/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/130225.mbx
T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R
E U R O P E
Monday, February 25, 2013, Vol. 14, No. 39
Headlines
B E L G I U M
TRUVO NV: S&P Cuts Corp. Credit Rating to 'CCC', Outlook Negative
C R O A T I A
NEXE GRUPA: Files for Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement Procedure
F R A N C E
REXEL SA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' CFR, Outlook Negative
G E R M A N Y
HEIDELBERGER DRUCKMASCHINEN: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Credit Rating
SANGUI BIOTECH: Incurs US$500,000 Net Loss in Fiscal 2nd Quarter
G R E E C E
NATIONAL BANK: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Mortgage Covered Bonds
I C E L A N D
KAUPTHING BANK: Successor Sells Bonds to Offshore Investors
I T A L Y
BANCA MONTE: Court Rejects Codacons' State Aid Legal Challenge
SAFILO GROUP: S&P Puts 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating Watch Developing
SESTANTE FINANCE: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rated Cl. C1 Notes on Watch Neg.
K A Z A K H S T A N
BTA BANK: Moody's Upgrades Long-Term Deposit Ratings to 'Caa1'
L I T H U A N I A
UKIO BANKAS: Siauliu Bankas Agrees to Assume Insured Deposits
L U X E M B O U R G
AI CHEM: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B+' Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
N E T H E R L A N D S
IBERDROLA INTERNATIONAL: S&P Rates Subordinated Securities 'BB+'
PANTHER CDO IV: S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
SNS REAAL: Wins Temporary EU Approval for Recapitalizations
P O L A N D
LOT POLISH: To Present Rescue Plan Next Month
R U S S I A
KOKS OAO: Consent Solicitation No Impact on Moody's 'B2' Rating
PHOSAGRO OJSC: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating
TRANSCONTAINER OJSC: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Bond Series
* MORDOVIA: High Debt Burden Cues Moody's to Assign B1 Ratings
S P A I N
BANKIA SA: Set to Reveal Annual Net Loss of More Than EUR19-Bil.
* SPAIN: Fiscal Consolidation Gains Traction, Fitch Says
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
AXMINSTER: In Administration, 400 Jobs at Risk
BREWHOUSE THEATRE: In Administration After Cuts to Public Funding
DEANE & AMOS: In Administration, Cuts 150 Jobs
INCHMARLO GOLF: In Provisional Liquidation; 25 Jobs Affected
PATTON GROUP: Owes Around GBP60-Mil. to 1,000+ Creditors
WILLIAM CRAWFORD: In Administration, Cuts 46 Jobs
X X X X X X X X
* BOND PRICING: For the Week February 18 to February 22, 2013
*********
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B E L G I U M
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TRUVO NV: S&P Cuts Corp. Credit Rating to 'CCC', Outlook Negative
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Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its long-
term corporate credit rating on Belgium-based publisher of
classified directories Truvo N.V. to 'CCC' from 'CCC+'. The
outlook is negative.
At the same time, S&P lowered to 'CCC' from 'CCC+' the issue
rating on Truvo's EUR350 million senior secured term loan A due
2015. The recovery rating on this instrument remains unchanged
at '4', indicating S&P's expectation of average (30%-50%)
recovery in the event of a payment default.
In addition, S&P lowered to 'CC' from 'CCC-' the issue rating on
Truvo's EUR100 million second-lien term loan B due 2015 and on
holding company Talon PIKco N.V.'s EUR52.3 million payment-in-
kind (PIK) notes due 2019. The recovery rating on these
instruments remains unchanged at '6', indicating S&P's
expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event of a
payment default.
The downgrades reflect S&P's view that, despite Truvo's recent
material debt repayments, a continuing decline in its earnings
and a lack of visibility on any turnaround in the print
directories industry point to an increased risk of financial
restructuring.
In particular, S&P believes that Truvo faces a possible covenant
breach in the coming quarters. A partial waiver of the lenders'
enforcement rights expires after the test in the first quarter of
2013, and in S&P's view the test threshold will remain
prohibitive thereafter. In S&P's opinion, the risk of a covenant
breach, combined with Truvo's high leverage and a tough operating
environment, could lead management to implement credit-dilutive
debt restructuring measures.
In addition, Truvo's term loan A is due for refinancing in 2015,
and in S&P's view an inability to refinance it before early 2014
could lead to issues around Truvo's status as a going concern.
Therefore, in S&P's opinion, the combination of a possible
covenant breach and upcoming refinancing risk, in the context of
a highly leveraged capital structure and declining operating
dynamics, could lead Truvo to undertake some form of financial
restructuring in the next 12 months.
S&P considers that Truvo's capital structure remains highly
leveraged, despite the group's recent EUR140 million of debt
repayments using proceeds from asset disposals and a U.S. tax
refund that lenders appropriated for debt repayment as part of an
enforcement process. As a result of a declining operating trend,
S&P estimates that Truvo's Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt-to-
EBITDA ratio will remain in the low double digits-- S&P estimates
adjusted leverage of 12.6x by Dec. 31, 2013. S&P's estimate
includes more than EUR60 million in PIK notes at Truvo's holding
company, Talon PIKco N.V., which S&P fully consolidate in Truvo's
accounts.
A revision of the outlook to stable and potential rating upside
depend on S&P taking the view that Truvo could maintain at least
adequate (15%) covenant headroom and stabilize its revenues,
EBITDA, and free cash flow, while successfully addressing the
2015 debt maturities. At this stage, S&P views this scenario as
remote.
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C R O A T I A
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NEXE GRUPA: Files for Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement Procedure
---------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews reports that Nexe Grupa said on Thursday it has submitted
a motion for the opening of a pre-bankruptcy settlement
procedure.
The company also said in a bourse filing that its affiliates
Nasicement, Dilj, Luka Tranzit, Igma and Nexe Beton have likewise
filed for pre-bankruptcy settlement before the competent
authorities, SeeNews relates.
Nexe Grupa said in a separate statement that by setting the
bankruptcy procedure in motion, the company wishes to accelerate
its financial and operational restructuring, having in mind the
large number of creditors involved, SeeNews notes.
Nexe Grupa -- http://www.nexe.hr-- is a Croatian building
materials producer. The company comprises around 20 companies
operating in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro. It is
active in construction and agriculture and in the production of
cement, bricks, tiles, concrete and lime.
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F R A N C E
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REXEL SA: Moody's Affirms 'Ba2' CFR, Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service changed the outlook on Rexel SA's
ratings to negative from stable. Moody's has concurrently
affirmed Rexel's existing ratings including its Ba2 corporate
family rating, Ba2-PD probability of default rating and Ba2
ratings on the company's senior unsecured notes due December
2016, 2018 and 2019.
Ratings Rationale:
"The change in outlook to negative from stable reflects Rexel's
weaker than expected credit metrics as of December 2012 with
limited prospects for meaningful recovery in 2013 given the
difficult macro-economic environment and the late-cycle nature of
Rexel's business" says Margaux Pery, lead analyst for Rexel. "It
also reflects some uncertainty as to the level of future free
cash flow generation, considering the level of cash dividends in
conjunction with ongoing M&A activity".
In spite of unfavorable trading conditions in almost all of
Rexel's markets which drove the organic same day sales down by
around 1.8%, the company's operating margin actually slightly
improved in 2012, as evidenced by EBITDA margin up to 7.4% from
7.3% the year before. However, Rexel's key credit metrics such as
net debt to EBITDA and Retained Cash Flow (RCF) to net debt
deteriorated as of December 2012. Rexel's net leverage increased
to 4.3x as of December 2012 from 3.9x the previous year and its
RCF to net debt decreased to 11.4% from 17.5% in 2011 as a result
of the combination of the company's more active external growth
strategy as well as the higher amount of dividend paid in cash to
shareholders.
Rexel's Ba2 CFR remains supported by the company's solid business
profile as a leading global distributor of low voltage electrical
products with a substantial revenue base and its track record at
delivering fairly stable operating profitability through the
cycle. However, Moody's expects that the macro-economic
environment in Europe and in the US where Rexel generates over
80% of its sales will remain challenging in 2013.
Rexel's liquidity profile remains solid. It is supported by the
company's EUR1 billion undrawn revolving credit facility and its
securitization programs. Moody's assumes that Rexel will be able
to successfully renew its European securitization program
maturing in December 2013 as well as extend the maturity of its
revolving credit facility due in December 2014.
What Could Change The Rating Down/Up
Downward pressure on the rating could potentially result from any
further deterioration in Rexel's credit protection measures
resulting from more adverse trading conditions beyond Moody's
expectations for 2013 or from shareholder friendly policies, such
that its retained cash flow (RCF)/net adjusted debt sustainably
falls below 15% or if its net adjusted debt/EBITDA (as adjusted
by Moody's) remains above 4.0x. The ratings outlook could
stabilize if Rexel demonstrates a prudent financial policy as
well as a successful implementation of its Energy in Motion
strategy leading to growth in profitability, while maintaining a
net debt/EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's) sustainably below
4.0x and an RCF/net debt (as adjusted by Moody's) above 15%.
The principal methodology used in this rating was the Global
Distribution & Supply Chain Services published in November 2011.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.
Based in France, Rexel is a leading global distributor of low
voltage products. For 2012, it reported total sales and EBITA of
EUR13.4 billion and EUR767.4 million respectively.
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G E R M A N Y
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HEIDELBERGER DRUCKMASCHINEN: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Credit Rating
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Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it revised its outlook to
stable from negative on Germany-based printing equipment
manufacturer Heidelberger Druckmaschinen AG (HDM). At the same
time, S&P affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit rating on
the company and S&P's 'CCC+' issue rating on its EUR304 million
senior unsecured notes. The '6' recovery rating on these notes
is unchanged, indicating S&P's expectations of negligible (0%-
10%) recovery in the event of a payment default.
The outlook revision primarily reflects S&P's belief that HDM
will continue to reap the benefits of the restructuring program
it initiated in 2011. While some of the restructuring gains will
feed through in fiscal 2013 (year ending March 31, 2013) S&P
anticipates the main impact on earnings will be in fiscal 2014.
Financial results released by HDM suggest that EBIT before
special items in its equipment division turned minimally positive
in October-December 2012, the third quarter of fiscal 2013. S&P
views this as a positive indicator on restructuring gains
achieved so far.
S&P has slightly changed its base-case scenario for HDM in fiscal
2013. This is mainly because S&P now believes that cash effects
from the restructuring are likely to be incurred evenly in fiscal
years 2013 and 2014, as opposed to its previous assumption that
most of the cash outlays for restructuring would become effective
in fiscal 2013. S&P is now forecasting in its base case a low-
single-digit increase in HDM's sales in fiscal 2013. S&P has
factored in EBITDA before special items of EUR110 million-
EUR120 million, translating into an EBITDA margin of about 4.0%-
4.5%. This is in line with projections in S&P's previous base
case.
The stable outlook incorporates S&P's expectation that HDM will
deliver stable revenues in fiscal 2014, coupled with an EBITDA
margin of about 7%, reflecting the benefits from the
restructuring program. S&P would view a ratio of FFO to debt in
the high single digits (in percent) in fiscal 2014 as
commensurate with the current rating.
S&P could lower the rating if the benefits of the restructuring
don't continue to materialize. S&P also views weak end-market
demand, notably from developed regions such as Europe and U.S. as
a key risk for the rating. Other drivers of potential negative
rating actions are operating results in fiscal 2014 falling short
of S&P's current base-case expectations or higher-than-expected
cash outflows adversely affecting liquidity.
S&P might consider an upgrade if HDM improved its operational
results significantly and reported EBITDA margins considerably
above 6%-7%, including positive FOCF generation for a sustained
period. S&P views this scenario as unlikely at this stage.
SANGUI BIOTECH: Incurs US$500,000 Net Loss in Fiscal 2nd Quarter
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Sangui BioTech International, Inc., reported a net loss of
US$500,404 on US$46,249 of revenues for the three months ended
Dec. 31, 2012, compared with a net loss of US$302,862 on US$1,043
of revenues for the prior fiscal period.
For the six months ended Dec. 31, 2012, the Company reported a
net loss of US$696,300 on US$48,043 of revenues, compared with a
net loss of US$557,716 on US$2,224 of revenues for the six months
ended Dec. 31, 2011.
The Company's balance sheet at Dec. 31, 2012, showed US$1.6
million in total assets, US$253,376 in total current liabilities,
and stockholders' equity of US$1.3 million.
The Company's balance sheet at June 30, 2012, showed US$1.1
million in total assets, US$168,351 in total current liabilities,
and stockholders' equity of US$959,374.
The Company has accumulated deficit of US$32.6 million as of
Dec. 31, 2012, and has been significantly reducing its working
capital since June 30, 2004.
A copy of the Form 10-Q is available at http://is.gd/NNEBCJ
About Sangui BioTech
Sangui BioTech International, Inc., incorporated in Colorado in
1995, and its subsidiary, Sangui BioTech GmbH, which is
headquartered in Witten, Germany, are engaged in the development
of artificial oxygen carriers (external applications of
hemoglobin, blood substitutes and blood additives) as well as in
the development, marketing and sales of cosmetics and wound
management products.
* * *
As reported in the TCR on Oct. 9, 2012, Sadler, Gibb &
Associates, LLC, in Farmington, Utah, expressed substantial doubt
about Sangui's ability to continue as a going concern. The
independent auditors noted that the Company had accumulated
losses of US$31.9 million for the period from inception through
June 30, 2012.
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G R E E C E
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NATIONAL BANK: Fitch Affirms B- Rating on Mortgage Covered Bonds
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Fitch Ratings has affirmed National Bank of Greece S.A.'s (NBG;
'CCC'/'C') mortgage covered bonds outstanding under Programme I
at 'B-' with a Negative Outlook and has removed them from Rating
Watch Negative (RWN).
The rating action follows a full review of the program, which has
one outstanding series of covered bonds totaling EUR846.2
million. The rating on the outstanding bonds was on RWN pending
the application of Fitch's updated residential mortgage loss
criteria.
Rating Rationale
The rating is based on NBG's Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) of 'CCC', a Discontinuity Cap (D-Cap) of 0 (full
discontinuity risk) and the asset percentage (AP) of 53% which
Fitch takes into account in its analysis, which corresponds to
the figure published in NBG's monthly investor report. The
Negative Outlook reflects the deteriorating asset performance,
the adverse operating environment and uncertainties surrounding
the macro-economic situation in Greece.
Sensitivities
The 'B-' rating would be vulnerable to downgrade if any of the
following occurred: (i) NBG's IDR was downgraded by one or more
notches to 'CCC-' or below; or (ii) the AP that Fitch takes into
account in its analysis increased above Fitch's 'B-' breakeven AP
of 55%.
The unchanged D-Cap of 0 is driven by the full discontinuity
assessment for the liquidity gap and systemic risk component;
notably, NBG's Programme I features a one-year extension period
in case of an issuer default event which, in Fitch's view, would
not provide sufficient time for a successful asset refinancing
given the highly stressed economic environment in Greece.
As of end-December 2012, the cover pool consisted of
approximately 37,500 residential mortgage loans originated by
NBG, totaling EUR1.9 billion, with a weighted average current
indexed loan-to-value of 58.2% as calculated by the agency. Fitch
has determined a cumulative weighted average frequency of
foreclosure (WAFF) for the cover assets of 30% and a weighted
average recovery rate (WARR) of 77% at 'B'-category.
Fitch has compared the cash flows from the cover pool in a wind-
down situation, subject to stressed defaults and losses and under
the management of a third party, to the payments due under the
outstanding covered bonds. The cover assets have a weighted
average life of about 11 years, assuming no prepayments, and the
covered bonds of almost four years. The mismatches between the
soft bullet covered bonds and the amortizing cover pool assets
expose the program to material refinancing risk. Fitch modelled
the cost at which the pool would be refinanced using its updated
refinancing spread assumptions.
The 53% AP Fitch takes into account in its analysis compares with
the Fitch breakeven level of AP of 55% for this program, which
allows the bonds assumed to be in default in a 'B-' scenario to
attain at least 71% recoveries. The Fitch breakeven AP will be
affected, among others, by the profile of the cover assets
relative to outstanding bonds, which can change, even in the
absence of new issuances. Therefore it cannot be assumed to
remain stable over time.
All assets and liabilities are EUR-denominated. The cover pool is
made up of fixed-rate assets (12.9%), floating rate assets linked
to Euribor (25.8%) and linked to the ECB reference rate (61.3%)
while the outstanding covered bonds pay a fixed rate of interest.
A liability swap is in place with Deutsche Bank AG (DBAG,
'A+'/'F1+') to hedge the interest rate risk between the floating
rate loans in the cover pool and the fixed-rate owed under the
covered bond. Furthermore, in its cash flow analysis, Fitch has
stressed the foreclosure timing assumptions as outlined in the
criteria to reflect the extension until the end of 2013 of the
mandatory auction freeze in Greece for debtor's main residences
of up to EUR300,000.
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I C E L A N D
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KAUPTHING BANK: Successor Sells Bonds to Offshore Investors
-----------------------------------------------------------
Omar R. Valdimarsson at Bloomberg News reports that Arion Bank hf
sold bonds to offshore investors as the successor to failed
Kaupthing Bank hf taps global markets more than four years after
Iceland's banking system collapsed under an US$85 billion
mountain of debt.
Bloomberg relates that Reykjavik-based Arion said in a statement
on Friday the lender raised NOK500 million (US$88 million) in
floating rate notes maturing in 2016, with a coupon that's 5
percentage points more than the Norwegian interbank offered rate.
The statement said that the sale was managed by Pareto Oehman and
sold to investors in Norway, Sweden, Finland, the U.K. and
mainland Europe and Asia, Bloomberg notes.
About Kaupthing Bank
Headquartered in Reykjavik, Iceland Kaupthing Bank --
http://www.kaupthing.com/-- is Iceland's largest bank and among
the Nordic region's 10 largest banking groups. With operations
in more than a dozen countries, the bank offers a range of
services including retail banking, corporate finance, asset
management, brokerage, private banking, treasury, and private
wealth management. Kaupthing was created by the 2003 merger of
Bunadarbanki and Kaupthing Bank. In October 2008, the Icelandic
government assumed control of Kaupthing Bank after taking similar
measures with rivals Landsbanki and Glitnir.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, on Nov. 30,
2008, Olafur Gardasson, assistant for Kaupthing Bank hf, filed a
petition under Chapter 15 of title 11 of the United States Code
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York commencing the Debtor's Chapter 15 case ancillary to
the Icelandic Proceeding and seeking recognition for the
Icelandic Proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" under the
Bankruptcy Code and relief in aid of the Icelandic Proceeding.
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I T A L Y
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BANCA MONTE: Court Rejects Codacons' State Aid Legal Challenge
--------------------------------------------------------------
Elisa Martinuzzi and Sonia Sirletti at Bloomberg News report that
an Italian court rejected a legal challenge to Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena SpA receiving EUR3.9 billion (US$5.2 billion) in
state aid.
According to Bloomberg, the regional administrative court said in
a ruling published on its Web site in Rome that it threw out the
claim by consumer group Codacons that the Bank of Italy and other
regulators didn't adequately monitor the Siena-based lender's
activities. The court, as cited by Bloomberg, said that alleged
damage by the bailout is still an eventuality.
As part of the suit Codacons sought access to a central bank
technical opinion on Monte Paschi drafted last month and not
released to the public, Bloomberg discloses. The document,
Bloomberg says, was filed to the court in a sealed envelope. The
central bank said two weeks ago Codacons's assertions were
"inadmissible and unfounded", Bloomberg recounts.
"Blocking aid would have hurt Italy's credibility," Bloomberg
quotes Alessandro Frigerio, a fund manager at RMJ Sgr in Milan,
as saying before the ruling was announced. "We have never seen a
government procedure, backed by the central bank, obstructed by a
tribunal."
Bloomberg relates that Codacons President Carlo Rienzi said
Codacons may appeal the ruling at the Council of State or may
file a new claim at the administrative court after the bonds are
issued.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 4,
2013, Bloomberg News said that Monte Paschi is seeking state aid
to bolster its balance sheet after the bank failed to meet the
capital requirements set by the European Banking Authority. The
lender is also selling assets and reducing risk and costs in a
three-year plan to restore liquidity, Bloomberg disclosed. Under
the government's rescue plan, Monte Paschi will sell securities,
dubbed "Monti bonds" after Prime Minister Mario Monti, to the
government with a 9% coupon that may rise to as much as 15%,
Bloomberg noted.
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA -- http://www.mps.it/-- is
an Italy-based company engaged in the banking sector. It
provides traditional banking services, asset management and
private banking, including life insurance, pension funds and
investment trusts. In addition, it offers investment banking,
including project finance, merchant banking and financial
advisory services. The Company comprises more than 3,000
branches, and a structure of channels of distribution. Banca
Monte dei Paschi di Siena Group has subsidiaries located
throughout Italy, Europe, America, Asia and North Africa. It has
numerous subsidiaries, including Mps Sim SpA, MPS Capital
Services Banca per le Imprese SpA, MPS Banca Personale SpA, Banca
Toscana SpA, Monte Paschi Ireland Ltd. and Banca MP Belgio SpA.
* * *
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 04,
2013, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it lowered its
long-term counterparty credit rating on Italy-based Banca Monte
dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS) to 'BB' from 'BB+'. S&P also
lowered its rating on MPS' Lower Tier 2 subordinated notes to
'CCC+' from 'B-'. These ratings remain on CreditWatch,
where S&P originally placed them with negative implications on
Dec. 5, 2012. S&P lowered the ratings on MPS' junior
subordinated debt to 'CCC' from 'CCC+' and on its preferred stock
to 'CCC-' from 'CCC'. S&P also placed these ratings on
CreditWatch with negative implications. S&P affirmed its 'B'
short-term counterparty credit rating on the bank. The downgrade
follows MPS' recent announcement related to the investigation of
potential losses on three structured transactions.
SAFILO GROUP: S&P Puts 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating Watch Developing
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it placed its 'B-' long-
term corporate credit rating on Italy-based eyewear manufacturer
Safilo Group SpA (Safilo) and its 'CCC+' issue rating on the
group's second-lien notes on CreditWatch with developing
implications.
The recovery rating of '5' on the second-lien notes remains
unchanged, indicating S&P's expectation of modest (10%-30%)
recovery for noteholders in the event of a payment default.
The CreditWatch placement reflects S&P's understanding that
Safilo has not yet secured any long-term refinancing, while it
reported EUR182 million of short-term debt on Sept. 30, 2012,
including the second-lien notes maturing on May 15, 2013. S&P
has consequently revised its assessment of Safilo's liquidity to
"weak" from "less than adequate."
In addition to the EUR127 million second-lien notes, of which
EUR68 million held by Safilo's main shareholder HAL following the
2010 debt restructuring, Safilo reported EUR55 million of other
short-term debt on Sept. 30, 2012. S&P understands that Safilo
has not finalized any plan to refinance this total short-term
debt maturing by Sept. 30, 2013.
S&P calculates that Safilo's cash balances and undrawn committed
long-term lines -- totaling EUR187 million on Sept. 30, 2012 --
should just about cover the short-term debt. Safilo's 2015
revolving credit facility (RCF), of which EUR114 million was
available on Sept. 30, 2012, can be used to repay the second-lien
notes, following the 2010 debt restructuring. In addition, S&P
understands that HAL could extend a loan of up to about
EUR40 million to Safilo, if it was unable to refinance its
second-lien notes.
Without a refinancing, S&P believes that Safilo would likely be
able to address its 2013 debt obligations, but liquidity
thereafter would be very tight. Safilo would in S&P's opinion
have minimal flexibility to finance its operations, notably its
working capital. The group generally has significant working
capital needs due to the seasonality of its operations.
S&P aims to resolve the CreditWatch in the next three months.
S&P will closely monitor Safilo's potential refinancing plans.
The developing implications mean that S&P could raise, lower, or
affirm the ratings on Safilo, depending on the speed and progress
of its refinancing plans and implementation of a long-term
financing structure.
S&P understands Safilo is currently in talks with its bank
regarding long-term financing and addressing the second-lien
notes maturing in May 2013.
S&P foresees potential rating upside if Safilo puts in place a
long-term financing structure and restores its liquidity to
"adequate" under its criteria.
Without long-term refinancing, S&P calculates that Safilo could
meet its 2013 debt obligations through cash and undrawn lines.
But this would lead to a strong liquidity squeeze and limit
Safilo's leeway to fund operations. Therefore, if discussions on
long-term refinancing are not successful, S&P could downgrade
Safilo, reflecting its tight liquidity ahead of its 2013 debt
maturities.
SESTANTE FINANCE: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rated Cl. C1 Notes on Watch Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed on CreditWatch negative
its credit ratings on various classes of notes in Sestante
Finance S.r.l.'s series 1, 2, 3, and 4 for counterparty and
performance reasons.
Specifically, S&P has:
-- Placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings on the class A1
and A2 notes in Sestante Finance series 1 for counterparty
reasons;
-- Placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings on the class A
and B notes in Sestante Finance series 2 for counterparty
reasons;
-- Placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings on the class A
and B notes in Sestante Finance series 3 for counterparty
reasons. S&P has also placed on CreditWatch negative its
rating on the class B, C1, and C2 notes for performance
reasons.
-- Placed on CreditWatch negative its ratings on the class A1
and A2 notes in Sestante Finance series 4 for counterparty
reasons. S&P has also placed on CreditWatch negative its
ratings on the class B, C1, and C2 notes for performance
reasons.
COUNTERPARTY ANALYSIS
The CreditWatch negative placements of S&P's ratings on the class
A and B notes in Sestante Finance's series 1, 2, 3, and 4 follow
S&P's Feb. 7, 2012 CreditWatch negative placements of its 'A/A-1'
long- and short-term counterparty ratings on Commerzbank AG--the
swap counterparty.
Since the swap documents for these transactions do not comply
with S&P's 2012 counterparty criteria, but do comply with its
previous counterparty criteria, the notes in each transaction can
achieve a maximum rating that is equal to its long-term issuer
credit rating (ICR) on the swap counterparty plus one notch.
S&P's ratings on the senior classes of notes in these
transactions are therefore linked to its long-term ICR on the
interest swap counterparty--Commerzbank--plus one notch.
Any change to S&P's long-term ICR on Commerzbank could result in
an equivalent change to S&P's ratings that it has placed on
CreditWatch negative for counterparty reasons in Sestante Finance
series 1, 2, 3, and 4, all else being equal. Consequently, the
resolution of S&P's counterparty-related CreditWatch placements
that it has taken depends on S&P's resolution of its CreditWatch
placement of its long-term ICR on Commerzbank.
CREDIT PERFORMANCE
S&P's rating actions on the class B, C1, and C2 notes in Sestante
Finance 4, and the class B, C1, and C2 notes in Sestante Finance
3 follow its assessment of the arrears and defaults in these
transactions. Note that S&P has placed on CreditWatch negative
its rating on the class B notes in Sestante Finance series 3 for
both counterparty and performance reasons.
As of December 2012, delinquencies of more than 30 days were
9.51% and 12.68% for series 3 and 4, respectively. Severe
delinquencies (90+ days) were 5.64% and 7.81% for series 3 and 4,
respectively.
Furthermore, following rising new defaults recorded on the most
recent IPD, the unpaid principal deficiency ledger (PDL) balance
has increased to EUR12,177,130 from EUR10,910,493 for series 3,
and to EUR29,809,660 from EUR27,809,660 for series 4. A further
rise in arrears transitioning to defaults could reduce credit
enhancement available to the entire capital structure in both
transactions, because they have not been able to generate enough
excess spread to cover the unpaid PDL balances. S&P expects to
resolve these performance-related CreditWatch placements in due
course.
Sestante Finance's series 1, 2, 3, and 4 are Italian residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transactions backed by pools of
residential mortgage loans that Meliorbanca S.p.A. originated in
Italy.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities.
The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially rated
(including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011. If
applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating
To From
Ratings Placed On CreditWatch Negative
Sestante Finance S.r.l.
EUR412.3 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Mortgage-Backed Notes
Series 1
A1 A+ (sf)/Watch Neg A+ (sf)
A2 A+ (sf)/Watch Neg A+ (sf)
Sestante Finance S.r.l.
EUR647.2 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Series 2
A A+ (sf)/Watch Neg A+ (sf)
B A+ (sf)/Watch Neg A+ (sf)
Sestante Finance S.r.l.
EUR899.51 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Series 3
A A+ (sf)/Watch Neg A+ (sf)
B A+ (sf)/Watch Neg A+ (sf)
C1 BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)
C2 B (sf)/Watch Neg B (sf)
Sestante Finance S.r.l.
EUR647.9 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Series 4
A1 A+ (sf)/Watch Neg A+ (sf)
A2 A+ (sf)/Watch Neg A+ (sf)
B BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg BBB- (sf)
C1 BB (sf)/Watch Neg BB (sf)
C2 B (sf)/Watch Neg B (sf)
===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================
BTA BANK: Moody's Upgrades Long-Term Deposit Ratings to 'Caa1'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded BTA Bank's long-term local and
foreign-currency deposit ratings to Caa1 from Caa2. Concurrently,
Moody's affirmed the bank's E standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) and raised the corresponding baseline credit
assessment (BCA) to caa3 from ca.
The rating actions follow BTA's completion of its US$11.2 billion
market debt restructuring in December 2012, which is supportive
of the bank's credit fundamentals.
The outlook on the BFSR remains stable, whereas the outlook for
the deposit ratings is developing.
Ratings Rationale:
Standalone Rating
Under the debt restructuring completed in December 2012,
Kazakhstan's National Welfare Fund, Samruk-Kazyna, remains BTA's
majority shareholder with a 97% stake. The restructuring included
the cancellation of existing debt, a debt-to-equity conversion as
well as the issuance of longer-maturity bonds. These aspects had
the following credit-positive effects on BTA's key financial
metrics (1) equity was restored to US$1.4 billion at year-end
2012 from a US$8 billion deficit at end-H1 2012, resulting in an
Equity-to-Assets ratio of 13.8% at year-end 2012, according to
the bank's regulatory reports and; (2) total liabilities were
halved to US$8.7 billion (including foreign-market borrowings of
around US$1 billion) at year-end 2012, from US$17.9 billion at
end-H1 2012. As a result the bank's operating losses are expected
to decline substantially in 2013, owing to over US$300 million of
annual savings from the reduced debt burden and improved revenue
due to support from the government through a higher interest rate
on the Samruk-Kazyna bonds held by BTA.
Current level of loan loss reserves will likely be sufficient to
absorb expected losses from problem loans estimated at 75% of
total loans. The recovery of some of the problem loans may also
support BTA's financial metrics. However, significant uncertainty
remains as to the sustainability of the bank as an ongoing
concern. Despite the expected positive effects of the
restructuring on the bank's performance, Moody's expects that BTA
will report substantial losses at least over the next two years
stemming from weak operating results and loan loss provisions for
newly underwritten loans. These losses and rising level of risk
assets could considerably erode BTA's capitalization. Therefore
the need for additional emergency support remains elevated.
Deposit Ratings
Moody's incorporates a moderate systemic support probability into
BTA's deposit ratings due to the bank's significant market share
in the Kazakh banking system and its government ownership. As a
result, BTA's Caa1 deposit ratings receive two-notches of uplift
from its caa3 BCA.
Moody's understands that BTA may be privatized by the end of
2013, as instructed by Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev in early
February. Privatization could have either positive or negative
effects on BTA's deposit ratings, depending on the profile and
financial strength of the potential buyer. Consequently, the
deposit ratings carry a developing outlook, which indicates that
the ratings could either be upgraded or downgraded over the next
12 to 18 months.
What Could Move the Ratings Up/Down
Upwards pressure might develop on BTA's standalone and deposit
ratings if the bank restores its operating profitability and
improves its liquidity.
Downwards pressure might develop on BTA's standalone and deposit
ratings if the bank's losses significantly weaken its capital or
its liquidity cushion deteriorates notably.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.
Headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan, BTA reported total assets
and equity of US$10.07 billion and US$1.39 billion, respectively,
as at year-end 2012 according to the bank's regulatory financial
statements.
=================
L I T H U A N I A
=================
UKIO BANKAS: Siauliu Bankas Agrees to Assume Insured Deposits
-------------------------------------------------------------
Bryan Bradley at Bloomberg News reports that Siauliu Bankas AB,
the Lithuanian lender part-owned by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, will assume the insured deposits
of insolvent Ukio Bankas AB in a deal that will almost double its
size.
According to Bloomberg, Siauliu said in an e-mailed statement
that under a contract signed on Saturday night with Ukio's
administrator and the state deposit-insurance fund, Siauliu will
take over LTL2.7 billion (US$1 billion) of Ukio deposits and
assets of the same value.
Siauliu said the EBRD will grant it a EUR20 million (US$26
million) 10-year subordinated loan to strengthen its capital base
for the expansion, Bloomberg notes.
Bloomberg relates that the Bank of Lithuania said in a separate
e-mailed statement the contract, which the Lithuanian government
and central bank supported, obliges Siauliu "to renew banking
services for the customers of Ukio Bankas in the shortest time
possible".
The central bank said that the preliminary value of the assets
transferred to Siauliu, determined by auditor KPMG Baltic, may be
revised in three months after a more detailed assessment, in
which case the liabilities of the parties to the contract will
also be revised, Bloomberg notes. It said that bankruptcy
proceedings are planned to recover remaining assets of Ukio,
including property in Scotland and elsewhere, for creditors,
among whom the deposit-insurance fund will be the largest,
according to Bloomberg.
About Ukio Bankas
Ukio Bankas AB is a Lithuania-based commercial bank, which is
involved in the provision of banking, financial, investment, life
insurance and leasing services to individuals and companies. It
is Lithuania's sixth-largest lender by assets. The Central Bank
suspended Ukio Bankas' operations on Feb. 12, 2013, after it was
established the lender had been involved in risky activities. A
majority 64.9% of Ukio Bankas had been owned by Russian born-
businessman Vladimir Romanov.
===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================
AI CHEM: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B+' Corp. Rating; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'B+'
long-term corporate credit rating to Luxembourg-registered
coating resins producer AI Chem Intermediate Sarl (AI Chem). The
outlook is stable.
In addition, S&P assigned to the proposed US$120 million
revolving credit facility (RCF) and US$565 million first-lien
term loan S&P's 'B+' preliminary issue ratings and recovery
ratings of '3', indicating S&P's expectation of meaningful (50%-
70%) recovery in the event of a payment default. S&P also
assigned to the proposed US$200 million second-lien term loan its
'B-' preliminary issue rating and a recovery rating of '6',
indicating S&P's expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in
the event of a payment default.
The preliminary ratings are subject to the successful issuance of
the term loans and RCF and S&P's review of final documentation.
Any change in the amount or terms of the issue would trigger a
review by Standard & Poor's and could affect the current
corporate credit and issue ratings.
The 'B+' preliminary corporate credit rating reflects AI Chem's
business risk profile, which S&P's assess as "weak," and its
financial risk profile, which S&P assess as "aggressive."
"We view the business risk profile as "weak" because of the
company's large exposure to cyclical end markets, including
automotive, industrial, and construction segments, which account
for about 70% of revenues. The company is exposed to raw
material prices volatility, primarily derived from propylene, and
the fragmented nature of the coating resin market, which makes
the market competitive. We also note the company's moderate
customer concentration -- its top 10 customers represent about
37% of revenues. In light of the announced acquisition by Advent
and spin-off from Cytec Industries Inc., we see risks associated
with operating as a stand-alone entity," S&P said.
"These weaknesses are mitigated in our view by AI Chem's leading
market positions in the segments from which the company derives
over 60% of its revenues. We view as positive the company's
geographic diversification -- 18% of its revenues derive from the
U.S. market and nearly 25% from the higher-growth Asia-Pacific
region. That said, approximately 50% of revenues come from the
EMEA market, which we expect to remain sluggish in 2013. We
expect AI Chem's profitability to benefit from restructuring
actions, an improved product mix, and pricing initiatives
undertaken since the economic downturn in 2009. Although volumes
have declined to 371 thousand metric tons (kMT) in 2012 from 416
kMT in 2010, reported EBITDA improved to US$177 million from
US$142 million over the same period," S&P added.
S&P assess the financial risk profile as "aggressive" because it
calculates that the Standard & Poor's-adjusted debt to EBITDA
ratio will be about 4.7x after the transaction, based on EBITDA
of US$177 million in 2012. It would be 4.0x based on pro forma
adjusted EBITDA of US$214 million; this includes potential stand-
alone cost savings. When adding US$264 million of preferred
stock to debt, leverage rises to 6.2x (or 5.1x pro forma). At
closing, S&P foresees adjusted pro forma debt of EUR837 million,
which includes US$40 million of postretirement deficit, US$12
million of operating leases, and US$11 million of asset
retirement obligations. S&P assess the company's financial policy
as "aggressive" given its private equity ownership, and factor in
appetite for acquisitions. When the transaction is completed, AI
Chem should benefit from "adequate" liquidity, supported by a
long-term debt maturity profile and sizable availability under
the RCF.
S&P factors into the rating its expectation that AI Chem will
continue to generate consistently positive free operating cash
flow (FOCF), despite S&P's forecast that the European market will
remain soft in 2013. S&P anticipates EBITDA of US$180 million-
$190 million in 2013, benefitting from various cost efficiency
measures undertaken in the past and resulting from a transition
to operations as a stand-alone entity. S&P assumes higher
capital expenditure of about US$70 million in the next two years
(versus about US$38 million in 2012), of which about US$35
million for maintenance, while the rest relates to investments
due to the process of spinning off AI Chem from its parent. S&P
therefore anticipates leverage of 4.5x at the end of 2013,
gradually declining in the following years on the back of the
modest recovery that S&P anticipates in Europe.
The stable outlook reflects S&P's expectation that AI Chem will
continue to generate positive FOCF and maintain adequate
liquidity in 2013-2014. Although S&P expects the European
operating environment to remain difficult, S&P anticipates that
this will be partly offset by cost savings. S&P also expects
that over the next one to two years the company will be able to
maintain credit metrics which S&P considers appropriate for the
current rating, including debt to EBITDA of between 4x to 5x
(excluding the preferred stock).
S&P could lower the ratings if profitability declines materially,
as a result of increasingly competitive market conditions, the
loss of a key customer or worse-than-expected macroeconomic
contractions. Based on S&P's downside scenario, it could lower
the ratings if the EBITDA margin weakened to 10%, coupled with
volume declines of 10%. More generally, downward rating pressure
would likely arise if adjusted debt to EBITDA (excluding
preferred stock) increased to about 6x, without any near-term
prospect of recovery.
Rating upside is constrained by S&P's criteria, which incorporate
the likelihood of some moderate releveraging over the two-year
rating horizon. Other constraining factors include the cyclical
nature of the business, which stems from a meaningful portion of
its revenues being derived from cyclical end markets.
=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================
IBERDROLA INTERNATIONAL: S&P Rates Subordinated Securities 'BB+'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that it assigned its
'BB+' long-term issue rating to the undated, optionally
deferrable, and deeply subordinated capital securities being
issued by Iberdrola International B.V. (the issuer; not rated).
The securities benefit from an unconditional and irrevocable
guarantee from Spain-based utility Iberdrola S.A. (Iberdrola or
the guarantor; BBB/Stable/A-2). The transaction volume is
subject to market conditions.
S&P considers the new securities to have intermediate equity
content until their first call date in 2018 because they meet
S&P's criteria in terms of subordination, permanence, and
optional deferability during this period.
S&P arrived at its 'BB+' issue rating on the new securities by
notching down from S&P's 'BBB' long-term corporate credit rating
(CCR) on the guarantor, Iberdrola. The two-notch differential
between the issue rating and the CCR reflects S&P's notching
methodology, which calls for:
-- A one-notch deduction for subordination because the CCR on
Iberdrola is investment grade (that is, higher than 'BB+');
and
-- An additional one-notch deduction for payment flexibility
to reflect that the deferral of interest is optional and
that the CCR on Iberdrola is investment grade.
The notching of the new securities is linked to S&P's perception
of a relatively low likelihood of deferral. Should S&P's
perception change, it may increase the notching significantly
and, in relative terms, more quickly than a revision of the CCR
on Iberdrola.
In addition, to reflect S&P's view of the intermediate equity
content of the new securities, it allocates 50% of the related
payments on these securities as a fixed charge and 50% as an
equivalent of a common dividend, in line with S&P's hybrid
capital criteria. The 50% treatment of principal and accrued
interest also applies to S&P's adjustment of debt.
KEY FACTORS IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTRUMENT'S PERMANENCE
Although the securities are perpetual, they can be called at any
time for tax, gross-up, rating, or accounting events.
Furthermore, the issuer can redeem them for cash as of the first
call date in 2018, and every five years thereafter. The issuer
is also free to buy back the securities on the open market at any
time, which S&P sees as negative for its assessment of their
equity content. This is partly mitigated by the issuer's intent
to replace the securities, if such repurchases exceed more than
10% in any 12-month period, or more than 25% in any 10-year
period.
S&P understands that Iberdrola will use the proceeds for general
corporate purposes. S&P also notes that Iberdrola recently
announced a share buyback to partially offset the dilutive effect
of a high take-up of its 2013 scrip dividend. However, S&P
understands that Iberdrola remains committed to its strategy of
using free cash flows (after tariff deficit securitization
receipts and asset disposals) to reduce debt in order to
strengthen its credit metrics.
The hybrid transaction only marginally affects S&P's base-case
forecasts. This is because the share buyback offsets the support
that the hybrid gives the credit metrics, and because overall
equity still increases slightly as a result of the scrip
dividend. Nevertheless, S&P could view any further share buybacks
that reduce equity significantly, or any open market purchases of
the hybrid, as signs of less credit-supportive financial
policies, which could lead S&P to re-assess its opinion of the
hybrid's equity content.
The interest to be paid on the new securities will increase by 25
basis points in 2023 and a further 75 basis points in 2038. S&P
considers the cumulative 100 basis points as a material step-up--
unmitigated by any current commitment to replace the instrument
in 2038--and as providing an incentive for Iberdrola to redeem
the instrument in 2038.
Consequently, in accordance with S&P's criteria, it will no
longer recognize the instrument as having intermediate equity
content after the first call date in 2018, because the remaining
period until its economic maturity would, by then, be less than
20 years. However, S&P classifies the instrument's equity content
as intermediate until the first call date as long as S&P believes
that the loss of the beneficial intermediate equity content
treatment will not cause the instrument to be called at that
point. Iberdrola's willingness to maintain or replace the
instrument in the event of a reclassification of equity content
to minimal is underpinned by its statement of intent.
KEY FACTORS IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTRUMENT'S DEFERABILITY
In S&P's view, the issuer's option to defer payment on the new
securities is discretionary. This means that the issuer may
elect not to pay accrued interest on an interest payment date
because it has no obligation to do so. However, any outstanding
deferred interest payment will have to be settled in cash if the
issuer or guarantor declares or pays a cash equity dividend or
interest on equally ranking securities, and if the guarantor and
its subsidiaries redeem or repurchase shares or equally ranking
securities. S&P sees this as a negative factor. That said, this
condition remains acceptable under S&P's methodology because once
the issuer has settled the deferred amount, it can still choose
to defer on the next interest payment date.
Iberdrola retains the option to defer coupons throughout the
instrument's life. The deferred interest on the proposed
securities is cash cumulative, and will ultimately be settled in
cash.
KEY FACTORS IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE INSTRUMENT'S SUBORDINATION
The new securities (and coupons) are intended to constitute
direct, unsecured, and deeply subordinated obligations of the
issuer and guarantor. The new securities rank senior to common
shares. In S&P's notching of the proposed securities, it do not
make a distinction for the degree of subordination.
RATINGS LIST
New Rating
Iberdrola International B.V.
Junior Subordinated* BB+
* Guaranteed by Iberdrola S.A.
PANTHER CDO IV: S&P Cuts Ratings on 3 Note Classes to 'CCC-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Panther CDO IV B.V.'s class E1, E2, and P (combo) notes. At the
same time, S&P has affirmed its ratings on the class A1, A2, B,
C, and D notes.
The rating actions follow S&P's assessment of the transaction's
performance based on the trustee report (dated Dec. 31, 2012),
S&P's credit and cash flow analysis, the application of its
relevant criteria, and recent transaction developments.
Since S&P's previous review of this transaction on May 29, 2012,
it has observed an increase in the available credit enhancement
for the class A1 notes due to the deleveraging of this class.
Conversely, the level of credit enhancement available to all
other classes of notes in this transaction has decreased. In
S&P's view, this is due to the failure of all par coverage tests
of the class A1, A2, B, C, D, and E1 E2 notes. As a result, the
issuer has deferred the interest due on the class B, C, D, E1,
and E2 notes and the proportion of assets that S&P considers to
be defaulted has increased to EUR36.06 million from EUR35.6
million since S&P's May 2012 review, resulting in a lower
aggregate performing collateral balance. Overall, the class B,
C, D, and E notes' outstanding notional amount has increased to
EUR74.6 million from EUR73.7 million since S&P's May 2012 review.
In addition, the weighted-average spread earned on the assets has
marginally increased to 2.32% from 2.30% since S&P's previous
review.
S&P's ratings on the class A1 and A2 notes address timely payment
of interest and ultimate payment of principal, and S&P's ratings
on the other classes of notes address ultimate payment of
interest and principal. S&P's rating on the class P (combo)
notes only addresses ultimate payment of principal.
The proportion of assets that S&P considers to be rated in the
'CCC' category ('CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-') and that S&P considers
to be defaulted (assets rated 'CC', 'C', 'SD' [selective
default], and 'D') has increased since its previous review.
None of the par coverage tests comply with the required triggers
under the transaction documents, which were failing as of S&P's
May 2012 review.
S&P has subjected the capital structure to its cash flow
analysis, based on the methodology and assumptions outlined in
its 2012 and 2009 collateralized debt obligation (CDO) criteria,
to determine the break-even default rate (BDR) at each rating
level.
S&P used the reported portfolio balance that it considered to be
performing, the principal cash balance (if any), the weighted-
average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates that S&P
considered to be appropriate. S&P incorporated various cash flow
stress scenarios, using various default patterns, in conjunction
with different interest rate stress scenarios as outlined in
S&P's criteria.
To assess the collateral pool's credit risk, S&P used CDO
Evaluator 6.0.1 to generate scenario default rates (SDRs) at each
rating level. S&P then compared these SDRs with their respective
BDRs.
S&P has analyzed counterparty risk by applying its 2012
counterparty criteria. The transaction features an interest rate
hedge and asset swaps (classified as 'Derivatives' under S&P's
criteria), the documents for which do not comply with S&P's
current counterparty criteria. As such, the maximum potential
rating on the notes can be no higher than one notch above the
issuer credit rating of the counterparty, unless the current
credit enhancement available to the notes is sufficient to cover
both asset credit risk and counterparty risk--after the
application of appropriate rating stresses. The transaction
documents for the bank account comply with S&P's criteria.
Taking into account the observations outlined above, S&P has
affirmed its ratings on the class A1, A2, B, C, and D notes
because the available levels of credit enhancement are
commensurate with the currently assigned ratings.
S&P has lowered its ratings on the class E1 and E2 notes due to
the application of the largest obligor test and largest industry
test, two supplemental stress tests that S&P introduced in its
2012 CDO criteria. The class P (combo) notes comprise the class
E1 and subordinated notes. S&P has lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from
'CCC+ (sf)' its rating on the class P (combo) notes based on the
same rationale applied to its rated component, i.e., the class E1
notes.
These tests address event and model risk that might be present in
the transaction and assess whether a CDO tranche has sufficient
credit enhancement (not including excess spread) to withstand
specified combinations of underlying asset defaults in addition
to S&P's cash flow analysis. Although S&P's cash flow analysis
showed that the class E1 and E2 notes passed at a 'CCC+' rating
level, the supplemental stress tests capped at 'CCC- (sf)' the
maximum potential ratings for these classes of notes.
Panther CDO IV is a CDO transaction backed by pools of structured
finance assets and corporate bond and loans, which closed 2006.
This semi-annual paying transaction is still in its reinvestment
period, which is scheduled to end in March 2014.
STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT
SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.
If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:
http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com
RATINGS LIST
Class Rating
To From
Panther CDO IV B.V.
EUR410 Million Floating-Rate Notes
Ratings Lowered
E1 CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)
E2 CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)
P (combo) CCC- (sf) CCC+ (sf)
Ratings Affirmed
A1 AA- (sf)
A2 A+ (sf)
B BBB+ (sf)
C BB+ (sf)
D B+ (sf)
SNS REAAL: Wins Temporary EU Approval for Recapitalizations
-----------------------------------------------------------
Aoife White at Bloomberg News reports that SNS Reaal NV won
temporary approval from European Union regulators for
recapitalizations and a bridge loan from the Dutch government,
which took control of the country's fourth-largest lender earlier
this month.
According to Bloomberg, the EU said in an e-mailed statement on
Friday that a restructuring plan for SNS Reaal must be sent to
the European Commission within six months before the Brussels-
based authority gives final approval for the aid.
The EU will examine a EUR300 million (US$395 million)
recapitalization and a EUR1.1 billion bridge loan for SNS Reaal
and a EUR1.9 billion recapitalization for its SNS Bank unit,
Bloomberg discloses.
"The intervention by the Dutch state leads to far-reaching and
appropriate burden sharing by shareholders and hybrid capital
holders," Bloomberg quotes the EU as saying in the statement.
"Through the nationalization all capital holders of SNS Reaal and
SNS Bank -- including hybrid capital holders -- are fully
participating in the losses of SNS Reaal."
The EU must examine large government payments to banks to ensure
they don't receive an unfair advantage over rivals, Bloomberg
states. It has required banks to sell assets or set limits on
executive bonuses, acquisitions and dividends to compensate for
harm to competition in return for final approval for state help,
Bloomberg notes.
Bloomberg relates that Ben Feiertag, a spokesman for the Dutch
finance ministry, said in an e-mail [Fri]day's decision allows
the Dutch government to proceed with the capital injections and
the bridge loan.
According to Bloomberg, Roland Kroes, a spokesman for SNS Reaal,
said the bank had "taken note of the announcement and will get
started on the restructuring plan."
SNS REAAL NV -- http://www.snsreaal.nl-- is a Netherlands-based
financial services provider engaged in banking and insurance.
The Company's activities are divided into five segments: SNS
Bank, providing banking services both for the retail and small
and medium enterprises, such as mortgages, asset growth and asset
protection, insurance, payments, savings and financing; Property
Finance; Zwitserleven, providing pension insurance services,
mortgages and investment products; REAAL providing life and non-
life insurances; and Group activities. As of December 31, 2011,
the Company operated through 16 wholly owned subsidiaries, such
as SNS Bank NV, REAAL NV, SNS REAAL Invest NV and SNS Asset
Management NV, among others.
Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem took control of SNS
Reaal on Feb. 1 after real estate losses brought the bank to the
brink of collapse. The nationalization included shares and
subordinated bonds in SNS Reaal NV and SNS Bank NV.
===========
P O L A N D
===========
LOT POLISH: To Present Rescue Plan Next Month
---------------------------------------------
The Associated Press reports that Poland's LOT airline said
Friday it will present a plan to stave off bankruptcy next month
after the government indicated that there will be no more money
for the lossmaking state-owned company.
LOT spokesman Marek Klucinski said the rescue plan will be
presented March 20 and will include layoffs among some 2,000
employees and a deep restructuring of the company and its routes,
the AP relates.
In 2012, LOT carried about 5 million passengers, but incurred
losses of PLN157 million, chiefly due to high fuel prices and the
changing rate of the zloty, the AP recounts. It sought a
government loan of some PLN1 billion (US$312 million) and so far
has received around PLN400 million to service debts and
temporarily stabilize the budget, the AP relates. Poland will
need to clear that move with the European Commission, which
monitors whether government support violates competition rules,
the AP notes.
According to the AP, Prime Minister Donald Tusk has indicated
there will be no more "infusions" or efforts to save LOT "at any
cost."
The government owns almost 68% of LOT shares, the AP discloses.
Another 25% belong to a group that specializes in restructuring
companies, while just under 7% are in the hands of employees, the
AP notes.
The plan to float LOT on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, possibly this
year, remains, the AP states.
As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 19,
2012, The Financial Times related that Lot Polish Airlines asked
for PLN1 billion in aid, and the full amount of help could come
to PLN1.5 billion. An aviation expert said that without an
immediate cash infusion, Lot will fail to pay its bills for fuel,
airport fees and salaries, the FT noted. Lot has put some of the
blame for its troubles on a fall in business-class sales because
the financial crisis is prompting many people to fly economy
instead, the FT disclosed. Lot faces competition at the bottom
end from carriers such as Ryanair and Hungary's Wizz Air, while
airlines such as Lufthansa siphon off higher-end Polish
travelers, the FT said.
Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, Polskie Linie Lotnicze LOT, or
LOT Polish Airlines -- http://www.lot.com-- serves about a dozen
cities in Poland and about 120 destinations across Europe and
North America. Subsidiaries include regional carrier EuroLOT and
charter operator Centralwings. Overall, LOT and its affiliates
maintain a fleet of about 55 aircraft, consisting of Embraer
regional jets, Boeing 767s and 737s, and ATR turboprops. The
airline is a member of the Star Alliance marketing group, and LOT
serves many of its North American destinations through code-
sharing with Star partners United Airlines and Air Canada.
(Code-sharing allows airlines to sell tickets on one another's
flights and thus extend their networks.) The Polish government
owns 68% of the company.
===========
R U S S I A
===========
KOKS OAO: Consent Solicitation No Impact on Moody's 'B2' Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service reports that it views as credit neutral
for OAO KOKS (B2 stable) the company's launch of a consent
solicitation process.
On February 19, 2013, KOKS submitted a consent solicitation to
its bondholders to amend certain covenants, namely those limiting
its ability to incur debt in excess of US$150 million permitted
indebtedness if its leverage, as measured by gross debt/EBITDA,
exceeds 3.5x. In addition, KOKS's consent solicitation included a
request to increase the maximum share of its secured indebtedness
to 25% from the current 15%. Weak market environment, with prices
for the company's pig iron and coke in 2012 on average 10% and
30%, respectively, lower than in 2011, will likely lead its
debt/EBITDA ratio to approach 4.0x as of year-end 2012.
On February 15, 2013, KOKS renegotiated its covenants package
with Sberbank (Baa1 stable), its major creditor, and plans to
soften its bond covenants accordingly.
Given that its Butovskaya coking coal mine is almost complete and
expected to start production in H1 2013, Moody's considers that a
cap on borrowings -- assuming that the company failed to obtain
consent to soften the covenants -- would mostly affect Tikhova
mine, as the company plans to invest approximately US$300 million
in the development of this mine over the next three years.
Overall, the company has adjusted its 2013 capex plans downwards
by around 30% (2012: by around 20%).
The company needs to obtain the consent from at least 75% of the
responded bondholders to change the covenants. Moody's believes
that the consent solicitation is likely to be accepted by the
creditors due to (1) the remuneration they will receive, with the
company paying up to 1.5% to those who consent by 4 March and
0.75% those consenting between 4 and 13 March; (2) substantial
proportion of the bonds kept by relationship banks, which are
likely to support the covenants reset; (3) the increased appetite
for risk currently observed in the marketplace; and (4) the
recent recovery in pig iron prices, which will contribute to an
improvement in the company's metrics in 2013.
Despite Moody's view that the consent solicitation process is
credit neutral for KOKS, the rating agency notes that if the
recovery in pig iron/coke prices is not sustained, this could
weaken the company's credit metrics and increase its leverage
further. This would put the company's ratings and/or outlook
under pressure.
KOKS is a relatively small Russia-based producer of coking coal,
coke, iron ore and pig iron. In 2012, it produced 1.6 million
tons of coking coal, 2.6 million tons of coke, 2.2 million tons
of iron ore concentrate and 2.1 million tons of pig iron. The
group comprises seven mining entities with proven and probable
reserves of 285 million tons of iron ore (44 years of production
at current levels) and 115 million tons of coking coal (18 years
of production) based on the Joint Ore Reserves Committee (JORC)
methodology. KOKS's key production facilities are located in the
Kemerovo, Belgorod and Tula regions of Russia. In 2011, the
company reported RUB55.6 billion of revenue and RUB8.3 billion of
EBITDA based on IFRS audited accounts. In H1 2012, KOKS generated
RUB23.5 billion of revenue and RUB3.8 billion of EBITDA. KOKS is
majority-owned by the Zubitsky family, which controls
approximately 94% of the group's shares.
PHOSAGRO OJSC: S&P Assigns 'BB+' Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said it assigned its 'BB+'
long-term corporate credit rating to Russian phosphate fertilizer
and rock producer PhosAgro OJSC. The outlook is positive. S&P
also assigned its 'ruAA+' Russia national scale rating to
PhosAgro.
The rating on PhosAgro reflects S&P's view of the company's
"satisfactory" business risk profile and "significant" financial
risk profile, as defined under S&P's criteria.
The main factors supporting S&P's assessment of PhosAgro's
business risk profile include its high profitability, illustrated
by favorable return on capital of above 25% over 2010-2012,
EBITDA of about US$1.2 billion in 2012, an EBITDA margin at 25%-
35% over 2009-2012, and moderate maintenance capital expenditure
(capex) of between US$160 million and US$180 million per year.
The positive outlook reflects the possibility of an upgrade to
'BBB-' within six to 12 months if PhosAgro completes its
secondary public offering (SPO, planned by November 2013) and
diversifies its funding sources in line with its plan, while
sustainably maintaining very strong credit metrics under S&P's
base-case scenario. This could lead S&P to revise its assessment
of the company's liquidity to "strong" from "adequate," which
could increase ratings upside. An upgrade would also hinge on
S&P's continuing favorable outlook on the industry supply and
demand balance.
S&P could revise the outlook to stable if the SPO did not occur
according to plan by November 2013. Other factors that could
lead to a stable outlook include increased shareholder
distributions, capex, or acquisitions compared with the company's
current strategy.
TRANSCONTAINER OJSC: Fitch Assigns 'BB+' Rating to Bond Series
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned OJSC TransContainer's ('BB+'/Negative)
bond series 04 issue, a five-year RUB5 billion 8.35% bond (the
bond) due Jan. 26, 2018, a senior unsecured rating of 'BB+'.
The bond is unsecured and ranks pari passu with all existing
unsecured debt, including the outstanding bond series 02 issue of
RUB3 billion, which matures in June 2015. There are no financial
ratio covenants or change of control clauses and the mandatory
prepayment terms do not relate to all of the company's debt. The
bond issuance proceeds are to be used for general corporate
purposes as well as the refinancing of debt, comprising the RUB3
billion bond issue series 01, which matures on February 26, 2013.
- Terms Generally Consistent with Existing Issuance
Similar to the bond series 02 issue, the RUB5 billion bond has
ten coupon periods, each subject to equal interest rate payments.
It has an amortizing repayment structure, and will be repaid in
four equal installments on the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth
coupon payment dates.
- Mandatory Prepayment Terms Provide Some Creditor Protection
There is no explicit cross-default with all unsecured debt issued
by the company, but mandatory prepayment terms refer to bonds
issued by the company, if in default or in mandatory prepayment.
Whilst we view this clause as weak, the company's relatively low
leverage acts as a mitigant.
KEY DRIVERS
- Disposal Timeline Uncertainty Remains
TransContainer's Long-Term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB+'
currently includes a one-notch uplift for parental support from
JSC Russian Railways (RZD, 'BBB'/Stable), its present majority
shareholder. The Negative Outlook reflects RZD's earlier decision
to further reduce its stake in TransContainer to below 50%, and
the remaining uncertainty about the timing of the disposal and
the percentage of shares to be disposed of.
- Post-Sale Parental Support Cessation
Fitch will no longer incorporate RZD's parental support into
TransContainer's ratings, in accordance with Fitch's parent and
subsidiary rating methodology, once RZD's stake drops below 50%.
RZD's plans to maintain a 25%+1 share stake in TransContainer and
a recent agreement to pay EUR800 million for a 75% stake in
France's Gefco, a logistics company, implies RZD's ongoing
interest in the segment and the company, which will remain
important to RZD in terms of strategy and operations.
- Weak 'BB' Standalone Profile
Fitch views TransContainer's standalone profile as being
commensurate with a weak 'BB' rating. It is supported by the
company's leading position in Russia in terms of flat-car and
container fleet, its strong presence in key locations in Russia
and central Asia after the acquisition of Kedentransservice in
Kazakhstan in 2011, a well-diversified customer base and moderate
leverage.
- Moderate Leverage Expected
In 2011 TransContainer reported funds from operations (FFO)
adjusted leverage of 1.5x, down from 2.2x in 2010. Fitch
considers further deleveraging unlikely in view of the company's
2012-2013 capex forecast, and the RUB1.2 billion dividend paid in
2012. The agency expects FFO adjusted leverage to remain under
1.6x in the medium term.
- Strong 12YTD Results
Its 9M12 consolidated revenues under IFRS reached RUB27.4
billion, up 24.5% yoy on the back of strong pricing and shipment
volumes. EBITDA margins also continued to be strong at around
29.2% driven by continued operating efficiencies and cost-
savings.
- Stable Rail Sector Outlook Despite Some Slow Down
Fitch's outlook for rail transportation in Russia is stable,
based on the agency's Russian GDP growth forecast of 3.8% on
average for 2013-2014. Fitch conservatively estimates that
Russia's container transportation volumes will increase by mid-
to high single digits in 2013-2014, fuelled by the expected
moderate GDP growth and the high potential for further cargo
containerization in Russia.
However, growth is not expected to be as strong as it has been
over the recent past. Despite continued growth, Q412 operating
results signaled some signs of a slowdown in the Russian
container transportation market relating to the weakening
economic environment.
RATING SENSITIVITIES:
Positive: The current Rating Outlook is Negative. As a result,
Fitch's sensitivities do not currently anticipate developments
with a material likelihood, individually or collectively, of
leading to a rating upgrade. Future developments that may
nonetheless potentially lead to a stabilization of the Outlook
include:
- a delay in the disposal by RZD of TransContainer's shares in
the coming months as long as TransContainer's performance
remains in line with expectations for the current standalone
rating level.
Negative: Future developments that could lead to negative rating
action include:
- Funds from operations (FFO) adjusted leverage consistently
above 2.0x and FFO interest coverage consistently below 8x,
perhaps as a result of a prolonged step-up in capex, could
result in a negative rating action.
- Once privatized, TransContainer's ratings may be affected by
the relative credit strength of a new majority shareholder and
the parent-subsidiary arrangements put in place. Sizeable
acquisition funding raised at the TransContainer level may put
pressure on the ratings.
LIQUIDITY AND DEBT STRUCTURE
- Adequate Liquidity, Sizeable Maturities
At end-Q312 TransContainer had RUB3.8 billion in cash and short-
term deposits. This was sufficient to cover RUB3.4 billion in
short-term maturities, including the RUB3 billion bond issue
series 01 maturing in February, which will be refinanced by the
recently issued RUB5 billion bond. Its sources of liquidity are
cash flows from operations, which Fitch forecasts will continue
to be healthy, and credit facilities, albeit uncommitted with key
Russian banks for RUB8 billion. These are deemed sufficient to
cover its remaining obligations in 2012-2015.
Full list of TransContainer's ratings is as follows:
-- Long-term IDR: 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
-- Long-term local currency IDR: 'BB+'; Outlook Negative
-- Short-term IDR: 'B'
-- Short-term local currency IDR: 'B'
-- National Long-term rating: 'AA(rus)'; Outlook Negative
-- Local currency senior unsecured rating: 'BB+'
* MORDOVIA: High Debt Burden Cues Moody's to Assign B1 Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned first-time global scale local
and foreign-currency issuer ratings of B1 to Mordovia Republic in
Russia. The outlook on the ratings is stable.
Ratings Rationale:
Moody's notes that Mordovia's B1 rating is constrained by the
region's high debt burden, its substantial short-to-medium term
refinancing requirements, persistently high financing and
operating deficits over the past few years and its weak own-
source liquidity position.
"The republic recorded a financing deficit of -7.9% of total
revenue in 2012, which was an improvement on the -21.3% posted in
2011, but required further debt funding," says Alexander Proklov,
a Moody's Senior Analyst and lead analyst for the Republic of
Mordovia. "The region's high deficits are attributable to
substantial local infrastructure spending made recently, as well
as growing social payments and public salaries, with the latter
adding to already inflexible operating expenditure," says Mr.
Proklov.
The region's net direct and indirect debt progressively increased
to 95.2% of operating revenue in 2012, up from 81.6% in 2011 and
50.6% in 2010. The bulk of new debt was in federal low-interest
bearing loans and rouble loans from Russian banks. Moody's notes
that Mordovia's debt ratio, the highest among Moody's-rated
Russian regions, approaches the legislative ceiling, which will
constrain its future borrowing capacity.
The republic's debt- maturity profile is mostly made up of short-
to-medium term debt, with substantial repayments coming due in
the next three years, although this is common for many Russian
sub-sovereigns due to the weakness of the national banking
system. These refinancing requirements should be considered in
the context of the region's limited cash position, which also
adds to rating pressures. "We note that the republic has only a
limited capacity to boost its liquidity position, as new taxes
and levies are prohibited by the national law, while the tax
potential of the local economy is limited," says Mr. Proklov.
At the same time, the regional government has started to
implement a three-year budget consolidation program, which is
aimed to achieve an only marginal financing deficit by 2015.
Moody's positively notes that the federal government will
supervise the program's implementation, which will increase the
likelihood of successful consolidation. This should enable
Mordovia to decrease its debt burden to a level more comparable
to its Russian sub-sovereign peers.
Furthermore, anticipated improvements in the Mordovian economy
and in its tax base are also considered to be credit positive. A
growing tax revenue stream, mainly from corporate and personal
income taxes, will mitigate forthcoming austerity measures and
help to partially offset short-term liquidity needs.
Moody's also considers ongoing federal support -- in the form of
operating and capital subsidies -- as supportive of the region's
future financial performance. "Federal investments have
substantially funded the region's infrastructure requirements in
the past, and we anticipate additional federal funding in the
future, particularly given that Mordovia's capital city of
Saransk will host some football matches during the 2018 FIFA
World Cup," added Mr. Proklov.
What Could Change The Ratings Up/Down
Moody's notes that upward movement in the republic's ratings
would be driven by increasing own-source budget revenue and
consistent strengthening of financing and operating balances, if
combined with a steady decrease in its debt position. In
contrast, the ratings could come under pressures if the republic
experiences further increase in its debt position and fails to
achieve its medium-term budget consolidation targets.
The principal methodology used in this rating was Regional and
Local Governments published in January 2013.
Mordovia Republic is located in the Volga Federal District in
European Russia. Mordovia's economy is small, with a gross
regional product (GRP) of just 0.3% of Russia's GDP, while its
population is around 0.6% of the total Russian population.
Mordovia's economy is diversified: the tertiary sector (including
transportation) accounts for around 41% of GRP, industry for 30%,
construction for 12% and agriculture for 17%.
=========
S P A I N
=========
BANKIA SA: Set to Reveal Annual Net Loss of More Than EUR19-Bil.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Miles Johnson at The Financial Times reports that Bankia will
this week reveal an annual net loss of more than EUR19 billion,
the largest in Spanish corporate history, as the nationalized
lender that last year became the symbol of the country's
financial crisis speeds up its plan to close branches and sell
assets.
The bank, which was set to report its full-year earnings on
Thursday, will announce the loss as a result of a EUR12 billion
provision made in the fourth quarter of 2012 after it transferred
assets into Spain's "bad bank" vehicle Sareb at steep discounts,
the FT relates.
Bankia, a merger of seven savings banks that was hailed at the
time of its creation as the solution to Spain's banking problems,
last year succumbed to a state bailout eventually rising to EUR24
billion just 11 months after it was listed on the Madrid stock
market, the FT recounts.
Bankia, which had to accept strict conditions imposed from
Brussels to shrink its business after the rescue, is aiming to
close 1,100 branches, or a third of its office network across
Spain, this year, the FT discloses. The closures, which will
happen at a faster pace than ordered by Brussels, will begin in
two weeks in the areas surrounding Madrid, the FT notes.
According to the FT, while people close to the bank say it has
received numerous enquiries from potential buyers and their
representatives for several of the stakes, they say it has just
under three years to sell them under the terms of its rescue, and
so will only do so at acceptable prices.
The Spanish state controls 45% of Bankia but this is expected to
rise to more than 70% after a capital raising absorbing the
rescue money takes place in the coming weeks, the FT states.
Investors who bought shares during the bank's IPO are expected to
be diluted by 97%; an ongoing inquest at Spain's high court into
the listing has seen near daily protests by angry clients who
lost money investing in the bank, the FT says.
Bankia, which has already declared a EUR4.45 billion loss for the
first half of 2012, and EUR2.6 billion in the third quarter, in
December announced it had transferred EUR22.3 billion in assets
to Spain's "bad bank" vehicle, the FT recounts.
Bankia is a Spanish banking conglomerate that was formed in
December 2010, consolidating the operations of seven regional
savings banks. As of 2012, Bankia is the fourth largest bank of
Spain with 12 million customers.
* SPAIN: Fiscal Consolidation Gains Traction, Fitch Says
--------------------------------------------------------
The announcement on Feb. 20, 2013, by Spain's prime minister,
Mariano Rajoy, that the country's 2012 budget deficit fell below
7% of GDP is a sign that fiscal consolidation gained traction in
the second half of last year, Fitch Ratings says. "The figure,
which excludes the cost of bailing out Spanish banks, is in line
with our expectations," Fitch notes.
If confirmed, the reading will be the lowest in four years, and a
large fall from the previous year, even allowing for the fact
that above-the-line treatment of bank recapitalization
contributed around 0.5 percentage points to the 9.4% headline
figure for 2011. Spain's fiscal deficit was 11.2% of GDP at its
peak in 2009.
The announcement, made in a speech to the Spanish parliament,
indicates that Spain has missed its official 2012 deficit target
of 6.3%, agreed with the European Union. Nevertheless, a deficit
of 7% of GDP would be in line with our previous forecast, and the
gap between the target and the deficit would be narrower than in
2011.
No additional details were given, and the Spanish regions could
yet have an impact on the final reading. Spain's consolidation
program for 2012-2013 is front loaded, and the general government
deficit, excluding financial sector recapitalization, was 5.3% of
GDP up to end-Q312. The central government deficit to November
was 4.4%, down from 4.9% in 2011.
Spanish regions recorded an accumulated consolidated deficit of
0.93% of GDP for the first three quarters of 2012. This was less
than three-quarters of the annual target of 1.5%, although the
final figure for the full year is still uncertain and in previous
years has been subject to revision.
"We still think the government is likely to miss its 2013
government deficit target of 4.5%, chiefly because we predict a
larger economic contraction this year than the government has
budgeted for. We predict a 1.6% contraction in the Spanish
economy this year, and forecast a 6% deficit. Our medium-term
deficit forecasts already assume some slippage from official
targets, and this is incorporated into our 'BBB' rating.
"We project Spain's public debt to peak in 2014-2015 at around
96% of GDP and then fall gradually. As we said when we affirmed
Spain's sovereign rating earlier this month, failure to place the
public debt ratio on a firm downward path over the medium term is
one of the risks to the rating, and is reflected in the Negative
Outlook. Further evidence that Spain's fiscal strategy is
yielding substantial deficit reduction in 2012-2013 would lower
the risks regarding debt/GDP forecasts."
===========================
U N I T E D K I N G D O M
===========================
AXMINSTER: In Administration, 400 Jobs at Risk
----------------------------------------------
The Independent reports that Axminster is to go into
administration in a move putting 400 jobs at risk.
The company said the decision will provide the company and its
creditors with time to explore various rescue options, according
to The Independent.
"Trading has been difficult and the management has been working
with key suppliers, creditors and the lenders in an attempt to
resolve the company's financial difficulties. . . . We continue
to be committed to working to achieve the best possible outcome
for all concerned and most importantly the staff and suppliers,"
the report quoted Director Joshua Dutfield as saying.
The report notes that a statement from Axminster confirmed the
notice of intention to appoint Duff & Phelps as administrators.
It said: "The notice was filed in order to provide the company
and its creditors with a moratorium period during which the
various rescue options being explored can continue," the report
relays.
Axminster is a historic carpet maker based in Devon.
BREWHOUSE THEATRE: In Administration After Cuts to Public Funding
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The Stage News reports that the Brewhouse Theatre and Arts Centre
in Taunton is to go into administration following cuts to its
public funding in recent years.
The center is expected to confirm that it will be closing from
February 21 while all options are considered, according to The
State News.
The report relates that it currently employs 55 people and is
expected to announce that all staff will be made redundant.
Arts Council England withdrew its regular funding to the
Brewhouse in 2005, which preceded an annual funding cut of 25%
from Taunton Deane Borough Council, the report notes.
The report discloses that Somerset County Council then removed
its funding to all cultural organizations, including the
Brewhouse, in 2010.
DEANE & AMOS: In Administration, Cuts 150 Jobs
----------------------------------------------
Callum Jones at Northampton Chronicle reports that Deane & Amos
Group has gone into administration resulting in the loss of 150
jobs in the town.
Deane & Amos Group is in the process of being placed in
liquidation.
The company has a number of subsidary companies, including
Aluminium Systems, Streets bespoke metalwork, Withey Interiors
and Lovell Electrical Contracting, which have been placed in
administration, according to Northampton Chronicle.
The report notes that Gary Pettit, joint administrator for
Marshman Price, said he was hoping to find a buyer for these
three companies which would save some of the jobs.
Deane & Amos Group is a Northampton based shop-fitting company.
It has factories in Kingsthorpe, and in the Queens Park and Round
Spinney Industrial estates, is in the process of being placed in
liquidation.
INCHMARLO GOLF: In Provisional Liquidation; 25 Jobs Affected
------------------------------------------------------------
The Scotsman reports that Inchmarlo Golf Centre has gone into
provisional liquidation with the loss of 25 jobs.
According to the Scotsman, Blair Nimmo of KPMG, who is handling
the company's affairs, said the business had experienced trading
difficulties for some time. Although significant funding had
been injected by its main shareholder over the past five years,
no further investment was available, the Scotsman notes.
The golf course operation has now been closed and is being
offered for sale, the Scotsman discloses. Five remaining workers
are being kept on to assist with the villa rental operation, the
Scotsman says.
Inchmarlo Golf Centre is a high profile golf resort.
PATTON GROUP: Owes Around GBP60-Mil. to 1,000+ Creditors
--------------------------------------------------------
According to BBC News, it has emerged that more than 1,000
companies or individuals are owed money following the collapse of
the Patton construction group.
The publication of the list of creditors reveals the full extent
of the impact the Patton collapse has had across the UK and the
Irish Republic, BBC relates.
It shows that around 1,000 companies or individuals are owed a
total of almost GBP60 million, BBC discloses. The largest
unsecured creditor is the Bank of Ireland which stands to lose
more than GBP10 million, BBC notes. Three Northern Ireland
companies are owed around GBP1 million each and an individual
businessman is owed more than GBP1.7 million, BBC states. One of
the largest creditors is Revenue and Customs who are owed more
than GBP3 million, BBC says.
The company's administrator has already stated that none of the
unsecured creditors will get the money they are owed, BBC notes.
Northern-Ireland based contractor Patton firm has offices in
London and Milton Keynes and works on projects across the UK.
The firm, which has traded for around 100 years, has a total
turnover of GBP140 million and employs around 320 staff.
Patton went into administration in November 2012 after it
suffered from the widespread downturn impacting the construction
industry, resulting to a decline in trading performance. Tom
Keenan -- tom@keenancf.com -- of Keenan CF was appointed
administrator.
WILLIAM CRAWFORD: In Administration, Cuts 46 Jobs
-------------------------------------------------
Construction Enquirer reports that William Crawford and Son has
fallen into administration with the loss of 46 jobs.
Parent company J&T Blacksmiths is also now in the hands of
Begbies Traynor who are seeking a buyer for the business,
according to Construction Enquirer.
The report relates that more than 40 staff have been kept on
while Begbies listen to offers.
Joint administrator Paul Dounis said: "We are continuing to trade
the businesses and continue to provide an ongoing service to
existing customers that include major contractors. . . . A quick
sale will be needed to enable the businesses to continue to win
future contracts and maintain sales revenues."
"We are unable to make any guarantees regarding how long jobs
will remain viable until we secure a buyer for the firms, but we
are making every effort to secure a return for the creditors and
secure a future for the businesses and their staff," the report
quoted Mr. Dounis as saying.
J&T Blacksmiths was established in 1979 and provides steel works
to major contractors and utility companies. Its fully-owned
subsidiary William Crawford and Son (Contractors) Ltd worked
closely with J&T Blacksmiths Ltd on construction, repair and
maintenance contracts.
===============
X X X X X X X X
===============
* BOND PRICING: For the Week February 18 to February 22, 2013
-------------------------------------------------------------
Issuer Coupon Maturity Currency Price
------ ------ -------- -------- -----
AUSTRIA
-------
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 8.750 10/27/2014 EUR 27.75
A-TEC INDUSTRIES 2.750 5/10/2014 EUR 29.13
IMMOFINANZ 4.250 3/8/2018 EUR 4.29
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.907 7/24/2013 EUR 58.30
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.588 1/23/2013 EUR 73.37
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.965 1/23/2013 EUR 55.53
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.873 1/23/2013 EUR 66.96
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.646 1/23/2013 EUR 45.43
RAIFF CENTROBANK 5.097 1/23/2013 EUR 58.24
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.417 1/22/2014 EUR 67.62
RAIFF CENTROBANK 7.122 1/22/2014 EUR 66.49
RAIFF CENTROBANK 11.134 7/24/2013 EUR 66.13
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.200 7/24/2013 EUR 56.71
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.304 1/23/2013 EUR 62.19
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.876 1/23/2013 EUR 60.11
RAIFF CENTROBANK 9.558 1/23/2013 EUR 67.69
RAIFF CENTROBANK 8.920 1/23/2013 EUR 52.62
BELGIUM
-------
ECONOCOM GROUP 4.000 6/1/2016 EUR 22.94
TALVIVAARA 4.000 12/16/2015 EUR 72.61
FRANCE
------
AIR FRANCE-KLM 4.970 4/1/2015 EUR 12.38
ALCATEL-LUCENT 5.000 1/1/2015 EUR 2.62
ALTRAN TECHNOLOG 6.720 1/1/2015 EUR 5.62
ASSYSTEM 4.000 1/1/2017 EUR 23.27
ATOS ORIGIN SA 2.500 1/1/2016 EUR 58.17
CAP GEMINI SOGET 3.500 1/1/2014 EUR 38.69
CGG VERITAS 1.750 1/1/2016 EUR 31.64
CLUB MEDITERRANE 6.110 11/1/2015 EUR 17.80
EURAZEO 6.250 6/10/2014 EUR 55.33
FAURECIA 3.250 1/1/2018 EUR 17.91
FAURECIA 4.500 1/1/2015 EUR 19.45
INGENICO 2.750 1/1/2017 EUR 48.14
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2015 EUR 17.13
MAUREL ET PROM 7.125 7/31/2014 EUR 18.15
NEXANS SA 2.500 1/1/2019 EUR 66.69
NEXANS SA 4.000 1/1/2016 EUR 56.09
ORPEA 3.875 1/1/2016 EUR 47.89
PEUGEOT SA 4.450 1/1/2016 EUR 23.56
PIERRE VACANCES 4.000 10/1/2015 EUR 73.63
PUBLICIS GROUPE 1.000 1/18/2018 EUR 54.06
SOC AIR FRANCE 2.750 4/1/2020 EUR 21.24
SOITEC 6.250 9/9/2014 EUR 7.25
TEM 4.250 1/1/2015 EUR 54.36
GERMANY
-------
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.750 12/28/2012 EUR 58.32
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 10.500 12/28/2012 EUR 47.62
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 64.67
BNP EMIS-U.HANDE 7.750 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
COMMERZBANK AG 6.000 12/27/2012 EUR 73.49
COMMERZBANK AG 7.000 12/27/2012 EUR 60.71
COMMERZBANK AG 13.000 12/28/2012 EUR 47.48
COMMERZBANK AG 16.750 1/3/2013 EUR 73.77
COMMERZBANK AG 8.400 12/30/2013 EUR 13.74
COMMERZBANK AG 8.000 12/27/2012 EUR 43.32
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 64.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 71.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 74.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 2/28/2013 EUR 75.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.80
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 70.30
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 2/20/2013 EUR 68.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 11.000 1/18/2013 EUR 73.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 15.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 66.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 41.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 12/20/2012 EUR 68.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 74.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 72.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 10.000 12/20/2012 EUR 63.00
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 62.90
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 12/20/2012 EUR 73.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 61.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 70.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 12/20/2012 EUR 38.60
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 7.000 12/20/2012 EUR 69.40
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 11/29/2012 EUR 65.20
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 9.000 11/29/2012 EUR 67.10
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 53.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 12.000 4/2/2013 EUR 74.50
DEUTSCHE BANK AG 8.000 11/29/2012 EUR 71.50
DZ BANK AG 15.500 10/25/2013 EUR 71.05
DZ BANK AG 15.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.86
DZ BANK AG 15.750 7/26/2013 EUR 71.21
DZ BANK AG 15.000 7/26/2013 EUR 75.00
DZ BANK AG 6.000 7/26/2013 EUR 69.50
DZ BANK AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.36
DZ BANK AG 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.28
DZ BANK AG 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.43
DZ BANK AG 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.14
DZ BANK AG 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.07
DZ BANK AG 19.500 4/26/2013 EUR 61.83
DZ BANK AG 18.500 4/26/2013 EUR 57.11
DZ BANK AG 17.000 4/26/2013 EUR 15.42
DZ BANK AG 16.500 4/26/2013 EUR 59.63
DZ BANK AG 15.750 4/26/2013 EUR 43.33
DZ BANK AG 14.500 4/26/2013 EUR 56.77
DZ BANK AG 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.81
DZ BANK AG 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.74
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.16
DZ BANK AG 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.95
DZ BANK AG 12.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.97
DZ BANK AG 12.250 3/22/2013 EUR 74.07
DZ BANK AG 13.750 3/8/2013 EUR 54.29
DZ BANK AG 10.000 3/8/2013 EUR 68.17
DZ BANK AG 9.750 3/8/2013 EUR 73.96
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 74.66
DZ BANK AG 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 72.63
DZ BANK AG 18.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.25
DZ BANK AG 19.000 1/25/2013 EUR 44.10
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.38
DZ BANK AG 10.250 2/8/2013 EUR 71.88
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 70.66
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 71.94
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 69.43
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 73.27
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 68.24
DZ BANK AG 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 67.09
DZ BANK AG 11.500 11/23/2012 EUR 74.94
DZ BANK AG 16.750 11/23/2012 EUR 63.46
DZ BANK AG 20.000 11/23/2012 EUR 41.34
DZ BANK AG 5.000 12/14/2012 EUR 69.68
DZ BANK AG 9.750 12/14/2012 EUR 66.05
DZ BANK AG 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 74.23
DZ BANK AG 9.500 1/2/2013 EUR 71.10
DZ BANK AG 12.000 1/2/2013 EUR 65.09
DZ BANK AG 16.250 1/2/2013 EUR 68.65
DZ BANK AG 10.500 1/11/2013 EUR 66.00
DZ BANK AG 14.000 1/11/2013 EUR 48.04
DZ BANK AG 15.500 1/11/2013 EUR 53.41
DZ BANK AG 12.500 1/25/2013 EUR 50.73
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 3/20/2013 EUR 74.90
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 17.000 3/20/2013 EUR 73.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 16.000 6/26/2013 EUR 74.30
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 18.000 3/20/2013 EUR 69.10
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 14.000 12/28/2012 EUR 72.60
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 15.000 12/28/2012 EUR 71.70
GOLDMAN SACHS CO 13.000 12/27/2013 EUR 72.70
HSBC TRINKAUS 25.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.61
HSBC TRINKAUS 30.000 6/28/2013 EUR 46.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.000 6/28/2013 EUR 48.63
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.76
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.98
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 72.84
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 62.42
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 45.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.94
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.000 3/22/2013 EUR 60.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 60.07
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.53
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.21
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 71.40
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 3/22/2013 EUR 41.52
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.28
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.45
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 3/22/2013 EUR 74.88
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 58.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.90
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.29
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 69.93
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.09
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 55.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.85
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 69.38
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 39.60
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 3/22/2013 EUR 55.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 71.17
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.58
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.000 3/22/2013 EUR 72.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 20.500 3/22/2013 EUR 56.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 3/22/2013 EUR 70.19
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 38.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.000 3/22/2013 EUR 54.00
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 3/22/2013 EUR 67.68
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.000 3/22/2013 EUR 52.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 3/22/2013 EUR 65.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 61.96
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 67.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 24.000 3/22/2013 EUR 73.10
HSBC TRINKAUS 26.500 3/22/2013 EUR 61.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.000 3/22/2013 EUR 53.26
HSBC TRINKAUS 27.500 3/22/2013 EUR 43.48
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 6.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.24
HSBC TRINKAUS 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 49.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 72.27
HSBC TRINKAUS 8.500 6/28/2013 EUR 69.16
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.12
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.11
HSBC TRINKAUS 10.500 6/28/2013 EUR 46.20
HSBC TRINKAUS 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.23
HSBC TRINKAUS 12.500 6/28/2013 EUR 63.33
HSBC TRINKAUS 13.500 6/28/2013 EUR 61.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.50
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.06
HSBC TRINKAUS 14.000 6/28/2013 EUR 61.82
HSBC TRINKAUS 15.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.79
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.22
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 41.80
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.08
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.77
HSBC TRINKAUS 16.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.72
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 57.46
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 74.75
HSBC TRINKAUS 17.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.43
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.000 6/28/2013 EUR 70.95
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.14
HSBC TRINKAUS 18.500 6/28/2013 EUR 57.51
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 40.97
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.92
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.78
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 59.74
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 56.67
HSBC TRINKAUS 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.65
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 54.87
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 64.56
HSBC TRINKAUS 21.500 6/28/2013 EUR 68.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 60.02
HSBC TRINKAUS 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 64.88
LANDESBK BERLIN 5.500 12/23/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 7/26/2013 EUR 74.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 6.000 8/23/2013 EUR 74.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 8/23/2013 EUR 72.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 73.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 8/23/2013 EUR 71.91
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 68.83
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 8/23/2013 EUR 69.40
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 9/27/2013 EUR 74.38
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.33
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 11.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.000 6/28/2013 EUR 73.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 72.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 6/28/2013 EUR 73.55
LB BADEN-WUERTT 9.000 6/28/2013 EUR 69.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 6/28/2013 EUR 65.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 18.44
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 49.68
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.98
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 73.69
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 41.51
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 67.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 42.64
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 64.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 15.76
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 61.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 11/23/2012 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 36.96
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 14.49
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 58.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 55.36
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 71.19
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 69.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 67.15
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 38.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.82
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 70.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 74.57
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 11/23/2012 EUR 56.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 11/23/2012 EUR 46.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 51.63
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 38.27
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 67.54
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 18.70
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 57.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/4/2013 EUR 63.31
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 54.39
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 65.07
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 51.99
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 32.90
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 58.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 72.77
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 16.46
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 59.10
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/4/2013 EUR 67.25
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 66.61
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 30.35
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 70.66
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 15.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 52.34
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 60.85
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 49.73
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 61.11
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/4/2013 EUR 58.93
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.47
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.12
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 1/25/2013 EUR 25.04
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 22.14
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.50
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 61.75
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 67.92
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 1/25/2013 EUR 65.65
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 73.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 57.74
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 70.62
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 61.42
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 55.00
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 62.58
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 72.60
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 20.18
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 1/25/2013 EUR 74.43
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 2/22/2013 EUR 72.06
LB BADEN-WUERTT 7.500 2/22/2013 EUR 62.21
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 2/22/2013 EUR 55.52
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 2/22/2013 EUR 47.17
LB BADEN-WUERTT 8.000 3/22/2013 EUR 68.03
LB BADEN-WUERTT 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.16
LB BADEN-WUERTT 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 66.23
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 74.79
LB BADEN-WUERTT 15.000 3/22/2013 EUR 59.20
LB BADEN-WUERTT 5.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.83
MACQUARIE STRUCT 13.250 1/2/2013 EUR 67.09
MACQUARIE STRUCT 18.000 12/14/2012 EUR 63.38
Q-CELLS 6.750 10/21/2015 EUR 1.08
QIMONDA FINANCE 6.750 3/22/2013 USD 4.50
SOLON AG SOLAR 1.375 12/6/2012 EUR 0.58
TAG IMMO AG 6.500 12/10/2015 EUR 9.73
TUI AG 2.750 3/24/2016 EUR 56.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 3/22/2013 EUR 68.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 3/22/2013 EUR 55.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 3/22/2013 EUR 65.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.050 3/22/2013 EUR 62.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 43.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.200 3/22/2013 EUR 70.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.700 3/22/2013 EUR 71.00
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.700 3/22/2013 EUR 42.16
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 3/22/2013 EUR 63.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 3/22/2013 EUR 50.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 3/22/2013 EUR 40.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 3/22/2013 EUR 39.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.450 12/31/2012 EUR 56.96
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.100 12/31/2012 EUR 50.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.050 12/31/2012 EUR 54.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.850 12/31/2012 EUR 60.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.700 12/31/2012 EUR 71.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.450 12/31/2012 EUR 73.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.350 12/31/2012 EUR 57.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.150 12/31/2012 EUR 63.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.100 12/31/2012 EUR 71.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 16.050 12/31/2012 EUR 72.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.900 12/31/2012 EUR 73.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.750 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 15.250 12/31/2012 EUR 57.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.950 12/31/2012 EUR 74.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.700 12/31/2012 EUR 73.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.600 12/31/2012 EUR 53.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.500 12/31/2012 EUR 63.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.450 12/31/2012 EUR 53.02
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 70.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.350 12/31/2012 EUR 71.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 71.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.300 12/31/2012 EUR 48.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.100 12/31/2012 EUR 74.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 14.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.550 12/31/2012 EUR 57.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.500 12/31/2012 EUR 61.24
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.150 12/31/2012 EUR 70.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 12/31/2012 EUR 67.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.900 12/31/2012 EUR 50.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.800 12/31/2012 EUR 46.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 56.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.550 12/31/2012 EUR 73.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.250 12/31/2012 EUR 68.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 12.000 12/31/2012 EUR 61.78
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 72.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 56.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.950 12/31/2012 EUR 49.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.850 12/31/2012 EUR 68.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.750 12/31/2012 EUR 55.44
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.700 12/31/2012 EUR 61.98
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.600 12/31/2012 EUR 74.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.450 12/31/2012 EUR 54.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.400 12/31/2012 EUR 58.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.150 12/31/2012 EUR 72.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 12/31/2012 EUR 70.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.900 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.550 12/31/2012 EUR 58.28
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.500 12/31/2012 EUR 41.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.050 12/31/2012 EUR 63.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 12/31/2012 EUR 61.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.900 12/31/2012 EUR 72.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.650 12/31/2012 EUR 70.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 72.14
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.600 12/31/2012 EUR 71.92
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.500 12/31/2012 EUR 59.22
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 73.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.400 12/31/2012 EUR 54.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.350 12/31/2012 EUR 72.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.250 12/31/2012 EUR 41.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.150 12/31/2012 EUR 73.58
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.050 12/31/2012 EUR 73.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.650 12/31/2012 EUR 66.36
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.500 3/22/2013 EUR 38.32
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.900 3/22/2013 EUR 72.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.750 3/22/2013 EUR 73.52
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.200 12/31/2012 EUR 65.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.950 12/31/2012 EUR 52.66
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.700 12/31/2012 EUR 62.56
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 23.600 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 4.000 6/28/2013 EUR 44.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 6.000 6/28/2013 EUR 63.20
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.76
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.700 12/31/2012 EUR 67.42
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.400 12/31/2012 EUR 55.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.550 6/28/2013 EUR 74.90
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.250 12/31/2012 EUR 53.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.050 6/28/2013 EUR 72.48
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.389 11/25/2013 EUR 44.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.100 4/14/2014 EUR 32.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 72.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.200 12/31/2012 EUR 73.86
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 50.70
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.850 12/31/2012 EUR 63.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.46
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.950 12/31/2012 EUR 68.80
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 19.300 12/31/2012 EUR 66.04
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.000 12/31/2012 EUR 69.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 20.850 12/31/2012 EUR 72.94
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.150 12/31/2012 EUR 68.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 54.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 21.200 12/31/2012 EUR 74.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.250 12/31/2012 EUR 66.40
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 22.700 12/31/2012 EUR 66.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.700 12/31/2012 EUR 43.38
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 24.900 12/31/2012 EUR 51.50
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 26.050 12/31/2012 EUR 69.82
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 27.600 12/31/2012 EUR 40.62
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 28.250 12/31/2012 EUR 38.08
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 11.000 2/1/2013 EUR 55.10
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 13.650 3/1/2013 EUR 35.30
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.100 3/8/2013 EUR 74.60
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 5.650 3/22/2013 EUR 68.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 7.500 3/22/2013 EUR 73.88
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.550 3/22/2013 EUR 61.34
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 8.850 3/22/2013 EUR 73.64
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.200 3/22/2013 EUR 65.12
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 9.950 3/22/2013 EUR 70.06
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.150 3/22/2013 EUR 59.84
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 18.050 12/31/2012 EUR 64.74
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 17.650 12/31/2012 EUR 73.18
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.300 3/22/2013 EUR 70.72
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.350 3/22/2013 EUR 73.54
VONTOBEL FIN PRO 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 46.30
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/28/2012 EUR 59.08
WGZ BANK 8.000 12/21/2012 EUR 66.08
WGZ BANK 5.000 12/28/2012 EUR 73.18
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/28/2012 EUR 67.75
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/28/2012 EUR 63.10
WGZ BANK 6.000 12/21/2012 EUR 74.00
WGZ BANK 7.000 12/21/2012 EUR 68.47
GUERNSEY
--------
BCV GUERNSEY 8.020 3/1/2013 EUR 56.54
BKB FINANCE 10.950 5/10/2013 CHF 62.57
BKB FINANCE 10.150 9/11/2013 CHF 73.89
BKB FINANCE 13.200 1/31/2013 CHF 50.08
BKB FINANCE 9.450 7/3/2013 CHF 68.52
BKB FINANCE 11.500 3/20/2013 CHF 59.30
BKB FINANCE 8.350 1/14/2013 CHF 54.15
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/13/2012 EUR 73.04
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.000 11/13/2012 EUR 64.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.830 11/19/2012 CHF 70.07
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 62.03
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.300 11/20/2012 CHF 64.99
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.500 11/20/2012 EUR 55.05
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.800 11/20/2012 EUR 65.84
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.250 11/27/2012 CHF 68.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 11/27/2012 CHF 64.89
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.500 11/27/2012 CHF 31.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 11/27/2012 EUR 59.21
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.750 12/3/2012 CHF 72.96
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.750 12/6/2012 CHF 35.12
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.500 12/14/2012 CHF 58.17
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.250 12/14/2012 EUR 66.29
EFG INTL FIN GUR 17.500 12/14/2012 EUR 62.97
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.300 12/21/2012 CHF 64.50
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.900 12/21/2012 CHF 64.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.600 12/21/2012 CHF 64.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.830 12/28/2012 USD 57.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 1/9/2013 EUR 52.73
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.000 1/15/2013 CHF 27.36
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.250 1/15/2013 CHF 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 11.250 1/15/2013 GBP 73.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.500 1/15/2013 CHF 28.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 1/15/2013 CHF 74.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.500 1/18/2013 CHF 50.63
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.800 1/23/2013 CHF 69.35
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.050 2/20/2013 USD 74.67
EFG INTL FIN GUR 15.000 3/1/2013 CHF 71.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.000 3/6/2013 USD 71.83
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.250 12/27/2012 GBP 67.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.000 4/2/2013 CHF 63.34
EFG INTL FIN GUR 16.000 4/4/2013 CHF 23.40
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.530 4/16/2013 EUR 49.58
EFG INTL FIN GUR 7.000 4/19/2013 EUR 55.27
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.000 4/26/2013 CHF 66.95
EFG INTL FIN GUR 9.500 4/30/2013 EUR 28.64
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.200 6/7/2013 EUR 71.88
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.500 8/27/2013 CHF 51.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.400 9/30/2013 CHF 63.25
EFG INTL FIN GUR 19.000 10/3/2013 GBP 74.39
EFG INTL FIN GUR 8.160 4/25/2014 EUR 71.56
EFG INTL FIN GUR 5.850 10/14/2014 CHF 57.06
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 CHF 56.98
EFG INTL FIN GUR 6.000 11/12/2012 EUR 57.81
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.500 11/13/2012 CHF 65.60
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 22.70
EFG INTL FIN GUR 12.750 11/13/2012 CHF 71.49
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 22.91
EFG INTL FIN GUR 13.000 11/13/2012 CHF 74.82
EFG INTL FIN GUR 14.000 11/13/2012 USD 23.41
EFG INTL FIN GUR 10.750 3/19/2013 USD 71.27
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 62.81
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.250 11/9/2012 CHF 54.03
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.670 12/28/2012 CHF 70.24
ZURCHER KANT FIN 11.500 1/24/2013 CHF 59.11
ZURCHER KANT FIN 17.000 2/22/2013 EUR 59.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.128 3/7/2013 CHF 64.97
ZURCHER KANT FIN 13.575 4/10/2013 CHF 74.72
ZURCHER KANT FIN 7.340 4/16/2013 CHF 70.68
ZURCHER KANT FIN 12.500 7/5/2013 CHF 70.56
ZURCHER KANT FIN 10.200 8/23/2013 CHF 67.39
ZURCHER KANT FIN 9.000 9/11/2013 CHF 69.23
ICELAND
-------
KAUPTHING 0.800 2/15/2011 EUR 26.50
LUXEMBOURG
----------
ARCELORMITTAL 7.250 4/1/2014 EUR 21.66
NETHERLANDS
-----------
BLT FINANCE BV 12.000 2/10/2015 USD 24.88
EM.TV FINANCE BV 5.250 5/8/2013 EUR 5.89
KPNQWEST NV 10.000 3/15/2012 EUR 0.13
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 9/13/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.600 2/22/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 2/14/2012 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 12/15/2011 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 12.000 7/4/2011 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 7/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 1/4/2011 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 12/31/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.300 12/21/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 11/16/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 10/12/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.500 8/9/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 7/28/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 5/30/2010 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.750 3/1/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 2/15/2010 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 1.750 2/7/2010 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.800 12/27/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.800 8/21/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 8/3/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.500 8/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.500 7/6/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 6/29/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 6/17/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.750 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.500 6/15/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 6/13/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 15.000 6/4/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 17.000 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.500 6/2/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 5/22/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.200 5/14/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 4.000 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.850 4/24/2009 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 4/14/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 9.000 3/17/2009 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 11.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 2/16/2009 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 0.500 2/16/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.750 1/30/2009 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.432 1/8/2009 ILS 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 12/26/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.000 11/28/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.442 11/22/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.100 11/12/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 11/9/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.150 10/30/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/28/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.500 10/24/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/24/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 5.000 10/24/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 8.000 10/23/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 10.000 10/22/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 16.000 10/8/2008 CHF 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.250 10/6/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 18.250 10/2/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 7.375 9/20/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 23.300 9/16/2008 USD 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 14.900 9/15/2008 EUR 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 3.000 9/12/2036 JPY 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 6.000 10/30/2012 USD 5.50
LEHMAN BROS TSY 2.500 8/23/2012 GBP 22.63
LEHMAN BROS TSY 13.000 7/25/2012 EUR 22.63
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 1.375 4/30/2012 EUR 26.88
Q-CELLS INTERNAT 5.750 5/26/2014 EUR 26.88
RENEWABLE CORP 6.500 6/4/2014 EUR 61.31
SACYR VALLEHERM 6.500 5/1/2016 EUR 51.72
SWEDEN
------
Rorvik Timber 6.000 6/30/2016 SEK 66.00
SWITZERLAND
-----------
BANK JULIUS BAER 8.700 8/5/2013 CHF 60.55
BANK JULIUS BAER 15.000 5/31/2013 USD 69.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 13.000 5/31/2013 USD 70.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.000 4/9/2013 CHF 56.05
BANK JULIUS BAER 10.750 3/13/2013 EUR 66.60
BANK JULIUS BAER 17.300 2/1/2013 EUR 54.65
BANK JULIUS BAER 9.700 12/20/2012 CHF 75.00
BANK JULIUS BAER 11.500 2/20/2013 CHF 47.15
BANK JULIUS BAER 12.200 12/5/2012 EUR 54.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.19
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 6/10/2014 CHF 62.13
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/26/2014 CHF 65.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/13/2014 CHF 63.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/24/2014 CHF 55.39
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 2/11/2014 CHF 54.50
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 18.400 12/20/2013 EUR 74.64
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 11/26/2013 CHF 64.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 4.500 8/13/2014 CHF 48.74
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 16.500 9/23/2013 USD 57.03
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/23/2013 CHF 50.04
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 3.250 9/16/2013 CHF 49.05
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.500 11/13/2012 CHF 58.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/13/2012 CHF 74.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.250 11/12/2012 CHF 73.60
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 8/27/2014 CHF 55.45
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 9/10/2014 CHF 51.16
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 10/15/2014 CHF 57.48
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 5.250 8/6/2014 CHF 51.70
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.000 7/22/2013 CHF 72.18
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 10.000 6/10/2013 CHF 70.08
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 5/31/2013 CHF 55.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 6.500 4/26/2013 CHF 58.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/25/2013 CHF 59.57
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 3/18/2013 CHF 74.71
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 3/1/2013 USD 74.21
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 9.000 2/14/2013 CHF 66.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 11.500 2/13/2013 EUR 57.40
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 1/24/2013 CHF 66.96
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.750 1/15/2013 CHF 68.73
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.250 12/17/2012 CHF 61.30
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/17/2012 EUR 67.37
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.500 12/14/2012 EUR 72.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 0.000 12/14/2012 CHF 36.53
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 12.000 11/23/2012 CHF 47.83
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 8.000 11/20/2012 CHF 74.87
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.125 11/19/2012 CHF 58.17
CLARIDEN LEU NAS 7.250 11/16/2012 CHF 58.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 8.900 3/25/2013 EUR 57.79
CREDIT SUISSE LD 10.500 9/9/2013 CHF 66.05
S-AIR GROUP 0.125 7/7/2005 CHF 10.63
SARASIN CI LTD 8.000 4/27/2015 CHF 68.67
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.600 2/17/2014 CHF 71.51
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 13.200 1/23/2013 EUR 72.52
SARASIN/GUERNSEY 15.200 12/12/2012 EUR 73.12
UBS AG 11.870 8/13/2013 USD 4.68
UBS AG 9.600 8/26/2013 USD 15.21
UBS AG 10.200 9/20/2013 EUR 61.15
UBS AG 12.900 9/20/2013 EUR 57.98
UBS AG 15.900 9/20/2013 EUR 55.99
UBS AG 17.000 9/27/2013 EUR 73.19
UBS AG 17.750 9/27/2013 EUR 73.50
UBS AG 18.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.56
UBS AG 19.750 9/27/2013 EUR 74.84
UBS AG 20.000 9/27/2013 EUR 70.19
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 74.87
UBS AG 20.500 9/27/2013 EUR 71.43
UBS AG 21.750 9/27/2013 EUR 72.53
UBS AG 22.000 9/27/2013 EUR 71.57
UBS AG 22.500 9/27/2013 EUR 70.55
UBS AG 22.750 9/27/2013 EUR 67.91
UBS AG 23.000 9/27/2013 EUR 72.72
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.81
UBS AG 23.250 9/27/2013 EUR 68.35
UBS AG 24.000 9/27/2013 EUR 69.47
UBS AG 24.750 9/27/2013 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 8.060 10/3/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 13.570 11/21/2013 USD 16.25
UBS AG 6.980 11/27/2013 USD 34.85
UBS AG 17.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.48
UBS AG 17.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 73.31
UBS AG 18.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.28
UBS AG 19.500 1/3/2014 EUR 73.10
UBS AG 20.000 1/3/2014 EUR 74.53
UBS AG 20.500 1/3/2014 EUR 71.30
UBS AG 20.750 1/3/2014 EUR 71.59
UBS AG 21.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.44
UBS AG 22.250 1/3/2014 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 23.000 1/3/2014 EUR 71.55
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.29
UBS AG 23.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.57
UBS AG 24.000 1/3/2014 EUR 72.95
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 68.40
UBS AG 24.250 1/3/2014 EUR 70.18
UBS AG 6.440 5/28/2014 USD 51.67
UBS AG 3.870 6/17/2014 USD 38.08
UBS AG 6.040 8/29/2014 USD 35.22
UBS AG 7.780 8/29/2014 USD 20.85
UBS AG 11.260 11/12/2012 EUR 47.13
UBS AG 11.660 11/12/2012 EUR 34.35
UBS AG 13.120 11/12/2012 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 13.560 11/12/2012 EUR 36.51
UBS AG 13.600 11/12/2012 EUR 56.96
UBS AG 13.000 11/23/2012 USD 62.55
UBS AG 8.150 12/21/2012 EUR 72.14
UBS AG 8.250 12/21/2012 EUR 74.88
UBS AG 8.270 12/21/2012 EUR 74.19
UBS AG 8.990 12/21/2012 EUR 72.49
UBS AG 9.000 12/21/2012 EUR 69.13
UBS AG 9.150 12/21/2012 EUR 71.84
UBS AG 9.450 12/21/2012 EUR 74.42
UBS AG 9.730 12/21/2012 EUR 70.24
UBS AG 9.890 12/21/2012 EUR 66.37
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 72.98
UBS AG 10.060 12/21/2012 EUR 69.64
UBS AG 10.160 12/21/2012 EUR 73.41
UBS AG 10.490 12/21/2012 EUR 68.12
UBS AG 10.690 12/21/2012 EUR 71.60
UBS AG 10.810 12/21/2012 EUR 63.85
UBS AG 11.000 12/21/2012 EUR 67.59
UBS AG 11.260 12/21/2012 EUR 66.14
UBS AG 11.270 12/21/2012 EUR 70.63
UBS AG 11.330 12/21/2012 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 11.770 12/21/2012 EUR 61.53
UBS AG 11.970 12/21/2012 EUR 65.67
UBS AG 11.980 12/21/2012 EUR 69.02
UBS AG 12.020 12/21/2012 EUR 64.27
UBS AG 12.200 12/21/2012 EUR 56.09
UBS AG 12.400 12/21/2012 EUR 68.07
UBS AG 12.760 12/21/2012 EUR 59.39
UBS AG 12.800 12/21/2012 EUR 62.51
UBS AG 12.970 12/21/2012 EUR 63.87
UBS AG 13.320 12/21/2012 EUR 66.64
UBS AG 13.560 12/21/2012 EUR 65.71
UBS AG 13.570 12/21/2012 EUR 60.85
UBS AG 13.770 12/21/2012 EUR 57.41
UBS AG 13.980 12/21/2012 EUR 62.18
UBS AG 14.350 12/21/2012 EUR 59.29
UBS AG 14.690 12/21/2012 EUR 64.44
UBS AG 14.740 12/21/2012 EUR 63.53
UBS AG 14.810 12/21/2012 EUR 55.58
UBS AG 15.000 12/21/2012 EUR 60.59
UBS AG 15.130 12/21/2012 EUR 57.81
UBS AG 15.860 12/21/2012 EUR 53.88
UBS AG 15.920 12/21/2012 EUR 56.41
UBS AG 15.930 12/21/2012 EUR 61.51
UBS AG 16.030 12/21/2012 EUR 59.10
UBS AG 16.600 12/21/2012 EUR 50.18
UBS AG 16.710 12/21/2012 EUR 55.09
UBS AG 16.930 12/21/2012 EUR 52.30
UBS AG 17.070 12/21/2012 EUR 57.69
UBS AG 17.500 12/21/2012 EUR 53.84
UBS AG 18.000 12/21/2012 EUR 50.83
UBS AG 19.090 12/21/2012 EUR 51.52
UBS AG 10.770 1/2/2013 USD 38.33
UBS AG 13.030 1/4/2013 EUR 73.40
UBS AG 13.630 1/4/2013 EUR 71.63
UBS AG 14.230 1/4/2013 EUR 69.95
UBS AG 14.820 1/4/2013 EUR 68.36
UBS AG 15.460 1/4/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 15.990 1/4/2013 EUR 65.39
UBS AG 16.500 1/4/2013 EUR 73.32
UBS AG 17.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 17.150 1/4/2013 EUR 62.69
UBS AG 17.180 1/4/2013 EUR 74.58
UBS AG 18.000 1/4/2013 EUR 73.54
UBS AG 18.300 1/4/2013 EUR 60.23
UBS AG 19.440 1/4/2013 EUR 57.99
UBS AG 19.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.92
UBS AG 20.500 1/4/2013 EUR 70.21
UBS AG 20.570 1/4/2013 EUR 55.94
UBS AG 21.700 1/4/2013 EUR 54.05
UBS AG 21.750 1/4/2013 EUR 69.65
UBS AG 23.750 1/4/2013 EUR 66.55
UBS AG 11.020 1/25/2013 EUR 67.05
UBS AG 12.010 1/25/2013 EUR 65.34
UBS AG 14.070 1/25/2013 EUR 62.22
UBS AG 16.200 1/25/2013 EUR 74.54
UBS AG 8.620 2/1/2013 USD 14.04
UBS AG 8.980 2/22/2013 EUR 72.86
UBS AG 10.590 2/22/2013 EUR 69.90
UBS AG 10.960 2/22/2013 EUR 67.35
UBS AG 13.070 2/22/2013 EUR 63.96
UBS AG 13.660 2/22/2013 EUR 61.23
UBS AG 13.940 2/22/2013 EUR 73.02
UBS AG 15.800 2/22/2013 EUR 67.24
UBS AG 8.480 3/7/2013 CHF 58.00
UBS AG 10.000 3/7/2013 USD 72.30
UBS AG 12.250 3/7/2013 CHF 59.20
UBS AG 9.000 3/22/2013 USD 11.16
UBS AG 9.850 3/22/2013 USD 19.75
UBS AG 16.500 4/2/2013 EUR 72.16
UBS AG 17.250 4/2/2013 EUR 72.45
UBS AG 18.000 4/2/2013 EUR 73.44
UBS AG 19.750 4/2/2013 EUR 69.63
UBS AG 21.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.05
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.98
UBS AG 21.500 4/2/2013 EUR 73.88
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 67.19
UBS AG 22.250 4/2/2013 EUR 69.43
UBS AG 24.250 4/2/2013 EUR 65.24
UBS AG 24.750 4/2/2013 EUR 68.24
UBS AG 10.860 4/4/2013 USD 37.21
UBS AG 9.650 4/11/2013 USD 27.17
UBS AG 9.930 4/11/2013 USD 24.77
UBS AG 11.250 4/11/2013 USD 24.39
UBS AG 10.170 4/26/2013 EUR 67.84
UBS AG 10.970 4/26/2013 EUR 66.50
UBS AG 12.610 4/26/2013 EUR 64.06
UBS AG 7.900 4/30/2013 USD 33.75
UBS AG 9.830 5/13/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.000 5/24/2013 USD 63.90
UBS AG 11.670 5/31/2013 USD 35.12
UBS AG 12.780 6/7/2013 CHF 62.60
UBS AG 16.410 6/7/2013 CHF 64.70
UBS AG 9.330 6/14/2013 USD 22.00
UBS AG 11.060 6/14/2013 USD 28.17
UBS AG 6.770 6/21/2013 USD 10.43
UBS AG 7.120 6/26/2013 USD 29.83
UBS AG 15.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.98
UBS AG 17.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.05
UBS AG 17.250 6/28/2013 EUR 72.59
UBS AG 19.250 6/28/2013 EUR 70.54
UBS AG 19.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.28
UBS AG 20.250 6/28/2013 EUR 74.82
UBS AG 20.500 6/28/2013 EUR 70.91
UBS AG 21.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.62
UBS AG 22.000 6/28/2013 EUR 71.86
UBS AG 22.500 6/28/2013 EUR 66.83
UBS AG 23.000 6/28/2013 EUR 67.15
UBS AG 23.500 6/28/2013 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 24.000 6/28/2013 EUR 68.94
UBS AG 24.500 6/28/2013 EUR 67.97
UBS AG 11.450 7/1/2013 USD 27.96
UBS AG 6.100 7/24/2013 USD 30.07
UBS AG 8.640 8/1/2013 USD 27.87
UBS AG 13.120 8/5/2013 USD 4.62
UBS AG 0.500 4/27/2015 CHF 52.50
UBS AG 6.070 11/12/2012 EUR 65.82
UBS AG 8.370 11/12/2012 EUR 59.26
UBS AG 8.590 11/12/2012 EUR 53.53
UBS AG 9.020 11/12/2012 EUR 43.76
UBS AG 9.650 11/12/2012 EUR 37.64
UBS AG 10.020 11/12/2012 EUR 71.72
UBS AG 10.930 11/12/2012 EUR 64.23
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 43.13
BARCLAYS BK PLC 11.000 6/28/2013 EUR 74.83
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.750 3/22/2013 EUR 41.06
BARCLAYS BK PLC 10.000 3/22/2013 EUR 42.44
BARCLAYS BK PLC 6.000 1/2/2013 EUR 50.37
BARCLAYS BK PLC 8.000 6/28/2013 EUR 47.66
ESSAR ENERGY 4.250 2/1/2016 USD 72.62
MAX PETROLEUM 6.750 9/8/2013 USD 40.36
*********
Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual
trades are probably different. Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.
Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.
A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com
Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.
*********
S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N
Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Washington, D.C., USA.
Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez,
Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter
A. Chapman, Editors.
Copyright 2013. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754.
This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.
Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.
The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$775 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 215-945-7000 or Nina Novak at
202-241-8200.
* * * End of Transmission * * *