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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, July 22, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 143

                            Headlines



B U L G A R I A

* BULGARIA: Moody's Revises Bond, Deposit Ceilings


D E N M A R K

* DENMARK: Moody's Says Outlook for Banking System Remains Neg.


F R A N C E

DEXIA SA: France May Face Further Losses From Bailout
MAISONS DU MONDE: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
VIVARTE: Breaches Bank Loan Conditions; May Need Cash Injection


G E R M A N Y

CONERGY AG: Kawa Capital to Take Over Following Bankruptcy
FAENZA GMBH: Moody's Assigns First-Time 'B2' Corp. Family Rating
PRAKTIKER AG: Bond Holders Want to Convert EUR250MM Into Shares
SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Corp Family Rating


I R E L A N D

ALPSTAR CLO 2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'
CELTIC RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Ratings on Two Tranches
FASTNET SECURITIES 2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A2 Notes to Ba2
LANSDOWNE MORTGAGES: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A2 Notes to Ba2
WATERFORD CASTLE: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator

* IRELAND: Trading Firms Can Create Prospects From Receiverships


I T A L Y

CARTESIO SRL: S&P Puts B+ Ratings on 5 Notes on Watch Negative
CLARIS FINANCE 2006: S&P Puts 'BB+' Rating on CreditWatch Neg.
DEXIA CREDIOP: Parent's IDR Cut No Effect on Fitch's 'ccc' VR
SALINI SPA: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'BB' CCR; Outlook Stable
SALINI SPA: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating


L I T H U A N I A

* LITHUANIA: Moody's Revises Bond, Deposit Ceilings


L U X E M B O U R G

MERLIN ENTERTAINMENTS: Moody's Rates GBP1.387-Bil. Notes 'B1'


N E T H E R L A N D S

CID FINANCE: Fitch Keeps 'BB-' Rating on Rating Watch Negative
SILVER BIRCH CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'


P O R T U G A L

NOSTRUM MORTGAGES: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR5MM B Notes to 'B3'
PELICAN MORTGAGES 3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. D Notes to 'Caa3'
PELICAN MORTGAGES 3: Swap Novation No Impact on Moody's Ratings


R U S S I A

URALSIB OJSC: S&P Lowers Rating to 'B+'; Outlook Stable


S P A I N

BANKINTER 3: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR6MM C Notes to 'B3'
CECABANK: Swap Amendments No Impact on TDA, FTA Note Issues
IM SABADELL 3: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR14.4MM C Notes to Ba3


U K R A I N E

* KYIV: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Foreign, Local Currency Ratings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

COMMUNISAVE CREDIT: Placed Into Liquidation
HEARTS OF MIDLOTHIAN: Disciplinary Hearing Moved to August 1
HEARTS OF MIDLOTHIAN: Administrators Seek Bidder's Funding Proof
PALLETLINE LOGISTICS: Ceases Trading Following CVA Deal
SOUTHWICK FOOTBALL: Club Relegated After Liquidation

SWANGLEN FURNITURE: Airsprung Buys Business Out of Liquidation
VEDANTA RESOURCES: Fitch Rates US$350MM Sr. Unsecured Loan 'BB'


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Notes Slowdown in EMEA High-Yield Bond Issuance
* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 15 to July 19, 2013


                            *********


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


* BULGARIA: Moody's Revises Bond, Deposit Ceilings
--------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has adjusted the local-currency bond
and deposit ceilings, and the foreign-currency bond and deposit
ceilings of Bulgaria, Israel and Lithuania. The sovereign ratings
of these countries are unaffected by these changes.

The ceilings relate to the highest rating that can be assigned to
a domestic issuer in these countries, or to a structured finance
security backed by local currency receivables. The changes are as
follows:

Bulgaria

Moody's has adjusted the long-term foreign and local-currency
bond ceilings to A3 from Aa3. The ceiling for local-currency
deposits has been adjusted to A3 from Baa2, while the foreign-
currency deposit ceiling remains unchanged at Baa2. The short-
term foreign-currency bond ceiling has been changed to P-2 from
P-1. The short-term foreign-currency deposit ceiling remains
unchanged at P-2.

Israel

Moody's has adjusted the long-term foreign-currency bond and
local-currency bond ceilings to Aa3 from Aa1. The long-term
local-currency deposit ceiling has been adjusted to Aa3 from Aa2.
The long-term foreign-currency deposit ceiling remains unchanged
at A1. The short-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings
remain unchanged at P-1.

Lithuania

Moody's has adjusted the long-term foreign-currency bond ceiling
to A2 from Aa2 and the ceiling for local-currency bonds and
deposits have also been adjusted to A2 from Aa1. The foreign-
currency deposit ceiling remains unchanged at Baa1. The short-
term foreign currency bond and deposit ceilings remain unchanged
at P-1 and P-2, respectively.

Ratings Rationale:

Rationale For Change In Ceilings

Moody's has adjusted country ceilings to better reflect the
linkages between the different sectors in the economy and to
better capture the default correlation between the government and
private-sector borrowers. These adjustments have been taken under
Moody's methodology "Local-Currency Country Risk Ceiling for
Bonds and Other Local Currency Obligations", re-published on
March 15, 2013 and initially published in August 2012. As a
result, the rating agency has aligned country ceilings more
closely with the government bond ratings.

The ceiling encapsulates elements of the economic, financial,
political, and legal risks in a country, including political
instability, the risk of government intervention, the risk of
systemic economic disruption, severe financial instability risks,
currency redenomination, and natural disasters among other
factors. These factors need to be incorporated into the ratings
of even the strongest domestic issuers. The ceiling caps the
credit rating of all issuers and transactions with material
exposure to those risks -- in other words, it affects all
domestic issuers and transactions other than those whose assets
and revenues are sourced from or located outside of the country,
or which benefit from an external credit support.

Bulgaria

Moody's decision to adjust the local and foreign currency country
ceilings for Bulgaria is based on assessment of the moderate
economic strength and moderate susceptibility of event risks.
Moody's decision to adjust the country ceilings for Bulgaria also
takes into account the country's currency board arrangement,
which limits the central bank's lender of last resort function.
Moody's has adjusted the local-currency ceilings to better
capture the country's systemic risk and the default correlation
between the government and private-sector borrowers.

Moody's rates Bulgaria's government debt at Baa2 with a stable
outlook. The government rating is underpinned by the country's
moderate economic and institutional strength, as well as high
financial strength, which contribute to the moderate
susceptibility to event risk. The economy's reliance on natural
resource-based exports is high but declining, which should
improve the economy's stability and reduce its pro-cyclicality
over time. Institutional capacity was strengthened in the process
of accession to the European Union, which Bulgaria joined in
2007, and the macroeconomic policy framework has been fairly
predictable for some time. Bulgaria's government effectiveness
and the rule of law score low relative to the European average.
Moody's assessment incorporates both the progress already made as
well as the ongoing challenges to improving the rule of law.

In terms of the government's financial strength, debt remains
very low by any standard. A new fiscal rule has been approved
that assures the continuation of low deficits and relatively
small government. In 2012, Bulgaria was removed from the
Excessive Deficit Procedure that it had been in since 2010, owing
to the country's success in bringing its budget deficit-to-GDP
ratio below 3% in 2011. Susceptibility to event risk is moderate
(instead of low) owing to the euroization of the economy and the
currency peg, which drive financial risk, and the economy's and
banking system's close ties with Greece, which drive economic
event risk. The electorate has become increasingly disgruntled
with austerity measures, and voter disenchantment has been
expressed through street demonstrations in recent months.
Although such public pressure may slow the pace of fiscal
consolidation and force early parliamentary elections, all the
major parties remain committed to prudent fiscal policies.

Israel

Moody's has adjusted the local and foreign-currency country
ceilings for Israel to better capture the country's systemic risk
and the default correlation between the government and private-
sector borrowers.

Moody's rates the government of Israel at A1 with a stable
outlook. The country's resilient growth model is based on a
diversified high-tech export sector, an industry that benefits
from a well-educated population and substantial investment in
research and development, sourced both from the private and the
public sectors. A culture of entrepreneurship and a robust
venture capital industry have furthermore enabled Israeli
companies to effectively monetize innovation.

At the same time, Israel's economic strength is constrained by
low levels of educational attainment and earnings potential among
a sizeable proportion of the country's fast-growing Arab and
ultra-Orthodox communities. Maintaining and improving
productivity performance over the longer term will therefore
depend on the government's ability to raise educational and
living standards for poor households and integrating them into
the labor force. The flexibility of the Israeli economy is again
being tested by the ongoing euro area debt crisis and the
concurrent slowdown in the global economy.

Israel's institutional strength is assessed as high by Moody's,
reflecting its high scores for government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption,
indicators for which Israel ranks slightly above or at the 'A'
category median according to international surveys. By contrast,
Israel scores very low relative to its peers and in absolute
terms for political stability/absence of violence. This ranking
reflects the unstable security situation caused by the ongoing
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and by Israel's difficult
relationship with some of its neighbors as well as its volatile
coalition politics. These factors also explain Israel's moderate
susceptibility to event risk; its financial and economic event
risk is deemed to be low.

Lithuania

Moody's decision to adjust the local and foreign currency country
ceilings for Lithuania is based on assessment of the moderate
economic strength and the low susceptibility of event risks. This
assessment also incorporates the limitations of the lender of
last resort function of the central bank due to the currency
board arrangement currently in place. At the same time, the
assessment captures the institutional improvements that come with
the accession to the European Union and eventually the Euro area.
The adjustment to the local-currency ceilings has been taken to
better capture the country's systemic risk and the default
correlation between the government and private-sector borrowers.

Moody's rates Lithuania's government debt at Baa1 with a stable
outlook. The economy has recovered strongly in 2011 and growth
has averaged around 5% over the past two years, registering some
of the strongest growth in the EU. Moody's assessment of high
institutional strength reflects the progress made in
strengthening the country's public administration and
policymaking over the past decade and the consensus amongst
various stakeholders towards adopting the euro in 2015.

Lithuania's susceptibility to event risk continues to diminish
with the reduction in its external vulnerabilities since 2009, as
evidenced by the rapid decrease in the current account deficit
and the decline in financial stress. Moreover, the banking sector
has been consolidated and around 90% of the system is now owned
by foreign banks. In particular, the Nordic banks that own the
major Lithuanian banks continue to view Lithuania as their home
markets and Moody's expects them to provide liquidity and capital
support to their subsidiaries in a time of stress.



=============
D E N M A R K
=============


* DENMARK: Moody's Says Outlook for Banking System Remains Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
The outlook for Denmark's banking system remains negative, as it
has been since November 2008, says Moody's Investors Service in a
new report entitled "Banking System Outlook: Denmark."

Over the outlook period, the system's low profitability and
reduced earnings quality will restrict the banking system's
ability to absorb any further weakening of asset quality or other
earnings shocks, and constrain the banks' ability to build
capital to support their future growth.

Moody's expects weak GDP growth of between 0%-1% for Denmark in
2013 and any recovery is likely to be gradual and fragile after
four years of economic stagnation. Weak growth will reduce credit
demand and limit the likelihood of a recovery in private
consumption. The low economic growth both domestically and in key
export markets will continue to exert pressure on the corporate
sector, while high household debt and the uncertainties in the
housing market will negatively impact the quality of lending to
households. Moody's sees a risk that problem loans will increase
further over the outlook period, following the increase to 3.7%
of total lending in 2012 from 3.5% in 2011.

Low credit demand, impacting both interest and fee income,
combined with low interest rates, high loan losses and increased
levels of capital and liquidity, will continue to suppress the
banks' profitability over the outlook period. While Moody's sees
some improving trends in the sector, as well as an increasing
differentiation in financial performance between the Danish banks
in the recent period, it does not regard the earnings outlook as
stable and notes that the system's continued high dependence on
bond-investor confidence exacerbates the risks stemming from weak
financial performance. The sector's reliance on market funding,
specifically covered bonds, will thus remain a credit weakness in
light of the continued fragile credit markets and the weak
financial performance of Danish banks.

Weak earnings will also result in limited capacity for internal
capital generation and dividend distributions, although Tier 1
capital ratios are now in line with similarly-rated European
banks. Measured by the cost-to-income ratio, Danish banks are
largely in line with other systems and the potential to
significantly increase profitability in the near term through
increased cost efficiency seems limited.

Moody's ratings for Danish financial institutions already
incorporate some room to accommodate further negative stress,
derived from the factors described in this report, such that
ratings for some of the larger banks retain stable outlooks.
Nevertheless, Moody's negative outlook for the banking system as
a whole indicates its view that, on average, the creditworthiness
of rated financial institutions in Denmark is more likely to
deteriorate than to remain unchanged or to improve over the next
12-18 months.



===========
F R A N C E
===========


DEXIA SA: France May Face Further Losses From Bailout
-----------------------------------------------------
Hugh Carnegy at The Financial Times reports that France has to
date lost EUR6.6 billion through the bailout of Dexia, the
Franco-Belgian bank that was one of the biggest victims of the
financial crisis, and may face further losses, according to an
official report highly critical of the handling of the bank's
collapse.

According to the FT, the Cour des Comptes, France's national
auditor, said the failure of Dexia, three times bailed out by the
French and Belgian authorities, showed the need for the eurozone
to accelerate its plans to establish a single banking supervisor
and resolution authority.

In a hard-hitting report, it also strongly criticized pay-offs
made to the top management sacked in 2008, led by Pierre Richard,
former chief executive and chairman at the time of the collapse,
and the lack of action taken against them, the FT discloses.

"Dexia's case illustrates the absolute necessity to improve
banking supervision and resolution mechanisms in Europe," the FT
quotes Didier Migaud, head of the Cour des Comptes, as saying.
"The serious deficiencies in Dexia's management, and the
resulting substantial cost for taxpayers, should have led to a
probe and sanctions."

The report attacked shareholders, directors, managers and
national bank regulators of Dexia for their role in its
bankruptcy, the FT notes.  The bank was felled in 2008 as it was
no longer able to fund its EUR650 billion balance sheet,
including a EUR125 billion exposure to US subprime property
assets, which relied heavily on short-term finance, the FT
recounts.

The FT relates that the report said the board failed to
anticipate the risks attached to Dexia's strategy of rapid growth
after the first appearance of liquidity issues in 2007, singling
out France's Caisse des Depots et Consignations, the "armed wing"
of the finance ministry that held France's minority shareholding,
for being "very withdrawn".

France, Belgium and Luxembourg were forced to inject EUR6.5
billion in to Dexia -- at the time the world's biggest municipal
lender -- in 2008, but had to stump up a further EUR90 billion in
state guarantees to keep it afloat when it was hit by the
European sovereign debt crisis of 2011, the FT states.  A final
bailout was agreed last December when France and Belgium put up a
further EUR5.5 billion capital injection, the FT recounts.

According to the FT, the Cour des Comptes said the total loss to
date to French taxpayers -- it did not estimate the cost to
Belgium -- amounted to EUR6.6 billion.  But it warned that a
"much longer horizon" was likely to be required to complete a
run-off of its residual assets than the date of 2020 approved by
the European Commission when it gave the green light to the
rescue plan, the FT notes.

"There remains a substantial risk of the need for (further)
recapitalization," the FT quotes the report as saying.

It said the responsibility of Dexia's management for the collapse
had not been investigated "either by the new management, the
shareholders or by the states".

Dexia SA is a Belgium-based banking group with activities
principally in Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Turkey in the
fields of retail and commercial banking, public and wholesale
banking, asset management and investor services.  In France,
Dexia Bank focuses on funding public sector bodies and providing
financial services to local government.  In Luxembourg, Dexia
operates in two main areas: commercial banking (for personal and
professional customers) and private banking (for international
investors).  In Turkey, Dexia is involved in retail and
commercial banking and offers services to ordinary account
holders, business and local public sector customers and
institutional clients. The Company operates through its
subsidiaries, such as Dexia Credit Local, DenizBank, Dexia
Credicop, Dexia Sabadell, Dexia Kommunalbank Deutschland, Dexia
Asset Management, among others.


MAISONS DU MONDE: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' CCR; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' preliminary
long-term corporate credit rating to France-based decoration and
furniture retailer Magnolia (BC) S.A. (Maisons du Monde).  The
outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B+' issue rating to Maisons
du Monde's proposed EUR60 million super senior RCF, one notch
higher than the corporate credit rating on the company.  The
recovery rating on the proposed RCF is '2', indicating S&P's
expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

S&P also assigned its preliminary 'B' issue rating to its
proposed EUR325 million senior secured notes, in line with the
corporate credit rating.  The recovery rating is '3', indicating
S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event
of a payment default.

The preliminary ratings reflect S&P's assumption that in the next
few months, the private equity fund Bain Capital will acquire 90%
of Maisons du Monde, with management owning the remainder.  They
also factor in S&P's belief that the company will refinance its
outstanding debt and partially finance its acquisition by
completing the followings steps:

   -- Issuing EUR325 million of senior secured notes maturing in
      2020.

   -- Signing a EUR60 million RCF maturing in 2019 (undrawn at
      closing).

   -- Issuing about EUR300 million of noncash interest paying
      instruments.

   -- Repaying its existing debt, which stood at EUR469 million
      at year-end 2012 on a reported gross basis.

The preliminary ratings on Maisons du Monde also reflect S&P's
view of the company's "highly leveraged" financial profile and
"fair" business profile.

Maisons du Monde's sizable debt and limited free operating cash
flows (FOCF) constrain S&P's assessment of its financial risk
profile.  Pro forma for the refinancing, S&P expects the adjusted
debt-to-EBITDA and EBITDA-to-cash interest ratios to reach about
5.5x and 2.3x respectively at year-end 2013, or about 8x and 1.8x
if we include the noncash interest paying instruments.  In S&P's
view, reported FOCF should remain close to zero at least over the
next 12 months since the company is investing heavily--S&P
forecasts that the reported capital expenditure-to-revenue ratio
will reach about 10% in 2013, a level well above the average of
the retail sector.  S&P calculates adjusted debt of roughly
EUR0.8 billion at year-end, of which EUR0.3 billion of notes,
EUR0.2 billion of operating leases (applying a discount rate of
8% to the operating lease schedule provided by management), and
EUR0.3 billion of noncash interest paying instruments.

"Our assessment of the business risk profile factors in our view
that Maisons du Monde outperforms an industry pressurized by
adverse economic conditions.  We consider the French decoration
and furniture markets to be fragmented and sensitive to decline
in disposable income and real estate volumes.  While most players
struggle, Maisons du Monde exhibits strong revenue growth rates
and adjusted EBITDA margins fluctuating between 15% and 20%.  The
company has been steadily gaining market shares, which stood at
2.6% in France for 2012, thanks to an attractive offering, above-
average operating efficiency, and a good multi-channel strategy.
We believe that Maisons du Monde's business model entails some
degree of fashion and inventory risks, but they have been well-
managed so far," S&P said.

"We forecast that EBITDA generation will improve over the next 12
months, despite a tough operating environment.  Even though we
anticipate a 0.3% contraction of French GDP on a real basis in
2013, we believe that rising online sales and new openings will
support additional market share gains in France and that the
company will successfully expand its international operations.
This should result in high single-digit revenue growth rates and
stable profitability levels.  Excluding noncash interest paying
instruments, the adjusted debt-to-EBITDA and EBITDA-to-cash
interest ratios should gradually move to 5x and 2.5x in our
opinion, unless higher-than-expected investments cause the
company to draw on its RCF.  We note that performances are
seasonal, as Maisons du Monde usually generates more than half of
its EBITDA during the fourth quarter," S&P added.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's view that Maisons du Monde's
future earnings growth, fuelled by market share gains in France
and successful international expansion, should enable the company
to gradually improve credit ratios over time, despite S&P's
expectation of weak free cash flow generation over the next
12 months and a challenging business environment for decoration
and furniture retailers in Europe.

In particular, S&P believes that Maisons du Monde will be able to
post an adjusted EBITDA-to-cash interest of at least 2x in 2013
and an adjusted EBITDA-to-debt ratio of about 5.5x excluding
noncash interest paying instruments, after the implementation of
the new capital structure.

S&P could lower the ratings if the adjusted EBITDA-to-cash
interest ratio were to decline below 2.0x (about 1.5x including
noncash interest paying instruments).  This could occur if growth
failed to materialize, possibly because of tougher-than-expected
operating conditions, increased competition, or a failure to
manage properly fashion and inventory risks.

Though S&P sees it as unlikely over the next 12 months, it could
upgrade Maisons du Monde if the adjusted EBITDA-to-cash interest
ratio exceeded 3.0x (about 2.5x including noncash interest paying
instruments).  This would require a successful implementation of
Maisons du Monde's organic growth strategy, notably in foreign
markets.


VIVARTE: Breaches Bank Loan Conditions; May Need Cash Injection
---------------------------------------------------------------
Anne-Sylvaine Chassany at The Financial Times reports that
Vivarte breached the conditions of its bank loans.

According to the FT, the company has been hit by a deterioration
in trading conditions caused by the country's sluggish economic
growth and recent poor weather.

Its owner, UK-based private equity group Charterhouse Capital
Partners, may need to inject cash into the company to keep its
lenders from trying to seize control, the FT notes.  The buyout
group recently extended Vivarte's loans so they will not mature
until 2018, the FT recounts.  The FT relates that people with
knowledge of the matter said it is now willing to seek more
breathing room on the terms of the company's loans in another
round of negotiations that could start as soon as this autumn.

Charterhouse bought Vivarte in a deal worth EUR3.3 billion
including debt in 2007, investing about EUR500 million of its own
equity into the transaction -- or 12.5% of the EUR4 billion
buyout fund it manages, the FT discloses.

Vivarte's chief executive, Marc Lelandais, told the FT that the
company, which has EUR2.2 billion of net debt, has breached its
so-called quarterly leverage ratio covenant in May, because
operating profit was lower than expected.  The company has enough
cash to meet its debt repayment obligations next year and in
2015, the FT sates.

If a company breaches a covenant, it gives them certain rights,
including, in some cases, the theoretical right to request full
repayment, the FT notes.  In the case of Vivarte, the company can
wait until the next covenant check, at the end of August, the FT
says.  If it passes the test, the previous breach is deemed
"cured", the FT states.  If it does not, Charterhouse has to
inject cash to help meet the covenant -- in a so-called equity
cure, the FT discloses.  On the basis of the May test, the
private equity house may need to add about EUR17 million, the FT
says, citing a person with knowledge of the matter.

Vivarte is a French fashion retailer.  It is the owner of
numerous fashion and shoe retail chains in France, including
Kookai, Andre and Naf Naf.



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


CONERGY AG: Kawa Capital to Take Over Following Bankruptcy
----------------------------------------------------------
Nicholas Brautlecht at Bloomberg News reports that U.S. private-
equity firm Kawa Capital Management Inc. agreed to take over
Conergy AG, two weeks after the company filed for bankruptcy.

According to BankruptcyLaw360's Ama Sarfo, Conergy's management
board, its preliminary insolvency administrator and Kawa signed a
letter of intent Friday, and Conergy said the parties will
finalize the transaction's details and their purchase agreement
in the next four weeks.

Bloomberg relates that Antje Stephan, spokeswoman for Conergy,
said that the transaction, due to be completed in the second half
of August, will focus on Conergy's main brand and most global
sales and service activities.  She didn't disclose the price.  It
will exclude module production activities, which in the last two
years have become a secondary business for Conergy, Bloomberg
notes.

Conergy and its domestic counterparts are under pressure as
subsidies for renewable energy fall at home and competition from
China depresses margins and panel prices, Bloomberg discloses.

Ms. Stephan, as cited by Bloomberg, said Conergy produces only
about half of the modules it sells, and has been focused on
planning, servicing and financing solar farms.

"Kawa is our preferred partner," and the initial accord follows
months of talks following an agreement "a long time ago" on
strategy, Conergy Chief Executive Officer Philip Comberg, as
cited by Bloomberg, said in a statement.  "In the last two years,
we have consistently focused Conergy on our strengths in
international sales and services.  We want to sustainably
implement this downstream strategy in the international solar
markets with a strong financial and strategic partner."

Ms. Stephan said that the planned transaction affects 670 of
Conergy's 1,200 employees, many of which will be able to keep
their jobs, without giving details, Bloomberg relates.  The fate
of the 530 production jobs will be determined by negotiations
between the insolvency administrator and potential investors,
Bloomberg discloses.

Conergy filed for insolvency on July 5 and stopped its module
production in Frankfurt an der Oder near the Polish border after
a delay in payments from a large project and the failure of
executives to bridge the financial gap, Bloomberg recounts.

Conergy said in a separate statement that manufacturing at its
insolvent Conergy SolarModule GmbH & Co. KG will resume on
Systems GmbH in Rangsdorf near Berlin continue, Bloomberg notes.

Conergy's sales last year dropped 37% to EUR473.5 million while
the net loss widened to EUR99 million, Bloomberg discloses.

Conergy AG is a Hamburg-based solar panel manufacturer.


FAENZA GMBH: Moody's Assigns First-Time 'B2' Corp. Family Rating
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Services' assigned a B2 corporate family rating
and B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to Faenza GmbH.
Faenza is an intermediate holding company established for the
purpose of acquiring CeramTec GmbH and certain affiliated
entities through its subsidiary Faenza Acquisition GmbH.

Concurrently, Moody's has assigned provisional (P)Ba3 ratings
with an loss given default (LGD) assessment of LGD3 (32%) to the
proposed senior secured credit facilities to be issued by Faenza
Acquisition GmbH, including EUR650 million equivalent of senior
secured term loans due 2020 and a EUR100 million senior secured
revolving credit facility due 2018. In addition, Moody's has
assigned (P)Caa1 (LGD5, 86%) ratings to the proposed EUR307
million of senior unsecured notes due 2021 to be issued by Faenza
GmbH. The outlook on the ratings is stable. This is the first
time Moody's has publicly rated Faenza and Faenza Acquisition
GmbH.

Moody's issues provisional instrument ratings in advance of the
final sale of securities and these reflect the rating agency's
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a conclusive
review of the final documentation, Moody's will endeavor to
assign definitive instrument ratings. A definitive rating may
differ from a provisional rating.

The assignment of definitive ratings is also subject to the
closing of the sale of CeramTec and certain affiliated entities
to private equity firm Cinven Partners LLP. On June 15, 2013,
Cinven signed a definitive agreement to acquire German-based
CeramTec from US-based chemical company Rockwood Specialties
Group, Inc.

"The B2 rating assigned to Faenza balances the group's modest
scale, the product and customer concentration in its medical
applications business unit and high expected leverage at the
closing of the transaction, with its solid market positions in
its niche of high-performance ceramics materials and products,
and good historical operating performance," says Kathrin
Heitmann, a Moody's Assistant Vice President - Analyst and lead
analyst for Faenza.

Ratings Rationale:

The B2 CFR assigned to Faenza primarily reflects the group's
modest scale (EUR425 million in revenues in 2012), product and
customer concentration in its medical applications business unit
and high expected leverage at the closing of the transaction, of
around 7.3x adjusted debt/EBITDA based on a pro-forma reported
EBITDA of EUR136 million. The rating also reflects that the high
interest expense associated with the new debt instruments will
weigh on Faenza's future free cash flow (FCF) generation, which
Moody's expects to be positive but modest compared with the
group's outstanding debt. In addition, the rating considers the
fairly lenient terms of the new debt instruments, which, for
instance, allow for incremental term loans or revolving credit
facility commitments of an amount equal to around EUR136 million,
plus additional amounts as long as on a pro-forma basis the
maximum senior secured net leverage ratio of 4.75x is satisfied
(around 4.7x at closing).

More positively, the B2 CFR benefits from Faenza's established
position in its niche of high-performance ceramics (HPC)
materials and products. In its medical applications business unit
(34% of 2012 revenues), the group occupies an entrenched position
as the global leading supplier of ceramic components for ceramic
hip joint implants, supplying all of the five leading global hip
implant system manufacturers. In addition, the group enjoys solid
market positions for high-performance ceramics used in industrial
applications (66% of 2012 revenues) for the automotive,
electronics, textile and construction industries.

Industrial applications add to the diversity of the group's
revenue and profit base and mitigate the customer and product
portfolio concentration present in its medical applications
business unit thanks to a broad product portfolio in industrial
applications.

The CFR also considers the group's good historical operating
performance, evidenced by Moody's-adjusted EBITDA margins of
around 29%-32% and positive free cash flow generation in the
period 2010-12. This performance was supported by higher and more
stable reported EBITDA margins and cash conversion ratios at
Faenza's medical applications business unit compared with the
group's more cyclical and capital-intensive industrial
applications activities.

Future headwinds on Faenza's operating performance could stem
from the risk of product substitution, pricing pressure as well
as increases in raw material costs and energy costs.
Consequently, the group is required to continuously improve
product efficiency in order to protect profit margins. In
addition, the rating considers the group's exposure to product
liability claims in its medical applications business unit.
However, as a component supplier, Faenza is less exposed to
product liability risk than the hip joint implant system
manufacturers. In addition, Moody's understands that Faenza is
currently not exposed to litigation cases that could have a
material impact on the group's operating performance.

Rationale For Stable Outlook

The stable rating outlook reflects Moody's expectation that
Faenza will maintain stable operating performance and will reduce
adjusted gross leverage to around 6.5x debt/EBITDA over the next
12-18 months with visibility that the group will make further
progress in deleveraging towards 6.0x . Leverage reduction is
expected to be the result of revenue and EBITDA growth and excess
cash flow being applied to debt reduction.

Liquidity

Faenza's ratings are supported by the company's good short-term
liquidity profile. This is characterized by (1) EUR15 million of
cash on the balance sheet expected at the closing of the
transaction; (2) the presence of the new EUR100 million five-year
revolving credit facility, which Moody's expects to be undrawn at
closing; and (3) the rating agency's expectation that the group
will generate positive free cash flow over the next 12 to 18
months. Faenza's internal cash sources should fund all its basic
cash requirements over the next 12-18 months. In addition,
Moody's notes that the senior secured credit facilities agreement
contains a cash flow sweep, which requires that 50% of annual
excess cash flow is applied to debt reduction starting December
31, 2014 if first lien leverage is above 4.0x.

Moody's has not anticipated material dividends paid to equity
holders or debt-financed acquisitions in its assessment of the
company.

Structural Considerations

Faenza's rated debt will benefit from guarantees from all
material group entities representing at least 80% of the group's
EBITDA and consolidated assets.

The EUR650 million equivalent of senior secured term loans and
the EUR100 million revolving credit facility, to be issued by
Faenza Acquisition GmbH, will benefit from share pledges and
asset pledges of all material operating subsidiaries. The (P)Ba3
(LGD3, 32%) rating on these senior secured instruments reflects
their priority position in the group's capital structure and the
benefit of the loss absorption provided by the unsecured debt
below it.

The EUR307 million of senior unsecured notes, to be issued by
Faenza GmbH, share the same guarantors with the senior secured
credit facilities but do not benefit from any security, which is
reflected in the (P)Caa1 (LGD5, 86%) rating on the notes.

Moody's assumes that shareholder funding into the top holding
company of the restricted group, Faenza GmbH, will be in the form
of common equity.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Moody's could downgrade the rating as a result of (1) weakening
operating performance; (2) loss of market share; (3) product
recalls; (4) large debt-financed acquisitions that result in
higher leverage, such that EBITA/interest approaches 1.0x and
debt/EBITDA exceeds 6.5x by end of 2014; or (5) negative free
cash flow generation.

Conversely, Moody's could upgrade the rating if the company is
able to deleverage such that its debt/EBITDA approaches 5.0x and
its FCF/debt is sustainably around 5%.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Medical Product and Device Industry published in October 2012.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

German-based Faenza GmbH (B2 stable) is an intermediate holding
company and the indirect parent of CeramTec GmbH and certain
affiliated entities. CeramTec designs and manufactures high-
performance ceramics (HPC) materials primarily for medical
applications (ceramic components for hip joint implants) as well
as industrial applications used in the automobile, electronics,
textile and construction industries, among others. CeramTec GmbH
generated revenues of EUR425 million in fiscal year ending
December 31, 2012. The group generates around 75% of its
consolidated revenues in Europe (31% of which in Germany).


PRAKTIKER AG: Bond Holders Want to Convert EUR250MM Into Shares
---------------------------------------------------------------
Reuters reports that hedge funds holding bonds in insolvent
German DIY retailer Praktiker AG want to convert a EUR250 million
($327 million) bond into Praktiker shares, their representative
said on July 18.

That means the bondholders are effectively targeting a takeover
of the group, Germany's third biggest home-improvement chain,
whose blue and yellow-branded stores selling paints, tools and
gardening products are a familiar sight in Germany's out-of-town
shopping centres, according to Reuters.

"There's a group of four or five investors coming together," Ingo
Scholz, representative of the bond holders, told Reuters. "They
are prepared to help the group out of its crisis."

Reuters relates that Mr. Scholz said the bondholders' plan,
however, rested on banks agreeing not to separately sell the more
successful Max Bahr brand. The hedge funds invested in the bond
want to continue Praktiker with around 200 stores, but under the
Max Bahr brand, the report relays.

"The Praktiker brand is tarnished," Reuters quotes Mr. Scholz as
saying.

Separately, Reuters reports that a spokesman for the insolvency
administrator for Praktiker, Udo Groener, said there had been
interest in parts of the group from rivals and financial
investors.

However, the aim was to sell Praktiker as a whole.

"No one should just be able to pick out the best morsels,"
Mr. Scholz told Reuters.

Praktiker filed for insolvency last week after talks with
creditors failed, triggering fears of heavy job losses. The
insolvency administrators are continuing to keep the business
running while they review options for the chain, a household name
in Germany.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on July 15,
2013, Bloomberg News said Praktiker AG filed for insolvency after
the sale of a division collapsed, and said it will focus on
restructuring the business. According to Bloomberg, Praktiker
said units that own the Praktiker and Extra-Bau+Hobby stores and
online outlets applied at Hamburg's local court for protection
from creditors.  The company said the Max Bahr chain won't be
affected by the insolvency move, Bloomberg noted.

Praktiker AG is a German home-improvement retailer.


SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS: Moody's Gives (P)B3 Corp Family Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)B3
corporate family rating  to BLITZ 13-347 GmbH, the holding
company within the ring-fenced group (as defined in the draft
senior facilities agreement (SFA)) for Springer Science+Business
Media, a leading international publisher and provider of
publishing services.

Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a (P)B2 rating with a loss
given default assessment of LGD3 (33%) to the senior secured debt
whose lead borrower is BLITZ 13-253 GmbH (a wholly owned and
fully guaranteed subsidiary of BLITZ 13-347 GmbH). The ratings
outlook is stable.

Moody's has assigned the following instrument ratings:

BLITZ 13-253 GmbH (the lead borrower of the senior secured debt
facilities)

- EUR1.770 billion equivalent of Term Loan B (TLB): (P)B2

- EUR150 million of RCF: (P)B2

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect Moody's preliminary
credit opinion regarding the transaction only. The provisional
ratings in this case reflect Moody's assumptions about key terms,
including the alignment of the restricted payment tests within
the restricted group. Upon a conclusive review of the final
documentation, Moody's will endeavor to assign a definitive
rating to the Notes. A definitive rating may differ from a
provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale:

The (P)B3 CFR for BLITZ 13-347 GmbH is constrained by: (i) the
significant group leverage at transaction closing; (ii) modest
free cash flow generation; (iii) negative historical track record
in the Professional and Science, Technology and Medicine German-
language divisions of Springer and expectation that the operating
environment for these divisions will remain challenging; (iv)
moderate organic revenue growth reported by the company over
recent years; and (v) a degree of medium term uncertainty
regarding the further developments in Open Access (OA)
publishing.

However, the CFR also considers: (i) Springer's strong and
defensible market position; (ii) the resilience of the STM market
and the must-have nature of the Springer's core product offering
the company relative stability and good revenue visibility; (iii)
ongoing improvements in the quality and content of the STM
portfolio; (iv) early positioning in the Open Access market and
hitherto successful eBook initiative; and (v) expectation that
the global STM academic and scientific market will continue to
grow over the coming years, driven in particular by emerging
market growth for which the company appears well positioned.

BLITZ 13-347 GmbH's leverage will remain high following the
introduction of a new capital structure with Moody's adjusted
Debt/EBITDA estimated at around 7.4x (including the EUR94.7
million of shareholder loans from former owners as debt).
However, the ratings assigned are forward-looking and incorporate
an assumption that de-leveraging will occur, consistent with the
description of the rating drivers. Springer's business plan
envisages a degree of de-leveraging from EBITDA improvements and
modest free cash flow generation. Leverage will remain elevated
in the near-term and the de-leveraging process might well be
slower than currently envisaged, depending on revenue
development.

EUR1.77 billion of the first lien senior secured TLB (due 2020)
and the EUR150 million of revolving credit facility (RCF; due
2020) have been ranked highest in priority of claims. The (P)B2
rating (with a loss given default (LGD) assessment of LGD 3-33%),
for first lien senior secured TLB and the RCF reflects their
secured interest in a material portion of the assets of the
restricted group. The secured term loan and RCF will be
guaranteed by members of the Restricted Group accounting for 80%
of consolidated EBITDA and gross assets.

The (P)B2 instruments ratings for the senior secured debt are one
notch higher than the (P)B3 CFR largely due to the presence of
contractually subordinated High Yield notes of EUR640 million
(due 2021; unrated by Moody's) in the capital structure issued by
BLITZ 13-252 GmbH. In addition to non-financial liabilities, the
LGD waterfall (as well as the CFR) include EUR94.7 million of
shareholder loans which are effectively a pass-through of vendor
debt.

Liquidity:

Moody's believes that Springer has an adequate liquidity position
given the presence of a EUR150 million RCF, which Moody's
considers adequate to manage the group's working capital
requirements. However, Moody's notes that EUR35 million of the
RCF remains drawn at transaction closing and Springer has no
additional cash on its balance sheet except the drawn revolver
amount. The US$1.553 billion of term loan facility has a 1%
scheduled amortization payable in equal quarterly installment. An
excess cash flow sweep mechanism has also been built into the
SFA. Given the very high leverage, free cash flow generation will
be sensitive to actual interest rate margins achieved. The
revolver has a leverage based maintenance financial covenant
which will only be tested should the RCF be drawn 30% or more.
There are no other maintenance financial covenants under the SFA.

Outlook:

A stable ratings outlook is based on Moody's expectation that
Springer will pursue a de-leveraging strategy and that its
current business plan appears broadly achievable. Failure to
achieve this deleveraging will lead to ratings pressure.

What Could Change The Rating Up/ Down

Upward pressure could be exerted on the ratings once (i) Springer
is able to reduce its leverage to around or below 6.0x Gross
Debt/ EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) on a sustained basis; and
(ii) continues to generate positive free cash flow generation.

On the contrary, downward pressure could be exerted on the
ratings should (i) leverage remain at or above 7.0x Gross Debt to
EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) at the end of 2014, (ii) material
deterioration occur in the operating performance; (iii) free cash
flow generation fall towards zero; and/or (iv) any other factors
emerge with a negative impact on liquidity.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Publishing Industry published in December 2011. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

BLITZ 13-347 GmbH is the ultimate holding company of the ring-
fenced group (as defined in the draft senior facilities
agreement) for Springer, a leading international publisher and
provider of publishing services. In 2012, Springer recorded
EUR981.1 million in revenues and EUR348.5 million in EBITDA
(before corporate, disposals and consolidation costs).



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ALPSTAR CLO 2: S&P Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Alpstar CLO 2 PLC's class A1, AR, B, C, and D notes.  At the same
time, S&P has lowered its rating on the class E notes and has
affirmed its rating on the class A2 notes.

The rating actions follows S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the May 2, 2013 trustee report.

"We subjected the capital structure to our cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) for each class of
notes at each rating level.  In our analysis, we used the
reported portfolio balance that we consider to be performing
(EUR523,295,817), the current weighted-average spread (3.76%),
and the weighted-average recovery rates that we considered
appropriate.  We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using alternative default patterns and levels, in conjunction
with different interest and currency stress scenarios," S&P said.

Since S&P's June 14, 2012 review, the portfolio's credit quality
has remained stable.  However, S&P has observed that the scenario
default rates (SDRs) at each rating level have decreased
following a reduction in the transaction's weighted-average life
to
4.65 years from 4.88 years at S&P's previous review.

S&P's weighted-average recovery rate assumptions have increased
due to a reduction in subordinated loans in the portfolio.  S&P
has also observed an increase in the weighted-average spread.
These developments have led to an increase in the BDR at each
tranche rating level.

The results of S&P's credit and cash flow analysis indicate that
the class A1, AR, B, C, and D notes' available credit enhancement
is now commensurate with higher ratings.  S&P has therefore
raised its ratings on these classes of notes.

S&P considers the available credit enhancement for the class A2
notes still to be commensurate with the currently assigned
rating, taking into account the results of S&P's credit and cash
flow analysis.  S&P has therefore affirmed its 'AA+ (sf)' rating
on the class A2 notes.

The application of the largest obligor test constrains S&P's
rating on the class E notes following a reduction in the
aggregate collateral balance.  This is a supplemental stress test
that S&P introduced in its 2009 corporate collateralized debt
obligations criteria.  Therefore, S&P has lowered to 'CCC+ (sf)'
from 'B (sf)' its rating on the class E notes.

Alpstar CLO 2 is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms.  The transaction closed in April 2007 and is
managed by Chenavari Financial Group Ltd.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class        Rating          Rating
             To              From

Alpstar CLO 2 PLC
EUR600 Million Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A1           AAA (sf)        AA+ (sf)
AR           AAA (sf)        AA+ (sf)
B            AA- (sf)        A (sf)
C            A- (sf)         BBB (sf)
D            BB+ (sf)        BB (sf)

Rating Lowered

E            CCC+ (sf)       B (sf)

Rating Affirmed

A2           AA+ (sf)


CELTIC RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Affirms Ba3 Ratings on Two Tranches
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of five
senior notes and upgraded the rating of one senior note in four
Irish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions:
Celtic Residential Mortgages Securitization No. 9 PLC (Celtic 9),
Celtic Residential Mortgages Securitization No. 10 PLC (Celtic
10), Celtic Residential Mortgages Securitization No. 11 PLC
(Celtic 11) and Celtic Residential Mortgages Securitization No.
12 LIMITED (Celtic 12).

The rating action concludes the reviews of the affected notes
placed on review for downgrade on September 12, 2012 due to
insufficient credit enhancement to address sovereign risk,
following the lowering of the Irish country ceiling to A3.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating confirmations of senior notes in Celtic 9, 10, 11 and
12 has been primarily driven by sufficient credit enhancement to
address sovereign risk as well as the deterioration in collateral
performance. Furthermore, Moody's has upgraded the class A2 notes
in Celtic 12 to a level where the available credit enhancement is
sufficient to compensate for increased sovereign risk and
deterioration in collateral performance. For that particular
class of notes, Moody's thinks that the risk of switching from
the current sequential amortization of the class A2 and A3 notes
to pro-rata is remote due to the de-leveraging of the
transaction. Indeed it is at the occurrence of an enforcement
event (e.g. missed payment of interest or principal) that the
current sequential amortization would switch to pro-rata.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement that
drives these rating actions reflects the introduction of
additional factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the
impact of sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
Local Currency Country Risk Ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Irish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating that
Moody's will assign to a domestic Irish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Irish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's has reassessed the collateral performance of the four
transactions. As a result, Moody's has increased its current
lifetime expected loss (EL) assumptions in the cases of Celtic 9,
10 and 12. This increase reflects the recent rise in arrears
which is mainly due to the alignment of the transactions arrears
management to other Celtic transactions. Moody's increased its EL
assumptions in Celtic 9 to 4.90% from 3.60%, in Celtic 10 to
6.50% from 4.80%, in Celtic 12 to 9.10% from 7.30%. Moody's
maintained its EL assumption in Celtic 11 at 3.60%.

Moody's also reassessed the transactions' current MILAN CE
numbers based on the transactions' EL multiples and portfolio
characteristics, such as the estimated portion of negative equity
and indexed loan-to-value ratios. Moody's maintained its MILAN CE
assumptions in Celtic 9 at 27%, in Celtic 10 at 27% and in Celtic
11 at 22%. Moody's increased its assumption in Celtic 12 to 28%
from 26% due to the transaction's relative low EL multiple.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increase portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in May 2013, and
The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines in March 2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: CELTIC RESIDENTIAL IRISH MORTGAGE SECURITISATION NO. 9
PLC

  EUR1067.5M A2 Notes, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on
  Sep 12, 2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: CELTIC RESIDENTIAL IRISH MORTGAGE SECURITISATION NO. 10
PLC

  EUR1253M A2 Notes, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
  2012 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CELTIC RESIDENTIAL IRISH MORTGAGE SECURITISATION NO. 11
PLC

  EUR1388.8M A3a Notes, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on
  Sep 12, 2012 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

  GBP586M A3c Notes, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
  2012 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: CELTIC RESIDENTIAL IRISH MORTGAGE SECURITISATION NO. 12
LIMITED

  EUR487.5M A2 Notes, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep
12,
  2012 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

  EUR1010.685M A3 Notes, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep
  12, 2012 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


FASTNET SECURITIES 2: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A2 Notes to Ba2
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of nine
senior notes in four Irish residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions: Fastnet Securities 2, 3, 6 & 7. At the same
time, Moody's confirmed the rating of three senior note in
Fastnet Securities 8. Insufficiency of credit enhancement to
address sovereign risk and counterparty exposure have prompted
the downgrade.

The rating action concludes the review of eight notes placed on
review on November 15, 2012 pending the incorporation of country
risk exposure across capital structure. This rating action also
concludes the review four notes placed on review on September 12,
2012, following Moody's intention to reassess credit enhancement
adequacy for each of the rated notes, given the increased risk of
economic and financial instability.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk and counterparty exposure.
Moody's confirmed the ratings of securities whose credit
enhancement and structural features provided enough protection
against sovereign and counterparty risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
Local Currency Country Risk Ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Irish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating that
Moody's will assign to a domestic Irish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Irish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The downgrade of Class A notes in Fastnet 2 also reflect the
commingling and set-off risks due to exposure to Pemanent tsb
acting as originator, servicer, collection account bank and
issuer account bank. Moody's has assessed the probability and
effect of a default Permanent tsb on the ability of the issuers
to meet their obligations under the transaction documentation.
The exposure to Permanent tsb is factored in the downgrade of
notes in Fastnet 2. Exposure to Permanent tsb is not a driver of
the rating action in Fastnet 3, 6 and 7.

Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's has not revised collateral performance assumptions
because the transactions perform in line with expectations.
Moody's has maintained its expected loss assumption at 5.9% of
the original pool balance in Fastnet 2, at 14.4% in Fastnet 3, at
11.9% in Fastnet 6, at 22.4% in Fastnet 7 and at 15.6% in Fastnet
8. Moody's has maintained its MILAN assumption at 25.8% in
Fastnet 2, at 45% in Fastnet 3, at 46% in Fastnet 6, at 55% in
Fastnet 7 and at 45% in Fastnet 8.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect The Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in May 2013, and
The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines published in March 2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: Fastnet Securities 2 Plc.

EUR1656M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
2012 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fastnet Securities 3 Ltd

EUR1920M A1 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 15,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR5040M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 15,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Fastnet Securities 6 Ltd

EUR561.6M A1 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov
15, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
Possible Downgrade

EUR559.2M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov
15, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
Possible Downgrade

EUR559.2M A3 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov
15, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Fastnet Securities 7 Ltd

EUR375M A1 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 15,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR375M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 15,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR375M A3 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov 15,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Fastnet securities 8 Ltd

EUR483M A1 Notes, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
2012 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR483M A2 Notes, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
2012 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR483M A3 Notes, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
2012 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


LANSDOWNE MORTGAGES: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. A2 Notes to Ba2
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating action on three Irish
Residential mortgage-backed securities transactions. Moody's
downgraded the rating of one note in Lansdowne Mortgage
Securities No.1 plc. and confirmed the rating of two notes in
Emerald Mortgages No. 4 plc. and Emerald Mortgages No. 5 Limited.
Insufficiency of credit enhancement to address sovereign risk
have prompted the downgrade.

This rating action concludes the review of the two notes placed
on review on September 12, 2012, following Moody's decision to
adjust the Irish country ceiling to A3 on September 6, 2012 and
one note placed on review on November 15, 2012, following Moody's
revision of key collateral assumptions for the entire Irish RMBS
market.

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade primarily reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk. Moody's confirmed the
ratings of securities whose credit enhancement and structural
features provided enough protection against sovereign and
counterparty risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
Local Currency Country Risk Ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Irish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating that
Moody's will assign to a domestic Irish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Irish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Moody's has not revised the key collateral assumptions for any of
the deals. Expected loss assumptions as a percentage of original
pool balance remain at 8% for Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No.
1, 3.4% for Emerald Mortgages No. 4 and 7.7% for Emerald
Mortgages No. 5. The MILAN CE assumptions remain at 70% for
Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 1, 22% for Emerald Mortgages
No. 4 and 30% for Emerald Mortgages No. 5.

Exposure to Counterparty Risk

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the set-off
risk arising from exposure to EBS Ltd (Ba2, NP), acting as
originator in the Emerald Mortgages No. 4 and 5. For Lansdowne
Mortgage Securities No1, Moody's took into consideration the
exposure to Allied Irish Bank plc. (Ba2, NP), acting as issuer
account bank. These exposures do not impact on the rating action.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect The Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework, published in May 2013, and
The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines, published in March 2013.

Other Factors used in these ratings are described in "Approach to
Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance
Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment."

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (1)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (2)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: Emerald Mortgages No. 4 plc.

EUR1428M A Notes, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Emerald Mortgages No. 5 Limited

EUR2375M A Notes, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 15,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Lansdowne Mortgage Securities No. 1 plc.

EUR258M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Sep 12,
2012 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


WATERFORD CASTLE: High Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator
------------------------------------------------------------
Aodhan O'Faolain at Independent.ie reports that the Waterford
Castle Hotel and Golf Course, which employs 80 people, can
continue to trade after the High Court appointed a provisional
liquidator to run the business.

The National Asset Loan Management Ltd. (NALM), a company of
NAMA, petitioned the court to appoint Aiden Murphy as provisional
liquidator over the hotel owners, Newgold Ltd. and Cendant Ltd.,
which owe NALM some EUR33.8 million, Independent.ie relates.

The four-star hotel is located at Little Island Ballinakill,
Waterford.

The court heard that NALM brought the petition to ensure the
facility, which consists of a 19 room hotel, 48 lodges and an 18
hole golf course on a 310 acre site, can continue to trade as a
going concern, Independent.ie discloses.

On Thursday, Ms. Justice Mary Laffoy said she was satisfied to
appoint Mr. Murphy as provisional liquidator to the companies,
Independent.ie notes.  The judge, as cited by Independent.ie,
said that the appointment was in the best interests of the
creditors.

Rossa Fanning BL, for NALM, said both companies are "hopelessly
insolvent," unable to pay their debts and should be wound up,
Independent.ie recounts.  The money is owed to NALM on foot of
guarantees on mortgage agreements entered into between the
companies and AIB in 2007, Independent.ie states.


* IRELAND: Trading Firms Can Create Prospects From Receiverships
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ken Tyrrell at Independent.ie reports that over the past few
years, secured creditors have appointed receivers to take control
of a large number of commercial properties and the trading
businesses operating from these premises.

Secured creditors include banks but also loan buyers, who may
have either purchased a portfolio of loans or individual loans
from de-leveraging banks or other financial institutions,
according to Independent.ie.

The report notes that with the rise of commercial properties in
receivership, there has been an increase in the use of specialist
business operators by receivers to manage the day to day trading
of these businesses.

The report relates that in circumstances, where there is a
'PropCo' (Property company) and 'OpCo' (Operating/Trading
company) structure, there may be merit in the receiver continuing
to trade the business by engaging a specialist operator.

The report says that this means the underlying business trading
from the property may be salvaged and sold to a new purchaser.

This gives the employees the chance to work with a specialist
operator for a period, but ultimately with a view to continuing
employment with the new owner, the report relays.

The report discloses that in turn, continuity of trade by theOpCo
should preserve and possibly enhance the underlying value of
PropCo, maximising the return for the secured creditor and
mitigating against any further impairments in value.

The report says that the operator model concept can be equally
applicable if a receiver is appointed solely over a trading
business or a property, although there are some variations to the
structure of the arrangement.

The use of specialist business managers has become especially
obvious in hotels, pubs, restaurants, convenience/retail stores,
pharmacies, waste management and healthcare, the report notes.

The report says that if a receiver is appointed over a property
and a trading business, which the borrower is no longer able to
trade, the receiver will generally make a decision reasonably
quickly as to whether to continue to trade the business or close
it.

The report relates that that this decision will be based on the
financial performance and trading history of the business and an
assessment of its future trading prospects.  If it is loss-
making, there is little economic sense in continuing to operate
the business, the report notes.

Independent.ie adds that if there is merit in continuing to trade
though, the receiver may then engage a specialist operator to run
the day to day operations.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


CARTESIO SRL: S&P Puts B+ Ratings on 5 Notes on Watch Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch negative
its 'B+ (sf)' credit ratings on the class 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 notes
in Cartesio S.r.l.'s series 2003-1.

The CreditWatch placements follows S&P's July 12, 2013
CreditWatch negative placement of its 'B+' long-term issuer
credit rating (ICR) on Dexia Crediop SpA, one of the
transaction's swap counterparties.  To assess the effect of this
CreditWatch placement on S&P's ratings in the transaction, it has
applied its current counterparty criteria.

As in S&P's previous review of the transaction on Aug. 8, 2012,
its current counterparty criteria links its ratings in the
transaction to its long-term ICR on Dexia Crediop.  Therefore,
following S&P's recent CreditWatch placement of its 'B+' long-
term ICR on Dexia Crediop, S&P has placed on CreditWatch negative
all of its ratings in Cartesio's series 2003-1.

Under S&P's current counterparty criteria, any change to its
long-term ICR on Dexia Crediop would result in an equivalent
change to its ratings in the transaction.  Therefore, the
resolution of CreditWatch placements in this transaction depends
on the resolution of S&P's CreditWatch placement of the long-term
ICR on Dexia Crediop.

Cartesio's series 2003-1 is a medium-term note program, with
receivables represented by payments under lease contracts between
the originator, SAN.IM (a company owned by the region of Lazio)
and certain healthcare entities as collateral.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class    Rating                    Rating
         To                        From

Cartesio S.r.l.
EUR541 Million, GBP200 Million, US$450 Million
Asset-Backed Medium-Term Note Program
Series 2003-1

Ratings Placed On CreditWatch Negative

1        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg         B+ (sf)
2        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg         B+ (sf)
3        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg         B+ (sf)
4        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg         B+ (sf)
5        B+ (sf)/Watch Neg         B+ (sf)


CLARIS FINANCE 2006: S&P Puts 'BB+' Rating on CreditWatch Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch negative
its 'BB+ (sf)' credit rating on Claris Finance 2006 S.r.l.'s
class B notes.

The rating actions follow Standard & Poor's July 12, 2013
CreditWatch negative placement of S&P's 'BB+' long-term issuer
credit rating (ICR) on Veneto Banca SCPA as the transaction's
liquidity guarantee provider.  To assess the effect of this
CreditWatch placement on S&P's ratings in the transaction, the
ratings agency has applied its current counterparty criteria.

"As in our previous review of the transaction on Dec. 28, 2012,
our current counterparty criteria link our ratings in the
transaction to our long-term 'BB+' ICR on Veneto Banca.
Therefore, following our recent CreditWatch placement of our
long-term ICR on Veneto Banca, we have placed on CreditWatch
negative our 'BB+ (sf)' rating on Claris Finance 2006's class B
notes," S&P said.

"Under our current counterparty criteria, any change to our long-
term ICR on Veneto Banca would result in an equivalent change to
our rating on the class B notes.  Therefore, the resolution of
today's CreditWatch placement depends on the resolution of our
CreditWatch placement of the long-term ICR on Veneto Banca," S&P
added.

Claris Finance 2006 is a securitization of a pool of Italian
residential and commercial mortgages.  The transaction closed in
July 2006 and its revolving period elapsed in March 2010.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


DEXIA CREDIOP: Parent's IDR Cut No Effect on Fitch's 'ccc' VR
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded three Italian subsidiaries of French
banks, following the downgrade of their parents' Long-Term Issuer
Default Ratings (IDRs).

Credit Agricole's (CA) Italian subsidiaries, car finance company
FGA Capital S.p.A.'s (FGAC) and consumer lender Agos Ducato
S.p.A.'s (Agos) Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) have been
downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB' and 'BBB+' from 'A-',
respectively, following the downgrade of CA and its subsidiary CA
Consumer Finance's (CACF) Long-term IDRs to 'A'/Stable from
'A+'/Negative. The Outlooks on FGAC and Agos are now Stable, in
line with the Outlook on CA and CACF. Dexia Crediop's (Crediop)
Long-term IDR has been downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+' following
the downgrade of Dexia's and Dexia Credit Local's (DCL) Long-term
IDR to A/Stable from 'A+'/Negative. The Outlook on Crediop's
Long-term IDR remains Negative.

Fitch downgraded CA, CACF and DCL on July 17, 2013, as a result
of the downgrade of France's sovereign rating to 'AA+/Stable.

The downgrades of FGAC's, Agos's and Crediop's ratings reflects
Fitch's view that the ability of their respective main
shareholders to provide support has weakened, as reflected in the
downgrade of their parents' IDRs. Fitch has maintained the
existing notching between the Long-term IDRs of Agos, FGAC and
Crediop and their respective parents. This reflects Fitch's
opinion that the strategic importance of Agos, FGAC and Crediop
has remained unchanged following the downgrades of their parents'
IDRs.

KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRS, SENIOR DEBT AND SUPPORT RATING

Agos's IDRs and Support Rating are driven by support from its
majority shareholder, CACF, and ultimately from CA. The two-notch
difference between the Long-term IDRs of Agos and CACF reflects
it being majority, but not fully owned by CACF as well as Fitch's
view that Agos is a strategically important subsidiary in a
strategically important country for the CA group.

CACF's propensity to support Agos was demonstrated in 2013 and
2012 when CACF participated in Agos's capital increases of EUR240
million and EUR235 million, respectively, together with the
company's other shareholder, Banco Popolare.

FGAC's IDRs, senior debt and Support Rating are based on
potential support from CA, which holds a 50% stake in FGAC
through its consumer finance subsidiary CACF. The four-notch
difference between the Long-term IDRs of FGAC and CACF reflects
its 50%/50% ownership structure and Fitch's view of its more
limited strategic importance to the CA group compared with Agos.

FGAC's funding and liquidity benefit from the joint venture
agreement under which CA undertakes to cover the company's
funding and liquidity needs through CACF. FGAC carries out Fiat
Group Automobile, Chrysler group, Jaguar and Land Rover retail,
dealer financing and car rental activities in 14 European
countries.

Crediop's IDRs and Support Rating are based on support from its
majority owner Dexia, which holds a 70% stake in Crediop through
its French subsidiary, DCL. Dexia's IDRs are based on support
from the French and Belgian authorities. Consequently, Crediop's
IDRs ultimately reflect support from the French and Belgian
states.

The three-notch difference between the Long-term IDRs of Crediop
and DCL reflects Fitch's opinion that Crediop's strategic
importance for Dexia is limited and could decline over time. The
Negative Outlook mirrors the Negative Outlook on Italy's
sovereign ratings as Crediop's business is focussed on Italian
public sector lending. The agency believes that Crediop's
strategic importance for its parent is limited as Dexia and DCL
are in an orderly run-down and rely on extraordinary support from
central banks and sovereigns for its funding.

RATING SENSITIVITIES - IDRS, SENIOR DEBT AND SUPPORT RATING

Agos's ratings are sensitive to changes in CA's and CACF's
propensity and ability to provide support. The ratings would come
under further pressure if Italy became a less strategically
important market for CA, which could arise if the operating
environment in Italy materially deteriorated. This could be
reflected, for example, in a downgrade of the Italian sovereign
rating. A downgrade of CA's and CACF's Long-term IDRs, could also
result in a downgrade of Agos's Long-term IDR as it would reflect
a weakening of their ability to support a strategically important
subsidiary.

FGAC's ratings are also sensitive to changes in CA's and CACF's
propensity and ability to provide support. Pressure on FGAC's
ratings might also arise if CACF reduced its stake in FGAC,
exited the joint venture agreement -- which Fitch currently does
not expect -- or if the terms of the joint venture agreement were
changed and resulted in the agency considering timely and full
support from the CA group less likely. The ratings would also
come under pressure if CA's or CACF's ability to support FGAC, as
indicated by its Long-term IDR, deteriorated further.

An upgrade of FGAC's and Agos's ratings is considered unlikely as
this would depend on an upgrade of CA's IDRs, which is not
Fitch's base case. The Outlooks on FGAC and Agos are linked to
that on CA and are likely to move in tandem with it provided that
the strategic importance of FGAC and Agos for CA remains
unchanged.

Crediop's IDRs are sensitive to changes in Dexia's and DCL's
propensity and ability to provide support to Crediop. A further
downgrade of Dexia's or DCL's Long-term IDR would likely result
in a downgrade of Crediop. Crediop's Long-term IDR is also
sensitive to Italy's sovereign rating as Fitch believes there is
a high level of correlation between Crediop's risk and Italian
sovereign risk.

The rating actions are:

FGAC
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
Senior unsecured debt rating: downgraded to 'BBB-' from 'BBB'

Agos
Long-term IDR: downgraded to 'BBB+' from 'A-'; Outlook Stable
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F2' from 'F1'
Support Rating: downgraded to '2' from '1'

Crediop
Long-term IDR downgraded to 'BBB' from 'BBB+', Negative Outlook
Short-term IDR: downgraded to 'F3' from 'F2'
Viability Rating: 'ccc'; unaffected
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'


SALINI SPA: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'BB' CCR; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it has assigned its 'BB'
preliminary long-term corporate credit rating to Italy-based
construction company Salini SpA. The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned a preliminary 'BB-' issue rating
to the company's proposed EUR350 million senior unsecured notes
due 2018.  The recovery rating on these notes is '5', indicating
S&P's expectation of modest (10%-30%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

The final ratings will depend on S&P's receipt and satisfactory
review of the final transaction documentations.

The rating assignment follows Salini's recent 88% acquisition of
Impregilo SpA.  The two companies plan to complete a reverse
merger by the end of this year.  S&P bases the preliminary
ratings on its assumption that in the next three months Salini
will refinance most of the about EUR700 million still outstanding
on its secured acquisition financing facility through a
combination of a new unsecured bank financing and issuance of the
EUR350 million senior unsecured notes.

Salini focuses on the construction and engineering sector and
builds large infrastructure such as dams, bridges, and railways
all over the world.

The preliminary rating on Salini reflects S&P's view of its
"fair" business risk and "significant" financial risk, as S&P's
criteria define these terms.  S&P considers Salini's business
risk profile to be constrained by its exposure to the cyclical
and capital-intensive construction market with high operational
risks, its limited product diversification in the infrastructure
segment, significant exposure to the mature and stagnant Italian
market, and high country risks it faces in Africa and South
America. Nevertheless, S&P believes these risks are mitigated to
a large degree by Salini's track record and experience in risk
management and its consistently higher profitability than peers'.

Given Salini's currently high EUR19.9 billion order backlog,
S&P's base case assumes that it will expand its revenues by at
least 6% in 2013 and further in 2014.  S&P also assumes Salini's
EBITDA margin will be about 8% in 2013 and 9% 2014, above the 6%
pro forma it achieved in 2012.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's assessment that Salini's credit
metrics, including Impregilo, will be consistent with the
company's "significant" financial risk profile at year-end 2013
and slowly improve over the next few years.

S&P could consider a negative rating action if Salini's EBITDA
falls below 7%, if debt continues to increase due to new
acquisitions or a very generous shareholder remuneration policy,
or if its liquidity weakens to the "weak" category, according to
S&P's criteria.

Rating upside potential could build if Salini's adjusted FFO to
debt improved sustainably to at least 35%, and if Salini
demonstrated its capacity to generate steady positive free cash
flow.


SALINI SPA: Fitch Assigns 'BB' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Salini S.p.a. a Long-term Issuer
Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB' with a Stable Outlook. The
prospective senior unsecured bond has been assigned an expected
rating of 'BB(EXP)'. The final rating on the prospective bond is
contingent on the receipt of final documents conforming to
information already received.

The IDR reflects Fitch's view that the integration between Salini
and Impregilo creates a large international construction company,
with a solid business profile and the scale and knowledge to
compete worldwide for large projects. The debt-funded acquisition
of Impregilo from Salini will cause leverage to peak in 2013, but
Fitch expects net debt to rapidly decline. The prospective senior
unsecured bond in line with the IDR is based on the assumption
that the merger between Salini and Impregilo will go ahead as
expected.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

Solid Business Profile
Salini Impregilo's business profile is solid for the 'BB'
category. With EUR4.1 billion pro-forma revenue in 2012, the
group ranks among the top 15 European construction companies.
While still being smaller than some competitors, the group is
highly specialized in complex high value added segments (i.e.
hydro-electric plants, metro, railways, highways) offering higher
margins. Salini Impregilo benefits from a wide geographical
diversification, with presence in 50 countries worldwide and a
well balanced mix between mature and emerging markets.

Strong Order Book
The group is not diversified into the more stable service and
concession businesses, like some of its major peers. However, the
solid order backlog (EUR19.9 billion at December 2012) increases
visibility on future revenues. The backlog corresponds to 4.8x
annual revenue, the highest value among Fitch-rated construction
companies. The long duration of some contracts in the metro and
dam segments (up to seven years) offers a recurring revenue
profile similar to the service segment.

Leverage to Peak in 2013
The EUR900 million debt-funded public tender offer on Impregilo
from Salini in H113 will cause leverage to peak this year. Fitch
estimates funds from operation (FFO) net leverage to reach 1.7x
in 2013. However, the agency expects the group to be able to
deleverage rapidly thanks to the improvement in the operating
performance, the disposal of non-core assets and the favourable
outcome of some litigations. Under Fitch's conservative
assumptions on these potential cash inflows, FFO net leverage
could stabilize at 1.0-1.2x as early as in 2014.

Under-Performing Contracts
Impregilo's under-performing contracts are a major credit
concern. The company experienced costs overruns on some projects
(mainly the Panama Canal project), that depressed 2012
profitability. Notwithstanding these extra-costs, the Salini
Impregilo combined pro-forma EBITDA margin stood at 6.6% in 2012.
Fitch takes comfort from Salini's management experience and solid
track-record on risk management and assumes no further large
losses on future contracts.

Senior Unsecured Bond
The prospective senior unsecured bond was assigned an expected
rating in line with the IDR, assuming that the merger between
Salini and Impregilo will be completed as expected. In the event
of the merger being stopped for any reason, the bond rating would
likely be notched down from the IDR, reflecting its structural
subordination to the senior unsecured debt of Impregilo. After
the merger, the bond would still be structurally subordinated to
the operating companies' (including Todini) debt, none of which
is the bond's guarantor. However, Fitch deems this structural
subordination not to be material.

RATING SENSITIVITIES:

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

-- Liquidity to remain comfortably above 1.25x on a sustained
   Basis

-- FFO net leverage to improve to 1.0x or below on a sustained
   basis.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

-- Liquidity score below 1.1-1.2x on a sustained basis

-- FFO net leverage above 2.0x

-- Evidence of poor performance on major contracts with a
   material impact on profitability.



=================
L I T H U A N I A
=================


* LITHUANIA: Moody's Revises Bond, Deposit Ceilings
---------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has adjusted the local-currency bond
and deposit ceilings, and the foreign-currency bond and deposit
ceilings of Bulgaria, Israel and Lithuania. The sovereign ratings
of these countries are unaffected by these changes.

The ceilings relate to the highest rating that can be assigned to
a domestic issuer in these countries, or to a structured finance
security backed by local currency receivables. The changes are as
follows:

Bulgaria

Moody's has adjusted the long-term foreign and local-currency
bond ceilings to A3 from Aa3. The ceiling for local-currency
deposits has been adjusted to A3 from Baa2, while the foreign-
currency deposit ceiling remains unchanged at Baa2. The short-
term foreign-currency bond ceiling has been changed to P-2 from
P-1. The short-term foreign-currency deposit ceiling remains
unchanged at P-2.

Israel

Moody's has adjusted the long-term foreign-currency bond and
local-currency bond ceilings to Aa3 from Aa1. The long-term
local-currency deposit ceiling has been adjusted to Aa3 from Aa2.
The long-term foreign-currency deposit ceiling remains unchanged
at A1. The short-term foreign-currency bond and deposit ceilings
remain unchanged at P-1.

Lithuania

Moody's has adjusted the long-term foreign-currency bond ceiling
to A2 from Aa2 and the ceiling for local-currency bonds and
deposits have also been adjusted to A2 from Aa1. The foreign-
currency deposit ceiling remains unchanged at Baa1. The short-
term foreign currency bond and deposit ceilings remain unchanged
at P-1 and P-2, respectively.

Ratings Rationale:

Rationale For Change In Ceilings

Moody's has adjusted country ceilings to better reflect the
linkages between the different sectors in the economy and to
better capture the default correlation between the government and
private-sector borrowers. These adjustments have been taken under
Moody's methodology "Local-Currency Country Risk Ceiling for
Bonds and Other Local Currency Obligations", re-published on
March 15, 2013 and initially published in August 2012. As a
result, the rating agency has aligned country ceilings more
closely with the government bond ratings.

The ceiling encapsulates elements of the economic, financial,
political, and legal risks in a country, including political
instability, the risk of government intervention, the risk of
systemic economic disruption, severe financial instability risks,
currency redenomination, and natural disasters among other
factors. These factors need to be incorporated into the ratings
of even the strongest domestic issuers. The ceiling caps the
credit rating of all issuers and transactions with material
exposure to those risks -- in other words, it affects all
domestic issuers and transactions other than those whose assets
and revenues are sourced from or located outside of the country,
or which benefit from an external credit support.

Bulgaria

Moody's decision to adjust the local and foreign currency country
ceilings for Bulgaria is based on assessment of the moderate
economic strength and moderate susceptibility of event risks.
Moody's decision to adjust the country ceilings for Bulgaria also
takes into account the country's currency board arrangement,
which limits the central bank's lender of last resort function.
Moody's has adjusted the local-currency ceilings to better
capture the country's systemic risk and the default correlation
between the government and private-sector borrowers.

Moody's rates Bulgaria's government debt at Baa2 with a stable
outlook. The government rating is underpinned by the country's
moderate economic and institutional strength, as well as high
financial strength, which contribute to the moderate
susceptibility to event risk. The economy's reliance on natural
resource-based exports is high but declining, which should
improve the economy's stability and reduce its pro-cyclicality
over time. Institutional capacity was strengthened in the process
of accession to the European Union, which Bulgaria joined in
2007, and the macroeconomic policy framework has been fairly
predictable for some time. Bulgaria's government effectiveness
and the rule of law score low relative to the European average.
Moody's assessment incorporates both the progress already made as
well as the ongoing challenges to improving the rule of law.

In terms of the government's financial strength, debt remains
very low by any standard. A new fiscal rule has been approved
that assures the continuation of low deficits and relatively
small government. In 2012, Bulgaria was removed from the
Excessive Deficit Procedure that it had been in since 2010, owing
to the country's success in bringing its budget deficit-to-GDP
ratio below 3% in 2011. Susceptibility to event risk is moderate
(instead of low) owing to the euroization of the economy and the
currency peg, which drive financial risk, and the economy's and
banking system's close ties with Greece, which drive economic
event risk. The electorate has become increasingly disgruntled
with austerity measures, and voter disenchantment has been
expressed through street demonstrations in recent months.
Although such public pressure may slow the pace of fiscal
consolidation and force early parliamentary elections, all the
major parties remain committed to prudent fiscal policies.

Israel

Moody's has adjusted the local and foreign-currency country
ceilings for Israel to better capture the country's systemic risk
and the default correlation between the government and private-
sector borrowers.

Moody's rates the government of Israel at A1 with a stable
outlook. The country's resilient growth model is based on a
diversified high-tech export sector, an industry that benefits
from a well-educated population and substantial investment in
research and development, sourced both from the private and the
public sectors. A culture of entrepreneurship and a robust
venture capital industry have furthermore enabled Israeli
companies to effectively monetize innovation.

At the same time, Israel's economic strength is constrained by
low levels of educational attainment and earnings potential among
a sizeable proportion of the country's fast-growing Arab and
ultra-Orthodox communities. Maintaining and improving
productivity performance over the longer term will therefore
depend on the government's ability to raise educational and
living standards for poor households and integrating them into
the labor force. The flexibility of the Israeli economy is again
being tested by the ongoing euro area debt crisis and the
concurrent slowdown in the global economy.

Israel's institutional strength is assessed as high by Moody's,
reflecting its high scores for government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption,
indicators for which Israel ranks slightly above or at the 'A'
category median according to international surveys. By contrast,
Israel scores very low relative to its peers and in absolute
terms for political stability/absence of violence. This ranking
reflects the unstable security situation caused by the ongoing
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and by Israel's difficult
relationship with some of its neighbors as well as its volatile
coalition politics. These factors also explain Israel's moderate
susceptibility to event risk; its financial and economic event
risk is deemed to be low.

Lithuania

Moody's decision to adjust the local and foreign currency country
ceilings for Lithuania is based on assessment of the moderate
economic strength and the low susceptibility of event risks. This
assessment also incorporates the limitations of the lender of
last resort function of the central bank due to the currency
board arrangement currently in place. At the same time, the
assessment captures the institutional improvements that come with
the accession to the European Union and eventually the Euro area.
The adjustment to the local-currency ceilings has been taken to
better capture the country's systemic risk and the default
correlation between the government and private-sector borrowers.

Moody's rates Lithuania's government debt at Baa1 with a stable
outlook. The economy has recovered strongly in 2011 and growth
has averaged around 5% over the past two years, registering some
of the strongest growth in the EU. Moody's assessment of high
institutional strength reflects the progress made in
strengthening the country's public administration and
policymaking over the past decade and the consensus amongst
various stakeholders towards adopting the euro in 2015.

Lithuania's susceptibility to event risk continues to diminish
with the reduction in its external vulnerabilities since 2009, as
evidenced by the rapid decrease in the current account deficit
and the decline in financial stress. Moreover, the banking sector
has been consolidated and around 90% of the system is now owned
by foreign banks. In particular, the Nordic banks that own the
major Lithuanian banks continue to view Lithuania as their home
markets and Moody's expects them to provide liquidity and capital
support to their subsidiaries in a time of stress.



===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


MERLIN ENTERTAINMENTS: Moody's Rates GBP1.387-Bil. Notes 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a B1 instrument rating,
with a loss given default assessment of LGD3 (33%), to Merlin
Entertainment S.ar.l's (Merlin) new credit facilities amounting
to a GBP-equivalent of around GBP1.387 billion (consisting of
US$602.2 million; GBP455.2 million; EUR500 million and AUD185
million) maturing in 2019. Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a
B1 instrument rating with LGD3 (33%) to Merlin's GBP150 million
revolving credit facility (RCF) maturing in 2018. These
instruments are borrowed at MEG Luxembourg 2 and 3 S.ar.l. and
drawn at various intermediate holding companies within the group.

These instruments are refinancing the previous capital structure
through an amend and extend process. The aim of the refinancing
was to better match the currency structure with future revenues
and improve pricing. The term loans contain covenants for
leverage and interest cover, for which Moody's expects headroom
to remain strong. The loans also set different baskets and
thresholds to apply in case of an IPO. The guarantor and security
package are largely unchanged from the previous credit
facilities, as is the overall quantum of debt. The refinancing
does not impact the company's credit profile.

Merlin's B1 corporate family rating  and the B2-PD probability of
default rating (PDR) previously assigned at Merlin Entertainments
S.ar.l, which is the ultimate holding company for Merlin
Entertainment Group and its operating subsidiaries, as well as
the outlook on all ratings remain unchanged.

Ratings Rationale:

The term loans and RCF are rated B1, at the same level as the
CFR, in light of the terms of the refinancing and its guarantee,
covenant and security package. Under the terms of the senior
facilities, the guarantors must represent at least 80% of
consolidated group EBITDA and assets (at FYE2012, the actual
numbers were approximately 88% and 86%; these declined versus 95%
and 92% FYE2011, but are expected to rise again as the acquired
Australian assets accede to the guarantors). Under the agreed
security principles, the large majority of the guarantors also
provide a security over assets for the loans. The loans represent
nearly all of Merlin's outstanding debt. The PDR of B2-PD
reflects the use of the 65% family recovery rate assumption,
consistent with an all-bank capital structure.

Merlin's B1 CFR reflects that while Merlin has a strong position
as a global operator of theme parks and attractions, it is still
small relative to companies in the broader services industry, and
has a fairly leveraged capital structure. Merlin is the second-
largest operator of theme parks and attractions globally after
Walt Disney Company (A2 stable), owning internationally
recognized brand names including Madame Tussauds, The Dungeons,
Alton Towers, LEGOLAND, SEA LIFE, Gardaland and the London Eye.
The company's mixture of theme parks and midway attractions, as
well as indoor and outdoor activities (approximately 40% and 60%
of revenues, respectively), has proven resilient to external
shocks in recent years. The company has seen steady growth in
visitor numbers and the number of attractions, although
comparable visitor numbers and revenues (i.e. on a like-for-like
basis) dipped marginally in 2012, when the company experienced a
slowdown in visitor volumes in Europe, negatively affected by
both poor weather conditions and competition from the summer
Olympics in London. Nevertheless, Merlin's underlying EBITDA, as
reported, was at GBP346 million for FY2012, versus GBP306 million
in 2011 (for 53 weeks; or GBP296 million on a comparable 52-week
basis), with the increase reflecting acquisitions, new openings,
as well as reductions in certain variable costs.

While Merlin has grown its geographical coverage in recent years
(particularly in Asia-Pacific, with a concurrent diminishing
share of European revenues), its ratings are constrained by its
small scale and fairly leveraged capital structure. The company's
adjusted leverage, measured by debt/EBITDA, was at about 5x as of
financial year-end December 31, 2012, although this has been
declining gradually from 6.5x in FY2010 (on a comparable basis,
i.e., excluding the shareholder loan, which was converted into
equity that year). Merlin's current debt capital structure
consists principally of GBP1.387 billion in term loans, with a
bullet repayment in June 2019. Moody's notes that Merlin's
management has been targeting international growth, predominantly
through new site openings as well as broadening the offering to
attract multi-day visitors. This has had a clear impact on
growing the company's geographical footprint. The trend in
declining leverage has therefore been driven by growth in
Merlin's earnings, as the company's reported debt has actually
increased in the past two years. Moody's considers Merlin to be
strongly positioned in the B1 rating category at this point, and
that further deleveraging will largely depend on the company's
own growth strategy and financial policies.

Moody's expects Merlin's liquidity to remain solid, with no
significant debt maturities prior to the term loans maturing in
2019. The loans contain financial covenants for leverage and
interest coverage, for which headroom remained strong as of the
first quarter of 2013. The term loans are multi-currency (GBP,
EUR, $ and AUD), to largely mirror the earnings structure by
currency. The company's liquidity is also supported by a new
GBP150 million revolving credit facility due 2018, which has the
same covenants as the term loans; the previous RCF was fully
undrawn as of FYE2012.

Merlin's earnings and cash flows tend to be fairly seasonal in
nature. Earnings are nearly entirely generated in the second and
third quarters. Cash flows from operations tend to be negative in
the first quarter due to lower earnings and seasonal capital
investment, albeit there is a working capital inflow in the
quarter, in part due to prepayments by ticket-holders for
activities during the summer. The company was largely free cash
flow neutral on average between 2010 and 2012 (after capex),
while investments in new attractions and acquisitions resulted in
a gradual growth in reported net debt in those years.

Outlook:

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects the recent
strengthening of Merlin's metrics and Moody's view that this
trend may continue, albeit gradually.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

A deleveraging trend, with adjusted debt/EBITDA well below 5x,
could be positive for the rating or outlook. Conversely, a more
aggressive financial policy, or a significant industry downturn,
neither of which Moody's expects at this time, could lead to
negative ratings pressure if gross leverage were to rise beyond
6.0x. Although currently not expected, the emergence of liquidity
concerns could also exert downward pressure on the rating.

Principal Methodology

Merlin Entertainments Group Luxembourg 2 S.a.r.l's ratings were
assigned by evaluating factors that Moody's considers relevant to
the credit profile of the issuer, such as the company's (i)
business risk and competitive position compared with others
within the industry; (ii) capital structure and financial risk;
(iii) projected performance over the near to intermediate term;
and (iv) management's track record and tolerance for risk.
Moody's compared these attributes against other issuers both
within and outside Merlin Entertainments Group Luxembourg 2
S.a.r.l's core industry and believes Merlin Entertainments Group
Luxembourg 2 S.a.r.l's ratings are comparable to those of other
issuers with similar credit risk. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Merlin Entertainments, based in Dorset, the UK, is the largest
European, and second-largest global, operator of theme parks and
attractions in terms of visitor admissions. The company reported
about GBP1.1 billion in revenues and underlying EBITDA of GBP346
million for FY2012 (to December), and attracted over 54 million
visitors to its 94 locations in that year. The company's owners
include two private equity partners (Blackstone (34.0%) and CVC
(28.1%); Kirkbi, a Danish investment fund (36.5%); and management
(1.4%).



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CID FINANCE: Fitch Keeps 'BB-' Rating on Rating Watch Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained CID Finance B.V. Series 54's 'BB-sf'
rating on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

Key Rating Drivers

The maintained RWN reflects the RWN on Unicaja Banco S.A.U. (BBB-
/RWN/F3/RWN'). The notes are secured by a covered bond issued by
Unicaja (ISIN ES0458759034) which is not rated by Fitch. The
analysis was based on Fitch's rating of Unicaja Banco S.A.U.
representing a rating floor for the covered bond.

In this transaction, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (BBVA,
BBB+/Negative/F2) is the interest and credit default swap
counterparty to the transaction, The credit default swap
references senior unsecured debt issued by Deutsche Bank
(A+/Stable/F1+).

Rating Sensitivities

A rating action would be triggered if any of the three risk-
presenting entities were subject to a rating action. The risk-
presenting entities are BBVA, Deutsche Bank and Unicaja Banco
S.A.U.


SILVER BIRCH CLO I: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
Silver Birch CLO I B.V.'s class B and E notes.  At the same time,
S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class A, C, and D notes.

The rating actions follows S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance based on the trustee report dated May 31, 2013 (the
most recent data available at the time of S&P's analysis), S&P's
credit and cash flow analysis, and recent transaction
developments.  In S&P's analysis, it has also applied its current
counterparty criteria and its 2009 corporate cash flow
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) criteria.

Since S&P's previous review of this transaction on Feb. 13, 2012,
the collateral pool's weighted-average spread has increased to
3.47% from 3.04%.

The collateral pool has experienced an increase in the proportion
of assets in the pool that S&P considers to be rated in the 'CCC'
category ('CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') and the proportion of assets
that S&P considers to be defaulted (assets rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD'
[selective default], and 'D'), in percentage terms since S&P's
February 2012 review.  However, in notional terms, assets in the
pool that S&P considers to be rated in the 'CCC' category have
been stable and assets that S&P considers to be defaulted have
decreased.  The increase in concentration has been mainly due to
the transaction's deleveraging.

Since the reinvestment period ended on Aug. 10, 2010, the senior
notes have partially amortized.  The outstanding balance of the
class A notes is now 33.69% of its original balance.
Accordingly, the aggregate collateral balance that S&P considers
to be performing reduced to EUR147.29 million from EUR183.48
million on Feb. 13, 2012.  This deleveraging, along with the
overcollateralization (EUR147.29 million of performing assets
available to service EUR133.74 million of rated liabilities), has
increased the available credit enhancement for all classes of
notes.  In addition, the pool's increased obligor concentration
is mainly due to the transaction's deleveraging.

S&P has observed that the par value test for all classes of notes
meet the trigger requirements under the transaction documents.
As of S&P's February 2012 review, all par value tests complied
with the level required under the transaction documents.

S&P has subjected the capital structure to its cash flow
analysis, based on its 2009 corporate cash flow CDO criteria, to
determine the break-even default rate (BDR) at each rating level.
S&P used the reported portfolio balance that it considered to be
performing, the principal cash balance, the weighted-average
spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P
considered to be appropriate.

S&P incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios, using
various default patterns, levels, and timings for each liability
rating category, in conjunction with different interest rate
stress scenarios.  To help assess the collateral pool's credit
risk, S&P used CDO Evaluator 6.0.1 to generate scenario default
rates (SDRs) at each rating level.  S&P then compared these SDRs
with their respective BDRs.

S&P's rating actions on the class C, D, and E notes reflect its
view of the available credit enhancement for these notes
following our credit and cash flow analysis, the application of
S&P's 2009 cash flow CDO criteria, and its observations on the
transaction's performance.  As a result, S&P considers the
available credit enhancement for the class C and D notes to be
commensurate with current ratings and to be commensurate with a
higher rating on the class E notes than previously assigned.

S&P has affirmed its 'BBB+ (sf)' rating on the class C notes, its
'B+ (sf)' rating on the class D notes, and raised to 'CCC+ (sf)'
from 'CCC- (sf)' its rating on the class E notes based on the
maximum ratings achievable under the largest obligor test,
although the results of S&P's cash flow analysis could support
higher ratings.

"We have analyzed the transaction's exposure to the derivative
counterparties under our current counterparty criteria.  In our
view, the transaction documents for the derivative counterparty
are not fully in line with our current counterparty criteria.  As
a result, our current counterparty criteria constrains our
maximum potential ratings in this transaction at 'AA (sf)', i.e.,
one notch above our long-term issuer credit rating on Erste
Abwicklungsanstalt (AA-/Stable/A-1+) as the derivative
counterparty.  However, this does not apply if the available
credit enhancement for the class of notes in question is
sufficient to support higher ratings after adjusting the pool
balance.  We estimate currency advance rates to help us evaluate
a transaction's potential currency exposure risk.  These advance
rates are used at the applicable rating level and the
transaction's relevant exposure period," S&P said.

"Our rating actions on the class A and B notes reflect our
opinion of the available credit enhancement for these notes after
we adjusted the aggregate pool balance, following the application
of our current counterparty criteria, and our credit and cash
flow analysis.  As a result, we consider that the available
credit enhancement for the class A notes is commensurate with the
currently assigned rating, while we consider the available credit
enhancement for the class B notes to be commensurate with a
higher rating than previously assigned.  We have therefore
affirmed our 'AAA (sf)' rating on the class A notes.  We have
raised our rating on the class B notes to 'AA+ (sf)' from 'A+
(sf)' based on the maximum ratings achievable under the largest
obligor test, although the results of our cash flow analysis
suggest a higher rating on this class of notes.  Our rating on
the class B notes was previously constrained at 'A+ (sf)' based
on the maximum rating achievable under the largest obligor test
at our February 2012 review," S&P added.

Silver Birch CLO I is a corporate cash flow loan collateralized
loan obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to
primarily speculative-grade corporate firms.

            STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating            Rating
            To                From

Silver Birch CLO I B.V.
EUR300 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

B           AA+ (sf)          A+ (sf)
E           CCC+ (sf)         CCC- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A           AAA (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)
D           B+ (sf)



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


NOSTRUM MORTGAGES: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR5MM B Notes to 'B3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of one
senior note and three mezzanine and junior notes in two
Portuguese residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions: Nostrum Mortgages 2003-1 PLC and Navigator Mortgage
Finance No.1 plc. At the same time Moody's has confirmed the
rating of two senior notes in Bocage Mortgages No.1 Limited and
Bocage Mortgages No.2 Limited and one junior notes in Nostrum
Mortgages 2003-1 PLC. Insufficiency of credit enhancement to
address sovereign risk, counterparty risk and revision of key
collateral assumptions have prompted the downgrade.

This rating action concludes the review of six notes placed on
review on September 11, 2012, following Moody's decision to
adjust the Portuguese country ceiling to Baa3 on September 5,
2012 and of one note placed on review on November 28, 2012,
following Moody's revision of key collateral assumptions for the
entire Portuguese RMBS market.

Ratings Rationale:

This rating action primarily reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk, counterparty risk and
revision of key collateral assumptions. Moody's confirmed the
ratings of securities whose credit enhancement and structural
features provided enough protection against sovereign,
counterparty risk and change in key collateral assumptions.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Portuguese country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Portuguese issuer
including structured finance transactions backed by Portuguese
receivables, is Baa3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit
Enhancement (MILAN CE) represents the required credit enhancement
under the senior tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling.
By lowering the maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's has revised its lifetime loss expectation (EL) assumption
as a percentage of original pool balance in Bocage Mortgages No.1
Limited to 3% from 2.5%, Bocage Mortgages No.2 Limited to 3% from
2.7% and Navigator Mortgage Finance No.1 plc. to 4% from 3.3%.
Moody's maintained the EL assumption for Nostrum Mortgages 2003-1
PLC at 1%.

The MILAN CE assumption remained at 15.0% for Bocage Mortgages
No.1 Limited, Bocage Mortgages No.2 Limited and Navigator
Mortgage Finance No.1 plc. It remained at 10% for Nostrum
Mortgages 2003-1 PLC.

Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The downgrade of Class B in Navigator Mortgage Finance No.1 plc.
is also driven by set-off and commingling risk due to the
exposure to Banco Popular Portugal (NR) acting as originator and
collection account bank in the transaction.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect The Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in May 2013, and
The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines published in March 2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM/ ABSCORE to
model the cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The
cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the lognormal
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche."

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: Bocage Mortgages No. 1 Limited

EUR892.1M A Notes, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Bocage Mortgages No. 2 Limited

EUR1144.95M A Notes, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep
11, 2012 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for
Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Navigator Mortgage Finance No. 1 plc.

EUR10M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR10M C Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: Nostrum Mortgages 2003-1 PLC

EUR980M A Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 28,
2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR5M B Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 11, 2012
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR15M C Notes, Confirmed at Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


PELICAN MORTGAGES 3: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. D Notes to 'Caa3'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of 1 senior
and 6 junior notes in three Portuguese residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transactions: PELICAN MORTGAGES NO. 1
PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY, PELICAN MORTGAGES NO. 2 PUBLIC LIMITED
COMPANY and PELICAN MORTGAGES NO. 3 PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY. Also,
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the ratings of the senior
notes in Nostrum Mortgages No.2. Insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk and exposure to
counterparty risk have prompted the downgrade action.

The rating action concludes the review of 5 notes placed on
review on September 11, 2012, following Moody's decision to
adjust the Portuguese country ceiling to Baa3 from Baa1 on
September 5, 2012 and of 2 notes placed on review on November 28,
2012, following Moody's revision of key collateral assumptions
for the entire Portuguese RMBS market.

Ratings Rationale:

The downgrade rating action primarily reflects the insufficiency
of credit enhancement to address sovereign risk. Moody's
confirmed the ratings of securities whose credit enhancement and
structural features provide enough protection against sovereign
and counterparty risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Portuguese country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Portuguese issuer
including structured finance transactions backed by Portuguese
receivables, is Baa3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit
Enhancement (MILAN CE) represents the required credit enhancement
under the senior tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling.
By lowering the maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Moody's has not revised the key collateral assumptions for any of
the deals. Expected loss assumptions as a percentage of original
pool balance remain at 5.5% in Nostrum Mortgages 2, 0.9% in
Pelican Mortgages 1 and 2 and at 1.1% in Pelican Mortgages 3. The
MILAN CE assumptions remain at 25% in Nostrum Mortgages 2 and at
12.5% in Pelican Mortgages 1, 2 and 3.

Exposure to Counterparty

Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the
commingling and set-off risk arising from exposure to Caixa Geral
de Depositos, S.A. in Nostrum Mortgages 2 and Caixa Economica
Montepio Geral in Pelican Mortgages 1, 2 and 3, as collection
account bank and originator in the respective transactions. This
exposure does not drive the downgrade action.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increase portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in "Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment".

The methodologies used in these ratings were Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework, published in May 2013 and
The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines published in March 2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used its cash flow
model, ABSROM, to determine the loss for each tranche. The cash
flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (1) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (2) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach. In addition, the following cashflow model inputs have
been corrected during the review: triggers to stop using
principal to pay interest have been corrected in Pelican
Mortgages 1, 2 and 3; the margin guaranteed by the swap has been
corrected in Pelican Mortgages 1 and 2.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: Nostrum Mortgages No.2

EUR4008.8M A Notes, Confirmed at Baa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: PELICAN MORTGAGES NO. 1 PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY

EUR22.75M C Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 28,
2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: PELICAN MORTGAGES NO. 2 PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY

EUR17.5M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR22.75M C Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 28,
2012 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: PELICAN MORTGAGES NO. 3 PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY

EUR717.375M A Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov
28, 2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
Possible Downgrade

EUR14.25M B Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR12M C Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR6.375M D Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade


PELICAN MORTGAGES 3: Swap Novation No Impact on Moody's Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has determined that the proposed novation of the swap
counterparty from RBS N.V (A3/P-2) to RBS Plc. (A3/P-2) plc. will
not, in and of itself and at this time, result in a reduction or
withdrawal of the current ratings of the notes (the "Notes")
issued by Pelican Mortgages No.3. Moody's does not express an
opinion as to whether the proposals may be considered to have
negative effects in any other respect.

The novation transfers all rights and obligations of RBS N.V. to
RBS PLC under the existing transaction.

In assessing the impact of the novation on the current Moody's
ratings of the Notes, Moody's took into account the credit
quality of the new swap counterparty, and reviewed the novation
to determine whether it changed the obligations of the swap
counterparty in any respect that could negatively affect the
credit quality of the rated securities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in
May 2013.

On July 17, 2013, Moody's took these actions on PELICAN MORTGAGES
NO. 3 PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY:

EUR717.375M A Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov
28, 2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
Possible Downgrade

EUR14.25M B Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR12M C Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR6.375M D Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade



===========
R U S S I A
===========


URALSIB OJSC: S&P Lowers Rating to 'B+'; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it lowered its long-term
rating on Russian Bank URALSIB (OJSC) to 'B+' from 'BB-' and
affirmed the short-term rating at 'B'.  The outlook is stable.

The downgrade reflects continuing pressure on the bank's capital
and profitability, which constrains its future competitive
position.  S&P believes URALSIB's market shares and capacity to
deliver stable earnings have significantly deteriorated in the
past few years.

URALSIB has experienced structural decline in the earnings power
of its core business over the past five years.  Specifically,
margins are under pressure and costs are increasing, undermining
the bank's capacity to generate resilient returns in line with
those of its peers.  S&P understands that the bank's owners
aren't planning any additional capital increase in 2013-2015,
leaving it more vulnerable to external shocks than it used to be,
and also making it unable to seize the growth opportunities
offered by the dynamic Russian market.  In S&P's view, it will
take time for the bank to restore its previously sound footprint
in the market, even though S&P believes it reached the bottom in
2012 in terms of profitability and capital.

In 2012, URALSIB appointed a new CEO and made some structural
changes in top management.  Although S&P considers the current
management team to be highly professional, it anticipates some
risks associated with the execution of the revised strategy,
exacerbated by the bank's high ownership concentration.  Due to
heavy capital erosion in 2011-2012 we expect URALSIB to proceed
in reset mode, demonstrating close to zero lending growth in
2013.

That said, URALSIB still possesses a wide branch network, which
supports a sound and granular funding profile, and good diversity
in terms of business lines and Russian regional geography.
URALSIB is one of Russia's five largest private banks, with total
assets of about Russian ruble (RUB)451 billion (or about
$15 billion) on Dec. 31, 2012.  S&P expects the bank to
demonstrate moderate improvement in profitability not earlier
than in 2015, following a resumption of lending with more focus
on retail customers and small and midsize enterprises (SMEs),
stabilized provisioning, and cost optimization.  But its earnings
metrics are likely to continue to fall short of pre-2008-crisis
levels.

The stable outlook balances the bank's recently weakened
competitive position and capitalization against its wide customer
franchise, lower single-name concentration than peers, and sound
funding profile.

S&P might consider a negative rating action if the bank's margins
and cost efficiency were to weaken further.  This would indicate
an inability to turn around the business and would likely result
in a significant drop in capitalization, such that the bank's RAC
ratio  would fall below 3%, although this is not S&P's base-case
scenario.  S&P could also take a negative rating action if the
quality of the portfolio deteriorated with reported nonperforming
loans (NPLs) and loan losses substantially exceeding 2011 and
2012 levels.

S&P might consider a positive rating action if the bank were to
demonstrate sustained positive profitability, which could boost
capitalization to a level where S&P's RAC ratio exceeded 5%, and
maintain asset quality at levels not worse than the industry
average.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANKINTER 3: Moody's Lowers Rating on EUR6MM C Notes to 'B3'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
classes of notes issued by BANKINTER 3 FTPYME, FTA (Bankinter 3).
Bankinter 3 is a Spanish asset-backed securities transaction
backed by loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME ABS)
originated by Bankinter, S.A. (Ba1). The rating action follows an
internal review after a correction to the Coefficient of
Variation (CoV) of the loss distribution. Considering the
corrected CoV level, insufficient credit enhancement to address
sovereign risk and exposure to counterparty risk has prompted the
action. At the same time, the rating agency affirmed the Class D
notes at Caa2 (sf).

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action follows Moody's internal review and correction
of one of the key collateral assumptions, the CoV, that it had
used in its original ratings review on November 26, 2012.
Following the initial rating review, Moody's downgraded by one
notch the ratings of two senior notes and by one to two notches
the ratings of mezzanine and junior notes in the transaction. The
rating agency has now adjusted its volatility assumption to
108.0% from 98.0%. Moody's also revised its key collateral
assumptions with a mean default rate of 15.5% for the current
portfolio and fixed recovery of 60.0%, which corresponds to a
portfolio credit enhancement of 22.1%.

The credit enhancement levels in Bankinter 3 in May 2013 were
20.99%, 10.81%, 8.71% and 3.41% for the Class A, B, C and D
notes, respectively. The reduction of the reserve fund in
combination with slow deleverage results in the limited changes
of credit enhancement since November 2012. In summary, the
negative effect of the input correction with insufficient credit
enhancement has led to the one-notch downgrade of the two senior
notes, the two-notch downgrade of the Class B notes and the one-
notch downgrade of the Class C junior note.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement that
drives the rating action reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in the Request for Comment, "Approach to Assessing Linkage to
Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions:
Request for Comment", July 2, 2012.

In reviewing this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the inverse normal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and the loss
derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario for
each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

When remodeling the transaction affected by the rating action,
some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new approach.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating EMEA SME Balance Sheet Securitizations", published in May
2013 and "The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance
Transactions: Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published
in March 2013.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: BANKINTER 3 FTPYME, FTA

EUR288.9M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov
26, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

EUR91.2M A3 (G) Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov
26, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf)

EUR23.1M B Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Nov 26,
2012 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

EUR6M C Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Nov 26, 2012
Downgraded to B2 (sf)

EUR10.8M D Notes, Affirmed Caa2 (sf); previously on Nov 26, 2012
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)


CECABANK: Swap Amendments No Impact on TDA, FTA Note Issues
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's has announced that the proposed action of TitulizaciOn de
Activos S.G.F.T. acting as management company to replace CECABANK
(Ba1, possible downgrade) in its current role as swap
counterparty with JP Morgan Securities plc. (Aa3/P-1) would not,
in and of itself and as of this time result in the downgrade or
withdrawal of the current ratings of the notes issued by TDA CAM
4, FTA, TDA CAM 5, FTA, TDA CAM 8, FTA and TDA CAM 9, FTA.
Moody's opinion addresses only the credit impact associated with
the proposed amendment, and Moody's is not expressing any opinion
as to whether the amendment has, or could have, other non-credit
related effects that may have a detrimental impact on the
interests of note holders and/or counterparties.

Moody's has assessed the proposal from the Management Company to
replace CECABANK (Ba1, possible downgrade) in its current role as
swap counterparty in the four deals. The new Swap Counterparty
will be JP Morgan Securities plc. (Aa3/P-1). The amendments do
not modify the main economic terms of the swaps. Moody's has made
this determination based on, among other things, the degree of
compliance with the "Framework for De-Linking Hedge Counterparty
Risks from Global Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions"
published in October 2010, along with the current rating of JP
Morgan Securities plc. and the current ratings of the Notes.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework", published in
May 2013.

Moody's noted that on July 2, 2012, it released a Request for
Comment, in which the rating agency has requested market feedback
on potential changes to its rating implementation guidance for
its "Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions" published in July 2012.
If the revised rating implementation guidance is implemented as
proposed, the rating on the Notes should not be negatively
affected.

Moody's will continue to monitor the ratings. Any change in the
ratings will be publicly disseminated by Moody's through
appropriate media.


IM SABADELL 3: Moody's Raises Rating on EUR14.4MM C Notes to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the rating of all notes
issued by IM SABADELL RMBS 3, FTA. This rating action follows
Moody's review of recent structural changes to the transactions
and concluded that these amendments have positive impact on the
ratings of the notes.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects the recent changes in the capital
structure in IM Sabadell RMBS 3, FTA. The amendments incorporate
an increase to the credit enhancement in the deal. The increase
was implemented in the current capital structure by increasing
the size of the reserve fund. The reserve fund increased by
EUR31,120,082.38. The current reserve fund and the target level
are EUR70,720,082.38 million (8% of the outstanding amount of the
notes). Additionally, the amount in the reserve fund will not be
reduced on any payment date on which either of the following
scenarios occurs:

- The arrears level (defined as the percentage of non-written-off
loans that are more than 90 days in arrears) exceeds 1.0%

- The reserve fund is not funded at its required level

-- Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's has not changed the current MILAN Credit Enhancement
("MILAN CE") assumption of the transaction of 10.0% and also
maintained the current Expected Loss assumption in the
transaction of 2.50%.

The methodology used in this rating was Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in May 2013.

In reviewing this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (1)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (2)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: IM SABADELL RMBS 3, FTA

EUR1411.2M A Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 7,
2013 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

EUR14.4M B Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2013
Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

EUR14.4M C Notes, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jun 7, 2013
Downgraded to B3 (sf)



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


* KYIV: Fitch Affirms 'B-' LT Foreign, Local Currency Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the City of Kyiv's Long-term foreign
and local currency ratings at 'B-', with Stable Outlooks, and its
Short-term foreign currency rating at 'B'. The agency has also
affirmed the city's National Long-term rating at 'BBB+(ukr)' with
Stable Outlook.

The rating action also affects the city's senior unsecured
domestic bonds in local currency totaling UAH5.4 billion
(UA4000142707, UA4000142715, UA4000142723, UA4000142731,
UA4000142749 and UA4000142884) and Eurobonds totaling US$550
million (US225407AA34, US50154TAA34, XS0644750027 and
XS0233620235).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The affirmation of Kyiv's ratings reflects its status as capital
and implicit support from the central government, satisfactory
budgetary performance and stabilized debt. The ratings also
factor in refinancing risk, stemming from debt obligations
maturing in 2014 and exposure to foreign currency risk on
Eurobonds. Ukraine's Long-term foreign and local currency ratings
were affirmed at 'B' on June 28, 2013, while Outlook was revised
to Negative from Stable.

Fitch notes that Kyiv's status as the country's capital and the
administration's integration with the central government
constitutes a support factor for the city's ratings. Kyiv's
political and economic importance to the state benefits the
city's budget and limits downside risks at times of distress.

Fitch expects the city's direct risk to increase up to 60% of
current revenue in 2013 with stabilization at this level in 2014-
2015. Kyiv placed domestic bonds totaling UAH5.4 billion
replacing matured bonds, bank loans and promissory notes in 2012.
Issued debt increased to 96% of the city's debt stock in 2012
(2011: 84%).

Fitch considers the city's medium term refinancing risk as
material due to the volume of maturing obligations and the
national capital market's limited capacity. The city will be
refinancing domestic bonds of UAH3.5 billion maturing in 2014-
2015 and Eurobonds of US$250 million coming due in 2015.

Kyiv has two outstanding Eurobonds denominated in US dollars,
which in Fitch's view exposes the city to forex risk as Ukraine's
hryvnia remains vulnerable to internal and external shocks.

Fitch expects consolidation of Kyiv's satisfactory budgetary
performance in 2013-2015 with margins at about 8%-10%. The agency
also highlights that the city's deficit before debt variation
might widen up to 9% of total revenue in 2013 and then decrease
to about 3%-5% over the medium term. Kyiv's 2012 operating
balance improved to 11.7% of operating revenue in 2012 (2011:
9.8%), leading to reduced deficit before debt variation at 3% of
total revenue.

The city's economy is well-diversified and service-oriented; Kyiv
contributed 18% to Ukraine's gross domestic product (GDP) in
2012. A sound socio-economic profile supports the city wealth
indicators significantly above Ukraine's average in 2008-2012.
The city's gross value added (GVA) increased by 1% yoy in 2012,
while the administration forecasts sluggish growth at about 1.5%-
2.5% yoy in 2013-2015.

Rating Sensitivities

A sound budget would be positive. The rating could be positively
affected by a sustained sound budgetary performance leading to
the direct risk to current balance ratio matching average debt
maturities along with reduced refinancing risk

Increased debt would be negative. A downgrade could result from a
significant rise in direct risk above 70% of current revenue
along with increased refinancing risk.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


COMMUNISAVE CREDIT: Placed Into Liquidation
-------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that South Birmingham Community Credit Union Ltd
(SBCCU), also known as Communisave, operated in south Birmingham,
Bromsgrove and Redditch.

BBC relates that liquidators Baker Tilly said "certain matters"
surrounding the winding up are "subject to on-going
investigations".

The liquidators said deposits and savings will be protected under
the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, according to BBC.

SBCCU has also been affected by a lack of growth in the loan
book, an increase in bad debts and a fall in its investment
income, a spokesperson told BBC.

Following the winding-up order the credit union will no longer
able to accept deposits, allow members to withdraw money or make
loans, the report notes.

BBC adds that Guy Mander, joint liquidator, said they will write
to all affected savers.


HEARTS OF MIDLOTHIAN: Disciplinary Hearing Moved to August 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sports.stv.tv reports that Hearts of MidLothian Football Club
will have to wait to learn if they will be punished by the
Scottish FA for an insolvency event after their disciplinary
hearing was postponed.

According to the report, the Scottish FA has confirmed that some
members of the tribunal due to rule on Hearts were unavailable
for the scheduled date of July 18, forcing the hearing to be
rescheduled for August 1.

The Tynecastle club was served with a notice of complaint by the
governing body after they appointed administrators BDO to take
charge of their affairs in June, sports.stv.tv recalls.

If found guilty, the club face a number of possible punishments
from the Scottish FA, ranging from a warning and fine to having
its membership of the governing body suspended or revoked, the
report notes.

sports.stv.tv notes that Hearts are the third club to go into
administration since new disciplinary measures were brought into
effect at the start of the 2011/12 season.

Rangers were fined for suffering an "insolvency event" while
Dunfermline Athletic were banned from registering new players
until the end of the year, the report relates.

According to sports.stv.tv, Hearts will be represented by joint
administrators Trevor Birch and Bryan Jackson when the case is
heard, and the club will set out what they say are mitigating
factors they believe should temper any sanctions to be handed
out.

Mr. Jackson has previously said that it would be "a disaster" if
a financial penalty was imposed, sports.stv.tv adds.

Heart of Midlothian plc, more commonly known as Hearts, is a
Scottish football club from Edinburgh who currently plays in
the Scottish Premier League.


HEARTS OF MIDLOTHIAN: Administrators Seek Bidder's Funding Proof
----------------------------------------------------------------
Barry Anderson at The Scotsman reports that the three bidders for
Hearts of MidLothian Football Club must prove their financial
clout within the next seven days or risk being discounted from
the race to gain control at Tynecastle.

Administrators BDO emailed all three parties on Thursday
Foundation of Hearts, Bob Jamieson's HMFC Limited and Angelo
Massone's Five Stars Football Limited -- requesting proof of
funding before they can name a preferred bidder for the Edinburgh
club, the Scotsman relates.

The Foundation will submit financial documents to BDO by the
middle of this week, possibly earlier, detailing their GBP5.75
million offer, the Scotsman discloses.  The fans' group will
demonstrate that an initial GBP2 million cash is available from
investors for a Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA), which is
necessary for Hearts to exit administration, the Scotsman says.
Converted monthly pledges from supporters will provide the
remaining GBP3.75 million in working capital to run the club for
the next three years, the Scotsman states.

It remains to be seen whether HMFC Limited and Five Stars
Football Limited will follow suit, the Scotsman notes.
Mr. Jamieson has denied being in dispute with his American
backers, Club 9 Sports, over funding for his GBP5 million offer
for Hearts, the Scotsman relates.  It is comprised of GBP1.8
million for control of the club plus GBP3.2 million in working
capital for three years, the Scotsman states.

According to the Scotsman, Mr. Massone's bid is around GBP4
million, but does not include a plan for working capital.  The
Italian previously led Livingston into financial trouble and
could be considered not "fit and proper" to run a football club
under Scottish Football Association guidelines on owners, the
Scotsman notes.

According to the Scotsman, any party which is unable to provide
proof of funding will no longer be considered a serious bidder by
BDO.  The administrators hope to name a preferred bidder within
the next three to four weeks, the Scotsman says.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 19,
2013, Press Association said Heart of Midlothian Football Club,
the financially-stricken Scottish Premier League club, lodged
papers at the Court of Session in Edinburgh and have approached
accountancy firm KPMG to act as their administrators.  The club
was faced with a winding-up order after Her Majesty's Revenue and
Customs threatened action over an unpaid GBP100,000 tax bill,
although the majority of that sum has been paid, according to
Press Association.  Hearts were also hit with an immediate
transfer embargo by the Scottish Premier League last June 14
after admitting they could not afford to pay their players.

Heart of Midlothian Football Club (more commonly known as Hearts)
is a Scottish professional football club based in Gorgie, in the
west of Edinburgh.


PALLETLINE LOGISTICS: Ceases Trading Following CVA Deal
-------------------------------------------------------
Motor Transport reports that Palletline Logistics (Midlands) has
lost its battle for survival and ceased to trade.

Palletline had entered into a company voluntary arrangement (CVA)
last May, after encountering cash flow problems that stemmed from
errors in reporting its operating figures to its lenders, Motor
Transport relates.

Palletline Logistics (Midlands) is a Birmingham-based haulier.


SOUTHWICK FOOTBALL: Club Relegated After Liquidation
----------------------------------------------------
Shoreham Herald reports that Southwick Football Club have been
relegated into County League Division 3 for the first time in
their history after going into liquidation.

The report says Wickers will not be playing senior football next
season after the Sussex County Football League had to act on
Football Association rules enforced upon them.

Under the rules, any club that goes into liquidation must be
automatically relegated down a division.  This differs from going
into administration which, under FA rules, only carries a ten-
point deduction, the report notes.

According to the report, Wickers chairman Alan Petkin admits the
club has made a mistake and will have to move on, but stressed
that the club only owes money to its owner.

"We went into liquidation and we just have to go by the rules and
accept the punishment and that's all we have really got to say.
We made a mistake and that is it. There is no bitterness or
anything," the report quotes Mr. Petkin as saying.  "We do not
owe anyone any money, apart from the owner and he has not asked
for it back. We changed the trading name and that is what has got
us into the trouble we're in."

Southwick Football Club Limited is currently in liquidation and a
new company is now being run under Southwick F.C. Limited,
according to official documents obtained by Shoreham Herald.


SWANGLEN FURNITURE: Airsprung Buys Business Out of Liquidation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Insider Media reports that the Airsprung Group has bought
Swanglen Furniture Ltd out of liquidation by.

Swanglen Furniture entered liquidation after being hit by the
collapse of bed retailer Dreams earlier this year and its
business and assets has now been bought by the Trowbridge-
headquartered company, the report relays.

It had ceased trading with all 28 employees made redundant.

The business will now be known as Swanglan Furnishings, the
report notes.

According to the report, liquidator Tim Ball of Mazars said the
administration of Dreams resulted in a significant bad debt for
the company and the loss of a major part of its annual sales.

"A sale of the business and assets was completed on Friday (12
July 2013)," the report quotes Mr. Ball as saying. "Airsprung
Group is a major bed manufacturer. Swanglen Furniture's main
product was head boards for beds. Hence it is a good fit, the
report notes.

Headquartered in Bristol, Swanglen Furniture Ltd sold beds,
chairs, storage units, footstools and headboards to major
retailers or bed manufacturers.


VEDANTA RESOURCES: Fitch Rates US$350MM Sr. Unsecured Loan 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned UK-based Vedanta Resources PLC's
(VRPLC, BB+/Stable) US$170 million and US$180 million guaranteed
senior unsecured loan facilities ratings of 'BB'. The details of
the loan facilities are as below:

  US$170m senior unsecured loan facility of Valliant (Jersey)
  Limited guaranteed by VRPCL: assigned 'BB'

  US$180m senior unsecured loan facility of Vedanta Finance
  (Jersey) Limited guaranteed by VRPLC: assigned 'BB'

The loans are rated at the same level as VRPLC's senior unsecured
rating of 'BB' based on the unconditional and irrevocable
guarantee provided by VRPLC.

The single-notch differential between the IDR and the senior
unsecured rating reflects structural subordination at VRPLC (the
holding company) due to its complex and fragmented holding
structure. Fitch may equalize the senior unsecured rating with
the IDR if structural subordination is reduced such that the
difference between the adjusted net debt (plus minority
interest)/EBITDAR and the adjusted net debt/EBITDAR ratios is
around 1x on a sustained basis.

Key Rating Drivers

Rising regulatory risks: The ratings reflect the impact of
regulatory risks on the metals & mining industry, particularly in
India, on VRPLC's businesses. The ban on iron ore mining
operations during the financial year to March 2013 impacted
VRPLC's iron ore mines in the state of Goa, its largest mines,
causing EBITDA from the iron ore mining business to decline to
US$84 million from US$721 million in FY12. Consequently, the
company's consolidated EBITDA fell to US$4.9 billion in FY13
(FY12: US$5.4 billion adjusted for full year's operations of
Cairn India Ltd).

VRPLC has been facing challenges in obtaining clearance for its
bauxite mining operations and also in expanding its alumina
processing facility in India. While the Supreme Court has allowed
commencement of the iron ore mining in the state of Karnataka,
Fitch expects VRPLC's operations to continue to be impacted by
regulatory challenges in the near term.

Reduced refinancing risk: VRPLC has refinanced most of the debt
at the holding company level maturing in FY14. The company has
also refinanced a significant amount of debt maturing in FY15,
which has resulted in extended maturities and improved liquidity.
Consequently, VRPLC's debt maturities in FY15 have declined to
around US$1.4 billion from US$2.7 billion (assuming the put on
the US$1.25 billion convertible debt is exercised on the put date
in July 2014), reducing refinancing risk. Most of the debt at
VRPLC's operating entities maturing in FY14 has also been
refinanced.

Re-organization reduces holding company debt: VRPLC has received
most of the approvals required for its re-organization announced
in February 2012. The re-organization is likely to reduce the
high level of debt at the holding company level to about one-
third of the current US$9 billion. Until the restructuring is
complete, Fitch expects dividend and other cash flows from
operating entities to be used for interest servicing.

Cash flow subordination remains: The group structure after re-
organization will continue to result in subordination of cash
flows at VRPLC to its subsidiaries given the minority
shareholding in its key operating entities. The agency will
continue to evaluate the group structure of VRPLC, the level of
subordination and VRPLC's ability to access cash flows from its
subsidiaries after re-organization.

Rating Sensitivities

Positive: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to positive rating action include

-- Continued positive free cash flow (FCF post acquisitions) and
   net leverage (adjusted net debt/operating EBITDAR) of below 2x
   on a sustained basis (FY13: 1.8x)

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to negative rating action include

-- Margin pressures, higher-than-expected capex, or a major debt-
   funded acquisition resulting in net leverage of over 2.75x on
   a sustained basis

In FY13, VRPLC recorded revenue of US$15 billion (FY12: US$15.6
billion on a proforma basis) and EBITDA of US$4.9 billion (FY12:
US$5.4 billion on a proforma basis). At end-March 2013, VRPLC's
total debt was US$16.6 billion and liquidity in the form of cash
balance of about US$8 billion which was largely held at
subsidiaries, Hindustan Zinc Ltd and Cairn India Ltd.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Notes Slowdown in EMEA High-Yield Bond Issuance
--------------------------------------------------------
The record-setting pace of high-yield bond issuance by EMEA
corporates has slowed, falling to approximately US$3 billion in
June from approximately US$11 billion in the previous month, says
Moody's in the July edition of its "High Yield Interest --
European Edition" publication.

"The reduction in bond issuance in June was unsurprising, given
the ongoing market disruption related to concerns about rising
rates," says Chetan Modi, head of Moody's European leveraged
finance team. "The reduction in issuance coincides with concerns
about credit risks in China, the return of sovereign credit
stress in the euro area and stresses in important emerging
markets."

The July edition also reveals that although the number of rating
downgrades by Moody's in June again exceeded the number of
upgrades, the absolute number of downgrades was low in both May
and June. June was also unusual in that there were a high number
of positive outlook changes.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 15 to July 19, 2013
-----------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *