 40% on the class A notes. Fitch believes default is
inevitable on the class B-1 and B-2 notes and does not expect
holders of these notes to receive any further interest or
principal payments.
Fitch has placed the 'sf' designation on these esoteric notes to
signify to investors that, although it may not be a true
structured finance security, it contains several transaction
elements and risk mitigants to resemble a structured finance
transaction.
Ballantyne Re is a special purpose public limited company
incorporated and registered in Ireland. The company was
established for the limited purpose of entering into a
reinsurance agreement and conducting activities related to the
notes' issuance. Ballantyne Re issued the notes to finance excess
reserve requirements under Regulation XXX for the block of
business ceded under the reinsurance agreement.
Rating Sensitivities
Unanticipated increases in life insurance losses or declines in
the value of the assets in the investment portfolio could produce
loss levels higher than the current projected losses and impact
the recovery estimates for the classes.
SMURFIT KAPPA: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Sr. Sec. Facilities
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it withdrew its 'BB'
issue and '3' recovery ratings on the senior secured facilities
issued by Irish packaging producer Smurfit Kappa Group PLC
(Smurfit Kappa) following the group's early repayment of this
debt. The senior secured facilities comprised a EUR360 million
term loan B due June 2016; a EUR363 million term loan C due March
2017; and a EUR525 million revolving credit facility (RCF) due
June 2016.
S&P understands that Smurfit Kappa has established new senior
unsecured facilities, comprising a EUR750 million amortizing term
loan A and a EUR625 million RCF, both due July 2018. S&P do not
rate the new facilities. Following the refinancing, Smurfit
Kappa's various existing notes will also become unsecured and
therefore all of the group's facilities and notes continue to
rank pari passu as per the amended intercreditor agreement.
S&P's issue rating on Smurfit Kappa's various unsecured notes
remains unchanged at 'BB', in line with the corporate credit
rating on Smurfit Kappa. The recovery rating on these unsecured
notes is unchanged at '3', indicating S&P's expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment
default. The outlook on Smurfit Kappa remains positive.
THOMAS CROSBIE: Court Appoints Creditors' Nominee as Liquidator
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mary Carolan at The Irish Times reports that the High Court has
made orders winding up Thomas Crosbie Printers Ltd. but refused
to accept the company's nominee as official liquidator and has
appointed the nominee of two large creditors of the company. TCP
is a subsidiary of the Thomas Crosbie Holdings media group.
Mr. Justice Peter Kelly said he was satisfied to appoint as
official liquidator Tom Kavanagh, of Kavanagh Fennell, the
nominee of Webprint Concepts Ltd., owed some EUR2.3 million by
TCP, which has sued TCP and others over the loss of its printing
contract for TCH titles, the Irish Times relates. Ulster Bank,
owed some EUR7 million, had supported either Mr. Kavanagh or any
nominee of the court but not the company's nominee, the Irish
Times discloses.
In his decision, the judge stressed there were no issues
concerning the competence or integrity of either nominee for
official liquidator -- Mr. Kavanagh or Michael Cotter of Ernst &
Young, the Irish Times notes.
He found TCP had given no satisfactory reasons why the court
should depart from the normal practice that, when there are two
nominees for liquidator, the nominee of creditors would be
appointed, the Irish Times states.
According to the Irish Times, there was no opposition to the
winding-up order for TCP, which is insolvent with some EUR7
million liabilities over assets, but the issue was the
appointment of an official liquidator.
Thomas Crosbie Holdings is the company behind the Irish Examiner
and a number of regional newspapers and radio stations.
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I T A L Y
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MANUTENCOOP FACILITY: Moody's Rates EUR450MM Notes Issue '(P)B2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B2 corporate family
rating (CFR) and a B2-PD probability of default (PDR) to
Manutencoop Facility Management S.p.A., the holding company for
Manutencoop, a leading integrated facilities management company
in Italy. Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B2
senior secured rating with a loss given default (LGD) assessment
of LGD4 to Manutencoop's combined EUR450 million senior secured
fixed-rate notes and floating-rate notes. The outlook on all
ratings is stable.
"The B2 rating we have assigned to Manutencoop Facility
Management S.p.A. primarily reflects the group's moderate size
and limited geographic diversification, its sole focus on the
Italian facility management market, and that a key contract is
due for renewal later this year," says Andreas Rands, a Moody's
Vice President - Senior Analyst and lead analyst for Manutencoop.
"The ratings also incorporate the Manutencoop's high opening
leverage pro forma for the proposed note issuance, as well as its
historically high working capital fluctuations, given the
company's reliance on the Italian public authorities for timely
payment of revenues. However, these negatives are partially
offset by the group's leading market position in the Italian
facility management market and its resilient sales and EBITDA
performance over the past three financial years, which is
impressive given the challenging market conditions."
Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect the rating agency's
preliminary credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the group's proposed
senior secured debt facilities. The definitive ratings may differ
from the provisional rating.
Ratings Rationale:
The assigned B2 corporate family rating (CFR) primarily reflects
(1) Manutencoop's moderate size, especially relative to some of
its international rated and unrated peers; (2) the company's
exposure to the currently challenged Italian economy, which
limits growth prospects; (3) its substantial focus on the Italian
public sector, within which spending cuts, which are affecting
growth prospects, are likely to continue for at least the next
12-18 months; (4) its historically high working capital
fluctuations, given its reliance on Italian public authorities
for timely payment of revenues; (5) that a key contract is due
for renewal in 2013; and (6) the company's high Moody's-adjusted
leverage of around 6.5x, for the 12 months to March 31, 2013, pro
forma for the refinancing, with limited deleveraging prospects
over the next 12-18 months.
More positively, the ratings reflect (1) the business's leading
market position in its core market, namely the Italian facility
management (FM) sector, albeit this is a very fragmented market;
and (2) its resilient profit and loss performance over the past
three fiscal years, which Moody's considers impressive, given the
challenging market conditions, and which demonstrates the
strength of Manutencoop's client proposition.
The company's probability of default (PDR) rating of B2-PD is in
line with the CFR, and reflects the use of a 50% family recovery
rate, consistent with a bond and bank debt capital structure. The
(P)B2 senior secured instrument ratings are also in line with the
CFR, reflecting the lack of significant structural subordination
and that they are guaranteed by substantially all of
Manutencoop's subsidiaries.
Liquidity
Manutencoop's liquidity is good, with a reported cash balance of
EUR52 million as of year-end 2012 and EUR56.6 million as at March
31, 2013. Moody's would expect Manutencoop's internally generated
cash flow to cover the company's ongoing basic cash needs, such
as debt service, working capital needs and expected capital
expenditures. Therefore, Moody's does not expect the company to
draw significantly under its EUR30 million revolving credit
facility and expects that it will maintain adequate headroom
under the facility's proposed net debt/ EBITDA financial covenant
(5.5x at closing, stepping down to 4.2x after September 2015) at
all times.
Moody's cautions that the financial investors have a put option
to Manutencoop Societa Cooperativa (MSC) for their remaining
21.08% of MFM's share capital which begins July 1, 2016 for a
period of 30 days, and the rating agency is unclear as to whether
MSC has the financial capacity to meet this payment, should it
materialize. Although not currently expected, any impact of this
event on Manutencoop's financial condition and liquidity profile
could have negative implications on Manutencoop's rating.
Rationale For Stable Outlook
The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that (1) Manutencoop will maintain its current performance and
generate positive free cash flow; and (2) its adjusted
debt/EBITDA will trending comfortably below 6.0x in the next 6-12
months.
What Could Change The Rating Up/Down
Positive pressure on the ratings could materialize if Manutencoop
(1) maintains its current operating performance in relation to
EBITDA margins; (2) generates sustained positive free cash flow;
and (3) improves its leverage profile such that its Moody's-
adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio moves towards 5.0x.
Conversely, negative pressure could be exerted on the ratings if
Manutencoop's liquidity profile and credit metrics deteriorate as
a result of (1) its operational performance weakening or loss of
material contracts; (2) acquisitions; or (3) an aggressive change
in its financial policy. Quantitatively, Moody's would also
consider downgrading Manutencoop's ratings if (1) its adjusted
debt/EBITDA fails to sustainably decrease towards 6x in the next
6-12 months; or (2) the company reports negative free cash flow
on a sustained basis.
Moody's has assigned the following senior secured provisional
instrument ratings:
Manutencoop Facility Management S.p.A.:
Combined EUR450 million senior secured fixed-rate notes and
floating-rate notes (P)B2
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
Founded in 1938 and headquartered in Bologna, Italy, Manutencoop
Facility Management S.p.A. is Italy's largest integrated
facilities management (FM) company (based on revenues).
Manutencoop's service offering includes technical maintenance,
cleaning, energy management, and laundry & sterilization --
primarily to the Italian public and healthcare sectors, but also
the private sector. Manutencoop generated fiscal 2012 (to
December 31, 2012) reported revenues of EUR1.1 billion and EBITDA
of EUR114 million.
* ITALY: Moody's Says Building Sector Most at Risk of Default
-------------------------------------------------------------
Italian SMEs most at risk of defaulting on their securitized
secured and unsecured loans are those active in the construction
and building sector, says Moody's Investors Service in a new
Special Comment entitled "Italian SME: Debtors in Construction &
Building Sector Are Most at Risk of Default."
The report covers data on Italian SMEs between 2012-13, and the
default drivers that Moody's identifies are rating neutral for
Italian SME ABS transactions.
Moody's analysis of default data reveals that both medium-sized
corporates and microenterprises active in the highly cyclical
construction and building sector tend to default more than their
peers. Borrowers in this sector typically account for around one
third of the securitized portfolio loan balances and default 1.3-
1.5 times more than the overall SME population. Of the medium-
sized corporate borrowers active in the construction and building
sector, real-estate developers are the riskiest.
According to the data sample that Moody's analyzed, the following
characteristics have been the main historical drivers for
defaults by Italian SMEs: 1) having a longer remaining term on
their loans (e.g., more than 10 years); (2) loans originated by
some specific originators; (3) having loans that are not
amortizing (although the sample of bullet loans is quite small);
and (4) being domiciled in northeast Italy.
Moody's report also indicates that Italian SMEs least likely to
default are those (1) with loans with the longest seasoning at
closing; (2) that have real estate collateral; and (3) where the
borrower is a microenterprise (i.e., with a turnover below EUR1
million).
Moody's has based these findings on the loan-by-loan information
recently available for Italian SME balance-sheet transactions,
for which at least 12 months have elapsed since their closing
date.
===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================
KAZINVESTBANK: S&P Affirms 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B-' long-term
and 'C' short-term counterparty credit ratings on Kazakhstan-
based KazinvestBank. S&P also affirmed the 'kzBB-' Kazakhstan
national scale rating on the bank. S&P subsequently withdrew all
ratings on KazinvestBank at its request. The outlook was stable
at the time of the withdrawal.
The ratings on KazinvestBank reflected S&P's anchor of 'bb-', or
its baseline assessment of the bank, as well as S&P's views of
its:
-- "Weak" business position, because of its small domestic
franchise and modest market share of less than 1% in loans
and deposits in Kazakhstan;
-- "Moderate" capital and earnings, with a projected risk-
adjusted capital ratio, its measure of capital, close to 6%
in 2014. Weak earnings capacity, mainly due to credit
losses, and the low quality of the loan portfolio prevent
any substantial build-up of capital, in S&P's opinion;
-- "Moderate" risk position, because of high concentration
risks and credit losses; and
-- "Average" funding and "adequate" liquidity, given the
presence of sufficient liquidity buffers and S&P's view on
KazinvestBank funding structure to be in line with system
average.
S&P assessed the bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at 'b-'
at the time of the withdrawal, at the same level as the 'B-'
long-term rating. S&P do not take into account any external
support or additional factors in the rating.
At the time of withdrawal, the stable outlook incorporated S&P's
view that KazinvestBank would focus on improving operational
efficiency over the next years. S&P also took into account that
its total amount of assets would likely remain stable. S&P don't
expect KazinvestBank to shift its business focus at this stage.
S&P also currently anticipates a decrease in the bank's risk
appetite.
KAZTRANSGAS AIMAK: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' LT Issuer Default Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned KazTransGas Aimak JSC (KTGA) a Long-
term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB+' with a
Stable Outlook.
KTGA is Kazakhstan's state-owned near-monopoly engaged in
domestic natural gas transportation and distribution. Its ratings
are aligned with that of its immediate parent, KazTransGas JSC
(KTG, BB+/Stable) and reflect the company's dominant position and
strong strategic and operational ties with KTG, Kazakhstan's
national gas operator. KTGA is an essential part of KTG's
strategy, and has a socially important function of providing
natural gas to domestic consumers. Its overall strategy is
approved by its ultimate parent, JSC National Company KazMunayGas
(BBB/Stable). KTGA is presently expanding and upgrading the
domestic gas network. We also factor in KTGA's increasing
leverage and customer payment risks, as well as a developing
regulatory framework, in its ratings.
Key Rating Drivers
Domestic Gas Near-Monopoly
KTGA, a 100% subsidiary of KTG, operates natural gas distribution
and supply in eight out of nine Kazakh regions and serves
households and industrial consumers, including heat and power
utilities. KTGA owns nearly all domestic gas distribution assets
eg, high-, medium- and low-pressure gas pipelines. KTGA directly
owns all but one remaining network in the Almaty region, which
may be merged with the company pending the state's approval. In
2012, KTGA sold 8.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas, which
accounted for 87% of Kazakhstan's domestic consumption. Its
Fitch-adjusted revenue reached KZT88.3 billion (US$597 million),
excluding a one-off gas sale to a related KazRosGas LLP.
Full Ratings Alignment
We align KTGA and KTG's ratings, per Fitch's Parent and
Subsidiary Rating Linkage dated August 2012. This reflects our
assessment of strong operational and strategic, and moderate
legal ties between KTGA and KTG. KTG, Kazakhstan's national gas
operator, maintains and develops country's domestic and transit
gas pipelines and sells natural gas domestically and for export.
KTGA is responsible for KTG's domestic operations including
domestic gas transportation and sales of natural gas. KTGA
benefits from the links with the state, which are embedded in
KTG's ratings.
Moderate Legal Ties
We assess the legal ties between KTG and KTGA as moderate.
Although KTG currently guarantees all KTGA's loans, this may not
be the case in the future when KTGA materially increases its
leverage, according to our expectations. Also, KTGA's loans do
not qualify under the cross-default clauses contained in JSC
Intergas Central Asia's (BB+/Stable) Eurobonds, KTG's 100%
subsidiary operating Kazakhstan's high pressure gas transit
pipelines to China and Russia.
Regulated Tariffs, High Receivables
KTGA's profitability depends on cost-plus domestic tariffs and
regulated gas prices set by Kazakhstan's Agency for Regulation of
Natural Monopolies (AREM). We view Kazakhstan's tariff-setting
environment as developing. Historically, gas prices and transit
tariffs have been sufficient for KTGA to maintain adequate
profits and finance its moderate maintenance capex. We expect
this to continue under our rating case scenario. However, this
may not be the case in an economic recession, as AREM may face
political pressure to limit tariff increases.
KTGA purchases natural gas from domestic producers and resells it
to domestic consumers. In 2012, its receivables collection period
was 56 days, which is significantly longer than that of its local
peers. While KTGA claims that the current payment discipline is
strong, this might change in the event of an economic downturn,
affecting its operating cash flows.
Capex Drives Leverage Up
KTGA's ongoing KZT86 billion (US$562 million at current exchange
rates) modernization program will be partially debt-funded. We
expect the company's funds from operations (FFO) gross adjusted
leverage to increase from 1.3x in 2012 to 5x on average in 2013-
2017 and FFO interest coverage to be in the 3x range over the
same period, down from 12x in 2012. The capex covers the
modernization and extension of existing gas pipelines, and will
have a moderately positive effect on the company's EBITDA through
higher transportation and sales volumes and lower gas losses. We
view the company's financial policy as aggressive but
commensurate with the 'BB' rating category.
Rating Sensitivities
Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action include:
-- Positive changes in Kazakhstan's regulatory environment eg,
long-term tariffs linked to the asset base.
-- KTGA's FFO gross adjusted leverage materially below 3x on a
sustained basis.
Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action include:
-- Weakening ties between KTGA and KTG, eg, if KTG fails to make
agreed equity injections to KTGA.
-- Negative rating action on KTG.
-- KTGA's leverage above 6x on a sustained basis, eg, due to an
increase in capex without a corresponding increase in equity
contribution from the state or lower-than-expected tariffs.
Liquidity and Debt Structure
Short-term Debt, Insufficient Liquidity
At end-2012, KTGA's debt amounted to KZT9.8 billion, made up of
unsecured KZT-denominated bank loans, from Citibank Kazakhstan
(nearly KZT7.5 billion) and Development Bank of Kazakhstan
(BBB/Stable), all guaranteed by KTG. KZT7.7 billion or 79% of the
company's loans are short-term.
At Dec. 31, 2012, KTGA had KZT2.4bn in cash and cash equivalents
plus KZT3.3bn in short-term KZT and USD deposits with, among
others, Halyk Bank of Kazakhstan (BB-/Rating Watch Evolving) and
Kazakh's Subsidiary Bank Sberbank of Russia OJSC (BBB-/Stable),
which was insufficient to cover its short-term debt at that time.
We expect the company to refinance its bank loans when they
become due.
KTGA aims to raise long-term funds to finance its ambitious
capex. We estimate that its gross debt could reach KZT45bn-50bn
by 2014-2015.
Full List of Ratings
Long-term foreign currency IDR of 'BB+'; Stable Outlook
Short-term IDR of 'B'
Long-term local currency IDR of 'BB+' with a Stable Outlook
Unguaranteed senior unsecured rating of 'BB+'
=================
L I T H U A N I A
=================
UKIO BANKO INVESTICINE: Enters Bankruptcy in Lithuania
------------------------------------------------------
sport.stv.tv, citing Verslo Zinios, relates that Ukio Banko
Investicine Grupe (UBIG), the former parent company of Hearts of
Midlothian Football Club, has begun bankruptcy proceedings in
Lithuania.
The report cites that UBIG had administrators appointed by Kaunas
District Court on Thursday, July 25, after they signalled
insolvency to the authorities in May.
The holding company, part of Vladimir Romaniv's collapsed
business empire, had its assets frozen in April as the Russian-
born banker was investigated, sport.stv.tv recounts. That meant
discussions between Hearts administrators, BDO, and UBIG could
not take place until now, the report cites.
UBIG holds the 50% stake in Hearts that will be key to the
capital club exiting administration. UBIG is owed GBP10 million
by the Tynecastle outfit and will have to give their blessing to
any cash settlement, sport.stv.tv says.
According to the report, UBIG has 10 days to appeal the
appointment of UAB Insolvensa as administrators and Hearts joint
administrator Bryan Jackson from the BDO firm expects that could
delay matters.
Ukio Bankas AB owns a 29.9% stake in the Hearts Football Club,
plus rights to Tynecastle Stadium, and is owed GBP15 million.
The bank is already undergoing bankruptcy proceedings. The
Central Bank suspended Ukio Bankas' operations on Feb. 12, 2013,
after it was established the lender had been involved in risky
activities. A majority 64.9% of Ukio Bankas had been owned by
Russian born-businessman Vladimir Romanov.
Administrators BDO is sizing up three offers for Hearts, with
fan-backed Foundation of Hearts believed to be leading the race,
relates sports.stv.tv.
In a separate report, Alan Pattullo at The Scotsman relates that
the Hearts Football Club administrator, Bryan Jackson of the BDO
firm, claims that news of UBIG being declared insolvent by a
Lithuanian court is "positive" for the club's survival hopes.
The move will allow negotiations over securing the Kaunas-based
bank's shares in the club to progress, Mr. Jackson said,
according to the Scotsman.
The Club's administrators BDO were restricted in what they could
achieve before UBIG's insolvency was confirmed by the courts in
Lithuania and liquidators appointed, the Scotsman notes.
This has been described as "the last piece in the puzzle" towards
securing a CVA, which is necessary for Hearts to exit
administration, the Scotsman states. However, the process of
naming a preferred bidder could take some time, according to the
Scotsman.
===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================
OXEA SARL: S&P Lowers Corp. Credit Rating to 'B'; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered to 'B'
from 'B+' its long-term corporate credit rating on Luxembourg-
headquartered chemicals intermediates and derivatives company
Oxea S.a.r.l., Luxembourg (Oxea). The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' issue rating to Oxea's
senior secured EUR110 million revolving credit facility (RCF) and
first-lien term loans B-1 (EUR450 million) and B-2 (US$535
million). The recovery rating on these facilities is '3',
indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default.
In addition, S&P assigned its 'CCC+' issue rating to Oxea's
US$325 million/EUR248 million second-lien term loan. The
recovery rating on this term loan is '6', indicating S&P's
expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery prospects in the
event of a payment default.
The downgrade reflects the doubling of Oxea's debt to about
EUR1.1 billion on a reported basis, following its issuance of
EUR858 million-equivalent first-lien term loans B-1 and B-2 and a
EUR248 million-equivalent second-lien term loan.
"We have revised our assessment of the company's financial risk
profile downward to "highly leveraged" from "aggressive," based
on our projection of Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA of
5.8x at year-end 2013. We view private equity shareholder
Advent's financial policy for Oxea as more aggressive than we
previously assumed, because the company has used part of the
proceeds from its refinancing to pay a EUR0.6 billion dividend to
Advent, significantly exceeding Advent's initial investment," S&P
said.
"At the same time, we recognize Oxea's highly successful
operational track record since it was acquired by Advent in 2007.
We also view positively Oxea's strategy of capacity additions and
the gradual shift of its product mix toward higher-margin
derivative products. We believe that the recent completion of
Oxea's carboxylic acid plant and 50% capacity increase at its
specialty esters plant should contribute increasingly to EBITDA
from 2013. However, in our view, Oxea's EBITDA growth in 2014-
2015 depends on its successful execution of further multiple
projects under way," S&P added.
In S&P's view, Oxea's niche Oxo chemicals will remain resilient
to weak economic conditions in Europe, supported by capacity
additions and changes to its product mix in favor of higher-
margin derivatives. S&P believes this, as well as Oxea's
geographic diversity, will help mitigate the tough economic
environment in Europe in 2013. S&P considers adjusted debt to
EBITDA in the range of 5.0x-6.0x to be commensurate with the
current rating.
Ratings upside could arise in 2015 if Oxea deleveraged faster
than S&P currently anticipates, with adjusted debt to EBITDA
falling to less than 4.5x. This could be the case if S&P sees
EBITDA rising to about EUR250 million, which itself depends on
Oxea successfully executing its growth initiatives and increasing
its presence in Asia.
S&P views a downgrade as relatively remote, assuming that Oxea's
performance remains resilient to economic weakness in Europe.
However, S&P could consider lowering the ratings if Oxea's
adjusted debt to EBITDA approached 6.0x-6.5x without any near-
term prospect of recovery, or if liquidity and covenant pressures
arose.
===========
R U S S I A
===========
MOBILE TELESYSTEMS: S&P Raises Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it raised its long-term
corporate credit rating on Russia's largest mobile
telecommunications operator Mobile TeleSystems (OJSC) (MTS) and
related debt ratings to 'BB+' from 'BB'. The outlook is stable.
The upgrade primarily reflects S&P's reassessment of MTS'
management and governance to "fair" from "weak," according to
S&P's criteria. S&P previously considered management and
governance to be the main rating constraint for MTS and its
parent company Sistema.
MTS recently resolved all legal disputes with Altimo and Nomihold
over its unsuccessful acquisition of Kyrgyz mobile operator
Bitel. S&P believes this eliminates any immediate risk to MTS,
whose subsidiary MTS Finance was ordered to pay an arbitral award
to Nomihold in January 2011. This had created a risk of
technical default on MTS Finance's bonds, and increased MTS'
reputational risks, which could have impaired its access to
capital markets. According to the terms of the settlement, all
claims against MTS' subsidiary should be withdrawn, and the
company is entitled to receive compensation.
"We assess MTS' stand-alone credit profile at 'bbb-', based on
our assessment of its business risk profile as "satisfactory" and
its financial risk profile as "intermediate." The 'BB+'
corporate credit rating on MTS remains dependent on the
application of our parent-subsidiary criteria. Although we
continue to believe Sistema's majority ownership could have a
negative impact on MTS' governance, this could be somewhat offset
by MTS' governance practices as a New York Stock Exchange-listed
company. In particular, we expect MTS' solid corporate
governance should limit Sistema's ability to take assets from MTS
or burden it with liabilities. We also consider that
extraordinary dividend distributions or related-party
transactions with Sistema require approval from MTS' independent
directors, which are in place to preserve the interests of MTS'
minority shareholders. Moreover, we believe it could be in
Sistema's best interest to preserve MTS' credit quality, as it
might help Sistema in case of financial distress. We therefore
rate MTS one notch above its parent company (Sistema; BB/Stable/-
-)," S&P said.
MTS' satisfactory business risk profile is supported by its
leading positions in the Russian and Ukrainian telecoms markets,
which are characterized by leading market shares, robust
operating performance, and strong profitability.
MTS' intermediate financial risk profile is supported by its
solid credit ratios, with an average historical and Standard &
Poor's-forecast debt-to-EBITDA ratio of below 2x.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that MTS will continue to
perform in line with the Russian telecoms market and will
preserve its profitability, including a consolidated EBITDA
margin above 40%.
The rating has limited upside potential as long as Sistema
retains its majority ownership of MTS and has control over its
board of directors. An upgrade of Sistema could unlock, but
would not guarantee, ratings upside for MTS.
S&P might consider a negative rating action if MTS undertook
large debt-financed acquisitions or dividend payments that
increased its adjusted debt to EBITDA to materially above 2x.
POWER MACHINES: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' CFR; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a Ba1 corporate family
rating (CFR) and a Ba1-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to
OJSC Power Machines (PM), a Russian producer of power equipment.
The outlook on the rating is stable.
"The ratings reflect the company's consistent track record of
robust operational and financial performance and our expectations
that it will continue to demonstrate strong financial metrics" -
says Sergei Grishunin, a Moody's Assistant Vice President -
Analyst and lead analyst for PM. "At the same time we view PM's
modest size and limited diversification as a constraint on the
rating, as is the company's sales concentration in the Russian
market, its concentrated ownership structure and undeveloped
corporate governance".
Rating Rationale
The rating assignment reflects 1) PM's consistent track record of
strong operational and financial performance with high
profitability (three-year average adjusted EBITA margin of over
20%), which exceeds that of the power equipment divisions of its
global peers; 2) low leverage (three-year average adjusted
debt/EBITDA of around 0.4x); 3) high cash flow generation (three-
year average retained cash flow (RCF)/debt at above 100%); and 4)
strong liquidity position. The rating also reflects Moody's
expectation that the company will continue to demonstrate strong
financial metrics over time, in line with its conservative
financial policy of maintaining reported debt/EBITDA below 2.0
times.
This robust performance is underpinned by 1) the strong
fundamentals of PM's core Russian electric power equipment
market, in which steady growth has been underpinned by ongoing
modernization (in accordance with Russian state programs, which
aim is to increase electricity generation and rehabilitate the
ageing domestic electric power equipment fleet) performed by
domestic (mainly state controlled) electric utilities companies.
However, Moody's notes that the regulatory and market framework
is evolving.
The company's performance is further supported by 1) PM's
dominant market position in the domestic electric power equipment
market (with the share of installed power equipment fleet of
around 60%), which, coupled with the company's ability to provide
an integrated solution for power stations of all types and
established long-term relationships with domestic electric
utilities companies, erects high barriers to entry and allows PM
to command premium prices and advantageous contract terms; 2) the
historically higher profitability of manufacturing traditional
electric power generation equipment than other electric equipment
(such as power grid equipment or wind and solar electric
generation equipment); 3) lower labor and energy cost in Russia;
4) the company's low capex requirements in the next 12-24 months
and 5) the company's focus on efficiency improvements and cost
optimization.
PM's ratings also reflect 1) its strong order backlog of more
than 24 months of sales, which provides high visibility of future
revenues; and 2) PM's low operating leverage (with company's cost
structure with around 60% of variable costs), which reduces the
volatility of profits and increases the company's ability to
compete on prices.
At the same time, the ratings factor in PM's modest size compared
with those in its global peer group including Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft (Aa3 negative) or Alstom (Baa3 stable). This
may constrain PM's ability to negotiate favorable contract terms,
to participate in certain tenders in particular outside of Russia
and perform sufficient R&D and equipment modernization.
PM's ratings also reflect its concentration of sales (around 80%)
in the Russian market. This concentration may expose PM to the
longer term challenges of the domestic electric power equipment
market such as potential reduction of capex programs of domestic
utilities companies or increase in competition due to entry or
expansion of larger foreign competitors. This exposure is partly
mitigated by the company's efforts to increase revenue
diversification to export markets with strong fundamentals (such
as India, Latin America and Asia), in which PM has established
business relationships. Moody's also notes that unlike global
peers which are diversified across multiple businesses, PM's
operations are concentrated on manufacturing of electric power
generation equipment thus exposing the company to industry shifts
driven by introduction of new products, overcapacity of electric
utilities resulting in decrease in capex or increase in
competition. However, the cyclicality in this industry in
comparison to other heavy manufacturing industries (e.g. truck
manufacturing) is lower. The ratings are also constrained by
risks associated with the PM's concentrated ownership structure
and developing corporate governance system.
Outlook
The stable outlook on PM's rating reflects Moody's expectations
that the robust business conditions will remain for PM's key
markets. The outlook also assumes that the company will continue
to follow its strategy of organic growth whilst maintaining a
high profitability and a strong financial profile within a stated
financial policy.
What Could Change The Rating Up/Down
Moody's does not envisage positive pressure being exerted on PM's
rating in the following 12-18 months. Nevertheless, Moody's would
consider upgrading the rating if (1) conditions in PM's key
markets remain robust; (2) PM upgrades its corporate governance
so that the company's financial policies and strategy are to a
lesser degree dependent on the decisions of the controlling
shareholder; and (3) PM were to increase its revenue generation
and expand geographical diversification of its revenue outside
Russia and/or product diversification, while continuing to
demonstrate on a sustainable basis (i) strong profitability; and
(ii) conservative financial metrics within its stated financial
policy. Additionally, in light of negative working capital nature
of the power equipment manufacturing industry, a rating upgrade
would require PM to demonstrate its ability to maintain an
appropriate level of liquidity in the form of cash balances, and
strong liquidity management.
Downward pressure on the ratings would be likely to develop if 1)
weaker-than-anticipated conditions in PM's key markets were to
result in deterioration in the size and quality of the company's
order book, and in PM's leverage (measured as adjusted
debt/EBITDA) increasing to, and remaining, above 2.0 times; or 2)
material debt-financed expansion projects and/or acquisitions, or
debt-financed dividend payouts to shareholders or other
shareholder initiatives, were to lead to the company materially
deviating from its stated financial policies or financial
thresholds.
The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Heavy Manufacturing Rating Methodology published in November
2009.
Headquartered in St. Petersburg, Russia, OJSC Power Machines is
manufacturer of a wide range of electric power generating
equipment (turbines, generators, boilers and other equipment) and
integrated solutions for electric power plants of all types and
sizes. 100% of PM's share capital is indirectly controlled by
Mr. Aleksey A Mordashov. In 2012, PM generated revenue and
adjusted EBIT of US$2.0 billion and US$0.5 billion, respectively.
SEVERSTAL OAO: Fitch Affirms 'BB' LongTerm Issuer Default Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed OAO Severstal's Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BB' with a Stable Outlook.
Key Rating Drivers
The affirmation follows an industry review also including fellow
Russian steel producers OJSC Novolipetsk Steel (NLMK: BBB-
/Negative), Evraz Group SA (BB-/Stable) and Evraz plc (BB-
/Stable). This review included an analysis of forecast
operational and financial profiles for each company over the next
three years. Over this period Fitch expects steel products'
prices to remain below 2012's level, although with some recovery
year-on-year. Companies will face a decrease of margins. However,
Fitch expects each company's EBITDAR margin to be above 10%-12%
over the next three years.
Companies will continue to benefit from low-cost upstream
operations and relatively high capacity utilization rates at
their Russian production sites. However, European and North
American operations will struggle to be profitable.
At end-2012 the companies had higher leverage than required by
Fitch for steel companies at the respective rating level.
However, the agency expects Severstal's 2013-2015 free cash flow
(FCF) to be neutral-to-positive, which will contribute to
deleveraging.
A key consideration for the future direction of the companies'
ratings is the ability to reduce capex and generate positive FCF.
Rating Sensitivities
Severstal
Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:
-- Ability to decrease funds from operations (FFO) adjusted
gross leverage below 2.0x by end-2015 according to Fitch's
projections (2.9x at end-2012)
-- Positive FCF
Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:
-- Non-ability to decrease FFO adjusted gross leverage to 2.5x
by end-2015 according to Fitch's projections
-- Negative FCF
The rating actions are as follows:
OAO Severstal
Foreign currency Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Stable Outlook
Foreign currency Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'
Foreign Currency Senior Unsecured Rating: affirmed at 'BB'
Local currency Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Stable Outlook
National Long-term Rating: affirmed at 'AA-(rus)'; Stable
Outlook
Steel Capital SA
USD1,250m LPNs due July 2013: affirmed at 'BB'
USD375m LPNs due April 2014: affirmed at 'BB'
USD1,000m LPNs due October 2017: affirmed at 'BB'
USD500m LPNs due July 2016: affirmed at 'BB'
USD 600m LPNs due March 2018: affirmed at 'BB'
* S&P Applies Revised Insurance Criteria to 11 Insurance Groups
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has reviewed its
ratings on 11 Russian insurance groups and their subsidiaries, by
applying its new ratings criteria for insurers, which were
published on May 7, 2013.
S&P will publish individual analytical reports on the insurance
groups identified below, including a list of ratings on
affiliated entities.
RATINGS LIST
(All ratings are affirmed, except where a "from" rating is
indicated.)
CJSC Insurance Co. TRANSNEFT
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BBB-/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BBB-/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruAAA/--/--
Energogarant JSIC
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BB-/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BB-/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruAA-/--/--
Ingosstrakh Insurance Co.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BBB-/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BBB-/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruAA+/--/--
Bank Soyuz
Counterparty Credit Rating B/Stable/C
Russia National Scale ruA-/--/--
LEXGARANT Insurance Co. Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency B+/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency B+/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruA/--/--
Moscow Re OJSIRC
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BB/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BB/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruAA/--/--
To From
OJSC Sogaz
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BBB-/Stable/-- BBB-
/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BBB-/Stable/-- BBB-
/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruAAA/--/--
ruAA+/--/--
OSAO RESO Garantia
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BB+/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BB+/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruAA+/--/--
To From
Pomosch Insurance Company Ltd.
Giva Insurance Company LLC
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency B+/Stable/--
B/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency B+/Stable/--
B/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruA/--/-- ruA-/-
-/--
To From
Rosgosstrakh OAO
Rosgosstrakh OOO
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BB-/Negative/-- BB-
/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BB-/Negative/-- BB-
/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruAA-/--/-- ruAA-
/--/--
RGS Assets Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency CCC+/Negative/--
CCC+/Stable/--
Unity Re
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BB/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BB/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruAA/--/--
VTB Insurance Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BBB/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BBB/Stable/--
Russia National Scale ruAAA/--/--
=========
S P A I N
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BANCO DE VALENCIA: Moody's Withdraws 'Ba3' Deposit Ratings
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Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the following ratings of
Banco de Valencia (1) the standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) of E; and (2) the long and short-term local and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Ba3 and Not-Prime,
respectively. All the ratings were on review for upgrade at the
time of the withdrawal.
Ratings Rationale:
Banco Valencia's ratings have been withdrawn following its merger
with Caixabank (Baa3 negative, BFSR D+/BCA ba1 negative),
effective as of July 19, 2013. At the same time, Moody's upgraded
the preference shares ratings of BVA Preferentes, S.A. to B2(hyb)
from C(hyb), in line with the preference share ratings of
Caixabank, following the transfer of these instruments to and
assumption by Caixabank.
At end-December 2012, Banco de Valencia had total assets
amounting to EUR19.3 billion.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.
HIPOTECARIO XVI: Fitch Assigns 'CCC' Rating to Class B Notes
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Fitch Ratings has assigned Rural Hipotecario XVI F.T.A.'s
mortgage-backed floating-rate notes due April 2055 final ratings,
as follows:
EUR133,500,000 class A notes 'Asf'; Outlook Negative
EUR16,500,000 class B notes: 'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate of 90%
The transaction is a multi-originator securitization of a EUR150
million static pool of Spanish residential mortgage loans,
originated and serviced by Caja Rural de Soria, Caja Rural de
Teruel, and Caja Rural de Zamora (the originators, unrated). The
final ratings address timely payment of interest and ultimate
payment of principal on the class A notes, and ultimate payment
of interest and principal on the class B notes by the legal final
maturity date of the notes in April 2055.
Key Rating Drivers
In deriving the lifetime default rate of the securitized
portfolio under a base case scenario, Fitch has adjusted upwards
the observed default rates by a factor of 1.1x. This upward
adjustment captures our opinion that the historical default rates
do not entirely reflect the risk attributes of the securitized
pool, which is linked to younger vintages (2009 to 2012). Fitch
received historical cumulative arrears data covering 2004 to 2012
from the originators based on their past RMBS securitization
transactions.
Fitch believes the securitized portfolio has prime
characteristics with 100% first-lien positions, all residential
mortgage loans with a moderate weighted average (WA) OLTV of
70.42%, and an indexed (WA) CLTV of 71.91% estimated by the
agency taking into consideration the almost 5.5 years of
seasoning. Fitch believes a key risk attribute of the portfolio
is its high geographical concentration in the two regions of
Castilla Leon (60.6%) and Aragon (29.4%), and has consequently
incorporated into its analysis a probability of default hit of
1.15x for these loans.
Fitch believes that servicer disruption risk, caused by the
default of one servicer, is adequately mitigated by the
incorporation of purpose-specific liquidity reserves and the
appointment of a cold back up servicer, Banco Cooperativo Espanol
(BCE; BBB/Negative/F3). BCE provides the Spanish Credit
Cooperative Group with a common range of services and uses the
same IT systems.
Fitch has incorporated potential stresses derived from basis and
reset risks within the cash flow analysis, as the structure is
unhedged. The notes are referenced to EURIBOR with quarterly
resets, while most loans are referenced to 12-month EURIBOR with
annual, bi-annual and quarterly resets.
Rating Sensitivities
Fitch believes the key risks that could introduce volatility to
the ratings are home price declines beyond Fitch's expectations,
as these could limit recoveries, and a material change in the
current legal framework, weakening the full recourse nature of
the Spanish mortgage market, as this scenario could change
borrower payment behavior. The Negative Outlook on the class A
notes reflects the uncertainty associated with changes to the
mortgage enforcement framework.
Fitch's expectation under a 'Bsf' stress scenario is linked to a
weighted average (WA) lifetime loss rate of 4.3%, which results
from a WA foreclosure frequency assumption of 7.6% and a WA
recovery rate expectation of 44.0%. The assumed WA loss rate in a
'A' rating scenario is 11.6%.
TDA IBERCAJA 7: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'D'
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Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
TDA Ibercaja 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class B and C
notes for performance reasons. At the same time, S&P has
affirmed its rating on the class A notes.
The rating actions follows S&P's review of the transaction's
performance and its structural features, based on the trustee's
latest available investor report (dated June 2013), and the
application of its relevant criteria for conducting S&P's credit,
cash flow, and counterparty risk analysis.
TDA Ibercaja 7 has experienced increasing delinquencies. In
particular, long-term arrears excluding defaults (defined in this
transaction as loans in arrears for more than 18 months)
represent 0.60% of the outstanding collateral balance. Gross
cumulative defaults represent 0.25% of TDA Ibercaja 7's initial
collateral balance. While currently limited, compared with other
Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions of similar vintages, S&P expects the securitized
portfolio's credit quality to deteriorate further due to
difficult Spanish macroeconomic conditions and a depressed
housing market. In S&P's opinion, these factors will increase
long-term delinquencies, defaults, and expected losses in the
transaction. In S&P's view, the transaction's structural
features can only partially mitigate the expected credit
deterioration.
The increase in long-term delinquencies, stemming from an
increase in long-term arrears rolling into defaults, and the
year-on-year decrease in Spanish house prices, are increasing
S&P's assumptions of the portfolio's foreclosure frequency and
the expected losses suffered from those defaulted assets. With
regards to the transaction's structural features, the increase in
available credit enhancement has been limited for the class B
notes as the performing collateral balance and amount of cash
available to the transaction have reduced in line with further
portfolio credit quality deterioration.
On the last interest payment date (IPD), the reserve fund was
marginally drawn for the first time to provision for defaulted
loans. The reserve fund represents 4.29% of the outstanding
balance of the class A and B notes. S&P's cash flow analysis
indicates that the class B notes cannot maintain the currently
assigned rating, as it expects that the portfolio credit quality
will deteriorate further and the reserve fund will continue to be
depleted accordingly.
The notes' priority of payments is currently sequential and based
on a combined interest and principal waterfall. S&P expects the
class A and B notes to continue to repay sequentially as pro rata
amortization triggers have not been reached. The class A notes
benefit from available credit enhancement of 9.1%, based on the
level of the performing collateral balance and the amount of cash
available to the transaction, while the class B notes' available
credit enhancement is 3.12%.
The interest deferral trigger for the class B notes is set at 10%
of cumulative defaults of the original portfolio balance, with
defaults defined in this transaction as assets being in arrears
for more than 18 months. This interest deferral trigger will
only benefit the class A notes late in the transaction's life.
The transaction has a hedge mechanism, under which the swap
counterparty provides a margin of 65 basis points to the
transaction based on the performing balance of the assets, while
all of the interest received on the portfolio is transferred to
the swap counterparty. Due to the low margin observed on the
underlying collateral, the transaction relies on the support the
swap agreement provides to be able to service the amounts due
under the notes.
The transaction is exposed to the counterparty risk of Banco
Santander S.A. (BBB/Negative/A-2) acting as bank account provider
and swap counterparty. On Feb. 15, 2013, in accordance with
S&P's current counterparty criteria, it linked its rating on TDA
Ibercaja 7's class A notes to its long-term issuer credit rating
on Banco Santander, as bank account provider, and it consequently
lowered its rating on the class A notes to 'BBB (sf)' from 'AA-
(sf)'.
Taking into account the observed and expected portfolio credit
quality deterioration, transaction's structural features, and
counterparty risk, S&P has affirmed its 'BBB (sf)' rating on the
class A notes and lowered to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its rating
on the class B notes.
S&P has lowered to 'D (sf)' from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the
class C notes following the issuer's failure to pay interest on
these notes on the most recent IPD.
S&P's ratings in this transaction addresses timely payment of
interest and ultimate payment of principal.
TDA Ibercaja 7 is a Spanish RMBS transaction, which closed in
December 2009 and securitizes a portfolio of first-ranking
mortgage loans granted to individuals resident in Spain. The
portfolio features loans granted to self-employed borrowers (15%
of the outstanding portfolio) and broker-originated mortgages (6%
of the outstanding portfolio), while 11% of the outstanding
mortgages were granted for a purpose other than buying a
residential property. Second homes account for 6.3% of the
outstanding portfolio. The securitized portfolio features a
seasoning of 75 months and is mainly exposed to geographic
concentration in the regions of Madrid (34.4%), Aragon (15%), and
Valencia (14.4%).
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating Rating
To From
TDA Ibercaja 7, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR2.07 Billion Floating-Rate Notes
Rating Affirmed
A BBB (sf)
Ratings Lowered
B BB- (sf) BB (sf)
C D (sf) CCC- (sf)
* SPAIN: Fitch Says Mortgage Arrears Stable in Second Quarter
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In its Q213 'Mortgage Market Index -- Spain', Fitch Ratings
reveals that although the official index of doubtful loans
continues to increase, reaching 4.2% in Q213, the arrears levels
in securitized portfolios are showing signs of stabilization.
Loans in arrears by more than three months (excluding those
classified as defaulted) across Fitch-rated Spanish RMBS
transactions remained at 2.6% from the previous quarter.
Some of the arrears stabilization may be due to the fact that
more borrowers are entering default. In Q213, the Fitch constant
default rate increased to 1.5% compared with 1.0% a year earlier.
The index also shows a continued decline in house prices. The
reduction in the quarter was by 0.8% suggesting a total decline
of 27.7% from peak levels in Q208.
Following a recent Supreme Court ruling, the agency expects some
banks to revisit their mortgage terms and conditions, if they
allow floors to be applied to interest rates payable. Although
these changes may lead to an improvement in borrower
affordability and consequently an improvement in loan
performance, they are also expected to compress the levels of
excess spread across RMBS transactions.
Fitch's 'Mortgage Market Index - Spain' is part of the agency's
quarterly series of structured finance index reports. It includes
information on the performance of residential mortgages,
predominantly from RMBS transactions, but also those held on bank
balance sheets. The report sets the housing market against the
macroeconomic background and provides commentary on the emerging
trends.
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T U R K E Y
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* TURKEY: Still Vulnerable to Market Sentiment Shifts, Fitch Says
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The increase in the Central Bank of Turkey's (CBT) overnight
lending rate signals the Turkish authorities' greater readiness
to address the risks presented by currency weakness, high
inflation, and falling capital inflows, Fitch Ratings says.
However, Turkey is still vulnerable to shifts in market
sentiment, its external finances remain a key sovereign rating
weakness, and balancing growth, price and exchange rate stability
concerns present a policy challenge.
Balance of payments data indicate that Turkey suffered a halt to
capital inflows in May, with portfolio debt flows recording a
minor outflow compared to a net inflow of US$8.9 billion in
April. Net capital inflows are essential to economic growth in
Turkey: a current account deficit of 6-7% of GDP mirrors a
comparable imbalance between savings and investment. With the
current account deficit showing signs of renewed widening this
year, following last year's narrowing, declining capital inflows
represent a greater near-term potential risk to Turkey's economy
than the possibility that tighter monetary policy constrains
domestic demand.
Favorable economic growth prospects support Turkey's sovereign
credit profile. GDP increased by 1.6% in the first three months
of this year from the previous quarter, and data on industrial
production and imports suggest that Q213's reading could also be
strong.
The CBT had been intervening in the currency markets to defend
the lira, which hit an all-time low against the US dollar earlier
this month, but Turkey's international liquidity ratio is weak
and it does not have a sufficient stock of FX reserves to
maintain this strategy for long. We estimate that reserves may
have dropped from a peak of US$114 billion (excluding gold) in
April to around US$100 billion in mid-July, reflecting both
central bank intervention and portfolio capital outflows.
The sharp drop in net capital inflows, currency depreciation, and
fall in international reserves remain within the tolerance of
Turkey's 'BBB-' rating. However, recent developments serve to
highlight Turkey's vulnerability to shocks against a background
of domestic political and social unrest and volatile investor
sentiment towards emerging markets in general, as speculation
about the eventual withdrawal of quantitative easing continues.
As we have previously said, persistent political and social
unrest could deter tourism, destabilize short-term capital
inflows, push up inflation and damage economic growth.
Although the CBT's still relatively new monetary policy framework
has traction and has helped to rebalance the economy under
challenging conditions, it has failed to hit the inflation target
of 5%, suggesting that up until recently supporting growth may
have taken priority over price stability. Credit growth has
remained elevated and inflation rose to 8.3% year-on-year at the
end of June, up from 6.5% in May.
The CBT raised the overnight lending rate for the first time in
nearly two years, to 7.25% from 6.5%, while leaving the one-week
repo rate unchanged. The Monetary Policy Committee's statement
said that a "cautious stance will be maintained until the
inflation outlook is in line with medium term targets. . .
additional monetary tightening will be implemented when
necessary."
"We upgraded Turkey to 'BBB-' from 'BB+' in November. The Outlook
on the rating is Stable," Fitch notes.
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U K R A I N E
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CREATIV GROUP: S&P Assigns 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating
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Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B-' long-term
corporate credit rating to Ukraine-based agri-business Creativ
Group OJSC. The outlook is positive.
At the same time, S&P withdrew its preliminary 'B-' issue rating
and its recovery rating of '4' on the proposed US$400 million
senior notes that were not issued.
The rating on Creativ is based on S&P's assessment of the group's
business risk profile as "weak" and its financial risk profile as
"highly leveraged."
The group's business risk profile is constrained by the inherent
volatility of the agribusiness industry and the group's exposure
to Ukraine. Although only about one-third of the company's sales
are domestic, S&P still considers Creativ's country risk exposure
to Ukraine to be a key risk factor, because all of its operating
assets are located there. Ukraine has implemented export bans
detrimental to agriculture groups in the past, but it views this
risk as higher for grains than for oil. Creativ has an ambitious
expansion strategy but, in S&P's view, it manages related
execution risks well.
The rating is supported by Creativ's sound position in the
sunflower crushing business and its record of profitable growth.
The group is also present in the fat and margarine, and soybean
crushing businesses, which add some diversity to earnings. The
bulk of the group's profits come from sunflower end-products,
which are oil for human consumption, and meals for pig and
poultry feeds.
S&P views Creativ's financial risk profile as "highly leveraged,"
owing to aggressive leverage, negative free cash flows,
dependence on short-term debt, and exposure to financial
covenants.
The outlook on Creativ is positive, reflecting a substantial
potential for deleveraging once major growth investments are
completed. Should adjusted debt to EBITDA improve to less than
3.5x at year-end 2013, S&P would envisage an upgrade. This is a
significant deleveraging from the quite high 4.6x at year-end
2012, but S&P expects EBITDA to markedly increase again this year
assuming higher capacity, a high utilization rate, and favorable
industry trends with sustained global demand for agricultural
products. Improved financial metrics would also release the
pressure on the tight financial covenants, prompting S&P to
revise the liquidity qualifier to adequate. Equally importantly,
an upgrade would be contingent on a stabilization of operating
margins, which have declined over the past 12 months.
On the other hand, inability to substantially deleverage in 2013
would likely cause an outlook revision to stable. In S&P's
opinion, this could occur if the group does not moderate its
capital expenditures from the peak recorded in 2012. S&P will
also closely monitor future covenant headroom, as well as
profitability evolution: S&P believes the operating margin could
be squeezed again if raw material prices significantly increase.
Equally importantly, under S&P's criteria, the long-term
sovereign rating and transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment
on Ukraine constrain the rating on Creativ, based on S&P's view
that the group's cash flow generation is sensitive to country
risk.
A downgrade of Ukraine could therefore affect the ratings on
Creativ. A downgrade of Ukraine to 'B-' could affect the outlook
on Creativ, which would then mirror the outlook on Ukraine. A
downgrade of Ukraine by more than one notch would trigger a
downgrade of Creativ.
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U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
ANDERSON PRECISION: In Administration; 38 Jobs Affected
-------------------------------------------------------
Erikka Askeland reports that Anderson Precision Gearing, which
was awarded a GBP1.6 million grant by Scottish Enterprise in
January, has called in an administrator.
The immediate closure of APG means the loss of 38 jobs, the
Scotsman notes.
According to the Scotsman, administrator PricewaterhouseCoopers
said the firm had been hit by a downturn in demand and the loss
of contracts after a failure to find a buyer.
In January, the company, which employed 42 people, announced it
had won a government-funded regional selective assistance grant
which it would use to move into bigger premises at Bellshill
industrial estate and hire 53 staff over the next three years,
the Scotsman recounts. PwC confirmed that the enterprise agency
was a creditor and is owed GBP825,000 which had been advanced to
the firm, the Scotsman relates.
PwC's Bruce Cartwright and Alan Brown, as cited by the Scotsman,
said the business had ceased trading with only four staff
retained "to assist in realizing the value of APG's assets".
Anderson Precision Gearing is a 114-year old engineering firm in
Motherwell. The business specializes in manufacturing heavy
industrial gears for the rail, oil and gas, construction and
mining industries.
BEATBOX BARS: Goes Into Administration, Closes Fire Island Bar
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WalesOnline reports that London-based administrators the SFP
Group has confirmed that Beatbox Bars Limited, the firm behind
Cardiff bars Buffalo, 10 Feet Tall, and Fire Island has gone into
administration after citing financial difficulties.
SFP's Simon and Daniel Plant were appointed joint administrators
for Beatbox Bars by the board of directors on July 22.
Buffalo and 10 Feet Tall will continue trading, despite the
sudden closure of Fire Island last week, WalesOnline relates.
The Fire Island bar, which specialised in craft ales, had only
been open eight months and had received a GBP250,000 investment
from Finance Wales, a subsidiary of the Welsh Government, the
report cites.
WaleOnline notes that while the sudden closure of Fire Island has
come as a shock to many, SFP revealed that it is currently in
negotiations with a number of interested parties in the hope that
the bar will be up and running again soon, albeit under new
management.
A Beatbox Bars spokesman said the firm is undertaking marketing
efforts to seek out potential purchasers for Buffalo and 10 Feet
Tall, WalesOnline relates. Group partner Daniel Plant, according
to the report, expressed his belief that 10 Feet Tall and Buffalo
represent an excellent opportunity for a potential purchaser,
especially one with industry knowledge and local connections.
Beatbox Bars is run by a group of friends -- Daniel Biscombe,
Nathan Vaughan, Ian Dakin, Claire Biscombe and Alex Power -- who
worked their way up through the licensed trade and, after
spotting a gap in the market in 2004, seized the opportunity to
form a company. They opened Buffalo in 2005, 10 Feet Tall in
2008, while the lease for Fire Island was first negotiated in
early 2010.
CP GROUP: Two Bailiff Bridge Sites For Sale Amid Administration
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Brighouse Echo reports that two derelict sites in the heart of
Bailiff Bridge, a village north of Brighouse, West Yorkshire,
England, is on the market as its owner, CP Group Limited, goes
into administration.
Administrators for CP Group have instructed Edward Symmons to get
the best possible price for the sites.
The land parcels are adjacent to each other and located in
Bradford Road. Brighouse Echo relays that the first site is the
former Clifton Mills, which has recently been granted planning
permission for three shops and outline plans for a 56-bed care
home. The second site is behind the former St. Aidan's Church in
Wyke Old Lane, which had a planning consent for 18 apartments
with car parking, a clock tower and bin store. It is believed
this planning application has now expired.
The advertisement for the first site does specify that part of it
is pre-let to the Co-operative Group Food Limited, the report
relates. Brighouse Echo relates that CP Group has entered into
an April 4, 2012 lease agreement for the unit following
construction for a 20-year term at an initial rent of GBP60,000
per year.
Written offers for the first site can be made until noon on
Friday, August 2, according to Brighouse Echo.
C P Group Limited was incorporated on Jul 6, 1998 and is located
in Leeds. The company is in real estate business. It was
founded by Bruce Heblethwayte Raper and William Moran Law. The
company has four subsidiaries. It went into administration on
April 24, 2013, after undergoing cash flow problems in early
2013. Begbies Traynor act as administrators of the company.
JAGUAR LAND: S&P Raises CCR to 'BB'; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it raised its long-term
corporate credit rating on U.K.-based automaker Jaguar Land Rover
Automotive PLC (JLR) to 'BB' from 'BB-'. The outlook is stable.
S&P has also raised its issue rating on JLR's senior unsecured
debt to 'BB' from 'BB-', in line with the action on the corporate
credit rating. S&P has changed its recovery rating on this debt
to '3' from '4', indicating its expectations for meaningful
(50%-70%) recovery in the event of a payment default.
The upgrade reflects S&P's opinion that JLR has confirmed its
solid positioning in the premium car segment. In fiscal 2013
(year ended March 31), it maintained a steady operating margin
and according to S&P's estimate generated free operating cash of
more than GBP400 million, notwithstanding its increased
investments. S&P assess JLR's business risk and financial risk
profiles respectively as fair and intermediate and factor these
views into the rating. The rating is constrained by that on its
India-based 100% owner, Tata Motors Ltd. (BB/Stable/--).
JLR has reported sound fiscal 2013 results, on the back of the
strong increase in sales of the Land Rover brand. The reported
EBITDA margin was 15.2% at about last year's figure. JLR is
continuing to increase its investment to expand its Land Rover
product range and the relaunch of its Jaguar brand. The company
benefits from the positive momentum of demand from premium cars
in all the major economies, in S&P's opinion. In S&P's base-case
scenario for 2014-2015, it assumes that this demand will continue
and that JLR will report a fresh 10%-15% jump in revenues in
fiscal 2014. S&P also thinks the reported EBITDA margin will
contract only marginally, to about 14% in 2014 from about 15%
this year, due to the cost related to the significant expected
expansion in products and sales in the coming years. The margin
should then stay at about the same level in fiscal 2015. S&P
believes that Jaguar sales should start to rise more than in the
past year thanks to the effect of the new Jaguar XF model and
other derivative models. S&P understands that the repositioning
of the Jaguar brand will be completed only in the next two years
as other new products are launched.
Given JLR's high reported free cash flow in fiscal 2013, S&P
estimates that its adjusted funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt
ratio for JLR at fiscal yearend is about 130%, not far from the
previous-year level. The company has announced new increases in
investments, however. S&P believes the investments will total
about GBP2.8 billion in the current year and could rise further
subsequently, which will likely push JLR's free cash flow
generation into negative territory both this fiscal year and the
following one. S&P consequently expects weakening credit metrics
in the next two years, but FFO to debt should stay above 30%-35%,
which is the minimum target for the current rating.
"We apply our parent-subsidiary criteria to the ratings on JLR,
based on its full ownership by Tata Motors. JLR is large in the
group, having generated about 66% of Tata Motors' consolidated
revenues and 70% of its consolidated EBITDA in fiscal 2013. We
rate JLR and Tata Motors are now at the same level after the
upgrade. Consequently, any potential future rating upgrade of
JLR can only occur if we also upgrade Tata Motors. Still, we
acknowledge that JLR's credit quality could improve over the next
two years, based on our forecasts," S&P said.
"The stable outlook reflects that on JLR's parent company, Tata
Motors, and our opinion that JLR will maintain credit metrics
well in line with our guidelines for the current rating. We also
factor in our view that the company's profitability will
deteriorate only slightly owing to the cost related to the
significant expected expansion in products and sales in the next
years. We believe that the company's FFO to debt will be higher
than the 30%-35% target for the current rating in fiscal 2014,
but we expect significant cash burn of about EUR400 million
before dividends. According to our base-case scenario, sales
will continue to grow, exceeding 10% in fiscal 2014; supported by
the positive product momentum and the favorable trend in demand
for premium cars," S&P added.
S&P could take a negative rating action if JLR's reported EBITDA
falls due to lack of interest for its new products and this
weakness appears to S&P to not to be temporary and triggers a
cash burn significantly higher than what is assumed in the base
case scenario that weakens the ratios below the targets.
S&P could upgrade JLR if we upgrade Tata Motors and if JLR
successfully launches new models, and maintains the reported
EBITDA margin at least at 15% and FFO to debt at about 40%.
KITSONS ENVIRONMENTAL: Bought Out Of Administration
---------------------------------------------------
Tom Keighley at Bdaily reports that Kitsons Environmental Europe
Limited has been acquired by South Yorkshire-based Euro
Dismantling Services Ltd (EDS).
Warrington-headquartered Kitsons entered into administration this
month and parent company Silverdell Plc has now bought the
business back through its subsidiary, EDS, according to Bdaily.
The report notes that the deal has been capped at GBP8 million
following the completion of a valuation of the Kitsons business.
Bdaily discloses that Kitsons will now operate as a separate
division of EDS and all staff will transfer.
The firm also has a base on Teesside.
PREMIER WASTE: In Liquidation; Owes GBP19 Million to Creditors
--------------------------------------------------------------
Joe Willis at The Northern Echo reports that Premier Waste
Management has gone into liquidation with debts of GBP19 million.
Furious small business owners have accused Durham County Council
and Darlington Borough Council of allowing Premier Waste
Management to continue trading when they knew it was insolvent,
the Northern Echo discloses.
The company, which is majority owned by Durham Council with the
Darlington authority holding a smaller share, has about 150
creditors, with the biggest being the staff pension fund which
has been left with a GBP12.5 million black hole, the Northern
Echo discloses.
The scheme is now likely to be passed to the Pension Protection
Fund, which would issue compensation to members -- although
potentially not 100% of what is due to former employees, the
Northern Echo notes.
The company entered a Company Voluntary Agreement (CVA) in
February after Durham County Council handed the contract for
domestic waste collection in the county to a rival company, the
Northern Echo recounts. The company stopped trading at the end
of May and joint liquidators from KPMG were brought in earlier
this month, the Northern Echo relates. About 50 staff
transferred to the new contractor, however 11 were made redundant
ahead of the liquidators' arrival, the Northern Echo discloses.
KPMG's Mark Firmin and Howard Smith were appointed joint
liquidators of Premier Waste Management and its parent company
Durham County Waste Management Company (DCWM) on July 1, the
Northern Echo relates.
Independent Durham county councilor John Shuttleworth is also
furious with the way the authorities have handled the company,
the Northern Echo discloses.
According to the Northern Echo, Don McLure, Durham County Council
corporate director of resources, denies any rules have been
broken.
Mr. McLure, as cited by the Northern Echo, said "Premier Waste
Ltd. has been trading through a regulated Company Voluntary
Arrangement since February 2013 under which all creditors have
been paid in full between then and May 31, 2013 when the company
ceased trading.
"The company is now in the process of voluntary liquidation and
the outstanding creditors will have made a claim through KPMG who
is the liquidator.
"There has been no wrongful trading and county council officers
on the board of the company are subject to the same legal duties
and responsibilities as all other directors."
Premier Waste Management is a waste company based at Aykley
Heads, in Durham City.
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X X X X X X X X
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* New Pension Trends Credit Positive for European Insurers
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Sovereign states and private employers across Europe are
increasingly stepping back from providing for individuals in
their retirement, says Moody's Investors Service in a new Special
Comment entitled "European Pensions: Opportunity for Life
Insurers, But Macro Challenges Will Suppress Demand."
This increases the onus on individuals to provide for themselves
and look for ways to supplement their retirement income, creating
an opportunity for life insurers to fill the pensions gap.
Moody's says that the long-term growth opportunities arising from
the shift in pension provision will be credit positive for life
insurers. However, whilst macro pressures across Europe will
provide near-term constraints to such growth, competition from
banks and asset managers will provide longer-term constraints.
Moody's believes that the shift towards increasing the onus on
individuals to provide for themselves in their retirement years
creates significant opportunities for life insurers (as well as
banks and asset managers) to make up the shortfall between the
retirement expectations of the individual and the reality of
their retirement provision.
Moody's also says that pensions products sold by life insurers
continue to benefit from tax advantages in many European
jurisdictions. If these tax advantages continue, Moody's expects
life insurers to be well placed to take advantage of these
shifts, relative to other types of financial institution.
However, demand for life insurance and pensions across Europe is
likely to remain pressurized in the near-term, given the macro
economic challenges with many households' discretionary spending
under pressure. At the same time, Moody's believes that life
insurers face two main challenges in obtaining this business: (1)
encouraging consumers to act; and (2) defending against the
challenge of asset managers and banks, particularly in those
markets where tax incentives for pension products have been
removed or reduced. In addition, insurers providing annuities are
exposed to longevity risk in the event of their policyholders
living longer than expected when pricing the annuity at
retirement.
* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 22 to July 26, 2013
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Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
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A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13
IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62
BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94
TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62
ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33
FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45
INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15
NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56
PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36
GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49
COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71
COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48
COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77
COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74
COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 7.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 71.50
DZ BANK AG 15.500 10/25/2013 EUR 71.05
DZ BANK AG 15.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.86
DZ BANK AG 15.750 7/26/2013 EUR 71.21
DZ BANK AG 15.000 7/26/2013 EUR 75.00
DZ BANK AG 6.000 7/26/2013 EUR 69.50
DZ BANK AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.36
DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.28
DZ BANK AG 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.43
DZ BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.14
DZ BANK AG 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.07
DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 61.83
DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 57.11
DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 15.42
DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 59.63
DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 43.33
DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 56.77
DZ BANK AG 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.81
DZ BANK AG 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.74
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.16
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.95
DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.97
DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.07
DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.29
DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 68.17
DZ BANK AG 9.750 3/8/2013 EUR 73.96
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.66
DZ BANK AG 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 72.63
DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.25
DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 44.10
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.38
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.88
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.66
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 71.94
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.43
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.27
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 68.24
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 67.09
DZ BANK AG 11.500 11/23/2012 EUR 74.94
DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 63.46
DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 41.34
DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 69.68
DZ BANK AG 9.750 12/14/2012 EUR 66.05
DZ BANK AG 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 74.23
DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 71.10
DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 65.09
DZ BANK AG 16.250 1/2/2013 EUR 68.65
DZ BANK AG 10.500 1/11/2013 EUR 66.00
DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.04
DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 53.41
DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 3/20/2013 EUR 74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 17.000 3/20/2013 EUR 73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 16.000 6/26/2013 EUR 74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 15.000 12/28/2012 EUR 71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS 25.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS 30.000 6/28/2013 EUR 46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 3/22/2013 EUR 41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.000 3/22/2013 EUR 52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.000 3/22/2013 EUR 53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.500 3/22/2013 EUR 43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN 5.500 12/23/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 7/26/2013 EUR 74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 6.000 8/23/2013 EUR 74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 8/23/2013 EUR 72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 9/27/2013 EUR 74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 11/23/2012 EUR 46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 2/22/2013 EUR 62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 2/22/2013 EUR 55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT 13.250 1/2/2013 EUR 67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT 18.000 12/14/2012 EUR 63.38
Q-CELLS 6.750 10/21/2015 EUR 1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE 6.750 3/22/2013 USD 4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 0.58
TAG IMMO AG 6.500 12/10/2015 EUR 9.73
TUI AG 2.750 3/24/2016 EUR 56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 3/22/2013 EUR 68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 3/22/2013 EUR 55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.050 3/22/2013 EUR 62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.700 3/22/2013 EUR 71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.700 3/22/2013 EUR 42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 3/22/2013 EUR 50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 3/22/2013 EUR 40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 3/22/2013 EUR 39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.450 12/31/2012 EUR 56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.100 12/31/2012 EUR 50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.050 12/31/2012 EUR 54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 12/31/2012 EUR 60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.700 12/31/2012 EUR 71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.450 12/31/2012 EUR 73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.350 12/31/2012 EUR 57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.150 12/31/2012 EUR 63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.100 12/31/2012 EUR 71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.050 12/31/2012 EUR 72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.900 12/31/2012 EUR 73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.750 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 12/31/2012 EUR 57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.950 12/31/2012 EUR 74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.700 12/31/2012 EUR 73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 12/31/2012 EUR 63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.450 12/31/2012 EUR 53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.100 12/31/2012 EUR 74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.550 12/31/2012 EUR 57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.500 12/31/2012 EUR 61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.150 12/31/2012 EUR 70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 12/31/2012 EUR 67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.900 12/31/2012 EUR 50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.800 12/31/2012 EUR 46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.250 12/31/2012 EUR 68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 12/31/2012 EUR 61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 12/31/2012 EUR 68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.750 12/31/2012 EUR 55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.700 12/31/2012 EUR 61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.600 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.450 12/31/2012 EUR 54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.400 12/31/2012 EUR 58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 12/31/2012 EUR 72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.900 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.500 12/31/2012 EUR 41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.050 12/31/2012 EUR 63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.650 12/31/2012 EUR 70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.350 12/31/2012 EUR 72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.250 12/31/2012 EUR 41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.150 12/31/2012 EUR 73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.050 12/31/2012 EUR 73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.650 12/31/2012 EUR 66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.900 3/22/2013 EUR 72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.750 3/22/2013 EUR 73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.200 12/31/2012 EUR 65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.700 12/31/2012 EUR 62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 23.600 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 4.000 6/28/2013 EUR 44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.700 12/31/2012 EUR 67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.400 12/31/2012 EUR 55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.550 6/28/2013 EUR 74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.250 12/31/2012 EUR 53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 6/28/2013 EUR 72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.389 11/25/2013 EUR 44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.100 4/14/2014 EUR 32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.950 12/31/2012 EUR 68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.300 12/31/2012 EUR 66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.000 12/31/2012 EUR 69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.850 12/31/2012 EUR 72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.150 12/31/2012 EUR 68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.250 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.700 12/31/2012 EUR 66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.700 12/31/2012 EUR 43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 26.050 12/31/2012 EUR 69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 27.600 12/31/2012 EUR 40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 28.250 12/31/2012 EUR 38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 2/1/2013 EUR 55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.650 3/1/2013 EUR 35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.100 3/8/2013 EUR 74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.650 3/22/2013 EUR 68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.550 3/22/2013 EUR 61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.850 3/22/2013 EUR 73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.200 3/22/2013 EUR 65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 3/22/2013 EUR 70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.150 3/22/2013 EUR 59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.050 12/31/2012 EUR 64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.300 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.350 3/22/2013 EUR 73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 46.30
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/28/2012 EUR 59.08
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/21/2012 EUR 66.08
WGZ BANK 5.000 12/28/2012 EUR 73.18
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/28/2012 EUR 67.75
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/28/2012 EUR 63.10
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/21/2012 EUR 74.00
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/21/2012 EUR 68.47
GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY 8.020 3/1/2013 EUR 56.54
BKB FINANCE 10.950 5/10/2013 CHF 62.57
BKB FINANCE 10.150 9/11/2013 CHF 73.89
BKB FINANCE 13.200 1/31/2013 CHF 50.08
BKB FINANCE 9.450 7/3/2013 CHF 68.52
BKB FINANCE 11.500 3/20/2013 CHF 59.30
BKB FINANCE 8.350 1/14/2013 CHF 54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/13/2012 EUR 73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.000 11/13/2012 EUR 64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.830 11/19/2012 CHF 70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.300 11/20/2012 CHF 64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.500 11/20/2012 EUR 55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.800 11/20/2012 EUR 65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.250 11/27/2012 CHF 68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 11/27/2012 CHF 64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/27/2012 CHF 31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 11/27/2012 EUR 59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.750 12/3/2012 CHF 72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.750 12/6/2012 CHF 35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.500 12/14/2012 CHF 58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.250 12/14/2012 EUR 66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.500 12/14/2012 EUR 62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.300 12/21/2012 CHF 64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.900 12/21/2012 CHF 64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.600 12/21/2012 CHF 64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.830 12/28/2012 USD 57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 1/9/2013 EUR 52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.000 1/15/2013 CHF 27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.250 1/15/2013 CHF 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 1/15/2013 GBP 73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.500 1/15/2013 CHF 28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 1/15/2013 CHF 74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.500 1/18/2013 CHF 50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.800 1/23/2013 CHF 69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.050 2/20/2013 USD 74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR 15.000 3/1/2013 CHF 71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 3/6/2013 USD 71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.250 12/27/2012 GBP 67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 4/2/2013 CHF 63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 4/4/2013 CHF 23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.530 4/16/2013 EUR 49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.000 4/19/2013 EUR 55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.000 4/26/2013 CHF 66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.500 4/30/2013 EUR 28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.200 6/7/2013 EUR 71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.500 8/27/2013 CHF 51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.400 9/30/2013 CHF 63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.000 10/3/2013 GBP 74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.160 4/25/2014 EUR 71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.850 10/14/2014 CHF 57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 CHF 56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 EUR 57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.000 11/13/2012 USD 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.750 3/19/2013 USD 71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.670 12/28/2012 CHF 70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN 11.500 1/24/2013 CHF 59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN 17.000 2/22/2013 EUR 59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.128 3/7/2013 CHF 64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN 13.575 4/10/2013 CHF 74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN 7.340 4/16/2013 CHF 70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.500 7/5/2013 CHF 70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.200 8/23/2013 CHF 67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.000 9/11/2013 CHF 69.23
ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING 0.800 2/15/2011 EUR 26.50
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 21.66
NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV 12.000 2/10/2015 USD 24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV 5.250 5/8/2013 EUR 5.89
KPNQWEST NV 10.000 3/15/2012 EUR 0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 9/13/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.600 2/22/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 2/14/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 12/15/2011 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 12.000 7/4/2011 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 1/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 12/31/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 11/16/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 10/12/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.500 8/9/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 5/30/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.750 3/1/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2010 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 1.750 2/7/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.800 12/27/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.800 8/21/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 8/3/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.500 8/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.500 7/6/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 6/29/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 6/17/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.750 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.500 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 6/13/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 15.000 6/4/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 17.000 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.500 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.200 5/14/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.850 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 4/14/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 3/17/2009 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 0.500 2/16/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.750 1/30/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.432 1/8/2009 ILS 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 12/26/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 11/28/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.442 11/22/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.100 11/12/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 11/9/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.150 10/30/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/28/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 10/24/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/24/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.000 10/24/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 10/23/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 10/22/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/8/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.250 10/6/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 18.250 10/2/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.375 9/20/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 23.300 9/16/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 9/15/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.000 9/12/2036 JPY 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/30/2012 USD 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 8/23/2012 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 7/25/2012 EUR 22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 1.375 4/30/2012 EUR 26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 5.750 5/26/2014 EUR 26.88
RENEWABLE CORP 6.500 6/4/2014 EUR 61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM 6.500 5/1/2016 EUR 51.72
SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber 6.000 6/30/2016 SEK 66.00
SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER 8.700 8/5/2013 CHF 60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER 15.000 5/31/2013 USD 69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 13.000 5/31/2013 USD 70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.000 4/9/2013 CHF 56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 10.750 3/13/2013 EUR 66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER 17.300 2/1/2013 EUR 54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 9.700 12/20/2012 CHF 75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER 11.500 2/20/2013 CHF 47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.200 12/5/2012 EUR 54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/26/2014 CHF 65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/13/2014 CHF 63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/24/2014 CHF 55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/11/2014 CHF 54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 18.400 12/20/2013 EUR 74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 11/26/2013 CHF 64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 4.500 8/13/2014 CHF 48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 16.500 9/23/2013 USD 57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/23/2013 CHF 50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 3.250 9/16/2013 CHF 49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.500 11/13/2012 CHF 58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/13/2012 CHF 74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.250 11/12/2012 CHF 73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 8/27/2014 CHF 55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/10/2014 CHF 51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 10/15/2014 CHF 57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 5.250 8/6/2014 CHF 51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.000 7/22/2013 CHF 72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.000 6/10/2013 CHF 70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/31/2013 CHF 55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 6.500 4/26/2013 CHF 58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/25/2013 CHF 59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/18/2013 CHF 74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 3/1/2013 USD 74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 9.000 2/14/2013 CHF 66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 11.500 2/13/2013 EUR 57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 1/24/2013 CHF 66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.750 1/15/2013 CHF 68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.250 12/17/2012 CHF 61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/17/2012 EUR 67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 12/14/2012 EUR 72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/14/2012 CHF 36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.000 11/23/2012 CHF 47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.125 11/19/2012 CHF 58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/16/2012 CHF 58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 8.900 3/25/2013 EUR 57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 10.500 9/9/2013 CHF 66.05
S-AIR GROUP 0.125 7/7/2005 CHF 10.63
SARASIN CI LTD 8.000 4/27/2015 CHF 68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.600 2/17/2014 CHF 71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.200 1/23/2013 EUR 72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 15.200 12/12/2012 EUR 73.12
UBS AG 11.870 8/13/2013 USD 4.68
UBS AG 9.600 8/26/2013 USD 15.21
UBS AG 10.200 9/20/2013 EUR 61.15
UBS AG 12.900 9/20/2013 EUR 57.98
UBS AG 15.900 9/20/2013 EUR 55.99
UBS AG 17.000 9/27/2013 EUR 73.19
UBS AG 17.750 9/27/2013 EUR 73.50
UBS AG 18.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.56
UBS AG 19.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.84
UBS AG 20.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.19
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 74.87
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.43
UBS AG 21.750 9/27/2013 EUR 72.53
UBS AG 22.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.57
UBS AG 22.500 9/27/2013 EUR 70.55
UBS AG 22.750 9/27/2013 EUR 67.91
UBS AG 23.000 9/27/2013 EUR 72.72
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.81
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.35
UBS AG 24.000 9/27/2013 EUR 69.47
UBS AG 24.750 9/27/2013 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 8.060 10/3/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 13.570 11/21/2013 USD 16.25
UBS AG 6.980 11/27/2013 USD 34.85
UBS AG 17.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.48
UBS AG 17.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 73.31
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.28
UBS AG 19.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.10
UBS AG 20.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.53
UBS AG 20.500 1/3/2014 EUR 71.30
UBS AG 20.750 1/3/2014 EUR 71.59
UBS AG 21.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.44
UBS AG 22.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 23.000 1/3/2014 EUR 71.55
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.29
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.57
UBS AG 24.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.95
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 68.40
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.18
UBS AG 6.440 5/28/2014 USD 51.67
UBS AG 3.870 6/17/2014 USD 38.08
UBS AG 6.040 8/29/2014 USD 35.22
UBS AG 7.780 8/29/2014 USD 20.85
UBS AG 11.260 11/12/2012 EUR 47.13
UBS AG 11.660 11/12/2012 EUR 34.35
UBS AG 13.120 11/12/2012 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 13.560 11/12/2012 EUR 36.51
UBS AG 13.600 11/12/2012 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 13.000 11/23/2012 USD 62.55
UBS AG 8.150 12/21/2012 EUR 72.14
UBS AG 8.250 12/21/2012 EUR 74.88
UBS AG 8.270 12/21/2012 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 8.990 12/21/2012 EUR 72.49
UBS AG 9.000 12/21/2012 EUR 69.13
UBS AG 9.150 12/21/2012 EUR 71.84
UBS AG 9.450 12/21/2012 EUR 74.42
UBS AG 9.730 12/21/2012 EUR 70.24
UBS AG 9.890 12/21/2012 EUR 66.37
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 72.98
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 69.64
UBS AG 10.160 12/21/2012 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 10.490 12/21/2012 EUR 68.12
UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 71.60
UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.85
UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 67.59
UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.14
UBS AG 11.270 12/21/2012 EUR 70.63
UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53
UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67
UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02
UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09
UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07
UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39
UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51
UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64
UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85
UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41
UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18
UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29
UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44
UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53
UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58
UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59
UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81
UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88
UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41
UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51
UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10
UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18
UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09
UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69
UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84
UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83
UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52
UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33
UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40
UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63
UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95
UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39
UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32
UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69
UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58
UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54
UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23
UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99
UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92
UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21
UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94
UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05
UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65
UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55
UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34
UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54
UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04
UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86
UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90
UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35
UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96
UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23
UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02
UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24
UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00
UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30
UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20
UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16
UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16
UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45
UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44
UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63
UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43
UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24
UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21
UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17
UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77
UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39
UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84
UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50
UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06
UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75
UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90
UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12
UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60
UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70
UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00
UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17
UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43
UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83
UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98
UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05
UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54
UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91
UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62
UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86
UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83
UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15
UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94
UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97
UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96
UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87
UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62
UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50
UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82
UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26
UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53
UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76
UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64
UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66
ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62
MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *