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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, July  25, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 146

                            Headlines



B E L G I U M

DEXIA SA: Pulls Out of Talks on Asset Management Arm Sale


G E R M A N Y

HSH NORDBANK: Former Chief Executive Officer Faces Criminal Trial
TELEFONICA FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Preference Shares Rating
THIELERT AIRCRAFT: AVIC Buys Business Out of Insolvency
TRIONISTA TOPCO: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Rating to Debt Instruments


G R E E C E

S&B MINERALS: Moody's Rates EUR275MM Senior Notes Issue '(P)B3'


I T A L Y

BANCA CARIGE: Moody's Confirms 'Ba2' Issuer & Deposit Ratings
GAMENET SPA: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable
MANUTENCOOP FACILITY: S&P Assigns Prelim. B+ CCR; Outlook Stable
* Moody's Notes Decline in Performance of Italian RMBS in May


K A Z A K H S T A N

ASIACREDIT BANK: Fitch Assigns 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating


L U X E M B O U R G

NORTHLAND RESOURCES: CFO Eva Kaijser to Step Down by Year-End


N E T H E R L A N D S

ROYAL KPN: Fitch Affirms BB Subordinated Capital Security Rating


R O M A N I A

RAIFFEISEN BANK: Moody's Rates Senior Unsecured Bonds '(P)Ba1'


R U S S I A

RUSNANO: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corporate Credit Rating
URALSIB BANK: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B+'
* SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Rates RUB8.3-Bil. Unsecured Bond 'BB+'


S P A I N

ALBIASA SOLAR: CSP Firm to Go Into Liquidation
BANCO COOPERATIVO: Moody's Cuts Debt & Deposit Ratings to Ba2
CAJA RURAL: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' Deposit Ratings for Downgrade


T U R K E Y

ALTERNATIFBANK AS: Fitch Lifts LT Local Currency IDR From 'BB'


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ALLIANCE BUILDING: Goes Into Liquidation After Safety Violations
LEHMAN BROTHERS: Pension Debts Equal with Unsecured Creditors
MODELZONE LTD: Ripmax Buys Wholesale Arm Out of Administration
STEMCOR: Under Debt Pressure; Jindal Brothers Eye Iron Ore Assets
ZATTIKKA: Faces Possible Administration

* UK: Scottish Corporate Insolvencies Up 29% in Second Quarter


U Z B E K I S T A N

ASIA ALLIANCE: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Ratings; Outlook Stable
INFINBANK: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Deposit Ratings


X X X X X X X X

* Anti-Dumping Tariffs to Spur Insolvencies in EU Solar Sector
* Fitch Says End-June MMF Snapshot Reflects Uncertain Outlook
* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars


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B E L G I U M
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DEXIA SA: Pulls Out of Talks on Asset Management Arm Sale
---------------------------------------------------------
Hugh Carnegy and Paul J. Davies at The Financial Times report
that Dexia SA, the failed Franco-Belgian bank, said it had pulled
out of talks on a EUR380 million deal to sell its asset
management arm to GCS Capital of Hong Kong -- a sale that would
have been one of the first big acquisitions by an Asian buyer of
a European financial business since the sovereign debt crisis.

According to FT, Dexia relayed on Wednesday an agreement had been
signed between the two groups to complete the sale by the end of
June and all regulatory approvals were in place, but the deadline
was missed.  Dexia subsequently decided after discussions with
GCS Capital to end negotiations on the sale, the report notes.
GCS nevertheless has until July 30 to "fulfill its contractual
obligations and close the transaction," FT cites.

Dexia said it remained committed to finding a buyer for Dexia
Asset Management, the FT notes.

The sale of the unit, with about EUR80 billion under management,
was the last stage in a process of breaking up Dexia, one of the
biggest victims of the financial crisis, the FT states.

Dexia was bailed out three times by Paris and Brussels after it
crashed in 2008, unable to fund its EUR650 billion balance sheet,
which included a EUR125 billion exposure to US subprime property
assets, the FT recounts.

The breakdown of the sale to GCS followed an announcement on
Monday by Dexia, formerly the world's biggest municipal lender,
that it would take a EUR59 million charge on its exposure to the
US city of Detroit, which last week filed for bankruptcy
protection, the FT relates.  Dexia said its total exposure to
Detroit's debt due to be restructured was US$305 million, the FT
notes.

Dexia, which posted a net loss of EUR2.9 billion last year,
swallowed EUR6.5 billion in bailout funds from France, Belgium
and Luxembourg in 2008, the FT recounts.  Paris and Brussels were
forced to put up a further EUR90 billion in state loan guarantees
when it was hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2011 and a new
EUR5.5 billion capital injection last December, the FT discloses.

Dexia SA is a Belgium-based banking group with activities
principally in Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Turkey in the
fields of retail and commercial banking, public and wholesale
banking, asset management and investor services.  In France,
Dexia Bank focuses on funding public sector bodies and providing
financial services to local government.  In Luxembourg, Dexia
operates in two main areas: commercial banking (for personal and
professional customers) and private banking (for international
investors).  In Turkey, Dexia is involved in retail and
commercial banking and offers services to ordinary account
holders, business and local public sector customers and
institutional clients. The Company operates through its
subsidiaries, such as Dexia Credit Local, DenizBank, Dexia
Credicop, Dexia Sabadell, Dexia Kommunalbank Deutschland, Dexia
Asset Management, among others.



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G E R M A N Y
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HSH NORDBANK: Former Chief Executive Officer Faces Criminal Trial
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Karin Matussek at Bloomberg News reports that Dirk Jens
Nonnenmacher, a former HSH Nordbank AG executive, faces the first
German criminal trial over the financial crisis.

Mr. Nonnenmacher, the 50-year-old ex-chief executive officer, is
one of six former HSH Nordbank management board members who went
on trial in Hamburg yesterday, Bloomberg discloses.  Another
former CEO, Hans Berger, is also a defendant, Bloomberg notes.

All six ex-board members were charged with breach of trust and
two of them with false accounting over the Omega 55 transaction,
the 2007 CDO package that prosecutors said led to EUR160 million
(US$211 million) in losses, Bloomberg discloses.  Two years
later, the Hamburg-based lender was bailed out at the height of
the financial crisis with EUR30 billion in aid from German state
and federal governments, Bloomberg recounts.

"The defendants didn't live up to their duty to act as diligent
businessmen when deciding whether to authorize the transaction,"
Bloomberg quotes prosecutor Karsten Wegerich as saying.  "They
took chances on incalculable risks of a highly speculative CDO."

Mr. Nonnenmacher, who was ousted as CEO in 2011 over his role in
an unrelated spying scandal, and Mr. Berger deny the allegations,
Bloomberg discloses.

The CDO package is one of several deals that led to the bank's
troubles and HSH Nordbank has also sued lenders in U.S. courts
over residential mortgage-backed securities, Bloomberg notes.

The German states of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, majority
owners of HSH Nordbank, were forced to bail out the bank in 2009,
Bloomberg recounts.   They provided the lender, based in Hamburg
and Kiel, with EUR3 billion in capital and EUr10 billion in
guarantees to cover potential losses, Bloomberg discloses.  HSH
also tapped the federal government's Soffin bank-rescue fund for
EUR17 billion in guarantees, Bloomberg states.

HSH Nordbank -- http://www.hsh-nordbank.com/-- is a commercial
bank in northern Europe with headquarters in Hamburg as well as
Kiel, Germany.  It is active in corporate and private banking.
HSH's main focus is on shipping, transportation, real estate and
renewable energy.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 22,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded HSH Nordbank AG's
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to E, equivalent
to a standalone credit assessment of caa2, from E+/b3.
Concurrently, Moody's extended the review for downgrade on
HSH's long and short-term debt and deposit ratings of Baa2 and
Prime-2, respectively.

The lowering of the standalone BFSR reflects the significant
challenges faced by HSH in its efforts to stabilize its franchise
and comply with compensation measures for earlier state aid.
Asset-quality deterioration and the resulting pressure on capital
have triggered renewed requirements for capital strengthening
which Moody's expects to include additional support from the
bank's owners. This support would imply an additional financial
burden for the fragile group. The E/caa2 standalone credit
strength better reflects Moody's view that HSH has reached a
critical stage.


TELEFONICA FINANCE: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' Preference Shares Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Telefonica SA's (TEF) Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB+' with Negative Outlook, and
Telefonica Deutschland Holding AG's (TEF DE) Long-Term Issuer
Default rating (IDR) of BBB, Outlook Stable. Both affirmations
follow the announcement of the proposed acquisition of E-Plus,
the mobile market number four measured by subscribers, in
Germany.

The agency has also affirmed the senior unsecured rating of the
bonds issued by Telefonica Europe BV, Telefonica Emisiones S.A.U
at 'BBB+' and Telefonica Finance USA LLC's preference shares at
'BB+'. The agency has also affirmed TEF's Short-term IDR at 'F2'
and Telefonica Germany GmbH & Co OHG's senior unsecured rating at
'BBB'.

The affirmation of both ratings (IDRs) reflects Fitch's view of
the industrial logic of the transaction and a financial structure
involving a combination of cash and equity that will preserve
Telefonica's leverage profile. Management have shown prudent
financial management over the past eighteen months, reducing
leverage and significantly improving liquidity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Transaction Logic
The combination of Telefonica's German operations with E-Plus
will create the country's largest mobile operator by customers
and second largest by revenues. In a market currently dominated
by T-Mobile and Vodafone, the consolidation of the market down to
three, will in Fitch's view create a more balanced playing field,
allowing the combined business the opportunity to exploit the
economies of scale enjoyed by the existing incumbents. Cost
synergies should come over time, with the enlarged business
better placed to meet the ongoing need for network and product
investment (infrastructure and spectrum related) - something that
should ultimately benefit the consumer.

Positive for Telefonica Germany
While the near term impact of the transaction does not change
Telefonica Germany's 'BBB' rating, it is seen as credit positive
in terms of the scale and market position it would achieve. Over
time cost synergies (both opex and capex) can be expected and the
combined business better placed to compete with T-Mobile and
Vodafone. The latter both benefit from the potential to offer
full facilities-based quad-play services, nascent in other
markets and not currently a feature of the German market, which
could however yet prove an advantage.

Conservative Transaction Structure
In keeping with the approach that Telefonica has taken in
managing its leverage profile through the eurozone crisis, the
proposed transaction is structured conservatively. The
combination of the equity component of the acquisition and the
stronger cash flow of the enlarged German business is expected to
offset any leveraging effect of the cash / debt component of the
deal. Near term leverage metrics in Fitch's rating case remain
largely unchanged, while cash flow generation and synergy
benefits offer leverage upside further out.

There is an element of execution risk attached to some of the
equity components in the proposed structure, the details of which
have yet to be finalized -- Fitch assumes a successful outcome to
these proposals but notes an element of uncertainty will remain
in the meantime.

Deleveraging & Liquidity
Fitch views management actions to improve leverage and shore up
liquidity, over the past 18-24 months -- to have been prudent and
successful. While minority stake sales have helped, Fitch
considers the 2012 dividend holiday and rebasing of the
distribution at EUR0.75 per share, to be significant -- both in
terms of absolute cash preservation and the message these actions
serve in prioritizing debt protection.

A net debt target of below EUR47 billion by YE13 is, in Fitch's
view, likely to be met and the company's current liquidity
largely covers maturities through 2015. EUR23 billion of debt
refinancing over the past 18 months underlines the company's
ability to access debt markets despite the market volatility
associated with a domicile in southern Europe.

Regulatory and Competition Review Hurdles
Despite the strategic logic and potential benefits to the wider
market, Fitch believes the transaction could run into protracted
regulatory and competition related reviews. European policy
makers have voiced concerns generally over in-market
consolidation, ignoring the potential benefits of a more evenly
balanced and more efficiently invested market environment.

For a summary of the broader KEY RATING DRIVERS underlining the
agency's Telefonica rating please refer to the RAC dated 8 April
2013.

RATING SENSITIVITIES (Telefonica SA)

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

A stabilization of the Spanish sovereign is the single most
necessary near-term event to prompt a revision of the Outlook to
Stable.

Outside of sovereign linkage TEF displays strong portfolio
diversification, scale and strong underlying cash flow; but its
organic growth profile and ability to deleverage has stalled.
Fitch would need to believe that weakness across Europe, in
particular Spain, will not inhibit further deleveraging and
evidence of the company's ability to continue to finance itself
despite eurozone pressures, would also be expected, before the
Outlook was revised to Stable.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

Funds from operations (FFO) net leverage of 3.19x in 2012 remains
high for the rating but heading in the right direction. Fitch's
rating case forecasts a metric trending towards 3.0x by YE13,
which is consistent with the current ratings. High single digit
pre-dividend free cash flow to sales is also expected at the
rating level. Metrics expected to remain consistently outside
these levels are likely to lead to a downgrade, with TEF
currently having limited ratings headroom.

A downgrade of the Spanish sovereign to below 'BB+' would be
likely to result in an immediate downgrade. If the sovereign was
downgraded to 'BB+' Fitch would consider the implications for
funding costs and market access for Spanish corporates and the
company's prevailing liquidity, while recognizing TEF's solid
geographic diversification.

RATING SENSITIVITIES (Telefonica Deutschland)

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

Given the company's current operational profile -- somewhat
limited scale and single geography presence -- the ratings sit
most comfortably at the 'BBB' level. While the financial profile
compares well with the 'BBB' peer group, a higher rated single
market operator would be expected to have a materially stronger
(market number one or two) business position in turn resulting in
a considerably stronger margin profile.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

A material weakening in the company's financial profile -- driven
either by operating performance or a change in financial policies
-- would pressure the ratings. Financial metrics likely to exert
ratings pressure include:

  -- FFO net adjusted leverage above 3.0x, and
  -- FFO fixed charge cover below 4.0x


THIELERT AIRCRAFT: AVIC Buys Business Out of Insolvency
-------------------------------------------------------
Richard Weiss at Bloomberg News reports that Aviation Industry
Corp. of China, the country's biggest aerospace company, agreed
to buy Thielert Aircraft Engines GmbH, focusing the insolvent
German supplier fully on powering private aircraft and away from
U.S. drones.

According to Bloomberg, Bruno Kuebler, Thielert's insolvency
administrator, said that the Chinese manufacturer's AVIC
International Holding Ltd. unit, which has already acquired
Minnesota-based planemaker Cirrus Aircraft and engine producer
Continental Motors Inc. of Alabama, is adding Thielert's civil
engine business to prepare for a domestic boom in private
aviation.

The sale ends five years of insolvency proceedings and
restructuring for Hamburg-based Thielert, Bloomberg notes.

Mr. Kuebler, as cited by Bloomberg, said Thielert remained
profitable with three German sites and just over 200 employees
because of orders mainly from San Diego-based General Atomics
Aeronautical Systems Inc. to power drones.

Bloomberg notes that Mr. Kuebler said General Atomics indicated
potential interest in Thielert, but AVIC offered a "strategic
price" for the propeller-engine maker.

The administrators said that Thielert had EUR24.5 million
(US$32.3 million) in sales last year, Bloomberg relates.

Headquartered in Lichtenstein, Saxony/Germany, Thielert Aircraft
Engines GmbH -- http://www.thielert.com/--  is a full subsidiary
of Thielert AG, which develops and manufactures components for
high-performance engines and special parts with complex
geometries and hardware and software for digital engine control
systems.

The Chemnitz Local Court, on July 1, 2008, opened insolvency
proceedings against Thielert.  Bruno M. Kuebler was appointed as
the company's insolvency administrator.


TRIONISTA TOPCO: Moody's Assigns 'B1' Rating to Debt Instruments
----------------------------------------------------------------
Following the successful placement of the notes and loans issued
by Trionista TopCo GmbH, Trionista HoldCo GmbH, ista
International GmbH and other operating subsidiaries ("ista"),
Moody's has assigned a definitive B1 instrument rating with an
LGD3 37% on the EUR1,300 million senior secured credit facilities
and EUR150 million revolving credit facility which have been
raised at the level of ista International GmbH (as well as other
operating subsidiaries) and on the EUR350 million senior secured
notes raised at the level of Trionista HoldCo GmbH. Moody's has
also assigned a definitive Caa1 rating with an LGD6 90% to the
EUR525 million senior subordinated notes issued by Trionista
TopCo GmbH. The outlook on the ratings is stable. The B2
Corporate Family and B2-PD probability of default ratings remain
unchanged with a stable outlook.

Ratings Rationale:

The B2 CFR and PDR ratings reflect: i) ista's strong and robust
profitability with a reported EBITDA-margin of over 42% in FY2012
supported by the group's high market penetration, particularly in
Germany, ii) good revenue visibility and stability driven by the
non-discretionary nature of demand and long-term contracts, iii)
high entry barriers and low customer churn rates, as well as iv)
a supportive regulatory environment and focus on energy
efficiency.

These positive factors are offset by (i) the group's high
leverage with a Moody's adjusted debt/ EBITDA of 7.6x in FY2012
pro-forma the newly implemented capital structure, (ii) its
limited ability to generate positive free cash flows, and hence
pay down debt, due to the challenge to cope with increasing
capital spending requirements in the upcoming years in line with
projected business growth and combined with high interest
payments on the new debt, and (iii) ista's lower profitability in
regions outside Germany (accounting for around 45% of group
revenues in FY2012), which may dilute the group's earnings levels
as sub-metering penetration rates in these markets increase.

The stable outlook reflects the good level of revenue visibility
and Moody's expectation of a stable operating performance in the
mid-term. It also incorporates the company's expectation to
achieve a slightly improved Moody's adjusted leverage of around
7.4x debt/ EBITDA in the current financial year, driven by an
improvement in EBITDA, and that the group is able to maintain a
satisfactory liquidity profile. Given the high interest burden
and substantial capex requirements in the upcoming years as well
as the stability of the business Moody's does not expect a
meaningful deleveraging going forward.

ista's B2 rating could be upgraded if Moody's adjusted Debt/
EBITDA could be reduced to levels below 7.0x, interest cover rise
above 1.5x EBIT/ interest expense and EBITDA margins be
maintained at current levels on a sustainable basis.

ista's rating could come under pressure if Moody's adjusted Debt/
EBITDA ratio increased to above 8.0x and/or adjusted EBIT/
interest were to fall below 1.0x and adjusted EBITDA margins
reduced to levels below 40%. Also Moody's would consider revising
downward its ratings should ista fail to maintain positive free
cash flow generation in any financial year with no signs of
improvement.

Liquidity

Based on the new financing structures Moody's believes that
ista's liquidity would be adequate but with limited cushion for
higher than expected working capital swings or negative free cash
flows that would have to be financed by existing cash sources.
This assessment is supported by Moody's assumption of a cash
balance just sufficient to manage the seasonality of the
company's cash collection during the year, availability under the
new revolving credit facility (EUR150 million) and a stable
ongoing cash flow generation. Moody's also assumes a comfortable
covenant headroom to be agreed in the new financing contracts.

Structural Considerations

The senior secured credit facilities issued by Trionista HoldCo
GmbH were funded via an amend and extend to the existing credit
facilities with the primary borrower being ista International
GmbH, the German operating company, alongside operating entities
in France, Denmark and the Netherlands. The facilities are
guaranteed by operating entities representing at least 80% of the
consolidated group EBITDA and benefit from first-priority
security interests over the shares of Trionista HoldCo GmbH and
Trionista Capital GmbH, receivables of Trionista HoldCo GmbH, and
pledge of proceeds loan from Trionista TopCo GmbH and Trionista
HoldCo GmbH. The senior secured notes issued by Trionista HoldCo
GmbH benefit from first-priority security interests over the
shares of Trionista HoldCo GmbH and Trionista Capital GmbH,
receivables of Trionista HoldCo GmbH, and pledge of proceeds loan
from Trionista TopCo GmbH and Trionista HoldCo GmbH. Moody's
notes that a loss sharing agreement to equalize security across
the senior secured facilities and the senior secured notes is in
place. The senior secured instruments rank pari passu with all
other senior secured instruments but ahead of the subordinated
bond.

The senior subordinated notes issued by Trionista TopCo GmbH are
guaranteed on a senior subordinated basis and benefit from
second-priority security interests over the shares of Trionista
HoldCo GmbH and Trionista Capital GmbH, receivables of Trionista
HoldCo GmbH, and pledge of proceeds loan from Trionista TopCo
GmbH and Trionista HoldCo GmbH and rank behind the senior secured
notes and senior secured bank facilities.

In Moody's analysis of the priority of claims within the capital
structure the senior secured notes (EUR350 million) and senior
secured bank facilities (EUR1,300 million) as well as trade
payables rank prior to the senior subordinated notes (EUR525
million). As a result of Moody's Loss Given Default analysis the
senior secured notes are rated one notch above the corporate
family rating. The senior subordinated notes are rated two
notches below the corporate family rating given their claims
contractually rank behind the senior secured notes and senior
secured bank facilities in a default scenario.

The new capital structure of ista also includes preferred equity
certificates (PECs) of EUR550 million which Moody's treats as
100% equity due to the long maturity of the instrument (2028),
its non-cash interest characteristic and full subordination to
all other debt of the group.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Essen (Germany) ista is a leading provider of
energy services which provides sub-metering of heating use and
water consumption for individual housing units and ancillary
services. In FY2012 ista group had revenues of EUR710 million and
thereof around 55% were generated in Germany.



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S&B MINERALS: Moody's Rates EUR275MM Senior Notes Issue '(P)B3'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)B3
corporate family rating to S&B Minerals Finance S.C.A.
Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a (P)B3 rating to the EUR275
million senior secured notes maturing in 2020 (the Notes) to be
issued by the company and S&B Industrial Minerals North America,
Inc. as co-issuers. The outlook on the ratings is stable. This is
the first time Moody's has assigned a rating to the company.

The proceeds from the notes alongside EUR31 million of S&B's cash
will be used to refinance S&B's existing debt of EUR226 million,
and to a pay a EUR70 million distribution and fees.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign a definitive rating to the facilities. A definitive rating
may differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

"The (P)B3 CFR reflects S&B's leading position in niche minerals
supported by good mining reserves, and its successful
diversification into downstream "value-added" activities,
counterbalanced by the cyclicality of S&B's end-markets, its
small scale of operations with a geographical concentration of
mining assets, and the relatively high leverage", says Sebastien
Cieniewski, Moody's lead analyst for S&B.

The rating is supported by S&B's leading position globally for
the production of continuous casting fluxes (CCF), perlite, and
wollastonite, and its number 2 position for bentonite. S&B
operates in markets with a limited number of competitors. Moody's
views positively S&B's strategy to increasingly diversify its
revenues into more "value-added" downstream activities -- in 2012
65% of revenues were generated by downstream operations. These
activities are typically higher margin than upstream operations
and increase switching costs for customers. Despite its
relatively small scale, the company enjoys good diversification
in terms of customers with the top ten clients accounting for 27%
of revenues in 2012. Moody's notes, however, that the company has
limited exposure to clients in faster growing emerging markets as
46%, 5.7%, and 13.7% of sales were generated in North Europe,
Eastern Europe, and South Europe, respectively, where growth
prospects remain limited in the near future.

S&B's rating incorporates the company's small scale, with
revenues of EUR470 million in 2012 -- or EUR425 million as
adjusted for the application of IFRS 11 and IAS 19 going forward
impacting the treatment of the share of profit from joint-
ventures. These revenues are subject to high volatility due to
the cyclicality of the company's segments including Metallurgy
(35% of 2012 revenues), Foundry (25%), and Construction (23%).
For example, the company's sales dropped by 26% between 2008 and
2009 and increased by 25% the following year. Despite benefitting
from large proved reserves for its main minerals, a significant
portion of these is concentrated in Greece (11 Greek mines out of
30 globally accounting for a majority of the company's mineral
reserves). The rating also incorporates S&B's relatively high
leverage ratio (as adjusted by Moody's mainly for pensions and
operating leases) estimated at approximately 4.3x (pro-forma for
the issuance of the notes and the NYCO acquisition as of December
2012).

S&B's liquidity position is considered to be adequate assuming
the transaction closes on terms anticipated, and benefits from a
cash balance of EUR22 million as of March 31, 2013 pro-forma for
the issuance of the notes and from a EUR40 million revolving
credit facility (RCF). Free Cash Flow generation is expected to
be limited due to the capital intensive nature of the business
leading to high Capex.

The notes will be senior secured obligations benefitting from
senior secured guarantees provided by the issuer and most of its
material operating subsidiaries -- as of fiscal year-end 2012
including NYCO since acquisition the notes' guarantors
represented 78%, 73%, and 74% of the company's assets, sales, and
EBITDA, respectively. The notes will also benefit from a first
lien pledge over assets and shares of substantially all
guarantors, shared on a pari-passu basis with the lenders of the
RCF. However the RCF lenders will rank ahead in a scenario of
security enforcement.

Greece's foreign currency ceiling for bonds is Caa2, reflecting
the risk of exit of Greece from the eurozone. The Notes (to be
denominated in EUR) and the RCF will be governed by the State of
New York and English law, respectively. Under the RCF, no local
Greek facilities will be permitted. However, the terms of the
notes place few other structural restrictions to mitigate Greek
sovereign risks e.g. there are no limitations on the extent of
cash flow that can enter Greece. Nevertheless, the (P)B3 CFR has
not been constrained by this ceiling, given the very low level of
the country rating (and sovereign ceiling). Only 7% of the
company's revenues were originated in Greece in 2012. The
company's primary exposure to Greece derives from the fact that a
very large portion of its mining assets are located in that
country, and the rating therefore captures the potential for
disruptions to the company's production operations.

The (P)B3 assigned to the notes, at the same level as the CFR,
reflects the relatively small amount of revolving credit facility
ranking ahead.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that S&B should
be able (i) to maintain its current profitability levels; (ii) to
maintain its adequate liquidity position; and (iii) keep adjusted
leverage well below 5.0x.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Due to the rating being relatively weakly positioned in its
category, Moody's does not foresee any upwards pressure in the
short-term.

Conversely, negative rating pressure could develop if (i) the
company's adjusted leverage ratio increases to 5.0x; or (ii) the
company experiences pressure on its EBIT margin; (iii) its
liquidity position deteriorates due to weak performance or
significant spend on acquisitions; or (iv) Moody's observes a
further deterioration in the political and economic environment
in Greece where a significant portion of the company's mining
assets are located.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Mining Industry published in May 2009. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

S&B is a provider of mineral-based industrial solutions. Its main
activities include the mining, processing, distribution and
supply of industrial minerals. In 2012, S&B Industrial Minerals
operated 30 mines, 49 processing facilities and 27 warehouses and
distribution centers in 21 countries. The company is owned by the
Kyriacopoulos family (61%) and the private equity investor Rh“ne
Capital (39%).



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA CARIGE: Moody's Confirms 'Ba2' Issuer & Deposit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed Banca Carige's long-term
issuer and deposit ratings of Ba2. At the same time, the
standalone baseline credit assessment (BCA) was lowered to ba3,
which is equivalent to a standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) of D-, from ba2/D.

According to Moody's the lowering of the standalone rating
reflects the increasingly difficult operating environment in
Italy, and the expectation that this will result in pressure on
profitability and asset quality persisting in 2013 and into 2014.
At the same time the rating agency noted the progress being made
by the bank in selling non-core assets, which should in the
coming months result in significant improvement in capital
adequacy. The rating agency however also noted that failure by
the bank to successfully complete this planned capital
strengthening could lead to a further downgrade in the bank's
ratings.

The long-term deposit and issuer ratings of Ba2 were confirmed,
reflecting Moody's continuing assumption of moderate systemic
(government) support in case of need; at the lower standalone
rating level, this assessment of support likelihood now results
in a one-notch uplift from the standalone BCA of ba3.

This rating action concludes the review initiated on April 27,
2013.

Ratings Rationale:

The main driver of this action is the persistency of a difficult
operating environment in Italy. Moody's forecasts a GDP
contraction of around 2% in 2013, and zero growth in 2014; some
sign of recovery is expected only towards the end of 2014. These
macro-economic factors are expected to result in a further
pressure on asset quality and profitability for Carige, and for
the Italian banking system.

In 2012 Carige's problem loans increased from 7.3% to 8.5% (1) of
total gross loans, reflecting the ongoing recession and the
inspection the Bank of Italy conducted on major Italian banks'
provisioning levels. Despite reporting lower numbers than the
system average of 10.6% as at the same date (2), Moody's notes
that the stock is nevertheless high for Carige. The rating agency
said it expects further deterioration in asset quality in the
remainder of 2013 and 2014, reflecting the forecasts for Italian
GDP. Moody's noted that coverage of problem loans has increased
in recent years, going from a historical low of 35% in 2009 to
46% in 2012; the current levels are however still below the
system average of 49%.

Moody's said that Carige's profitability and internal capital
generation were weak. The group posted a consolidated net loss of
Eur63 million in 2012, which compares with a net profit of Eur169
million in 2011; the loss was mainly due to extraordinary
provisioning on both the insurance and banking operations of the
group, but also benefitted from a Eur261 million non-recurring
tax gain related to the reorganization of the group structure. In
the next two years Moody's expects pressure on Carige's
profitability to remain high, given the persistency of a low-
interest rate environment and still high loan loss charges.

During the review process, Moody's noted some progress from the
bank in its planned sale of non-core assets, which is expected to
strengthen the bank's capitalization. In December 2012 Carige
reported very low capital ratios; core tier 1 and tier 1 ratios
stood at 6.7% and 7.4% respectively, in line with 2011 figures
(3). The bank announced its intention to raise around Eur800
million of new capital; the bulk of the increase is planned to
come from the sale of its insurance subsidiaries and other non-
core assets, combined with a possible rights issue by March 2014
should the sale not be sufficient. This capital increase of
Eur800 million is expected to increase the bank's core tier 1
ratio to around 10% under Basel 2. Moody's believes that this
level of capital would be just adequate to withstand the
pressures coming from a prolonged recessionary environment.

The long-term issuer and deposit ratings were confirmed at Ba2,
reflecting the BCA of ba3, as well as Moody's assessment of
moderate probability of extraordinary systemic (government)
support in terms of capital and/or liquidity. The assessment
takes into consideration the size and importance in the banking
system of Carige, with national market shares of 1.2% and 1.3%
for loans and deposits respectively (22% and 19% in its core
territory of Liguria). This results in a one-notch uplift from
the standalone BCA of ba3 to the issuer rating of Ba2.

The outlook is negative, in line with most Italian rated banks,
reflecting macro-economic pressures highlighted in Moody's GDP
forecasts for the country.

What Could Change The Ratings Up/Down

Any failure to fully implement the planned capital raising could
put downwards pressure on Carige's standalone BCA; additionally,
any further material deterioration in the bank's asset quality,
or other net losses, would put further downward pressure on
Carige's standalone BCA.

Any downgrade of the standalone BCA would result in a downgrade
of Carige's long-term deposit ratings.

At present, there is no upwards pressure on the ratings, as
highlighted by the negative outlook. However, the following
factors could have a positive impact on Carige's standalone BCA
in the medium term: (i) material improvements on core capital,
such as common equity ratio under Basel III (fully-loaded) above
10%; (ii) a material decline in inflow of new problem loans,
together with a substantial reduction of the stock; and (iii) a
return to sustainable profitability both on pre-provision and net
profit level.

An upgrade of the standalone BCA would also add upward pressure
to Carige's deposit ratings.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks,
published in May 2013.

(1) Problem loans include non-performing loans (sofferenze),
watchlist (incagli), restructured (ristrutturati), and past-due
(scaduti); Moody's adjusts these numbers and only incorporates
30% of the watchlist category as an estimate of those over 90
days overdue.

(2) Source: Bank of Italy's 5th Financial Stability Report,
published in April 2013.

(3) Unless otherwise noted, data in this report are from Company
data or Moody's Financial Metrics.


GAMENET SPA: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B+' CCR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'B+'
corporate credit rating to Italy-based gaming company Gamenet
S.p.A.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned the proposed EUR200 million senior
secured bond due 2018, to be issued by Gamenet, a preliminary
issue rating of 'B+', and a preliminary recovery rating of '3',
indicating S&P's expectation for meaningful (50%-70%) recovery
prospects for lenders in the event of a payment default.

The 'B+' preliminary corporate credit rating on Gamenet reflects
S&P's view that the company has a "weak" business risk profile
and an "aggressive" financial risk profile according to S&P's
criteria.

Gamenet operates in Italy and is one of the leading players in
the gaming machine segment (second concessionaire after GTECH
S.p.A.). The group is a licensed gaming operator for betting and
online products, although this segment is still marginal on a
consolidated basis (less than 5% of consolidated revenues).

S&P's assessment of Gamenet's business risk profile as "weak"
reflects the company's small scale (compared with other rated
players) and limited geographic and product diversification.  In
particular, S&P considers the lack of diversification, and sole
exposure to the waning Italian economy and declining consumer
spending, along with S&P's view of the maturing Italian gaming
market after years of solid growth, as constraints.

S&P calculates that Gamenet has adjusted profitability margins of
about 12%-13%, which is below the 15%-35% average for the gaming
sector.  However, S&P notes that this is mostly due to varying
business models.  Excluding network fees from the top line,
margins are significantly higher (at more than 50%).  The company
has a retail network that encompasses approximately 13,000 points
of sale--the third-largest in Italy after GTECH (70,000) and
Sisal (46,000).  In S&P's view, a gaming sector company's retail
network size (and brand awareness) is essential for capturing a
large portion of the offline gaming market and for being well-
positioned for concession and license renewals and bids, as well
as protecting and gaining market share.

"We assess Gamenet's financial risk profile as "aggressive,"
mostly reflecting its financial sponsor ownership.  Gamenet is
controlled by private equity Trilantic Capital Partners.  As per
our criteria, despite financial sponsor ownership, our assessment
of Gamenet's financial risk profile as "aggressive" reflects our
projected adjusted leverage ratio at consistently less than 5.0x,
the company's "adequate" liquidity profile, and our perception
that the risk of material releveraging is low and that adjusted
leverage will remain at less than 5.0x.  Our assessment is based
on what we see as a fairly conservative track record of the
financial sponsor with regard to financial policy and risk
appetite," S&P said.

"Under our base-case operating scenario, we assume that Gamenet's
Standard & Poor's-adjusted gross debt to EBITDA will be less than
3.0x in December 2013.  In addition, we forecast that the
company's adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt should be
slightly more than 20%, while we estimate adjusted interest
coverage at about 5.5x by the same date.  In addition, post bond
issuance the company will benefit from sizable cash on balance
sheet (over EUR100 million estimated on Dec. 31, 2013), a lack of
short-term maturities and debt amortization requirements, and
discretionary cash flow generation, which we estimate (post
capital expenditure and dividends) at approximately EUR25
million-EUR30 million for 2013.  We estimate that this will grow
further in the years following, in the absence of any material
departure from the financial policy," S&P added.

The preliminary issue rating on the proposed EUR200 million
senior secured notes is 'B+'.  The preliminary recovery rating on
these instruments is '3', reflecting S&P's expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a payment default.

The preliminary rating on the new notes is in line with S&P's
preliminary corporate credit rating on Gamenet.  It is based on
preliminary information and is subject to S&P's satisfactory
review of final documentation.  In the event of any changes to
the amount or terms of the bond, the recovery and issue ratings
might be subject to further review.

The preliminary recovery and issue ratings are underpinned by
S&P's evaluation of Gamenet as a going concern and the company's
simple capital structure.

At the same time, the preliminary recovery and issue ratings are
constrained by S&P's view of the weak security package only
comprising share pledges (on the entity that generates 100% of
EBITDA), and the likelihood of insolvency proceedings being
adversely influenced by Gamenet's Italian domicile.  S&P views
Italy as having a relatively unfavorable insolvency regime for
secured creditors.

The notes' documentation allows for up to EUR35 million in a
revolving credit facility, a EUR15 million finance lease, and a
EUR40 million general basket including any refinancing.  However,
priority indebtedness will be limited to EUR15 million.

In order to determine recoveries, S&P simulates a default
scenario.  As a gaming company, Gamenet operates in a highly
regulated sector.  Therefore, S&P's hypothetical default scenario
assumes some decline in revenues and margins, primarily stemming
from the potential introduction of regulatory and tax reforms in
Italy and/or losing some licenses (online and betting) on their
expiration.

"In our simulated default, we value the business as a going
concern, based on the company's strong market share, leading
brands, cash-generative businesses, and barriers to entry.  Under
these assumptions, we calculate an enterprise value of about
EUR225 million at our simulated point of default, equivalent to
5.5x EBITDA.  In order to determine recovery prospects, we then
deduct EUR16 million of priority obligations, which mostly
comprise enforcement costs.  This leaves a net enterprise value
of about EUR210 million available to debtholders.  On this basis,
we see recovery prospects in the 50%-70% range for the EUR200
million senior secured debt.  While the nominal calculated
recovery is higher than the indicated threshold, we have assigned
a recovery rating of '3'.  This is because our criteria for the
insolvency regime of Italy requires higher numerical coverage to
lead to a higher recovery rating," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the company
will maintain leverage of less than 5.0x, preserve sufficient
liquidity for operating needs, and continue to generate positive
discretionary cash flow.  The stable outlook also reflects our
view that Gamenet's profitability will grow further over the next
few years.  We base this view on the company's strategy to expand
its new product offering to betting and online through the roll
out of 81 new betting licenses in selected gaming halls and the
introduction of virtual races.  Our view also reflects the
expansion of Gamenet's directly managed retail network through
the buyout of small point of sales," S&P added.

S&P could consider lowering the rating if adverse operating
developments and/or a material departure from Gamenet's financial
policy (in terms of a higher risk appetite) cause its credit
metrics to significantly deteriorate.  Specifically, the rating
could come under pressure if adjusted EBITDA interest coverage
declines to less than 3.0x and adjusted gross debt to EBITDA
exceeds 5.0x, or if we reassess Gamenet's liquidity as "less than
adequate" under our criteria.

A positive rating action would depend on the group achieving
better product diversification, sustaining a resilient operating
performance, and steadily growing its profit and size.  This
would depend on a successful implementation of the strategic plan
to enhance its betting and online offering, along with further
consolidation in the machine segment and effective expansion of
the controlled retail network.  This, if combined with a
consistently rigorous financial policy, could lead to a possible
one-notch upgrade.


MANUTENCOOP FACILITY: S&P Assigns Prelim. B+ CCR; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'B+'
long-term corporate credit rating to Italy-based facility
services provider Manutencoop Facility Management SpA (MFM).  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned our preliminary 'B+' issue rating
to MFM's EUR450 million senior secured notes.  The recovery
rating on the notes is '3', indicating S&P's expectation of
average (50%-70%) recovery for lenders in the event of a payment
default.

The rating on MFM reflects S&P's assessment of the company's
financial risk profile as "highly leveraged" and business risk
profile as "fair," as S&P's criteria defines these terms.
Because of the company's cooperative ownership and moderate
financial policy, the rating is one notch above S&P's matrix
guidance.

MFM has weaker geographic diversity than larger international
facility management companies.  It has operations only in Italy,
and its business is sensitive to Italy's continued depressed
economic environment.  Furthermore, the Italian facility service
market is highly fragmented and competitive.  MFM has high
working capital needs owing to the delay in payments from public
administration, which is a common industry feature in Italy.

Nonetheless, MFM has a leading position in the Italian facility
service market, and good visibility of future revenues due to its
long-term contracts, especially with public sector clients.
Additionally, S&P's business risk profile assessment is supported
by MFM's diverse product offering, and higher EBITDA margins than
industry peers, given its presence in the higher margin
laundering and sterilization segment, which has posted an EBITDA
margin above 24% for the past three years.  MFM's operating
efficiency benefits from a flexible cost base; it is exposed to
wage cost inflation, but this can be passed on to customers,
albeit with a time lag.

S&P assess the company's management and governance as "fair,"
reflecting its experienced management team and cooperative
controlling ownership.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that MFM's
operational performance will be resilient to the difficult
economic environment in Italy, and that its credit metrics will
remain broadly unchanged in 2013 and 2014.  That's because
revenue additions coming from new signed contracts should offset
likely price discounts linked to spending cuts to be implemented
in Italian public administration.  S&P expects MFM's EBITDA
margin to stay between 9% and 10% in 2013 and 2014, and revenue
growth to not exceed the inflation rate in the same period.  S&P
is also assuming that working capital will not request additional
debt financing in the next couple of years.

S&P could take a positive rating action if MFM's credit metrics
improved to levels S&P views as commensurate with an "aggressive"
financial risk profile over a sustained period.  This could occur
if MFM was able to deleverage at a faster rate than S&P is
assuming under its base-case scenario, due to better
profitability or improved working capital management.  An upgrade
would also depends on MFM maintaining its adequate liquidity and
moderate financial policy.

S&P might consider a negative rating action if the company's
profitability became significantly weaker than S&P currently
anticipate , mainly owing to a worsening operating environment in
the Italian facility management market.  Downside rating pressure
could also arise if the company took a more aggressive stance on
financial leverage than S&P currently anticipates.  This could,
for example, stem from significantly increased debt to finance
working capital or significant debt-funded acquisitions.  S&P
sees this scenario as unlikely, however.


* Moody's Notes Decline in Performance of Italian RMBS in May
-------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of the Italian residential mortgage-backed
securities market slightly deteriorated in May 2013, according to
the latest indices published by Moody's Investors Service.

The overall cumulative default rate index (as of original pool
balance plus cumulative replenishment) increased slightly to 2.9%
in May 2013, from 2.7% a year earlier. The moderate increase and
the decreased trend after the January 2013 pick-up is mostly the
result of the inclusion in the index trend of the 2012
transaction cumulative default rate, which in May 2013 stood at
0.2%. These transactions are a significant part of the
outstanding portfolio balance and therefore may have a
significant impact on the index trend. The performance of all
other vintages, except the 2010 vintage, showed an increased
deteriorating trend. The reactivation of Fondo Solidariet… will
as Piano Famiglie, which ended in March 2013, continue to help
borrowers to overcome temporary payment problems but given the
small amount that the fund has at its disposal a smaller amount
of borrowers can be supported which also could lead to small
increase in default rates.

Moody's noted a similar trend in the 60+ day delinquencies which
ended in May 2013 at 2.1%, the same level as a year earlier. The
prepayment rate index continued its decline, standing at 2.2% in
May 2013.

Moody's outlook for Italian RMBS is negative. Moody's expects
that the unemployment rate in Italy will increase to 12.5% in
2013, from 12.0% in 2012.

Italian house prices will continue to fall in 2013 which will
increase losses on foreclosed properties.

Between June 2013 and July 2013 Moody's has concluded the review
of 110 tranches which resulted in 76 downgrades, three upgrades
and 31 confirmations. The downgrade actions have primarily
reflected the insufficiency of credit enhancement to address
sovereign risk.

As of May 2013, 117 transactions are outstanding, with a total
pool balance of EUR80.6 billion, down from EUR105.4 billion in
May 2012. In the second quarter of 2013 four other transactions
have been terminated following an early redemption (Orio Finance
No. 3 Public Limited Company, Mercurio Mortgage Finance S.R.L.,
Sanvitale 1 S.r.l. and Felsina Funding S.r.l.).

The reserve funds of 36 transactions are currently below their
target levels, of which nine are fully drawn down.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ASIACREDIT BANK: Fitch Assigns 'B-' LT Issuer Default Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Kazakhstan-based JSC AsiaCredit Bank
(ACB) a Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'B-' with a
Stable Outlook.

Key Rating Drivers

ACB's Long-term IDRs are underpinned by its Viability Rating (VR)
of 'b-', which reflects its currently small franchise and low
competitiveness, limited track record of performance under the
current controlling shareholder; highly concentrated and under-
provisioned loan book; significant reliance on deposits of state-
owned entities; and only moderate profitability. At the same
time, the ratings positively consider the currently strong
economic growth in Kazakhstan, the bank's currently reasonable
capitalization and liquidity.

The Support Rating of '5' reflects Fitch's view that external
support from ACB's private shareholder, although possible, cannot
be relied upon. The Support Rating Floor 'No Floor' is based on
the bank's limited role in the domestic banking sector.

ACB is a small universal bank which was established in 1992 and
is now operating in Almaty and Astana, as well as in oil-rich
Atyrau and Aktau. In 2008, a 40% stake was acquired from Saudi
investors by Mr. Nurbol Sultan who is currently the bank's major
shareholder. Mr. Sultan consolidated 81.6% of the bank by end-
H113 and plans to further increase his share. The bank has grown
rapidly in the past few years (106% loan growth in 2012 and 227%
for 2011), but as of end-2012 had only USD364m of assets, which
corresponds to 0.4% of the Kazakh banking system.

ACB's reported asset quality is on par with its peers with non-
performing loans (NPLs, 90 days past overdue) a moderate 4.6% of
gross loans at end-Q113, although they were only 37% covered by
reserves. Furthermore, restructured exposures stand at higher
6.6%, which together with unreserved NPLs equaled a material 34%
of end-Q113 Fitch core capital (FCC). The loan book quality is
rather volatile and suffers from high single-name concentration
(largest 25 borrowers comprise 65% of end-Q113 loans) and
significant exposures to vulnerable sectors of the economy such
as construction and agriculture (at least 68% and 71% of end-Q113
FCC, respectively, based on analysis of the largest exposures).

The bank's profitability is moderate with return on average
assets (ROAA) of 2.5% in 2012 and only 0.6% in 2011. While ACB
currently enjoys a relatively wide net interest margin (7.7% in
2012 and 8.6% in 2011), it is under pressure as the bank tries to
attract more wholesale funding and retail deposits, which come at
a higher cost. Further pressure on the bottom line in the near
term could stem from increased operating costs following the
bank's growth and network expansion. Fitch is also concerned
about the quality of earnings, as a material 14% of 2012 accrued
interest income (23% in 2011) was not received in cash.

The bank's liquidity buffer is reasonable covering 38% of
customer accounts at end-Q113. However, despite efforts to
diversify funding, ACB still heavily relies on few large
corporate deposits (the top 15 names contribute 62% of end-Q113
customer accounts or 55% of liabilities) almost half of which is
sourced from state-owned entities. At the same time, the complete
withdrawal of the latter deposits from the bank is unlikely,
given the overall reliance of the Kazakh banking sector on state
funds.

The capital position is currently adequate with the ratio of FCC
to weighted risks of 29% at end-2012 but it is expected to weaken
as the bank's earnings generation significantly lags growth.
Unless there are significant capital injections the
capitalization will therefore quickly deteriorate. At the same
time, current capital levels suggest that the bank could reserve
an additional 13% of gross loans at end-Q113 (19% at end-2012)
before breaching prudential requirements. Positively, this would
be enough to fully reserve NPLs and restructured loans and still
comply with local regulations.

Rating Sensitivities

ACB's IDRs and VR could be upgraded if there was an extended
track record of reasonable performance; material improvement in
the quality of borrowers; and timely equity injections as
required by growth plans to support adequate capitalization.
Downward pressure on the ratings could result from a significant
deterioration of the economy, or the bank's asset quality or
capitalization.

The rating actions are:

-- Long-term foreign currency IDR: assigned at 'B-'; Outlook
    Stable

-- Short-term foreign currency IDR: assigned at 'B'

-- Long-term local currency IDR: assigned at 'B-'; Outlook
Stable

-- Viability Rating: assigned at 'b-'

-- Support Rating: assigned at '5'

-- Support Rating Floor: assigned at 'No Floor'



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


NORTHLAND RESOURCES: CFO Eva Kaijser to Step Down by Year-End
-------------------------------------------------------------
Northland Resources S.A. on July 18 disclosed that CFO Eva
Kaijser is leaving the Company at year-end 2013.

As a consequence of the closure of its Stockholm office,
Northland will recruit a new CFO located in Lulea.  Eva Kaijser
will continue as CFO until the end of 2013/beginning of 2014.

"We regret that Eva has chosen to leave, but we are grateful for
both the contributions she has made to the Company and for those
she will continue to make during the time she remains working
with us.  It is beneficial to Northland that we without urgency
are able to recruit a replacement," says Acting CEO Peter
Pernlof.

                        About Northland

Headquartered in Luxembourg, Northland Resources S.A. is a
producer of iron ore concentrate, with a portfolio of production,
development and exploration mines and projects in northern Sweden
and Finland.  The first construction phase of the Kaunisvaara
project is complete and production ramp-up started in November
2012.  The Company expects to produce high-grade, high-quality
magnetite iron concentrate in Kaunisvaara, Sweden, where the
Company expects to exploit two magnetite iron ore deposits,
Tapuli and Sahavaara.  Northland has entered into off-take
contracts with three partners for the entire production from the
Kaunisvaara project over the next seven to ten years.  The
Company is also preparing a Definitive Feasibility Study for its
Hannukainen Iron Oxide Copper Gold project in Kolari, northern
Finland and for the Pellivuoma deposit, which is located 15 km
from the Kaunisvaara processing plant.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter on July 15, 2013,
Peter Pernlof, Acting CEO and COO of Northland Resources S.A.,
disclosed that the Lulea District Court approved on July 12 the
reorganization plan for the Company's Swedish subsidiaries.
As previously disclosed, the Lulea District Court held
composition proceedings on July 12 in connection with the
reorganization of companies Northland Resources AB (publ),
Northland Sweden AB and Northland Logistics AB.  During the
proceedings the companies' creditors approved the terms of the
proposed composition.  The District Court held in accordance with
this and approved the reorganization plan and composition.
Norwegian subsidiary Northland Logistics AS is not going through
formal reorganization, but has previously agreed with all of its
creditors on a payment plan identical to that of the other
subsidiaries.

                         *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 1,
2013, Moody's Investors Service affirmed the Caa3 corporate
family rating and bond rating of Northland Resources AB.
Concurrently, Moody's has applied the 'limited default' ('/LD')
indicator to the company's Ca-PD probability of default rating
(PDR), to reflect the recently missed interest payment on its
outstanding notes, which the rating agency considers a default
according to its definition of default.  As a result, Moody's PDR
for Northland has been affirmed at Ca-PD/LD.  In addition, the
outlook on all ratings remains negative.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


ROYAL KPN: Fitch Affirms BB Subordinated Capital Security Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Royal KPN N.V.'s (KPN) Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'BBB-'. The Outlook is Stable.

The affirmation follows the announcement of KPN's sale of E-plus.
The transaction, which is subject to regulatory clearance, is
credit positive for KPN as it strengthens the company's balance
sheet and provides it with an exit from an increasingly
competitive market. However, KPN still faces a very difficult
domestic situation and an upgrade is unlikely until the company
demonstrates that its competitive position in the Dutch telecoms
market has improved.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

E-plus Disposal
The sale reduces KPN's leverage and reduces KPN's exposure to a
market that could have proved challenging over the coming few
years. E-plus is a mobile-only player in a market increasingly
moving towards the integration of fixed plus mobile offerings.
Also, E-plus is the number 4 operator in the German market and is
somewhat smaller than its main rivals. E-plus's current strategy
is to expand into underpenetrated areas and win market share from
its larger rivals. Fitch was unconvinced about the long-term
viability of such a move. We therefore view the sale as positive
for KPN.

Fixed Line Improvements
In 2012 and H113, KPN increased its broadband subscriber base and
continued to gain substantial TV market share. Given the
competitive threat posed by cable over the past few years, these
recent improvements are positive. However, these positive
operational developments seem to have come at the expense of
profitability, with KPN's consumer residential EBITDA margin
falling to 16.5% in Q213 from 17.5% in Q212 and 28% in Q211.
Converting the positive operational trends into improved
profitability will be key to any positive rating action.

New Entrant in Mobile Market
Tele2 plans to launch the fourth mobile network in the
Netherlands. Tele2 typically attempts to gain market share by
employing a price challenger strategy. Although the company is
not expected to launch its 4G network until 2014, the entry could
lead to increased price competition in the Dutch market, which
could put further pressure on KPN's cash flows. Fitch would
consider a positive rating action if KPN can demonstrate that it
can effectively manage any challenges posed by Tele2's entry into
the market.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to positive rating action include:

Fitch would want to see clear evidence that there is a sustained
improvement in KPN's domestic fixed and mobile operations, as
well as maintenance of net debt/EBITDA (as defined by Fitch,
including Reggefiber-related liabilities) at lower than 3x.

Future developments that may, individually or collectively, lead
to negative rating action include:

-- Continued deterioration in KPN's domestic fixed and mobile
   Operations

-- An expectation that net debt/EBITDA (as defined by Fitch,
   including Reggefiber-related liabilities) could exceed 3.5x
   on a sustained basis could lead to a downgrade

Full List of Rating Actions

-- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-', Outlook Stable
-- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB-'
-- Subordinated capital security: affirmed at 'BB'


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R O M A N I A
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RAIFFEISEN BANK: Moody's Rates Senior Unsecured Bonds '(P)Ba1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba1
senior unsecured debt rating to the bonds to be issued by
Raiffeisen Bank SA, based in Romania. The amount of the issuance
will be up to RON225 million. A definitive rating will be
assigned following the review of final debt documentation.

Moody's notes that the three-year senior unsecured bonds will be
listed on the local stock market and are governed by Romanian
law.

Ratings Rationale:

The assigned provisional senior unsecured bond rating is based on
the bank's existing local-currency long-term deposit rating of
Ba1, and is not constrained by the local-currency bond ceiling
for Romania currently at A3.

Raiffeisen Bank SA's standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR) of D- is equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA)
of ba3, with a stable outlook. Raiffeisen Bank SA's long-term
deposit ratings of Ba1, with a stable outlook, incorporate two-
notches of uplift from the bank's BCA, based on Moody's
assumption of a high probability of support from the parent:
Raiffeisen Bank International AG (A2 negative, BFSR D+/BCA ba1
stable).

What Can Change Rating Up/Down

Any changes in the rating will depend upon changes in the bank's
local-currency deposit rating.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.



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R U S S I A
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RUSNANO: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corporate Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it affirmed its 'BB+/B'
long- and short-term corporate credit and 'ruAA+' Russian
national scale ratings on Russian state-run technology investment
vehicle RusNano.

The ratings continue to reflect S&P's opinion that there is a
"high" likelihood that the government of the Russian Federation
(foreign currency BBB/Stable/A-2; local currency BBB+/Stable/A-2;
Russia national scale 'ruAAA') would provide timely and
sufficient extraordinary support to RusNano in the event of
financial distress.  The ratings also incorporate S&P's unchanged
assessment of the company's stand-alone credit profile at 'b+'.

S&P views RusNano as a government-related entity (GRE) and
expects it to receive strong ongoing support from the Russian
government in the form of guarantees on all debt issued.  In
accordance with S&P's criteria for GREs, its view of the "high"
likelihood of extraordinary government support is based on its
assessment of RusNano's:

   -- "Important role" for the Russian government, which created
      RusNano to support state policies on promoting economic
      diversification in innovative sectors.  RusNano's mandate
      is to invest in projects that applies nanotechnology and to
      promote these investments in the market.  S&P do not
      believe any potential failure of RusNano would have a
      systemwide impact on Russia's economy, however.

   -- "Very strong" link with the Russian government, currently
      its full owner.  Although privatization of RusNano is
      currently incorporated in the Ministry of Economy program,
      it is unlikely to happen in the next few years, in S&P's
      view.  All of RusNano's outstanding debt is government-
      guaranteed, and it expects the government to continue
      guarantying RusNano's new borrowings in 2013-2015 .  S&P
      don't expect the creation and consequent privatization of
      RusNano's "management company," as the company suggests,
      will affect its link with the government.

Consequently, the ratings on RusNano are three notches higher
than its 'b+' stand-alone credit profile (SACP).  Given the
nature of RusNano's business model and government mandate, S&P
factors in ongoing government support into the SACP.  S&P
believes the company's ownership structure supports the
sustainability of the business, even in the event of
underperformance.  S&P also incorporates the government's
commitment to provide guarantees on new debt issues to ensure
some stability in RusNano's financial profile.  Still, the
company's very short track record and credit history, together
with growing borrowing, and losses reported at year-end 2012
remain vulnerabilities in S&P's view.  The ratings continues to
be constrained by high credit risk from investment in very risky
and unpredictable high technology projects at an early stage of
their project life, together with a growing investment portfolio
and enterprise risk management that S&P thinks needs
strengthening.  Positively, RusNano started in 2012 to report
some gains on investments sold.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that strong ongoing
state support to RusNano, in the form of guarantees, will
continue at least until 2015 and help offset any uncertainty it
perceives in the viability of the company's business model.

At present, S&P views rating upside as remote in the next 12
months.  S&P believes it will take time for RusNano to improve
its business and financial profiles given the planned increase in
leverage and uncertainties about investment returns.

S&P could lower the ratings on RusNano within the next 12 months
if it lowered its long-term sovereign local currency credit
rating on Russia or if S&P observed signs of a lower likelihood
of timely extraordinary support from the government, possibly
prompted by privatization.  Larger-than-expected borrowings,
beyond the amounts guaranteed by the government, deterioration of
RusNano's liquidity position, or continued weak performance of
the investment portfolio leading to pronounced losses could
prompt S&P to take a negative rating action.  In particular, S&P
would consider an increase in gross debt to adjusted equity to
more than 3x as a trigger for a downgrade.


URALSIB BANK: Fitch Cuts LT Issuer Default Ratings to 'B+'
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded URALSIB Bank's (UB) and its 100%
subsidiary Uralsib Leasing Group's (ULG) Long-term foreign-
currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) to 'B+' from 'BB-'. The
Outlooks are Negative.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - UB'S IDRS, VR

The downgrade of UB's Long-term IDR and Viability Rating (VR)
reflects the further weakening of the bank's capitalization as a
result of losses and capital withdrawals by the shareholder,
while there has been no meaningful progress with divestiture of
significant non-core assets held on the balance sheet. On the
positive side, liquidity remains adequate supported by the bank's
ability to collect deposits through its wide branch network.

In 2012, capitalization was further undermined by the RUB3.2
billion comprehensive loss, RUB1.1 billion of distributions to
shareholder and RUB1 billion of charity contributions made on his
behalf. A further RUB0.5 billion dividend was declared in May
2013, which coupled with only modest profitability (1.3%
annualized return on equity (ROE) in H113 regulatory accounts)
suggests that the shareholder's approach remains the same and
capitalization is unlikely to strengthen in the medium term.

Capitalization remains burdened by the large holding of non-core
assets and related party exposures, which cumulatively equal 1.4x
of Fitch Core Capital (FCC) suggesting weak ability to absorb
losses. These exposures include:

-- Real-estate investments (RUB22 billion or 62% of FCC), some of
   which seems overvalued to Fitch and may require additional
   capital spending before they can be sold

-- RUB19 billion (55% of FCC) indirect equity investment (held
   through mutual funds) for a 91% stake of the insurance company
   SG Uralsib (SGU). The fact that the company is not controlled
   by the bank's management allows it to not be consolidated in
   UB's IFRS accounts. The valuation is also on the high side
   considering a RUB15 billion premium to the insurer's net
   assets. The bank has not been able to sell it at this price
   for a prolonged period of time, while in a forced sale
   scenario this may result in losses for the bank

-- RUB9 billion (26% of FCC) of related-party loans, including
   RUB3.8 billion to factoring business, RUB4 billion to
   investment business (ultimate exposures not yet disclosed) and
   RUB1.2 billion of loans to other businesses

Regulatory capitalization was also a modest 11.0% at the end-2012
(11.1% at end-H113). Fitch notes that RUB19 billion equity
investment in SGU (37% of regulatory capital) is not deducted
from the bank's regulatory capital as it is structured through
mutual funds (if it was a direct investment it would have been
deducted). Also not deducted from regulatory capital is
investment in ULG's RUB6.4 billion convertible subordinated bonds
(13% of regulatory capital). Although UB currently formally
complies with Central Bank (CBR) regulations, there is a risk
that regulatory treatment of these exposures could be changed,
especially with the introduction of Basle III on 1 January 2014,
requiring UB to either seek their forced sale and/or new capital.

UB's core performance has been undermined by high operating costs
at 94% of gross revenues for 2012, the highest level among
Russian banks rated 'B' and higher by Fitch. Significant
profitability improvement is not expected in the medium-term, as
the bank has been slow in cutting costs, and the share of
relatively high-margin retail lending, although it is growing
rapidly, is moderate.

Impairment charges totaled RUB6.4 billion in 2012 (mainly
relating to corporate loans) wiping out the modest RUB1.5 billion
pre-impairment profit and eating into capital. Further reserves
might be needed as corporate non-performing (NPLs; 90+ days
overdue) and restructured loans of, respectively, 10.7% and 4.0%,
at end-2012 were cumulatively around 70% covered by reserves.
There is also a large RUB7 billion (3.7% of gross corporate
loans) worked-out leasing exposure (booked in ULG) with prices
for the underlying leased assets being highly susceptible to
potential market stress. Retail NPLs made up 7% of retail gross
loans at end-2012, but were adequately reserved. However, recent
expansion in the unsecured retail space may expose the bank to
higher retail impairment charges, while moderate interest rates
compared to peers provide limited safety buffer.

UB's ratings continue to consider positively the bank's solid
deposit collection capability based on the nationwide branch
network and moderate single-name concentrations of the third-
party business. The recently steady deposit growth has
underpinned a reasonable liquidity cushion with around
RUB70 billion of highly liquid assets (cash and interbank
deposits up to three months) held by UB at end-H113. Additionally
about RUB20 billion could be sourced from a repo of eligible
securities with the CBR and RUB6 billion from a securitization of
mortgage loans.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - UB'S IDRS, VR

The Negative Outlook indicates the prevailing risks of further
capital erosion as a result of weak core performance, potential
downward adjustments to some of the asset valuations and capital
withdrawals.

Ratings could stabilize at the current level should there be an
improvement of core profitability and capital quality as a result
of divesting non-core and related party assets.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SUPPORT RATING AND SUPPORT
RATING FLOOR

Bank Uralsib's '4' Support Rating and 'B' Support Rating Floor
reflect the moderate probability of government support, given the
bank's nationwide presence and significant deposit franchise. The
ratings could be downgraded if state support fails to be made
available in case of a marked deterioration of the bank's credit
profile. The Support Rating could be upgraded if Uralsib becomes
owned by a high-rated entity.

KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - ULG'S IDRS AND SUPPORT
RATING

ULG's IDRs are aligned with those of UB and would likely to move
simultaneously with the parent's ratings.

ULG's '4' Support Rating reflects Fitch's view that UB would have
a high propensity to support ULG, if needed, due to 100%
ownership, high reputational risks for the bank of its
subsidiary's potential default, significant operational
integration in terms of management and funding.

Fitch could start notching ULG's ratings from UB's if the
latter's ability to provide timely support to the leasing
subsidiary deteriorates significantly as a result of weakened
financial standing and/or regulatory limitations. However, Fitch
believes UB currently retains an adequate flexibility to provide
support given ULG's relatively small size.

The rating actions are:

URALSIB Bank:

Long-Term IDR downgraded to 'B+' from 'BB-'; Outlook Negative
Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Viability Rating downgraded to 'b+' from 'bb-'
Support Rating affirmed at '4'
Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'B'

Uralsib Leasing Group:

Long-Term local and foreign currency IDR downgraded to 'B+' from
  'BB-'; Outlook Negative
Short-Term IDR affirmed at 'B'
Support Rating downgraded to '4' from '3'


* SAMARA OBLAST: S&P Rates RUB8.3-Bil. Unsecured Bond 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it has assigned its 'BB+'
long-term debt rating and 'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating to
the amortizing senior unsecured bond of up to Russian ruble
(RUB) 8.3 billion (about US$270 million) to be issued by Russia's
Samara Oblast (BB+/Stable/--; Russia national scale 'ruAA+').

The bond will have 28 quarterly fixed-rate coupons and an
amortizing repayment schedule.  In 2015, 20% of the bond is
scheduled for redemption, a further 25% should be repaid in 2017,
35% in 2018, 15% in 2019, and the remaining 5% in 2020.

The ratings on Samara Oblast reflect S&P's view of Russia's
developing and unbalanced institutional framework, as well as
Samara Oblast's limited budgetary flexibility and predictability,
and low economic wealth compared with international peers'.  A
further constraint is the oblast's lack of reliable long-term
financial planning.  The ratings are supported by S&P's
expectation that the oblast will maintain modest debt and
positive liquidity.  Low contingent liabilities and moderately
sound budgetary performance also support the ratings.

S&P's stable outlook on Samara Oblast reflects its view that, in
2013-2015, its budgetary performance will remain moderately
sound, with average deficits after capital accounts below 5% of
total revenues, but subject to volatility and gradual weakening
due to the need to increase expenditure.  S&P also assumes that
the oblast will maintain its positive liquidity position.



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S P A I N
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ALBIASA SOLAR: CSP Firm to Go Into Liquidation
----------------------------------------------
CSP World reports that Spain's Albiasa Solar, a company providing
parabolic trough technology for Concentrated Solar Power plants,
is winding up, according to fillings with Spanish regulator.

CSP World relates that Albiasa Solar had developed its
proprietary parabolic trough design, called ALBIASA-TROUGH, to be
deployed in several CSP plants in Spain.  According to the
report, the company carried out performance tests at the
Plataforma Solar de Almeria, the major European research center
for CSP and was ready to be commercially manufactured on 2008,
when the CSP boom started in Spain.

The report says the company had applied for permits approval for
a 50 MW CSP plant to be located in Saucedilla, in southwestern
Spain, but the plant was not included in the first round of
approved plants. Therefore, the company had to wait for a second
round expected by 2013 that has never come.

In January 2012, CSP World recalls, Spain's government announced
a halt in new renewable energy plants. Although it was announced
as a temporary measure, the fact is that it has become
definitive. Furthermore, as reported by CSP World, the new
measures undertaken by Spanish government are hitting the
profitability of CSP plants, what makes it harder to finance
these kind of projects.

CSP World notes that the company tried to enter in the US market
with its wholly owned subsidiary Albiasa Corp. based in
San Francisco. The company announced in 2009 it was promoting a
200 MW CSP plant worth $1 billion in Kingman, Arizona and it was
reported on April 2010 that Pacific Light and Power asked the
company to supply its CSP technology for a 10 MW plant in Hawaii
(PLP Kaual 1 project). But none of these projects have succeeded,
the report relays.


BANCO COOPERATIVO: Moody's Cuts Debt & Deposit Ratings to Ba2
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the debt and deposit
ratings of Banco Cooperativo Espanol to Ba2 from Ba1, following
the downgrade of the bank's baseline credit assessment (BCA) to
ba3 from ba1, which is equivalent to a standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) of D-, down from D+. Banco Cooperativo's
short-term ratings remain at Not Prime. All of the bank's ratings
now carry a negative outlook, with the exception of the short-
term rating.

The lowering of Banco Cooperativo's BCA by two notches reflects
the bank's vulnerability to the weak operating environment, due
to its role as service provider and central treasury provider for
the Spanish rural credit co-operatives sector. As such, Banco
Cooperativo's credit-risk concentration to the rural co-
operatives sector is very high, while the sector's credit profile
has been weakening.

However, Banco Cooperativo's debt and deposit ratings have been
downgraded by one notch as a result of Moody's assessment of a
moderate probability of systemic support.

This rating action concludes the review for downgrade extended on
October 24, 2012.

Ratings Rationale:

Lowering Of The Standalone Credit Assessment

The lowering of Banco Cooperativo's standalone BFSR/BCA to D-/ba3
from D+/ba1 primarily reflects the bank's exposure to the rural
co-operatives sector, whose credit profile has been weakening and
is expected to deteriorate further. This increasing risk profile
is not sufficiently mitigated by Banco Cooperativo's very high
leverage, irrespective of the bank's high regulatory capital
ratios, which do not fully cover the risks inherent in the bank's
activity.

Banco Cooperativo displays high credit-risk concentrations to the
Spanish rural credit co-operatives, which adversely affects its
risk profile. The bulk of the bank's activity has traditionally
consisted of investing the excess liquidity deposited by rural
co-operatives at Banco Cooperativo into interbank deposits and
fixed-income debt. However, in the recent past, a large part of
Banco Cooperativo's activity relates to the issuance of
government-backed debt and access to European Central Bank (ECB)
funding on behalf of rural co-operatives, which has materially
increased the bank's exposure to this financial sector, even
after including the cash collateral that Banco Cooperativo is
increasingly demanding for these activities.

In addition, Moody's notes the credit risk exposure to the rural
co-operatives sector, given their weakening credit profile. While
the Spanish rural cooperative banks had largely avoided the most
blatant real estate development excesses of the Spanish savings
banks due to their restriction to their home markets, they are
now affected by the broader economic recession. The Spanish
economy has continued contracting in the first half of 2013, with
domestic demand not showing any significant signs of recovery. In
Moody's view, any signs of a modest economic recovery at this
stage are only being generated by the export sector, while still
weak domestic demand is likely to cause further contraction in
domestic growth into 2014 as the unemployment rate remains at
very high levels. Therefore, the rating agency expects Spanish
rural co-operatives' asset quality to deteriorate further across
asset classes.

However, due to the avoidance of large real estate development
exposures outside of their core area, the performance of rural
cooperatives over this crisis has so far been better than the
average for Spanish banks. The ability of Spanish rural co-
operatives to continue their track record of better asset quality
performance in relation to the system average in Spain are a key
rating driver for Banco Cooperativo. Any evidence that would
point towards the sector's asset quality being closer to the
Spanish banking system average would exert significant downward
rating pressure for the bank.

Banco Cooperativo's Tier 1 ratio stood at a high 12.2% at end-
December 2012. However, Moody's believes that the risk weighting
of its assets is very low, given that it is a wholesale-oriented
institution acting on behalf of the rural credit co-operatives.
Its ratio of shareholders' equity to total assets amounted to
1.4% at the end of 2012, and the ratio of risk-weighted assets to
total assets was 11.4%, which is also indicative of the low risk
weighting of Banco Cooperativo's assets. Moody's notes that the
bank's high leverage poses a significant risk, as it provides
Banco Cooperativo with insufficient cushion against any
unforeseen, unexpected losses.

Downgrade of the Senior Debt And Deposit Ratings

The downgrade of Banco Cooperativo's senior debt and deposit
ratings reflects the lowering of the bank's BCA, together with
Moody's ongoing consideration of a moderate probability of
systemic support, on the back of Banco Cooperativo's importance
for Spanish rural co-operatives. At the lower standalone BCA of
ba2, this systemic support assumption now translates into a one-
notch uplift from the bank's standalone ratings

Downgrade Of Subordinated Debt Ratings

Moody's has downgraded the senior subordinated debt ratings of
Banco Cooperativo to (P)B1 from (P)Ba2, with a negative outlook,
in line with the lowering of the bank's BCA.

Rationale For The Negative Outlook

The negative outlook that Moody's has assigned to Banco
Cooperativo's BFSR and the debt and deposit ratings reflects the
bank's high exposure to the rural credit co-operative sector,
against the background of continued challenges for this sector.
Those challenges include the continuing weak operating
environment in Spain and the broader euro area sovereign and
banking crisis. These conditions will likely lead to further
asset-quality deterioration across the Spanish rural co-
operatives sector.

In addition, the negative outlook incorporates the downside risks
to the Spanish sovereign's creditworthiness, as reflected in the
negative outlook on the Baa3 government bond rating.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

An upgrade of Banco Cooperativo's standalone BFSR is currently
unlikely, given the negative outlook.

Downwards pressure could be exerted on Banco Cooperativo's
ratings as a result of (1) a worse-than-expected deterioration in
the credit profile of the rural co-operatives; (2) the bank's
inability to maintain its role as a primary service provider for
the rural co-operatives; (3) any worsening in operating
conditions beyond Moody's current expectations, i.e., a broader
economic recession beyond its current GDP forecast of a 1.4%
contraction for 2013; and (4) a higher risk profile, which could
stem from aggressive new lending activities, or from other market
or credit activities outside of Banco Cooperativo's intermediary
role for the rural co-operatives.

Banco Cooperativo's debt and deposit ratings are linked to the
standalone BCA, and any change to it would likely also affect
these ratings.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.


CAJA RURAL: Moody's Reviews 'Ba2' Deposit Ratings for Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for downgrade Caja
Rural de Granada's long-term deposit ratings of Ba2 and D
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR; equivalent to a
ba2 baseline credit assessment, or BCA). The bank's short-term
rating remains at Not Prime.

The review was prompted by Moody's concern over the broader asset
quality deterioration at Caja Rural de Granada, particularly in
the corporate segment. Moody's believes that the pace of asset-
quality deterioration is accelerating in the context of the
ongoing real-estate crisis and the continuing weak outlook for
the non-export-oriented corporate sector, in view of the ongoing
contraction in the domestic economy.

Ratings Rationale:

Review of Standalone BFSR

The review of CRG's D standalone BFSR reflects Moody's concern
about CRG's financial profile in view of the rapid deterioration
of the bank's asset-quality indicators, particularly in the
corporate loan-book. This deterioration not only affects those
exposures related to the real-estate and construction sectors,
but also loans extended to companies related to other economic
sectors. CRG's exposure to these two segments represented 43% of
the bank's total loan book at end-December 2012.

Moody's expects the asset quality of the corporate sector to
deteriorate further, and that other asset categories, such as
residential mortgages and consumer loans will also come under
rising pressure. This is because Moody's believes that any signs
of a modest economic recovery at this stage are only caused by
the export sector, whereas weak domestic demand is still set to
contract domestic growth into 2014. Furthermore, Moody's notes
that the negative conditions in the country's economy will
continue to drive a deterioration in CRG's asset-quality
indicators across all asset classes, including the residential
mortgage portfolio (around 42% of the bank's loan book).

As a result of these conditions, the increase in CRG's non-
performing loans (NPLs) has been particularly acute since 2012,
with an NPL ratio of 9.9% as of end-December 2012 up from 6.0% a
year earlier.

Moody's also notes that in addition to rising NPLs, CRG had gross
real-estate assets of EUR260 million at year-end 2012 that were
acquired during the crisis through repossessions and negotiations
with troubled borrowers, which, if included, increase the NPL
ratio to 16.4% (Moody's-estimated system average: 17%).
Furthermore, Moody's notes the high percentage of refinanced
loans at the bank (13.3% of gross loans). The aggregation of
refinanced loans (that are not already captured in the NPL ratio)
increases the overall problem loan ratio to 23.1%, compared to
Moody's estimated system average of around 26%.

Focus of the Review

In its review of CRG's ratings, Moody's will take into account
(1) the bank's ability to generate sufficient earnings to offset
any increase in provisioning requirements; and (2) its ability to
strengthen its loss-absorption capacity via asset sales and other
management actions to ensure a sufficiently resilient capital
base.

Review of the Long-Term Deposit Ratings

The review for downgrade of the long-term deposit ratings was
triggered by the review for downgrade of CRG's standalone BFSR.

According to Moody's methodology, the deposit rating of a bank
results from the combination of its BCA and any external support
it may benefit from. Accordingly, a lowering of a bank's BCA
could trigger a downgrade of its deposit ratings. CRG's deposit
ratings benefit from a low probability of systemic support, which
results in no uplift from its BCA of ba2.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

The ratings have been placed on review for downgrade, indicating
downward pressure. This pressure may intensify if the
macroeconomic operating conditions in Spain deviate significantly
from Moody's current GDP growth projections: a GDP decline of -
1.4% for 2013 and very weak growth of less than 1% in 2014.
Furthermore, if asset quality deteriorates at a significantly
faster rate than the system average, this may exert further
pressure on the rating.

An upgrade of CRG's standalone credit strength is currently very
unlikely, given the current review for downgrade. However, upward
pressure could be exerted on the bank's BFSR as a result of (1)
CRG successfully resolving its asset-quality challenges; and (2)
a sustainable recovery of its profitability indicators.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.



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T U R K E Y
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ALTERNATIFBANK AS: Fitch Lifts LT Local Currency IDR From 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded Alternatifbank A.S.'s Long-term
foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) to 'BBB' from 'BB'
and its Long-term local currency IDR to 'BBB+' from 'BB' and
removed them from Rating Watch Positive (RWP). The Outlooks are
Stable. The bank's Support Rating Floor (SRF) has been withdrawn.
Alternatifbank's Viability Rating of 'bb' is unaffected.

The rating actions follow a change of ownership, effective
July 18, 2013, whereby Commercial Bank of Qatar (CBQ; A/Stable)
acquired a 70.84% stake in the bank.

The upgrade of the IDRs, National Rating and Support Rating
reflect Fitch's belief that CBQ would provide support, if
required, to Alternatifbank. Fitch believes Alternatifbank is a
strategically important subsidiary for CBQ. SRFs are only
assigned to banks whose primary source of external support is
considered to be the sovereign. This is no longer the case for
Alternatifbank.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS AND NATIONAL RATINGS
The bank's IDRs and National Rating are driven by potential
support from CBQ. CBQ's IDR of 'A' is driven by Fitch's
expectation of a very high probability of Qatari sovereign
support for the bank, should it be required. CBQ is 16.7% owned
by an investment arm of the Qatari authorities. Fitch believes
the Qatari authorities are highly supportive of their banking
sector and, subject to an extent to sovereign risks in Turkey,
would allow support to flow through to foreign subsidiaries
should this be required.

Alternatifbank's Long-term foreign currency IDR and Short-term
foreign currency IDR are constrained by Turkey's 'BBB' Country
Ceiling. The Long-term local currency IDR is notched down twice
from CBQ's Long-term IDR, reflecting Fitch's classification of
Alternatifbank as a 'strategically important' subsidiary for CBQ
under its criteria. The Stable Outlook reflects the Outlook on
CBQ's Long-term IDR.

CBQ has minority stakes in banks in the UAE and Oman. The
Alternatifbank acquisition is a larger investment and the Turkish
banking sector offers considerable growth opportunities at
present. CBQ intend to make an offer for the 4.16% stake
currently quoted on the Istanbul stock exchange, which would
raise its ownership to 75%. The remaining 25% stake will remain
with the Anadolu Group, a leading, diversified conglomerate in
Turkey.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, NATIONAL RATING AND SUPPORT RATING
Assuming there is no narrowing in the 'strategically important'
notching from CBQ (currently two notches), Alternatifbank's local
currency IDRs are sensitive to any downgrade of CBQ's Long-term
IDR and Turkey's Long-term local currency IDR. They could also
potentially be sensitive to a weakening in Fitch's classification
of Alternatifbank to 'limited importance', although this is
currently unlikely.

Under Fitch's criteria, it is possible for a bank to be rated
more than one notch above its sovereign of domicile in local
currency. However, Fitch does not assign any Long-term local
currency IDRs to Turkish banks owned by highly rated foreign
parents higher than one notch above Turkey's local currency
sovereign rating. This reflects Turkey's still volatile operating
environment and the fact that some uncertainty is likely to
remain with respect to a foreign owner's commitment to its
subsidiary in a sovereign default scenario. As a result, an
upgrade of CBQ's IDR would not result in an upgrade of
Alternatifbank's local currency IDRs.

For Alternatifbank's National Rating to be downgraded, its Long-
term local currency IDR would have to be downgraded to 'BBB-'.

Alternatifbank's 'BBB' Long-term foreign currency IDR is
sensitive to i) any downgrade of Turkey's 'BBB' Country Ceiling,
or ii) a downgrade of CBQ's IDR by more than one notch. The
Outlook on CBQ's IDR is currently Stable, so this is not
currently envisaged.

Alternatifbank's Short-term IDR is sensitive to a downgrade of
Turkey's Country Ceiling by more than one notch or to a multiple
notch downgrade (at least three notches) of CBQ's Long-term IDR.

For Alternatifbank's Support Rating to be downgraded, events
would have had to transpire for the bank's Long-term foreign
currency IDR to have been downgraded by more than one notch. For
example, a multiple-notch downgrade of Turkey's Country Ceiling
or a downgrade of CBQ by three notches.

The rating actions are as follows:

  Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'BBB' from 'BB';
off
  RWP; Stable Outlook

  Short-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'F3'from 'B'; off
  RWP

  Long-term local currency IDR: upgraded to 'BBB+' from 'BB'; off
  RWP; Stable Outlook

  Short-term local currency IDR: upgraded to 'F2'from 'B', off
RWP

  Viability Rating unaffected at 'bb'

  Support Rating: upgraded to '2' from '5'; off RWP

  Support Rating Floor 'NF' withdrawn

  National Long-term Rating: upgraded to 'AAA(tur)' from
  'AA(tur)'; off RWP; Stable Outlook



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ALLIANCE BUILDING: Goes Into Liquidation After Safety Violations
----------------------------------------------------------------
Alliance Building and Contracting ltd, a Weybridge company in the
United Kingdom, has recently gone into voluntary liquidation
after being fined heavily for safety violations. The Monument
Hill based company was the main contractor for a destruction and
rebuild project in London, England. After the demolition phase of
the work was completed, the company left a sixteen-metre length
of scaffolding freestanding over the site at Lillie Road, Fulham.
The scaffolding ended up collapsing onto the busy London street
below in the middle of the day. The incident happened on October
3, 2011. Fortunately, when the structure fell from the first
floor level, it did not injure anyone; it covered the pavement
and blocked one lane of traffic.

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) investigated the incident
and found safety failings. HSE prosecuted the company after
finding it negligent. The company improperly managed the
demolition phase of the work and left the scaffolding free
standing after the work had completed. Regular safety inspections
of the scaffold had not been conducted and the structure was left
unattended for long periods, HSE claimed.

Alliance Building and Contracting ltd, which is now in voluntary
liquidation, has had to pay out more than GBP17,000. It was found
guilty of a breach of the work at height regulations 2005 by the
Westminster Magistrates' Court and fined GBP10,000 with costs of
GBP7,190 imposed. Inspector Charles Linfoot, speaking after the
hearing, said: "Scaffold collapses are infrequent in the
construction industry, but when they occur, they often cause
serious injury, fatalities and major damage. Lillie Road is a
busy one and it is a matter of chance that the collapse, brought
about by the safety failures of Alliance Building & Contracting,
did not have more serious consequences. The case shows how
important it is to actively manage all the risks on a
construction site and, in particular, to make sure inspections of
scaffolding are carried out regularly."


LEHMAN BROTHERS: Pension Debts Equal with Unsecured Creditors
-------------------------------------------------------------
Anthony Aarons at Bloomberg News reports that pension debts in
insolvency cases should be paid on equal footing with unsecured
creditors, the U.K. Supreme Court ruled in a dispute about
underfunded retirement plans at the U.K. units of Lehman Brothers
Holding Inc. and Nortel Networks Corp.

                     About Lehman Brothers

Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. -- http://www.lehman.com/-- was
the fourth largest investment bank in the United States.  For
more than 150 years, Lehman Brothers has been a leader in the
global financial markets by serving the financial needs of
corporations, governmental units, institutional clients and
individuals worldwide.

Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Sept. 15, 2008
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 08-13555).  Lehman's bankruptcy
petition disclosed US$639 billion in assets and US$613 billion in
debts, effectively making the firm's bankruptcy filing the
largest in U.S. history.  Several other affiliates followed
thereafter.

Affiliates Merit LLC, LB Somerset LLC and LB Preferred Somerset
LLC sought for bankruptcy protection in December 2009.

The Debtors' bankruptcy cases are handled by Judge James M. Peck.
Harvey R. Miller, Esq., Richard P. Krasnow, Esq., Lori R. Fife,
Esq., Shai Y. Waisman, Esq., and Jacqueline Marcus, Esq., at
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, in New York, represent Lehman.  Epiq
Bankruptcy Solutions serves as claims and noticing agent.

Dennis F. Dunne, Esq., Evan Fleck, Esq., and Dennis O'Donnell,
Esq., at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, in New York, serve
as counsel to the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin Capital, Inc., is the Committee's
investment banker.

On Sept. 19, 2008, the Honorable Gerard E. Lynch of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, entered an
order commencing liquidation of Lehman Brothers, Inc., pursuant
to the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act (Case
No. 08-CIV-8119 (GEL)).  James W. Giddens has been appointed as
trustee for the SIPA liquidation of the business of LBI.

The Bankruptcy Court approved Barclays Bank Plc's purchase of
Lehman Brothers' North American investment banking and capital
markets operations and supporting infrastructure for US$1.75
billion.  Nomura Holdings Inc., the largest brokerage house in
Japan, purchased LBHI's operations in Europe for US$2 plus the
retention of most of employees.  Nomura also bought Lehman's
operations in the Asia Pacific for US$225 million.

Lehman emerged from bankruptcy protection on March 6, 2012, more
than three years after it filed the largest bankruptcy in U.S.
history.  The Chapter 11 plan for the Lehman companies other than
the broker was confirmed in December 2011.

Lehman made its first payment of $22.5 billion to creditors in
April 2012 and a second payment of $10.2 billion on Oct. 1.  A
third distribution is set for around March 30, 2013.  The
brokerage is yet to make a first distribution to non-customers.

Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., publishes Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy News.  The newsletter tracks the Chapter 11 proceeding
undertaken by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., and other
insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings undertaken by its
affiliates.


MODELZONE LTD: Ripmax Buys Wholesale Arm Out of Administration
--------------------------------------------------------------
John Brazier at InsolvencyNews reports that Amerang Limited, the
wholesale arm of insolvent model retailer Modelzone Limited, has
been sold out of administration.

The business and assets of Amerang have been purchased by Ripmax
Limited via a newly incorporated company, Pinehurst 104 Limited
which will trade under the Amerang name, the report relates.

Richard Hawes, Nick Edwards, and Rob Harding of Deloitte were
appointed as joint administrators to Modelzone Limited and
Amerang Limited on June 26, 2013, InsolvencyNews discloses.

"We have secured a buyer for Amerang, which continues to be an
attractive brand given the strength of its customer and supplier
base and its reputation in the market," the report quotes Mr.
Hawes as saying.

InsolvencyNews notes that Ripmax is a competitor in the sector
and the sale will see Amerang continue as a going concern. All
remaining 18 staff at Amerang will transfer to the new company,
the report relays.

Last week, InsolvencyNews recalls, administrators announced
proposals to implement a store closure programme for Modelzone's
47 retail stores.

Store closures are expected to start over the coming weeks,
although no final decision has been made on which individual
stores will close, the report relates.

ModelZone is a clothing retailer.  It has 47 stores across the
UK, according to its latest accounts and is majority owned by the
private equity arm of Lloyds Banking Group, Lloyds Development
Capital. Modelzone currently employs a total of 335 staff.


STEMCOR: Under Debt Pressure; Jindal Brothers Eye Iron Ore Assets
-----------------------------------------------------------------
James Crabtree at The Financial Times reports that two of India's
most high-profile industrial tycoons, brothers Naveen and Sajjan
Jindal, are vying to buy the iron ore assets of Stemcor.

According to the FT, one of Britain's largest unlisted companies,
with revenues of GBP5.1 billion during the last financial year,
Stemcor is under pressure from a consortium of banks to repay
about US$1.2 billion of debts, following weak financial
performance.

The FT relates that people familiar with the process said the
trading company, which is controlled by the Oppenheimer family,
has appointed Goldman Sachs to find a buyer for its Indian
assets, which include an iron ore pellet plant and an iron ore
mine, located in the eastern state of Orissa.

The FT notes that people familiar with the negotiations said
Naveen Jindal, the head of Jindal Steel and Power, a conglomerate
with a turnover of about US$3.5 billion last year, is negotiating
with Stemcor's Indian management on a potential buyout of the
assets which are estimated to have an enterprise value of about
US$800 million.

However, Sajjan Jindal, the head of JSW Steel, India's second
largest private steelmaker by output, last week wrote to Ralph
Oppenheimer, Stemcor's London-based managing director, stressing
his interest, the FT recounts.

Mr. Jindal's letter, dated July 18, also suggested that a
potential purchase by JSW would be better for Stemcor's investors
than the bid being supported by his brother, who is also a member
of parliament for India's ruling Congress party, the FT relates.

Stemcor is a private British steel trading group.


ZATTIKKA: Faces Possible Administration
---------------------------------------
Craig Chapple at MCVUK News reports that online games firm
Zattikka could go into administration next month as it struggles
to make a loan payment of GBP275,000.

The company revealed on July 9th that it was due to pay the
interest, but it has still failed to make the payment, according
to MCVUK News.

The report notes that Zattikka-owned developer Hattrick, which is
owed the money, has now demanded payment by close of business on
August 2nd.  The report relates that failure to do so would mean
an amount of EUR6.4 million would become repayable within the two
business days of the expiry date.

The report discloses that Zattikka says it has been advised
however not to make the transaction, as it may cause issues
should it enter administration.  The firm said it is continuing
negotiations with its loan note holders to eliminate a
"substantial proportion" of the group's liabilities, but these
have so far been unsuccessful, the report adds.


* UK: Scottish Corporate Insolvencies Up 29% in Second Quarter
--------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that official figures show companies going bust
in Scotland has gone up.

More than 180 companies entered liquidation or receivership
during the period, BBC discloses.

According to BBC, only one company went into receivership between
April and June and 183 were either voluntary or compulsory
liquidations.

That is a quarterly rise of nearly 29% but a 56% fall compared
with the same period in 2012, BBC notes.

"The rise in the number of corporate insolvencies in the second
quarter is to be expected given many firms are simply 'existing'
from month-to-month," BBC quotes Bryan Jackson, Business
Restructuring partner, BDO LLP, as saying.

"For many firms, the long wait for the expected upturn in the
economy has not arisen and they have exhausted cash reserves and
found themselves falling into insolvency.

"While there are signs that some sectors such as manufacturing
are improving, it is clear that retail, hospitality and
construction are still being adversely affected by the
recession."



===================
U Z B E K I S T A N
===================


ASIA ALLIANCE: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Ratings; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B3 long-term local-
and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Asia Alliance Bank
(Uzbekistan), as well as the bank's standalone financial strength
rating (BFSR) of E+, equivalent to a baseline credit assessment
(BCA) of b3. The bank's Not Prime short-term local- and foreign-
currency deposit ratings were also affirmed. The outlook on the
bank's BFSR and the long-term ratings is stable.

Moody's affirmation of Asia Alliance Bank's ratings is primarily
based on the bank's audited financial statements for 2012
prepared under IFRS.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's notes that Asia Alliance Bank's ratings are constrained
by the bank's aggressive growth which may put pressure on asset
quality and capital adequacy levels going forward, although these
metrics are currently satisfactory. The bank's ratings are
underpinned by its solid profitability and stable liquidity
profile.

Asia Alliance Bank's total assets almost tripled in 2012 and its
gross loan book multiplied more than two times over the same
period; the rapid growth prolonged into 2013. As a result, Asia
Alliance Bank's rapidly augmented loan portfolio remains
unseasoned which gives rise to asset quality concerns. Currently,
Asia Alliance Bank's asset quality metrics appear to be
satisfactory: there were no 'past due' loans in the bank's loan
book at year-end 2012, while restructured loans amounted to
around 0.2% of total gross loans. However, as the loan portfolio
starts maturing Moody's expects a higher level of problem loans.

Moody's is also concerned that the rapid growth of the bank's
risk-weighted assets (RWAs) may quickly deplete its capital.
Although Asia Alliance Bank's Basel I total capital adequacy
ratio (CAR) stood at a relatively high level of 19% at year-end
2012, Moody's expects that capital injections from the
shareholders will be warranted in the short-to-medium term,
whereas the rating agency is not currently aware of any action
plan aimed at shoring up capital.

The rating agency explains that Asia Alliance Bank's
profitability is solid, with return on average assets (ROAA) and
return on average equity (ROAE) reported at 5.7% and 61%,
respectively, during 2012; however, the bank's internal profits
generation is not sufficient to match the current pace of growth.

Moody's also notes positively Asia Alliance Bank's sound
liquidity position: although the top 20 deposits exceeded 80% of
the bank's total customer accounts as at year-end 2012, the
refinancing risks are mitigated by its high liquidity cushion
exceeding 50% of total assets as of the same reporting date.

According to Moody's, Asia Alliance Bank's global local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of B3/Not Prime are derived from
the bank's b3 BCA, and -- in accordance with Moody's joint
default analysis methodology -- do not incorporate any
probability of external support.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

Asia Alliance Bank's deposit ratings have limited upside
potential at their current level, given the bank's very
aggressive business expansion and the downside risks to its
financial fundamentals stemming from the rapid growth, especially
taking into account the bank's insufficiently tested business
model and unseasoned loan portfolio.

Negative pressure could be exerted on the ratings as a result of
failure by the bank to maintain -- amidst this strong lending
growth -- the good quality of its loan book, sustainable
financial performance and adequate capital and liquidity
cushions.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.

Headquartered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Asia Alliance Bank
reported total audited IFRS assets of US$355 million and total
shareholders' equity of US$31 million as at year-end 2012. The
bank's net IFRS income for 2012 was US$14 million.


INFINBANK: Moody's Affirms 'B3' Deposit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B3 long-term local-
and foreign-currency deposit ratings of Infinbank (Uzbekistan),
as well as the bank's standalone financial strength rating (BFSR)
of E+, equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b3.
The bank's Not Prime short-term local- and foreign-currency
deposit ratings were also affirmed. The outlook on the bank's
BFSR and the long-term ratings is stable.

Moody's affirmation of Infinbank's ratings is primarily based on
the bank's audited financial statements for 2012, prepared under
IFRS.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's notes that Infinbank's ratings are constrained by the
bank's limited market share in the Republic of Uzbekistan, its
high credit concentrations, as well as very rapid lending growth
resulting in the unseasoned nature of the bank's loan book. At
the same time, the rating agency notes that Infinbank's
shareholders have -- to the moment - demonstrated their
commitment as they make regular capital injections to support the
bank's growth. The bank's ratings are underpinned by its sound
profitability metrics and stable liquidity profile.

Moody's explains that, as at year-end 2012, Infinbank held less
than 1% of total banking sector assets in Uzbekistan and this
limited scope of operations leads to high single-name credit
concentrations: the aggregate credit exposure to the top 20
borrowers accounted for 76% of Infinbank's total gross loans or
278% of Tier 1 capital at year-end 2012.

Furthermore, Infinbank has been reporting high lending growth
over the recent years: the three-year average growth rate of its
gross loan book has been high at 53% and the portfolio remains
unseasoned. According to the bank's 2012 IFRS, its impaired loans
stood at 6.9% of total gross loans as of year-end 2012 (still
somewhat lower than the sector average of 7.9%), whereas the loan
loss reserves (LLR) accumulated as of the same reporting date
covered only 22% of these loans (sector average -- 56%). Moody's
considers that such low level of LLR is not sufficient to address
the loan book growth and its potential deterioration in the
future.

Moody's notes positively the evidence of commitment of
Infinbank's shareholders who regularly inject capital to support
the bank's growth: its Basel I Tier 1 ratio improved to 14.2% at
year-end 2012 from 13.6% at year-end 2011, and another capital
injection was completed in the first half of 2013. At the same
time, the quality of Infinbank's capital remains under pressure
given a material -- albeit declining -- level of related-party
exposure: this accounted for 13.2% of Tier 1 capital as at year-
end 2012, having reduced from 24.5% reported a year earlier.

Moody's further explains that Infinbank's ratings are underpinned
by its sound profitability metrics with Return on Average Assets
(ROAA) reported at 3.0% in 2012. As Infinbank is actively
involved in trade finance business, the share of stable and
recurring fee and commission income prevails in its revenue
structure. The rating agency also notes the granular structure of
Infinbank's funding sources, with top 20 deposits together
accounting for 29% of total customer funding (which, in turn,
makes up the bulk of the bank's liabilities), and Infinbank's
ample liquidity cushion (48% of total assets at year-end 2012)
which addresses the predominantly short-term nature of the bank's
funding mix.

According to Moody's, Infinbank's global local- and foreign-
currency deposit ratings of B3/Not Prime are derived from the
bank's b3 BCA, and -- in accordance with Moody's joint default
analysis methodology -- do not incorporate any probability of
external support.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

Infinbank's standalone BFSR has limited upside potential at its
current level given the bank's rapid lending growth and the
unseasoned nature of its loan book. In the longer term rating
horizon, the BFSR might map to a higher standalone BCA, as
opposed to b3 currently, if the bank were to reduce its credit
concentrations and lengthen the maturity of its funding base,
while simultaneously maintaining stable and sound financial
fundamentals.

Negative pressure could be exerted on Infinbank's ratings as a
result of (1) any failure by the bank's shareholders to support
the institution's rapid growth by additional capital injections;
and (2) any notable increase in asset or liability
concentrations. A substantial increase in the volume of related-
party business represents another factor that could have an
adverse impact on Infinbank's ratings.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.

Headquartered in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Infinbank reported total
audited IFRS assets of US$124 million and total equity of US$12.7
million as at year-end 2012. The bank's net IFRS profits for 2012
was US$3.3 million.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Anti-Dumping Tariffs to Spur Insolvencies in EU Solar Sector
--------------------------------------------------------------
John Parnell at PV-Tech reports that more European solar
construction firms will face insolvency this year as the European
Union's anti-dumping tariffs drive up prices for Chinese-
manufactured solar modules.

That's the warning from the latest report by IHS, which found
that the average price for Chinese crystal polysilicon modules in
Europe rose by 4% in June to hit EUR0.54 (US$0.71), PV-Tech
relates.  The price rise comes after Chinese module prices
declined for the 48 months prior, PV-Tech notes.

"The era of low-cost Chinese modules is now over, as prices have
risen due to the EU Commission's implementation of preliminary
anti-dumping tariffs," PV-Tech quotes Henning Wicht, senior
director of solar research for IHS, as saying.

"This will have a negative impact on solar installations, and is
likely to cause many companies engaged in the engineering,
procurement and construction (EPC) of solar systems to go out of
business this year."

The majority of the solar industry had hoped that the European
Union and China could negotiate a settlement and avoid the
imposition of further duties before Aug, 5, PV-Tech discloses.

According to PV-Tech, the analysts have noted that prices are now
starting to rise again due to the closing of a loophole that
allowed Chinese solar manufacturers to declare modules shipped to
Croatia as duty-cleared goods due to its imminent EU membership.


* Fitch Says End-June MMF Snapshot Reflects Uncertain Outlook
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has published the latest edition of its monthly
money market fund (MMF) snapshot report, with data as at end of
June 2013. Fitch now rates just under US$1 trillion of MMF assets
in Europe and the US.

Euro MMFs have maintained their weighted average lives (WALs) at
near recent highs in response to a continuing low yield
environment. The average WAL for euro funds was 55 days at end-
June, marginally down from 56 days at end-May. There has been an
increase in liquidity in June; average euro MMF daily and weekly
liquidity stood at 31% and 37%, respectively, up from 28% and
35%, respectively, at end-May. The increase in liquidity has been
influenced by quarter-end investor flow requirements.

GBP MMFs average WAL stand at 54 days, largely unchanged from
May. There was a reduction in liquidity in June. Average GBP MMF
daily and weekly liquidity stood at 28% and 36%, respectively,
down from 30% and 43%, respectively, at end-May.

Offshore USD average WAL stand at 63 days, largely unchanged from
the high levels maintained since March. There was a slight
reduction in the liquidity over in June. Average USD MMF daily
liquidity was unchanged at 30% with weekly liquidity down to 42%
from 44% at end-May.

Across all three currencies, average WALs are well within Fitch's
guidelines for a 'AAAmmf' rated fund at 120 days, with average
weighted average maturities (WAMs) remaining broadly constant
over the month. These funds' average overnight and one-week
liquidity levels also remain consistent with Fitch's 'AAAmmf'
rating criteria guidelines.

At the end of June, US domiciled MMFs remained stable in terms of
preserving stable liquidity, maturity, and credit risk metrics.
US government funds reduced maturity by cutting WAM by two days
to 45 days and WAL by four days to 55 days since May, while prime
and tax-exempt funds remained the same. All funds continued to
maintain high levels of daily and weekly liquid assets,
surpassing Fitch's minimum liquidity guidelines for currently
assigned ratings.

US domiciled prime MMFs increased investments to repos and
agency/treasury securities, while decreasing CP, TD, and
municipal securities. Government MMFs continue to reduce repos
and treasuries, and reallocating into agencies.

Prime EUR fund assets fell 1% over the month. Prime GBP fund
assets fell 2%, whilst prime offshore USD assets fell by 5%,
following an increase of 7% in May. US prime MMFs' experienced
outflows of US$10.8 billion, a 3% decrease to all US Fitch rated
prime funds' assets. Fitch-rated US government and tax-exempt
funds did not experience meaningful investor flows.

Fitch's MMF snapshot is a monthly publication of key portfolio
analytics relevant to MMFs' safety and liquidity. The snapshot's
consistent analytical information allows data comparison across
MMFs. All data is based on fund surveillance reports received by
Fitch from fund administrators and fund managers. The report
provides consistent and comparable portfolio analytics across all
U.S. and European MMFs publicly rated under Fitch's global money
market fund rating criteria. It is complemented by quarterly MMF
dashboards reports, highlighting key trends.


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars
---------------------------------------------

Aug. 8-10, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
         Hotel Hershey, Hershey, Pa.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Aug. 22-24, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Southwest Bankruptcy Conference
         Hyatt Regency Lake Tahoe, Incline Village, Nev.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Oct. 3-5, 2013
   TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
      TMA Annual Convention
         Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, D.C.
            Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Nov. 1, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      NCBJ/ABI Educational Program
         Atlanta Marriott Marquis, Atlanta, Ga.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Dec. 2, 2013
   BEARD GROUP, INC.
      19th Annual Distressed Investing Conference
          The Helmsley Park Lane Hotel, New York, N.Y.
          Contact:   240-629-3300 or http://bankrupt.com/

Dec. 5-7, 2013
   AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
      Winter Leadership Conference
         Terranea Resort, Rancho Palos Verdes, Calif.
            Contact:   1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *