/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/130715.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, July 15, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 138
Headlines
F R A N C E
MUTUELLE DE POITIERS: S&P Ups Counterparty Credit Rating From BB
TERREAL: Creditors Take Over as Part of Restructuring Deal
G E R M A N Y
PRAKTIKER AG: Files for Insolvency After Failed Unit Disposal
* GERMANY: Moody's Sees Decline in Utility Sector Profitability
G R E E C E
FREESEAS INC: Re-Files 2012 Annual Report to Revise Disclosures
PISTI 2010-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'CCC'
K A Z A K H S T A N
BTA BANK: Italian PM Revokes Expulsion of Ex-Chairman's Wife
N E T H E R L A N D S
GOLDENTREE CREDIT 2013-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating to Class E Notes
P O R T U G A L
DOURO MORTGAGES: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'Caa2'
METROPOLITANO DE LISBOA: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'B' ICR
* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on Portuguese Banks
R U S S I A
ROSBANK: Fitch Upgrades Viability Rating to 'bb+'
SUKHOI CIVIL: May Face Default; Has Until Year-End to Settle Debt
S P A I N
FTPYME BANCAJA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class D Notes
IBERCAJA BANCO: Moody's Continues Review of 'Ba2'-Rated Debts
LIBERBANK SA: Moody's Lowers Rating on Covered Bonds to 'Ba1'
LIBERBANK SA: Moody's Downgrades Debt Ratings to 'B1'
TDA IBERCAJA: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'B-'
UNICAJA BANCO: Weak Finances Cue Moody's to Lower Ratings to Ba3
S W E D E N
UNILABS HOLDING: Bond Offering Relaunch No Impact on Moody's CFR
UNILABS HOLDING: S&P Lowers Prelim. CCR to 'B'; Outlook Stable
S W I T Z E R L A N D
* Moody's Says Outlook on Swiss Banking System Remains Stable
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
ARGON CAPITAL: Moody's Eyes Downgrade of B1-Rated Repack Notes
BOPARAN HOLDINGS: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba3 CFR to Negative
CATTLES PLC: PwC Drags Rivals in Suit Over Auditing Negligence
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Misled Pensioners Month Prior to Bail-Out
INFINIS PLC: S&P Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
INTERNACIONALE RETAIL: Brought Out From Administration
QUINTON HAZELL AUTOMOTIVE: Mochdre Factory Sold Securing 15 Jobs
TRANSEUROPA FERRIES: Thanet Council Rejects Probe on GBP3MM Debt
VICARAGE FIELDS CARAVAN: Sold After Fell In Administration
VPHASE: Will Go Into Administration Absent Funding
X X X X X X X X
* Fitch Says EMEA Corp Cyclicals Split from Defensive Losers
* Moody's Notes Rise in Global SGDL Rate in Second Quarter
* Moody's Says EMEA Cos. Face US$1.23 Trillion Refinancing Needs
* S&P Applies Revised Insurance Criteria to Central EU Insurers
* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 8 to July 12, 2013
*********
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F R A N C E
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MUTUELLE DE POITIERS: S&P Ups Counterparty Credit Rating From BB
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it raised its public
information financial strength and counterparty credit ratings on
France-based mutual insurer Mutuelle de Poitiers Assurances (MdP)
to 'BBBpi' from 'BBpi'.
"The ratings reflect our view of MdP's fair business risk profile
and lower adequate financial risk profile. Our assessment of the
business risk profile is based on our view of low industry and
country risk for MdP's insurance operations in France, and the
company's long-established and stable domestic market position.
Still, we assess MdP's competitive position as less than
adequate. Our assessment of the financial risk profile takes into
account the company's upper adequate capital and earnings, partly
offset by MdP's in our view moderate risk position. We combine
these factors to derive our 'bbbpi' anchor for MdP. Our 'BBBpi'
rating is at the same level as the anchor because we consider the
company's enterprise risk management (ERM), management and
governance, and liquidity to be neutral for the rating," S&P
said.
"We assess MdP's insurance industry and country risk as low risk
because the company is active in the French property/casualty
(P/C) market. In the sector, we foresee a limited risk of new
entrants, generally good underwriting practices, and a reducing
expense base. Partly offsetting these positives is the highly
competitive nature of France's P/C insurance market, and
currently low investment returns due to the low interest rate
environment," S&P added.
"We view MdP's competitive position as less than adequate, due to
the company's small size and visibility in the competitive French
personal motor and property lines. MdP's market share in French
P/C is only 0.6%. The company's operating performance, which we
regard as marginal, also weighs negatively in our assessment of
MdP's competitive position. MdP's combined (loss and expense)
ratio averaged 108.6% over the past five years, worse than the
market average of 101% over the same period. What we consider as
relatively aggressive pricing policies have enabled the company
to record 4% average annual growth in gross premium written (GPW)
in 2008-2012, compared with a 2.5% average for the French P/C
market. MdP is present in several French regions through its 212
tied agents and 32 direct sales points," S&P noted.
MdP's capital and earnings are upper adequate, in S&P's opinion.
S&P considers the group's capital as a relative strength for its
financial risk profile. However, when S&P analyzes only capital,
its measure of total adjusted capital (TAC) for MdP is small and
partly relies on market-sensitive elements, notably unrealized
gains.
In S&P's view, MdP's risk position is moderate, mostly reflecting
the company's exposure to natural catastrophes. These include
windstorms and floods through its concentrated exposure to
western France, which have periodically triggered net losses in
recent years. S&P also factors in MdP's exposure to market
volatility through its higher-than-market-average equity
allocation. However, credit risk is manageable, in S&P's
opinion, thanks to its view of the good average credit quality of
the company's bond portfolio and its diversified exposures.
"We regard MdP's financial flexibility as adequate. Its main
source of capital is internal profit generation to fund any
requirements which, in practice, we consider to be limited. In
addition, a debt-free balance sheet supports our view of
financial flexibility. In addition, we do not expect any debt
issuance in practice given the company's size and still-
comfortable regulatory solvency coverage. Lastly, the company's
mutual status provides it with the ability to levy premiums calls
in the event of large losses," S&P said.
S&P regards MdP's ERM as adequate and its management and
governance practices as fair.
S&P considers MdP's liquidity to be adequate.
TERREAL: Creditors Take Over as Part of Restructuring Deal
----------------------------------------------------------
Michael Stothard at The Financial Times reports that Terreal has
been taken over by creditors including Goldman Sachs and Park
Square Capital as part of a consensual restructuring deal that
will see its debt burden slashed by more than half.
Terreal was taken over by LBO France, a private equity group, in
2005 for EUR860 million, the FT recounts. But the firm has since
struggled amid a downturn in the European construction industry
since 2008 and found itself weighed down by EUR1 billion in gross
debt, the FT notes.
After more than a year of negotiations between creditors and
shareholders, the company has been taken over by a group of
lenders led by ING, Park Square and Goldman Sachs, the FT
discloses. The trio will own 50% of Terreal, the FT says.
According to the FT, in exchange for control of the company,
more than a dozen creditors have agreed to write the senior debt
down from EUR486 million to EUR300 million and the junior PIK
notes, which are redeemable as shares, down from EUR550 million
to EUR157.5 million.
"The financial restructuring of the business will allow us to
pursue a consistent operational strategy," the FT quotes
Herve Gastinel, president of the management board of Terreal, as
saying.
The company saw a partial debt restructuring in 2009, but, like
many other continental restructurings carried out soon after the
financial crisis, it did not prove sufficient to tackle the
problem, the FT states.
Terreal is a French clay tile and brick maker.
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G E R M A N Y
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PRAKTIKER AG: Files for Insolvency After Failed Unit Disposal
-------------------------------------------------------------
Angela Maier at Bloomberg News reports that Praktiker AG filed
for insolvency after the sale of a division collapsed, and said
it will focus on restructuring the business.
According to Bloomberg, Praktiker said in a statement on Thursday
units that own the Praktiker and Extra-Bau+Hobby stores and
online outlets applied at Hamburg's local court for protection
from creditors. The company said the Max Bahr chain won't be
affected by the insolvency move, Bloomberg notes.
Praktiker dropped to the lowest price since its November 2005
initial public offering on Thursday after saying on Wednesday
that creditors wouldn't approve a debt reorganization following
the retailer's failure to sell a stake in a Luxembourg unit,
Bloomberg discloses. Bloomberg relates that two people familiar
with the matter said talks on the restructuring broke down after
credit insurers pulled support as they lost confidence in
management's ability to turn Praktiker around.
According to Bloomberg, the people said Praktiker needed more
than EUR30 million (US$39.2 million) to avoid insolvency. The
people, as cited by Bloomberg, said that private-equity company
Apollo Global Management LLC considered offering credit to
Praktiker before deciding the move wasn't viable because the
retailer's creditors declined to give up their collateral.
Praktiker sold 55.6 million new shares in November in an effort
to shore up funding, Bloomberg recounts. The company said in June
that was seeking to exit Ukraine, while its Turkish business was
in "orderly" insolvency proceedings, Bloomberg relates. The
company said Wednesday that proceeds from the failed stake sale
in the Batiself unit in Luxembourg had been "firmly included" its
business plan, and that it now faced excess debt and lacked
liquidity, Bloomberg notes.
The first-quarter net loss widened to EUR127.7 million from
EUR76.4 million a year earlier as sales dropped 10%, Bloomberg
discloses. The workforce totaled 17,820 people, with German
operations accounting for 5,399 jobs at the Praktiker brand,
5,068 at Max Bahr and 390 at other units, according to Bloomberg.
Its businesses abroad employed 6,963 workers. The store network
amounted to 414 outlets, with 76% of the locations in Germany.
Praktiker AG is a German home-improvement retailer.
* GERMANY: Moody's Sees Decline in Utility Sector Profitability
---------------------------------------------------------------
The profitability of German utilities' conventional power
generation business will be decline in 2013-15 because of a
combination of structural and cyclical challenges, says Moody's
Investors Service in a Special Comment report on the sector
entitled "German Utilities Face Structural and Cyclical
Challenges to Profitability and Credit Profile."
"We expect the combination of structural change, caused by the
increasing share of renewables in the energy mix, and weak demand
and commodity prices to exert negative pressure on the
profitability of German utilities' conventional generation," says
Niel Bisset, a Senior Vice President in Moody's Infrastructure
Finance Group and author of the report.
This expectation prompted Moody's recent negative rating actions
on E.ON SE (A3 negative), Vattenfall AB (A2 review for downgrade)
and RWE AG (Baa1 stable). Specifically, the actions and revised
rating positioning reflected the rating agency's view that
despite successful measures taken to address existing challenges,
the structural changes and steeper-than-expected declines in
power prices increased the risk that these utilities would be
unable to maintain financial profiles aligned with their ratings.
Moody's notes that low margins and falling load factors are
reducing output and profits from peaking plant. Lower power
prices will pose a greater risk to cash flow generation once
existing hedges on outright power begin to run off from 2015.
Utilities have some flexibility to deal with declining profits
thanks to debt reduction, cost cutting and hedging. However, this
is not inexhaustible given structural pressures on companies'
core generation business and continuing uncertainty around the
development of energy markets in Germany.
In Moody's view, German utilities' ability to adapt their
business risk profiles to the challenges of a shrinking power
generation business is compromised by the chronic political and
regulatory uncertainty that currently characterizes European
energy markets -- including Germany.
Although it is possible that generation market conditions in
Germany could improve in the future, Moody's considers that to be
a remote near-term possibility and therefore does not factor it
into its ratings.
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G R E E C E
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FREESEAS INC: Re-Files 2012 Annual Report to Revise Disclosures
---------------------------------------------------------------
FreeSeas Inc. filed an amendment to its annual report on Form
20-F/A for the year ended Dec. 31, 2012, originally filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 19, 2013. In
connection with a comment letter received from the SEC, the
Company determined that certain disclosures in the Original
Filing would need to be revised.
The following items have been amended as a result of, and to
reflect, the restatement:
* Item 16F - Change in Registrant's Certifying Accountant, to
clarify the timing of the change of accountants in January
2013; and
* Item 19 - Exhibits, to include a letter from Ernst & Young
(Hellas) Certified Auditors Accountants S.A. and an updated
letter from Sherb & Co., LLP.
A copy of the Form 20-F/A is available for free at:
http://is.gd/mPgDEe
About FreeSeas Inc.
Headquartered in Athens, Greece, FreeSeas Inc., formerly known as
Adventure Holdings S.A., was incorporated in the Marshall Islands
on April 23, 2004, for the purpose of being the ultimate holding
company of ship-owning companies. The management of FreeSeas'
vessels is performed by Free Bulkers S.A., a Marshall Islands
company that is controlled by Ion G. Varouxakis, the Company's
Chairman, President and CEO, and one of the Company's principal
shareholders.
The Company's fleet consists of six Handysize vessels and one
Handymax vessel that carry a variety of drybulk commodities,
including iron ore, grain and coal, which are referred to as
"major bulks," as well as bauxite, phosphate, fertilizers, steel
products, cement, sugar and rice, or "minor bulks." As of
Oct. 12, 2012, the aggregate dwt of the Company's operational
fleet is approximately 197,200 dwt and the average age of its
fleet is 15 years.
Freeseas disclosed a net loss of US$30.88 million in 2012, a net
loss of US$88.19 million in 2011, and a net loss of US$21.82
million in 2010. The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2012,
showed US$114.35 million in total assets, $106.55 million in
total liabilities and US$7.80 million in total shareholders'
equity.
RBSM LLP, in New York, issued a "going concern" qualification on
the consolidated financial statements for the year ended Dec. 31,
2012. The independent auditors noted that the Company has
incurred recurring operating losses and has a working capital
deficiency. In addition, the Company has failed to meet
scheduled payment obligations under its loan facilities and has
not complied with certain covenants included in its loan
agreements. It has also failed to make required payments to
Deutsche Bank Nederland as agreed to in its Sept. 7, 2012,
amended and restated facility agreement and received notices of
default from First Business Bank. Furthermore, the vast majority
of the Company's assets are considered to be highly illiquid and
if the Company were forced to liquidate, the amount realized by
the Company could be substantially lower that the carrying value
of these assets. These conditions among others raise substantial
doubt about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern.
PISTI 2010-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'CCC'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'CCC (sf)' from
'B- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its credit rating
on Pisti 2010-1 PLC's class A notes. S&P has subsequently
withdrawn its rating on the class A notes.
On March 26, 2013, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its rating
on Pisti 2010-1's class A notes following breaches of the cash
management agreement.
The noteholders and other relevant parties subsequently waived
these breaches and further consented to amendments of the
transaction documents. The amendments allow the allocation of
charge-offs firstly to transferor interest until it is reduced to
zero, before allocation to the investor interest. Additionally,
the finance charge priority of payment was amended to disallow
the application of excess spread to cure losses. This reduces
the notes' expense rate and minimizes the likelihood of early
amortization due to negative excess spread, but eliminates the
possibility of curing losses allocated to the investor interest,
which backs the notes.
"In our view, the transaction is increasingly reliant on the
servicer, Alpha Bank A.E. (CCC/Negative/C) for its performance.
In light of this, we believe that the credit quality of the class
A notes depends directly on Alpha Bank's performance. We have
therefore lowered to 'CCC (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' our rating on the
class A notes to equalize the rating with our long-term issuer
credit rating on Alpha Bank. At the same time, we have removed
the rating from CreditWatch negative," S&P said.
"In our opinion, the transaction has benefited from substantial
voluntary support from the servicer, in order to moderate the
transaction's deteriorating asset credit performance. For
example, the servicer's voluntary repurchase of defaulted assets
has helped to maintain eligible principal receivables at
sufficient levels relative to the amount of notes outstanding.
Without this support, the class A notes would have amortized
early as the eligible principal receivables balance trigger test
would have been breached," S&P added.
"We have subsequently withdrawn our rating on the class A notes
as we believe that the investor report information provided to us
to monitor the transaction is not sufficiently reliable. For
example, we have observed that there has been a regular stream of
credit adjustments added to the eligible principal receivables
balance. In our opinion, these adjustments are not necessarily
consistent with the definitions set out within the transaction
documents and may result in erroneous reporting of the pool's
performance. The issuer has also separately requested that we
withdraw our rating on the notes," S&P noted.
Pisti 2010-1 is a securitization of credit card and revolving
loan receivables that Alpha Bank originated.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
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K A Z A K H S T A N
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BTA BANK: Italian PM Revokes Expulsion of Ex-Chairman's Wife
------------------------------------------------------------
Marco Bertacche at Bloomberg News reports that former BTA Bank
JSC Chairman Mukhtar Ablyazov thanked Italian Prime Minister
Enrico Letta for revoking the expulsion of his wife, Alma
Shalabayeva, while saying his family is in "great danger."
Mr. Ablyazov said he fears Kazakhstan won't let his family leave
the country and will instead jail his wife, Bloomberg says,
citing a statement to Italian daily La Stampa. Mr. Letta's
office on Saturday revoked the expulsion of Ms. Shalabayeva after
reviewing her case, Bloomberg relates.
The Italian government said it also asked the head of police to
probe why it wasn't properly informed of her expulsion, Bloomberg
notes.
Kazakh prosecutors issued an international arrest warrant for
Ablyazov in March 2009 on suspicion he embezzled money from BTA
and laundered it through loans to fictitious companies, Bloomberg
recounts. Mr. Ablyazov has denied the accusations, saying the
lawsuits against him are politically motivated, Bloomberg
discloses.
According to Bloomberg, the Kazakh government, as cited by
Italian news agency Ansa, said Ms. Shalabayeva is not under house
arrest but she can't leave the country because she's under probe.
About BTA Bank
BTA Bank JSC, a Kazakhstan-based financial institution, again
filed for creditor protection under Chapter 15 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 12-12-13081) on July
16, 2012, in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan. BTA Bank is
asking the U.S. court to recognize the proceeding in the
Specialized Financial Court of Almaty City in the Republic of
Kazakhstan as a "foreign main proceeding."
BTA Bank estimated both debt and assets of more than $1 billion.
BTA Group -- comprised of BTA Bank and its subsidiaries and
affiliated companies -- is one of the leading banking groups in
the Commonwealth of Independent States and has affiliated banks
in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and
Turkey.
As of May 1, 2012, BTA Bank was the third largest bank in the
Republic of Kazakhstan by total assets with a market share of
10.9%, serving approximately 710,218 retail customers, 73,200
small and middle business customers and 1,397 corporate
customers, most of which reside or are registered, or maintain
their operations, inside Kazakhstan. As of May 1, 2012, the Bank
employed 5,290 people inside and 2 people outside Kazakhstan.
In 2009, investigations and proceedings were launched in the
Republic of Kazakhstan, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in
relation to fraudulent and unlawful transactions entered into by
the Bank's former management prior to February 2009 which, it
transpires, caused the Bank very significant losses.
On Oct. 7, 2009, the Bank applied to the Financial Court for an
order to commence a restructuring. The foreign representative in
2010 filed a petition (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Case No. 10-10638) in
Manhattan and the judge granted a petition for recognition of the
Kazakhstan proceeding as "foreign main proceeding.
The Kazakhstan proceedings were closed in August 2010 after all
distributions were made. The Chapter 15 case was closed in
January 2011. Creditors whose claims were restructured received
a mixture of cash, senior debt, subordinated debt, other forms of
debt, equity and so-called recovery units in consideration for
the restructuring of their claims.
Since the beginning of 2011, the Bank's financial situation,
however, has deteriorated despite measures undertaken by
management. A high cost of funding and fierce competition among
Kazakhstan banks for business led to a steep deterioration in the
Bank's net interest margin, the measure of the difference between
the interest income generated by the Bank and the amount of
interest paid out to its lenders, relative to the amount of its
(interest-earning) assets. Due to the subdued business
environment and cumbersome legal procedures, recoveries on non-
performing loans were considerably lower than expected. As a
result, the Bank showed a total negative equity under
International Financial Reporting Standards of KZT 216 billion
(US$1.5 billion) by June 30, 2011, which worsened to an estimated
IFRS consolidated equity deficit of KZT 367 billion (US$2.5
billion) at year end and has continued to worsen in 2012.
Considering the Bank's financial situation and the need to
restore the IFRS Tier 1 capital position, the Bank commenced
discussions with its creditors in order to effect a second
restructuring of all or part of its financial indebtedness under
Kazakhstan laws.
The Bank on April 5, 2012, formally agreed to the creation of a
steering committee of creditors to coordinate further discussions
in relation to the Restructuring. The Steering Committee
selected Houlihan Lokey and Deloitte as joint financial advisers
and Baker & McKenzie as legal adviser.
On April 25, 2012, the Bank's board of directors resolved to
initiate the Restructuring. On April 28, the Bank entered into
an agreement on restructuring with the National Bank of
Kazakhstan pursuant to Article 59-3(3) of the Kazakhstan Banking
Law. On April 28, after obtaining a review and comments from the
Steering Committee's advisers, the Bank submitted a draft
restructuring plan to the National Bank of Kazakhstan. After the
National Bank of Kazakhstan completed its review, the way was
clear for the Bank to seek a Financial Court order opening a
restructuring proceeding under Kazakhstan law.
The Bank made an application for restructuring under the Banking
Law, the Civil Procedural Code and the Amending Law on May 2,
2012.
The second restructuring will be effected through the
restructuring of the existing claims arising from the financial
instruments issued during the first restructuring. The
Restructuring is expected to be completed by Sept. 27, 2012.
The Chapter 15 petition was filed to prevent creditors from
seeking to take action against the Bank or its assets in the
United States. The Bank's principal assets in the United States
are balances in accounts of correspondent banks located in New
York City. Its major American creditors are financial
institutions, such as Deere Credit Inc, Goldman Sachs Lending
Partners LLC, LM Moore, L.P., PNC Bank N.A. (formerly National
City Bank Cleveland).
The Steering Committee of Creditors comprises Ashmore Investment
Management Limited (as agent for and on behalf of certain funds
and accounts for which it acts as investment adviser), the Asian
Development Bank, D.E. Shaw Oculus International, Inc. and D.E.
Shaw Laminar International, Inc., Gramercy Funds Management LLC,
J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd., Nomura International plc, The Royal
Bank of Scotland plc, SAM Salute Advisors Ltd., Swedish Export
Credits Guarantee Board - EKN and VR Capital Group Ltd. in its
capacity as General Partner of VR Global Partners, L.P
BTA Bank is represented in the U.S. by Evan C. Hollander, Esq.,
at White & Case LLP.
Judge James M. Peck oversees the Chapter 11 case.
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N E T H E R L A N D S
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GOLDENTREE CREDIT 2013-1: S&P Assigns BB Rating to Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its credit ratings to
GoldenTree Credit Opportunities European CLO 2013-1 B.V.'s
floating- and fixed-rate class A-1, A-2, A-3, B, C, D, and E
notes. At closing, GoldenTree Credit Opportunities European CLO
2013-1 also issued an unrated subordinated class of notes.
GoldenTree Credit Opportunities European CLO 2013-1 LLC is the
transaction's co-issuer. GoldenTree Asset Management LP acts as
portfolio manager.
S&P's ratings reflect its assessment of the collateral
portfolio's credit quality. As of closing, the portfolio is
diversified, primarily comprising broadly syndicated speculative-
grade U.S. and European senior secured term loans and senior
secured bonds.
S&P's ratings also reflect the credit enhancement available to
the rated notes through the subordination of cash flows payable
to the subordinated notes. S&P subjected the capital structure
to a cash flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate
(BDR) for each rated class of notes.
In S&P's analysis, it used the target par amount, the covenanted
weighted-average spread, the covenanted weighted-average coupon,
the covenanted weighted-average recovery rates, and the initial
foreign exchange rate. S&P applied various cash flow stress
scenarios, using four different default patterns, in conjunction
with different interest rate and foreign exchange stress
scenarios for each liability rating category.
The ratings assigned to the notes are commensurate with S&P's
assessment of available credit enhancement following its credit
and cash flow analysis. S&P's analysis shows that the credit
enhancement available to each rated class of notes was sufficient
to withstand the scenario default rates and defaults applicable
under the supplemental tests outlined in S&P's corporate
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria.
The issuer and co-issuer comply with S&P's bankruptcy-remoteness
criteria for special-purpose entities (SPEs).
GoldenTree Credit Opportunities European CLO 2013-1 is a cash
flow corporate loan CLO securitization of a revolving pool,
comprising senior secured loans and bonds issued by European and
U.S. borrowers.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.
The Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report included in this
credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com/1586.pdf
RATINGS LIST
GoldenTree Credit Opportunities European CLO 2013-1 B.V.
EUR285 Million, GBP15.32 Million Floating-Rate, Fixed-Rate,
and Subordinated Notes
Class Rating Amount
(mil.)
A-1 AAA (sf) EUR82.00
A-2 AAA (sf) EUR35.00
A-3 AAA (sf) GBP15.32
B AA (sf) EUR39.00
C A (sf) EUR21.00
D BBB (sf) EUR21.00
E BB (sf) EUR28.00
Sub NR EUR59.00
NR-Not rated.
===============
P O R T U G A L
===============
DOURO MORTGAGES: Moody's Cuts Rating on Class D Notes to 'Caa2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven notes,
confirmed the rating of two notes and upgraded the rating of one
note in three Portuguese residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions: DOURO MORTGAGES No.1, DOURO MORTGAGES No.2
and DOURO MORTGAGES No.3. Insufficiency of credit enhancement to
address sovereign risk has prompted the downgrade.
The rating action concludes the review of six notes placed on
review on September 11, 2012, following Moody's decision to
adjust the Portuguese country ceiling to Baa3 on September 5,
2012 and of four notes placed on review on November 28, 2012,
following Moody's revision of key collateral assumptions for the
entire Portuguese RMBS market.
Ratings Rationale:
The rating action primarily reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk. Moody's confirmed the
ratings of securities whose credit enhancement and structural
features provided enough protection against sovereign and
counterparty risk. Moody's upgraded one note in Douro Mortgage
No. 2 in consideration of the expected amortization profile of
this note and its resulting excess credit enhancement.
The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.
Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk
Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
Local Currency Country Risk Ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.
The Portuguese country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Portuguese issuer
including structured finance transactions backed by Portuguese
receivables, is Baa3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit
Enhancement (MILAN CE) represents the required credit enhancement
under the senior tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling.
By lowering the maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the
revised methodology alters the loss distribution curve and
implies an increased probability of high loss scenarios.
Moody's has not revised the key collateral assumptions for any of
the deals. Expected loss assumptions as a percentage of original
pool balance remain at 0.8% for Douro Mortgages No1;1.0% for
Douro Mortgages No2 and 1.6% for Douro Mortgages No3. The MILAN
CE assumptions remain at 10% for Douro Mortgages No1 and 12.5%
for Douro Mortgages No2 and Douro Mortgages No3.
In Douro Mortgages No2, all classes are currently amortizing pro-
rata. However, pro-rata amortization reverts to sequential if the
reserve fund is not at target or if the outstanding amount of
loans more than 3 months in arrears and net of amounts
provisioned for exceeds 2.5% of the original pool balance. Under
the current expected loss assumption, Moody's expects the
triggers to be breached. As a result, Class A1 is expected to be
repaid in priority to Class A2 in most of the default scenarios.
Exposure to Counterparty Risk
Moody's rating analysis also took into consideration the
commingling and set-off risk arising from exposure to Banco BPI
S.A. (Ba3,NP) acting as collection account bank and originator,
respectively, in the three transactions and swap counterparty in
Douro Mortgages No1 and No3. This exposure does not drive the
downgrade action.
Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes
In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.
As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.
The methodologies used in these ratings were Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework, published in May 2013, and
The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines, published in March 2013.
Other Factors used in these ratings are described in "Approach to
Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in Structured Finance
Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment".
In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (1)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (2)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.
As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.
In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach. In addition, in Douro Mortgages No2, Moody's corrected
the modeling of the reserve fund amortization as well as the
priority of principal payment upon a breach of performance
trigger.
List of Affected Ratings
Issuer: DOURO MORTGAGES No.1
EUR1434M A Notes, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 28,
2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR24.75M B Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR22.5M C Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR18.75M D Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: DOURO MORTGAGES No.2
EUR315M A1 Notes, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 28,
2012 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR1125M A2 Notes, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 28,
2012 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
EUR27.75M B Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR18M C Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
EUR14.25M D Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Sep 11,
2012 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade
Issuer: DOURO MORTGAGES No.3
EUR1441.5M A Notes, Downgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Nov 28,
2012 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade
METROPOLITANO DE LISBOA: S&P Revises Outlook & Affirms 'B' ICR
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it revised its outlook on
Portuguese subway company Metropolitano de Lisboa E.P.E. (Metro)
to negative from stable. At the same time, S&P affirmed its
long-term issuer credit rating on Metro at 'B'.
The rating actions mirror a similar action on the Republic of
Portugal.
The rating on 100% government-owned Metro is supported by S&P's
assessment that there is an "extremely high" likelihood that the
sovereign would provide extraordinary and timely support in case
of need. This reflects S&P's view of Metro's:
-- "Integral" link with the government. S&P continues to see
Metro as an extension of Portugal's central government, in
charge of managing and enlarging the subway network in the
Lisbon area in strict accordance with government's plans.
-- The central government decides Metro's strategy, makes its
main budgetary decisions, and exercises very tight control
over the company. Also, ongoing support in the form of
government guarantees has been strong. A large majority of
the company's debt, excluding central government loans, is
currently guaranteed by the central government, and the
guaranteed debt bears cross-default clauses with all of
Metro's financial obligations. The Portuguese government
also has a policy of providing extraordinary support
through budget loans so Metro can service its debt on time.
The central government also manages Metro's derivatives
directly, which fortifies the integral link between the
company and the central government under our criteria; and
-- Metro's "very important" role, as Lisbon's subway operator,
in charge of developing the city's subway infrastructure.
S&P believes Metro has a key role in implementing the
government's policy of building and managing the subway
network, a main feature in Lisbon's urban mobility.
However, S&P do not consider Metro's role as critical to
the government. S&P bases this view partly on the abrupt
deterioration of Metro's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
since its funding difficulties in 2011, which the
government did not prevent.
"Our assessment of Metro's SACP at 'cc' reflects our view that
Metro remains unable to fund its large negative cash flow without
central government support. In our opinion, Metro is highly
leveraged, generates negative cash flow, and has limited access
to substantial sources of funding other than central government
support. We understand that the government has not yet created a
formal financial framework that would provide Metro stable
financial support. As a result, since June 2011, the company has
relied on ad hoc extraordinary support when needed from its
government owner. However, we do not factor in extraordinary
government support when assessing the SACP of a government-
related entity (GRE) such as Metro, according to our criteria,"
S&P said.
"In accordance with our criteria, we consider the 'CC' rating
category to be applicable to an issuer that we consider is at
substantial risk of default, generally within six months,
especially when a default date can be determined. While we
generally anticipate that issuers in the 'CC' category will
default in the near term, some may find resources to continue
operations and honor their financial obligations for a longer
period. In the case of Metro, however, only its SACP--and not
the issuer credit rating--is in the 'cc' category, as we believe
that there is an extremely high likelihood that the company will
receive additional resources from the central government to repay
debt during our forecast horizon," S&P noted.
The negative outlook reflects the outlook on Portugal. S&P could
lower the rating on Metro if it downgraded Portugal.
The rating on Metro could stabilize at the current level if S&P
revised its outlook on Portugal to stable.
* S&P Takes Various Rating Actions on Portuguese Banks
------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it had taken the
following rating actions on Portuguese banks:
-- It revised the outlook on Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A.
(CGD) and Banco Santander Totta S.A. (Totta) to negative
from stable and affirmed its long- and short-term ratings
at 'BB-/B' and 'BB/B' respectively.
-- S&P affirmed the 'BB-/B' long- and short-term ratings on
Banco Espirito Santo S.A. (BES) and its core subsidiary
Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento S.A. (BESI), and Banco
BPI S.A. (BPI) and its core subsidiary Banco Portugues de
Investimento S.A.
-- S&P lowered to 'B' from 'B+' its long-term counterparty
credit rating on Banco Comercial Portuguˆs S.A. (Millennium
bcp) and affirmed its 'B' short-term rating. The outlook
is negative.
In a related action, S&P raised its ratings on BPI's hybrid
instruments to 'CCC+' from 'CCC-' and removed them from
CreditWatch negative where it had placed them on Feb. 22, 2013.
S&P reviewed all rated Portuguese banks following its recent
revision of the outlook on the long-term sovereign credit rating
on Portugal to negative from stable and the deteriorating trend
in our assessment of economic and industry risks for the
Portuguese banking system. S&P also took into account recent
bank-specific developments.
S&P's revision to negative of the outlook on government-owned
bank CGD and Totta mirrors its outlook on the sovereign. A lower
sovereign rating would constrain its ability to incorporate
extraordinary government support into the ratings on CGD if its
stand-alone creditworthiness were to deteriorate. Similarly, a
lower sovereign rating would constrain S&P's rating on Totta.
This is because S&P generally do not uplift the rating on non-
core subsidiaries above the sovereign rating of the subsidiary's
host country, based on group support.
"We downgraded Millennium bcp because, in our view, the bank's
risk profile is weaker than its peers', making it more vulnerable
to the difficult environment. Millennium bcp has not only
accumulated more problem loans than the system average, its asset
quality has also deteriorated more quickly. The outlook remains
negative," S&P said. S&P also revised downward its assessment of
the bank's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to 'b-' from 'b'.
S&P rates four further Portuguese banks: BES, BESI, BPI, and
Banco Portugues de Investimento. Following S&P's review of the
sector, the ratings on these banks were affirmed and their
outlooks remain negative.
All S&P's ratings on Portuguese banks currently carry negative
outlooks, which is consistent with S&P's view of the very
difficult environment in which they operate and with S&P's view
that economic and industry risks in the Portuguese financial
system could rise.
The economic downturn -- with recession now in its third year --
high and rising unemployment, and ongoing fiscal consolidation
are eroding the resilience of the private sector. This makes
lending in Portugal riskier. Banks, as a result, are accumulating
a high volume of problem assets, and the volume will likely
increase until the economy starts to grow again. In S&P's view,
growing political uncertainty could undermine the country's
fragile growth prospects, hitting banks harder than S&P currently
expects.
On the industry risk side, S&P anticipates that funding risks for
banks could increase if concerns regarding the sovereign's
creditworthiness are renewed. As a result, banks' progress
toward rebalancing their funding profiles could be reversed and
their reliance on the European Central Bank (ECB) could increase
once more. Competitive dynamics could also worsen, in S&P's
view, if the restructuring plans of state-supported entities
prove unsuccessful. If this occurs, the state could end up
ultimately controlling a sizable share of the banking system,
which could distort the market.
Both the negative trend on S&P's assessment of the banking system
and bank-specific factors contribute to its negative outlooks on
three of the Portuguese banks:
-- S&P's negative outlook on BES takes into account the
possibility that the bank might be unable to sustain
capital at what it considers to be a moderate level.
-- CGD and Millennium bcp both received state aid and as a
result must be restructured. The negative outlooks on
these banks therefore also factor in the implementation
risks associated with restructuring. In S&P's view, the
restructuring could erode the stability and franchise of
these two banks.
S&P currently considers a revision of the outlooks on the
Portuguese banks to stable to be unlikely. S&P would probably
not revise the outlook to stable until the risks affecting the
country's economy and its financial sector have eased.
"In a related action, we have raised our issue ratings on BPI's
hybrid instruments to 'CCC+' from 'CCC-' and removed them from
CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on
Feb. 22, 2013. BPI has continued to pay the interest due on
these hybrid instruments, despite having received state aid. We
understand that BPI will continue to pay coupons on these
instruments because otherwise, according to their terms and
conditions, it will be unable to redeem the EUR1.5 billion
contingent convertible instrument subscribed by the government.
Out of the total capital injection, the bank has already repaid
EUR0.5 billion during 2012 and 2013. At 'CCC+', these
instruments are rated four notches below the bank's SACP and
still reflect a relatively high likelihood that the coupon will
not be paid.
BICRA SCORE SNAPSHOT
Portugal To From
BICRA Group 7 7
Economic risk 7 7
Economic resilience High Risk High Risk
Economic imbalances High Risk High Risk
Credit risk in the economy
Very High Risk High Risk
Industry risk 6 6
Institutional framework Intermediate Risk Intermediate Risk
Competitive dynamics Intermediate Risk Intermediate Risk
Systemwide funding Very High Risk Very High Risk
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) economic risk
and industry risk scores are on a scale from 1 (lowest risk) to
10 (highest risk).
RATINGS LIST*
(All ratings are affirmed, except where a "from" rating is
given.)
Banco BPI S.A.
Banco Portugues de Investimento S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating BB-/Negative/B
To From
BPI Capital Finance Ltd.
Preference Stock (1 issue) CCC+ CCC-
/Watch Neg
(Guaranteed by Banco BPI S.A.)
To From
Banco Comercial Portugues S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating B/Negative/B
B+/Negative/B
Banco Espirito Santo S.A.
Banco Espirito Santo de Investimento S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating BB-/Negative/B
To From
Banco Santander Totta S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating BB/Negative/B
BB/Stable/B
To From
Caixa Geral de Depositos S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating BB-/Negative/B BB-
/Stable/B
* This list does not include all ratings affected.
===========
R U S S I A
===========
ROSBANK: Fitch Upgrades Viability Rating to 'bb+'
-------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Russia-based Rosbank's (RB),
Rusfinance Bank's (RFB) and DeltaCredit Bank's (Delta) Long-term
Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'BBB+' with a Stable Outlook. At
the same time Fitch upgraded all three banks' Viability Ratings
(VRs) to 'bb+' from 'bb'.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - IDRs, NATIONAL RATINGS, SUPPORT RATINGS
RB's, RFB's and Delta's IDRs and Support Ratings are driven by
potential support the banks may receive from their ultimate
parent, France's Societe Generale (SG; 'A+'/Negative; 82.4% stake
in RB which in turn owns 100% of RFB and Delta) and constrained
by the Russian Country Ceiling of 'BBB+'. In Fitch's view, SG
would have a strong propensity to support the banks, given its
controlling stake and strategic commitment to the Russian market;
the banks' still small size relative to the SG group limiting the
burden of any support required; and the significant
contagion/reputational risks for SG from their potential default.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - RB'S VR
The upgrade of RB's VR reflects the improved integration of RB
into SG following its merger with BSGV and overhaul of the
management framework; improvement of its asset quality due to
considerable work outs of legacy problem loans; the bank's strong
liquidity position and reasonable capitalization. RB's risk
profile and hence VR also benefits from its ownership of well
performing and better capitalized RFB and Delta, which pay
dividends and support its profitability. At the same time RB's
stand-alone performance is still modest and, Fitch believes,
achieving improvement would be challenging, yet possible given
considerable potential for further cost optimization.
RB managed to recover about 3% of its average corporate loans in
2012 with the remaining non-performing loans (NPLs; 90 days
overdue) equaling 9% of end-2012 loans and being 1.1x covered by
reserves. Fitch views the quality of the remaining loan book as
solid: 44% of end-2012 loans is lower risk secured auto loans and
mortgages with a further 20% unsecured retail exposure to mostly
payroll clients, while 36% of corporate loans are weighted
towards better quality/blue chip corporates.
Profitability remains modest (consolidated return on average
assets (ROAA) of only 1.5%), due to the large and partly
inefficient branch network, but, conversely, here the opportunity
lies to optimize costs. Another reason is the bank's more
conservative approach to lending which makes it challenging to
grow in the currently competitive market.
The bank also keeps a considerable low-yielding liquidity buffer
(around 15% of end-5M13 assets or 31% of customer accounts). The
RUB60 billion outflow of corporate funding in May 2013 was not
triggered by the recent allegations of RB's former head of the
management board, but rather withdrawal of funds temporary placed
in April 2013 by the few corporate clients with whom RB has a
long-established relationship, which the bank placed on short-
term money market. Excluding this effect the customer base and
liquidity position remains stable.
RB is strongly capitalized on a consolidated level as expressed
by its high 15% Fitch Core Capital (FCC) ratio. However,
regulatory capitalization on a standalone basis is tighter with
the regulatory total capital adequacy ratio (CAR) equaling 13.3%
at end-5M13 allowing the bank to withstand only moderate 4.5% of
additional credit losses. However, there is no immediate
significant pressure on it given resolved asset quality problems,
moderate growth plans (10% in 2013) and recently received
dividends from RFB and Delta equaling, respectively, 45% and 35%,
of their annual profits for 2012.
KEY RATING DRIVERS - RFB'S AND DELTA'S VRs
The upgrade of RFB's and Delta's VRs reflects reassessment of the
appropriate rating levels given their relatively low-risk secured
lending business, which showed considerable resilience during the
last crisis, solid management, sound profitability and strong
capitalization.
At the same time, RFB's and Delta's VRs continue to factor in the
banks' significant dependence on SG's funding, although this is
obtained on market terms, and uncertain growth prospects for
RFB's car lending segment, despite the recently relaunched
government subsidy program.
RFB's asset quality remains solid with the NPL origination rate
of 1.4% of average loans in 2012 (0.9% in 2011), which is well
below the Fitch-estimated break-even rate of 7.3%. The bank
remains strongly capitalized with a FCC ratio of 24.9% at end-
2012 and regulatory total CAR of 18.3% at end-5M13; the latter
would allow RFB to reserve additional 11% of gross loans before
breaching the regulatory minimum. De-leveraging capacity stemming
from a relatively short-term loan book (19 months on average)
provides an additional safety cushion.
Delta's NPLs were low at 0.7% at end-Q113 (considerably below
average 1.7% for mortgages in Russia). The bank is reasonably
capitalized with regulatory CAR standing at 15.1% (FCC ratio is
much higher at 30.7% at end-Q113 due to lower risk-weights of
mortgages as per IFRS), which would allow it to reserve an extra
6% of the loan book before breaching the regulatory minimum,
which is well above historical losses.
On the funding sides both banks still rely on SG's funds which,
albeit decreasing, equal 32% and 43% of their end-2012
liabilities, respectively. Although the funding is provided in
roubles (all of it for RFB, 48% for Delta), Fitch is concerned
that the cost of this funding, if refinanced, may increase if
there is a sharp deterioration of the local currency against the
US dollar and/or euro. This is of more concern for Delta due to
its mortgage loan book being longer-term (five years on average).
RATING SENSITIVITES - IDRS, NATIONAL RATINGS AND SUPPORT RATINGS
The banks' Long-term IDRs could be upgraded/downgraded if
Russia's Country Ceiling ('BBB+') was upgraded/downgraded. The
possible downward pressure for all three banks could also arise
if there was a multi-notch downgrade of SG or a marked reduction
in the strategic importance of the Russian market for SG, none of
which Fitch currently anticipates.
RATING SENSITIVITIES - VRS
The upside potential for RB's VRs stems from marked improvement
in operating efficiency translating into strong bottom line
results and potentially further recoveries from its legacy loan
book.
The upside potential for RFB and Delta is currently limited,
given their niche business models. However, an extended track
record of solid performance through-the-cycle as well as the
development of banks' own deposit collection franchises would be
credit positive.
Downside pressure for all three banks, although unlikely in the
medium term, could stem from potential weakening of banks' asset
quality and/or liquidity driven by a marked deterioration of the
operating environment.
KEY RATING DRIVERS AND SENSITIVITIES - SENIOR UNSECURED DEBT
Long-term and National Ratings of all banks' senior unsecured
debt correspond to their Long-term IDRs and are expected to move
along with them.
The rating actions are:
RB
Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BBB+';
Stable Outlook
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Stable
Outlook
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bb+' from 'bb'
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB+'/'F2'/'AAA(rus)'
Market linked securities: affirmed at 'BBB+(emr)'
RFB
Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BBB+';
Stable Outlook
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Stable
Outlook
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bb+' from 'bb'
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed 'BBB+'/'F2'/'AAA(rus)'
Delta
Long-term foreign and local currency IDRs: affirmed at 'BBB+';
Stable Outlook
Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F2'
Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
National Long-term rating: affirmed at 'AAA(rus)'; Stable
Outlook
Viability Rating: upgraded to 'bb+' from 'bb'
Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'BBB+'/'AAA(rus)'
SUKHOI CIVIL: May Face Default; Has Until Year-End to Settle Debt
-----------------------------------------------------------------
RT Business reports that Sukhoi Civil Aircraft has accumulated
US$2 billion in debt and failed to meet its credit obligations.
The problem needs to be settled by the year end, otherwise the
company will default, RT Business says.
According to RT Business, Kommersant daily said Sukhoi is now
more than US$600 million in debt to the State Corporation Bank
for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank),
with an additional US$300 million unsettled to related parties.
On top of that, Sukhoi violated the terms of servicing the loans
from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
and its financial obligations to the Germany's WestLB, and
Russia's VTB banks, RT Business notes. The banks agreed not to
require an early loan repayment, but by the end of 2013 the money
needs to be there, RT Business states.
A recovery plan would see half of the company's debt settled with
bonds under state guarantees, RT Business states.
Vnesheconombank could also help with an estimated US$483.9
million, according to RT Business. This money could be raised
through the sale of a 5% stake in EADS, the parent company of
Airbus, RT Business says, citing a Kommersant source.
RT Business relates that Oleg Panteleev, Chief Editor of
Aviaport, told Kommersant given the scale of the SSJ project,
state support looks logical here.
". . . SSJ is a pilot project for Russia's airline industry,
that's why it's crucial for Sukhoi Civil Aircraft company to meet
its obligations to its creditors, as well as to retain confidence
from international partners," Mr. Panteleev, as cited by RT
Business, said.
Sukhoi is reportedly being in talks to restructure its debt,
where it's also checking its position with the World Wings
airline that holds a 25%+ 1 stake in Russia's company, RT
Business states.
The company's 2012 IFRS revenue stood at US$198 million, with the
net loss going above US$111 million, RT Business discloses.
Sukhoi Civil Aircraft is the Russian maker of the Sukhoi Superjet
(SSJ).
=========
S P A I N
=========
FTPYME BANCAJA: Fitch Affirms 'CCC' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded FTPYME Bancaja 3, FTA's class B
notes and affirmed the others, as follows:
EUR4.1m Class A3(G) (ISIN ES0304501028): affirmed at 'AA-sf';
Outlook Negative
EUR12.4m Class B (ISIN ES0304501036): downgraded to 'A+sf' from
'AA-sf'; Outlook Stable
EUR20.0m Class C (ISIN ES0304501044): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Outlook
Negative
EUR8.2m Class D (ISIN ES0304501051): affirmed at 'CCCsf';
Recovery Estimate 5%
KEY RATING DRIVERS
The affirmation of the class A3(G), C, and D notes reflects
adequate levels of credit enhancement which offset the
deterioration in portfolio performance since the last review.
Loans in arrears of more than 90 days have increased to 8.9% of
the total portfolio, from 8.7% in June 2012. The balance of
defaulted assets in the portfolio has risen to EUR10.7 million
from EUR7.0 million in June 2012. Recoveries have been minimal
since June 2012 and consequently the reserve fund has been
depleted.
The downgrade of the class B notes reflects their exposure to
payment interruption risk in the case of servicer disruption.
Since the reserve fund is depleted, the class B notes would have
no source of liquidity while collections from the portfolio are
not forthcoming during the servicer replacement period. The
highest achievable rating for the note is therefore limited to
'A+sf' (see 'Criteria for Rating Caps and Limitations in Global
Structured Finance Transactions', dated June 12, 2013, for more
details). The Stable Outlook on the class B notes reflects the
high level of credit enhancement available to the notes.
Payment interruption risk for the class A3(G) notes is mitigated
by the prefunded liquidity facility (guarantee fund) which forms
part of the guarantee mechanism available to the class A3(G)
note. Fitch only gave credit to the guarantee fund held in the
issuer's treasury account and did not give credit to
disbursements by the guarantor in rating scenarios above the
rating of the guarantor.
The class A3(G) notes benefit from a guarantee from the Kingdom
of Spain (BBB/Negative/F2), which covers payment of accrued
interest and principal for the note when due. A claim is
submitted under the guarantee whenever the trustee determines
that the transaction has insufficient funds to pay principal and
interest due on the class A3(G) notes on a particular payment
date. The Kingdom of Spain will make a disbursement under the
guarantee three months after the claim is submitted.
Disbursements under the guarantee are a liability of the SPV and
rank pari passu with the class A3(G) notes.
At closing, the issuer entered into a liquidity facility
agreement with Caja de Ahorros de Valencia, Castellon y Alicante
(Bancaja; now part of Bankia S.A., BBB/RWN/F2) to mitigate the
impact of the three-month payment lag under the guarantee. The
liquidity line is used on any payment date when the issuer would
otherwise be unable to pay all interest and principal due on the
class A3(G) notes. The liquidity line drawings are then repaid
from the corresponding guarantee disbursements.
Following the downgrade of the liquidity facility provider below
'F1', the issuer drew the entire available amount of the
liquidity facility and deposited the funds in the treasury
account, currently held at Barclays Bank plc (A/Stable/F1). On
the June 2013 payment date, a guarantee fund drawing of EUR1.3
million was made to pay principal due on the class A3(G) notes.
The remaining balance of the guarantee fund is EUR2.8 million.
The transaction has already experienced principal shortfalls in
2010 and 2011. However, no principal was due on the class A3(G)
notes and hence the guarantee mechanism was not triggered at that
time.
FTPYME Bancaja 3, FTA, is a granular cash flow securitization of
a static portfolio of secured and unsecured loans granted to
Spanish small- and medium-sized enterprises by Bancaja.
Rating Sensitivities
Applying a 1.25x default rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would not result in a downgrade of the notes.
Applying a 0.75x recovery rate multiplier to all assets in the
portfolio would result in a downgrade of the notes by at most one
notch.
IBERCAJA BANCO: Moody's Continues Review of 'Ba2'-Rated Debts
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has extended the review for downgrade
on all of Ibercaja Banco's ratings. The debt and deposit ratings
remain at Ba2/ Not Prime and the bank's standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) at D- (equivalent to a ba3 baseline credit
assessment).
The review for downgrade of Ibercaja's ratings has been extended
to reflect the downside risks to the bank's standalone credit
profile, associated with the planned integration with Grupo Banco
Cajatres S.A. (Caja 3, unrated) that was approved by the board of
both banks on May 23, 2013. The review for downgrade was
initiated on October 24, 2012.
The ratings of Ibercaja incorporate the bank's capacity to
maintain an adequate risk absorption capacity despite ongoing
negative asset quality trends against a backdrop of a weak
operating environment and very low interest rates that will
continue to put pressure on its recurring earning power.
Ratings Rationale:
Ibercaja's standalone credit assessment of D-/ba3 incorporates
the bank's (1) improved risk-absorption capacity following the
capital strengthening initiatives that have been implemented as
part of its recapitalization plan; (2) better-than-average asset-
quality indicators despite ongoing deterioration; and (3)
adequate liquidity position, despite restricted market access for
most Spanish banks.
On October 31, 2012, following the stress test by Oliver Wyman
Bank of Spain announced that Ibercaja will not require public
support to fill the capital shortfall of EUR226 million which
Oliver Wyman had identified, and that it was going to be able to
cover its capital deficit through private resources, as
contemplated on the recapitalization plan that was submitted for
its approval.
Moody's will continue to monitor the bank's asset-quality
performance closely. Asset-quality indicators have weakened
recently -- although at 5.99% at end of March 2013, they continue
to compare favorably with the system average at 10.47% --.
Furthermore, Moody's takes some comfort from Ibercaja's high
coverage ratio (defined as loan loss reserves/non-performing
loans (NPLs)) of 83%, which exceeds the system average of 70.4%.
Moody's also notes that Ibercaja's net NPLs (NPLs minus loan loss
reserves) at end-March 2013 stood at 1% while the system's ratio
reached 3.1%.
Moody's also notes, however, that in addition to the NPLs, the
group has other non-earning assets such as real-estate (RE)
assets of EUR1.4 billion gross at end 2012 that were acquired
during this crisis through repossessions and negotiations with
troubled borrowers. If included, the NPL ratio rises to 9.7%
(Moody's-estimated system average: 17%). Furthermore, Moody's
notes the high percentage of refinanced loans at the bank (16.8%
of gross loans). The aggregation of refinanced loans (that are
not already captured in the non-performing loan ratio) increases
the overall problem loan ratio to a high 22.7%, compared to
Moody's- estimated system average of close to 26%. In this
context, Moody's emphasized that the ability of the bank to
continue its track record of better asset quality performance in
relation to the system average in Spain will be a vital
indication that the risks of the acquisitions have been correctly
assessed. Any signs that Ibercaja's asset quality is less
resilient than the Spanish banking system than in the past would
exert significant downward rating pressure.
Ibercaja has a strong reliance on the residential mortgage
segment, which represents around 65% of its loan portfolio.
Moody's notes the resilience of its book of residential
mortgages, which continues to outperform the system average and
displays an NPL ratio very far from Moody's loss estimates.
Ibercaja also displays lower NPL ratios than the system average
for the remaining asset classes.
Moody's expects asset quality to deteriorate further across asset
classes, based on the rating agency's view that any signs of a
modest economic recovery at this stage are being generated by the
export sector, while still weak domestic demand is likely to
cause further contraction in domestic growth into 2014 as
unemployment remains at very high levels.
Ibercaja's debt and deposit ratings benefit from a moderate
probability of systemic support, which results in one notch of
uplift from its standalone credit strength of D-/ba3.
Focus of the Ongoing Review
Ibercaja's standalone BFSR remains on review for downgrade to
reflect the downside risks associated with the planned
acquisition of Caja 3 announced on May 23, 2012. The transaction
is subject to the completion of the mandatory burden-sharing
process of Caja 3's junior instruments as part of the
restructuring plan approved by the European Commission for the
bank. In concluding the rating review, Moody's will assess the
credit risk profile and risk absorption capacity of the combined
entity.
What Could Move The Rating Up/Down
Ibercaja's ratings could be downgraded in the event of (1) broad
deterioration of its financial fundamentals following the
acquisition of Caja 3; (2) worsening operating conditions , i.e.,
a broader economic recession beyond Moody's current GDP decline
forecasts of -1.4% for 2013; and/or (3) a significant
deterioration of its liquidity profile.
The principal methodology used in this rating/analysis was Global
Banks published in May 2013.
Ibercaja's BFSR and long-term ratings are on review for
downgrade. Therefore, in the near term, there is little
likelihood of any significant upwards rating pressure on these
ratings.
LIBERBANK SA: Moody's Lowers Rating on Covered Bonds to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa2 (on
review for downgrade) the ratings of the mortgage covered bond
issued by Liberbank, S.A. (deposits B1 negative, standalone bank
financial strength rating E+/baseline credit assessment b2
negative).
This rating action follows Moody's decision to downgrade the
senior unsecured rating of Liberbank, which supports these
covered bonds.
Ratings Rationale:
These rating actions are prompted by Moody's decision to
downgrade the senior unsecured ratings of Liberbank to B1 from
Ba3 (on review for downgrade). The TPI Moody's assigns to the
issuer's covered bond program remains "Improbable".
Key Rating Assumptions/Factors
Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process:
an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.
EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's uses its Covered Bond Model (COBOL) to
determine a rating based on the expected loss on the bond. COBOL
determines expected loss as (1) a function of the issuer's
probability of default (measured by the issuer's rating); and (2)
the stressed losses on the cover pool assets following issuer
default.
For the covered bond program, cover pool losses are an estimate
of the losses Moody's currently models if the relevant issuer
defaults. Moody's splits cover pool losses between market risk
and collateral risk. Market risk measures losses stemming from
refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate and currency
mismatches (these losses may also include certain legal risks).
Collateral risk measures losses resulting directly from the cover
pool assets' credit quality. Moody's derives collateral risk from
the collateral score.
Liberbank's Mortgage Covered Bonds
The cover pool losses are 32.6%, with market risk of 22.8% and
collateral risk of 9.7%. The collateral score for this program is
currently 14.6%. The over-collateralization (OC) in this cover
pool is 134.7%, of which Liberbank provides 25% on a "committed"
basis. The minimum OC level that is consistent with the Ba1
rating target is 0.5%. These numbers show that Moody's is not
relying on "uncommitted" OC in its expected loss analysis.
TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator"
(TPI), which indicates the likelihood that the issuer will make
timely payments to covered bondholders if the issuer defaults.
The TPI framework limits the covered bond rating to a certain
number of notches above the issuer's rating.
The TPI assigned to this program is "Improbable".
Sensitivity Analysis
The issuer's credit strength is the main determinant of a covered
bond rating's robustness. The TPI Leeway measures the number of
notches by which Moody's might downgrade the issuer's rating
before the rating agency downgrades the covered bonds because of
TPI framework constraints.
Based on the current TPI of "Improbable", the TPI Leeway for
Liberbank's program is 1 notch. This implies that Moody's might
downgrade the covered bonds because of a TPI cap, if it
downgrades the issuer rating below B2, all other variables being
equal.
A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances, such as (1) a sovereign downgrade
negatively affecting both the issuer's senior unsecured rating
and the TPI; (2) a multiple-notch downgrade of the issuer; or (3)
a material reduction of the value of the cover pool.
The principal methodology used in this ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in July 2012.
LIBERBANK SA: Moody's Downgrades Debt Ratings to 'B1'
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by one notch the debt
and deposit ratings of Liberbank to B1 from Ba3, with a negative
outlook. The bank's short-term ratings remain at Not Prime. The
B1 debt and deposit ratings are now one notch above the bank's
baseline credit assessment (BCA) of b2, which Moody's has raised
from caa1. The one-notch uplift for the debt and deposit ratings
is based on Moody's typical support assumptions for banks of that
size, market share, complexity and systemic relevance in Spain.
The BFSR now carries a negative outlook.
The raising of the bank's BCA reflects Liberbank's improved
credit-risk profile following the recapitalization plan that it
has recently implemented to offset the capital deficit (EUR1.2
billion) identified under Oliver Wyman's stress test on September
28, 2012. The recapitalization plan encompassed public-sector
support, a mandatory burden-sharing exercise on its junior
instruments and asset sales.
The downgrade of the bank's debt and deposit ratings has been
prompted by the normalization of support assumptions by Moody's.
The rating agency had previously taken into consideration the
availability of extraordinary government support for senior debt
stemming from the government's decision in 2012 to request
funding from the European Stability Mechanism of up to EUR100
billion to recapitalize any banks that required additional
capital. This availability of government support had to a great
extent offset the bank's intrinsic weakness and the uncertainty
to what degree Liberbank would require government support and how
its credit profile would emerge from the restructuring. With the
restructuring of Liberbank now being implemented, and with only
conditional access to the rest of the EUR100 billion ESM capital,
Moody's is of the view that the Spanish government (Baa3
negative) is likely to find itself increasingly constrained in
providing further support for institutions such as Liberbank,
which have already received public support.
This rating action concludes the review for downgrade initiated
on October 24, 2012.
Ratings Rationale:
Downgrade of The Senior Debt and Deposit Ratings
The one-notch downgrade of Liberbank's senior debt and deposit
ratings reflects Moody's assessment of a lower level of systemic
support for the bank, once the recapitalization plan,
encompassing public-sector support, has been implemented. The
restructuring of Liberbank was approved by the European
Commission on December 20, 2012 and is now being implemented.
However, with only restricted and conditional further access to
the rest of the EUR100 billion European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
capital, the three-notch reduction in systemic support uplift
reflects Moody's view that the Spanish government is likely to
find itself increasingly constrained in providing further support
for Spanish banks, including those such as Liberbank that have
already received public support. While the rating agency
continues to reflect the potential for support to Liberbank in
the one notch uplift from b2 BCA to the B1 debt rating, Moody's
believes the probability has risen that the bank will meet
further shortfalls (at least partly) through burden-sharing.
Raising of the Standalone Credit Assessment
Moody's decision to raise Liberbank's standalone credit
assessment to E+/b2 from E/caa1 is primarily driven by the bank's
(1) improved risk-absorption capacity following the
implementation of several capital reinforcement measures as part
of its recapitalization plan; (2) improved asset-quality
indicators and credit-risk profile after the transfer of real-
estate-related assets to SAREB (Spain's so-called "bad bank"),
which were amongst the most seriously impaired assets of this
bank; and (3) adequate liquidity position, despite restricted
market access for most Spanish banks.
The stress test performed by Oliver Wyman on September 28, 2012
revealed a capital shortfall for Liberbank of EUR1.2 billion
under its adverse scenario. As part of the recapitalization plan
approved by the European Commission, Liberbank transferred on 26
February 2013 EUR6.7 billion of real-estate-related assets (in
gross terms) to SAREB, which implied a drastic reduction of its
exposure to this sector: to 3% of total lending as of end-March
2013 from 24% at end-December 2011. Liberbank also received a
capital injection by the Spanish Fund for the Orderly Resolution
of the Banking System (FROB) on March 12, 2013, for an amount of
EUR124 million in the form of contingent convertible bonds.
Furthermore, the bank completed a burden-sharing on its junior
instruments in April 2013 and asset sales, which have enabled it
to comply with minimum regulatory core capital threshold of 9%.
Following the transfer of real estate assets to SAREB,
Liberbank's standalone credit assessment is now underpinned by
the bank's better-than-average -- albeit still deteriorating --
asset-quality indicators, with an overall problem loan ratio of
7.5% at end-March 2013, comparing favorably with the 10.5% system
average. Moody's acknowledges the bank's modest refinancing
requirements over the next 12 months and improved funding
position, aided by the ongoing deleveraging and increased liquid
assets after receiving the bonds guaranteed by the Spanish
sovereign (government bond rating Baa3 negative), associated with
the transfer of real-estate-related assets to SAREB. Furthermore,
Moody's positively notes Liberbank's enhanced access to private
capital sources after becoming a publicly traded entity on May
16, 2013.
However, the standalone credit assessment is constrained by the
bank's weak quality of capital, with Deferred Tax Assets (DTAs)
net of deferred tax liabilities accounting for 85% of post-
recapitalization Tier 1 capital. Moody's recognizes that the
authorities have the option to provide further extraordinary
support by transforming these assets into other forms such as
direct government claims that can be more readily monetized.
The E+/b2 standalone profile is also constrained by the execution
risks associated with Liberbank's restructuring plan in light of
Spain's current recessionary environment. The bank's
restructuring plan aims to further reinforce solvency levels,
well above the 9.3% core capital ratio reported at end-March
2013. The success of this plan hinges on Liberbank's capacity to
improve profitability metrics, maintaining its cost of risk at
low levels and achieving significant cost-efficiency gains
arising from a reduction of its cost base.
Furthermore, Moody's expects asset quality to deteriorate further
across asset classes, based on its view that any signs of a
modest economic recovery at this stage are only being generated
by the export sector, while still-weak domestic demand is likely
to cause further contraction in domestic growth into 2014 as
unemployment remains at very high levels.
Rationale for the Outlooks
The negative outlook on Liberbank's debt and deposit ratings
reflect both the current negative outlook on the Spanish
government's Baa3 bond rating and the negative outlook on the
standalone BFSR.
Liberbank's standalone BFSR has a negative outlook to reflect the
bank's vulnerability to a further weakening of its credit profile
in light of the weak outlook for the Spanish economy.
What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down
A further upgrade of Liberbank's standalone BFSR is currently
unlikely, given the negative outlook. However, an improvement of
the standalone BFSR could be driven by (1) the successful work-
out of its asset-quality challenges; (2) a sustainable recovery
in its profitability indicators; (3) sustainable access to market
funding and capital; and (4) a successful execution of the
restructuring plan.
Downward pressure would be exerted on Liberbank's standalone
credit strength if (1) the weak quality of the bank's capital is
not addressed; (2) operating conditions worsen, i.e., a broader
economic recession beyond Moody's current expectations of a
forecasted GDP decline of -1.4% for 2013; (3) the bank's
liquidity position deteriorates significantly; and/or (4) its
franchise weakens.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.
TDA IBERCAJA: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in TDA Ibercaja 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos, TDA
Ibercaja 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos, and TDA Ibercaja 5,
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos.
Specifically, S&P has:
-- Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings
on TDA Ibercaja 1's class A notes and TDA Ibercaja 5's
class A1 and A2 notes;
-- Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings
on TDA Ibercaja 1's class B notes, TDA Ibercaja 4's class
A1, A2, A3PAC, B, and C notes, and TDA Ibercaja 5's class B
notes;
-- Lowered its ratings on TDA Ibercaja 1's class C and D
notes, TDA Ibercaja 4's class D and E notes, and TDA
Ibercaja 5's class C and D notes; and
-- Affirmed its 'D (sf)' ratings on TDA Ibercaja 4's class F
notes and TDA Ibercaja 5's class E notes.
The rating actions follows S&P's review of these transactions'
performance and their structural features, based on the trustee's
latest data provided for each of them, and the application of its
current counterparty criteria.
These three transactions have experienced increasing
delinquencies. In particular, long-term arrears excluding
defaults (defined in TDA Ibercaja 1 as loans in arrears for more
than 12 months and in TDA Ibercaja 4 and TDA Ibercaja 5 as loans
in arrears for more than 18 months) over the transaction's
respective outstanding balances represent:
June June June
2013 (%) 2012 (%) 2011 (%)
TDA Ibercaja 1 0.15 0.06 0.11
TDA Ibercaja 4 0.94 0.60 0.47
TDA Ibercaja 5 0.78 0.72 0.53
Gross cumulative defaults represent 0.18%, 0.82%, and 0.92% of
TDA Ibercaja 1, TDA Ibercaja 4, and TDA Ibercaja 5's initial
balances, respectively.
In S&P's view, this deterioration in long-term delinquencies is
due to Spain's poor macroeconomic performance, such as the
unemployment rate rising to 27.2% in April 2013. S&P has made
assumptions for economic deterioration in its credit analysis by
projecting further delinquencies.
Banco Santander S.A. (BBB/Negative/A-2) is the swap provider for
TDA Ibercaja 1, TDA Ibercaja 4, and TDA Ibercaja 5. Following
S&P's Oct. 15, 2012 downgrade of Banco Santander, it took remedy
actions in accordance with the transaction documents. The
documented remedies were not in line with S&P's current
counterparty criteria. As a result, on Feb. 15, 2013, S&P placed
on CreditWatch negative its ratings on the classes of notes that
were already capped at one notch above its long-term issuer
credit rating on the swap counterparty.
The transactions' downgrade language was amended on July 3, 2013,
and is now in line with S&P's current counterparty criteria. As
a result, S&P has conducted its credit, cash flow, and structural
analysis on these transactions while giving credit to the swap
agreement, in accordance with its current counterparty criteria.
In giving benefit to the swap, under S&P's current counterparty
criteria, the specified remedy periods and replacement framework
cap at 'AA- (sf)' the notes' maximum achievable rating.
TDA Ibercaja 1
The increase in delinquencies and the year-on-year decrease in
Spanish house prices are increasing S&P's assumptions of the
portfolio's probability of default and the losses suffered from
those defaulted assets. With regard to the transaction's
structural features, the increase in available credit enhancement
has been limited for the junior classes. Since closing in
October
2003, the available credit enhancement has increased by 5.68% for
the class A notes, and by just 3.10%, 2.49%, and 1.83% for the
class B, C, and D notes, respectively. This is due to the notes
having been paid sequentially until October 2008 and a decreasing
prepayment rate. Furthermore, interest deferral triggers are
benefiting the class A notes, but are detrimental to the class B,
C, and D notes when S&P applies its cash flow stresses.
The portfolio's deteriorating performance has had a limited
effect on the class A notes because of the transaction's
structural features. S&P has therefore affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch negative its 'AA- (sf)' rating on the class A notes.
However, as a result of the above factors, S&P's cash flow
analysis indicates that the class B, C, and D notes cannot
maintain the currently assigned ratings. S&P has therefore
lowered to 'BBB (sf)' from 'A+ (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch
negative its rating on the class B notes. At the same time, S&P
has lowered to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' its rating on the
class C notes and to 'BB (sf)' from 'BB+ (sf)' its rating on the
class D notes.
TDA Ibercaja 4
The increase in delinquencies and the year-on-year decrease in
Spanish house prices are increasing S&P's assumptions of the
portfolio's probability of default and the losses suffered from
those defaulted assets. With regard to the transaction's
structural features, the increase in available credit enhancement
has been limited for the junior classes. Since closing in
October 2006, the available credit enhancement has increased by
5.04% for the class A notes, and by 4.04%, 2.04%, 1.25%, and
0.75% for the class B, C, D, and E notes, respectively. This is
due to the sequential amortization among the class A, B, C, D,
and E notes and a decreasing prepayment rate. Furthermore,
interest deferral triggers are benefiting the class A notes, but
are detrimental to the class B, C, D, and E note when S&P applies
its cash flow stresses.
S&P's cash flow analysis shows that the current ratings on the
notes cannot be maintained, as the transaction's structural
features are insufficient to offset the portfolio's deteriorating
performance in light of the available credit enhancement.
According to the results of S&P's cash flow analysis, the maximum
ratings that the class A1, A2, and A3PAC notes can achieve is 'A+
(sf)' and the maximum ratings that the class B, C, D, and E notes
can achieve is 'BBB (sf)', 'BBB- (sf)', 'B (sf)', and 'B- (sf)',
respectively.
"We have therefore lowered to 'A+ (sf)' from 'AA- (sf)' our
ratings on the A1, A2, and A3PAC notes, to 'BBB (sf)' from
'AA- (sf)' our rating on the class B notes, to 'BBB- (sf)' from
'A (sf)' our rating on the class C notes, to 'B (sf)' from 'BBB
(sf)' our rating on the class D notes, and to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB
(sf)' our rating on the class E notes. At the same time, we have
removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings on the class A1,
A2, A3PAC, B, and C notes. We have also affirmed our 'D (sf)'
rating on the class F notes as this class of notes has defaulted
on interest payments since the August 2010 interest payment date
(IPD)," S&P said.
TDA Ibercaja 5
The increase in delinquencies and the year-on-year decrease in
Spanish house prices are increasing S&P's assumptions of the
portfolio's probability of default and the losses suffered from
those defaulted assets. With regard to the transaction's
structural features, the increase in available credit enhancement
has been limited for the junior classes. Since closing in May
2007, the available credit enhancement has increased by 3.41% for
the class A notes, and by just 1.37%, 0.69%, and 0.39% for the
class B, C, and D notes, respectively. This is due to the
sequential amortization among the class A, B, C, and D notes and
a decreasing prepayment rate. Furthermore, interest deferral
triggers are benefiting the class A notes, but are detrimental to
the class B, C, and D notes when we apply our cash flow stresses.
The portfolio's deteriorating performance has had a limited
effect on the class A notes because of the transaction's
structural features. S&P has therefore affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch negative its 'AA- (sf)' ratings on the class A1 and
A2 notes.
However, as a result of these factors, S&P's cash flow analysis
indicates that the class B, C, and D notes cannot maintain the
currently assigned ratings. S&P has therefore lowered to 'BB+
(sf)' from 'A (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its
rating on the class B notes. At the same time, S&P has lowered
to 'B (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' its rating on the class C notes and
to 'B- (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' its rating on the class D notes. S&P
has also affirmed its 'D (sf)' rating on the class E notes as
this class of notes has defaulted on interest payments since the
November 2009 IPD.
TDA Ibercaja 1, TDA Ibercaja 4, and TDA Ibercaja 5 are Spanish
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions, which
securitize portfolios of first-ranking mortgage loans granted to
individuals resident in Spain. These transactions closed in
October 2003, October 2006, and September 2007, respectively.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating
To From
TDA Ibercaja 1 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR600 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Rating Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative
A AA- (sf) AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
Rating Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative
B BBB (sf) A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
Ratings Lowered
C BB+ (sf) BBB+ (sf)
D BB (sf) BB+ (sf)
TDA Ibercaja 4 Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.411 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative
A1 A+ (sf) AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A2 A+ (sf) AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A3PAC A+ (sf) AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B BBB (sf) AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
C BBB- (sf) A (sf)/Watch Neg
Ratings Lowered
D B (sf) BBB (sf)
E B- (sf) BB (sf)
Rating Affirmed
F D (sf)
TDA Ibercaja 5, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1.207 Billion Secured Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative
A1 AA- (sf) AA-/Watch Neg
A2 AA- (sf) AA-/Watch Neg
Rating Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative
B BB+ (sf) A (sf)/Watch Neg
Ratings Lowered
C B (sf) BBB- (sf)
D B- (sf) BB (sf)
Rating Affirmed
E D (sf)
UNICAJA BANCO: Weak Finances Cue Moody's to Lower Ratings to Ba3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the debt and deposit
ratings of Unicaja Banco to Ba3 from Ba1, following the downgrade
of the bank's standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to
E+ (equivalent to a b1 baseline credit assessment) from D/ba2.
All of the bank's ratings remain on review for downgrade and the
short-term ratings remain Not Prime.
The downgrade of Unicaja's BFSR reflects its weakened financial
profile and the deterioration of asset-quality metrics in most
asset classes. The ongoing economic challenges are exerting
pressure on Unicaja's assets beyond commercial real estate,
exacerbated by the bank's operating focus on Andalusia (Ba2
negative), one of Spain's weakest regions.
The continued review for downgrade of Unicaja's ratings reflects
the downside risks to its standalone credit profile that could
stem from the planned integration of the significantly weaker
Banco CEISS (B3 review uncertain/NP, E/caa3 review uncertain).
Ratings Rationale:
Lowering Of The Standalone Credit Assessment
The downgrade of Unicaja's standalone financial strength rating
by two notches to E+/b1 from D/ba2, reflects the bank's ongoing
asset-quality deterioration across all asset classes as the
economy has continued contracting in H1 2013, with domestic
demand not showing any significant signs of recovery. Moody's
expects further significant deterioration in the context of the
continuing weak operating environment, which the rating agency
believes will continue to pressure the bank's risk-absorption
capacity.
Furthermore, Moody's says that the relatively weaker operating
environment in Andalusia -- one of Spain's weakest economic
regions and the bank's key operating focus -- poses additional
credit risks. Moody's considers that the weak domestic and
regional economy, subdued domestic consumption and investment and
particularly high unemployment in Andalusia, have deteriorated
the bank's risk-absorption capacity and will continue to do so.
In this context, Moody's expects further deterioration in
corporate sector asset quality -- as well as other asset
categories such as residential mortgages and consumer loans --
based on its view that any signs of a modest economic recovery at
this stage are only present in the export sector, whereas weak
domestic demand is still set to contract domestic growth into
2014.
In downgrading Unicaja's standalone financial strength rating,
Moody's has taken into account the bank's deteriorating, albeit
better-than-average asset-quality indicators, with the non-
performing loan (NPL) ratio standing at 6.9% at end-March 2013
compared with 10.5% system-wide. However, in addition to NPLs,
Unicaja has other problematic assets (broadly defined to include
NPLs, plus real-estate assets, plus refinanced loans categorized
as substandard or performing) that in aggregate total 144% of the
bank's shareholders equity and loss reserves. This compares
negatively to its domestic peers, and indicates the magnitude of
the existing balance-sheet pressures the bank faces before
considering any possible further deterioration of the loan book.
Moody's says that subdued lending volumes, low interest rates and
increasing non-earning assets have significantly diminished
Unicaja's capacity to generate recurring earnings, which,
combined with Spain's weak operating environment, are expected to
continue to suppress its ability to fully offset its asset
quality pressures from earnings. Though 2013 results will likely
significantly improve from the losses recorded in 2012, Moody's
considers that bottom-line profitability will remain pressured by
the need to increase provisions against weakening assets.
Focus of the Ongoing Review
Unicaja's standalone BFSR remains on review for downgrade to
reflect the downside risks associated with the planned
acquisition of Banco CEISS. The final terms of the agreement
between both banks is still pending approval and subject to the
completion of the restructuring plan approved by the European
Commission for Banco CEISS. In concluding the rating review,
Moody's will assess the credit-risk profile and risk-absorption
capacity of the combined entity.
Downgrade of the Senior Debt And Deposit Ratings
The downgrade of Unicaja's senior debt and deposit ratings by two
notches reflects (1) the lowering of its BCA to b1 from ba2; and
(2) Moody's assessment of a moderate probability of support from
the Spanish government for the bank in case of need.
The review for downgrade of the bank's debt and deposit ratings
is driven by the ongoing review for downgrade on Unicaja's
standalone BFSR.
Subordinated Debt And Hybrid Ratings
In line with the lowering of the bank's BCA, Moody's has
downgraded to (P)B2 from (P)Ba3 on review for downgrade the
senior subordinated debt ratings of Unicaja.
What Could Move The Rating Up/Down
Unicaja's ratings could be downgraded in the event of (1) broad
deterioration of its financial fundamentals, especially following
the acquisition of Banco CEISS; (2) worsening operating
conditions , i.e., a broader economic recession beyond Moody's
current GDP decline forecasts of -1.4% for 2013; and/or (3) a
significant deterioration of its liquidity profile.
An upgrade of the bank's ratings is unlikely, given the current
review for downgrade. An improvement of its standalone ratings
could be driven by (1) the work out of its asset-quality
challenges; (2) a sustainable recovery in its profitability
indicators; and (3) sustainable access to market funding and
capital.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Global Banks
published in May 2013.
===========
S W E D E N
===========
UNILABS HOLDING: Bond Offering Relaunch No Impact on Moody's CFR
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said that Unilabs' existing ratings --
B3 corporate family rating, provisional (P)B3 senior secured
rating and (P)Caa2 rating on payment-in-kind (PIK) toggle notes
-- remain unchanged following the company's decision to relaunch
its bond offerings, which was halted earlier in the month. The
proposed issuances notably include a EUR25 million upsizing of
the company's PIK notes -- now totaling EUR200 million -- and a
corresponding decrease in the amount of senior secured notes
issued, which total EUR485 million. The company will apply these
amounts towards the repayment of its existing debt.
Prior to yesterday's relaunch, the company decided to change a
number of the covenants in the offering memorandum. On balance,
Moody's considers these changes to be credit enhancing and
therefore positive for the overall rating. In particular, the
rating agency notes that the previously envisaged portability
clause has now been removed. This reduces the event risk related
to a change-of-ownership event.
However, Moody's expects that Unilabs will have to pay higher
coupons on its debt, which will weaken the company's cash flow
metrics. Notably, Moody's understands that the company may have
to pay cash interest on the PIK notes from the second anniversary
of the debt issuance. As such, the rating agency expects the
step-up in interest payments to have a negative impact on the
company's free cash flow generation. Given its already weak
positioning in the B3 rating category, Moody's would expect
Unilabs to adjust its expansion activities to the lower free cash
flow generation, which would allow the company to reduce leverage
-- defined as debt/EBITDA -- to move below 7.0x within a 12- to
18-month horizon.
UNILABS HOLDING: S&P Lowers Prelim. CCR to 'B'; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
preliminary long-term corporate credit rating on Sweden-based
medical diagnostics company Unilabs Holding AB (Unilabs) to 'B'
from 'B+'. The outlook is stable.
At the same time, S&P lowered its preliminary issue rating on the
proposed EUR485 million senior secured notes and senior secured
floating-rate notes to be issued by Unilabs SubHolding AB to 'B'
from 'B+'. The recovery rating on these notes is '4', indicating
S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery prospects in the
event of a payment default.
In addition, S&P lowered its issue rating on the proposed
EUR200 million payment-in-kind (PIK) toggle notes to be issued by
Unilabs MidHolding AB to 'CCC+' from 'B-'. The recovery rating
on the PIK toggle notes is '6', indicating S&P's expectation of
negligible (0%-10%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment
default.
The final ratings are subject to the successful closing of the
proposed issuance and depend on S&P's receipt and satisfactory
review of all final transaction documentation. Accordingly, the
preliminary ratings should not be construed as evidence of the
final ratings. If the final debt amounts, the assumed interest
rates, and the terms of the final documentation materially depart
from the documentation S&P has already reviewed, or if it do not
receive the final documentation within what S&P considers to be a
reasonable time frame, it reserves the right to withdraw or
revise its ratings.
"The downgrades reflect Unilabs' amendment of the payment
conditions for its proposed PIK toggle notes by changing the
previous 'pay as you want' condition to 'pay if you can' two
years from the notes' issuance date. We view this revision as
constituting a delay to a cash interest payment, and as reducing
Unilabs' long-term Standard & Poor's-adjusted EBITDA cash
interest coverage. In our view, although Unilabs' adjusted
EBITDA cash interest coverage should remain about 3x over the
first two years, we forecast that this will fall to about 2x
thereafter. This is below our previous guideline of adjusted
EBITDA cash interest coverage of 2.5x at all times, and is
commensurate with a 'B'
Rating," S&P said.
Unilabs plans to raise EUR685 million of notes to refinance its
existing bank debt. Based on the proposed capital structure
after the refinancing, S&P estimates that Unilabs' Standard &
Poor's-adjusted net debt-to-EBITDA ratio will be about 10x by
Dec. 31, 2013. S&P's estimate includes financial debt of about
EUR700 million, comprising the proposed EUR200 million PIK toggle
notes, about EUR442 million in the form of preference shares and
shareholder loans, and about EUR80 million of lease adjustments.
In S&P's view, despite the potentially negative effects of
European public spending cuts on health care, Unilabs will
sustain positive underlying revenue growth of at least low single
digits, while successfully integrating new acquisitions and at
least maintaining its operating performance and cash flow
generation.
S&P views adjusted EBITDA cash interest coverage of 2x at all
times and positive FOCF generation as commensurate with the 'B'
rating. S&P could take a negative rating action if adjusted
EBITDA interest coverage drops to less than 2x. This would most
likely occur if Unilabs' operating margins deteriorate due to an
inability to profitably integrate newly acquired operations.
A positive rating movement is unlikely, in S&P's view, due to
Unilabs' already high adjusted leverage. However, S&P would
likely take a positive rating action if Unilabs' adjusted EBITDA
cash interest coverage rises above 2.5x on a sustainable basis.
=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================
* Moody's Says Outlook on Swiss Banking System Remains Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
The outlook for Switzerland's banking system remains stable, says
Moody's Investors Service in a new report entitled "Banking
System Outlook: Switzerland."
The outlook reflects Swiss banks' solid financial fundamentals,
which include low levels of problem loans, strong capital ratios,
limited reliance on wholesale funding and substantial loss-
absorption capacity through earnings and loan-loss reserves.
However, Moody's says that there are increasing indications of
overly high asset-price inflation in Swiss real-estate markets,
fuelled by a combination of supply and demand-side factors that
has the potential to significantly impact Swiss banks' asset-
quality and capital ratios in an adverse scenario.
In addition to Swiss banks' solid financial fundamentals, the
creditworthiness of the Swiss sovereign (Aaa stable) as well as
the low level of unemployment support Moody's view of a continued
stable operating environment for Swiss banks. However, Moody's
says that the headwinds emanating from domestic residential real-
estate markets and sustained pressure on profitability
counterbalance the credit-positive outlook drivers.
The rating agency notes the Swiss regional and cantonal banks'
significant concentration risk to residential mortgage loans.
Therefore, a larger-than-anticipated slowdown in Swiss property
markets could lead to significantly higher loan loss charges,
dampening the profitability -- and, potentially, the capital
position -- of the Swiss banking system, thereby negatively
affecting the banks' standalone credit profiles.
Furthermore, the rating agency expects sustained pressure on
profitability from low interest rates and associated net interest
margin compression, aggravated by limited room for efficiency
improvements, which could potentially encourage further risk-
taking in search of yield.
Despite these pressure points, Moody's positively notes that many
banks have adhered to strict underwriting criteria, including low
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. In addition, a number of factors
compare favorably to the situation in the early 1990s and
significantly contributed to Moody's decision of keeping the
stable outlook for the Swiss banking system. Overall, the rating
agency's central scenario supports its view that the Swiss banks
should be able to manage expected asset-quality deterioration
without material negative consequences for their earnings or
capital.
Moody's further notes that the private banks and wealth managers
will be significantly challenged by the uncertainties related to
tax evasion and Swiss banking secrecy laws, which remain a source
of uncertainty vis-a-vis potential new regulations, fines, and
litigation expenses in addition to the challenging operating
environment for this group of banks.
The rating agency's outlook for systemic support over the next
12-18 months is stable despite authorities' focus on improving
capital cushions and developing a burden sharing regime. Moody's
believes support would be forthcoming for a troubled bank, in
case of need, given the importance of the banking system for
Switzerland's economy and the long-standing tradition of the
country as a global private banking center.
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
ARGON CAPITAL: Moody's Eyes Downgrade of B1-Rated Repack Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has reviewed the ratings of the
following notes issued by Argon Capital Limited Company:
Series 100 GBP 750,000,000 Perpetual Non-Cumulative Securities,
B1 Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade; previously on
Jul 2, 2012 Upgraded to B1
The transaction is a repackaging of preference shares issued by
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC.
Ratings Rationale:
Moody's explained that the rating action is the result of the
rating action on the preference shares of Royal Bank of Scotland
Group PLC whose B1 rating was placed on review for possible
downgrade on the July 5, 2013.
Moody's expects to conclude this review when the review of the
Royal Bank of Scotland is completed.
Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) more specifically, any
uncertainty associated with Royal Bank of Scotland could have a
direct impact on the repackaged transaction.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating Repackaged Securities published in April 2010.
Moody's conducted no additional cash flow analysis, sensitivity
or stress scenarios because the ratings are a direct pass-through
of the rating of the Royal Bank of Scotland preference shares.
BOPARAN HOLDINGS: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba3 CFR to Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed to negative from stable the
outlook on the Ba3 corporate family rating and the Ba3-PD
probability of default rating of Boparan Holdings Limited, as
well as on the Ba3 rating on the company's existing GBP400
million of senior notes and EUR340 million of senior notes, both
due 2018. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed these ratings.
Boparan Holdings Limited is the parent holding company of 2
Sisters Food Group (2 Sisters).
"We have changed the outlook on Boparan's Ba3 ratings to negative
because we expect that its operating performance and credit
metrics, specifically its margins and leverage, may continue to
weaken over the near term due to the company's recent acquisition
of VION's UK red meat and poultry business, which is dilutive of
Boparan's profitability, and ongoing challenges in the trading
environment," says Anthony Hill, a Moody's Vice President and
Senior Analyst.
Ratings Rationale:
The change of outlook to negative on Boparan's Ba3 ratings
reflects Moody's expectation that the company's operating
performance and credit metrics may continue to deteriorate as a
result of the recent acquisition of Netherlands-based VION Food
Group's UK red meat and poultry business (Moody's estimates the
purchase price of the VION business to be around GBP35 -- GBP75
million in an all cash transaction), high material prices,
production costs, and a challenging trading environment.
In June 2013, Boparan received final approval from the Office of
Fair Trading (OFT, the UK government's competition authority) for
the acquisition of VION's UK red meat and poultry business.
However, although the VION business generates approximately
GBP1.0 billion in annual sales (split approximately 60/40 between
red meat and poultry sales); Moody's estimates that it is
currently loss-making with negative EBITDA generation. As a
result, Moody's expects the acquisition will be dilutive of
Boparan's profitability through at least financial year-end (FYE)
July 2014.
The ongoing harsh trading environment and the recent dilutive
acquisition have taken their toll on Boparan's performance to
date. For example, Moody's expects the company's revenues to grow
from GBP2.3 billion at FYE July 2012, to around GBP2.8 billion at
FYE July 2013. However, over this same period, Moody's expects
Boparan's Moody's-adjusted EBIT to fall from GBP138 million, or a
margin of 5.9%, to around GBP94 -- GBP50 million, or a margin of
around 3.3% -- 1.8% (all figures are based on Moody's-adjustments
and estimates). In Moody's view, the company's revenue growth has
largely been due to recent acquisitions, while margin
deterioration is primarily attributed to the weak trading
environment. Over the coming quarters, Moody's expects Boparan's
profitability to modestly decrease as the company works to
address the ongoing weak trading environment and turn around the
loss-making operations of the recently acquired VION UK's poultry
and red meat business.
Despite the substantial cash outlay for the acquisition of VION's
UK red meat and poultry business, Boparan retains an adequate
liquidity profile. The company reported GBP145 million in cash at
FYE July 2012. The company also has access to an undrawn GBP40
million revolving credit facility. However, pro forma for the
VION acquisition and in Moody's view, there is some uncertainty
regarding whether the company will continue to have access to the
revolving credit facility unless headroom is adequately reset for
some covenant measures. Despite ongoing pressure on margins,
Moody's expects Boparan's free cash flow generation to be solidly
positive at FYE July 2013.
What Could Change The Rating Up/Down
Given the negative outlook, Moody's does not expect upward
pressure on the rating in the near term. For the outlook to
stabilize, the rating agency would expect consistent achievement
of the following by FYE July 2014: (1) a Moody's-adjusted EBIT
margin above 5%; (2) a Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio
sustained below 4.5x; and (3) ongoing, solidly positive, free
cash flow generation.
Conversely, Moody's could downgrade the rating if Boparan's
current profitability and leverage levels fail to show material
signs of improvement.
Principal Methodology
The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Packaged Goods published in June 2013. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.
Headquartered in Birmingham, UK, the privately held 2 Sisters
Food Group is a manufacturer of diversified food products in the
poultry, chilled, bakery, and frozen categories. Employing
approximately 24,000 people, 2 Sisters predominantly manufactures
private-label food products, but also produces a number of
branded products. The group primarily supplies major UK retail
grocers, and a number of food manufacturers, wholesalers and
food-service companies in the UK, Ireland, and Europe. The group
operates 47 manufacturing sites in the UK and Ireland, six in the
Netherlands and one in Poland. Following the acquisition of
Northern Foods in April 2011 and Brookes Avana in December 2011,
the combined group generated revenues of approximately GBP2.3
billion at FYE July 2012.
CATTLES PLC: PwC Drags Rivals in Suit Over Auditing Negligence
--------------------------------------------------------------
Adam Jones at The Financial Times reports that PwC has dragged
Deloitte and KPMG into its defense against a lawsuit that claims
negligence in its auditing of Cattles, the scandal-ridden
subprime lender.
The UK's biggest accountant said that its rivals had also
examined the way Cattles set aside money against bad loans
without exposing the massive under-provisioning that eventually
brought the company to its knees, the FT relates.
According to the FT, in legal documents filed on Friday, PwC
further argued that the damages of up to GBP1.6 billion claimed
in the case were inflated.
PwC is being sued on behalf of creditors to Cattles, who claim
that basic audit checks should have revealed that the loan book
of Welcome Financial Services -- Cattles' biggest unit -- was
much weaker than stated, the FT discloses.
Cattles, which specialized in lending to people with weak credit
histories, breached accounting rules by not writing off loans
that had demonstrably become bad debts, the FT says.
In its defense document, PwC stood behind its work as auditor,
the FT states. It said that the lender's publicly-stated
accounting policy for bad loans was reasonable, the FT notes. It
also defended, in principle at least, the use of "deferments" and
"rewrites" -- two practices that helped Cattles avoid taking
losses on impaired loans, according to the FT.
However, PwC said that the policy was abused in practice,
claiming that vital information was deliberately concealed from
its auditors, the FT notes.
As internal auditor to Cattles, Deloitte checked its risk
management and governance, the FT discloses. According to the
FT, PwC said that Deloitte had reviewed Cattle's policy on
recognizing bad loan losses early in 2008 and had deemed it to be
appropriate. But PwC also said that Deloitte raised significant
concerns about accounting practices with management in 2008 after
being alerted by a whistleblower, the FT relates.
PwC claimed that KPMG had also been hired by Cattles in 2007 to
review its approach to loan loss accounting and did not sound an
alarm, the FT discloses. Neither Deloitte nor KPMG are being
sued, the FT notes.
Cattles is now mainly being wound down gradually, the FT says.
The Financial Reporting Council, the UK's lead accounting
regulator, is yet to announce the result of its own investigation
into PwC's conduct during the affair and is closely watching the
litigation brought by Cattles creditors, the FT discloses.
Cattles plc -- http://www.cattles.co.uk/-- is a financial
services company engaged in providing consumer credit to non-
standard customers in the United Kingdom and the provision of
debt recovery services to external clients and the Company's
consumer credit business. Cattles also provides working capital
finance for small and medium size businesses.
CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Misled Pensioners Month Prior to Bail-Out
------------------------------------------------------------
Philip Aldrick and James Quinn at The Sunday Telegraph report
that the Co-operative Bank reassured pensioners that their
investments were safe a month before announcing plans to slash
their savings as part of a last-ditch bail-out.
In e-mails seen by The Sunday Telegraph, a manager at the Co-op
Bank told a worried pensioner that "there is no need to be
concerned" about a GBP50,000 investment. The e-mail was sent on
May 13, just three days after the ratings agency Moody's
downgraded the bank to "junk", The Sunday Telegraph recounts.
The following month, the Co-op suspended interest payments to
pensioners and told savers they faced losses of at least 40% on
their investments, The Sunday Telegraph recounts. The bank also
said it had a GBP1.5 billion capital shortfall, The Sunday
Telegraph relates.
At that point, the bank was in discussions with the regulator
about the size of its capital shortfall, The Sunday Telegraph
states. A month later it revealed it needed GBP1.5 billion,
GBP500 million of which was to come from enforcing losses on
bondholders, The Sunday Telegraph notes.
Including large investors, the bondholders have GBP1.3 billion of
debt, GBP65 million of which is with 15,000 pensioners and small
savers, The Sunday Telegraph discloses.
Last Friday, the Co-op offered bondholders an olive branch by
promising to roll up interest and pay it out if the rescue plan
is successful, The Sunday Telegraph relates.
According to The Sunday Telegraph, Co-op sources claimed that, if
bondholders refused to accept the terms, the bank would be put
into "resolution" -- potentially wiping them out.
Details of the deal will be published in October, The Sunday
Telegraph states.
Vince Cable, the Business Secretary, told The Sunday Telegraph
that MPs should investigate the crisis.
The Co-op's GBP1.5 billion capital hole virtually wiped out its
entire GBP1.7 billion equity base, leaving it almost insolvent,
The Sunday Telegraph discloses.
Many of the pensioners affected rely on the interest the bonds
pay, which ranges from 5.55% to 13%, The Sunday Telegraph notes.
According to The Sunday Telegraph, as well as the private
bondholders, the Co-op is facing resistance to its plans from
activist hedge funds that have bought up the cut-price debt in an
attempt to negotiate profitable terms. The Co-op needs 77% take-
up for its GBP1.5 billion rescue to work, The Sunday Telegraph
says.
The Co-op, as cited by The Sunday Telegraph, said: "'We accept
that one aspect of this communication raises questions, which we
are looking into.
"We would note that the member of staff referred the bondholder
to the bondholder helpline and informed the bondholder that
financial advice could be sought. We apologize if the customer
feels he was misled."
Co-op Bank -- part of the mutually owned food-to-funerals
conglomerate Co-operative Group -- traces its history back to
1872. The bank gained prominence for specializing in ethical
investment. It refuses to lend to companies that test their
products on animals, and its headquarters in Manchester is
powered by rapeseed oil grown on Co-operative Group farms.
Founded in 1863, the Co-op Group has more than six million
members, employs more than 100,000 people and has turnover of
more than GBP13 billion.
* * *
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior
debt ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from
A3/Prime 2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1. The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.
INFINIS PLC: S&P Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Corporate Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating on U.K.-based renewable energy generator
Infinis PLC. At the same time, S&P affirmed the 'B+' issue
rating on the senior secured debt issued by Infinis. The
recovery rating remained unchanged at '4' reflecting S&P's view
of "average" (30%-50%) recovery prospects in the event of a
payment default.
S&P subsequently withdrew the ratings at the issuer's request.
At the time of the withdrawal, the outlook was stable.
The rating on Infinis had been constrained by uncertainties
related to the financial policies and strategy of the group's
owner, private equity firm Terra Firma. These uncertainties,
coupled with the group's high financial leverage, resulted in
S&P's assessment of Infinis' financial risk profile as "highly
leveraged." S&P's assessment of Infinis' business risk profile
at the time of the withdrawal was "fair" due to the increasing
exposure of its revenues to volatile wholesale power prices, and
its naturally depleting landfill asset base. These factors were
mitigated by the group's increasing asset diversification into
wind power and its prominent position in what S&P sees as a
supportive, policy-driven U.K. market for renewable energy.
Furthermore, its above-average profitability, resulting from
attractive pricing on its renewable generation output, was a
ratings strength.
INTERNACIONALE RETAIL: Brought Out From Administration
------------------------------------------------------
Liverpool Echo reports that budget fashion chain Internacionale
Retail Limited has been rescued from administration but its new
owners have confirmed the Bootle store will not reopen.
Loss-making Internacionale Retail was placed into administration
and within hours, it was announced that the business had been
sold to a newly formed company, Internacionale UK Limited, backed
by the same shareholders, according to Liverpool Echo.
The report notes that the deal, however, means 18 of the 132
Internacionale stores will not reopen, having closed their doors.
It is understood staff working at these 18 stores, including the
one in Bootle, will be offered the chance to relocate to other
branches, Liverpool Echo relates.
"High street retailers have faced unprecedented conditions over
recent years and the market for fashion clothing has become
increasingly competitive. . . . The business has been
significantly loss-making over recent years and although the
directors have sought to restructure and reposition
Internacionale, with significant cash investment from
shareholders, it has not proved possible largely because of the
high fixed costs of the business. This has resulted in the
retailer being unable to continue to operate outside of
administration. . . . However, we are pleased to announce that a
sale has been completed that sees the majority of the
Internacionale business, including 114 of its stores, its head
office and its finance operation, being sold to Internacionale UK
Limited. The business will continue to trade without
interruption, all of the 1,550 jobs have been transferred to the
new owner and the future of Internacionale on the UK and Ireland
high street has been safeguarded," the report quoted Tom Jack,
one of the two administrators from Ernst & Young LLP who oversaw
the sale, as saying.
"The remaining stores that are not included in the sale will
close with immediate effect," Mr. Jack added, the report notes.
QUINTON HAZELL AUTOMOTIVE: Mochdre Factory Sold Securing 15 Jobs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Matt Jones at News North Wales reports that a Mochdre car plant
that closed after its parent company went into administration has
been sold securing 15 jobs.
Quinton Hazell Automotive Limited, which had 83 employees at its
plant in Mochdre, went into administration in February as KPMG
were appointed administrators of its parent company, Klarius
Group Ltd, according to News North Wales.
The report notes that a total of 79 people lost their jobs. Now
15 full time jobs have been reinstated at the factory after
KPMG's restructuring team completed the sale of the site to Mark
Water Pumps Limited, a newly incorporated 100 subsidiary of Mark
Exhaust Systems Limited, a joint venture with Suzuki Motors
Corporation India, News North Wales relates.
"As part of the sale of the Colwyn Bay site, 15 former employees
will be re-hired. . . .Having extensively marketed the business
to potential buyers for a number of weeks and maintained slimmed
down operations to meet outstanding contracts, we are pleased to
have secured a sale which confirms continued production at the
site and 15 jobs in the local area," the report quoted Paul
Flint, Joint Administrator and Restructuring Partner at KPMG, as
saying.
India-headquartered Mark Exhaust Systems Limited is a
manufacturer and global supplier of automotive components, and
counts Suzuki, Honda and Piaggio amongst its clients.
TRANSEUROPA FERRIES: Thanet Council Rejects Probe on GBP3MM Debt
----------------------------------------------------------------
BBC News reports that a Kent council has rejected calls for an
inquiry into how it allowed passenger ferry company TransEuropa
Ferries to run up a GBP3.4 million debt to the authority.
Independent and Green Party members of Thanet District Council
submitted a motion to the hung council on July 11, according to
BBC News.
The report relates that Green councillor Ian Driver said the deal
was kept secret, but the council reasoned it was commercially
sensitive.
The report notes that the debt was made up of waived port fees
and came to light after TransEuropa went into administration.
"The main problem is that this deal was kept secret from the vast
majority of councillors for three years. Only a handful of very
senior officers and political leaders knew about it," the report
quoted Mr. Driver as saying.
"If the council had not assisted by rescheduling their debts,
TransEuropa would have been forced into administration, and this
would have left the Port of Ramsgate without a ferry service,"
the report quoted Council Chief Executive Dr. Sue McGonigal as
saying.
BBC News adds that the debt has been lodged with the
administrators.
VICARAGE FIELDS CARAVAN: Sold After Fell In Administration
----------------------------------------------------------
Julian Whittle at North West Evening Mail reports that a caravan
park at Allonby, that fell into administration in February, has
been sold for an undisclosed sum thought to be above the
GBP650,000 guide price.
Vicarage Fields Caravan Park has 69 static pitches but holds a
site license for 80 holiday caravans, according to North West
Evening Mail. The 4.3-acre site is located at Beach Road.
The report relates that the Caravan Park was offered for sale by
real estate advisor Colliers International on behalf of receiver
Phillip Deyes of Leonard Curtis Business Solutions Group.
The report notes that the sale of the Caravan Park to an unnamed
local purchaser, a new entrant to the holiday park sector, has
been completed.
"It was encouraging to see such a high level of interest in
Cumbria from so many willing and able buyers," the report quoted
Richard Moss, director of Colliers' parks division, as saying.
North West Evening Mail discloses that the sale included Bay View
House, a three-bedroom detached property.
VPHASE: Will Go Into Administration Absent Funding
--------------------------------------------------
Alistair Houghton at Liver Pool Daily Post reports that
struggling Cheshire technology company VPhase says it will go
into administration unless it can find funding within 10 days.
The Capenhurst company has developed technology to regulate
voltage levels into people's homes, help householders save money
on their electricity bills, according to Liver Pool Daily Post.
The report notes that in June, the company disclosed it needed to
raise cash through a share placing if it was to survive. It
blamed a "noticeable slowdown in the demand for energy efficiency
products" after the Government introduced the Green Deal, Liver
Pool Daily Post relates.
The report notes that three weeks later, after insufficient
demand for the placing, VPhase announced shares were suspended.
It said the company only had sufficient cash to trade for a few
more weeks, the report says.
"Whil[e] the board continues to pursue options to preserve the
value of the company, including raising funds by way of debt or
equity and the sale of the business or its assets, there remains
no certainty that any funding option will materialise and if none
becomes available in the next ten days the appointment of an
administrator will become effective," the company said, the
report adds.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* Fitch Says EMEA Corp Cyclicals Split from Defensive Losers
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has published a special report analyzing the key
drivers for rating movements across the EMEA and APAC corporate
credit portfolio over the three-year period spanning end-2009 to
end-2012.
Following a challenging 2009 in which the majority of corporates
were adversely affected by a sudden and precipitous drop in
profitability, 2010 and 2011 saw some respite for those corporate
issuers who strengthened their positions during the aftermath of
the initial crisis, with positive actions dominating. The tide
however turned negative again in 2012 as renewed economic malaise
drove an increase in the pace of downgrades, clawing back some of
the previous two years' gains. Corporates, having already cut
costs to the bone, saw their financial flexibility significantly
eroded in the face of renewed concerns regarding the unified
future of the eurozone.
Overall, the past three years saw upgrades across the EMEA and
APAC portfolio surpassing downgrades, split into 26% upgrades and
19% downgrades. Most of these were not reversals of crisis-era
downgrades, but rather continuations of secular trends. This held
in particular for the dominance of defensive sector downgrades.
The turnaround in 2012 was driven primarily by the utilities
sector, followed closely by telecoms, media and technology (TMT).
A similar trend is observed when considering an increased numbers
of fallen angels versus rising stars, and despite more benign
conditions in APAC generally, both regions saw downgrades
overtake upgrades in 2012.
The industrials sector was the most upgraded over the three-year
period, both in proportion (36% of all upgrades) and absolute
numbers (41 upgrades, twice as many as downgrades). Conversely,
the energy and utilities sector suffered the most downgrades -
with more actions likely to come over the next 12 months to mid-
2014, mirroring the negative sector outlook for 2013. Strong
performance by food, beverage and tobacco companies supported a
7.5x upgrade/downgrade ratio for the sector.
TMT saw the highest number of multi-notch downgrades, with the
sector accounting for all of the downgrades of six notches and
above: Nokia Corporation, Panasonic Corporation and Sharp
Corporation; and OTE (withdrawn) following Greece's sovereign
downgrade.
The full report, "The Great Shift: EMEA & APAC Corporate Ratings"
is available at fitchratings.com. This report complements a
forward-looking analysis - "Top 10 EMEA Corporate Debt Changes,
2012-2014" - published earlier this week, identifying our top
anticipated debt raisers in EMEA over the coming two years and
their rating triggers.
* Moody's Notes Rise in Global SGDL Rate in Second Quarter
----------------------------------------------------------
The trailing 12-month global speculative-grade default rate
finished the second quarter of 2013 at 2.8%, up from 2.5% in the
first quarter but down from 3.1% in the same period last year,
Moody's Investors Service says in its latest monthly default
report. The latest default rate is extremely close to Moody's
year-ago prediction of 2.9%.
In the US, the speculative-grade default rate edged lower, to
2.9% in the second quarter from 3.0% in the first. A year ago,
the US default rate was 3.3%. In Europe, the default rate rose to
3.4% in the second quarter from 2.1% in the first, and stood at
3.6% this time last year.
Based on its forecasting model, Moody's expects the global
speculative-grade default rate to rise to 3.2% by the end of this
year, before falling to 2.7% by the end of the second quarter
next year.
"Defaults remain stable, but are expected to increase slightly,"
notes Albert Metz, Managing Director of Moody's Credit Policy
Research. "Easy liquidity has of course kept the default rate low
for some time. If funding becomes tighter we would expect an
increase in the incidence of default."
Of the 19 defaults among Moody's-rated corporate debt issuers in
the second quarter, 11 were from North America and four from
Europe, with the remainder from Latin America. For the year to
date, the default tally is 40, the same as that for the first
half of 2012.
By dollar volume, the global speculative-grade bond default rate
ended the second quarter at 1.8%, up from 1.4% the prior quarter.
A year ago, the comparable rate was 2.1%.
In the US, the dollar-weighted speculative-grade bond default
rate held steady, at 1.3%, from the first to the second quarter.
In Europe, the rate more than doubled, to 3.5% from 1.6%, during
the same period. At this time last year, the dollar-weighted bond
default rate stood at 1.6% in the US and at 3.9% in Europe.
Across industries, Moody's continues to expect default rates to
be highest in the Media: Advertising, Printing & Publishing
sector in the US and the Hotel, Gaming & Leisure sector in Europe
12 months down the road.
Moody's distressed index, which measures the percentage of high-
yield issuers whose debt is trading at distressed levels, came in
at 9.1% in the second quarter compared with 8.8% in the first. At
this time last year, the index was a noticeably higher 19.5%.
In the leveraged loan market, a total of four Moody's-rated
companies defaulted on their loans in the second quarter, with
two of these in June. The US leveraged loan default rate ended
the second quarter at 2.3%, down from 3.0% in the first, while a
year ago it stood at 2.6%.
* Moody's Says EMEA Cos. Face US$1.23 Trillion Refinancing Needs
----------------------------------------------------------------
Investment-grade non-financial companies in EMEA need to
refinance around US$1.23 trillion over the next four years but
this debt burden is likely to be manageable, as many have adopted
more conservative financial policies and pre-financed ahead of
their debt maturities, says Moody's Investors Service in its
latest EMEA IG refinancing study entitled "EMEA Investment-Grade
Non-Financial Companies: Refinancing Needs Over the Next Four
Years Appear Manageable."
The study analyzed the bond and bank debt maturities (rated and
unrated) of 308 companies across Europe, Middle East and Africa.
As of March 2013, EMEA IG corporate issuers held US$750 billion
in cash, up from US$690 billion at end-Q2 2011. This increased
cash balance shows that most companies have been cautious about
their discretionary use of cash, including paying out shareholder
dividends or buying back shares. In addition, IG corporates have
issued US$155 billion from January to June 2013, taking advantage
of periods of favorable market access to extend their debt
maturity profiles.
"EMEA companies' refinancing needs and increasing levels of debt
maturing over the next four years are in themselves not reasons
for concern. Many of these corporates have tapped the bond
markets, taking advantage of low fixed interest rates, and are
'cash-flush' ahead of future required financing. However, a sharp
increase in interest rates or a possible intensification of the
sovereign debt crisis could reduce capital market access and
increase the cost of debt for some issuers, particularly in the
euro area periphery," says Jean-Michel Carayon, a Moody's Senior
Vice President and co-author of the study.
Moody's refinancing study shows a gradual shift in favor of
capital markets over bank loans as corporates increasingly turn
to the bond markets due to reduced bank lending. As of March
2013, only 31% of EMEA IG issuers' maturities between 2014 and
2017 comprised bank debt, down from 37% in June 2010. While
Moody's expects the bond markets to remain the main source of
funding for IG issuers in the future, volumes of both bank and
bond debt annual maturities will decline from 2014 onwards, with
an exception in 2017, when bond debt maturities are expected to
be slightly higher than in 2016.
Utilities (18%) energy (15%), telecommunications (14%) and
automotive (14%) companies account for nearly two thirds of debt
maturing over the next four years, which mostly reflects the
amount of financing required in these sectors. Overall, issuers
rated Baa1 represent 21% of the total debt maturing in the next
four years, with bond maturities concentrated among issuers rated
A3-Baa1 and bank maturities among corporates rated Baa1-Baa3.
Western European corporates account for more than half of the
debt maturing, with Germany having the greatest number of
maturities at 23%, followed by France (18%) and the UK (13%).
However the three countries are also the most 'cash-flush', with
their corporates' cash balances making up more than half of the
total cash balance for EMEA.
For IG issuers in peripheral euro area countries (mainly Italy
and Spain), peak annual refinancing requirements will be in 2015,
with a noticeable bank debt maturity wall for Spanish issuers in
the same year. Maintaining substantial liquidity headroom remains
an important credit consideration for IG issuers rated above the
sovereign with material exposure to their domestic market. A
significant change in investor sentiment -- for instance,
concerns about interest rates rising -- could erode current
liquidity headroom above 12 months in a few quarters. Some
companies in the periphery still have some flexibility to improve
their free cash flow but this is limited for those that have
already cut dividends and capex.
* S&P Applies Revised Insurance Criteria to Central EU Insurers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it has reviewed its
ratings on nine African and Central European insurance groups and
their subsidiaries by applying its new ratings criteria for
insurers, which were published on May 7, 2013.
S&P will publish individual analytical reports on the insurance
groups identified, including a list of ratings on affiliated
entities.
RATINGS LIST
(All ratings are affirmed.)
African Reinsurance Corp.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency A-/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency A-/Stable/--
Compagnie d'Assurances et de Reassurances Tuniso-Europeenne
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BB-/Negative/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BB-/Negative/--
Hannover Reinsurance Africa Ltd.
Hannover Life Reassurance Africa Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency A-/Negative/--
South Africa National Scale zaAA+/--/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency A-/Negative/--
Lion of Africa Insurance Co Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BB+/Stable/--
South Africa National Scale zaA/--/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BB+/Stable/--
Milli Reasurans T.A.S.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Turkey National Scale trAA+/--/--
Powszechny Zaklad Ubezpieczen S.A.
Powszechny Zaklad Ubezpieczen na Zycie S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency A/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency A/Stable/--
Santam Ltd.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency A-/Negative/--
South Africa National Scale zaAA+/--/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency A-/Negative/--
Societe Centrale de Reassurance
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency BBB/Negative/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency BBB/Negative/--
Towarzystwo Ubezpieczen i Reasekuracji WARTA S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating
Local Currency A/Stable/--
Financial Strength Rating
Local Currency A/Stable/--
* BOND PRICING: For the Week July 8 to July 12, 2013
----------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13
IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62
BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94
TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62
ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33
FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45
INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15
NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56
PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36
GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49
COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71
COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48
COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77
COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74
COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 7.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 71.50
DZ BANK AG 15.500 10/25/2013 EUR 71.05
DZ BANK AG 15.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.86
DZ BANK AG 15.750 7/26/2013 EUR 71.21
DZ BANK AG 15.000 7/26/2013 EUR 75.00
DZ BANK AG 6.000 7/26/2013 EUR 69.50
DZ BANK AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.36
DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.28
DZ BANK AG 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.43
DZ BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.14
DZ BANK AG 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.07
DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 61.83
DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 57.11
DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 15.42
DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 59.63
DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 43.33
DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 56.77
DZ BANK AG 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.81
DZ BANK AG 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.74
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.16
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.95
DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.97
DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.07
DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.29
DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 68.17
DZ BANK AG 9.750 3/8/2013 EUR 73.96
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.66
DZ BANK AG 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 72.63
DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.25
DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 44.10
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.38
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.88
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.66
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 71.94
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.43
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.27
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 68.24
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 67.09
DZ BANK AG 11.500 11/23/2012 EUR 74.94
DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 63.46
DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 41.34
DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 69.68
DZ BANK AG 9.750 12/14/2012 EUR 66.05
DZ BANK AG 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 74.23
DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 71.10
DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 65.09
DZ BANK AG 16.250 1/2/2013 EUR 68.65
DZ BANK AG 10.500 1/11/2013 EUR 66.00
DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.04
DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 53.41
DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 3/20/2013 EUR 74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 17.000 3/20/2013 EUR 73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 16.000 6/26/2013 EUR 74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 15.000 12/28/2012 EUR 71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS 25.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS 30.000 6/28/2013 EUR 46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 3/22/2013 EUR 41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.000 3/22/2013 EUR 52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.000 3/22/2013 EUR 53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.500 3/22/2013 EUR 43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN 5.500 12/23/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 7/26/2013 EUR 74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 6.000 8/23/2013 EUR 74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 8/23/2013 EUR 72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 9/27/2013 EUR 74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 11/23/2012 EUR 46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 2/22/2013 EUR 62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 2/22/2013 EUR 55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT 13.250 1/2/2013 EUR 67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT 18.000 12/14/2012 EUR 63.38
Q-CELLS 6.750 10/21/2015 EUR 1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE 6.750 3/22/2013 USD 4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 0.58
TAG IMMO AG 6.500 12/10/2015 EUR 9.73
TUI AG 2.750 3/24/2016 EUR 56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 3/22/2013 EUR 68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 3/22/2013 EUR 55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.050 3/22/2013 EUR 62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.700 3/22/2013 EUR 71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.700 3/22/2013 EUR 42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 3/22/2013 EUR 50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 3/22/2013 EUR 40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 3/22/2013 EUR 39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.450 12/31/2012 EUR 56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.100 12/31/2012 EUR 50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.050 12/31/2012 EUR 54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 12/31/2012 EUR 60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.700 12/31/2012 EUR 71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.450 12/31/2012 EUR 73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.350 12/31/2012 EUR 57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.150 12/31/2012 EUR 63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.100 12/31/2012 EUR 71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.050 12/31/2012 EUR 72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.900 12/31/2012 EUR 73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.750 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 12/31/2012 EUR 57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.950 12/31/2012 EUR 74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.700 12/31/2012 EUR 73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 12/31/2012 EUR 63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.450 12/31/2012 EUR 53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.100 12/31/2012 EUR 74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.550 12/31/2012 EUR 57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.500 12/31/2012 EUR 61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.150 12/31/2012 EUR 70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 12/31/2012 EUR 67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.900 12/31/2012 EUR 50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.800 12/31/2012 EUR 46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.250 12/31/2012 EUR 68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 12/31/2012 EUR 61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 12/31/2012 EUR 68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.750 12/31/2012 EUR 55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.700 12/31/2012 EUR 61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.600 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.450 12/31/2012 EUR 54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.400 12/31/2012 EUR 58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 12/31/2012 EUR 72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.900 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.500 12/31/2012 EUR 41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.050 12/31/2012 EUR 63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.650 12/31/2012 EUR 70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.350 12/31/2012 EUR 72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.250 12/31/2012 EUR 41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.150 12/31/2012 EUR 73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.050 12/31/2012 EUR 73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.650 12/31/2012 EUR 66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.900 3/22/2013 EUR 72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.750 3/22/2013 EUR 73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.200 12/31/2012 EUR 65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.700 12/31/2012 EUR 62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 23.600 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 4.000 6/28/2013 EUR 44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.700 12/31/2012 EUR 67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.400 12/31/2012 EUR 55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.550 6/28/2013 EUR 74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.250 12/31/2012 EUR 53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 6/28/2013 EUR 72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.389 11/25/2013 EUR 44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.100 4/14/2014 EUR 32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.950 12/31/2012 EUR 68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.300 12/31/2012 EUR 66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.000 12/31/2012 EUR 69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.850 12/31/2012 EUR 72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.150 12/31/2012 EUR 68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.250 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.700 12/31/2012 EUR 66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.700 12/31/2012 EUR 43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 26.050 12/31/2012 EUR 69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 27.600 12/31/2012 EUR 40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 28.250 12/31/2012 EUR 38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 2/1/2013 EUR 55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.650 3/1/2013 EUR 35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.100 3/8/2013 EUR 74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.650 3/22/2013 EUR 68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.550 3/22/2013 EUR 61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.850 3/22/2013 EUR 73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.200 3/22/2013 EUR 65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 3/22/2013 EUR 70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.150 3/22/2013 EUR 59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.050 12/31/2012 EUR 64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.300 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.350 3/22/2013 EUR 73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 46.30
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/28/2012 EUR 59.08
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/21/2012 EUR 66.08
WGZ BANK 5.000 12/28/2012 EUR 73.18
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/28/2012 EUR 67.75
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/28/2012 EUR 63.10
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/21/2012 EUR 74.00
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/21/2012 EUR 68.47
GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY 8.020 3/1/2013 EUR 56.54
BKB FINANCE 10.950 5/10/2013 CHF 62.57
BKB FINANCE 10.150 9/11/2013 CHF 73.89
BKB FINANCE 13.200 1/31/2013 CHF 50.08
BKB FINANCE 9.450 7/3/2013 CHF 68.52
BKB FINANCE 11.500 3/20/2013 CHF 59.30
BKB FINANCE 8.350 1/14/2013 CHF 54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/13/2012 EUR 73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.000 11/13/2012 EUR 64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.830 11/19/2012 CHF 70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.300 11/20/2012 CHF 64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.500 11/20/2012 EUR 55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.800 11/20/2012 EUR 65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.250 11/27/2012 CHF 68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 11/27/2012 CHF 64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/27/2012 CHF 31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 11/27/2012 EUR 59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.750 12/3/2012 CHF 72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.750 12/6/2012 CHF 35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.500 12/14/2012 CHF 58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.250 12/14/2012 EUR 66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.500 12/14/2012 EUR 62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.300 12/21/2012 CHF 64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.900 12/21/2012 CHF 64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.600 12/21/2012 CHF 64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.830 12/28/2012 USD 57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 1/9/2013 EUR 52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.000 1/15/2013 CHF 27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.250 1/15/2013 CHF 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 1/15/2013 GBP 73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.500 1/15/2013 CHF 28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 1/15/2013 CHF 74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.500 1/18/2013 CHF 50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.800 1/23/2013 CHF 69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.050 2/20/2013 USD 74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR 15.000 3/1/2013 CHF 71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 3/6/2013 USD 71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.250 12/27/2012 GBP 67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 4/2/2013 CHF 63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 4/4/2013 CHF 23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.530 4/16/2013 EUR 49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.000 4/19/2013 EUR 55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.000 4/26/2013 CHF 66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.500 4/30/2013 EUR 28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.200 6/7/2013 EUR 71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.500 8/27/2013 CHF 51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.400 9/30/2013 CHF 63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.000 10/3/2013 GBP 74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.160 4/25/2014 EUR 71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.850 10/14/2014 CHF 57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 CHF 56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 EUR 57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.000 11/13/2012 USD 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.750 3/19/2013 USD 71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.670 12/28/2012 CHF 70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN 11.500 1/24/2013 CHF 59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN 17.000 2/22/2013 EUR 59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.128 3/7/2013 CHF 64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN 13.575 4/10/2013 CHF 74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN 7.340 4/16/2013 CHF 70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.500 7/5/2013 CHF 70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.200 8/23/2013 CHF 67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.000 9/11/2013 CHF 69.23
ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING 0.800 2/15/2011 EUR 26.50
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 21.66
NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV 12.000 2/10/2015 USD 24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV 5.250 5/8/2013 EUR 5.89
KPNQWEST NV 10.000 3/15/2012 EUR 0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 9/13/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.600 2/22/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 2/14/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 12/15/2011 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 12.000 7/4/2011 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 1/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 12/31/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 11/16/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 10/12/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.500 8/9/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 5/30/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.750 3/1/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2010 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 1.750 2/7/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.800 12/27/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.800 8/21/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 8/3/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.500 8/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.500 7/6/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 6/29/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 6/17/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.750 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.500 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 6/13/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 15.000 6/4/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 17.000 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.500 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.200 5/14/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.850 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 4/14/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 3/17/2009 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 0.500 2/16/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.750 1/30/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.432 1/8/2009 ILS 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 12/26/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 11/28/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.442 11/22/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.100 11/12/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 11/9/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.150 10/30/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/28/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 10/24/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/24/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.000 10/24/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 10/23/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 10/22/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/8/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.250 10/6/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 18.250 10/2/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.375 9/20/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 23.300 9/16/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 9/15/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.000 9/12/2036 JPY 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/30/2012 USD 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 8/23/2012 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 7/25/2012 EUR 22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 1.375 4/30/2012 EUR 26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 5.750 5/26/2014 EUR 26.88
RENEWABLE CORP 6.500 6/4/2014 EUR 61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM 6.500 5/1/2016 EUR 51.72
SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber 6.000 6/30/2016 SEK 66.00
SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER 8.700 8/5/2013 CHF 60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER 15.000 5/31/2013 USD 69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 13.000 5/31/2013 USD 70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.000 4/9/2013 CHF 56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 10.750 3/13/2013 EUR 66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER 17.300 2/1/2013 EUR 54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 9.700 12/20/2012 CHF 75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER 11.500 2/20/2013 CHF 47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.200 12/5/2012 EUR 54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/26/2014 CHF 65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/13/2014 CHF 63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/24/2014 CHF 55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/11/2014 CHF 54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 18.400 12/20/2013 EUR 74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 11/26/2013 CHF 64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 4.500 8/13/2014 CHF 48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 16.500 9/23/2013 USD 57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/23/2013 CHF 50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 3.250 9/16/2013 CHF 49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.500 11/13/2012 CHF 58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/13/2012 CHF 74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.250 11/12/2012 CHF 73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 8/27/2014 CHF 55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/10/2014 CHF 51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 10/15/2014 CHF 57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 5.250 8/6/2014 CHF 51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.000 7/22/2013 CHF 72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.000 6/10/2013 CHF 70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/31/2013 CHF 55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 6.500 4/26/2013 CHF 58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/25/2013 CHF 59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/18/2013 CHF 74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 3/1/2013 USD 74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 9.000 2/14/2013 CHF 66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 11.500 2/13/2013 EUR 57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 1/24/2013 CHF 66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.750 1/15/2013 CHF 68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.250 12/17/2012 CHF 61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/17/2012 EUR 67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 12/14/2012 EUR 72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/14/2012 CHF 36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.000 11/23/2012 CHF 47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.125 11/19/2012 CHF 58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/16/2012 CHF 58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 8.900 3/25/2013 EUR 57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 10.500 9/9/2013 CHF 66.05
S-AIR GROUP 0.125 7/7/2005 CHF 10.63
SARASIN CI LTD 8.000 4/27/2015 CHF 68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.600 2/17/2014 CHF 71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.200 1/23/2013 EUR 72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 15.200 12/12/2012 EUR 73.12
UBS AG 11.870 8/13/2013 USD 4.68
UBS AG 9.600 8/26/2013 USD 15.21
UBS AG 10.200 9/20/2013 EUR 61.15
UBS AG 12.900 9/20/2013 EUR 57.98
UBS AG 15.900 9/20/2013 EUR 55.99
UBS AG 17.000 9/27/2013 EUR 73.19
UBS AG 17.750 9/27/2013 EUR 73.50
UBS AG 18.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.56
UBS AG 19.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.84
UBS AG 20.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.19
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 74.87
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.43
UBS AG 21.750 9/27/2013 EUR 72.53
UBS AG 22.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.57
UBS AG 22.500 9/27/2013 EUR 70.55
UBS AG 22.750 9/27/2013 EUR 67.91
UBS AG 23.000 9/27/2013 EUR 72.72
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.81
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.35
UBS AG 24.000 9/27/2013 EUR 69.47
UBS AG 24.750 9/27/2013 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 8.060 10/3/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 13.570 11/21/2013 USD 16.25
UBS AG 6.980 11/27/2013 USD 34.85
UBS AG 17.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.48
UBS AG 17.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 73.31
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.28
UBS AG 19.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.10
UBS AG 20.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.53
UBS AG 20.500 1/3/2014 EUR 71.30
UBS AG 20.750 1/3/2014 EUR 71.59
UBS AG 21.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.44
UBS AG 22.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 23.000 1/3/2014 EUR 71.55
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.29
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.57
UBS AG 24.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.95
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 68.40
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.18
UBS AG 6.440 5/28/2014 USD 51.67
UBS AG 3.870 6/17/2014 USD 38.08
UBS AG 6.040 8/29/2014 USD 35.22
UBS AG 7.780 8/29/2014 USD 20.85
UBS AG 11.260 11/12/2012 EUR 47.13
UBS AG 11.660 11/12/2012 EUR 34.35
UBS AG 13.120 11/12/2012 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 13.560 11/12/2012 EUR 36.51
UBS AG 13.600 11/12/2012 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 13.000 11/23/2012 USD 62.55
UBS AG 8.150 12/21/2012 EUR 72.14
UBS AG 8.250 12/21/2012 EUR 74.88
UBS AG 8.270 12/21/2012 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 8.990 12/21/2012 EUR 72.49
UBS AG 9.000 12/21/2012 EUR 69.13
UBS AG 9.150 12/21/2012 EUR 71.84
UBS AG 9.450 12/21/2012 EUR 74.42
UBS AG 9.730 12/21/2012 EUR 70.24
UBS AG 9.890 12/21/2012 EUR 66.37
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 72.98
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 69.64
UBS AG 10.160 12/21/2012 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 10.490 12/21/2012 EUR 68.12
UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 71.60
UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.85
UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 67.59
UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.14
UBS AG 11.270 12/21/2012 EUR 70.63
UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53
UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67
UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02
UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09
UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07
UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39
UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51
UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64
UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85
UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41
UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18
UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29
UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44
UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53
UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58
UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59
UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81
UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88
UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41
UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51
UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10
UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18
UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09
UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69
UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84
UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83
UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52
UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33
UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40
UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63
UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95
UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39
UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32
UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69
UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58
UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54
UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23
UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99
UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92
UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21
UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94
UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05
UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65
UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55
UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34
UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54
UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04
UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86
UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90
UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35
UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96
UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23
UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02
UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24
UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00
UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30
UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20
UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16
UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16
UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45
UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44
UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63
UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43
UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24
UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21
UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17
UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77
UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39
UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84
UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50
UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06
UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75
UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90
UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12
UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60
UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70
UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00
UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17
UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43
UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83
UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98
UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05
UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54
UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91
UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62
UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86
UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83
UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15
UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94
UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97
UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96
UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87
UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62
UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50
UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82
UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26
UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53
UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76
UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64
UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66
ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62
MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *