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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Monday, April 8, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 68

                            Headlines



A Z E R B A I J A N

* AZERBAIJAN: Fitch Says Capital Issues Top of Agenda for Banks


B O S N I A   &   H E R Z E G O V I N A

BIRAC: Tax Authority to Launch Bankruptcy Procedures


C Y P R U S

BANK OF CYPRUS: Data on Greek Bond Purchases Missing
CYPRUS AIRWAYS: Survival Hinges on Financial Aid

C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

CEZ AS: May Face Investigation; Regulator Seeks to Revoke License


F R A N C E

FCC SURF: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCC'


G E R M A N Y

GERMAN RESIDENTIAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes


G R E E C E

PIRAEUS BANK: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings


H U N G A R Y

NITROGENMUVEK ZRT: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Corp. Credit Rating


I R E L A N D

IRISH BANK: Liquidator Hires UBS & PwC to Value Loan Books
IRISH BANK: Creditors Set to Take Legal Action Over Losses
OAK HILL II: Deutsche Bank Deal No Impact on Moody's 'Ba2' Rating


I T A L Y

BANCA MONTE: Accuses Two Banks of Colluding with Ex-Managers
BANCA POPOLARE: Italian Investors Mull EUR102MM Capital Increase
SILENUS LTD: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ca'


R U S S I A

EDC FINANCE: Fitch Rates USD-Denominated Notes 'BB(EXP)'
MOSCOW INTEGRATED: Fitch Puts 'BB+' IDRs on RWN on Privatization
RUSSIAN STANDARD: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to RUB3BB Bond Issues


S P A I N

BANKINTER 2: S&P Affirms 'D(sf)' Rating on Class E Notes
BANKINTER 3: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC'
CM BANCAJA 1: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'B+'
GC FTPYME 6: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC-'
GC FTPYME 8: S&P Affirms 'BB(sf)' Rating on Class B Notes

PESCANOVA SA: Files for Insolvency; In Dispute with Auditors


S W I T Z E R L A N D

* Fitch Maintains View of No Swiss Property Bubble


T U R K E Y

TURK EXIMBANK: S&P Lifts LT Foreign Currency Rating to 'BB+'


U K R A I N E

BIZ FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to US$100MM Notes Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AXMINSTER CARPETS: Bought Out of Administration; 100 Jobs Saved
HMV GROUP: Hilco Acquires 141 Stores for About GBP50 Million
* UK: Business Insolvencies at Lowest Level Since 2005, PwC Says


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Notes Weakening Euro Bond Protections in New Report
* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 1 to April 5, 2013


                            *********


===================
A Z E R B A I J A N
===================


* AZERBAIJAN: Fitch Says Capital Issues Top of Agenda for Banks
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that capital issues have become key for many
Azerbaijan's banks as a result of rapid asset growth, weak
internal capital generation and tougher regulatory requirements.
Asset quality and liquidity have been stable, but the performance
of both the broader economy and the banking sector remains highly
dependent on the oil price.

Fitch views current capitalization as moderate (the aggregate
sector total capital ratio stood at 16.7% at end-2012) given the
still high level of loan impairment and modest reserve coverage.
The agency estimates that full provisioning of non-performing
loans (NPLs) would result in the sector capital ratio falling to
the minimum 12% level. In addition, capital (and asset quality
problems) are unevenly distributed across the system, with three
large banks (together comprising 44% of sector assets) already
operating with ratios very close to or below 12% at end-2012.

Smaller banks appear to be poorly prepared for the increase from
January 2014 of the minimum permitted absolute amount of
regulatory capital to AZN50 million. At end-2012, only 12 banks
in the sector were already compliant with the new requirement,
while a further seven had capital of more than AZN35 million,
meaning only moderate capital raising should be necessary to
achieve compliance by end-2013. The remaining 24 banks (in
aggregate short of more than AZN700 million to reach the new
requirement) will need to seek more substantial capital
contributions, pursue merger opportunities, or transform
themselves into non-banking credit institutions.

Sector-wide profitability has been weak, with an estimated return
on average capital of just 8% in 2012 due to low margins,
unresolved asset quality problems and limited operational scale
at most privately-owned banks. Fitch expects that these factors
will continue to weigh on sector profitability in 2013, meaning
that internal capital generation alone is likely to be
significantly slower than still rapid loan growth (which Fitch
forecasts to remain at 20%-25% in 2013).

Asset quality has stabilized, supported by the buoyant
macroeconomic environment, but a survey of Fitch-rated banks
still indicated (weighted) average NPLs of 13% at end-2012 and
the same amount of restructured loans. Fitch expects the economy
to remain supportive in 2013, with non-oil GDP growth projected
at 10% driven by fiscal spending, but long corporate loan tenors
(frequently coupled with grace periods) mean that the quality of
much lending is largely untested. Rapid consumer lending growth
(by more than 50% in 2012) is also a source of risk, although
overall household leverage remains moderate to date, and in a
favorable economic environment, personal income should continue
to rise.

Sector funding and liquidity is supported by expansionary fiscal
policy and FX purchases by the Central Bank aimed at maintaining
the exchange rate. Retail deposit growth has been robust (24% in
2012), although consumer confidence in the banking sector is
still fragile, reflected by the still large volume of monetary
operations outside the system. Underscoring limited sector
intermediation, the state remains an important source of funding
(25% of sector liabilities at end-2012), mostly provided for
targeted lending. Foreign borrowings were a significant 20% of
liabilities, but this was equal to a moderate 8% of sovereign FX
reserves, and more than half of the amount represented borrowings
by majority state-owned International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA,
'BB'/Stable).

The Viability Ratings of Azerbaijani banks are concentrated in
the 'b' category (or below) and remain constrained by weaknesses
both in the broader operating environment (including the
potential cyclicality of the economy, weak corporate sector
transparency and low World Bank governance indicators) and their
own franchises, governance and performance. Most banks' ratings
do not benefit from potential external support given considerable
uncertainty about the authorities' willingness to provide capital
assistance in case of need, in particular following the delayed
and limited recapitalization of IBA. The Stable Outlooks on most
banks reflect Fitch's base case expectation of continued strong
near-term growth of the non-oil economy, which should continue to
support sector asset quality and liquidity.



=======================================
B O S N I A   &   H E R Z E G O V I N A
=======================================


BIRAC: Tax Authority to Launch Bankruptcy Procedures
----------------------------------------------------
Gordana Katana at Reuters reports that Bosnia's Serb Republic
government ordered the tax authority on Saturday to launch
bankruptcy procedures at the region's indebted alumina plant,
majority-owned by troubled Lithuanian lender Ukio Bankas.

The decision follows a police investigation earlier last week
into alleged tax evasion and irregular spending at the plant,
whose majority stake-holder is controlled by Vladimir Romanov,
owner of cash-strapped Scottish soccer club Hearts, Reuters
relates.

The loss-making Birac, Bosnia's sole alumina plant, is located in
the eastern town of Zvornik and has been struggling to pay off
mounting debts, Reuters discloses.

Birac is a major employer in the Zvornik area but recorded a loss
of BAM5.4 million (US$3.5 million) in 2012, bringing total losses
over an unspecified number of years to BAM735.3 million, Reuters
says, citing a financial report it published in February on the
Banja Luka Stock Exchange.

On Friday, Mr. Romanov called an assembly of Birac's shareholders
and appointed a new managing board to draft and adopt a new
business plan, according to Reuters.  However, he said that he
did not oppose the takeover of the loss-making plant by the
government, Reuters notes.

According to Reuters, Zoran Tegeltija, the region's finance
minister, said that bankruptcy procedure was the only way to
determine the state of the plant and to eventually preserve
production and pay off its creditors and suppliers.

He said the debts to the region's tax authority and finance
ministry amounted to BAM17 million and BAM14 million,
respectively, Reuters relates.  The plant also had unspecified
liabilities to the regional power utility, gas distributor,
railways company, a number of suppliers, as well as its
employees, Reuters notes.

Birac, which produces mainly alumina, the intermediate material
used to make aluminium, and some zeolites and hydrates used in
the chemicals industry, has struggled due to falling prices for
aluminium and alumina on world markets and a rise in the price of
gas, Reuters discloses.



===========
C Y P R U S
===========


BANK OF CYPRUS: Data on Greek Bond Purchases Missing
----------------------------------------------------
According to BBC News, investigators have found that some key
data about bond purchases by Bank of Cyprus -- now the focus of a
controversial EU-IMF bailout -- is missing.

Cypriot media say that the gaps were found in computer records
studied by a financial consultancy, Alvarez and Marsal, BBC
discloses.

The Cyprus Mail Web site says information provided by Bank of
Cyprus was incomplete and data-deleting software was found on
some computers there, BBC relates.  There were significant gaps
in computer records for the period 2007-2010, BBC says.  It is
not yet clear whether the wiping of records was accidental or
deliberate, BBC notes.  There were signs of mass deletion of
data, BBC states.

According to BBC, the Central Bank of Cyprus says that Alvarez
and Marsal are now investigating Laiki too -- Cyprus's second
largest bank, which is being wound up and folded into Bank of
Cyprus.

"The investigation will continue and cover: the purchase of Greek
government bonds by Laiki Bank; the expansion of Laiki Bank
outside Cyprus; the role and responsibilities of all parties
involved," BBC quotes the central bank as saying on Friday.

The consultancy's report on Bank of Cyprus has been leaked to
Cypriot media, but not yet published.

Besides the Greek bond purchases the consultancy also scrutinized
Bank of Cyprus operations in Romania and Russia, BBC discloses.
The consultancy's findings have been handed over to the Cypriot
parliament and the attorney-general, Petros Clerides, BBC
relates.

Bank of Cyprus, the island's biggest bank, bought Greek bonds
which turned into some EUR1.9 billion (GBP1.6 billion; US$2.4
billion) of losses in the Greek debt crisis, BBC recounts.
Depositors with more than EUR100,000 in the bank are now facing a
big loss, BBC notes.  The "haircut" for such deposits in Bank of
Cyprus is expected to be about 60%, BBC states.  The money taken
from those accounts, and from deposits above EUR100,000 at Laiki
(Popular) Bank, will be used by the government to contribute
billions towards the bailout, according to BBC.  Strict capital
controls -- unprecedented for the eurozone -- are in force in
Cyprus, limiting cash withdrawals to prevent a run on the banks,
BBC discloses.

Bank of Cyprus is a major Cypriot financial institution.  In
terms of market capitalization of 350 million in March 2013, it
is the country's biggest bank.  As of September 2012, the bank
held a 26.7% share of the Cypriot deposit market and a 22.5%
share of the Cypriot loan market, making it the largest bank in
Cyprus.  The Bank of Cyprus Group employs 11,326 staff worldwide.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 28,
2013, Fitch downgraded the Long- and Short-Term Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs) of Cyprus Popular Bank (CPB) to Default (D) and
those of Bank of Cyprus (BOC) to 'Restricted Default' (RD) from
'B', respectively, on losses imposed on senior creditors. The
fact that BOC will continue to operate in Cyprus, while CPB will
be wound-down drives the difference in their Long-term IDRs ('RD'
for BOC; 'D' for CPB) The Support Rating Floors (SRF) of the two
banks have been revised to 'NF' from 'B' and Support Ratings (SR)
to '5' from '4' as a result of the bail-in of senior creditors.
Following this, Fitch has also downgraded their VR to 'f' from
'c'.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on March 26,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded to Caa3, from Caa2,
the deposit and senior unsecured debt ratings of Bank of Cyprus
Public Company Limited.  These ratings have also been placed on
review for downgrade.  At the same time, Moody's affirmed the
Bank Financial Strength Rating (BFSRs) of Bank of Cyprus at E.
It lowered the standalone credit assessment for Bank of Cyprus to
ca from caa3.


CYPRUS AIRWAYS: Survival Hinges on Financial Aid
------------------------------------------------
Kurt Hofmann at Air Transport World, citing several Cyprus based
media, reports that Cyprus Airways must receive financial aid or
it will be forced to shut down operations.

According to ATW, the Cyprus government is talking about three
scenarios for the financially troubled carrier: Shut down the
company immediately, continue operations during the summer season
or continue operations further.

However, Cyprus Airways chairman Stavros Stavrou told the
Famagusta Gazette the last scenario would include 560 job cuts,
payment cuts and fleet reduction from 11 Airbus A319/320s to six
aircraft, plus a reserve, ATW notes.  The company also would need
financial aid of EUR83.2 million (US$107 million) over the next
three years, ATW states.

Cyprus Airways was close to shutting down in 2011, but received
financial aid of EUR20 million annually from the state, ATW
recounts. Now, European antitrust regulators are questioning
whether Cyprus Airways illegally received more than EUR100
million in public support, ATW says.  The European Commission has
barred the Cypriot government from providing any further public
support to the airline without prior approval while it assesses
whether a EUR31.3 million capital increase and EUR73 million
rescue aid loan falls outside of European law, ATW discloses.

Cyprus Airways reported a provisional full-year net loss of
EUR55.8 million for 2012, more than doubling its EUR23.9 million
loss reported in the year-ago period, ATW relates.

Cyprus Airways is the national airline of Cyprus, a public
limited company with its head offices located in the capital of
the island, Nicosia.



===========================
C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


CEZ AS: May Face Investigation; Regulator Seeks to Revoke License
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Elizabeth Konstantinova and Ladka Bauerova at Bloomberg News
report that CEZ AS may face a criminal investigation in Bulgaria
as it fights the energy regulator's effort to revoke its license.

According to Bloomberg, Chief Prosecutor Sotir Tsatsarov on
Wednesday said that the probe would establish whether CEZ
violated the country's law in outsourcing contracts.

The nation's energy regulator said Feb. 20 that CEZ is suspected
of 21 violations including evasion of public procurement laws as
it started procedures to revoke the company's license, Bloomberg
recounts.

Bulgaria's energy regulator has moved to strip CEZ of the right
to operate its power-distribution network as prosecutors
investigate CEZ, EVN AG and another Czech utility, Energo-Pro,
after high utility bills triggered protests that brought down the
government of Boyko Borissov, Bloomberg discloses.

The trouble in Bulgaria came only weeks after Albanian
authorities seized CEZ's assets and drove it out of the country,
Bloomberg states.  Both cases show that Prague-based CEZ, which
went on a Balkan buying spree in the last decade under former
Chief Executive Officer Martin Roman, underestimated the perils
of investing in one of the poorest parts of Europe, Bloomberg
notes.

CEZ filed a complaint against Bulgaria at the European Commission
on March 29, claiming that the country's regulator was breaking
both national and EU laws, Bloomberg relates.  The utility has
asked the commission for an independent review, Bloomberg says.

CEZ AS is the Czech Republic's largest power producer.



===========
F R A N C E
===========


FCC SURF: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCC'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed and removed from
CreditWatch negative its 'BBB+ (sf)' credit ratings on FCC Surf's
class A1 and A2 notes.  At the same time, S&P has lowered to 'CCC
(sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch negative its
ratings on the class B1 and B2 notes.

                     THE CLASS A1 AND A2 NOTES

S&P's ratings on FCC Surf's class A1 and A2 notes are linked to
the lower of i) S&P's long-term corporate credit rating on Dexia
Credit Local plus one notch, and ii) S&P's long-term corporate
credit ratings on Sanef (not rated), or the guarantee provider,
Assured Guaranty (Europe) Ltd. (AA-/Stable), whichever is higher.

On April 3, 2012, S&P placed its ratings on all classes of notes
in FCC Surf on CreditWatch negative following S&P's rating action
on the swap provider, Dexia Credit Local (BBB/Stable/A-2), to
which the ratings were weak-linked.

On Jan. 25, 2013, S&P affirmed and removed from CreditWatch
negative its ratings on Dexia Credit Local.

Under S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria, the class A1 and A2 notes
benefit from a one-notch uplift above its long-term corporate
credit rating on Dexia Credit Local.

S&P has therefore affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative
its 'BBB+ (sf)' ratings on the class A1 and A2 notes.

                     THE CLASS B1 AND B2 NOTES

S&P's ratings on the class B1 and B2 notes are structurally
linked to the lower of i) S&P's long-term corporate credit rating
on Dexia Credit Local plus one notch, and ii) S&P's long-term
corporate credit ratings on Sanef, or the guarantee provider,
MBIA U.K. Insurance Ltd. (CCC/Negative), whichever is higher.

On Feb. 14, 2013, S&P withdrew its ratings on the French toll
road operator, Sanef, at its request.  Following this withdrawal,
S&P's ratings on the class B1 and B2 notes became weak-linked to
the long-term rating on MBIA U.K. Insurance.

On Feb. 28, 2013, S&P lowered its long-term corporate credit
rating on MBIA U.K. Insurance to 'CCC' from 'B'.  S&P has
therefore lowered to 'CCC (sf)' from 'BBB+ (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative its ratings on the class B1 and B2 notes.

On taking this rating action, S&P noticed that on May 30, 2012,
it had lowered its long-term corporate credit rating on Sanef to
'BBB' from 'BBB+', while keeping it on CreditWatch negative.  S&P
resolved this CreditWatch negative placement on Sept. 10, 2012.
On those two occasions, S&P should have taken corresponding
rating actions on the class B1 and B2 notes.  However, due to an
administrative error, S&P did not take those corresponding rating
actions.

The downgrades of the class B1 and B2 notes resolve the error.

FCC Surf is a French asset-backed securities (ABS) transaction,
which securitizes the receivables arising from a bank loan to
Sanef, a French toll road operator.  The class A notes benefit
from a monoline guarantee from Assured Guaranty and the class B
notes benefit from a monoline guarantee from MBIA U.K. Insurance.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class       Rating         Rating
            To             From

FCC Surf
EUR750 Million Floating-Rate Partly-Paid Notes

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A1          BBB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
A2          BBB+ (sf)      BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

B1          CCC (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B2          CCC (sf)       BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg



=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


GERMAN RESIDENTIAL: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed German Residential Funding plc's
notes, as follows:

  EUR1,297.4m class A1 (XS0263580945) affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
  Stable

  EUR255.3m class A2 (XS0263190216) affirmed at 'A+sf'; Outlook
  Stable

  EUR183.3m class B (XS0263194713) affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
Stable

  EUR183.3m class C (XS0263195447) affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Outlook
  Stable

  EUR90.8m class D (XS0263195959) affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Outlook
  Stable

  EUR45.4m class E (XS0263196338) affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
Stable

Key Rating Drivers

The affirmations and Stable Outlooks are driven by the stable
performance of the portfolio over the past 12 months and the
positive developments in the German residential real estate
market, among which the successful refinancing of the EUR1.06
billion Gagfah Dresden loan (Woba) achieved by the same sponsor.
The relatively long five-year tail period is also beneficial, and
would enable sufficient time at the current ratings for a
portfolio resolution following loan maturity.

The broadly stable collateral performance is visible in both
rental income and net operating income. Net cold rent has
decreased in line with sold the residential units over the past
four quarters and is showing a stable trend. Average rents have
increased marginally by 0.5% over the past year to EUR5.30/sq. m
per month, while the vacancy rate remains within the expected 4%-
5% range.

The transaction's debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) stands at
1.50x, compared with 2.28x a year ago and the peak of 2.59x in
November 2009. Despite the recent decrease, Fitch expects the
DSCR to remain well in excess of both its 1.4x cash trap trigger
and its 1.15x default covenant.

The loan is scheduled to mature in August 2013 and the bonds'
legal final maturity is five years later, in August 2018.

Rating Sensitivities

A downgrade of the notes or a revision of the Outlook to Negative
would become more likely if the publicly communicated refinancing
plans not materialize and the loan would remain outstanding well
after its maturity in August 2013. The sale of the assets during
the later stage of the tail period would increase the stress on
the asset and likely have a negative impact on the asset value.

A performance update report discussing the German multifamily
housing market and the three main German multifamily CMBS
transactions will be published on www.fitchratings.com in the
coming weeks. Updated surveillance data can also be found on the
agency's website.



===========
G R E E C E
===========


PIRAEUS BANK: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it had affirmed its
'CCC/C' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
Piraeus Bank S.A.  The outlook is negative.

The affirmation follows Piraeus Bank's announcement that it is
absorbing EUR19.2 billion in assets and EUR15 billion in customer
deposits in Greece from three Cypriot banks: Bank of Cyprus,
Hellenic Bank Public Company Ltd., and Cyprus Popular Bank Ltd.

The affirmation reflects S&P's opinion that, at the current
rating level, the transaction will likely have only a limited
impact on its assessment of Piraeus Bank's fragile financial
profile.  This is because the terms of the transaction partially
mitigate the potential risk arising from the acquisition.  It
also reflects S&P's opinion that the HFSF will continue to
provide sufficient capital support to Piraeus Bank to allow the
bank maintain an adequate regulatory capital ratio.

S&P anticipates that the transaction will have a limited impact
on Piraeus Bank's capital ratios.  S&P understands the agreed
cash consideration of EUR524 million will be funded by Piraeus
Bank through the issuance of new shares to the HFSF.  S&P
believes the bank's total adjusted capital will improve because
the acquired assets have a higher valuation than the liabilities.
However, S&P believes this will be offset by the high credit
losses Piraeus Bank will experience due to the loans it acquires
from the Cypriot banks.  As of Dec. 31, 2012, S&P understands the
three banks' total nonperforming loans in Greece amounted to a
high 38% of customer loans, compared with Piraeus Bank's 23%.

S&P's long-term rating on Piraeus Bank incorporates the
EUR7.9 billion in capital already committed by the HSFS.  S&P
expects this capital will be needed to absorb increased credit
losses on the bank's domestic loan portfolio in 2013 and 2014,
which S&P believes will exceed the bank's capacity to absorb
losses through operating profits.  In addition, S&P expects the
HSFS will continue to provide further extraordinary capital
support to Greek banks, if needed, to maintain adequate
regulatory capital ratios.

In S&P's view, the transaction has no impact on our assessment on
the bank's liquidity position.  S&P's ratings reflect its belief
that Piraeus Bank's liquidity position is unlikely to deteriorate
further, based on the commitment by the European authorities to
continue providing sufficient support to Greek banks.  In January
2013, Piraeus Bank regained access to European Central Bank (ECB)
refinancing operations.

The negative outlook is based on the possibility that S&P might
lower the ratings if it believed Piraeus Bank could default on
its obligations, according to its criteria.  S&P might lower the
ratings on Piraeus Bank if its access to the EU's extraordinary
liquidity support mechanisms, including the Emergency Lending
Assistance discount facility at the ECB, and access to the
ECB were impaired for any reason.

S&P could revise the outlook to stable if economic conditions in
Greece improved and pressure on the bank's fragile financial
profile eased, or if additional external support materialized.



=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


NITROGENMUVEK ZRT: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Corp. Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it revised its
outlook on Hungarian fertilizer producer Nitrogenmuvek Zrt. to
stable from negative.  At the same time, S&P affirmed its 'BB-'
long-term corporate credit rating on Nitrogenmuvek.

The outlook revision reflects S&P's view that risks relating to
operating in Hungary should not affect Nitrogenmuvek
significantly, as its full-year 2012 results illustrate.  S&P
believes the main risks that the company is facing relate to the
fertilizer industry as opposed to downward pressure on the
sovereign rating.  S&P do not consider that Nitrogenmuvek would
suffer unduly from a decline in Hungarian GDP because the
company's profits derive predominantly from the agricultural
industry's need for fertilizers, gas prices, and the
supply/demand balance, all of which S&P continues to see as
supportive in 2013 and 2014.

In S&P's opinion, demand from farmers for fertilizers will remain
strong because of high commodities prices, and because S&P
anticipates that the Hungarian government and the EU will
continue to support farmers and not increase taxes materially.

S&P anticipates that Nitrogenmuvek will maintain its dominance in
its domestic market (74% market share in 2012).  Additionally,
S&P considers that the company could mitigate any drop in
fertilizer demand in Hungary, largely by redirecting sales to
neighboring countries.  S&P understands that there are currently
no restrictions on exports in Nitrogenmuvek's key markets within
the EU (including Germany and Austria) and our base case assumes
this will remain the case.

S&P anticipates that the company will continue to manage its
financial policies in a conservative manner.  This includes
keeping at least Hungarian forint (HUF) 10 billion of cash on the
balance sheet to cover funding requirements during the off-peak
seasons.  S&P understands that the company is committed to
maintaining strong credit metrics and that it will adjust its
acquisition and dividend policy accordingly.

In S&P's view, Nitrogenmuvek's operational performance will
remain robust and its credit metrics strong for the rating in
2013 and 2014, based on sustained demand for fertilizer products,
high selling prices, and a favorable industry supply/demand
balance. Assuming moderate financial policies, S&P anticipates
that free operating cash flow will remain positive in 2013, but
could turn modestly negative in 2014 if capex is at the higher
end of our forecast ranges.

Downward rating pressure could arise if S&P foresees that prices
or the supply/demand balance deteriorate, if material operational
issues arise, if energy or selling prices deviate significantly
from our base case, or if currency risk becomes more pronounced.
If S&P lowered its sovereign ratings on Hungary, it would assess
whether Nitrogenmuvek was able to mitigate the resulting
pressure.

S&P views the possibility of an upgrade as remote in view of
Nitrogenmuvek's asset concentration; the cyclical, capital-
intensive nature of the fertilizer industry; and currency and
sovereign-related risks.



=============
I R E L A N D
=============


IRISH BANK: Liquidator Hires UBS & PwC to Value Loan Books
----------------------------------------------------------
Finbarr Flynn at Bloomberg News, citing the Sunday Business Post,
reports that UBS and PricewaterhouseCoopers have been hired by
the liquidator of IBRC, formerly Anglo Irish Bank, to value loan
books, assets, and trading businesses before disposal of EUR16
billion portfolio.

The two firms have already been working on process for weeks,
Bloomberg says.

According to Bloomberg, special liquidator Kieran Wallace told
the Sunday Business Post shortly after appointment that he didn't
expect major writedowns.

Anglo Irish Bank was an Irish bank headquartered in Dublin from
1964 to 2011.  It went into wind-down mode after nationalization
in 2009.  In July 2011, Anglo Irish merged with the Irish
Nationwide Building Society, with the new company being named the
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation.

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Irish Bank
Resolution Corp. Ltd. (IBRC) to 'D/D' from 'B-/C'.   S&P also
lowered the senior unsecured ratings to 'D' from 'B-'.  S&P then
withdrew the counterparty credit ratings, the senior unsecured
ratings, and the preferred stock ratings on IBRC.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BBB+' issue rating on three government-
guaranteed debt issues.

The rating actions follow the Feb. 6, 2013, announcement that the
Irish government has liquidated IBRC.


IRISH BANK: Creditors Set to Take Legal Action Over Losses
----------------------------------------------------------
International Financing Review reports that creditors are gearing
up to sue the Irish government over allegations that Dublin
unlawfully wiped out about EUR1.8 billion of Irish Bank
Resolution Corporation bonds when it liquidated the entity last
month, in a deal that saved the taxpayer hundreds of millions of
euros in interest costs.

IFR relates that some creditors have already sought legal advice,
but had delayed any action as they waited for IBRC to appeal
against a judgment granted to hedge fund Assenagon Credit
Management that declared unlawful "exit consent" measures used in
the November 2010 restructuring of Anglo-Irish Bank, a
predecessor to IBRC.

Assenagon, which is now known as XAIA Investment, was forced to
tender its EUR17 million of subordinated bonds for just EUR170.
However, IBRC's special liquidators KPMG has decided not to
appeal against the judgment, the report says.

Lawyers believe the move could now open the floodgates for
litigation from IBRC subordinated bondholders, relates IFR.

"I have been approached by creditors looking at what legal
avenues are available for them in the IBRC case," the report
quotes one London-based lawyer as saying. "We will likely see
bondholders looking to challenge the exit consent and the
legality of the liquidation."

IFR relates that lawyers with knowledge of the situation said
XAIA is among those considering bringing a new claim against the
Irish state questioning the legality of the liquidation.

Anglo Irish Bank was an Irish bank headquartered in Dublin from
1964 to 2011.  It went into wind-down mode after nationalization
in 2009.  In July 2011, Anglo Irish merged with the Irish
Nationwide Building Society, with the new company being named the
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation.

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Irish Bank
Resolution Corp. Ltd. (IBRC) to 'D/D' from 'B-/C'.   S&P also
lowered the senior unsecured ratings to 'D' from 'B-'.  S&P then
withdrew the counterparty credit ratings, the senior unsecured
ratings, and the preferred stock ratings on IBRC.  At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'BBB+' issue rating on three government-
guaranteed debt issues.

The rating actions follow the Feb. 6, 2013, announcement that the
Irish government has liquidated IBRC.


OAK HILL II: Deutsche Bank Deal No Impact on Moody's 'Ba2' Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service reports that the ratings of the notes
issued by Oak Hill European Credit Partners II p.l.c. will not be
affected by entering into a new Currency Hedge Agreement Form
with Deutsche Bank.

Moody's has determined that the proposed action of the Bank, if
implemented, will not, in and of itself and at this time, result
in a downgrade or withdrawal of the current ratings of the Notes.

Moody's opinion addresses only the credit impact of the Proposal
and Moody's is not expressing any opinion as to whether the
Proposal has, or could have other, non-credit related effects
that may have a detrimental impact on the interests of note
holders and/or counterparties.

Moody's has assessed the Proposal, which consists of the Issuer
and the Bank agreeing various amendments to the ISDA Master
Agreement Schedule and Credit Support Annex forms related to the
currency hedge agreement to be used in the transaction in order
to hedge certain assets not denominated in Euro.

Moody's Rates Oak Hill's Class E Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2023 at Ba2.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's noted that on July  2, 2012, it released a Request for
Comment, in which the rating agency has requested market feedback
on potential changes to its rating implementation guidance for
assessing linkage to swap counterparties in structured finance
cash-flow transactions. If the revised rating implementation
guidance is implemented as proposed, the rating on the Notes may
be negatively affected.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA MONTE: Accuses Two Banks of Colluding with Ex-Managers
------------------------------------------------------------
Elisa Martinuzzi at Bloomberg News reports that Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena SpA alleged Nomura Holdings Inc. and Deutsche
Bank AG colluded with former managers to devise two derivatives
that hid losses and earned them at least EUR180 million (US$231
million).

According to Bloomberg, Monte Paschi said in a 74-page report to
shareholders that the two firms were aware the lender's then
managers wanted to hide losses and designed with them two
derivatives aimed at achieving that goal.  Monte Paschi, which
last month filed a lawsuit seeking damages from the two lenders
and former executives Antonio Vigni and Giuseppe Mussari, said it
will seek compensation if a court finds the behavior of Deutsche
Bank and Nomura employees to be criminal, Bloomberg relates.

Monte Paschi, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the lender hid as
much as EUR557 million of losses from previous years through the
two transactions in 2008 and 2009.  Deutsche Bank earned at least
EUR92 million from Santorini, while Nomura reaped at least EUR88
million from its transaction, dubbed Alexandria, Bloomberg
discloses.

Those deals "should never have been put together," the Siena,
Italy-based lender, as cited by Bloomberg, said in a report
released on March 29, Bloomberg notes.  According to Bloomberg,
Monte Paschi said that Nomura and Deutsche Bank "were perfectly
aware of the context, the illicit objectives" of the lender's
former executives.

Monte Paschi said that as part of the transactions, the lender
made money-losing bets on the value of Italian government bonds
which have forced the bank to post additional collateral that has
cost EUR173 million, Bloomberg relates.

Monte Paschi, Bloomberg says, is seeking EUR500 million of
compensation from Deutsche Bank, Germany's biggest bank, and
EUR700 million from Nomura.  The document shows that the lender
calculated Nomura's and Deutsche Bank's so-called hidden charges
on the deals as the difference between fair value of the new
deals at inception and the value of the original loss, Bloomberg
notes.

                             Net Loss

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on April 2,
2013, Bloomberg News related that Monte Paschi reported a third
straight quarterly loss, missing analysts estimates, on soaring
bad-loan provisions and lower income from lending.  The Siena-
based lender said in a statement on March 28 that the net loss of
EUR1.59 billion (US$2 billion) in the fourth quarter compared
with a loss of EUR5 billion a year earlier, when the bank wrote
down goodwill related to acquisitions, Bloomberg disclosed.  That
missed the EUR686.3 million loss estimated by 11 analysts
surveyed by Bloomberg.  Monte Paschi, engulfed by investigations
of its former managers, is selling assets, cutting costs and
reducing risks to return to profit, Bloomberg said.  Chief
Executive Officer Fabrizio Viola and Chairman Alessandro Profumo,
appointed last year to turn around the 541-year-old bank, are
trying to regain confidence of investors after the lender was
forced to seek a second state rescue in four years and to take a
EUR730 million hit linked to derivative contracts, Bloomberg
noted.

Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector.  It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts.  In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services.  The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution.  Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa.  It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 4,
2013, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
long-term counterparty credit rating on Italy-based Banca Monte
dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) to 'BB' from 'BB+'. S&P also
lowered its rating on MPS' Lower Tier 2 subordinated notes to
'CCC+' from 'B-'.  These ratings remain on CreditWatch, where S&P
originally placed them with negative implications on Dec. 5,
2012.  S&P lowered the ratings on MPS' junior subordinated debt
to 'CCC' from 'CCC+' and on its preferred stock to 'CCC-' from
'CCC'.  S&P also placed these ratings on CreditWatch with
negative implications.  S&P affirmed its 'B' short-term
counterparty credit rating on the bank.  The downgrade follows
MPS' recent announcement related to the investigation of
potential losses on three structured transactions.


BANCA POPOLARE: Italian Investors Mull EUR102MM Capital Increase
----------------------------------------------------------------
Silvia Aloisi at Reuters reports that a group of Italian
investors is ready to stump up over EUR100 million to take
control of Banca Popolare di Spoleto, which was put under special
administration this year.

According to Reuters, the Clitumnus group of investors said on
April 2 it would underwrite a capital increase of up to EUR102
million.

Clitumnus offered in January to buy a 51% stake for EUR2.10
per share, Reuters recounts.  That offer was rejected as
inadequate by the bank's main shareholder, cooperative group
Spoleto Crediti e Servizi, Reuters notes.

Less than two weeks later Italian authorities appointed special
administrators to run the bank, which has a market capitalization
of EUR53 million (US$68 million), at the request of the Bank of
Italy, Reuters relates.

Clitumnus, as cited by Reuters, said it was open to other
investors taking part in the capital raising.

Banca Popolare di Spoleto is a small cooperative lender based in
Italy.

                          *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 20,
2013, Moody's Investors Service downgraded Banca Popolare di
Spoleto's (BP Spoleto) long-term deposit rating to Caa2 from B3;
at the same time, the bank's standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) of E was remapped to a standalone baseline credit
assessment (BCA) of ca from caa2.  The Caa2 deposit rating
remains on review with direction uncertain, while the E BFSR now
carries a stable outlook.


SILENUS LTD: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'Ca'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service downgraded the following classes of
Notes issued by Silenus (European Loan Conduit No. 25) Limited
(ELoC 25) (amounts reflect initial outstanding):

EUR1035M Class A, Downgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Feb 25,
2011 Downgraded to Aa3 (sf)

EUR60M Class B, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Feb 25,
2011 Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

EUR63M Class C, Downgraded to Caa1 (sf); previously on Feb 25,
2011 Downgraded to B2 (sf)

EUR46M Class D, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Feb 25, 2011
Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)

EUR0.05M Class X, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Aug 22,
2012 Downgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Moody's does not rate the Class E, Class F or Class G Notes
issued by ELoC 25.

Ratings Rationale:

The rating downgrade of the Class A, B, C, D and X Notes reflect
(i) Moody's re-assessment of the refinancing risk of the loans
and (ii) a review of the expected recoveries from the properties
backing the loans in the pool. Based on Moody's updated
assessment, the loss expectation for the pool has increased
materially since the last review. In addition, the Class A rating
reflects the sovereign risk due to the Italian loan exposure.

The key parameters in Moody's analysis are the default
probability of the securitized loans (both during the term and at
maturity) as well as Moody's value assessment for the properties
securing these loans. Moody's derives from those parameters a
loss expectation for the securitized pool.

Several loans are currently facing problems. Four out of the
eight loans remaining failed to repay at maturity and are in
special servicing. Other loans are still performing but while
they present a low term risk, they could be exposed to losses at
refinancing due to a failure to refinance and/or a decrease in
the value of the assets backing these loans.

The overall transaction leverage has increased from 68% in
February 2011 to 76% currently on a whole loan underwritten
basis, mainly due to the repayment of loans with below average
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. As the majority of the valuations
have not been updated since 2006, the underwritten (UW) LTV
ratios are not representative of the actual leverage of the
portfolio. The Moody's whole loan LTV at the portfolio level is
significantly higher at 112%. This reflects the significant value
decreases observed in the market for asset types included in the
transaction, such as secondary retail assets, non-prime offices,
or non-standard asset types such as leisure. The large proportion
of assets in Italy, currently 41% of the securitized loan
balance, is also a negative factor from a valuation perspective
given the lack of financing currently being observed in the
peripheral countries of the Euro area.

On the positive side, the loans exhibit good coverage ratios and
are able to service the debt even upon a failure to refinance at
maturity and during the work-out process. Given the relatively
long legal final maturity of the Notes in 2019, there is some
time to extend, restructure, and work-out the loans facing
difficulties and possibly benefit from a recovery in asset prices
and market sentiment.

In general, Moody's analysis reflects a forward-looking view of
the likely range of commercial real estate collateral performance
over the medium term. From time to time, Moody's may, if
warranted, change these expectations. Performance that falls
outside an acceptable range of the key parameters such as
property value or loan refinancing probability for instance, may
indicate that the collateral's credit quality is stronger or
weaker than Moody's had anticipated when the related securities
ratings were issued. Even so, a deviation from the expected range
will not necessarily result in a rating action nor does
performance within expectations preclude such actions. There may
be mitigating or offsetting factors to an improvement or decline
in collateral performance, such as increased subordination levels
due to amortization and loan re- prepayments or a decline in
subordination due to realized losses.

Primary sources of assumption uncertainty are the current
stressed macro-economic environment and continued weakness in the
occupational and lending markets. Moody's anticipates (i) lending
will remain constrained over the next years, while subject to
strict underwriting criteria and heavily dependent on the
underlying property quality, (ii) strong differentiation between
prime and secondary properties, with further value declines
expected for non-prime properties, and (iii) occupational markets
will remain under pressure in the short term and will only slowly
recover in the medium term in line with anticipated economic
recovery. Overall, Moody's central global macroeconomic scenario
for the world's largest economies is for only a gradual
strengthening in growth over the coming two years. Fiscal
consolidation and volatility in financial markets will continue
to weigh on business and consumer confidence, while heightened
uncertainty hampers spending, hiring and investment decisions. In
2013, Moody's expects no growth in the Euro area and only slow
growth in the UK.

Moody's Portfolio Analysis

ELoC 25 is a securitization of currently eight loans secured by
123 commercial properties located in Germany (49%), Italy (41%)
and France (10%). The properties comprise offices (42%), retail
(48%), and mixed and leisure assets (10%).

Moody's uses a variation of the Herfindahl Index to measure
diversity of loan size, where a higher number represents greater
diversity. Large multi-borrower transactions typically have a
Herf of less than 10 with an average of around 5. This pool has a
Herf of 5.0, compared to 9.0 at closing.

Nine of the initially 17 loans have repaid since closing with no
losses recorded to date. As of the February 2013 interest payment
date, the total loan balance has decreased by 55% since closing
to EUR551.9 million. The proportion of offices has significantly
decreased whereas the retail exposure is now higher. In terms of
geographical distribution, the French exposure has decreased and
the Italian exposure has increased on a relative basis. The
overall performance of the portfolio has been deteriorating over
time. Four loans are in special servicing due to a failure to
repay at maturity and one loan is on the servicer's watchlist due
to a pending loan maturity and an increased vacancy.

The largest loan in the pool, Eurocastle Retail D-Portfolio (27%
of the securitized pool), is secured by a portfolio of 63 mainly
medium sized, secondary quality retail properties located across
Germany. The WA remaining lease term is 3.7 years, slightly
longer than the remaining loan term and the current passing rent
is approximately EUR15 million. The loan exhibits good coverage
ratios and a low vacancy. The loan maturity is in 2016, providing
some time before refinancing. However there are concerns about
the value of the properties. The portfolio has not been re-valued
since closing and gives a currently reported UW LTV of 77% based
on a 2006 valuation. Given the nature of the properties and the
value decreases observed in the market, Moody's expects
significant losses for this loan in the absence of a strong price
recovery before loan maturity in 2016. Moody's whole loan LTV is
123%.

The second largest loan in the pool, Orazio (26% of the
securitized pool) is secured by a portfolio of office and retail
properties in Italy. The loan failed to repay at its maturity
date in November 2012 and is currently in special servicing. The
loan is also in breach of the LTV covenant and the borrower has
been put into liquidation. The assets are currently being
marketed for sale with an external sales agent being appointed,
but the timing for the sale is difficult to predict. The quality
of the underlying properties is very diverse. The portfolio
contains three office properties in Milan, Rome and Naples of on
average good to very good quality. In contrast, the portfolio of
44 secondary quality retail properties located in Northern Italy
is much weaker. Moody's expects a significant value decline for
the retail portfolio which will in turn likely produce losses for
the loan. Moody's whole loan LTV is 127%.

The cash flows are stable with a low vacancy, good coverage
ratios and a weighted average lease term of around two years.
Moody's therefore expects that the interest due is paid during
the work-out process.

The third largest loan in the pool, Tishman Munich Elisenhof (19%
of the securitized pool) is secured by a mixed use property
located in the center of Munich in Germany. Around three quarters
of the space are occupied by offices while the remaining areas
are used as retail. The loan is performing. The UW whole loan LTV
is high at 92% based on a property valuation as of 2010. This is
mitigated by the quality of the sponsor and the perceived quality
of the asset, which should enable to refinance the loan in
February 2014. The building is currently being partly refurbished
in an attempt by the sponsor to reposition the asset and seek
rental increase. The current vacancy rate is 7% and the current
whole loan ICR is 115%. The weighted average lease length is
around 3.6 years, providing some stability in rental cash flows.
Moody's whole loan LTV is 111% and Moody's securitized loan LTV
is 96%.

The fourth largest loan in the pool is Antony Parc (10% of the
securitized pool), a loan backed by an office building located in
the south of Paris. The loan is performing and presents very high
coverage ratios. However there is a high refinancing risk as the
loan is due to be refinanced in less than six months, and the
main tenant contributing for more than half of the total rental
income has left the building recently. The current rental income
still allows servicing the debt even after the departure of the
main tenant. The UW LTV is high at 71% and is based on a
valuation made in 2006. Moody's whole loan LTV is 125%.

The fifth largest loan in the pool, Metropolis (8% of the
securitized pool) is secured by a shopping center located in
Calabria in Southern Italy. The loan is currently in special
servicing after a failure to repay at the maturity date in
February 2013. The location of the asset is a negative factor
with regards to refinancing as most of the financing providers
are concentrating their activity in core locations. The asset in
itself however is performing well, fully occupied, a good lease
profile and a high ICR ratio. The sponsor is also considered to
be of good quality. A potential sale, restructuring, or work-out
process will take time but the strong cash flows and the limited
leverage with an UW LTV of 53% based on a 2006 valuation should
avoid losses for this loan. Moody's whole loan LTV is 81%.

The sixth largest loan in the pool, Nextra (7% of the securitized
pool) is secured by a diversified pool of assets in Italy
comprising three office properties in Milan, one out-of-town
hypermarket in Northern Italy and a resort in Sardinia. The
properties are of average to good quality. The tenant of the
leisure asset, the value of which represents approximately 30% of
the total asset value, is in administration but continues to pay
the rent. The maturity of the loan has been extended to 2016. The
loan has been significantly amortized since closing following the
sale of one asset in 2008. The current UW LTV is 40%. Moody's
whole loan LTV is 78%. The cash flows generated by the properties
remain however sufficient to service the debt. Given the
additional time to maturity, the presence of good quality
properties in the portfolio and the conservative leverage,
Moody's does not expect losses for this loan.

The two remaining loans, Aprirose Retail Bonndorf and Aprirose
Munich Thun, failed to repay at maturity in 2011 and are both in
special servicing. Both loans are secured by retail assets in
Germany. The work-out process is already at an advanced stage,
some properties have been sold and more sales are expected. The
currently reported UW combined LTV ratio of 72% based on the 2006
valuations compares to a Moody's combined LTV ratio of 130%.
Moody's expects losses for these loans. However, the combined
outstanding loan amount is relatively small and constitutes 3.5%
of the pool.

Moody's expects a significant amount of losses on the securitized
portfolio, stemming mainly from the expected property value
declines on part of the assets and the refinancing difficulties
faced by a substantial part of the loans. The increased expected
loss is reflected in the rating action.

Rating Methodology

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio
Analysis (MoRE Portfolio) published in April 2006. The
methodology used in rating Class X was Moody's Approach to Rating
Structured Finance Interest-Only Securities published in February
2012.

Other factors used in this rating are described in European CMBS:
2013 Central Scenarios published in February 2013.

The updated assessment is a result of Moody's on-going
surveillance of commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS)
transactions. Moody's prior assessment is summarized in a press
release dated February 25, 2011. The last Performance Overview
for this transaction was published on March 25, 2013.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used both MoRE Portfolio and
MoRE Cash Flow to model the cash-flows and determine the loss for
each tranche. MoRE Portfolio evaluates a loss distribution by
simulating the defaults and recoveries of the underlying
portfolio of loans using a Monte Carlo simulation. This portfolio
loss distribution, in conjunction with the loss timing calculated
in MoRE Portfolio is then used in MoRE Cash Flow, where for each
loss scenario on the assets, the corresponding loss for each
class of notes is calculated taking into account the structural
features of the notes. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's ratings are determined by a committee process that
considers both quantitative and qualitative factors. Therefore,
the rating outcome may differ from the model output.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


EDC FINANCE: Fitch Rates USD-Denominated Notes 'BB(EXP)'
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned EDC Finance Limited's USD-denominated
guaranteed notes an expected foreign currency senior unsecured
'BB(EXP)' rating. The final rating is contingent upon the receipt
of final documentation conforming materially to information
already received and details regarding the amount and tenor.

EDC Finance Limited is EDC's wholly-owned subsidiary domiciled in
Ireland. The notes are guaranteed by EDC, as well as its two
largest operating subsidiaries, OOO Burovoya Kompaniya Eurasia
and OOO SGK-Burenie, together accounting for more than 80% of
EDC's consolidated revenue and EBITDA in 2012.

EDC's ratings reflect the company's position as the largest
oilfield drilling company in Russia with a strong operational and
financial profile. Fitch believes that EDC will continue to
benefit from a favorable business environment as high oil prices
enable Russian oil companies to finance their upstream capex
budgets. High customer concentration and low geographical
diversification beyond Russia limit the company's ratings.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

- Russia's Largest Drilling Company

EDC is the largest drilling company in Russia with a market share
of about 29% in 2012 (by meters drilled, excluding offshore
drilling). The company operates mostly in Western Siberia, Volga-
Urals, Timan Pechora and Eastern Siberia regions and is
predominantly involved in onshore drilling, although it has begun
to diversify geographically and stepped up offshore drilling
operations. Nonetheless, the company's operational scale remains
limited compared to that of larger, global oilfield services
companies, such as Halliburton Company ('A-'/Stable) and Nabors
Industries Inc. ('BBB'/Stable).

- Strong 2012 Performance

In 2012 EDC's drilling volumes increased to 6.1m meters, up 27%
year-on-year, following consolidation in 2011 of Russia-based
assets of Schlumberger and due to continued organic growth. EDC's
consolidated revenue increased in 2012 to US$3,237 million, up
17% yoy. The company has a relatively modern rig fleet, which
distinguishes it from other Russian drillers. At end-2012, EDC
operated 257 land drilling and sidetracking rigs, 413 workover
rigs, and two jack-up rigs intended for offshore drilling.

- Caspian Offshore Drilling Intensifies

EDC's steps to diversify its operations mainly include the
development of its second business segment, offshore drilling on
the Caspian Sea. At end-2012, EDC operated two jack-up rigs in
the region intended for offshore drilling, and two more are under
construction. Their commissioning in 2013 and 2014 will
strengthen the company's position in this region, the importance
of which in terms of oil exploration is growing. In 2012,
offshore drilling segment accounted for 5% and 15% of the
company's consolidated revenue and net income, respectively.

- Stable Industry Outlook

Fitch believes that the business environment will remain
favorable for EDC, as Russian oil majors will maintain high
upstream capex aimed at arresting production decline at Western
Siberian brownfields and developing greenfield sites. Based on
Fitch's price deck for Brent of US$100/bbl in 2013 and US$92/bbl
in 2014, the agency forecasts that companies will carry on with
their ambitious upstream capex budgets. On the other hand,
prolonged period of low oil prices might have a negative impact
on the EDC's drilling volumes and profit margins.

- High Dependence on LUKOIL

OAO LUKOIL ('BBB-'/Stable), Russia's largest private oil company,
remains EDC's top customer accounting for 57% of onshore drilling
volumes and 63% of total revenues in 2012. Fitch acknowledges the
long-term relations between EDC and LUKOIL as beneficial but
notes that the high customer concentration remains a key rating
constraint. Fitch expects that EDC's dependence on LUKOIL may
decrease over time as EDC makes attempts to diversify its
customer base, but this is unlikely to happen in the short to
medium term.

- Leverage to Remain Moderate

Fitch expects that EDC will maintain a conservative financial
policy, and that its funds from operations (FFO) adjusted gross
leverage will remain under 1.5x in 2013-2016, which is
commensurate with the current ratings.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Fitch would view positively stable revenue growth,
improved geographical diversification, and lower share of
revenues coming from LUKOIL.

Negative: Fitch would consider a negative rating action if the
company's FFO adjusted gross leverage rises above 2.0x and FFO
interest coverage falls below 8x on a sustained basis, as a
result of higher dividends, capex, or lower operating profits.

DEBT AND LIQUIDITY

- Comfortable Debt; Sufficient Liquidity

At end-2012 EDC had total debt of US$700 million. Its short-term
debt of US$258 million was well covered by cash and cash
equivalents of US$305 million. Fitch believes that EDC will be
able to refinance or repay its obligations when they are due from
its cash flows from operations.

- Limited Exposure to Cyprus

EDC has intermediate holding companies domiciled in Cyprus but no
significant operations in that country. The company has informed
Fitch that these entities typically do not have significant cash
balances in Cyprus. As of April 3, EDC had about US$25 million at
its accounts with a branch of Barclays Bank Plc in Cyprus which
is not accessible at the moment, but which EDC expects to
transfer within several weeks. The company's oil drilling in
Russia is unaffected by events in Cyprus. Fitch does not expect
an impact on EDC's ratings even if this amount proves to be
inaccessible to the company for a longer period.

- Manageable FX Risks

After the Eurobond issue, around half of EDC's debt portfolio
will be USD-denominated. The company expects that its net USD-
denominated operating cash flow generated by the offshore
drilling segment will be sufficient to cover its USD-denominated
debt servicing, including interest and principal. Hence, Fitch
assesses the company's currency mismatch risk as manageable.

Full List of Ratings

Eurasia Drilling Company Limited

Long-Term IDR: 'BB', Outlook Stable

Short-Term IDR: 'B'

Long-Term local currency IDR: 'BB', Outlook Stable

Short-Term local currency IDR: 'B'

National Long-Term Rating: 'AA-(rus)', Outlook Stable

Senior unsecured rating: 'BB'

National senior unsecured rating: 'AA-(rus)'

OOO Burovaya Kompaniya Eurasia

Senior unsecured rating: 'BB'

EDC Finance Limited

Senior unsecured rating: 'BB(EXP)'


MOSCOW INTEGRATED: Fitch Puts 'BB+' IDRs on RWN on Privatization
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed OJSC Moscow Integrated Power Company's
Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR)
of 'BB+' and National Long-term rating of 'AA(rus)' on Rating
Watch Negative (RWN) following the City of Moscow's recent
announcement about the planned privatization of its majority
stake in the company. A full list of rating actions is at the end
of this release.

The City of Moscow recently decided to tender its approximately
89% stake in MIPC and property that MIPC uses under lease
agreement. An auction is planned to be announced at the end of
April 2013 or beginning of May 2013. The decision about the sale
of the stake in MIPC was made with the view of engaging new
owners, as the company is currently loss-making. After the
planned sale, the City of Moscow will continue to control MIPC's
tariff policy.

If completed, the proposed privatization would decrease the City
of Moscow's shareholding in MIPC to zero. Consequently, following
the disposal, Fitch would re-consider incorporating the City of
Moscow's support into MIPC's ratings under Fitch's Parent-
Subsidiary Rating Linkage methodology. This would depend on the
ties with the City of Moscow, if any, following the planned
disposal, for instance related to subsidies. Fitch assesses
MIPC's standalone creditworthiness in the low 'BB' or high 'B'
rating category.

Fitch will also assess the new shareholding structure in place.
If there is a new majority shareholder of MIPC, the company's
ratings may be impacted by the relative credit strength of MIPC's
new parent and the parent-subsidiary arrangements put in place
(including the effect of possible acquisition funding).

KEY RATING DRIVERS

- Significant Shareholder Support

MIPC's ratings are currently notched down by two levels from
those of the City of Moscow ('BBB'/Stable/'F3'), its majority
shareholder, and reflect their strong operational and strategic
ties. Fitch will review the support from the City of Moscow once
MIPC is privatized with its ratings likely converging towards its
standalone profile unless the support from the new potential
shareholder(s) is deemed by Fitch to be material and is
incorporated into the ratings.

- Supportive Subsidies

In 2012, MIPC continued to receive large subsidies from Moscow to
cover the uneconomic residential utility tariff. The subsidies
amounted to RUB16.1 billion in 2012 and for 2013 the company
expects to receive about RUB14.6 billion. Fitch forecasts that
over time the subsidies will decrease as Moscow probably switches
to a more targeted subsidization of households by category.

- Stable Sector Outlook

Fitch does not expect significant power volume growth in 2013,
and power and heat price increases in the medium term are likely
to fall below the expected 15% annual price increase for natural
gas. The maximum heat tariff growth for the City of Moscow for
2013 was approved at 2.7%, starting from July 1.

- Higher Debt
At end-2011, MIPC had unadjusted debt of RUB21.7 billion, up from
RUB9.9 billion at end-2010. Higher leverage is mainly the result
of the replacement of outstanding trade accounts payable to OJSC
Mosenergo for loans from Sberbank of Russia (Sberbank,
'BBB'/Stable) in 2011-2012.

- Significant Capex Programme

MIPC estimates its total capex needs at about RUB12 billion
annually over 2012-2014, to be spent mainly on the reconstruction
of the heat supply network and on equipment, rather than on
capacity expansion. Despite significant capex, Fitch expects that
MIPC will maintain funds from operations (FFO) adjusted leverage
at under 2x, and FFO interest coverage of above 10x in 2012-2015.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Positive: Future developments that could lead to positive rating
actions include:

- An economic residential heat tariff and profitable operations
would be positive for the ratings. However, Fitch does not expect
this to happen in the medium term.

Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:

- The ratings may be affected by the relative credit strength of
the new parent and the parent-subsidiary arrangements put in
place (including the effect of possible acquisition funding).

- A reduction of subsidies and/or other forms of tangible support
from the City of Moscow following the privatization would be
negative for the ratings.

LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE

- Manageable Liquidity

At end-H112 MIPC had RUB2.9 billion of short-term borrowings and
RUB227 million in short-term finance lease obligations, compared
with RUB4.2 billion of cash in hand and RUB1.1 billion of unused
credit facilities (as of May 4, 2012). In 2011-2012, MIPC rolled
over its short-term bank loans and concluded long-term loan
agreements with Sberbank that mature in 2013-2014. Fitch expects
MIPC's free cash flow to remain negative in 2012.

FULL LIST OF RATING ACTIONS

Long-term foreign currency IDR of 'BB+' placed on RWN
Long-term local currency IDR of 'BB+' placed on RWN
National Long-term rating of 'AA(rus)' placed on RWN
Short-term foreign currency IDR; affirmed at 'B'
National Short-term rating of 'F1+(rus)' placed on RWN
Local currency senior unsecured rating of 'BB+' placed on RWN
National senior unsecured rating of 'AA(rus)' placed on RWN


RUSSIAN STANDARD: Fitch Assigns 'B+' Rating to RUB3BB Bond Issues
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned JSC Russian Standard Bank's two RUB3
billion senior unsecured fixed-rate exchange bond issues (BO-03
and BO-4 series), with a final maturity in February 2016, Long-
term ratings of 'B+'. The notes have Recovery Ratings of 'RR4'.

RSB has Long-term foreign and local Currency Issuer Default
Ratings (IDR) of 'B+' with a Stable Outlook, a National Long-term
Rating of 'A-(rus)' with a Stable Outlook, a Short-term foreign
currency IDR of 'B', a Viability Rating of 'b+', a Support Rating
of '5', and a Support Rating Floor at 'No Floor'.

For the most recent update on RSB see "Fitch Upgrades Two and
Affirms Three Russian Consumer Finance Banks" dated March 21,
2013, which is available at www.fitchratings.com.

KEY RATING DRIVERS

The issues' ratings correspond to RSB's Long-term local currency
IDR ('B+'/Stable). The latter factors in RSB's broad retail
franchise, moderate level of credit losses, healthy profitability
and adequate liquidity profile. At the same time RSB's Long-term
local currency IDR remains constrained by weak capitalization and
risks relating to other shareholder assets.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

Downward pressure on RSB's Long-term IDRs, and consequently the
issues' ratings, could stem from (i) a further material increase
of contingent risks or weakening of capitalization as a result of
the ongoing shareholder acquisition; (ii) a significant liquidity
squeeze; or (iii) significant asset quality deterioration, driven
for example by a marked downturn of operating environment.

The gradual rebuilding of the bank's capitalization, along with
moderation of group risks could result in an upgrade of RSB's
Long-term IDRs and the issue ratings.

The debt ratings could also be downgraded in case of a further
marked increase in the proportion of retail deposits in the
bank's liabilities (62% of end-2012 liabilities), resulting in
greater subordination of bondholders. In accordance with Russian
legislation, retail depositors rank above those of other senior
unsecured creditors.



=========
S P A I N
=========


BANKINTER 2: S&P Affirms 'D(sf)' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on Bankinter 2 PYME, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos'
outstanding EUR223.06 million notes.

Specifically, S&P:

   -- lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings
      on the class A2 and B notes;

   -- Affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings
      on the class C and D notes; and

   -- Affirmed its rating on the class E notes.

The rating actions follow the application of S&P's updated
criteria for collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) backed by
small and midsize enterprises (SMEs), as well as its assessment
of the transaction's performance using the latest available
investor report and portfolio data from the servicer.

On Jan. 17, 2013, when S&P updated SME CLO criteria became
effective, it placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings on the
class A2, B, C, and D notes.

                          CREDIT ANALYSIS

S&P has applied its updated European SME CLO criteria to
determine the scenario default rates (SDRs) for this transaction.

S&P's qualitative originator assessment of Bankinter S.A.
(BB/Negative/B) is moderate as, even though it meets all
characteristics in table 3 of S&P's updated European SME CLO
criteria, the average annual observed default frequency is above
5%.  Taking into account Spain's Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment (BICRA) of 6, S&P has applied a downward adjustment of
one notch to the archetypal European SME average credit quality
assessment.  S&P further applied a portfolio selection adjustment
of minus one notch.  As a result, S&P's average credit quality
assessment of the portfolio is 'b-'.

S&P then used the originator's internal credit scores and its
average portfolio credit quality assessment as inputs to its
European SME Mapping Model, as well as CDO Evaluator, to
determine the portfolio's 'AAA' SDR, which is 67.44%.

S&P has reviewed historical originator default data, and assessed
market trends and developments, macroeconomic factors, changes in
country risk, and the way these factors are likely to affect the
loan portfolio's creditworthiness.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's 'B' SDR is 3.25%.

The SDRs for rating levels between 'B' and 'AAA' are interpolated
in accordance with S&P's European SME CLO criteria.

                       RECOVERY RATE ANALYSIS

At each liability rating level, S&P assumed a weighted-average
recovery rate (WARR) by taking into consideration observed
historical recoveries.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's WARR assumptions in 'A',
'BBB' and 'B' scenarios were 22.0%, 23.5%, and 30.0%,
respectively.

                        CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P subjected the capital structure to various cash flow
scenarios, incorporating different default patterns and interest
rate curves, to determine each tranche's passing rating level
under its European SME CLO criteria.

Even though the payment of the class B notes' interest and
principal ranks junior to the class A2 notes, its comparatively
smaller size allows it to achieve an 'A+ (sf)' rating under S&P's
credit and cash flow analysis.

                         COUNTERPARTY RISK

As swap counterparty, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A.
(BBB-/Negative/A-3), covers the basis risk.  S&P notes that
following its October 2012 downgrade, the swap counterparty did
not replace itself or find a guarantor, as is covenanted in the
transaction documents.  Therefore, when S&P conducted its
scenario analysis at ratings above 'BBB-', it analyzed the
transaction's cash flow without giving benefit to the
counterparty.

Bankinter 2 PYME is a cash flow CLO transaction, securitizing a
portfolio of SME loans that Bankinter originated in Spain.  The
transaction closed in June 2006.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

Bankinter 2 PYME, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR800 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2          A+ (sf)           AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B           A+ (sf)           AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

E           D (sf)

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

C           BBB (sf)          BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
D           B (sf)            B (sf)/Watch Neg


BANKINTER 3: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'CCC'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on Bankinter 3 FTPYME, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos'
outstanding EUR266.24 million notes.

Specifically, S&P:

   -- Lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings
      on the class A2, A3(G), B, C, and D notes; and

   -- Affirmed its rating on the class E notes.

The rating actions follows the application of S&P's updated
criteria for collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) backed by
small and midsize enterprises (SMEs), as well as its assessment
of the transaction's performance using the latest available
investor report and portfolio data from the servicer.

On Jan. 17, 2013, when S&P updated European SME CLO criteria
became effective, it placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings
on the class A2, A3(G), B, C, and D notes.

                          CREDIT ANALYSIS

S&P has applied its updated European SME CLO criteria to
determine the scenario default rates (SDRs) for this transaction.

S&P's qualitative originator assessment of Bankinter S.A.
(BB/Negative/B) is moderate as, even though it meets all of the
characteristics in table 3 of S&P's updated European SME CLO
criteria, as the average annual observed default frequency is
above 5%.  Taking into account Spain's Banking Industry Country
Risk Assessment (BICRA) of 6, S&P has applied a downward
adjustment of one notch to the archetypal European SME average
credit quality assessment.  S&P further applied a portfolio
selection adjustment of minus three notches.  As a result, S&P's
average credit quality assessment of the portfolio is 'ccc'.

S&P then used the originator's internal credit scores and its
average portfolio credit quality assessment as inputs to its
European SME Mapping Model, as well as CDO Evaluator, to
determine the portfolio's 'AAA' SDR, which is 77.14%.

S&P has reviewed historical originator default data, and assessed
market trends and developments, macroeconomic factors, changes in
country risk, and the way these factors are likely to affect the
loan portfolio's creditworthiness.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's 'B' SDR is 6.0%.

The SDRs for rating levels between 'B' and 'AAA' are interpolated
in accordance with S&P's European SME CLO criteria.

                      RECOVERY RATE ANALYSIS

At each liability rating level, S&P assumed a weighted-average
recovery rate (WARR) by taking into consideration observed
historical recoveries.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's WARR assumptions in 'A',
'BBB', 'BB', and 'CCC' scenarios were 22.0%, 23.5%, 28.5%, and
30.0%, respectively.

                        CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P subjected the capital structure to various cash flow
scenarios, incorporating different default patterns and interest
rate curves, to determine each tranche's passing rating level
under its European SME CLO criteria.

                         COUNTERPARTY RISK

As swap counterparty, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (BBB-
/Negative/A-3) covers the basis risk.  Since S&P downgraded the
swap counterparty on Oct. 10, 2012, it has not replaced itself or
found a guarantor, as covenanted in the transaction documents.
Therefore, when S&P conducted its scenario analysis at ratings
above 'BBB-', it analyzed the transaction's cash flow without
giving benefit to the counterparty.

Bankinter 3 FTPYME is a cash flow CLO transaction, securitizing a
portfolio of SME loans that Bankinter originated in Spain.  The
transaction closed in November 2007.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To               From

Bankinter 3 FTPYME, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR617.4 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2          A- (sf)          AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A3(G)       A- (sf)          AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B           BBB- (sf)        A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C           BB- (sf)         BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
D           CCC (sf)         B (sf)/Watch Neg

Rating Affirmed

E           D (sf)


CM BANCAJA 1: S&P Raises Rating on Class D Notes to 'B+'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on CM Bancaja 1, Fondo de
Titulizacion de Activos' class B, C, and D notes.  At the same
time, S&P has affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its
rating on the class A notes.

The rating actions follow the application of S&P's updated
criteria for European collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
backed by small and midsize enterprises (SMEs), as well as its
assessment of the transaction's performance using the latest
available investor report and portfolio data from the servicer.

On Jan. 17, 2013, when S&P updated European SME CLO criteria
became effective, S&P placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings
on the class A, B, C, and D notes.

                          CREDIT ANALYSIS

S&P has applied its updated European SME CLO criteria to
determine the scenario default rates (SDRs) for this transaction.

Because of the lack of data provided, S&P's qualitative
originator assessment is moderate.  Taking into account Spain's
Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment (BICRA) of 6 and a
moderate qualitative assessment, S&P has applied a downward
adjustment of one notch to the archetypal European SME average
credit quality assessment.

S&P further applied a portfolio selection adjustment of minus one
notch to take into account the good performance of this
portfolio. CM Bancaja 1 has performed relatively better than most
Spanish SME transactions that S&P rates, with a cumulative
default rate of 1.22% over the initial pool balance.  As a
result, S&P's average credit quality assessment of the portfolio
is 'b-'.

The originator did not provide S&P with internal credit scores,
therefore it assumed that each loan in the portfolio had a credit
quality that is equal to S&P's average credit quality assessment
of the portfolio.  S&P then used CDO Evaluator to determine the
portfolio's 'AAA' SDR, which is 77.30%.

S&P has reviewed historical originator default data, and assessed
market trends and developments, macroeconomic factors, changes in
country risk, and the way these factors are likely to affect the
loan portfolio's creditworthiness.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's 'B' SDR is 3.04%.

The SDRs for rating levels between 'B' and 'AAA' are interpolated
in accordance with our European SME CLO criteria.

                            COUNTRY RISK

Given that S&P's long-term rating on the Kingdom of Spain is
'BBB-', in accordance with S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria,
it has affirmed its 'AA-' rating on the class A notes.

The class A notes have deleveraged significantly since S&P's
previous review on July 14, 2011, with only 5% of the initial
outstanding amount remaining.  The available credit enhancement
for the class B has consequently increased.  S&P has therefore
raised to 'A (sf)' from 'BB (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch
negative its rating on the class B notes.

                       RECOVERY RATE ANALYSIS

At each liability rating level, S&P assumed a weighted-average
recovery rate (WARR) by taking into consideration the asset type,
its seniority, and the country recovery grouping.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's WARR assumptions in 'AA',
'A', 'BBB', and 'B' scenarios were 42%, 46%, 49%, and 63%,
respectively.

                        CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P subjected the capital structure to various cash flow
scenarios, incorporating different default patterns and interest
rate curves, to determine each tranche's passing rating level
under its European SME CLO criteria.

S&P observed that the portfolio contains a wide range of spread
levels.  S&P considers that there is a risk that, should defaults
affect the highest highest-paying loans more than others, the
pool's yield would tend to decrease over time.  This could limit
the transaction's ability to service the rated notes.  Therefore,
S&P has applied a yield compression stress in its cash flow
analysis.

                        SUPPLEMENTAL TESTS

Since closing, the available credit enhancement has increased for
all classes of notes due to the high deleveraging of the capital
structure, with only 13% of the rated liabilities remaining.
Nevertheless, this increase in credit enhancement has been
mitigated by the increase in borrower concentration risk.
Consequently, S&P's ratings on the class C and D notes were
constrained by the application of the largest obligor default
test.

With only 53 loans, CM Bancaja 1 has one of the highest borrower
concentrations of the Spanish SME CLO transactions that S&P
rates. The current outstanding balance of the pool has decreased
to 13% of the original balance, from 19% at S&P's previous review
on July 14, 2011.  The top 10 and top 20 largest loans represent
about 52% and 69%, respectively, of the portfolio--compared with
about 47% and 64%, respectively, at S&P's previous review.

Therefore, S&P has raised its ratings on the class C and D notes
to the maximum ratings achievable under the largest obligor test.
S&P has raised to 'BBB+ (sf)' from 'B+ (sf)' and removed from
CreditWatch negative its rating on the class C notes.  S&P has
raised to 'B+ (sf)' from 'B- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch
negative its rating on the class D notes.

CM Bancaja 1 is a cash flow CLO transaction securitizing a
portfolio of SME loans that Caja de Ahorros de Valencia,
Castellon y Alicante (Bancaja) originated in Spain.  The
transaction closed in September 2005.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

CM Bancaja 1, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR556.2 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A           AA- (sf)          AA-(sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

B           A (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Neg
C           BBB+ (sf)         B+ (sf)/Watch Neg
D           B+ (sf)           B- (sf)/Watch Neg


GC FTPYME 6: S&P Lowers Rating on Class C Notes to 'CCC-'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on GC FTPYME SABADELL 6,
Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class A3(G), B, and C notes.
At the same time, S&P has raised and removed from CreditWatch
negative its rating on the class A2 notes.

The rating actions follow the application of S&P's updated
criteria for European collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
backed by small and midsize enterprises (SMEs), the application
of S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria and nonsovereign ratings
criteria, as well as its assessment of the transaction's
performance using the latest available investor report and
portfolio data from the servicer.

On Jan. 17, 2013, when S&P updated European SME CLO criteria
became effective, it placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings
on the class A2, A3(G), B, and C notes.

                          CREDIT ANALYSIS

S&P has applied its updated European SME CLO criteria to
determine the scenario default rates (SDRs) for this transaction.

S&P's qualitative originator assessment is moderate because of
the lack of data provided by the originator, Banco de Sabadell
S.A. Taking into account Spain's Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment (BICRA) of 6, S&P has applied a one-notch downward
adjustment to the archetypical (or average) European SME average
credit quality assessment.  S&P further applied a portfolio
selection adjustment of minus three notches based on the
transaction's performance, which has recently deteriorated.  As a
result, S&P's average credit quality assessment of the portfolio
is 'ccc'.

The originator did not provide S&P with internal credit scores,
therefore it assumed that each loan in the portfolio had a credit
quality that is equal to its average credit quality assessment of
the portfolio.  S&P then used CDO Evaluator to determine the
portfolio's 'AAA' SDR, which is 84.61%.

S&P has reviewed historical originator default data, and has
assessed the effect of macroeconomic conditions and developments,
changes in country risk, and the way these factors are likely to
affect the loan portfolio's creditworthiness.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's 'B' SDR is 7%.

The SDRs for rating levels between 'B' and 'AAA' are interpolated
in line with S&P's European SME CLO criteria.

                      RECOVERY RATE ANALYSIS

At each liability rating level, taking into account the observed
historical recoveries, S&P assumed a weighted-average recovery
rate (WARR) by taking into consideration the asset type, its
seniority, and the country recovery grouping.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's WARR assumptions in 'A',
'BBB', and 'BB' scenarios were 36.40%, 39.04%, and 47.53%,
respectively.

                         CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P subjected the capital structure to various cash flow
scenarios, incorporating different default patterns and interest
rate curves, to determine each tranche's passing rating level
under S&P's European SME CLO criteria.  In addition, S&P did not
give benefit to the swap in its analysis.

                         SUPPLEMENTAL TESTS

The application of S&P's supplemental tests, in particular the
largest obligor default test, constrained its ratings on the
class B and C notes to 'B+ (sf)' and 'CCC- (sf)', respectively.
This was due to the notes' undercollateralization.

                         COUNTERPARTY RISK

As swap counterparty, Banco de Sabadell (BB/Negative/B) covers
basis risk and ensures a certain yield in the transaction.  S&P
has reviewed the swap counterparty's downgrade provisions in the
swap documentation, which comply with S&P's 2012 counterparty
criteria.  Nevertheless, under the documentation, the swap
counterparty is no longer eligible to remain in the transaction
and it has not taken the remedy actions covenanted in the
documents.  Therefore, when S&P conducted its scenario analysis
at ratings above 'BB', it analyzed the transaction's cash flow
without giving benefit to the swap counterparty.

GC FTPYME SABADELL 6 relies more on the swap's support than other
Spanish SME CLO transactions that S&P rates.  The issuer pays
interest to the swap.  In turn, the swap counterparty pays to the
issuer the weighted-average coupon of the notes plus a margin
over a notional amount which is the outstanding balance of the
notes. Given the pool factor (the percentage of the pool's
outstanding aggregate balance) of 23.86%, the transaction has
deleveraged considerably, which has subsequently increased the
level of available credit enhancement.  However, this increase
does not mitigate the lack of benefit S&P has given to the swap,
given the recent deteriorating credit quality of the assets.  As
of December 2012, the level of defaults over the outstanding
balance of the assets had increased to 9.03% from 6.83% in
December 2011.

                           COUNTRY RISK

Given that S&P's long-term rating on the Kingdom of Spain is
'BBB-', according to S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria, the
maximum rating the notes in this transaction can achieve is 'AA-
(sf)'. Therefore, S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria constrain
its rating on the class A2 notes at 'AA- (sf)'.

Based on the class A2 notes' considerable deleveraging, S&P has
raised to 'AA- (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' and removed from CreditWatch
negative its rating on the class A2 notes.  At the same time, S&P
has lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
the class A3(G), B, and C notes due to the application of its
updated European SME CLO criteria and the transaction's recent
deteriorating performance.

GC FTPYME SABADELL 6 is a cash flow CLO transaction that
securitizes a portfolio of SME loans that Banco de Sabadell
originated in Spain.  The transaction closed in June 2007.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                 Rating
              To                     From

GC FTPYME SABADELL 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1 Billion Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2            AA- (sf)               A- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A3(G)         BBB+ (sf)              A- (sf)/Watch Neg
B             B+ (sf)                BBB (sf)/Watch Neg
C             CCC- (sf)              B (sf)/Watch Neg


GC FTPYME 8: S&P Affirms 'BB(sf)' Rating on Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
GC FTPYME Sabadell 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos' class
A1(G), A2(G), and A3 notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed
and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on the class B
notes.

The rating actions follow the application of S&P's updated
criteria for European collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
backed by small and midsize enterprises (SMEs), the application
of S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria and its nonsovereign ratings
criteria, as well as its assessment of the transaction's
performance using the latest available investor report and
portfolio data from the servicer.

On Jan. 17, 2013, when S&P updated SME CLO criteria became
effective, it placed on CreditWatch negative its rating on the
class B notes.

                          CREDIT ANALYSIS

S&P has applied its updated European SME CLO criteria to
determine the scenario default rates (SDRs) for this transaction.

S&P's qualitative originator assessment is moderate because of
the lack of data provided by the originator, Banco de Sabadell
S.A. Taking into account Spain's Banking Industry Country Risk
Assessment (BICRA) of 6, S&P has applied a one-notch downward
adjustment to the archetypal European SME average credit quality
assessment.  S&P further applied a portfolio selection adjustment
of minus three notches based on the transaction's performance,
which has deteriorated in recent months.  As a result, S&P's
average credit quality assessment of the portfolio is 'ccc'.

The originator did not provide S&P with internal credit scores,
therefore it assumed that each loan in the portfolio had a credit
quality that is equal to its average credit quality assessment of
the portfolio.  S&P then used CDO Evaluator to determine the
portfolio's 'AAA' SDR, which is 86.05%.

S&P has reviewed historical originator default data, and assessed
market trends and developments, macroeconomic factors, changes in
country risk, and the way these factors are likely to affect the
loan portfolio's creditworthiness.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's 'B' SDR is 8%.

The SDRs for rating levels between 'B' and 'AAA' are interpolated
in line with S&P's European SME CLO criteria.

                       RECOVERY RATE ANALYSIS

At each liability rating level, taking into account the observed
historical recoveries, S&P assumed a weighted-average recovery
rate (WARR) by taking into consideration the asset type, its
seniority, and the country recovery grouping.

As a result of this analysis, S&P's WARR assumptions in 'A',
'BBB', and 'BB' scenarios were 36.24%, 39.24%, and 47.11%,
respectively.

                        CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

S&P subjected the capital structure to various cash flow
scenarios, incorporating different default patterns and interest
rate curves, to determine each tranche's passing rating level
under S&P's European SME CLO criteria.  In addition, S&P did not
give benefit to the swap in our analysis.

                        SUPPLEMENTAL TESTS

S&P's ratings on the class A1(G), A2(G), A3, and B notes were not
constrained by the application of the supplemental tests because
of the transaction's diversification in terms of obligor,
regional, and economic sector exposure.

                        COUNTERPARTY RISK

As swap counterparty, Banco de Sabadell (BB/Negative/B) covers
basis risk and ensures a certain yield in the transaction.  S&P
has reviewed the swap counterparty's downgrade provisions in the
swap documentation, which comply with its 2012 counterparty
criteria.  Nevertheless, under the documentation, the swap
counterparty is no longer eligible to remain in the transaction
and it has not taken the remedy actions covenanted in the
documents.  Therefore, when S&P conducted its scenario analysis
at ratings above 'BB', it analyzed the transaction's cash flow
without giving benefit to the swap agreement.

GC FTPYME SABADELL 8 relies more on the swap's support than other
Spanish SME CLO transactions that S&P rates.  The issuer pays all
the interest proceeds received to the swap provider.  In turn,
the swap counterparty pays to the issuer the weighted-average
coupon of the notes plus a margin over a notional amount, which
is the outstanding balance of the notes.  Given the pool factor
(the percentage of the pool's outstanding aggregate principal
balance) of 50.87%, the transaction has deleveraged considerably
since closing, which has subsequently increased the level of
available credit enhancement.  This increase in credit
enhancement--taking into account the collateral performing
balance, the reserve fund, and the lack of concentration risk in
the transaction--mitigates the lack of benefit S&P has given to
the swap agreement and the recent deterioration of the assets'
credit quality.

                            COUNTRY RISK

Given that S&P's long-term rating on the Kingdom of Spain is
'BBB-', according to its nonsovereign ratings criteria, the
maximum rating the notes in this transaction can achieve is 'AA-
(sf)'. Therefore, S&P's nonsovereign ratings criteria constrain
its ratings on the class A1(G) and A2(G) notes at 'AA- (sf)'.

Based on the transaction's considerable deleveraging, S&P has
raised to 'AA- (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' its ratings on the class
A1(G) and A2(G) notes and to 'A+ (sf)' from 'A- (sf)' its rating
on the class A3 notes.  At the same time, S&P has affirmed and
removed from CreditWatch negative its 'BB (sf)' rating on the
class B notes, due to the application of S&P's updated European
SME CLO criteria.

GC FTPYME Sabadell 8 is a cash flow CLO transaction that
securitizes a portfolio of SME loans that Banco de Sabadell
originated in Spain.  The transaction closed in September 2010.

          STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.  The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

            http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class              Rating
            To                From

GC FTPYME Sabadell 8, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos
EUR1 Billion Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A1(G)       AA- (sf)           A- (sf)
A2(G)       AA- (sf)           A- (sf)
A3          A+ (sf)            A- (sf)

Rating Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

B           BB (sf)            BB (sf)/Watch Neg


PESCANOVA SA: Files for Insolvency; In Dispute with Auditors
------------------------------------------------------------
Carlos Ruano and Tomas Cobos at Reuters report that Pescanova SA
is filing for insolvency after a month of boardroom battles ended
in stalemate and put the future of the debt-laden group at risk.

Sources told Reuters that negotiations with creditors are
deadlocked and the group is at odds with its auditors amid an
atmosphere of mistrust and management infighting.

According to Reuters, a source said that Thursday's day-long
board meeting ended early on Friday without agreement as
shareholders locked horns over the role of the company's chairman
and main owner, Manuel Fernandez, with many wanting him to step
down.

The group made a net profit of EUR25 million (US$32.13 million)
in the nine months to the end of September 2012, but has debts of
at least EUR1.5 billion after massive expansion, Reuters
discloses.  Financial sources put the borrowings at closer to
EUR2.8 billion, Reuters notes.

The company suspended its auditors, BDO, and has said it will
hire forensic auditors to examine its accounts after reporting
discrepancies in its books on March 12, a day after the market
regulator said it would investigate the fishing firm over
possible market abuse, Reuters relates.

Spanish stock market regulator CNMV threatened to sanction the
company on Friday after it failed to provide requested
information on the state of its accounts, Reuters recounts.
Pescanova has yet to present audited 2012 results, Reuters notes.

Several sources close to the company told Reuters that BDO's
refusal to approve the accounts sparked tensions between board
members and among shareholders, leading to a breakdown in talks.

Another source with knowledge of the company said Pescanova would
soon file a legal complaint against BDO, Reuters relates.
According to Reuters, a source close to the company said it was
already in talks with Deloitte and PriceWaterhouseCoopers for a
new audit.

Pescanova kicked off talks with creditors in early March after it
failed to present 2012 results by an end of February deadline and
had three to four months to find a solution, Reuters recounts.

Creditors disputed the company's statement on Friday that the
failure to reach a debt restructuring deal triggered the
insolvency move, Reuters relates.

"Not being able to reach an agreement with creditors is just an
excuse, because they didn't even sit down with us and they have
never given us what we needed to refinance their debt," Reuters
quotes a source at one of Pescanova's lenders as saying.

Reuters relates that a source close to Pescanova's board said
mutual distrust between the company and its auditors and fights
between executives had resulted in "an unmanageable situation
that led to this decision that could mean an intervention and
possibly haircuts".

Pescanova, as cited by Reuters, said it hoped to find a solution
with creditors to guarantee the rights and interests of its
workers, creditors and shareholders and assure the continued
management of Pescanova.

The group's creditors, according to a banking source, include
Spain's biggest banks, Sabadell, Caixabank, Popular, Santander,
BBVA and Bankia, Reuters discloses.

Trading in Pescanova's stock, much of it held by retail
investors, has been suspended since March 12, Reuters recounts.

Meanwhile, Manuel Baigorri at Bloomberg News reports that
Pescanova, which that sought protection from creditors on
Thursday, may say debt widened to about EUR2.7 billion (US$3.5
billion) at the end of December following an internal review of
its finances.  According to Bloomberg, a person with knowledge of
the matter said that Pescanova was expected to announce the
figure last Friday.

"The restructuring process will be long and complicated,"
Bloomberg quotes Jesus Dominguez, a Madrid-based analyst at
Banesto Bolsa, as saying in a note sent to investors on Friday.
"The debt level remains the biggest question mark."

Mr. Dominguez, as cited by Bloomberg, said that the best solution
for the company would be to sell assets and reach an accord with
banks and bondholders.

Pescanova spokesman Juan Antonio Tarjuelo said on Thursday that
the company is in talks about selling its Chilean assets,
declining to comment on who the discussions are with, Bloomberg
relates.

Pescanova is a Galicia-based fishing company.  It catches,
processes and packages fish on factory ships.



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


* Fitch Maintains View of No Swiss Property Bubble
--------------------------------------------------
Uncertainty over the path of Swiss property prices has increased
over the last year, however, Fitch Ratings maintains its view
that the market as a whole is still not experiencing a bubble.
"To reflect the increased uncertainty, we have introduced a
buffer in our house price decline assumptions (HPD)," Fitch says.

"House prices have risen faster than general income levels since
2000, and the decoupling of house prices and real income growth
to the point where price rises start to outstrip affordability is
now comparable with that seen before the previous Swiss property
crisis in the early 1990s. In our view some regions, such as Lake
Geneva, Zug, Zurich, and some southern cantons, where price rises
have been particularly pronounced, have overheated.

"We do not think there is a general property price bubble
affecting the Swiss market as a whole. Swiss house prices have
risen by an average of 4.4% year-on-year from 2000 to 2012. This
is less than in the UK, Spain, or France although Swiss inflation
has been considerably lower over the same period. Vacancies
remain low and demand is still high, driven by migration (which
continues to be absorbed by rising construction activity) and the
low interest rate environment.

"The signs of excessive risk appetite among both borrowers and
lenders, such as a surge in mortgage lending, that have been seen
in other mortgage crises (including Switzerland's own in the
1990s) remain largely absent. Property purchases by cash buyers
appear to be still motivated by the view of property as a safe-
haven rather than a desire to speculate on rising prices.

"Furthermore, rising prices have prompted action by the
authorities. In June 2012, the Swiss banking association moved to
restrain lending volumes via voluntary commitments by banks such
as a minimum equity investment and minimum amortization by the
borrower. Then in February, the Swiss government activated the
counter-cyclical additional capital reserve requirement for
banks, resulting in a higher risk-weight for domestic residential
mortgages.

"Market participants also appear to be taking note. Average offer
prices for flats and single family houses in Switzerland fell for
the first time in five years in Q212, in what may be the first
sign of a slowdown in the Swiss housing market.

"In the absence of a general bubble, lower affordability combined
with economic stability will probably result in a stagnation of
prices until incomes catch up, rather than the kind of severe
falls seen in some other jurisdictions.

Nevertheless, there are still large regional differences in
property price developments. Flat prices in the Lake Geneva
region rose by 11% in 2012 and by 32% in the last three years. At
the other end of the spectrum flat prices in the Berne area rose
by only 4% in 2012 while the Swiss market average for flats is
7%, according to data from real estate consultancy Wuest und
Partner.

"These differences increase our concerns on regional overheating
and a possible house price correction (rather than a crash). To
provide a buffer against volatile price developments and a
potential medium term price correction, we have introduced a
buffer into our rating scenario dependent HPD assumptions. The
buffer is highest in low rating scenarios ('B') and reduces in
high rating scenarios up to zero in 'AAA'. This is because the
HPD assumptions for high rating scenarios already incorporate a
stronger price correction," Fitch says.

Geographically, the buffer is highest in the regions that saw the
biggest house price increases over the last year. In most
regions, it is 4% in the 'B' rating scenario, but it is as high
as 15% for flats in Lake Geneva (and 8% for houses). Central
Switzerland and Zurich have buffers of 6% for both flats and
houses.



===========
T U R K E Y
===========


TURK EXIMBANK: S&P Lifts LT Foreign Currency Rating to 'BB+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term foreign
currency credit rating on Export Credit Bank of Turkey (Turk
Eximbank) to 'BB+' from 'BB'.  At the same time, S&P affirmed the
'B' short-term foreign currency rating.  S&P also raised the
local currency credit ratings to 'BBB/A-2' from 'BBB-/A-3'.  The
outlook is stable.

The ratings on Turk Eximbank are equalized with those on its sole
owner, the Republic of Turkey.  They reflect S&P's opinion that
there is an "almost certain" likelihood that the Turkish
government would provide timely and sufficient extraordinary
support to Turk Eximbank in case of financial distress.  In
accordance with S&P's criteria for government-related entities
(GREs), its rating approach for Turk Eximbank is based on its
view of the bank's:

   -- "Critical" role in supporting Turkish exports, which is a
      key factor of national economic development; and

   -- "Integral" link to the Turkish government through sole
      sovereign ownership, government control of the board of
      directors, and a guarantee on the ultimate recovery of
      losses on the bank's sovereign lending.

Turk Eximbank is the official state export credit agency.  It has
been mandated to support foreign trade and Turkish contractors
and investors operating abroad, through credit, guarantee, and
insurance programs.  The bank does not compete, but works
closely, with commercial banks, encouraging them to increase
their support for the export sector.  As well as offering direct
lending, the bank also provides insurance and guarantees to
Turkish exporters. Turk Eximbank moved its headquarters to
Istanbul in December 2012 to be closer to the majority of the
Turkish exporters with which it works.

Various bodies govern Turk Eximbank.  The highest-ranked is the
Supreme Advisory and Credit Guidance Committee, which is chaired
by the state minister in charge of the bank's activities
(currently the deputy prime minister).  The committee is the main
decision-making authority for developing the bank's strategy, and
sets limits for credit, guarantees, and insurance transactions.
The state minister in charge of the bank's activities selects the
board of directors.  The bank's general manager is named by a
decree signed by the same state minister in charge of the bank's
activities, the prime minister, and the Turkish president.  In
S&P's opinion, strong government support for Turk Eximbank is
also evident from repeated capital contributions to the bank's
equity base.  These have been directly paid-in capital or
retained earnings that are managed by the bank and incorporated
into its total shareholder funds.  By end-2011, paid-in capital
from the government totaled Turkish lira (TRY) 2.0 billion, up
from TRY1.3 billion at end-2008.  The most recent capital
contribution was in 2009.  Further to the contributions to paid-
in capital, the Turkish treasury gives the bank additional money
from designated funds.  If requested, the treasury would support
Turk Eximbank's funding efforts by guaranteeing the bank's
borrowings abroad.

As a 100%-state-owned wholesale bank, Turk Eximbank does not
accept deposits.  However, in recent years it has diversified
funding.  In 2011, Turk Eximbank raised funds through a number of
bilateral loans from international banks as well as the World
Bank and the European Investment Bank.  It has also raised $500
million by issuing a fixed-coupon Eurobond maturing in five
years.  Further, in April 2012 the bank issued a seven-year
fixed-coupon Eurobond amounting to US$500 million.  This was
retapped in October 2012, bringing the total to US$750 million,
which means the total outstanding for the Eurobonds issued by the
bank reached US$1,250 million in 2012.  Turk Eximbank borrows
only in foreign currency in capital markets.  The capital
adequacy ratio (CAR), calculated using the bank's internal
methodology, was at 95.9% at the end of 2011 (down from 143% in
2010).  The decrease can largely be explained by the expansion of
the short-term pre-shipment rediscount program.

Since July 1, 2012, Turk Eximbank has also been reporting a CAR
under Basel II standards to the Banking Regulation and
Supervision Agency.  This was 25.12% at end-December 2012.  Turk
Eximbank also has access to funding from the Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey.  It borrows in Turkish lira from the central
bank and repays in foreign currency, contributing to the
accumulation of foreign reserves.

The stable outlook on Turk Eximbank mirrors that on the Republic
of Turkey.  As long as the government continues to provide
support, any change in the ratings on Turkey will likely result
in a similar rating action on Turk Eximbank.  Conversely, any
change in S&P's assessment of Turk Eximbank's critical role for,
and integral link with, the government could lead to downward
pressure on the rating.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


BIZ FINANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B' Rating to US$100MM Notes Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Biz Finance PLC's US$100 million 8.75%
tap issue of fixed-rate limited recourse notes a final Long-term
rating of 'B' and a Recovery Rating of 'RR4'. The notes are
consolidated to form a single series with the outstanding US$500
million 8.75% notes due in January 2018. The notes are to be used
solely for financing a loan to Ukraine-based JSC The State
Export-Import Bank of Ukraine (Ukreximbank, 'B'/Stable/'b').

For key rating drivers, rating sensitivities and further details
on the issue, please see "Fitch Assigns Ukreximbank's Upcoming
Tap Issue Expected 'B(EXP)'/'RR4', dated March 27, 2013, and
"Fitch Rates Ukreximbank's Upcoming Medium Term Notes at
'B(EXP)'/'RR4", dated Jan. 16, 2013 available at
www.fitchratings.com.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AXMINSTER CARPETS: Bought Out of Administration; 100 Jobs Saved
---------------------------------------------------------------
Emma Rowley at The Telegraph reports that Axminster Carpets has
been rescued by a group of local businessmen, saving 100 jobs.

According to the Telegraph, a consortium made up of Stephen Boyd,
who chairs leather supplier Pittards, and others, who want to
stay silent, has bought the East Devon business as a going
concern from administrators Duff and Phelps.

The newly formed business will begin trading on today, April 8,
with many of the senior management team still in place, the
Telegraph discloses.  It will undergo a restructure, which will
focus on its retail network and its consumer offering, the
Telegraph says.

London-based financiers Centric Commercial Finance provided
funding for the rescue, while Josh Dutfield, Axminster's managing
director and the grandson of the founder of the business in its
current form, led management efforts to support the deal, the
Telegraph relates.

The company employed 300 people before it recently ran into
financial problems, blaming the tough economic backdrop, the
Telegraph recounts.  Analysts said the company, known for its
intricately patterned designs, had also struggled to keep up with
changing consumer tastes, the Telegraph notes.

The deal means the 100 roles remaining will be protected and the
two outlet stores will also stay open, the Telegraph states.  The
consortium would not disclose the sums involved.


HMV GROUP: Hilco Acquires 141 Stores for About GBP50 Million
------------------------------------------------------------
Sarah Shannon at Bloomberg News reports that Hilco U.K. Ltd., a
firm that specializes in rescuing failed retailers, acquired 141
stores belonging to collapsed HMV Group Plc and said it will seek
to restore the business to health.

According to Bloomberg, Hilco said on April 5 in a statement on
its Web site that the outlets being acquired include 25 that were
slated for closure.  Bloomberg relates that the statement said
the buyer will reverse earlier decisions to sell tablets and
other devices in the stores, providing more space for "an
enhanced music and visual range".

Hilco, which also operates HMV Canada, bought the retailer's debt
in January and has been helping to run HMV as part of the
administration handled by Deloitte LLP, Bloomberg notes.
Deloitte has closed some HMV stores and sold others after sales
were hurt by competition from online retailers and supermarkets,
Bloomberg discloses.

Bloomberg relates that two people familiar with the matter said
Friday's deal is valued at about GBP50 million (US$76 million).

Ian Topping, a former chief executive officer of Steinhoff Group
in the U.K., and Henry Foster, an investment director at Hilco,
will lead a Hilco team working alongside HMV management,
Bloomberg says.

Hilco also said it is in talks with landlords with a view to re-
establishing an HMV business in the Republic of Ireland,
Bloomberg notes.

HMV had net debt of GBP176.1 million as of Oct. 27 and made a net
loss of GBP36.2 million in the six months through that date,
Bloomberg discloses.  Prior to appointing Deloitte, the company
had said it probably wouldn't comply with agreements on its
borrowings, Bloomberg relates.

According to the Scotsman's Scott Reid, the acquisition deal
saved more than 2,500 jobs at HMV.

                         About HMV Group

United Kingdom-based HMV Group plc is engaged in retailing of
pre-recorded music, video, electronic games and related
entertainment products under the HMV and Fopp brands, and the
retailing of books principally under the Waterstone's brand.  The
Company operates in four segments: HMV UK & Ireland, HMV
International, HMV Live, and Waterstone's.

On Jan. 14, HMV Group went into administration after suppliers
refused a request for a GBP300 million lifeline for the company.
Deloitte was appointed as administrator to the chain, which was
hit by growing competition from online rivals, supermarkets, and
illegal downloads.


* UK: Business Insolvencies at Lowest Level Since 2005, PwC Says
----------------------------------------------------------------
Ben Lobel at SmallBusiness.co.uk, citing a study by
PricewaterhouseCoopers, reports that business insolvencies are at
their lowest levels since 2005.

According to SmallBusiness.co.uk, the PwC study reveals that in
total there were 3,285 insolvencies in the first three months of
2013, down from 3657 in fourth quarter of 2012 and 4,412 in the
first quarter of 2012.

Administrations fell by almost a third from 724 in Q1 2012 to 490
while Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs), which allow an
insolvent company to reach a voluntary agreement with its
creditors regarding repayment of debts over time, dropped to 104,
their lowest level for ten years, SmallBusiness.co.uk discloses.

Looking at consecutive quarters, construction (Q1 2013: 625, Q4
2012: 658), retail (Q1 2013: 407, Q4 2012: 400) and manufacturing
(Q1 2013: 388, Q4 2012: 444) are the hardest hit sectors in terms
of insolvencies, SmallBusiness.co.uk notes.

The statistics suggest that conditions are generally improving
for businesses, but also reflect the difficulties being faced by
a retail sector failing to follow the overall downward trend,
SmallBusiness.co.uk says.

PwC partner Mike Jervis says that administrations have dropped
below the 500 mark for the first time since 2005, alongside other
insolvency processes, suggesting an early sign of confidence
returning and also a sign of some economic recovery,
SmallBusiness.co.uk relates.

"CVAs have dropped to a level never seen before -- this type of
insolvency appears to have become less popular because many CVAs
fail if they don't address the fundamental viability of the
underlying businesses, and instead simply focus, say, on store
closures," SmallBusiness.co.uk quotes Mr. Jervis as saying.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Notes Weakening Euro Bond Protections in New Report
-------------------------------------------------------------
European bond covenants are stronger than those in North America,
with the average Covenant Quality (CQ) score of European bonds at
2.74, compared with 3.41 for North American bonds, says Moody's
Investors Service in a Special Comment entitled "Moody's High-
Yield Covenant Database: European Bond Covenants Stronger Than in
North America, But Protection Has Declined."

The rating agency's CQ scores assess overall protection in bond
covenant packages on a five-point scale, ranging from 1.0 for
strong investor protection to 5.0 for the weakest. All covenant
scores and data in the report draw on Moody's High-Yield Covenant
Quality Database, which allows quick comparisons of a bond's
covenant protections with market standards, as well as the
ability to spot covenant trends in specific sectors and to
compare covenant strengths and weaknesses across bond issues and
issuers.

Among the six risk categories Moody's assesses in a covenant
package, European bonds score best in liens subordination (2.33).
In North America, the average liens subordination score of 3.71
is the weakest average score among the six categories. "European
bonds are far more likely to be secured," says author of the
report Matthew Musicaro, "but they also have better liens
covenant scores when comparing bonds with the same priority in a
capital structure (i.e., unsecured versus unsecured) because
North American bonds usually have significant capacity for
additional debt senior in priority to the notes, while this risk
is generally well contained in Europe."

Moody's also notes that among European bonds, 25.5% have high-
yield-lite (HY-lite) covenant packages, compared with 16.5% of
North American bonds. HY-lite covenant packages lack either a
restricted payments and/or a debt incurrence covenant. However,
Europe has a significant number of Ba-rated companies that had
been investment grade, and these fallen angels are more likely to
use HY-lite covenant packages. At the B rating level, only 2.2%
of European bonds are HY-lite, compared with 10.1% in North
America.

However, Moody's report notes that European bond covenants are
weakening. The average European CQ score weakened to 2.78 in 2012
from 2.64 in 2011, excluding HY-lite bonds. European bond
protections weakened across five of the six key risk categories;
only the debt-incurrence covenant strengthened in 2012. North
America also saw a weakening trend in 2012. In addition, the
average CQ score in January 2013 was 2.99.

According to Musicaro, Virgin Media's bond deal, which helped
finance its acquisition by Liberty Global, was the first European
bond assessed by Moody's to use a full high-yield covenant
package that scored in the weakest category of protection (4.20 -
- 5.00).


* BOND PRICING: For the Week April 1 to April 5, 2013
-----------------------------------------------------

Issuer                  Coupon    Maturity  Currency     Price
------                  ------    --------  --------     -----

AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          8.750  10/27/2014      EUR      27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES          2.750   5/10/2014      EUR      29.13
IMMOFINANZ                4.250    3/8/2018      EUR       4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.907   7/24/2013      EUR      58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.588   1/23/2013      EUR      73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.965   1/23/2013      EUR      55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.873   1/23/2013      EUR      66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.646   1/23/2013      EUR      45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK          5.097   1/23/2013      EUR      58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.417   1/22/2014      EUR      67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK          7.122   1/22/2014      EUR      66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK         11.134   7/24/2013      EUR      66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.200   7/24/2013      EUR      56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.304   1/23/2013      EUR      62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.876   1/23/2013      EUR      60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK          9.558   1/23/2013      EUR      67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK          8.920   1/23/2013      EUR      52.62

BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP            4.000    6/1/2016      EUR      22.94
TALVIVAARA                4.000  12/16/2015      EUR      72.61

FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM            4.970    4/1/2015      EUR      12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT            5.000    1/1/2015      EUR       2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG          6.720    1/1/2015      EUR       5.62
ASSYSTEM                  4.000    1/1/2017      EUR      23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA            2.500    1/1/2016      EUR      58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET          3.500    1/1/2014      EUR      38.69
CGG VERITAS               1.750    1/1/2016      EUR      31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE          6.110   11/1/2015      EUR      17.80
EURAZEO                   6.250   6/10/2014      EUR      55.33
FAURECIA                  3.250    1/1/2018      EUR      17.91
FAURECIA                  4.500    1/1/2015      EUR      19.45
INGENICO                  2.750    1/1/2017      EUR      48.14
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2015      EUR      17.13
MAUREL ET PROM            7.125   7/31/2014      EUR      18.15
NEXANS SA                 2.500    1/1/2019      EUR      66.69
NEXANS SA                 4.000    1/1/2016      EUR      56.09
ORPEA                     3.875    1/1/2016      EUR      47.89
PEUGEOT SA                4.450    1/1/2016      EUR      23.56
PIERRE VACANCES           4.000   10/1/2015      EUR      73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE           1.000   1/18/2018      EUR      54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE            2.750    4/1/2020      EUR      21.24
SOITEC                    6.250    9/9/2014      EUR       7.25
TEM                       4.250    1/1/2015      EUR      54.36

GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.750  12/28/2012      EUR      58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE         10.500  12/28/2012      EUR      47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE          7.750  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
COMMERZBANK AG            6.000  12/27/2012      EUR      73.49
COMMERZBANK AG            7.000  12/27/2012      EUR      60.71
COMMERZBANK AG           13.000  12/28/2012      EUR      47.48
COMMERZBANK AG           16.750    1/3/2013      EUR      73.77
COMMERZBANK AG            8.400  12/30/2013      EUR      13.74
COMMERZBANK AG            8.000  12/27/2012      EUR      43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000   2/28/2013      EUR      75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000   2/20/2013      EUR      68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         11.000   1/18/2013      EUR      73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         15.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  12/20/2012      EUR      68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         10.000  12/20/2012      EUR      63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  12/20/2012      EUR      73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  12/20/2012      EUR      38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          7.000  12/20/2012      EUR      69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000  11/29/2012      EUR      65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          9.000  11/29/2012      EUR      67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG         12.000    4/2/2013      EUR      74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG          8.000  11/29/2012      EUR      71.50
DZ BANK AG               15.500  10/25/2013      EUR      71.05
DZ BANK AG               15.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.86
DZ BANK AG               15.750   7/26/2013      EUR      71.21
DZ BANK AG               15.000   7/26/2013      EUR      75.00
DZ BANK AG                6.000   7/26/2013      EUR      69.50
DZ BANK AG               22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.36
DZ BANK AG               18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.28
DZ BANK AG               14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.43
DZ BANK AG                6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.14
DZ BANK AG                6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.07
DZ BANK AG               19.500   4/26/2013      EUR      61.83
DZ BANK AG               18.500   4/26/2013      EUR      57.11
DZ BANK AG               17.000   4/26/2013      EUR      15.42
DZ BANK AG               16.500   4/26/2013      EUR      59.63
DZ BANK AG               15.750   4/26/2013      EUR      43.33
DZ BANK AG               14.500   4/26/2013      EUR      56.77
DZ BANK AG               20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.81
DZ BANK AG               18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.74
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.16
DZ BANK AG               13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.95
DZ BANK AG               12.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.97
DZ BANK AG               12.250   3/22/2013      EUR      74.07
DZ BANK AG               13.750    3/8/2013      EUR      54.29
DZ BANK AG               10.000    3/8/2013      EUR      68.17
DZ BANK AG                9.750    3/8/2013      EUR      73.96
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      74.66
DZ BANK AG               10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      72.63
DZ BANK AG               18.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.25
DZ BANK AG               19.000   1/25/2013      EUR      44.10
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.38
DZ BANK AG               10.250    2/8/2013      EUR      71.88
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      70.66
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      71.94
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      69.43
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      73.27
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      68.24
DZ BANK AG               15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      67.09
DZ BANK AG               11.500  11/23/2012      EUR      74.94
DZ BANK AG               16.750  11/23/2012      EUR      63.46
DZ BANK AG               20.000  11/23/2012      EUR      41.34
DZ BANK AG                5.000  12/14/2012      EUR      69.68
DZ BANK AG                9.750  12/14/2012      EUR      66.05
DZ BANK AG                6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      74.23
DZ BANK AG                9.500    1/2/2013      EUR      71.10
DZ BANK AG               12.000    1/2/2013      EUR      65.09
DZ BANK AG               16.250    1/2/2013      EUR      68.65
DZ BANK AG               10.500   1/11/2013      EUR      66.00
DZ BANK AG               14.000   1/11/2013      EUR      48.04
DZ BANK AG               15.500   1/11/2013      EUR      53.41
DZ BANK AG               12.500   1/25/2013      EUR      50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000   3/20/2013      EUR      74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         17.000   3/20/2013      EUR      73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         16.000   6/26/2013      EUR      74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         18.000   3/20/2013      EUR      69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         14.000  12/28/2012      EUR      72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         15.000  12/28/2012      EUR      71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO         13.000  12/27/2013      EUR      72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS            25.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS            30.000   6/28/2013      EUR      46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.000   6/28/2013      EUR      48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.000   3/22/2013      EUR      60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   3/22/2013      EUR      41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   3/22/2013      EUR      74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   3/22/2013      EUR      55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.000   3/22/2013      EUR      72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            20.500   3/22/2013      EUR      56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   3/22/2013      EUR      70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.000   3/22/2013      EUR      54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   3/22/2013      EUR      67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.000   3/22/2013      EUR      52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   3/22/2013      EUR      65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            24.000   3/22/2013      EUR      73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS            26.500   3/22/2013      EUR      61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.000   3/22/2013      EUR      53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS            27.500   3/22/2013      EUR      43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS             6.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS             7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS             8.500   6/28/2013      EUR      69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS            10.500   6/28/2013      EUR      46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS            11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS            12.500   6/28/2013      EUR      63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS            13.500   6/28/2013      EUR      61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS            14.000   6/28/2013      EUR      61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS            15.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS            16.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS            17.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.000   6/28/2013      EUR      70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS            18.500   6/28/2013      EUR      57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS            19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS            21.500   6/28/2013      EUR      68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS            23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN           5.500  12/23/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   7/26/2013      EUR      74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT           6.000   8/23/2013      EUR      74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   8/23/2013      EUR      72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   8/23/2013      EUR      71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   8/23/2013      EUR      69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   9/27/2013      EUR      74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          11.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.000   6/28/2013      EUR      73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   6/28/2013      EUR      73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT           9.000   6/28/2013      EUR      69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   6/28/2013      EUR      65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500  11/23/2012      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000  11/23/2012      EUR      56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000  11/23/2012      EUR      46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000    1/4/2013      EUR      63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500    1/4/2013      EUR      67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000    1/4/2013      EUR      58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   1/25/2013      EUR      25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   1/25/2013      EUR      65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   1/25/2013      EUR      74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   2/22/2013      EUR      72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT           7.500   2/22/2013      EUR      62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   2/22/2013      EUR      55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   2/22/2013      EUR      47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT           8.000   3/22/2013      EUR      68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT          12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT          15.000   3/22/2013      EUR      59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT           5.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT         13.250    1/2/2013      EUR      67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT         18.000  12/14/2012      EUR      63.38
Q-CELLS                   6.750  10/21/2015      EUR       1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE           6.750   3/22/2013      USD       4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR            1.375   12/6/2012      EUR       0.58
TAG IMMO AG               6.500  12/10/2015      EUR       9.73
TUI AG                    2.750   3/24/2016      EUR      56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150   3/22/2013      EUR      68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850   3/22/2013      EUR      55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000   3/22/2013      EUR      65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.050   3/22/2013      EUR      62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.200   3/22/2013      EUR      70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.700   3/22/2013      EUR      71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.700   3/22/2013      EUR      42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000   3/22/2013      EUR      63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500   3/22/2013      EUR      50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250   3/22/2013      EUR      40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850   3/22/2013      EUR      39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.450  12/31/2012      EUR      56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.100  12/31/2012      EUR      50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.050  12/31/2012      EUR      54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.850  12/31/2012      EUR      60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.700  12/31/2012      EUR      71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.450  12/31/2012      EUR      73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.350  12/31/2012      EUR      57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.150  12/31/2012      EUR      63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.100  12/31/2012      EUR      71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         16.050  12/31/2012      EUR      72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.900  12/31/2012      EUR      73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.750  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         15.250  12/31/2012      EUR      57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.950  12/31/2012      EUR      74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.700  12/31/2012      EUR      73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.600  12/31/2012      EUR      53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.500  12/31/2012      EUR      63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.450  12/31/2012      EUR      53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.350  12/31/2012      EUR      71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.300  12/31/2012      EUR      48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.100  12/31/2012      EUR      74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         14.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.550  12/31/2012      EUR      57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.500  12/31/2012      EUR      61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.150  12/31/2012      EUR      70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050  12/31/2012      EUR      67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.900  12/31/2012      EUR      50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.800  12/31/2012      EUR      46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.550  12/31/2012      EUR      73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.250  12/31/2012      EUR      68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         12.000  12/31/2012      EUR      61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.950  12/31/2012      EUR      49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.850  12/31/2012      EUR      68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.750  12/31/2012      EUR      55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.700  12/31/2012      EUR      61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.600  12/31/2012      EUR      74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.450  12/31/2012      EUR      54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.400  12/31/2012      EUR      58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.150  12/31/2012      EUR      72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000  12/31/2012      EUR      70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.900  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.550  12/31/2012      EUR      58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.500  12/31/2012      EUR      41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.050  12/31/2012      EUR      63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950  12/31/2012      EUR      61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.900  12/31/2012      EUR      72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.650  12/31/2012      EUR      70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.600  12/31/2012      EUR      71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.500  12/31/2012      EUR      59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.400  12/31/2012      EUR      54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.350  12/31/2012      EUR      72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.250  12/31/2012      EUR      41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.150  12/31/2012      EUR      73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.050  12/31/2012      EUR      73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.650  12/31/2012      EUR      66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.500   3/22/2013      EUR      38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.900   3/22/2013      EUR      72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.750   3/22/2013      EUR      73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.200  12/31/2012      EUR      65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.950  12/31/2012      EUR      52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.700  12/31/2012      EUR      62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         23.600   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          4.000   6/28/2013      EUR      44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          6.000   6/28/2013      EUR      63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.700  12/31/2012      EUR      67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.400  12/31/2012      EUR      55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.550   6/28/2013      EUR      74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.250  12/31/2012      EUR      53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.050   6/28/2013      EUR      72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.389  11/25/2013      EUR      44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.100   4/14/2014      EUR      32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.200  12/31/2012      EUR      73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.850  12/31/2012      EUR      63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.950  12/31/2012      EUR      68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         19.300  12/31/2012      EUR      66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.000  12/31/2012      EUR      69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         20.850  12/31/2012      EUR      72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.150  12/31/2012      EUR      68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         21.200  12/31/2012      EUR      74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.250  12/31/2012      EUR      66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         22.700  12/31/2012      EUR      66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.700  12/31/2012      EUR      43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         24.900  12/31/2012      EUR      51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         26.050  12/31/2012      EUR      69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         27.600  12/31/2012      EUR      40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         28.250  12/31/2012      EUR      38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         11.000    2/1/2013      EUR      55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         13.650    3/1/2013      EUR      35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.100    3/8/2013      EUR      74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          5.650   3/22/2013      EUR      68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          7.500   3/22/2013      EUR      73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.550   3/22/2013      EUR      61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          8.850   3/22/2013      EUR      73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.200   3/22/2013      EUR      65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO          9.950   3/22/2013      EUR      70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.150   3/22/2013      EUR      59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         18.050  12/31/2012      EUR      64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         17.650  12/31/2012      EUR      73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.300   3/22/2013      EUR      70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.350   3/22/2013      EUR      73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO         10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      46.30
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/28/2012      EUR      59.08
WGZ BANK                  8.000  12/21/2012      EUR      66.08
WGZ BANK                  5.000  12/28/2012      EUR      73.18
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/28/2012      EUR      67.75
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/28/2012      EUR      63.10
WGZ BANK                  6.000  12/21/2012      EUR      74.00
WGZ BANK                  7.000  12/21/2012      EUR      68.47

GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY              8.020    3/1/2013      EUR      56.54
BKB FINANCE              10.950   5/10/2013      CHF      62.57
BKB FINANCE              10.150   9/11/2013      CHF      73.89
BKB FINANCE              13.200   1/31/2013      CHF      50.08
BKB FINANCE               9.450    7/3/2013      CHF      68.52
BKB FINANCE              11.500   3/20/2013      CHF      59.30
BKB FINANCE               8.350   1/14/2013      CHF      54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/13/2012      EUR      73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.000  11/13/2012      EUR      64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.830  11/19/2012      CHF      70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.300  11/20/2012      CHF      64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.500  11/20/2012      EUR      55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.800  11/20/2012      EUR      65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.250  11/27/2012      CHF      68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250  11/27/2012      CHF      64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.500  11/27/2012      CHF      31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000  11/27/2012      EUR      59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.750   12/3/2012      CHF      72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.750   12/6/2012      CHF      35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.500  12/14/2012      CHF      58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.250  12/14/2012      EUR      66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR         17.500  12/14/2012      EUR      62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.300  12/21/2012      CHF      64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.900  12/21/2012      CHF      64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.600  12/21/2012      CHF      64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.830  12/28/2012      USD      57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    1/9/2013      EUR      52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.000   1/15/2013      CHF      27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.250   1/15/2013      CHF      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         11.250   1/15/2013      GBP      73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.500   1/15/2013      CHF      28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000   1/15/2013      CHF      74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.500   1/18/2013      CHF      50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.800   1/23/2013      CHF      69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.050   2/20/2013      USD      74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR         15.000    3/1/2013      CHF      71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.000    3/6/2013      USD      71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.250  12/27/2012      GBP      67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.000    4/2/2013      CHF      63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR         16.000    4/4/2013      CHF      23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.530   4/16/2013      EUR      49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR          7.000   4/19/2013      EUR      55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.000   4/26/2013      CHF      66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR          9.500   4/30/2013      EUR      28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.200    6/7/2013      EUR      71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.500   8/27/2013      CHF      51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.400   9/30/2013      CHF      63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR         19.000   10/3/2013      GBP      74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR          8.160   4/25/2014      EUR      71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR          5.850  10/14/2014      CHF      57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      CHF      56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR          6.000  11/12/2012      EUR      57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.500  11/13/2012      CHF      65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR         12.750  11/13/2012      CHF      71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR         13.000  11/13/2012      CHF      74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR         14.000  11/13/2012      USD      23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR         10.750   3/19/2013      USD      71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.250   11/9/2012      CHF      54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.670  12/28/2012      CHF      70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN         11.500   1/24/2013      CHF      59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN         17.000   2/22/2013      EUR      59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.128    3/7/2013      CHF      64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN         13.575   4/10/2013      CHF      74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN          7.340   4/16/2013      CHF      70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN         12.500    7/5/2013      CHF      70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN         10.200   8/23/2013      CHF      67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN          9.000   9/11/2013      CHF      69.23

ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING                 0.800   2/15/2011      EUR      26.50

LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL             7.250    4/1/2014      EUR      21.66

NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV           12.000   2/10/2015      USD      24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV          5.250    5/8/2013      EUR       5.89
KPNQWEST NV              10.000   3/15/2012      EUR       0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500   9/13/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.600   2/22/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   2/14/2012      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500  12/15/2011      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          12.000    7/4/2011      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000    7/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000    1/4/2011      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  12/31/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.300  12/21/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900  11/16/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000  10/12/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.500    8/9/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000   7/28/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   5/30/2010      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.750    3/1/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   2/15/2010      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           1.750    2/7/2010      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.800  12/27/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.800   8/21/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000    8/3/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.500    8/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.500    7/6/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   6/29/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   6/17/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.750   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.500   6/15/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   6/13/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          15.000    6/4/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          17.000    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.500    6/2/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000   5/22/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.200   5/14/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           4.000   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.850   4/24/2009      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000   4/14/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           9.000   3/17/2009      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          11.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000   2/16/2009      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           0.500   2/16/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.750   1/30/2009      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.432    1/8/2009      ILS      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  12/26/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.000  11/28/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.442  11/22/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.100  11/12/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   11/9/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.150  10/30/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000  10/28/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.500  10/24/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/24/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           5.000  10/24/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           8.000  10/23/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          10.000  10/22/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          16.000   10/8/2008      CHF      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.250   10/6/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          18.250   10/2/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           7.375   9/20/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          23.300   9/16/2008      USD      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          14.900   9/15/2008      EUR      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY           3.000   9/12/2036      JPY       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           6.000  10/30/2012      USD       5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY           2.500   8/23/2012      GBP      22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY          13.000   7/25/2012      EUR      22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          1.375   4/30/2012      EUR      26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT          5.750   5/26/2014      EUR      26.88
RENEWABLE CORP            6.500    6/4/2014      EUR      61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM           6.500    5/1/2016      EUR      51.72

SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber             6.000   6/30/2016      SEK      66.00

SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER          8.700    8/5/2013      CHF      60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER         15.000   5/31/2013      USD      69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         13.000   5/31/2013      USD      70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.000    4/9/2013      CHF      56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER         10.750   3/13/2013      EUR      66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER         17.300    2/1/2013      EUR      54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER          9.700  12/20/2012      CHF      75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER         11.500   2/20/2013      CHF      47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER         12.200   12/5/2012      EUR      54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   6/10/2014      CHF      62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/26/2014      CHF      65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/13/2014      CHF      63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/24/2014      CHF      55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   2/11/2014      CHF      54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         18.400  12/20/2013      EUR      74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  11/26/2013      CHF      64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          4.500   8/13/2014      CHF      48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         16.500   9/23/2013      USD      57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/23/2013      CHF      50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          3.250   9/16/2013      CHF      49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.500  11/13/2012      CHF      58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/13/2012      CHF      74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.250  11/12/2012      CHF      73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   8/27/2014      CHF      55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   9/10/2014      CHF      51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  10/15/2014      CHF      57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          5.250    8/6/2014      CHF      51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.000   7/22/2013      CHF      72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         10.000   6/10/2013      CHF      70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   5/31/2013      CHF      55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          6.500   4/26/2013      CHF      58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/25/2013      CHF      59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   3/18/2013      CHF      74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500    3/1/2013      USD      74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          9.000   2/14/2013      CHF      66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         11.500   2/13/2013      EUR      57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000   1/24/2013      CHF      66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.750   1/15/2013      CHF      68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.250  12/17/2012      CHF      61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/17/2012      EUR      67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.500  12/14/2012      EUR      72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          0.000  12/14/2012      CHF      36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS         12.000  11/23/2012      CHF      47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          8.000  11/20/2012      CHF      74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.125  11/19/2012      CHF      58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS          7.250  11/16/2012      CHF      58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD          8.900   3/25/2013      EUR      57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD         10.500    9/9/2013      CHF      66.05
S-AIR GROUP               0.125    7/7/2005      CHF      10.63
SARASIN CI LTD            8.000   4/27/2015      CHF      68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.600   2/17/2014      CHF      71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         13.200   1/23/2013      EUR      72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY         15.200  12/12/2012      EUR      73.12
UBS AG                   11.870   8/13/2013      USD       4.68
UBS AG                    9.600   8/26/2013      USD      15.21
UBS AG                   10.200   9/20/2013      EUR      61.15
UBS AG                   12.900   9/20/2013      EUR      57.98
UBS AG                   15.900   9/20/2013      EUR      55.99
UBS AG                   17.000   9/27/2013      EUR      73.19
UBS AG                   17.750   9/27/2013      EUR      73.50
UBS AG                   18.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.56
UBS AG                   19.750   9/27/2013      EUR      74.84
UBS AG                   20.000   9/27/2013      EUR      70.19
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      74.87
UBS AG                   20.500   9/27/2013      EUR      71.43
UBS AG                   21.750   9/27/2013      EUR      72.53
UBS AG                   22.000   9/27/2013      EUR      71.57
UBS AG                   22.500   9/27/2013      EUR      70.55
UBS AG                   22.750   9/27/2013      EUR      67.91
UBS AG                   23.000   9/27/2013      EUR      72.72
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.81
UBS AG                   23.250   9/27/2013      EUR      68.35
UBS AG                   24.000   9/27/2013      EUR      69.47
UBS AG                   24.750   9/27/2013      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                    8.060   10/3/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   13.570  11/21/2013      USD      16.25
UBS AG                    6.980  11/27/2013      USD      34.85
UBS AG                   17.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.48
UBS AG                   17.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      73.31
UBS AG                   18.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.28
UBS AG                   19.500    1/3/2014      EUR      73.10
UBS AG                   20.000    1/3/2014      EUR      74.53
UBS AG                   20.500    1/3/2014      EUR      71.30
UBS AG                   20.750    1/3/2014      EUR      71.59
UBS AG                   21.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.44
UBS AG                   22.250    1/3/2014      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                   23.000    1/3/2014      EUR      71.55
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.29
UBS AG                   23.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.57
UBS AG                   24.000    1/3/2014      EUR      72.95
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      68.40
UBS AG                   24.250    1/3/2014      EUR      70.18
UBS AG                    6.440   5/28/2014      USD      51.67
UBS AG                    3.870   6/17/2014      USD      38.08
UBS AG                    6.040   8/29/2014      USD      35.22
UBS AG                    7.780   8/29/2014      USD      20.85
UBS AG                   11.260  11/12/2012      EUR      47.13
UBS AG                   11.660  11/12/2012      EUR      34.35
UBS AG                   13.120  11/12/2012      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   13.560  11/12/2012      EUR      36.51
UBS AG                   13.600  11/12/2012      EUR      56.96
UBS AG                   13.000  11/23/2012      USD      62.55
UBS AG                    8.150  12/21/2012      EUR      72.14
UBS AG                    8.250  12/21/2012      EUR      74.88
UBS AG                    8.270  12/21/2012      EUR      74.19
UBS AG                    8.990  12/21/2012      EUR      72.49
UBS AG                    9.000  12/21/2012      EUR      69.13
UBS AG                    9.150  12/21/2012      EUR      71.84
UBS AG                    9.450  12/21/2012      EUR      74.42
UBS AG                    9.730  12/21/2012      EUR      70.24
UBS AG                    9.890  12/21/2012      EUR      66.37
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      72.98
UBS AG                   10.060  12/21/2012      EUR      69.64
UBS AG                   10.160  12/21/2012      EUR      73.41
UBS AG                   10.490  12/21/2012      EUR      68.12
UBS AG                   10.690  12/21/2012      EUR      71.60
UBS AG                   10.810  12/21/2012      EUR      63.85
UBS AG                   11.000  12/21/2012      EUR      67.59
UBS AG                   11.260  12/21/2012      EUR      66.14
UBS AG                   11.270  12/21/2012      EUR      70.63
UBS AG                   11.330  12/21/2012      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   11.770  12/21/2012      EUR      61.53
UBS AG                   11.970  12/21/2012      EUR      65.67
UBS AG                   11.980  12/21/2012      EUR      69.02
UBS AG                   12.020  12/21/2012      EUR      64.27
UBS AG                   12.200  12/21/2012      EUR      56.09
UBS AG                   12.400  12/21/2012      EUR      68.07
UBS AG                   12.760  12/21/2012      EUR      59.39
UBS AG                   12.800  12/21/2012      EUR      62.51
UBS AG                   12.970  12/21/2012      EUR      63.87
UBS AG                   13.320  12/21/2012      EUR      66.64
UBS AG                   13.560  12/21/2012      EUR      65.71
UBS AG                   13.570  12/21/2012      EUR      60.85
UBS AG                   13.770  12/21/2012      EUR      57.41
UBS AG                   13.980  12/21/2012      EUR      62.18
UBS AG                   14.350  12/21/2012      EUR      59.29
UBS AG                   14.690  12/21/2012      EUR      64.44
UBS AG                   14.740  12/21/2012      EUR      63.53
UBS AG                   14.810  12/21/2012      EUR      55.58
UBS AG                   15.000  12/21/2012      EUR      60.59
UBS AG                   15.130  12/21/2012      EUR      57.81
UBS AG                   15.860  12/21/2012      EUR      53.88
UBS AG                   15.920  12/21/2012      EUR      56.41
UBS AG                   15.930  12/21/2012      EUR      61.51
UBS AG                   16.030  12/21/2012      EUR      59.10
UBS AG                   16.600  12/21/2012      EUR      50.18
UBS AG                   16.710  12/21/2012      EUR      55.09
UBS AG                   16.930  12/21/2012      EUR      52.30
UBS AG                   17.070  12/21/2012      EUR      57.69
UBS AG                   17.500  12/21/2012      EUR      53.84
UBS AG                   18.000  12/21/2012      EUR      50.83
UBS AG                   19.090  12/21/2012      EUR      51.52
UBS AG                   10.770    1/2/2013      USD      38.33
UBS AG                   13.030    1/4/2013      EUR      73.40
UBS AG                   13.630    1/4/2013      EUR      71.63
UBS AG                   14.230    1/4/2013      EUR      69.95
UBS AG                   14.820    1/4/2013      EUR      68.36
UBS AG                   15.460    1/4/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   15.990    1/4/2013      EUR      65.39
UBS AG                   16.500    1/4/2013      EUR      73.32
UBS AG                   17.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   17.150    1/4/2013      EUR      62.69
UBS AG                   17.180    1/4/2013      EUR      74.58
UBS AG                   18.000    1/4/2013      EUR      73.54
UBS AG                   18.300    1/4/2013      EUR      60.23
UBS AG                   19.440    1/4/2013      EUR      57.99
UBS AG                   19.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.92
UBS AG                   20.500    1/4/2013      EUR      70.21
UBS AG                   20.570    1/4/2013      EUR      55.94
UBS AG                   21.700    1/4/2013      EUR      54.05
UBS AG                   21.750    1/4/2013      EUR      69.65
UBS AG                   23.750    1/4/2013      EUR      66.55
UBS AG                   11.020   1/25/2013      EUR      67.05
UBS AG                   12.010   1/25/2013      EUR      65.34
UBS AG                   14.070   1/25/2013      EUR      62.22
UBS AG                   16.200   1/25/2013      EUR      74.54
UBS AG                    8.620    2/1/2013      USD      14.04
UBS AG                    8.980   2/22/2013      EUR      72.86
UBS AG                   10.590   2/22/2013      EUR      69.90
UBS AG                   10.960   2/22/2013      EUR      67.35
UBS AG                   13.070   2/22/2013      EUR      63.96
UBS AG                   13.660   2/22/2013      EUR      61.23
UBS AG                   13.940   2/22/2013      EUR      73.02
UBS AG                   15.800   2/22/2013      EUR      67.24
UBS AG                    8.480    3/7/2013      CHF      58.00
UBS AG                   10.000    3/7/2013      USD      72.30
UBS AG                   12.250    3/7/2013      CHF      59.20
UBS AG                    9.000   3/22/2013      USD      11.16
UBS AG                    9.850   3/22/2013      USD      19.75
UBS AG                   16.500    4/2/2013      EUR      72.16
UBS AG                   17.250    4/2/2013      EUR      72.45
UBS AG                   18.000    4/2/2013      EUR      73.44
UBS AG                   19.750    4/2/2013      EUR      69.63
UBS AG                   21.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.05
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.98
UBS AG                   21.500    4/2/2013      EUR      73.88
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      67.19
UBS AG                   22.250    4/2/2013      EUR      69.43
UBS AG                   24.250    4/2/2013      EUR      65.24
UBS AG                   24.750    4/2/2013      EUR      68.24
UBS AG                   10.860    4/4/2013      USD      37.21
UBS AG                    9.650   4/11/2013      USD      27.17
UBS AG                    9.930   4/11/2013      USD      24.77
UBS AG                   11.250   4/11/2013      USD      24.39
UBS AG                   10.170   4/26/2013      EUR      67.84
UBS AG                   10.970   4/26/2013      EUR      66.50
UBS AG                   12.610   4/26/2013      EUR      64.06
UBS AG                    7.900   4/30/2013      USD      33.75
UBS AG                    9.830   5/13/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.000   5/24/2013      USD      63.90
UBS AG                   11.670   5/31/2013      USD      35.12
UBS AG                   12.780    6/7/2013      CHF      62.60
UBS AG                   16.410    6/7/2013      CHF      64.70
UBS AG                    9.330   6/14/2013      USD      22.00
UBS AG                   11.060   6/14/2013      USD      28.17
UBS AG                    6.770   6/21/2013      USD      10.43
UBS AG                    7.120   6/26/2013      USD      29.83
UBS AG                   15.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.98
UBS AG                   17.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.05
UBS AG                   17.250   6/28/2013      EUR      72.59
UBS AG                   19.250   6/28/2013      EUR      70.54
UBS AG                   19.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.28
UBS AG                   20.250   6/28/2013      EUR      74.82
UBS AG                   20.500   6/28/2013      EUR      70.91
UBS AG                   21.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.62
UBS AG                   22.000   6/28/2013      EUR      71.86
UBS AG                   22.500   6/28/2013      EUR      66.83
UBS AG                   23.000   6/28/2013      EUR      67.15
UBS AG                   23.500   6/28/2013      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   24.000   6/28/2013      EUR      68.94
UBS AG                   24.500   6/28/2013      EUR      67.97
UBS AG                   11.450    7/1/2013      USD      27.96
UBS AG                    6.100   7/24/2013      USD      30.07
UBS AG                    8.640    8/1/2013      USD      27.87
UBS AG                   13.120    8/5/2013      USD       4.62
UBS AG                    0.500   4/27/2015      CHF      52.50
UBS AG                    6.070  11/12/2012      EUR      65.82
UBS AG                    8.370  11/12/2012      EUR      59.26
UBS AG                    8.590  11/12/2012      EUR      53.53
UBS AG                    9.020  11/12/2012      EUR      43.76
UBS AG                    9.650  11/12/2012      EUR      37.64
UBS AG                   10.020  11/12/2012      EUR      71.72
UBS AG                   10.930  11/12/2012      EUR      64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC          11.000   6/28/2013      EUR      74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.750   3/22/2013      EUR      41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC          10.000   3/22/2013      EUR      42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC           6.000    1/2/2013      EUR      50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC           8.000   6/28/2013      EUR      47.66
ESSAR ENERGY              4.250    2/1/2016      USD      72.62
MAX PETROLEUM             6.750    9/8/2013      USD      40.36


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2013.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *