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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, June 3, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 108

                            Headlines



B U L G A R I A

MARITSA IZTOK: On Brink of Bankruptcy, Trade Unions Say
LAIKI BANK: Cyprus Freezes Assets of Three Former Executives


F I N L A N D

YIT OYJ: Creditors Approve Annual Interest Hike on Notes


F R A N C E

HOLDELIS SAS: Moody's Assigns 'B2' CFR; Outlook Stable
SPCM SA: Good Performance Cues Moody's to Raise CFR to 'Ba2'


H U N G A R Y

ZALAI BAROMFIFELDOGOZO: Liquidation Orders Takes Effect


I R E L A N D

EIRCOM FINANCE: Moody's Rates EUR350MM Senior Secured Notes Caa1
SUNDAY BUSINESS: Two Potential Bidders to Launch Joint Offer


K A Z A K H S T A N

* KAZAKHSTAN: Fitch Says Banks Show Limited Growth in 2011-2013


N E T H E R L A N D S

LEOPARD CLO III: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa3
MESDAG BV: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Senior Notes to 'BB+'


R O M A N I A

HIDROELECTRICA SA: To Exit Insolvency Procedure on July 1
POSTA ROMANA: Gov't Blames Woes on Unfavorable Contracts


R U S S I A

ABSOLUT BANK: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Deposit Ratings to 'B1'
BELGOROD OBLAST: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Ratings; Outlook Negative
CREDIT BANK OF MOSCOW: Moody's Affirms B1 Deposit Ratings
CREDIT UNION: S&P Assigns 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
MTS INTERNATIONAL: Fitch Rates US$500MM Notes 'BB+'

SISTEMA JOINT: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba3 CFR to Positive


S P A I N

AYT CAJAGRANADA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B'
AYT HIPOTECARIO IV: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. B Notes to 'Ba1'
GROHE HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on EUR375MM Sr. Sec. Loan
HIPOTEBANSA 11: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to Caa1
RURAL HIPOTECARIO I: Moody's Cuts Cl. D Notes Rating to Caa3


S W E D E N

BRAVIDA HOLDING: Moody's Assigns 'B2' CFR; Outlook Stable
BRAVIDA HOLDING: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable


S W I T Z E R L A N D

* SWEDEN: Fitch Says Banks' US Tax Dispute Resolution Costly


T U R K E Y

YUKSEL INSAAT: Moody's Caa1-Rated Debt Still on Downgrade Watch


U K R A I N E

* UKRAINE: Moody's Says Banking System Outlook Still Negative


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Councils Cut Exposure After Rating Downgrade
HOUSE OF FRASER: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
MORTGAGES NO.7: Moody's Cuts Rating on GBP7.5MM Notes to B2
* UK: OFTOs Have Favorable Credit Risk Profiles, Says Moody's


X X X X X X X X

* Payment Defaults in Western Europe Up 5% of Invoice Value
* BOND PRICING: For the Week May 27 to May 31, 2013


                            *********


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B U L G A R I A
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MARITSA IZTOK: On Brink of Bankruptcy, Trade Unions Say
-------------------------------------------------------
Novinite.com reports that trade union representatives at
Bulgaria's state-owned Maritsa Iztok Mines have cautioned that
the company faces a tough financial situation, with efforts
underway to freeze bank accounts, cut jobs and delay salaries of
workers.

The representatives of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation and the
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB) at
the coal mining company reported their observations Friday at a
meeting of the public council of the Ministry of Economy and
Energy, Novinite.com says, citing reports of investor.bg.

Bulgaria's newly sworn-in Energy Minister, Dragomir Stoinev,
guaranteed, however, that the workers would be paid their
salaries and there would be no staff cuts at the mines,
Novinite.com notes.

According to Novinite.com, Valentin Topalov, Chair of the
Podkrepa Labor Confederation at the Maritsa Iztok Mines, argued
that the launch of bankruptcy proceedings was forthcoming and one
of the shifts at the coal mining company would be laid off from
July 1.

Mr. Topalov also called for an urgent decision on the price of
coal, saying that if the production process was stopped, the
restart would be difficult, Novinite.com discloses.


LAIKI BANK: Cyprus Freezes Assets of Three Former Executives
------------------------------------------------------------
Kerin Hope and Andreas Hadjipapas at The Financial Times report
that Cyprus has frozen billions of euros of assets held by three
former senior executives of Laiki (Popular) Bank, signaling a
protracted legal battle over who was to blame for the collapse in
March of the island's second-largest lender.

According to the FT, the central bank of Cyprus said on Friday
the temporary measure covered EUR3.8 billion held by Andreas
Vgenopoulos, Laiki's former executive chairman, and Efthimios
Bouloutas, former chief executive, together with EUR1.5 billion
held by Kyriakos Magiras, former head of wholesale banking.  All
three are Greek nationals, the FT notes.

The court order also called for the blocking of transfers or
payments to the three bankers by Athens-based Marfin Investment
Group, formerly a leading shareholder in Laiki, the FT says,
citing a statement by the central bank.  A hearing on the issue
is set for June 11, the FT discloses.

On Friday, Mr. Vgenopoulos rejected responsibility for Laiki's
collapse, claiming the Cypriot authorities were trying to shift
the blame to its former Greek management, the FT relates.

Laiki was merged with Bank of Cyprus, the biggest Cypriot lender,
as part of an international bailout agreed in March with the EU
and International Monetary Fund that imposed a "haircut" on
uninsured bank deposits which is expected to exceed 60%, the FT
recounts.  The Greek operations of Laiki and Bank of Cyprus were
acquired by Piraeus Bank, now the largest Greek lender, the FT
discloses.

MIG has already filed a claim against the Cypriot authorities,
seeking to recover EUR830 million injected as capital after MIG
acquired an 18% stake in Laiki from HSBC in 2006 and took over
management, the FT relates.

Mr. Vgenopoulos and Mr. Bouloutas stood down as chairman and
chief executive in 2011 following pressure from the central bank,
the FT discloses.  Laiki was nationalized last year after
reporting EUR3.8 billion of losses on Greek sovereign bonds and
its Greek loan portfolio, the FT recounts.

Laiki was founded in 1901 as the Popular Savings Bank Limassol.



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F I N L A N D
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YIT OYJ: Creditors Approve Annual Interest Hike on Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Kati Pohjanpalo at Bloomberg News reports that YIT Oyj
bondholders accepted a plan that left their debt junk rated after
the Finnish builder said its proposal wasn't open to discussion.

According to Bloomberg, a statement to the Helsinki Stock
Exchange on Friday said creditors approved raising the annual
interest by as much as 55 basis points on notes due 2015 and 2016
in compensation for a split in the company's operations.

In exchange, bondholders agreed to waive claims on assets in a
new company created through a spinoff, in the event of a default,
Bloomberg discloses.  Investors could either pass or reject the
proposals at the May 31 meetings, and weren't be able to make a
counter offer, Bloomberg notes.

"It was the best of bad options," Bloomberg quotes Juuso Rantala,
portfolio manager at Aktia Asset Management, who helps manage
about US$10 billion in bonds and stocks and has already sold some
of his YIT debt, as saying.  "The compensation is absolutely
inadequate.  While it may be enough to compensate for the drop in
market yields, it doesn't compensate for the weaker credit
quality of YIT after the spinoff."

YIT also offered to buy back outstanding floating-rate bonds,
Bloomberg relates.  About 42.6% of holders of bonds due in March
2014 tendered their holdings, leaving EUR28.7 million
outstanding, while 24% of those with about EUR25 million of
September 2016 securities grabbed the offer, Bloomberg discloses.
About 0.2% of YIT's August 2014 notes were tendered, leaving 49.9
million euros outstanding, Bloomberg states.



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F R A N C E
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HOLDELIS SAS: Moody's Assigns 'B2' CFR; Outlook Stable
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a B2 corporate family rating
(CFR) and a B2-PD probability of default rating (PDR) to Holdelis
S.A.S. Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a provisional (P)B1
rating, with a loss given default (LGD) assessment of LGD3, 37%,
to the company's proposed EUR450 million of senior secured notes.
The outlook on the ratings is stable. This is the first time that
Moody's has assigned a rating to Elis.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these reflect Moody's credit opinion regarding
the transaction only. Upon closing of the refinancing and a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign definitive ratings to Elis. A definitive
rating may differ from a provisional rating. The ratings assigned
to Elis assume the successful refinancing of the company's
current financing package.

Ratings Rationale:

"The B2 CFR primarily reflects Elis' high exposure to its home
market, France, which represents around 82% of the company's
revenues, as well as high leverage estimated to be around 5.4x
adjusted debt/EBITDA pro-forma for the refinancing," says Knut
Slatten, Moody's lead analyst for Elis. The B2 CFR also reflects
the capital-intensity of the business which requires substantial
amount of CAPEX as illustrated by the EUR238 million of capital
expenditure the company incurred in FY2012. Moody's notes,
however, that 2012 was exceptionally high because of the
completion of several one-off projects. The company expects a
normalized level of CAPEX to be c. 17% of sales (of which c. 10%
of linen CAPEX).

These factors are balanced to an extent by (1) a business model
which in the past has demonstrated a high degree of resiliency
(2) good visibility on future revenue streams thanks to company's
use of longer term contracts (3) a widely diversified customer
base with limited customer concentration (4) the company's high
profitability with EBITDA-margins above 30%. Moody's considers
Elis to be solidly positioned in the rating-category.

Elis is a multiservice provider of flat linen, garment and
hygiene and well-being products (HWB). It has a very strong
competitive positioning, notably in France, where it benefits
from barriers to entry thanks to broad geographical coverage as
well as large infrastructure investments. Moody's notes Elis
gradually has increased its international exposure and Moody's
would expect the company to continue focusing on international
expansion where growth potential may be higher than in France. As
part of this strategy, Moody's would anticipate Elis to continue
doing bolt-on acquisitions in foreign markets.

Pro-forma for the proposed senior secured notes issuance, Elis'
capital structure will consist of approximately EUR450 million of
senior secured notes, EUR915 million of term loans and EUR380
million of senior subordinated notes in addition to the secured
notes. Moody's also notes that Elis will be issuing EUR173
million worth of PIK notes at FrenchCo -- an entity sitting
outside of the restricted group. The proceeds from the PIK
issuance are, however, anticipated to be downstreamed into the
restricted group through an intra-group loan. As such, they will
be included in Moody's metrics-calculations. As of March 31,
2013, Elis also had EUR381 million of subordinated shareholder
loans in its structure. Moody's understands that this will
convert into common equity during 2013, and hence has considered
this capital as equity in its credit metrics.

The EUR450 million of secured notes and the EUR915 million of
term loans will be issued at Novalis level -- a holding-company -
- and will rank pari-passu in between them. They will benefit
from an upstream guarantee from MAJ S.A. which represents
approximately 60% of the sales of Elis' French operations.
Moody's understands security to essentially consist of share
pledges. The (P)B1 rating assigned to the senior secured notes --
one notch above the CFR -- reflects the loss absorption resulting
from the issuance of subordinated instruments ranking behind the
notes in the waterfall.

Moody's expects Elis' liquidity profile to remain adequate going
forward. In addition to Moody's expectations of a moderate free
cash flow over the next 12 months, the company's liquidity
profile is supported by EUR150 million revolving credit facility
(RCF), out of which EUR88 million will be available after
closing. Moody's notes, however, that the proposed refinancing is
anticipated to leave Elis with only a minor amount of cash at the
balance-sheet post-closing.

The company is controlled by Eurazeo, a principal shareholder.
However, Moody's notes that the proposed notes permit an
exception to the general change of control clause, whereby a
change of control would not trigger an investor put if the
company's consolidated leverage (excluding the PIK notes) is
below 3.75x.

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's anticipation
that, going forward, Elis will be able to deleverage further
while maintaining a satisfactory liquidity profile. The current
rating is solidly positioned and leaves some flexibility for
further investments in the business

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Positive pressure on the rating could develop if Elis' operating
performance continues to improve, allowing for the company's
leverage, measured by debt/EBITDA, to move sustainably below
5.25x. Conversely, negative pressure could develop if Elis'
leverage moves above 6.0x or if Moody's becomes concerned about
the company's liquidity.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Elis is a France-based multiservice provider of flat linen,
garment and HWB services. It has around 230 000 customers in the
private and public sector and operates throughout 10 European
countries. For the financial year ended December 31, 2012, it
reported total revenues of EUR1.185 billion and adjusted EBITDA
of EUR386 million.


SPCM SA: Good Performance Cues Moody's to Raise CFR to 'Ba2'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the corporate family rating
(CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) of SPCM SA's (SPCM)
to Ba2 from Ba3 and to Ba2-PD from Ba3-PD, respectively. The
outlook on the ratings is positive.

"We have upgraded SPCM's ratings by one notch and assigned a
positive outlook to reflect the company's solid operating
performance to date, and because we expect that the positive
trend in its key metrics will continue over at least the next
three years," says Anthony Hill, a Moody's Vice President --
Senior Analyst and lead analyst for SPCM.

Ratings Rationale:

This upgrade of SPCM's ratings and the positive outlook reflect
the company's solid operating performance to date, and Moody's
expectation that this now three-year positive trend in revenue
growth, EBITDA generation, and modestly declining leverage will
continue over at least the next three years.

The Ba2 CFR primarily reflects SPCM's limited scale and muted
free cash flow generation.

Regarding scale, SPCM is nearly singularly focused on
polyacrylamide (PAM) production technologies. PAM is a water-
soluble specialty chemical used in water treatment, oil and gas
applications, mineral extraction, and pulp and paper
manufacturing. For the last 12 months ending March 31, 2013, SPCM
reported revenues of EUR1.9 billion and a product portfolio of
more than 1,100 product formulations for customers across
multiple industries; however, nearly 80% of the company's
revenues are generated solely from PAM production technologies.

Concerning free cash flow (FCF) generation, in order to maintain
and improve on its competitive positioning, SPCM feels it must
continue to follow its stated policy of reinvesting all available
cash flow back into expansionary capital investments. Due to
increasing global demand for water treatment and fossil fuel
applications, the PAM industry, which is fairly consolidated,
continues to exhibit very high capacity utilization rates of
around 85%-90%. This tight supply-versus-demand balance makes it
necessary for SPCM to ensure sufficient investments in its
current plants and its global expansion projects in order to
maintain and improve its competitive level of supply for its
customers. For example, the company has three new PAM production
plants currently in the planning or pre-construction phase in the
UK, China and Russia. For these reasons, Moody's expects the
company's FCF generation will be within a negative range of EUR10
million--EUR15 million (on a Moody's-adjusted basis) for the
financial year-end December 2013 (FYE 2013). While Moody's
expects the company will continue to generate comfortable levels
of retained cash flow (RCF), the rating agency also expects that
SPCM's FCF generation will remain modestly negative over the
coming years as a result of its organic growth strategy.

Moody's is concerned that SPCM's limited scale and muted FCF
significantly limits the company's ability to handle unforeseen,
yet probable, challenges to its business plan, such as sharp raw
material price volatility, raw material supply limitations, or
the substitution of other products for PAM. Furthermore, SPCM's
global competition can come from the PAM division of
substantially larger and more financially flexible companies such
as BASF (SE) (A1 stable), Ecolab (Baa1 ratings under review for
downgrade), and Ashland Inc. (Ba1 stable).

However, more positively, the Ba2 CFR also reflects Moody's
positive view that SPCM (1) is a leading specialty chemicals
producer for the global PAM industry with a track record of
maintaining a solid market share position across diverse
applications; (2) has a proven ability to generate solid revenue
and EBITDA growth, while modestly reducing leverage, through
global and European economic cycles; and (3) has a resilient
business model, as demonstrated by solid operating performance
and growth; and (4) is able to pass through material and
production costs while simultaneously improving marginal income,
despite the high degree of competition in the US markets and the
challenging trading environment in Europe.

Moody's believes that SPCM's liquidity will continue to
comfortably cover its near-term requirements, such as debt
service and amortization, working capital needs and expected
capital expenditures (including expansionary capital
investments). For example, pro forma for FYE 2013 capital
investments, Moody's expects the company to exhibit a Moody's-
adjusted cash balance of approximately EUR100 million at FYE
2013. Currently, SPCM's Moody's-adjusted FCF is approximately
EUR14 million for the last 12 months ending March 31, 2013;
however, pro forma for FYE 2013 capital investments, Moody's
expects this to be within a negative range of EUR10 million--
EUR15 million (on a Moody's-adjusted basis). Additionally,
Moody's expects the company to continue to have access to a
senior secured $200 million revolving credit facility (unrated),
which currently remains largely undrawn.

The positive outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's view that
SPCM's operating performance is likely to remain solid over the
coming quarters, despite the highly competitive US markets, the
challenging European markets, and the company's robust organic
expansionary program.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

In Moody's view, SPCM is solidly positioned in the Ba2 rating
category. Moody's would consider upgrading SPCM's rating to the
extent that the company can improve on its scale through revenue
expansion; and continue to generate meaningful RCF while
maintaining, or improving on, current leverage such that Moody's-
adjusted RCF/debt ratio is sustained around 25% and Moody's-
adjusted debt/EBITDA is kept at around 2.3x.

Conversely, negative rating pressure, although unlikely at this
stage, could develop in the event of the company suffering a
material deterioration in operating performance, leading to (1) a
sustained weakness in cash flow generation, with RCF/debt falling
to the low teens in percentage terms; and (2) weaker debt
coverage metrics, with a debt/EBITDA ratio consistently above
3.0x. Moreover, the ratings could also come under negative
pressure if the company's liquidity profile were to significantly
deteriorate due to the implementation of an adverse dividend
policy and/or an overly robust capital investment program.

The principal methodology used in rating SPCM SA was the Global
Chemical Industry Methodology, published in December 2009. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

SPCM SA is the parent holding company of the SNF Group (SNF). SNF
is one of the world's leading producers of polyacrylamide, which
is a water-soluble specialty chemical used in water treatment,
oil and gas applications, mineral extraction, and pulp and paper
manufacturing. The company is family-owned and was formed as a
result of a buy-out of the flocculants business of WR Grace in
1978. SNF, headquartered in Saint-Etienne, France, reported
revenues of approximately EUR1.9 billion and EBITDA of EUR255
million for the last 12 months ending March 31, 2013.



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H U N G A R Y
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ZALAI BAROMFIFELDOGOZO: Liquidation Orders Takes Effect
-------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews reports that a court decision on the liquidation of
Zalai Baromfifeldogozo took effect on Thursday, May 30.

The owners decided to wind up the company in the middle of April,
MTI-Econews recounts.

Ferenc Somogyi, CEO of the liquidator company TM-Line told MTI
that based on a preliminary assessment, the company has assets
worth close to HUF1 billion against creditor claims of about
HUF2.5 billion.

The company built a HUF1.5 billion plant in Pacsa (W Hungary) in
2011 which was opened in February 2012, MTI-Econews MTI-Econews
relates.  Construction was supported by more than HUF600 million
in investment and employment grants, and debt included nearly
HUF1.2 billion owed to a lender bank according to earlier
information, MTI-Econews discloses.  The plant employed 150
people, MTI-Econews notes.

Zalai Baromfifeldogozo is a Hungarian poultry company.



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I R E L A N D
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EIRCOM FINANCE: Moody's Rates EUR350MM Senior Secured Notes Caa1
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive Caa1 rating
and loss given default (LGD) assessment of LGD3 to the EUR350
million of senior secured notes due 2020 issued by eircom Finance
Limited ("EFL"), an indirectly wholly owned subsidiary of eircom
Holdings (Ireland) Limited ("eircom"). eircom's Caa1 corporate
family rating (CFR) and Caa1-PD probability of default rating
(PDR), as well as the Caa1 rating on the EUR2.3 billion senior
secured credit facility due 2017 raised by eircom Finco S.a.r.l.,
remain unchanged. The outlook on all ratings is stable.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's definitive rating on this debt obligation is in line with
the provisional rating assigned on May 1, 2013.

The Caa1 rating on the senior secured notes is in line with
eircom's CFR and with the rating on the EUR2.3 billion senior
credit facility. The new notes are guaranteed by the same
entities that guarantee the senior credit facility, and are
secured over the same collateral on a pari passu basis with the
senior credit facility.

The group will use the proceeds from the notes issuance to
refinance part of the existing senior credit facility at a price
below par.

This refinancing exercise does not have an impact on eircom's
rating or its stable outlook, given that the group's leverage
ratios will remain broadly unchanged. While interest paid will
increase since the new debt is more expensive than the debt
eircom is retiring, the proposed refinancing is also positive for
eircom in that it will extend its debt maturity profile and
diversify its funding sources.

Moody's notes that eircom has made good progress in executing its
business plan since the initial rating assignment in June 2012.
The group's operating performance has been in line or slightly
exceeded the business plan, particularly with regard to EBITDA
generation and reducing the rate of fixed-line access losses.
eircom is also progressing well with its investment in next-
generation fiber, and the future roll-out of the 4G mobile
network and the launch of quad-play offers will enable the group
to strengthen its competitive positioning.

However, Moody's believes that the execution risk of the plan
remains significant, while visibility with regard to a recovery
in revenue growth is very limited. In fact, eircom has recently
announced a headcount reduction plan affecting 2,000 full-time
employees over two years. This plan would allow the group to
generate EUR100 million in cost savings per year and partially
mitigate the higher pressure on revenues than initially
anticipated.

Moody's expects that eircom's EBITDA will bottom out in fiscal
year (FY) 2012/13 and grow slowly thereafter. At the same time,
the group's accelerated investment in FY2013/14 will lead to
negative free cash flow generation, such that adjusted
debt/EBITDA will remain around 6.0x, a level that Moody's
considers to be high when compared with that of other European
telecom peers. Note that Moody's adjusted debt includes the
EUR638 million pension deficit reported by eircom as of December
2012, as well as the standard adjustment for operating leases. In
light of eircom's high leverage, the rating agency believes that
the group's equity cushion is negative, which could potentially
reduce the recovery prospects for debt holders.

eircom's liquidity profile is currently adequate, with a cash
balance of EUR243 million, no mandatory debt repayments until
2017 and sufficient headroom under covenants. However, the group
has not yet sought the EUR150 million super senior revolving
credit facility or the vendor financing of up to EUR200 million
that is available under the senior secured credit facility. In
the event of a weaker-than-expected operating performance or
higher-than-expected capex needs, not only eircom's credit
metrics but also its liquidity profile could come under negative
pressure as a result of the group's lack of committed external
liquidity sources.

The Caa1 CFR reflects (1) eircom's high leverage and very limited
deleveraging prospects for the foreseeable future; (2) its
negative equity cushion, resulting from an enterprise value that,
in Moody's view, is lower than the group's debt; (3) the
execution risk and operational challenges embedded in eircom's
business plan, in the midst of tough competition, regulatory
pressures and an adverse macroeconomic environment, which is
weakening the group's operating performance; (4) the group's
negative free cash flow generation in the first two years of the
implementation of its new strategy owing to the acceleration of
its fiber investments and spectrum requirements; and (5) the lack
of committed external facilities to support eircom's liquidity
profile beyond existing cash balances in the event of the group
deviating from its business plan.

The rating also reflects (1) eircom's dominant position in the
fixed-line market as Ireland's incumbent operator, with a 53%
market share, and its position as the third-largest operator in
the mobile segment, based on a market share of 20% as of December
2012, as reported by the Irish communications regulator; (2) the
potential for its competitive position to be strengthened over
time as a result of its accelerated investment plan; and (3) its
currently adequate liquidity profile.

Outlook

The stable outlook on the ratings reflects Moody's expectation
that eircom will perform according to its business plan. The
outlook also reflects the rating agency's expectation that
eircom's leverage will increase to around 6.0x in FY2012/13,
before decreasing towards 5.5x in FY2014/15 as the group executes
its investment plan and stabilizes its competitive positioning in
the Irish market. In Moody's view, there is limited flexibility
built in for deviation from the business plan should execution
risk prove to be higher than anticipated by management.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Upward pressure on the rating could develop over time if eircom
stabilizes its market share in fixed line, and improves its
margins in mobile, leading to operating performance and cash flow
generation metrics that sustainably exceed those implied by the
group's business plan. Upward rating pressure would also require
the group to maintain a sound liquidity profile, with comfortable
headroom under financial covenants. Upward pressure on the rating
would be supported by adjusted debt/EBITDA trending towards 5.0x
on a sustained basis.

Conversely, downward pressure on the rating could materialize if
the group fails to execute its business plan, leading to weaker-
than-expected credit metrics, including adjusted debt/EBITDA
trending sustainably above 6.0x, and free cash flow generation
persistently in negative territory. Given the size and volatility
of eircom's pension deficit, the Caa1 rating with a stable
outlook incorporates the potential for moderate deviations from
these ranges on a temporary basis.

Moody's would also be concerned if eircom's liquidity came under
stress as a result of a weaker-than-expected operating
performance or larger cash outflows for capex in the absence of
alternative external sources, such as a revolving credit
facility.

In addition, downward pressure on the rating could arise in the
event that eircom were to consider plans that could involve
swapping debt for equity, which Moody's could consider a
distressed exchange.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

eircom Holdings (Ireland) Limited is the holding company of the
eircom group, the principal provider of fixed-line
telecommunications services in Ireland, with a revenue share of
the fixed-line market of approximately 53% (according to ComReg).
The group is also the third-largest mobile operator in Ireland,
with a subscriber market share of approximately 20% (according to
ComReg). eircom reported revenue of EUR1.5 billion and adjusted
EBITDA of EUR542 million in the financial year ending June 30,
2012, and revenue of EUR723 million and adjusted EBITDA of EUR243
million for the six months ending December 31, 2012.


SUNDAY BUSINESS: Two Potential Bidders to Launch Joint Offer
------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Lyons at Irish Independent reports that two of the potential
bidders for the Sunday Business Post have combined to launch a
joint bid for the newspaper which is now 87 days into the 100-day
examinership process.

A consortium led by Michael Brophy, the former chief executive of
Independent News & Media (Northern Ireland), has combined with
corporate financiers Key Capital to make a joint bid for the
paper, Irish Independent discloses.  Paul Cooke, the former
managing director of Independent Star Ltd., is also involved with
this group, Irish Independent notes.

Meanwhile, a rival consortium led by former Newstalk chief
executive Frank Cronin is also preparing to submit a bid for the
newspaper, Irish Independent states.  Mr. Cronin is understood to
have an overseas investor interested in the paper, according to
Irish Independent.  This investor will visit Ireland this week to
discuss a bid, Irish Independent notes.

The price of the Business Post was pitched at EUR2 million when
it entered examinership -- but it is now expected to sell for
under EUR1 million, according to Irish Independent.  Any new
owner will have to present to Grant Thornton, the paper's
examiner, a plan to both invest in the business and implement a
redundancy program, Irish Independent says.  Last Friday,
examiner Mick McAteer told the High Court that talks were now at
a "critical stage", Irish Independent recounts.

Mr. McAteer told the court he believed he would find a credible
buyer for the paper complete with a survival plan for its future
by Friday, June 7, with a view to updating the High Court the
following week, Irish Independent relates.

The Sunday Business Post is an Irish national Sunday newspaper.
Accountant Michael McAteer of Grant Thornton was appointed as
interim examiner of Post Publishing Ltd., which owns the Sunday
Business Post' newspaper, at the High Court in Dublin by
Mr. Justice Peter Kelly, in March 2013.



===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


* KAZAKHSTAN: Fitch Says Banks Show Limited Growth in 2011-2013
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says in a newly-published report that Kazakh banks
are benefitting from the country's robust economic growth, which
has provided opportunities for gradual resolution of asset
quality problems, accumulation of moderate capital cushions and
reserves, generation of new lending business and rebalancing of
funding towards domestic sources. That said, the stock of legacy
problem loans on banks' balance sheets remains large and in some
cases may still be under-reserved, while improvements in earnings
have been varied across the sector.

Credit leverage has been notably reduced from pre-crisis levels,
with net loans equal to a moderate 30% of GDP at end-2012 (56%
relative to non-raw materials GDP). The largest banks have mostly
shown limited growth or deleveraged during 2011-2013 to date due
to legacy asset quality problems, limited new large-ticket
business and in some cases lack of clear strategy from
shareholders. At the same time, several mid-sized players
reported significantly higher growth rates (above 25% per annum),
reflecting their lower level of legacy problems, lower base
and/or retail focus.

The main growth drivers are largely limited to sectors
benefitting from either direct support from the state (through
subsidies to SMEs and agricultural borrowers) or connections to
large corporates, both state-owned and private. Retail lending
has also accelerated and is likely to remain robust in the near-
term, considering still moderate household leverage.

Reported non-performing loans (NPLs; loans more than 90 days
overdue) as a proportion of the total loans have been slightly
down (to 30% at end-2012) owing to a small number of work-outs in
large banks and pockets of resumed credit growth. However,
notable downside risks still remain, particularly from the
significant amount of restructured loans (estimated at 16% of the
sector portfolio). Recovery in the real estate sector (to which
the banks have been largely exposed) has been tepid, and cash
generation even from completed properties remains so far limited.

Loss-absorption capacity is considerable, with the system in
aggregate able to increase reserves to almost 40% of gross loans
before the sector capital ratio would breach the minimum level.
However, individual banks' positions vary significantly, with
some dependent to a significant degree on recoveries from
collateral or improvements in performance of restructured
portfolios in order to sustain their solvency. The extent to
which individual banks can absorb losses on reported and
potential additional problem loans remains a key part of Fitch's
rating assessments.

Profitability metrics showed significant improvement in 2012, but
not across the board. Six banks with returns on average assets of
1.9% or more accounted for three quarters of sector earnings
(excluding BTA, Alliance and Temir), but only 40% of assets. The
better performing banks were mainly those with fewer legacy loan
problems and a greater focus on retail lending. Some of the
largest banks have improved the quality of their earnings,
narrowing the gap between interest income accrued and received in
cash during 2012. However, legacy accruals on some banks' balance
sheets were still sizeable, and in aggregate comprised almost 60%
of sector equity.

The sector-wide balance sheet has been rather liquid due to
moderate loan growth and increases in retail deposits. The net
loans/deposits ratio has been comfortably maintained at around
100%, while external debt was equal to only 11% of liabilities at
end-2012 (following the second BTA restructuring), suggesting low
refinancing risks at most banks. At the same time, the quality of
corporate funding was undermined by significant concentrations at
the largest banks, which remain reliant on lumpy deposits from
state corporations. Liquidity support from the National Bank of
Kazakhstan is currently almost entirely limited to refinancing of
failed banks, and a more flexible regime may be required,
particularly as the state gradually reduces liquidity from the
sector through bond issuance.

The Viability Ratings of most Fitch-rated banks in Kazakhstan
remain in the 'b' category, reflecting in most cases the still
incomplete asset worked-outs, limited improvements in earnings
generation and/or high concentrations on both sides of the
balance sheets. Most ratings are currently on Stable Outlooks as
Fitch does not expect a material change in the banks' credit
profiles in the medium-term.

Exceptions are Halyk Bank ('BB-'/Rating Watch Evolving/'bb-'),
which Fitch views as the strongest bank in Kazakhstan on a stand-
alone basis, and BTA Bank ('CCC'/Rating Watch Positive/'ccc'/RWP)
and Alliance Bank ('CCC'/'cc'), whose credit profiles continue to
be undermined by large stocks of impaired loans and weak
capitalisation and earnings. The near-term direction of Halyk's
and BTA's ratings will depend primarily on the terms of any
acquisition of BTA by Halyk, while Alliance's credit profile
depends to a significant degree on whether state holding Samruk
Kazyna is able to find a buyer for the bank by its end-2013
deadline.

The report, entitled 'Kazakh Banks: Favourable Macro, Slow
Recovery' is in the form of a presentation and is available on
www.fitchratings.com.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


LEOPARD CLO III: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to Caa3
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of the following
notes issued by Leopard CLO III B.V.:

EUR235M A1 Notes (current balance EUR86.2M), Upgraded to Aaa
(sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

EUR14.5M B Notes, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Oct 20,
2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

Moody's also downgraded the ratings of the following notes issued
by Leopard CLO III B.V.:

EUR16.25M D Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Oct 20,
2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

EUR6.25M E1 Notes (current balance EUR4.8M), Downgraded to Caa3
(sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

EUR4M E2 Notes (current balance EUR3.1M), Downgraded to Caa3
(sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Moody's also affirmed the ratings of the following notes issued
by Leopard CLO III B.V.:

EUR18M C1 Notes, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

EUR11M C2 Notes, Affirmed Ba1 (sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011
Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

EUR10M Combo W Notes (current balance is EUR6.02M), Affirmed Ba1
(sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

EUR4M Combo Z Notes (current balance is EUR2.54M), Affirmed Ba1
(sf); previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Leopard CLO III B.V., issued in April 2005, is a single currency
Collateralized Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield senior secured European loans. The portfolio is
managed by M&G Investment Management Limited. The reinvestment
period ended on April 21, 2010.

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Classes
W and Z, the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the
principal amount of the Combination Note on the Issue Date
increased by the Rated Coupon of 1.5% and 0.25% per annum
respectively, accrued on the Rated Balance on the preceding
payment date minus the aggregate of all payments made from the
Issue Date to such date, either through interest or principal
payments.

Class X and Class Y Combination Notes have been cancelled and
their ratings have consequently been withdrawn.

Ratings Rationale:

According to Moody's, the upgrades of Class A1 and Class B notes
are primarily a result of continued deleveraging of the A1 notes
and subsequent increase in the Class A/B overcollateralization
ratio since the last rating action in October 2011. The
downgrades of the Class D, E1 and E2 notes are driven by the
decrease of their overcollateralization ratios and their
increased exposure to assets rated B3 and below.

Moody's notes that the Class A1 notes have paid down by
approximately 39% of its original rated balance or EUR89.4
million since the last rating action in October 2011. As a result
of the deleveraging, the overcollateralization ratios for the
senior notes have increased. As of the latest trustee report
dated April 2013, the Class A/B, C, D and E overcollateralization
ratios (taking into account the pay down of Class A1 by EUR17.9M
in Apr 2013) are 147.70%, 114.68%, 101.91%, 96.64%, respectively
versus September 2011 levels of 131.59%, 114.18%, 106.3%,
102.56%, respectively. The Trustee reported WARF has decreased to
2,773 from 3,021 between September 2011 and April 2013, however
during the same period total amount of securities treated as
defaulted by Moody's have increased to EUR10.5 million from
EUR5.9 million.

In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool
to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR
149.16 million, defaulted par of EUR10.5 million, a weighted
average default probability of 20.81% over 3.47 years (consistent
with a WARF ("Weighted Average Rating Factor") of 3,269), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.15% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 21 and a weighted
average spread of 3.45%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 89% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default and 11% non first-lien loan corporate
assets would recover 15%. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also relevant factors. These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a
function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

In addition to the base case analysis, Moody's also performed
sensitivity analyses on key parameters for the rated notes:
Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinancing and
sovereign risks -- Approximately 24% of the portfolio is rated B3
and below with maturities between 2014 and 2016, which may create
challenges for issuers to refinance. The portfolio is also
exposed 4.08% to obligors located in Spain and Ireland. Moody's
considered the scenario where the WARF of the portfolio was
increased to 3,585 by forcing to Ca the credit quality of 25% of
such exposures subject to refinancing or sovereign risks. This
scenario generated model outputs that were up to one notch lower
than the base case results.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
transaction is the pace of amortization of the underlying
portfolio. Pace of amortization could vary significantly subject
to market conditions and this may have a significant impact on
the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could accelerate
as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the loan market
or collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be delayed by
rising loan amend-and-extent restructurings. Fast amortization
would usually benefit the ratings of the notes.

2) Large Exposure to Credit Estimates: Moody's also notes that
around 40.76% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations
whose credit quality has been assessed through Moody's credit
estimates. Large single exposures to obligors bearing a credit
estimate have been subject to a stress applicable to concentrated
pools as per the report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of
Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October
2009.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than expected recoveries
would positively impact the ratings of the notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
May 2013.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Global
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in May 2013.

Under this methodology, Moody's used its Binomial Expansion
Technique, whereby the pool is represented by independent
identical assets, the number of which is being determined by the
diversity score of the portfolio. The default and recovery
properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in a cash flow
model where the default probabilities are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed. The default probability range is derived from the
credit quality of the collateral pool, and Moody's expectation of
the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery
rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the
seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology, is Moody's CDOEdge model. This
model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the loss
for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. Therefore,
Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


MESDAG BV: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Senior Notes to 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in MESDAG (Delta) B.V.

Specifically, S&P:

   -- Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings
on
      the class A senior, and class B and C mezzanine notes;

   -- Lowered its ratings on the class D junior and F
subordinated
      notes; and

   -- Affirmed its 'B-(sf)' rating on the class E junior notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's review of the portfolio and the
application of its updated European commercial mortgage-backed
securities (CMBS) criteria.

On Dec. 6, 2012, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings
on MESDAG (Delta)'s class A senior, B mezzanine, and C mezzanine
notes following an update to its criteria for rating European
CMBS transactions.

                         THE SENIOR LOAN

The securitized EUR609.6 million loan represents the senior
portion of a larger loan of approximately EUR648.6 million.  An
inter-creditor agreement regulates the issuer and the junior
lender's respective rights.  This agreement makes provisions for
pro rata payments, unless a material event of default under the
whole loan has occurred.  If the whole loan defaults, a
sequential payment waterfall applies.

The whole loan is secured on 61 Dutch commercial properties, down
from 77 at closing.  The properties include retail, office,
industrial, hotel, and residential accommodation.  The properties
are concentrated in the retail and office sectors, which account
for 75.3% of the current rental income.

S&P considers the property portfolio to be of mixed quality, with
some good quality assets in addition to more secondary premises.
The top 10 properties by market value account for about 59.5% of
the portfolio, which reflects some concentration risk, in S&P's
view.

The underlying portfolio currently has a 22.2% vacancy rate,
which has remained broadly consistent since January 2012, up from
11.3% at closing.  Similarly, the portfolio's rental receipts
have decreased to EUR46.4 million from EUR49.6 million at
closing. Rental income is granular, with almost 360 tenancies in
place, although there is some rental concentration:  The top 15
tenants by overall passing rent account for 52.9% of the pool.

As a result of property sales, the securitized loan balance
decreased to EUR609.6 million in April 2013 from EUR638.4 million
at closing.

The whole loan pays floating-rate interest.  However, at closing,
the borrower entered into interest-rate swap arrangements to
hedge the entire loan amount against interest-rate fluctuations
until loan maturity.

If the whole loan is not fully repaid on the December 2013 loan
interest payment date, a step-up margin will be due on the whole
loan from January 2014.  The relevant margin for each class of
notes will not change as a result of this step-up because the
proceeds will be paid to the class X noteholders.

The whole loan is interest-only until December 2013.  At that
point, the cash left after servicing the debt (including the
step-up margin) will be used to amortize the whole loan.  S&P
gave limited credit to amortization in its analysis.

In April 2013, the servicer reported a securitized 85.7% loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio and a 91.2% whole-loan LTV ratio.  These ratios
have increased from 74.6% and 79.3%, respectively, at closing.
The loan includes an 85.0% LTV ratio cash trap trigger covenant,
which was breached in April 2013. Monies trapped will be utilized
for loan prepayments until the breach is remedied.  However, no
amortization payments were made in April 2013, as the facility
account balance is currently zero.

The reported interest coverage ratios (ICRs) as of April 2013 are
now moderately lower than the ratios reported at closing--with a
current whole-loan ICR of 1.28x and a securitized-loan ICR of
1.36x, compared with a 1.39x whole-loan ICR and a 1.48x
securitized-loan ICR at closing.

                          RATING RATIONALE

Following the application of S&P's updated European CMBS
criteria, it considers that the amount of available credit
enhancement for the class A senior, B mezzanine, and C mezzanine
notes is insufficient to absorb the calculated losses at their
currently assigned rating levels.  S&P has therefore lowered and
removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on these notes.

In S&P's opinion, the class D junior, E junior, and F
subordinated notes are vulnerable to principal losses.  S&P has
therefore lowered its ratings on the class D notes from 'B (sf)'
to 'B- (sf)'.  As the current rating incorporates such principal
loss risk, S&P has affirmed its rating on the class E notes.  S&P
has lowered its rating on the class F notes to 'CCC+ (sf)' as it
is of the opinion that principal losses on this note class are
more likely to occur.

MESDAG (Delta) is a 2007-vintage CMBS single-loan transaction
secured on 61 Dutch commercial real estate properties.  The loan
includes additional debt outside the securitization, in the form
of a subordinated B-note.  The loan is scheduled to mature in
December 2016 and the notes' legal final maturity date falls in
January 2020.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an property-backed security as defined
in the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

MESDAG (Delta) B.V.
EUR638.4 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating

Class            To              From

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A sr            BB+ (sf)         BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B mezz          B+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C mezz          B (sf)           B+  (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

D jr            B- (sf)         B (sf)
F sub           CCC+ (sf)       B- (sf)

Rating Affirmed

E jr            B-(sf)



=============
R O M A N I A
=============


HIDROELECTRICA SA: To Exit Insolvency Procedure on July 1
---------------------------------------------------------
Irina Popescu at Romania-Insider.com reports that Romanian
Minister Delegate for Energy Constantin Nita said Hidroelectrica
SA will exit the insolvency procedure on July 1 this year.

According to Romania-Insider.com, the Romanian Minister, as
quoted by local news agency Mediafax, said: "We will promote
professional management as it was done for all the state-owned
companies, then we will list 10 percent on the stock exchange.
We will set a list of priorities because there are a lot of
investments that were started.  We have to go back to what we've
always said, namely to efficiency," adding that even if
Hidroelectrica exits the insolvency procedures, the company will
remain with debts, which will be paid in stages.

In the first quarter of 2013, the company reported a profit of
EUR32.8 million and a turnover of around EUR150 million, Romania-
Insider.com relates.

Hidroelectrica announced earlier in May that it will sell,
through public auction, 88 of its small hydro-power plants,
Romania-Insider.com recounts.  The sale was approved on March 13,
2013 during the company's General Meeting of Shareholders and it
will be done in stages, starting this June, "through transparent
and competitive methods, securely meeting the Romanian law,"
Romania-Insider.com quotes a statement from the company as
saying.

The 88 units have a combined installed capacity of 58 MW.
Hidroelectrica operates hydropower plants with a total capacity
of over 6,000 MW, Romania-Insider.com notes.

Hidroelectrica SA is a Romanian state-owned hydropower producer.

Hidroelectrica entered the insolvency process on June 20, 2012,
in order to be re-organized.  Euro INSOL was appointed the
judicial administrator.  On March 31, 2013, Hidroelectrica had
some 4,900 employees, down from over 5,200 recorded when the
company entered the insolvency process.


POSTA ROMANA: Gov't Blames Woes on Unfavorable Contracts
--------------------------------------------------------
According to Ziarul Financiar's Ioana Tudor, Romanian
Communications Minister Dan Nica said in an interview on Sunday
that Posta Romana could have been a profitable company had it not
been "plundered" through contracts that were definitely
unfavorable.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 21,
2012, Ziarul Financiar disclosed that the board of Posta Romana
planned to restructure the company and avoid bankruptcy,
entailing a new organization.  Mr. Nica said that under the plan,
100 managers and 1,068 technical and administrative staff will be
laid off, Ziarul Financiar noted.

Posta Romana is a Romanian state-owned postal operator.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


ABSOLUT BANK: Moody's Cuts Long-Term Deposit Ratings to 'B1'
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded long-term local- and
foreign-currency deposit ratings of Absolut Bank (Russia) to B1
from Ba3. Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the bank's E+
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) (equivalent to a
baseline credit assessment of b1), as well as its Not Prime
short-term local- and foreign-currency deposit ratings. The
outlook on the long-term ratings is stable.

Moody's assessment is primarily based on the public statements
made by Absolut Bank's former shareholder, KBC Group (KBC), and
representatives of Russia's Non-State Pension Fund
"Blagosostoyanie" (NSPF Blagosostoyanie, not rated) which
controls Absolut Bank's new shareholder, Open Joint Stock Company
"United Credit Systems" ("United Credit Systems", not rated). The
rating agency's assessment is also based on Absolut Bank's
audited financial statements for 2012 prepared under IFRS.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action completes the review initiated by Moody's in
January 2013 following the announcement made by KBC -- which at
that time owned a 99% stake in Absolut Bank via its subsidiary
KBC Bank NV (deposits A3 stable, BFSR D+ stable/BCA baa3) -- that
it would sell its stake in Absolut Bank to a group of Russian
companies managing assets of Russia's NSPF Blagosostoyanie. On
May 24, 2013, the parties announced the completion of the deal
whereby "United Credit Systems", controlled by NSPF
Blagosostoyanie, has acquired 100% stake in Absolut Bank.

Moody's explains that up until the finalization of the
transaction, Absolut Bank's long-term deposit ratings had
benefited from one notch of support uplift from the bank's b1
baseline credit assessment (BCA), which reflected the rating
agency's assessment of a low probability of parental support from
KBC. On initiation of the review, Moody's had signaled its
intention to remove this one notch of uplift on completion of the
transaction, and following completion, Absolut Bank's long-term
deposit ratings were downgraded to B1 (with stable outlook) and
are now aligned with the bank's b1 BCA.

The rating agency adds that Absolut Bank's global local currency
(GLC) deposit ratings of B1/Not Prime do not currently
incorporate any support either from its new direct shareholder,
"United Credit Systems", or from the ultimate parent, NSPF
Blagosostoyanie, as Moody's does not rate these entities and
therefore it is not possible for the rating agency to incorporate
parental support in accordance with Moody's Joint Default
Analysis Methodology.

According to Moody's, Absolut Bank's standalone BFSR of E+
(equivalent to a b1 BCA) is constrained by the bank's weakened
franchise, as reflected in a reduction of its loan book by
approximately 50% during the period 2008-12, which, in turn,
undermines Absolut Bank's recurring earnings generation, as the
bank reported weak return on average assets (ROAA) and return on
average equity (ROAE) of 1.1% and 6.9%, respectively, in 2012.
The rating agency also notes Absolut Bank's heightened dependence
on concentrated sources of funding, although this will likely be
offset going forward by financial facilities provided by NSPF
Blagosostoyanie. Overall, Moody's expects that the new ownership
structure will likely contribute to gradual restoration of
Absolut Bank's business volumes and market franchise, but the
rating agency will also need to assess the quality of the
potential growth.

More positively, Absolut Bank's standalone credit quality is
underpinned by the bank's solid capital cushion (with Basel II
Tier 1 and total capital adequacy ratios reported at 20.8% and
22.7%, respectively, at year-end 2012) and the recent
improvements in its risk profile and credit quality metrics. In
particular, the bank's 10 largest credit exposures accounted for
about 47% of its Tier 1 capital, and its aggregate exposure to
the construction and real estate sectors stood at 18% of Tier 1
capital at year-end 2012, which compare favorably to Absolut
Bank's Russia-based peers.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

There is currently little scope for upwards rating pressure;
however, this could develop over time following improvement in
Absolut Bank's franchise value and profitability metrics, if they
continue to be accompanied by good capital adequacy and sound
asset quality.

Negative pressure could be exerted on Absolut Bank's ratings as a
result of any weakening of the bank's financial fundamentals, in
particular, its profitability, asset quality and/or liquidity
profile.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Absolut Bank reported total
audited IFRS assets of US$3.5 billion and total shareholder
equity of US$584 million as at year-end 2012.


BELGOROD OBLAST: Moody's Affirms Ba1 Ratings; Outlook Negative
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has changed the outlook on the global-
scale foreign and local-currency issuer ratings of Belgorod
Oblast (Russia) to negative from stable. The Ba1 issuer ratings
have been affirmed. Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a Ba1
local-currency senior unsecured rating to Belgorod's RUB5.0
billion of bonds issued in August 2012.

Ratings Rationale:

The negative rating outlook reflects (1) the region's growing
financing requirements; (2) increased direct debt; and (3)
increasing contingent risks due to high guaranteed debt.

Moody's notes that the region recorded a financing deficit of -
6.8% of total revenue in 2012, which was a result of an 8.5%
decline in its tax proceeds following substantial changes in the
national corporate income tax regime that allow large Russian
corporations to pay by locus of their main assets and workforce.
Corporate income tax is one of most important taxes for Belgorod,
which as a result of the changes experienced a substantial
decrease in payments from one of its key taxpayers.

In turn, the region's net direct and indirect debt grew to around
57% of operating revenue in 2012 from 31% in 2011, which was
attributable to growing direct exposures and indirect debt in the
form of new guarantees provided to local enterprises. Rapid
growth of guaranteed debt poses contingent risks in terms of the
financial sustainability of the enterprises receiving guarantees.

Belgorod's ratings are supported by (1) its anticipated budget
consolidation policy, which is aimed at achieving financing
surpluses over next three years; (2) fairly low short-term
refinancing risks; and (3) low interests costs.

The region plans to maintain stable debt levels in absolute
terms, which, if supported by anticipated growth in budget
revenue, will lead to a decrease in gross debt ratios over the
next three years to levels more appropriate for Ba1-rated entity.
Belgorod displays a rather balanced direct debt structure, which
is almost equally divided between bonds, bank loans and low-
interest federal loans, and the region's refinancing requirements
in 2013-14 are low by Russian standards and manageable.

"In addition, we expect that the vibrant regional economy, which
recorded strong growth of around 6% in 2012 and anticipated 6-7%
in 2013, will help to increase Belgorod's tax revenue stream and
to improve operating balances over the next few years," says Mr
Proklov. A growing tax revenue stream, mainly from corporate and
personal income taxes, will help the region to achieve a
financing surplus over the next two to three years.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Given the negative outlook on the rating, Moody's does not
currently expect positive rating pressure. However, a
stabilization of the rating or an upgrade could be driven by an
increase in Belgorod's own-source budget revenue and a
strengthening of financing and operating balances, if combined
with a steady debt position over the next 12-18 months.
Conversely, the ratings could come under negative pressure if the
region experiences a further increase in its debt position and
fails to achieve its budget consolidation targets.

The Belgorod Oblast's senior unsecured local currency bonds of
RUB5.0 billion (RU34006BEL0) were issued on August 14, 2012 with
a quarter-of-a-year coupon rate. These amortized bonds are
direct, unconditional, unsecured and unsubordinated obligations
of the issuer, ranking pari passu with all its other unsecured
and unsubordinated debt. The purpose of the bond issuance was to
fund the region's financing deficit and to improve its liquidity
profile in 2012.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.

Belgorod Oblast is in southwest Russia and borders Ukraine. Its
population is 1.5 million, or approximately 1.1% of the national
population. Per capita gross regional product (GRP) is
approximately 75% of per capita national GDP. The Oblast's key
sectors are mining -- producing approximately one third of
Russia's iron ore -- as well as the agriculture and food-
processing industries.


CREDIT BANK OF MOSCOW: Moody's Affirms B1 Deposit Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service affirmed the B1 long-term local- and
foreign-currency debt and deposit ratings of Credit Bank of
Moscow, as well as the standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR) of E+, equivalent to a baseline credit assessment (BCA) of
b1. The bank's Not Prime short-term local- and foreign-currency
deposit were also affirmed. The outlook on the bank's BFSR and
the long-term ratings is stable.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's affirmation of Credit Bank of Moscow's ratings reflects
the bank's adequate capital buffer and good profitability
metrics, and takes into account the recent reduction in the
bank's credit risk concentrations and improved transparency, as
institutional investors have become minority shareholders of the
bank. At the same time, the ratings continue to be constrained by
the bank's high credit risk appetite as reflected by rapid loan
growth, which raises concerns over the future asset quality of
the bank as the loan book starts to season.

Adequate Capital Buffer and Sound Profitability

Moody's says that Credit Bank of Moscow's adequate loss
absorption capacity is one of the key drivers of the rating
affirmation. Supported by healthy recurring revenues -- with
return on equity of 18.2% in 2012 -- and capital injections,
Credit Bank of Moscow reported a Tier 1 capital ratio and total
capital adequacy ratio at 13.4% and 15.8%, respectively.

In 2012, Credit Bank of Moscow's internal capital generation
benefitted from a comfortable net interest margin of 4.7% and
well-controlled operating expenses, with the bank's cost-to-
income ratio of 43% being below that of its Russian peers.

Risk Appetite Is High, Albeit Diminishing

At the same time, Moody's notes that Credit Bank of Moscow
demonstrated high appetite for credit risk as measured by loan
growth in 2009-11. In 2010, the bank's loan book grew by a very
strong 77% (compared to the market average of 13%) and by 50% in
2011 (compared to the market average of 29%). In 2012, the bank
slowed down the pace of loan book growth to 27% (against market
average of 20%); however, Moody's notes the continued risks
associated with the bank's future asset quality against the
background of a seasoning loan book.

Credit Risk Concentration Has Improved

Aided by the developing SME and retail franchise, Credit Bank of
Moscow's financial stability has become less dependent on the
performance of a handful of borrowers. The 20 largest credit
exposures accounted for 167% of Tier 1 capital as at December 31,
2012 compared to 225% a year earlier.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Credit Bank of Moscow's ratings could be upgraded if the bank (1)
demonstrates a track record of reduction in its credit risk
appetite; (2) continues to display good asset quality,
profitability and capital adequacy metrics; and (3) further
improves its credit risk granularity.

Credit Bank of Moscow's ratings could face downward pressure in
the event of resurgence in NPLs (particularly amongst the bank's
largest debtors), weakening in capital buffers or a decline in
profitability.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, Credit Bank of Moscow reported
consolidated total assets of RUB309.85 billion (US$10.1 billion)
as of December 31, 2012 (in accordance with audited IFRS).


CREDIT UNION: S&P Assigns 'BB-/B' Counterparty Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-/B' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings to Russia-based Credit
Union "Payment Center" (RNKO).  S&P also assigned its 'ruAA-'
Russia national scale rating to RNKO.  The outlook is stable.

The rating on Russia-based Credit Union "Payment Center" (RNKO)
reflects its status as a "core" subsidiary of CFT Group (CFT or
the group).  CFT owns 100% of RNKO, which is the group's
settlement center for money transferring and payment systems.
RNKO's business, operations, and strategy are closely integrated
with those of the group.  S&P views RNKO as an infrastructure
vehicle, whose primary goal is to secure settlement of
transactions in CFT's payment systems instead of a usual profit
maximization goal.  S&P believes CFT does not have any incentives
to sell RNKO, as this would disrupt payment flows.  Creation or
purchase of another settlement center would be costly and time-
consuming, in S&P's view.

Under S&P's group rating methodology it do not assess the
creditworthiness of core subsidiaries on a stand-alone basis, and
S&P equalizes a subsidiary's ratings with the group credit
profile (GCP).

CFT's GCP reflects S&P's view of the group's business
concentration in a niche domestic market; the high level of
systemic risk in Russia; potential operational losses in payment
services and credit-card-related activities; and the complex
group structure and uncertain quality of corporate governance,
due to its concentrated ownership.  In S&P's opinion, these
weaknesses are partly mitigated by the group's strong market
position and product diversity in the segment in which it
operates; the steadily increasing demand for non-cash payments in
Russia; the group's strong profitability and adequate
capitalization; and low settlement risks.

CFT focuses on software and banking business, specifically
payment processing such as interbank transactions, credit card
and loyalty card processing, and money transfers.  The group also
provides processing for utilities and mobile phone payments (a
payment system called Gorod), issues prepaid debit and loyalty
cards
(7.5 million MasterCard and VISA cards to date), sponsors small
Russian banks to enter VISA and MasterCard payment networks, and
acts as a MoneyGram super agent for Russian banks and retailers.

In terms of software business, CFT is a small-scale, non-
diversified niche player in the Russian core banking software
market and bears all the risks of this particular sector.
However, it is now the market leader in this segment and its
strong customer base includes Russia's top-tier banks.  This is
due to the quality and complexity of its key product, which the
larger banks need.  The group currently holds around 30% market
share.  In S&P's view, the main competitive threat to CFT comes
not from international competitors (who lack local expertise),
but from the banks' in-house IT development teams.  In Russia,
however, just a handful of banks can afford to maintain an IT
team of sufficient scale.

CFT's payment network, which operates under the brand "Zolotaya
Korona", provides mainly money transferring services in Russia
and the other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries
and operates credit, debit, prepaid cards, as well as other
electronic payment systems for consumers, businesses, and
governments.  CFT has a dominant market share (more than half of
the market) in money transfers in Russia and other CIS countries.

S&P believes that the group's operational risks are mainly around
business continuity: systems and key personnel.  Credit risk,
market risk, and funding and liquidity risks are limited and
adequately managed, in S&P's view.  Generally, all processing
businesses are subject to reputational, regulatory, and fraud
risks.

Settlement risks in the processing business are partly mitigated
by the prefunded deposit accounts of RNKO's clients.  In a
typical transaction, RNKO receives payment information from its
agents and makes a payment from the agent's prefunded deposit
account in RNKO for the benefit of the payee.  Transactions occur
only when the bank or the retailer has sufficient funds deposited
on RNKO's accounts.  As a result of this policy, the company's
historical losses due to agents' defaults are zero.

Like other technology-driven companies, CFT has high operational
risk, in S&P's view, because of its dependency on systems,
networks, and software to conduct its business.  This risk
includes the potential for material operational events, such as
system malfunctioning, to cause large losses.  While careful risk
management can lower the probability of material events, S&P
believes that exposure is difficult to quantify.  These "low
probability, high impact" events require a strong capital base
that is capable of absorbing unexpected losses.

The group does not have any short-term or long-term debt
outstanding at this time.  Its liabilities are represented mostly
by settlement liabilities (US$507 million or 92% of total
liabilities).  These liabilities are predeposited customer funds
used for money transfer and other payment processing services.
On the assets side, the funds are placed on demand deposits with
the Central Bank of Russia and other Russian and international
banks (all with high creditworthiness).  In addition to
settlement funds deposited with the banks, CFT had US$102 million
of unencumbered cash and cash equivalents at year-end 2012 (13%
of the group's total assets), which would help mitigate
unexpected liquidity needs.

Stability and the recurring nature of cash-flow generation is an
important rating factor for CFT's GCP.  In 2012, the group
received about 40% of revenues from software business, and 60%
was from processing services.  S&P expects the proportion of
revenues from the processing business segment to increase in the
coming years.

Total revenue increased by a strong 20% in 2012 to reach
US$345 million.  The software business recorded US$123.7 million
of revenues in 2012 (US$121.8 million in 2011), a 1.5% increase,
while the segment's profitability decreased.  Such a result is
explained by a decrease in revenues from one major client.  This
demonstrates CFT's exposure to customer-concentration risk, which
S&P incorporates into the ratings.  Positively, however, revenue
concentrations have decreased: the top-20 customers accounted for
about 30% of total group's revenue at year-end 2012 (43% in
2011).

With total equity of US$247 million and a ratio of adjusted total
equity to adjusted assets of about 30% on Dec. 31, 2012, S&P
views the group as having a good cushion to absorb further
potential credit or operational losses.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that CFT (including
RNKO) will continue to grow organically, increasing the share of
processing services in the group's total revenue.

S&P could consider taking a positive rating action if the group
were to significantly increase its market share, while
maintaining its profitability, or if it diversified its ownership
structure.

S&P could consider lowering the ratings if the group were to
suffer material operational losses or if the regulatory
environment changed in an unfavorable way.


MTS INTERNATIONAL: Fitch Rates US$500MM Notes 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned MTS International Funding Limited's
US$500 million due 2023 loan participation notes' (LPNs) a final
'BB+' rating on receipt of final documentation substantially
conforming to information already received by Fitch. The LPN
proceeds were on-lent to OJSC Mobile Telesystems (MTS)
('BB+'/Stable). LPNs are effectively structured as senior
unsecured obligations of MTS. The agency also withdrew an
expected rating on the Ruble tranche of the LPNs as the plans to
issue this were scrapped.

LPNs were issued by MTS International Funding Limited, an SPV
domiciled in Ireland. The SPV is restricted in its ability to do
business other than issue notes and provide loans (effectively,
on-lend the proceeds) to MTS. LPNs are secured by a loan to MTS
which ranks equally with other senior unsecured obligations of
MTS. The loan contains a number of restrictive covenants
including, inter alia, negative pledge, change of control clause,
cross-default to other debt with a total limit of US$15 million,
limitation on assets sales, but no financial covenants.

On a stand-alone basis MTS's credit profile conforms to low
investment grade. It is an established mobile operator with
strong margins and free cash flow (FCF) generation and modest
leverage. However, MTS has limited geographic diversification
within CIS with high reliance on the Russian market. MTS's
ratings are notched down for the negative influence of Joint
Stock Financial Corp. Sistema ('BB-'/Stable), MTS's majority
shareholder.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

- Stable Market Shares:

MTS holds strong and reasonably stable market shares in all its
key mobile markets - including, and most important, Russia. Fitch
believes MTS will continue to successfully defend its positions
and maintain broad parity with peers in terms of network coverage
and technology solutions.

- Mature Markets, Rising Competition:

However, key Russian and Ukrainian mobile markets are mature and
competitive pressures may intensify further in light of the
market-share ambitions of Tele2 and Rostelecom in the medium
term.

- Robust FCF Generation:

MTS sustainably generates positive FCF and overall financial
performance is robust. Capex as a percentage of revenue has been
high - well above 20% - inflated by 3G spend in Russia. Fitch
expects this ratio to drop in the medium-to-long term but
stabilize at a higher level than at European peers, due to lower
average revenue per user (ARPU).

- Margin Resilience Likely:

Reduced dealer commission fees and no handset subsidization in
Russia should support margins. MTS managed to successfully change
its relationships with dealers whereby the operator switched from
paying a fixed fee to a revenue sharing model. The latter
incentivizes dealers to sign up quality subscribers with positive
implications for churn but also protects MTS from paying
excessive dealer commissions.

- Sufficient LTE spectrum:

MTS has sufficient LTE spectrum to successfully compete in
Russia. The company was one of the four winners in the all-Russia
LTE spectrum auction in July 2012. In addition, MTS has ready-
for-use 2.6GHz spectrum in the most lucrative Moscow market.

- Modest Leverage:

MTS's leverage has been modest at below 1.5x net debt/EBITDA, and
organic development, including LTE roll-out in Russia, can be
financed with internally generated cash flows. Fitch estimates
that a recent decision to increase dividend payments will not
jeopardize leverage. However, the company is not committed to a
public leverage target.

- Negative Sistema Influence:

Fitch regards MTS's exposure to the group-wide risks of Sistema,
and the holding company's flexibility to significantly increase
MTS's leverage, if need be, as significant credit constraints.
Under Fitch's parent-subsidiary methodology, the subsidiary's
rating may be a maximum of two notches higher than that of the
parent.

- Sufficient Liquidity:

MTS's debt maturity profile is well spread, with single-year
refinancing exposure below US$1 billion in each of 2013 and 2014.
The 2015 refinancing peak of slightly above US$2 billion is equal
to 0.4x of EBITDA and is manageable. Currency risks are moderate,
with the FX share of the total debt portfolio reported at 24% at
end-2012.

Rating Sensitivities

Shareholder Influence: Positive rating changes at Sistema, or
higher ring-fence around MTS limiting Sistema's influence, such
as corporate governance mechanisms or legal provisions will
likely lead to a positive rating action.

Leverage, FCF: A downgrade may arise from increased shareholder
remuneration, MTS's acquisition of Sistema group assets, or a
build-up in pressure to upstream cash due to funding needs at the
wider Sistema group -- and a consequent rise in funds from
operations adjusted net leverage to above 3x. Competitive
weaknesses and market-share erosion, leading to significant
deterioration in pre-dividend FCF generation, may also become a
negative rating factor.


SISTEMA JOINT: Moody's Changes Outlook on Ba3 CFR to Positive
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed to positive from stable the
outlook on the Ba3 corporate family rating (CFR) and Ba3-PD
probability of default rating (PDR) of Sistema Joint Stock
Financial Corporation (Sistema), as well as on the provisional
(P)Ba3 senior unsecured rating, with a loss given default (LGD)
assessment of LGD4/50%, assigned to the medium-term note (MTN)
program of Sistema Capital S.A. Concurrently, Moody's has
affirmed these ratings.

Ratings Rationale:

The change of outlook on Sistema's ratings to positive follows
the strengthening of the credit profile of Mobile TeleSystems
OJSC (MTS; Ba2 positive), which is one of Sistema's two core
operating subsidiaries (along with Bashneft OJSC; Ba2 stable),
reflected by the change of outlook on MTS's Ba2 CFR to positive
from stable on May 20, 2013. The positive outlook on Sistema's
ratings reflects the potential for an upgrade over the next 12-18
months, subject to further strengthening of the credit profiles
of Sistema's core subsidiaries (MTS and Bashneft), along with
Sistema maintaining solid standalone liquidity and consolidated
leverage metrics.

Sistema's Ba3 rating continues to reflect (1) the company's
acquisitive nature, which elevates the risk of opportunistic M&A
transactions, putting pressure on its standalone credit profile;
(2) the potential that the company will need to support its
developing assets, including Sistema Shyam TeleServices Ltd
(SSTL), an as-yet unprofitable mobile operator in India (although
the risk of high cash outlays to support SSTL has reduced as a
result of the completion of the mobile spectrum auction in India
in March 2013, which was favorable for SSTL and, consequently,
Sistema); (3) the degree of structural subordination of debt
located at the parent company level to significant debt at
Sistema's two core operating subsidiaries; and (4) its exposure
to an emerging market operating environment characterized by a
less developed regulatory, political and legal framework.

More positively, the rating also factors in (1) improved
diversification of the company's dividend base following the
acquisition of Bashneft in 2010; (2) Sistema's robust
consolidated financial metrics, underpinned by the solid credit
profiles of its core assets MTS and Bashneft, with debt/EBITDA
improving to 2.0x, funds from operations (FFO) interest coverage
to 5.5x and retained cash flow (RCF)/debt to 34% as of year-end
2012, compared with 2.2x, 4.2x and 27%, respectively, a year
earlier (all metrics are as adjusted by Moody's); (3) the
company's retained ability to upstream significant dividend
amounts from its core subsidiaries; and (4) its solid standalone
liquidity (albeit this is exposed to volatility, as a result of
potential large acquisitions).

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Moody's could consider an upgrade of Sistema's ratings if (1) its
standalone credit profile as well as the credit profiles of its
core cash-generating subsidiaries continue to strengthen; (2) the
company maintains solid standalone liquidity; and (3) its
consolidated debt/EBITDA remains around 2.0x (as adjusted by
Moody's) on a sustainable basis.

Conversely, downward pressure could be exerted on the ratings if
there is a material deterioration in the company's liquidity or
the credit profiles of its core subsidiaries. Moody's would
separately assess the credit implications of any sizable M&A and
investment initiatives should those materially change the
business mix and exert pressure on Sistema's leverage and
coverage metrics.

Principal Methodology

Sistema Joint Stock Financial Corporation's and Sistema Capital
S.A.'s ratings were assigned by evaluating factors that Moody's
considers relevant to the credit profile of the issuer, such as
the company's (i) business risk and competitive position compared
with others within the industry; (ii) capital structure and
financial risk; (iii) projected performance over the near to
intermediate term; and (iv) management's track record and
tolerance for risk. Moody's compared these attributes against
other issuers both within and outside Sistema Joint Stock
Financial Corporation's and Sistema Capital S.A.'s core industry
and believes Sistema Joint Stock Financial Corporation's and
Sistema Capital S.A.'s ratings are comparable to those of other
issuers with similar credit risk. Other methodologies used
include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial
Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Other Factors used in these ratings are described in Analytical
Considerations in Assessing Conglomerates published in September
2007.

Sistema Joint Stock Financial Corporation is Russia's largest
public conglomerate. Having evolved from a telecoms holding
company, the company currently operates oil & energy, telecoms,
technology, banking, media, retail, transportation and other
businesses. The founder of the company, Mr. Vladimir Evtushenkov,
holds 64.18% of Sistema's common shares. The remainder is held by
minority shareholders and is in free float. The company is listed
on the London Stock Exchange and Moscow Exchange MICEX-RTS. In
2012, Sistema generated consolidated revenue of $34.2 billion and
EBITDA of US$9.6 billion (as adjusted by Moody's).



=========
S P A I N
=========


AYT CAJAGRANADA: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in AyT CajaGranada Hipotecario I Fondo de Titulizacion de
Activos.

Specifically, S&P has:

   -- Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its 'AA-
      (sf)' rating on the class A notes;

   -- Lowered to 'BBB (sf)' from 'A (sf)' and removed from
      CreditWatch negative its rating on the class B notes;

   -- Lowered to 'BB- (sf)' from 'BBB- (sf)' its rating on the
      class C notes; and

   -- Lowered to 'B (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' its rating on the class
      D notes.

The rating actions follow S&P's credit and cash flow analysis of
the most recent transaction information that it has received.
S&P has also applied its relevant criteria.

On Nov. 6, 2012, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings
on the class A and B notes for counterparty reasons.

                          SOVEREIGN RISK

S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria classify the underlying
assets in this transaction as having low country risk.  Under
S&P's criteria, the maximum rating differential between its
rating on the sovereign in which the underlying assets are based
(Spain) and S&P's ratings in the transaction is up to six
notches.  Therefore, S&P's criteria caps the maximum potential
rating in this transaction at 'AA- (sf)'.

                         COUNTERPARTY RISK

S&P has reviewed counterparty risk by applying its 2012
counterparty criteria.  The transaction is exposed to
counterparty risk through the transaction account provider,
Barclays Bank PLC (A+/Negative/A-1) and the swap provider,
Cecabank S.A. (BB+/Negative/B).  Under the transaction documents,
the swap provider is not eligible to support ratings in this
transaction that are higher than S&P's 'BB+ (sf)' long-term
issuer credit rating on Cecabank.  Therefore, S&P did not give
benefit to the swap provider in its credit and cash flow
analysis.

                   CREDIT AND CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P has conducted its credit and cash flow analysis based on
March 2013 information.  The cumulative defaults ratio over the
original portfolio balance has remained stable between June 2011
and December 2012 at 1.63%.  However, this increased to 1.82% on
the March 2013 interest payment date.  S&P considers that the
underlying collateral is likely to further deteriorate, in line
with S&P's outlook for the Spanish economy and housing market.

The reserve fund is at 91% of its target level as specified by
the transaction documents.  The class A notes benefit from an
interest deferral trigger mechanism, which diverts interest from
the class B, C, and D notes to repay the class A notes' interest.

In S&P's view, the transaction's performance has deteriorated
since its last review in July 2011.  Arrears of more than 90 days
(including defaults) have increased to 5.83% from 3.30%.
Therefore, S&P has projected arrears based on the transaction's
historical performance and its expectations for its performance
in the near future.

Based on the transaction's deteriorating performance since S&P's
last review, it has increased its weighted-average foreclosure
frequency assumption due to the higher current and projected
arrears.  S&P has also increased its weighted-average loss
severity assumption, based on the Spanish house price decline
that S&P has observed since June 2011.

In S&P's opinion, the available credit enhancement for the class
A notes is sufficient to support its 'AA- (sf)' rating on this
class of notes.  S&P has therefore affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch negative its 'AA- (sf)' rating on the class A notes.

S&P's credit and cash flow results indicate that the class B
notes were not able to support a higher rating than 'BBB (sf)'.
S&P has therefore lowered to 'BBB (sf)' from 'A (sf)' and removed
from CreditWatch negative its rating on the class B notes.

S&P has lowered its ratings on the class C and D notes as they
were not able to support its credit and cash flow stresses at
higher rating levels.

CajaGranada Hipotecario I is a Spanish residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS) transaction, which closed in June 2007.
The first-ranking mortgage loans were originated mainly in
Andalucia, Catalonia, and Madrid.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class               Rating
           To                  From

Ayt CajaGranada Hipotecario I Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR400 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A          AA- (sf)            AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Lowered And Removed From CreditWatch Negative

B          BBB (sf)            A (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

C          BB- (sf)            BBB- (sf)
D          B (sf)              BB- (sf)


AYT HIPOTECARIO IV: Moody's Cuts Rating on Cl. B Notes to 'Ba1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the ratings of five notes in
four Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
transactions: AyT 7 Promociones Inmobiliarias I, AyT Promociones
Inmobiliarias II, AyT Promociones Inmobiliarias III and AyT
Hipotecario IV. At the same time, Moody's downgraded the ratings
of Class B notes in AyT Hipotecario IV. Insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk has prompted this
downgrade.

This rating action concludes the review of five notes placed on
review on July 2, 2012, following Moody's downgrade of Spanish
government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on June 13, 2012. This
rating action also concludes the review of one note placed on
review on November 23, 2012, following Moody's revision of key
collateral assumptions for the entire Spanish RMBS market.

Rating Rationale

This rating action primarily reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk. Moody's confirmed the
ratings of securities whose credit enhancement and structural
features provided enough protection against sovereign risk and
counterparty exposure.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

In all four affected transactions, Moody's maintained the current
expected loss and MILAN CE assumptions. Expected loss assumptions
remain at 1.34% in AyT 7 Promociones Inmobiliarias I, 1.20% in
AyT Promociones Inmobiliarias II, 1.12% in AyT Promociones
Inmobiliarias III and 0.40% in AyT Hipotecario IV. The MILAN CE
assumptions remain at 30% in AyT 7 Promociones Inmobiliarias I ,
15% in AyT Promociones Inmobiliarias II and AyT Promociones
Inmobiliarias III, and 10% in AyT Hipotecario IV.

Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review takes into consideration
the exposure to the relevant servicers acting as collection
account banks for the four transactions. Treasury Accounts are
held by Barclays Bank PLC for all deals. Sweeping is weekly in
the four deals.

As part of its analysis Moody's also assessed the exposure to
CECABank (Ba1 DNG/NP) as swap counterparty for the four deals.
The revised ratings of the notes are not negatively affected by
this exposure.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in "Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment".

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework", published in May 2013,
and "The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance
Transactions: Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines", published
in March 2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (1)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (2)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach. In addition, the following inputs have been corrected:
PDL mechanism and the default definition in AyT 7 Promociones
Inmobiliarias I; the swap margin in AyT Promociones Inmobiliarias
II; the default definition, notes margin and priority of payments
in AyT Promociones Inmobiliarias III; and PDL mechanism in AyT
Hipotecario IV.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: AyT HIPOTECARIO IV

EUR336M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR14M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: AyT Promociones Inmobiliarias II, FTA

EUR475.4M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: AyT Promociones Inmobiliarias III, FTA

EUR240.6M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR30M B Notes, Confirmed at Ba2 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: AyT.7, Promociones Inmobiliarias I, Fondo de Titulizacion
de Activos

EUR319.8M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade


GROHE HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'B-' Rating on EUR375MM Sr. Sec. Loan
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it affirmed its 'B-'
long-term corporate credit rating on Grohe Holding GmbH (Grohe),
the indirect parent of German sanitary fittings manufacturer
Grohe AG.  The outlook remains positive.

At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B-' issue ratings on Grohe's
senior secured debt--comprising the EUR375 million-equivalent
senior secured term loan and EUR500 million senior secured notes.
The recovery rating on these instruments is '3', indicating S&P's
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'B+' issue rating on Grohe's
EUR150 million super senior revolving credit facility (RCF) due
2016.  The recovery rating on the super senior RCF is '1',
indicating S&P's expectation of very high (90%-100%) recovery for
debtholders in the event of a payment default.

The affirmation follows Grohe's transfer of its rights in its
Chinese joint venture partner Joyou AG to its parent Grohe Group
S.a r.l. (not rated; formerly known as Glacier Luxembourg Two
S.a.r.l.) by way of a dividend in kind.  As a result, Grohe will
no longer fully consolidate earnings from Joyou.  When
calculating Grohe's Standard & Poor's-adjusted credit metrics,
S&P previously deconsolidated Grohe's accounts to reflect only
its 35.8% economic interest in Joyou.  Nevertheless, the change
in Grohe's structure has reduced the Asian market's contribution
to Grohe's revenues in S&P's forecasts.

However, S&P believes that the restricted Grohe group will
continue to outperform its tough end markets, with modest
positive sales growth for its core operations and robust
discretionary cash flow generation in 2013.  This is despite the
difficulties that S&P believes will persist in 2013 in Grohe's
European end markets, where it still derives more than two-thirds
of its sales.  S&P believes that improvements in Grohe's trading
performance will come from increased market penetration in the
U.S. and Asia, as well as from margin improvements, supported by
Grohe's strong pricing power and product and country mix changes.

At the same time, S&P believes that Grohe's adjusted debt will
have peaked in 2012 due to the deconsolidation of Joyou; the
conversion of EUR46 million of shareholder loans into equity in
May 2013; and record-high capital expenditure (capex) in 2011 and
2012 that S&P believes Grohe will not sustain in the future.

As a result of the reduced debt, as well as a reduction of
Grohe's interest osts from the repricing of term loan B in May
2013, S&P believes that Grohe's credit metrics will continue to
improve.  S&P foresees adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to
debt rising to 7% over the next 12 months, from 5.6% at year-end
2012. However, S&P believes that progress might take longer than
it previously forecasts due to the reduction of contributions
from the Asian market to the group's results.  S&P also forecasts
that Grohe will continue posting positive free operating cash
flow (FOCF), which was negative in 2010 and 2011.

In S&P's view, Grohe's trading performance will continue to
improve in 2013, despite difficult core European end markets.
S&P believes the group should continue generating positive FOCF
in 2013, which in the absence of large cash outflows such as an
EU fine paid in 2010 and the Joyou acquisition in 2011, should
allow the group to deleverage.

S&P could raise the rating to 'B' in the next 12 months should
Grohe sustain adjusted FFO to debt in the high single digits and
positive discretionary cash flow.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable should it no longer
believe that Grohe's credit metrics will improve at the rate S&P
anticipates.  This could in S&P's view occur through a more
pronounced deterioration in the group's markets than S&P
currently forecasts.


HIPOTEBANSA 11: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to Caa1
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of seven notes,
confirmed the rating of one note and upgraded the rating of one
note in four Spanish residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) transactions: Hipotebansa X, Hipotebansa XI, Madrid RMBS
III and Madrid RMBS IV. Insufficiency of credit enhancement to
address sovereign risk and revision of key collateral assumptions
have prompted the downgrade action.

The rating action concludes the review of eight notes placed on
review on November 23, 2012, following Moody's revision of key
collateral assumptions for the entire Spanish RMBS market. This
rating action also concludes the review of one note placed on
review on July 2, 2012, following Moody's downgrade of Spanish
government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on June 13, 2012.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk and revision of key
collateral assumptions. Moody's confirmed the ratings of
securities whose credit enhancement and structural features
provided enough protection against sovereign risk, counterparty
risk and revision of collateral assumptions.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
local currency country risk ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions

During its review Moody's increased its Milan assumption in
Madrid RMBS III and Madrid RMBS IV to 40% and 35% respectively.
The revised Milan CE reflect the exposure to high LTV loans,
loans originated by broker and loans to non-Spanish residents.
Moody's maintained the current MILAN CE assumptions of 10% in
Hipotebansa X and Hipotebansa XI.

In all four transactions, Moody's maintained the Expected Loss
assumptions at 0.50%, 0.40% , 14% and 10% of original pool
balance in Hipotebansa X, Hipotebansa XI, Madrid RMBS III and
Madrid RMBS IV respectively.

Amortization of senior notes in Madrid RMBS III and Madrid RMBS
IV

In Madrid RMBS III and Madrid RMBS IV, the class A notes are
currently amortizing sequentially. In Madrid RMBS IV, sequential
amortization reverts to pro-rata if the outstanding amount of
loans more than 12 months in arrears (net of recoveries) exceeds
25% of the original notes balance. In Madrid RMBS III, the
sequential amortization reverts to pro-rata if the cumulative
amount of defaulted loans exceeds 25% of the original notes
balance.

In Madrid RMBS IV, the outstanding balance of defaulted loans,
net of recoveries, represents currently 7.51% of original pool
balance, well below the trigger level. Under the current expected
loss assumptions, Moody's does not expect this trigger to be
breached in Madrid RMBS IV. As a result, Class A1 is expected to
be repaid in priority to Class A2 in most of the default
scenarios, and therefore Moody's has upgraded to A3 (sf) the
rating for the Class A1.

In Madrid RMBS III, the cumulative amount of defaulted loans
represents currently 19.22% of original pool balance compared to
a 25% trigger level. Under the current expected loss assumptions,
Moody's believes it is very likely that the trigger will be
breached. Moody's rates both senior notes Baa3 (sf) given that
Class A2 is expected to be repaid pro-rata with Class A3 in
several default scenarios.

Different support provided by the reserve funds in Hipotebansa X
and XI

The cashflows structures in Hipotebansa X and XI are similar, but
the use of the reserve fund is different. The reserve funds in
Hipotebansa X, supporting the A and B notes respectively, are to
be used to guarantee timely payment to the swaps, the interests
on the notes and can also be used to offset any principal losses
on the final maturity of the notes. However, in Hipotebansa XI,
the reserve funds is similar to a liquidity reserve as it is used
to guarantee due payment of interest on the swap agreement of
notes. The different support provided by the reserve funds in
Hipotebansa X and XI contributes to different notes rating
migration in both deals.

Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review takes into consideration
the exposure to Bankia (Ba2, NP, uncertain) acting as collection
account bank in Madrid RMBS III and Madrid RMBS IV. The revised
ratings were not affected by the current exposure to this
counterparty.

Moody's rating action takes into consideration the exposure to
Banco Santander (Baa2/P2), the swap counterparty in Hipotebansa X
and Hipotebansa XI and the exposure to Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria (Baa3/P3) acting as swap counterparty in Madrid RMBS
IV. The rating agency has assessed the probability and effect of
a default of the swap counterparties on the ability of the issuer
to meet its obligations under the transactions. Additionally,
Moody's has examined the effect of the loss of any benefit from
the swap and any obligation the issuer may have to make a
termination payment. In conclusion, these factors are not
negatively affect the rating on the notes.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect the Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Moody's describes additional factors that may affect the ratings
in "Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment".

Methodologies

The methodologies used in these ratings were "Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework" published in May 2013 and
"The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines" published in March 2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used its cash flow
model, ABSROM, to determine the loss for each tranche. The cash
flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
Moody's calculates the corresponding loss for each class of notes
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (1) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario and (2) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: HIPOTEBANSA 11 FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS

EUR1040.8M A Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov
23, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
Possible Downgrade

EUR21.2M B Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: HIPOTEBANSA X, FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS

EUR898.7M A Notes, Confirmed at Baa1 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR18.3M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: Madrid RMBS III, FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS

EUR1575M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR497M A3 Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR55.5M B Notes, Downgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: MADRID RMBS IV, FONDO DE TITULIZACION DE ACTIVOS

EUR1351.2M A1 Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR835.2M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Nov
23, 2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for
Possible Downgrade


RURAL HIPOTECARIO I: Moody's Cuts Cl. D Notes Rating to Caa3
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the ratings of five junior
and mezzanine notes in three Spanish residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions: RURAL HIPOTECARIO III, RURAL
HIPOTECARIO IV and RURAL HIPOTECARIO GLOBAL I. At the same time,
Moody's confirmed the ratings of one senior note in RURAL
HIPOTECARIO GLOBAL I. Insufficiency of credit enhancement to
address sovereign risk and revision of key collateral assumptions
have prompted the downgrade.

The rating action concludes the review of three notes placed on
review on July 2, 2012, following Moody's downgrade of Spanish
government bond ratings to Baa3 from A3 on June 13, 2012. This
rating action also concludes the review of three notes placed on
review on November 23, 2012, following Moody's revision of key
collateral assumptions for the entire Spanish RMBS market.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action primarily reflects the insufficiency of credit
enhancement to address sovereign risk and revision of key
collateral assumptions. Moody's confirmed the ratings of
securities whose credit enhancement and structural features
provided enough protection against sovereign and counterparty
risk.

The determination of the applicable credit enhancement driving
these rating actions reflects the introduction of additional
factors in Moody's analysis to better measure the impact of
sovereign risk on structured finance transactions.

Additional Factors Better Reflect Increased Sovereign Risk

Moody's has supplemented its analysis to determine the loss
distribution of securitized portfolios with two additional
factors, the maximum achievable rating in a given country (the
Local Currency Country Risk Ceiling) and the applicable portfolio
credit enhancement for this rating. With the introduction of
these additional factors, Moody's intends to better reflect
increased sovereign risk in its quantitative analysis, in
particular for mezzanine and junior tranches.

The Spanish country ceiling, and therefore the maximum rating
that Moody's will assign to a domestic Spanish issuer including
structured finance transactions backed by Spanish receivables, is
A3. Moody's Individual Loan Analysis Credit Enhancement (MILAN
CE) represents the required credit enhancement under the senior
tranche for it to achieve the country ceiling. By lowering the
maximum achievable rating for a given MILAN, the revised
methodology alters the loss distribution curve and implies an
increased probability of high loss scenarios.

Revision of Key Collateral Assumptions

Moody's has revised its lifetime loss expectation (EL) assumption
in RURAL HIPOTECARIO GLOBAL I because of worse-than-expected
collateral performance since the last review of the Spanish RMBS
sector in November 2012. The share of 90d+ arrears currently
stands at 3.1% of current pool balance, up from 2.3% as of the
previous review while cumulative defaults increased from 0.8% of
the original pool balance to 1.1%. Moody's have updated the EL
assumption to 2.0% of original pool balance. Moody's has
maintained its EL assumptions at 0.5% of the original pool
balance in RURAL HIPOTECARIO III and RURAL HIPOTECARIO IV.

During its review Moody's also reassessed the MILAN CE
assumptions of the transactions underlying portfolios based on
available loan-by-information. As a result, Moody's maintained
the MILAN CE assumption at 10.0% in RURAL HIPOTECARIO III and
RURAL HIPOTECARIO IV, and at 12.5% in RURAL HIPOTECARIO GLOBAL I.

Exposure to Counterparty Risk

The conclusion of Moody's rating review also takes into
consideration the exposure to Banco Cooperativo (Ba1) acting as
interest rate swap provider in RURAL HIPOTECARIO GLOBAL I.
Moody's concluded that this exposure does not affect negatively
the ratings of the notes in this transaction.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect The Notes

In consideration of Moody's new adjustments, any further
sovereign downgrade would negatively affect structured finance
ratings through the application of the country ceiling or maximum
achievable rating, as well as potentially increased portfolio
credit enhancement requirements for a given rating.

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Additional factors that may affect the ratings are described in
the "Approach to Assessing Linkage to Swap Counterparties in
Structured Finance Cashflow Transactions: Request for Comment".

The methodologies used in these ratings were Moody's Approach to
Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework published in May 2013, and
The Temporary Use of Cash in Structured Finance Transactions:
Eligible Investment and Bank Guidelines published in March 2013.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of (i)
the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii)
the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche."

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In the context of the rating review, the transactions have been
remodeled and some inputs have been adjusted to reflect the new
approach. In addition, for RURAL HIPOTECARIO GLOBAL I Moody's
corrected the artificial write off mechanism modeling.

List of Affected Ratings

Issuer: Rural Hipotecario Global I, FTA

EUR1008.1M A Notes, Confirmed at A3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Downgraded to A3 (sf) and Placed Under Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR36.3M B Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

EUR8M C Notes, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Jul 2, 2012
Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

EUR12.8M D Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Jul 2,
2012 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Downgrade

Issuer: RURAL HIPOTECARIO III

EUR12.7M B Notes Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade

Issuer: RURAL IV FONDO DE TITULIZACION HIPOTECARIA

EUR21.3M B Notes, Downgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Nov 23,
2012 Downgraded to Baa1 (sf) and Remained On Review for Possible
Downgrade



===========
S W E D E N
===========


BRAVIDA HOLDING: Moody's Assigns 'B2' CFR; Outlook Stable
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a corporate family rating
(CFR) of B2 and a probability of default rating (PDR) of B2-PD to
Bravida Holding AB (publ).

Concurrently, Moody's has assigned a (P)Ba2 rating to the SEK550
million Revolving Credit Facility (RCF) and (P)B2 rating to the
SEK3,200 million equivalent senior secured notes to be issued by
Bravida. The outlook on all ratings is stable.

The proceeds from the notes will be used to repay in full all
amounts outstanding under existing bank loans and increase cash
on balance sheet.

Ratings Rationale:

The B2 CFR assigned to Bravida primarily reflects (i) the intense
competition in the fragmented multi-technical activities market
in Scandinavia and the risk of price pressure, arising from the
fragmented structure of the industry; (ii) the company's limited
geographical and product diversification, with the majority of
its revenues being generated in Sweden. Bravida's CFR is also
constrained by high Moody's adjusted opening gross leverage,
representing 5.6x pro forma for the transaction, which combined
with the acquisition strategy of the company, will leave limited
headroom.

Positively, the B2 CFR assigned to Bravida factors in the group's
leading position in the Scandinavian multi-technical activities
market, supported by high brand recognition and a dense local
branch network. Additionally, Bravida's vulnerability to volatile
demand patterns is to some extent mitigated by (i) the high
proportion of its total revenues that is driven by renovation
demand, which tends to be more stable than new construction
demand; (ii) around 50% of revenue being generated by its service
business, which also tends to be less volatile and offers higher
margins than its installation business; and (iii) the group's
diversified customer and contracts structure, with a high
proportion repeat business.

Bravida's aforementioned characteristics, combined with an
increased focus on its cost structure and the low capital
intensity of the business, enabled the company to maintain stable
operating performance and steady cash flow generation during
2008-2011. The performance in 2012 was resilient, with c. 6%
revenue growth, out of which c. 4.2% was organic. However the
profitability was negatively affected by the slowdown in the
construction industry in the second half of the year, in
particular in Denmark and some parts of Sweden. As a result
EBITDA margin (as calculated by the company) declined to 5.5% in
2012 from 6.3% in 2011.

Medium-term demand for Bravida's services should benefit from (i)
expected modest GDP growth in its key markets of Sweden, Denmark
and Norway and (ii) a continued trend towards more complex
technical installations in buildings, caused in part by a drive
for greater energy efficiency and enhanced security systems among
other trends. However, Moody's does not expect an improvement in
EBITDA margin in 2013 due to continuing weakness in demand in
Denmark leading to price pressure.

Moody's also cautions that Bravida's operates with a negative
working capital position, driven by high prepayments, in
particular in the installation business and that opportunistic
acquisitions are a key pillar of the management's strategy in
order to further strengthen the company's market position in the
fragmented market, which may weaken cash flow generation. Moody's
rating incorporates a moderate amount of acquisition capex in the
medium term leading to positive free cash flow and slow
deleveraging.

The liquidity of Bravida, pro-forma for the refinancing, is
adequate -- subject to the extent of acquisition spend -
supported by c. SEK570 million cash on balance sheet and undrawn
RCF of SEK550 million. The terms of the RCF include one
maintenance covenant of minimum super senior leverage set at a
significant headroom. Only SEK450 million of RCF is available for
cash drawings, however the full face amount of the RCF is
considered in the loss given default (LGD) analysis.

Bravida's B2-PD PDR is based on a recovery rate of 50%,
reflecting an anticipated capital structure with bank debt and
bonds. The notes and the RCF will share the same security package
(including security on essentially all assets) and guarantees.
Operating entities of Bravida group will provide guarantees,
together representing at least 85% of consolidated EBITDA and 85%
of the aggregate turnover of the group. The (P)B2 rating on the
secured notes reflects their contractual subordination to the RCF
(rated (P)Ba2) via the intercreditor agreement in enforcement
payment waterfall. The ratings also incorporate Moody's
understanding that the shareholder funding into the restricted
group (at Bravida Holding AB) will be wholly via common equity.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectation that Bravida will
be able to maintain stable operating margins, supporting steady
cash flow generation and gradual deleveraging. The outlook also
incorporates an assumption of a disciplined approach towards
acquisitions. Any significant acquisition may lead to downward
pressure on the ratings.

What Could Change The Ratings Up / Down

Positive rating pressure could arise over time if the company (i)
de-levers its balance sheet leading to a Moody's adjusted gross
debt/EBITDA ratio below 5.0x on a sustainable basis; (ii)
improves its (EBITDA-Capex) to interest ratio towards 2.5x, and
(iii) maintains positive Free Cash Flow.

Conversely, downward pressure might occur as a result of
underperformance leading to: (i) Moody's adjusted gross leverage
trending towards 6.0x; (ii) (EBITDA-Capex) / Interest below 1.5x;
or (iii) Free Cash Flow turning negative.

The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Business & Consumer Service Industry Rating Methodology published
in October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Sweden, Bravida is a leading independent
provider of multi-technical activities in Scandinavia. In 2012,
Bravida generated revenues of around SEK11.4 billion. 64% of 2012
revenues was generated in its domestic market (Sweden), with the
remaining revenue split between Norway (24%) and Denmark (14%).
Bravida's main activities comprise the provision of electrical,
heating and plumbing, and heating and ventilation air
conditioning (HVAC) installation and maintenance services.


BRAVIDA HOLDING: S&P Assigns 'B' Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it has assigned its 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating to Bravida Holding AB, the
parent of Sweden-based provider of multitechnical services
Bravida.  The outlook is stable.

At the same time, S&P assigned its 'B' long-term issue rating to
Bravida Holding's proposed SEK3.2 billion-equivalent notes
maturing in 2019.  The recovery rating on this instrument is '4',
indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the
event of a payment default.

The ratings on Bravida Holding are constrained by S&P's view of
the group's highly leveraged financial risk profile, according to
S&P's criteria, which it believes will continue over the next two
to three years.  The company's debt consists of senior secured
notes of SEK3.2 billion (about US$480 million), maturing in 2019.
The company also has access to a SEK550 million revolving credit
facility (RCF) due in 2019.  In S&P's assessment, it also treats
a SEK2.5 billion shareholder loan (structured as preference
shares) like debt; these shares are however deeply subordinated
and non-cash-paying.

Following the group's acquisition by private equity company Bain
Capital, and related refinancing, S&P forecasts that the ratio of
adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt could stay at about
8%, and debt to EBITDA at about 10x for the next three years.
Excluding the preference shares, and adjusting for surplus cash,
S&P estimates adjusted FFO to debt at 15%-20%, and adjusted debt
to EBITDA at lower than 5.0x over the next two years.  S&P also
forecasts the EBITDA interest coverage ratio to gradually improve
to 2.8x from 2.4x.

However, the group's annual investments in assets represent less
than 1% of revenues.  S&P believes this supports Bravida's
ability to generate positive free operating cash flow, even after
likely bolt-on acquisitions of about SEK70 million yearly to
support growth and consolidate the fragmented Scandinavian market
further. S&P also believes that management may take advantage of
the company's relative strength, compared with its peers', and
potentially increase the pace and size of acquisitions.

In S&P's view, Bravida's business risk profile is constrained by
the group's limited geographic footprint.  However, S&P believes
that these risks are mitigated by the diverse customer base, low
volatility of historical earnings, and S&P's expectation that the
Scandinavian installation and multitechnical end markets will
remain stable, which should support demand for Bravida's
services. A further rating support is the very low capital
intensity of Bravida's business, which supports cash generation.
The reported EBITDA margin was 5.4% in 2012.

In S&P's base case, it expects Bravida's Nordic end markets to be
slightly less supportive in 2013 and 2014 than in 2012, even
though growth potential should remain higher than in continental
Europe.  S&P anticipates steady business related to public
infrastructure projects, and increasing demand for multitechnical
services.  S&P views the high customer diversity and large number
of recurring contracts as a stabilizing factor for Bravida.
Consequently, S&P expects operating margins to remain stable,
with EBITDA to sales at 5%-6%.

The stable outlook reflects S&P's opinion that Bravida should
generate free cash flow this year and be in a position to
maintain a ratio of FFO to adjusted debt (including preference
shares) exceeding 8%.  It also takes into account S&P's
expectation that Bravida will continue its strategy of
successfully integrating the add-on acquisitions we assume the
group will be making in Scandinavia.

S&P could lower the ratings if unexpected adverse operating
developments occur, in particular, a sharp economic downturn in
Scandinavia or a sudden loss of contracts that pushed the group's
reported EBITDA margin to less than 5.0% and FFO to debt to
significantly below 8%.  The rating could also come under
pressure if the group's free operating cash flow turned negative
as a result of operating shortfalls, perhaps related to
acquisitions, or if the non-cash-paying shareholder loan were
replaced by a cash-paying instrument.

S&P could consider a positive rating action if Bravida's adjusted
FFO to debt sustainably exceeded 15%.  An EBITDA interest
coverage ratio close to 3x could also be consistent with a higher
rating. Given the company's short operating track record under
its new shareholding structure, S&P sees upgrade potential as
limited at this stage.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


* SWEDEN: Fitch Says Banks' US Tax Dispute Resolution Costly
------------------------------------------------------------
A solution of the dispute between the US authorities and several
Swiss private banks, who have allegedly helped US citizens evade
tax, is likely to be costly for the banks involved, Fitch Ratings
says. "However, we believe the proposal by the Swiss government
should remove significant uncertainty for the banks and in the
medium term is preferable to a lengthy dispute with US
authorities," Fitch says.

"Litigation risks for Swiss private banks have increased in
recent years and their current ratings reflect the still
considerable costs relating to US offshore clients and other
legal risks. We expect any fine or indemnification to be
manageable for the Swiss private banks we rate as none of them
has strategically targeted undeclared US offshore clients after
UBS's settlement with the US authorities in 2009 over tax
evasion, to our knowledge. But the final settlements or fines for
tax evasion matters are difficult to predict and should the
amounts significantly exceed our expectations, this could be
negative for these banks' ratings.

"We anticipate all rated banks with exposure to US offshore
clients to cooperate with the US Department of Justice (DoJ)
because we understand that the US authorities could take further
legal steps should a bank decide not to participate in the
proposed solution.

"The framework of the settlement including how a fine, if any,
would be calculated will be disclosed by the US authorities once
the proposed bill has been passed by the Swiss parliament. We
expect that the banks' behavior post UBS's 2009 settlement will
be relevant in determining the fines. Active acquisition of
undeclared US offshore clients during this period is likely to
incur heftier fines.

"The US authorities have made general inquiries into the US
wealth management activities of three rated Swiss banks,
specifically Credit Suisse, Pictet and Zuercher Kantonalbank. Two
further rated banks, Lombard Odier and EFG International are
currently not subject to such inquiries to our knowledge.

"The Swiss federal government on May 29 approved a draft bill to
create the legal basis for Swiss banks to cooperate with US
authorities in matters relating to US off-shore clients. If
passed by parliament, this would allow banks to negotiate
individual closing agreements with the DoJ and would thus avoid
any further investigations or even indictments by US authorities.

"If passed according to the current time-table, the bill will
come into force on July 1, 2013 for one year only. We expect the
banks to start negotiating agreements with the US authorities
shortly thereafter."



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


YUKSEL INSAAT: Moody's Caa1-Rated Debt Still on Downgrade Watch
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service said that it is maintaining on review
for downgrade the Caa1 corporate family rating (CFR) and Caa1-PD
probability of default rating of Yuksel Insaat S.A., as well as
the Caa1 rating on the US$200 million of notes due 2015 issued by
the company.

Ratings Rationale:

Moody's has maintained the ratings on review for downgrade
because Yuksel is still in the process of considering its
strategic options, including with regard to its capital
structure. Therefore, it is currently unclear how its capital
structure will change and specifically what the impact of any
such change on its US$200 million of notes will be. During the
review process, Moody's will continue to monitor Yuksel's
progress in terms of these taking these strategic decisions.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

The outcome of the company's strategic review could have a
material impact on the direction of the rating. As it expects
that the strategic review will include distressed elements,
including bond buybacks, Moody's considers it more likely that
the rating will move in a negative direction, as indicated by the
ratings being maintained on review for downgrade.

Moody's could downgrade the ratings if the deterioration in
Yuksel's liquidity profile accelerates. Cash and cash equivalents
at FYE 2012 were TL60.2 million down from TL174.9 million at FYE
2011. In the context of reported negative cash flows from
operating activities of TL47.6 million in FY 2012 an upcoming
interest payment of US$9.5 million (ca. TL17 million) on its
US$200 million bonds is due in November 2013. A shortfall in
operating cash flow, or higher, unplanned capital expenditure and
working capital requirements could lead to a further downgrade of
the ratings.

As ratings are on review for downgrade, an upgrade is highly
unlikely at this juncture. For the outlook on the ratings to be
stabilized, Yuksel would need to stop the cash leakage it is
currently experiencing by (1) making further asset disposals; (2)
terminating projects that require equity contributions and have
limited/no recourse to the group; (3) undertaking sizable
shareholder injections.

The principal methodology used in this rating/analysis was the
Global Construction Methodology published in November 2010. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009.

Yuksel Insaat A.S. (Yuksel), which has corporate headquarters in
Ankara, Turkey, is among the 10 largest construction companies in
the country. The company was established in 1963 by the Sazak and
Sert families and maintains a visible footprint in Turkey, where
more than half of its revenues are generated, but has expanded
into the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as well as
Central Asia over recent years to diversify its revenue streams.
The company generated revenues of TL1.4 billion (around US$802
million) in its financial year 2012.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


* UKRAINE: Moody's Says Banking System Outlook Still Negative
-------------------------------------------------------------
The outlook for Ukraine's banking system remains negative,
unchanged since October 2009, says Moody's Investors Service in a
new report entitled "Banking System Outlook: Ukraine."

The outlook reflects the rating agency's expectation that
Ukrainian banks will continue to operate in a challenging
economic environment, causing asset quality to remain very weak.
This outlook also takes into account Moody's expectation of poor
profitability and tighter funding conditions in 2013.

Over the 12-18 month outlook period, the operating environment
for Ukrainian banks will remain negative with the economy
expected to show very little growth -- after meager GDP growth of
0.2% in 2012 -- largely because of weak external demand for
Ukraine's key export commodities, in particular steel.

Moody's says that within this context, Ukrainian banks' asset
quality will remain very weak over the outlook horizon. Problem
loans will remain at the 2012 level of around 35% of gross loans
in 2013, driven primarily by weak export prices and stagnant
real-estate prices. Furthermore, loan-loss provisions covered
only around 40% of total problem loans (including restructured)
at year-end 2012, which Moody's believes is insufficient to cover
potential credit losses. The banks will be marginally profitable
in 2013 as their earnings will be affected by increased loan loss
provisioning, shrinking margins and limited cost-cutting ability.
Net interest margins declined to 4.5% in 2012 from 5.3% in 2011,
and Moody's expects the negative trend to persist in 2013.

Depositor confidence has proven fragile in the past, and,
although deposit growth has been strong in recent years, it
slowed down in 2012 and Moody's expects this trend to continue in
2013, leading to tightening funding conditions. Moody's says that
the elevated risks of a current account crisis and uncertainties
over the stability of the local currency will negatively affect
depositors' confidence. In addition, the negative economic
environment and reduced access to credit could force companies to
draw their deposits from banks.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


CO-OPERATIVE BANK: Councils Cut Exposure After Rating Downgrade
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Pickard and Jennifer Thompson at The Financial Times report
that local authorities have started to cut their exposure to the
Co-operative Bank after taking advice from independent advisers
amid concerns about the health of the mutual lender.

According to the FT, more than 100 councils have nearly half a
billion pounds on deposit at the group, which was downgraded six
notches by Moody's in early May over concerns that the bank's
capital was coming under pressure.

Financial advisers, who work closely with local authorities, have
been "steering councils away from the Co-operative" in recent
weeks, the FT says, citing one government official.

The Co-op declined to comment, but a person familiar with the
bank said only a handful of councils had cut their exposure, the
FT notes.  The downgrade, he added, would have automatically
triggered some councils to review their position, the FT says.

The bank's GBP460 million of council deposits is a small fraction
of total customer deposits of GBP36.9 billion at the end of last
year, the FT states.

Founded in 1863, the Co-op has more than six million members,
employs more than 100,000 people and has turnover of more than
GBP13 billion.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on May 13,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the deposit and senior
debt ratings of Co-operative Bank plc to Ba3/Not Prime from
A3/Prime 2, following its lowering of the bank's baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to b1 from baa1.  The equivalent standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) is now E+ from C- previously.


HOUSE OF FRASER: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on U.K.-based premium department store group Highland
Group Holdings Ltd. (House of Fraser) to stable from negative.
At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit
rating on the company.

In addition, S&P affirmed its 'B' issue ratings on the senior
secured bonds issued by House of Fraser (Funding) PLC.  The
recovery rating on these bonds is unchanged at '4', indicating
S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that House of Fraser
will likely sustain trends of low-single-digit EBITDA growth and
improving operating performance in the year ahead.  These trends
are evident in stabilizing trading figures in the financial year
ended Jan. 26, 2013 (fiscal 2013).  Furthermore, the improvement
in trading performance has increased headroom under House of
Fraser's financial covenants, thereby improving the company's
overall liquidity position.

House of Fraser reported EBITDA growth of 4% to GBP61.1 million
in fiscal 2013, supported by a like-for-like increase in sales of
3.3%, strong growth in its online business, and an increasing
contribution from its higher-margin own-brand products.  For the
year ahead, S&P believes that the continuation of these positive
key performance indicators should lead to low-single-digit EBITDA
growth.

In S&P's base-case operating scenario, it anticipates a minimal
improvement in the economic environment in the U.K. and ongoing
strong competition for both in-store and online sales.  However,
S&P believes that House of Fraser should be able to achieve low-
single-digit top-line and EBITDA growth thanks to its portfolio
of well-located stores, growth in online sales, ongoing store
refurbishment program, and premium market position.

"Under our base-case forecasts, we project that a moderate
improvement in earnings will allow House of Fraser to marginally
improve its Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA from the
9.3x recorded in fiscal 2013.  In addition, we forecast positive
free operating cash flow (FOCF) of about GBP20 million in
financial 2014 as a result of a moderate level of capital
expenditure (capex), which will likely be about 2% of group
sales. We also forecast stable adjusted interest coverage of
1.4x, which corresponds to reported interest coverage of 2.8x.
Financial debt continues to represent about 20% of House of
Fraser's adjusted debt, with the remainder representing operating
lease adjustments," S&P said.

"In our view, House of Fraser should be able to maintain low-
single-digit EBITDA growth despite an ongoing challenging
economic environment in the U.K. We believe that the company will
likely sustain its operating trends of increases of same-store,
online, and own-brand sales.  These operating trends should
enable the company to marginally improve its leverage of broadly
about 9x adjusted debt to EBITDA, keep its adjusted EBITDA
interest coverage at about 1.5x, and maintain an "adequate"
liquidity position," S&P noted.

"We could lower the rating if House of Fraser's liquidity
position weakens as a result of tightening headroom under
financial covenants, or of FOCF turning negative as a result of
deteriorating operating performance.  We could lower the rating
if the company's adjusted interest coverage ratio falls to less
than 1x (reported interest coverage of less than 2x).
Deteriorating liquidity or credit metrics could occur due to an
operating setback in the fourth quarter or a severe weakening in
the economic environment," S&P added.

Ratings upside is limited at this stage, but would likely result
from a greater improvement than S&P anticipates of the company's
business operations over time, causing financial metrics to
strengthen on account of increasing EBITDA.  However, this is
outside S&P's current base-case scenario for the coming 12
months.


MORTGAGES NO.7: Moody's Cuts Rating on GBP7.5MM Notes to B2
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded from Ba1 (sf) to B2 (sf) the
ratings of the Class E notes issued by Mortgages No.7 plc
following a decrease in the credit enhancement provided by the
reserve fund and deterioration in the credit quality of the
collateral.

Issuer: Mortgages No 7 PLC

GBP7.5M E Notes, Downgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Aug 8, 2005
Definitive Rating Assigned Ba1 (sf)

Ratings Rationale:

The rating action reflects 1) the decreased credit enhancement
supporting the Class E notes, and 2) deterioration of credit
quality of the collateral portfolio

Decreased Credit Enhancement

On January 31, 2013, Mortgages No.7 amortized the reserve fund
from GBP7.5 million to GBP5.3 million, which led to a decrease in
credit enhancement under the Class E notes from 4.5% to 3.3%.
According to the documentation, the reserve fund should have
amortized after reaching 2% of notes balance assuming performance
conditions were met. Mortgages No.7 did not amortize the reserve
fund at the time that these conditions were satisfied. Moreover,
Mortgages No.7 informed us that the current amortization amounts
correspond to the amounts that it should have previously
amortized.

Moody's increased its expected loss assumption in October 2012
when the performance triggers were already breached. However,
this increase did not lead to a rating action due to the high
level of credit enhancement available under the Class E note at
that time. Since the amortization of the reserve fund, the
reduced credit enhancement no longer supports the rating of Class
E notes.

The rating impact of this decrease in the reserve fund is limited
to the junior notes because the fund constitutes the majority of
the credit enhancement supporting this rating. For mezzanine and
senior notes, the increase in overall credit enhancement due to
deleveraging has offset the rating impact of the decrease in the
reserve fund.

Deterioration Of Collateral Credit Quality

The rating action also reflects the deteriorating credit quality
of the underlying mortgage portfolio, from which Moody's
determined the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement (MILAN CE). The Milan
CE is one of two key parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its
loss distribution curve, which is used in the cash flow model to
rate European RMBS transactions.

Moody's has re-assessed updated loan-by-loan information on the
portfolio and increased its MILAN Aaa CE assumption to 27.5% from
21.0%. The major drivers of the increase are 1) the increase in
share of loans delinquent by more than 360 days (including
outstanding repossessions) to 9.2% of the current portfolio
balance from 5.7% as of October 2010 (the last data point
available during the previous review of MILAN CE); and 2) the
increase in the share of interest only mortgages to 73% from 66%
as of October 2010.

Moody's has maintained its expected loss assumption at 2.4% of
the original balance because the overall arrears level and loss
realization have been in line with Moody's expectations since the
previous review of the expected loss in October 2012.

Other Developments May Negatively Affect The Notes

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy. The deteriorating
creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as well as the weakening
credit profile of the global banking sector could further
negatively affect the ratings of the notes.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS Using the MILAN Framework," published in
May 2013.

In reviewing this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of 1) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and 2) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.


* UK: OFTOs Have Favorable Credit Risk Profiles, Says Moody's
-------------------------------------------------------------
Operational Offshore Transmission Owners (OFTOs) in the UK
exhibit a favorable credit risk profile comparable with that of
regulated onshore network businesses, reflecting such factors as
a transparent and predictable regulatory regime and their ability
to pass through certain costs, says Moody's in a Special Comment
report entitled "Operational UK Offshore Transmission Owners:
Solid Credit Strength Comparable to That of UK Regulated Onshore
Networks."

"Whilst we do not currently have any published ratings for OFTOs,
subject to the terms of the financing structure we could consider
transactions to be comparable with those of UK regulated onshore
network businesses that are rated in the Baa1/A3 range," says
Neil Griffiths-Lambeth, a Senior Vice President in Moody's
Infrastructure Finance team and an author of the report. "This
positive view of OFTOs' business risk profile reflects that they
are subject to a transparent and predictable regulatory regime
and a predictable availability-based revenue stream, as well as
their ability to pass through certain costs and their limited
operating risk."

Moody's notes that OFTOs operate under licenses awarded by the
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), the regulator for
onshore electricity and gas transmission and distribution
networks in the UK. Whilst the regulatory regime for OFTOs is new
and untested, Ofgem itself has a more than 20-year track record
of predictable and stable regulation for onshore networks, which
is based on transparent principles that are consistently applied.

In addition, OFTOs receive an availability-based payment linked
to UK Retail Price Index (RPI) inflation. There is a
bonus/penalty system if availability deviates from a target
level, but also a cap on deductions set at 10% of annual
revenues. The OFTO revenue stream is not exposed to price or
volume risk, nor to the performance of the associated wind farm.

As well as benefiting from the predictability of the regulatory
regime and availability-based revenue, OFTOs are able to recover
certain cost increases, including from force majeure or change-
in-law events, through automatic revenue adjustments under the
terms of the license.

With regard to OFTOs' limited operating risk, Moody's notes that
undersea electricity cables have been successfully operated for
many years with few issues. Maintenance requirements are
typically modest and low cost whilst risks associated with
physical damage are usually mitigated by physical protection,
insurance and reserves. The license provides additional
protection by ensuring that there are limited deductions from
revenue on account of availability failures. OFTO assets may also
be designed such that component failure may result in a limited,
rather than total, loss of capacity and revenue. Whilst, in
contrast to onshore networks, overall capital expenditure
requirements will be significantly lower, should they occur, the
execution of such investments bears additional risks due to the
offshore location, which adds complexity to any repair works.

Moody's favorable view of OFTOs' business risk profile also
reflects the limited risks associated with the 'OFTO of Last
Resort' regime. Whilst an OFTO could be required to assume
responsibility for another failed operator, the rating agency
views the risk of this occurring as small. In addition, this
mechanism will ensure recovery of at least the depreciated asset
value for investors (debt and equity) in a failing OFTO.

Any future ratings for OFTOs will be supported by Moody's
favorable view of the business risk profile of the asset class
but will also take into account specific features of transactions
and their financing arrangements. Whilst Moody's views OFTOs'
credit risk profile as potentially commensurate with that of
onshore transmission operators, ratings will take into account
(1) the limited track record of OFTO regulation and a degree of
uncertainty in this regard, albeit somewhat mitigated by the fact
that the regulator has a strong track record of stable and
predictable regulation of onshore networks; (2) design and
construction of the assets and whether they have achieved
successful operation as anticipated; (3) exposure to operating
risks and potential loss of revenue in the context of available
mitigants, including insurance and cash reserves; (4) financial
leverage, debt service cover ratios and funded reserves; and (5)
ownership and track record of financial policies unless mitigated
by creditor protections including financial covenants and
security.

In assessing the overall credit quality of operational OFTOs,
Moody's will apply its rating methodology for regulated electric
and gas networks.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Payment Defaults in Western Europe Up 5% of Invoice Value
-----------------------------------------------------------
Atradius N.V. on May 29 disclosed that payment default rates are
rising, negatively impacting the profitability of businesses in
Western Europe.  According to survey respondents of the Atradius
Payment Practices Barometer, on average, 5% of the total value of
B2B receivables of survey respondents was defaulted on (up from
3% last year).  The increase in default rates and in late
payments are making it more difficult for businesses to maintain
adequate cash flow levels.  This along with falling demand for
products and services is considered to be the biggest challenge
to business profitability this year.

The Atradius survey interviewed approximately 3,000 businesses
across 14 countries in Western Europe. Overall, approximately 30%
of the total value of the invoices issued by survey respondents
to their domestic and foreign B2B customers is unpaid at the due
date.  Payment delays from domestic B2B customers occur most
often in Italy (36.8% of average total value of domestic overdue
B2B invoices) and from export customers of Swiss respondents
(38.7%).

Compared to last year, domestic past due B2B invoices decreased
slightly (down 1.6%) whereas there was an increase in foreign
past due invoices (up 6.7%).  France recorded the largest
increase (up 14.2%) in the average total value of domestic past
due B2B invoices and Turkey in past due foreign invoices (up
194.4%).

Nearly 5% of the invoices issued by the survey respondents to
domestic and foreign B2B customers are defaulted on (up from
nearly 3% last year).  Average payment default rates are highest
from domestic B2B customers in Italy (7.6% of the total value of
domestic B2B receivables) and foreign B2B customers of
respondents from Switzerland (7.0%).  Domestic B2B receivables
are defaulted on mainly due to the customer being bankrupt or out
of business, In addition to this reason, foreign receivables are
frequently unpaid due to the failure of collections attempts.

The increase in payment default rates of survey respondents
reflects the year-over-year increase in domestic (15%) and
foreign (22.6%) B2B receivables unpaid more than 90 days past due
date. Consistent with responses in the survey of one year ago,
insufficient availability of funds is cited as the primary reason
for payment delays from B2B customers.  62.3% of respondents
reported it as the primary reason for domestic payment delays and
45.9% for foreign payment delays.

Falling demand of products and services and maintaining adequate
cash flow are considered to be the biggest challenges to the
profitability of the respondents' businesses this year.  The
percentage of respondents citing falling demand of products and
services ranges from 44.7% in Spain (42.2% in the Netherlands) to
20% in Greece.  This reverses, in respect of respondents citing
maintaining adequate cash flow, with Greece having the highest
percentage (48%) and Spain the lowest (17.7%).

Andreas Tesch, Chief Market Officer of Atradius N.V. stated, "The
payment environment in France, Switzerland and Austria have
declined quite noticeably and are now among the worst in Western
Europe.  The Payment Practices Barometer responses confirm this
deterioration showing that the default rate on French domestic
trade debt has reached 6.0% and is getting close to that of
Greece at 6.3%".

The complete report highlighting the findings of the 2013 edition
of the Atradius Payment Practices Barometer for Western Europe
can be found in the Publications section of the Atradius.com
website.

                         About Atradius

The Atradius Group -- http://www.atradius.com-- provides trade
credit insurance, surety and collections services worldwide. With
a presence through 160 offices in 45 countries, it has a market
share of approximately 31% of the global trade credit insurance
market.  Atradius has access to credit information on 100 million
companies worldwide.  Its products help protect companies
throughout the world from payment risks associated with selling
products and services on credit.


* BOND PRICING: For the Week May 27 to May 31, 2013
---------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *