/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/121102.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Friday, November 2, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 219

                            Headlines



C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

J&T BANKA: Moody's Affirms 'E+' BFSR; Outlook Negative


G E R M A N Y

DECO 15: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
HAPAG-LLOYD HOLDING: Moody's Cuts CFR/PDR to 'B2'; Outlook Neg.


H U N G A R Y

* HUNGARY: Mulls Talks with Banks After Municipal Debt Takeover


I R E L A N D

BROGAN'S BAKERY: Interim Examiner Appointed; 82 Jobs Secured
JJB SPORTS: Irish Stores Closed; 100 Jobs Affected
VERSAILLES CLO I: Moody's Confirms 'Ba3' Rating on Class E Notes


I T A L Y

GOLDEN BAR: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' Rating to Class B Notes
* ITALY: Moody's Says ABS Performance Deteriorates in July 2012


N E T H E R L A N D S

E-MAC DE 2005: Fitch Confirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
JUBILEE CDO VI: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B3'


R U S S I A

EUROPLANS: Fitch Rates RUB3-Bil. Sr. Unsecured Bonds 'BB-(EXP)'
SYNERGY OAO: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
* KALUGA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Currency Ratings
* VORONEZH REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Currency Ratings


S P A I N

UNION FENOSA: Fitch Maintains RWN on 'BB+' Subordinated Debt


S W E D E N

PERSTORP HOLDING: Moody's Assigns '(P)Caa1' Corp. Family Rating
PERSTORP HOLDING: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B-' LT Corp. Credit Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

COMET: May File for Administration; 6,000 Jobs at Risk
DREAMS: Needs to Inject More Funds; Chairman Steps Down
HIBU PLC: S&P Cuts Corp. Credit Rating to 'SD' on Missed Payment
RFC 2012: Judge Approves Winding-Up Petition
SPIRIT ISSUER: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Ratings on Five Note Classes


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The Health Care Marketplace


                            *********


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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
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J&T BANKA: Moody's Affirms 'E+' BFSR; Outlook Negative
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the E+ standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) of J&T Banka, a.s, with a
negative outlook. At the same time, Moody's affirmed the bank's
Ba1.cz long-term and the CZ-4 short-term deposit ratings.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, J&T Banka's E+ BFSR, mapping to a b3
baseline credit assessment, reflects 1) the bank's risk
positioning, as reflected by high exposure to commercial real
estate (CRE) projects and increasing reliance on trading income,
2) relatively low capitalization levels compared to this higher
risk business profile, and 3) a still small, albeit growing,
franchise in the competitive Czech banking market.

The negative outlook reflects (1) the ongoing structural changes
in J&T Banka, which have increased the bank's operational risk;
(2) continued deterioration of the bank's asset quality, and high
borrower concentrations, in particular in the riskier CRE asset
class; and (3) low profitability and insufficient internal
capital generation capacity needed to build up buffers against
losses.

J&T Banka integrated a range of external and group companies in
2011, including asset management and securities trading
operations. Although the bank has some track record of
successfully integrating third party businesses, this integration
increases operational risks.

The bank reported a problem loan ratio of 14.1% in 2011,
indicating a substantial deterioration year on year (2010: 9.2%).
J&T Banka's loan portfolio remains vulnerable, as high borrower
concentrations expose the bank to specific borrower
vulnerabilities, particularly in real estate, which has performed
more weakly in recent years. To illustrate this, Moody's notes
that in 2011, in the Czech market only 54% of new apartments were
sold before completion of residential development, compared with
almost 95% in 2007, as reported by the Czech National Bank.

J&T reported a CZK584.6 million (EUR22.8 million) net profit in
H1 2012, a 151% increase compared with the same period in 2011.
However, the increase was mainly attributable to rapid growth in
trading income, which grew more than tenfold compared to H1 2011,
and accounted for 35% of operating income in H1 2012. The bank's
capitalization, as measured by the total capital ratio, declined
to 11.3% at the end of June 2012 from 12.1% at year-end 2011.
Moody's deems the bank's economic capital buffer against losses
as limited.

What Could Move The Ratings Up/Down

Given the negative outlook, any upward pressure on the BFSR or
the national scale deposit ratings is limited at this moment.
Over time, upward pressure on these ratings could develop from
(1) further franchise enhancement, including corporate
governance; (2) improvement in the bank's risk positioning, and a
reduction in borrower and industry concentrations, and (3)
substantial improvement in capitalization levels. Downward
pressure on the BFSR and deposit ratings could result from
further deterioration of asset quality, and/or deterioration in
liquidity or capitalization.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Consolidated Global Bank Rating Methodology published in June
2012.

Moody's National Scale Ratings (NSRs) are intended as relative
measures of creditworthiness among debt issues and issuers within
a country, enabling market participants to better differentiate
relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's global scale ratings in
that they are not globally comparable with the full universe of
Moody's rated entities, but only with NSRs for other rated debt
issues and issuers within the same country. NSRs are designated
by a ".nn" country modifier signifying the relevant country, as
in ".mx" for Mexico.



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G E R M A N Y
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DECO 15: Fitch Affirms 'CCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded DECO 15 - Pan Europe 6 Ltd's
(DECO 15) class B notes and affirmed the other classes, as
follows:

  -- EUR7.6m class A1 due July 2014 (XS0307398841) affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- EUR202m class A2 due July 2014 (XS0307400258) affirmed at
     'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- EUR101m class A3 due July 2014 (XS0307400506) affirmed at
     'Asf'; Outlook Stable
  -- EUR56.3m class B due July 2014 (XS0307401140) downgraded to
     'BBsf' from 'BBB-sf'; Outlook Stable
  -- EUR57.8m class C due July 2014 (XS0307405133) affirmed at
     'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- EUR43.2m class D due July 2014 (XS0307405729) affirmed at
     'CCCsf'; Recovery Estimate (RE) 90%
  -- EUR16.4m class E due July 2014 (XS0307406453) affirmed at
     'CCsf'; RE90%

The downgrade of the class B notes reflects the application of
ambiguous principal pay rules in a manner that is not favorable
to this class of notes.  The associated risk of prolonged pro
rata payment makes allocation among noteholders (other than the
class A notes) sensitive to outcomes that are difficult to
predict with confidence.  As a result, there is less
differentiation in Fitch's ratings below the class A notes.

The transaction is structured to allow, subject to compliance
with sequential pay triggers, the bulk of principal receipts
(including recovery proceeds) to be applied to note classes in
proportions specified according to an initial dual categorization
of loans, with any surplus allocated pro rata among classes B
through F.

Even without a switch to sequential pay, these rules safeguard at
least 85% of principal being shared by the classes A1, A2 and A3
notes (80% of this principal allocated to the A1 class, the
surplus to classes A2 and A3 pro rata).  This underpins the high
ratings assigned to these classes.

Sequential pay will be triggered if losses exceed EUR70 million
or if enough loans are in default (determined according to
original loan terms and inclusive of loans that have been worked
out at a loss).  One of the default tests is breached if more
than five loans are in default -- an outcome not expected by
Fitch.  The more significant trigger is if "the cumulative
percentage of Loans (calculated by reference to the principal
amount outstanding of the Loans as at the date of calculation)
which have defaulted since the Closing Date is greater than 12.5
per cent."

Fitch is unable to determine from this language whether the 12.5%
threshold is intended to be applied in relation to the principal
balance at closing or at present.  Nevertheless, the test is
actually being applied in relation to the closing balance
(EUR1,445.3 million), subject to which it is accordingly more
likely to remain in compliance. (Dividing the defaulted balance
by the current balance would find the trigger, if interpreted as
such, already in breach, since two loans accounting for EUR88.5
million, Plus Retail and Main, failed to repay when due.)

In Fitch's analysis, breaching the 12.5% trigger is contingent on
the EUR151.8 Mansford OBI loan defaulting at its July 2014
maturity date, provided also that the EUR76.5 million Main loan
does not recover in full. While this combination of events is
Fitch's central expectation, there is uncertainty surrounding
this outcome which is factored in the ratings of the affected
classes.

Postponing reversion to sequential pay allows more principal to
leak to junior classes -- from recoveries collected on loans
already in default and/or from redemption funds on the higher
quality loans expected to redeem in the interim.  There is a core
of credit strength in the pool, with three loans, OWG MF (secured
on multifamily housing), SCN Shopping Centre (on an Austrian
shopping centre) and Fishman Coop III (on a Swiss retail asset),
all expected to repay in full before Mansford OBI matures.

Fitch identifies two plausible outcomes: either sequential pay
commences in July 2014 (when Mansford OBI matures) or not at all.
These two scenarios would leave the classes B through F in a
markedly different position, which complicates the credit
analysis of the rated bonds (class F is unrated).  The higher
ranking of these classes would naturally benefit from a breach of
a sequential pay trigger, and classes B and C could arguably be
considered investment grade in this scenario.

However, if the sequential pay triggers remain in compliance
(i.e. if Main recovers or Mansford OBI redeems), the classes B
through E would likely fall into distressed territory owing to
pro rata allocation of losses -- even though the gross amount of
principal returned to noteholders would be boosted.

While the risk that the deal does not revert to sequential is a
drag on credit quality, particularly on the ratings of classes B
and C, Fitch expects the trigger eventually to be breached given
the high leverage of the defaulted Main loan and the Mansford
OBI.  This also accounts for the continuing difference in the
ratings of the class A2 and A3 notes.

Since the last rating action in November 2011, there has been
full repayment of by far the largest loan in the pool, the
EUR712m Centro loan.  However, beside the two loans in default
and the Mansford OBI loan, Fitch believes the AOK Schwerin and
Freiberg loans are both in negative equity and likely to suffer
losses.

A minimum of three years remains between the maturity of Freiburg
and the legal maturity of the notes in April 2018, which gives
the servicer (Situs Asset Management Limited, rated 'CPS3+')
and/or special servicer (Hatfield Philips International Ltd,
'CSS3+') time to enact a range of workout strategies in order to
maximize recoveries.


HAPAG-LLOYD HOLDING: Moody's Cuts CFR/PDR to 'B2'; Outlook Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the corporate family
rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) of Hapag-
Lloyd Holding AG ("Hapag-Lloyd") to B2 from B1. Concurrently, the
rating agency has also downgraded to Caa1 from B3 the senior
unsecured rating currently assigned to the EUR480 million and
$250 million worth of senior unsecured notes maturing in 2015 and
2017, respectively, issued by Hapag-Lloyd AG and guaranteed by
Hapag-Lloyd Holding AG. The outlook on the ratings is negative.

Ratings Rationale

"The rating action reflects our view that, over the next 12-18
months , Hapag-Lloyd is unlikely to achieve a consolidated
financial profile that would be commensurate with its B1 rating,"
says Marco Vetulli, a Moody's Vice President - Senior Credit
Officer and lead analyst for Hapag-Lloyd.

Moody's had previously indicated that it could downgrade Hapag-
Lloyd's previous B1 rating if the company failed to achieve an
improvement in its credit metrics profile during 2012 -
specifically, financial leverage exceeding 6.5x or interest
coverage below 2.5 X (defined as funds from operations (FFO) +
interest expense)/interest expense).

After some strengthening earlier in the year, the combined effect
of overcapacity and a weaker-than-expected level of demand
triggered a reduction in freight rates from August 2012,
especially on Europe-Asia routes, which are a backbone of the
industry. Due to these market conditions, Moody's expects that
Hapag-Lloyd's profitability at the end of 2012 will be materially
lower than the rating agency was anticipating previously.

Moody's acknowledges that, in response to falling demand, some
container shipping companies, including Hapag-Lloyd, are
currently reducing their capacity in operation in order to avoid
a further reduction in freight rates.

Nonetheless, Moody's expects that the supply adjustment process
will be challenging. This is not only because there is sizable
capacity due to come on stream in the industry in 2013; but also
given the highly competitive structure of the industry - where an
operator reducing its capacity may be seen by another operator as
an opportunity to increase its market share.

In addition progress in operating performance and metrics in 2013
could be affected by the future evolution of the supply-demand
gap in the container market and the challenging economic
environment, especially in Europe. Therefore, Moody's is
concerned that freight rates might not fully recover for a
prolonged period of time with bunker costs staying relatively
high. Such combination of factors would constrain Hapag-Lloyd's
credit profile over the next 12-18 months, hence the negative
outlook on the rating.

On a more positive note, Hapag-Lloyd's B2 rating is still
supported by (1) the company's good business profile, which is
due to its leading market position as a result of its successful
commercial operations; (2) the flexibility of its fleet (due to
the high amount of chartered vessels that could be redelivered in
the next year); (3) Hapag-Lloyd's stable financial position,
given not only its adequate liquidity, but also the acceptable
headroom under the company's bank covenants; and (4) support the
company received from its shareholders, the German government and
the City of Hamburg during the 2008-09 global economic crisis.

What Could Change The Rating Up/Down

Moody's considers it unlikely that any upward pressure could be
exerted on HL's rating in the short term. However, longer term,
positive rating pressure could arise if the company were to
demonstrate progress towards (i) a reduction in financial
leverage approaching 6x on a sustainable basis; and (ii) an
increase in its (funds from operations (FFO) + interest
expense)/interest expense of above 2.5x on sustainable basis.

The ratings presently incorporate that the weak credit metrics
for the rating category will recover in 2013. The inability to
evidence a path to a stronger credit metrics profile during 2013
could result in a negative rating action. For instance, a
financial leverage remaining above 7x on sustained basis or
(funds from operations (FFO) + interest expense)/interest expense
of below 1.5x would indicate management's unwillingness or
inability to de-risk the capital structure. Any pressure on HL's
liquidity profile or lack of short term improvement in market
conditions which would underpin the strengthening of metrics
could result in immediate rating pressure.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating Hapag-Lloyd Holding AG
was the Global Shipping Industry Methodology published in
December 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Hamburg, Germany, Hapag-Lloyd Holding AG is the
holding company of Hapag-Lloyd Group, which includes Hapag-Lloyd
AG and its subsidiaries. Hapag-Lloyd Group is the largest
container liner shipping company in Germany and one of the
biggest worldwide based on global market coverage. As of June
2012, Hapag-Lloyd Group operated a fleet comprising 147 ships
including 56 owned, 84 chartered-in and seven leased vessels and
recorded a turnover of approximately EUR6.5 billion on a last-12-
months basis. Hapag-Lloyd Group was established in 1970 as a
result of the merger of Hapag (1847) and North German Lloyd
(1857). Hamburgische Seefahrtsbeteiligung "Albert Ballin" GmbH &
Co. KG is the company's largest shareholder, with a 78% stake.



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H U N G A R Y
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* HUNGARY: Mulls Talks with Banks After Municipal Debt Takeover
---------------------------------------------------------------
Veronika Gulyas at Dow Jones Newswires reports that Hungary will
talk to banks about some form of compensation for taking over
municipal debt worth 2% of the country's gross domestic product.

Prime Minister Viktor Orban said on Saturday that Hungary will
take over local government debt totaling HUF612 billion
(US$2.8 billion) at the beginning of next year, Dow Jones
relates.

"This is basically money found in the street for creditor banks,"
Dow Jones quotes Lajos Kosa, a senior governing Fidesz party
official, as saying, adding that the government will need to talk
to those six major banks that have lent to municipalities.

Local governments have amassed some HUF1.2 trillion in debts over
the past decade, with many of them on the verge of bankruptcy,
Dow Jones discloses.



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BROGAN'S BAKERY: Interim Examiner Appointed; 82 Jobs Secured
------------------------------------------------------------
Irish Examiner reports that an interim examiner has been
appointed to Brogan's Bakery in Glenamaddy, Co Galway.

The examiner, Michael McAteer of Grant Thornton, says the
business will continue to operate as normal during the
examinership, Irish Examiner relates.

According to Irish Examiner, all 55 full time and 27 seasonal and
part time workers at the bakery have been secured during the
examinership period.

The High Court was told that a potential investor has been
identified, Irish Examiner discloses.


JJB SPORTS: Irish Stores Closed; 100 Jobs Affected
--------------------------------------------------
Suzanne Lynch at The Irish Times reports that some 100 jobs,
mostly part-time, are to go following the closure of JJB Stores'
operations in Ireland.

The company is to cease trading in Ireland after the liquidator
failed to find a buyer for the Irish business, the Irish Times
says.  Its four retail stores and two leisure centers are to shut
immediately, with the loss of 100 jobs, the Irish Times
discloses.

Kieran Wallace of KPMG, who was appointed liquidator to the firm
by the High Court in early October, said on Wednesday a buyer
could not be found, the Irish Times relates.

                        About JJB Sports

JJB Sports plc -- http://www.jjbcorporate.co.uk/-- is a sports
retailer.  JJB Sports is a multi-channel sports retailer
supplying branded sports and leisure clothing, footwear and
accessories.  It operates out of over 185 stores across the
United Kingdom and Ireland with e-commerce offering.

On Oct. 1, 2012, administrators from KPMG were appointed to the
three companies which make up JJB Sports.  Brian Green, David
Costley-Wood and Richard Fleming were appointed joint
administrators to JJB Group plc; Brian Green, David Costley-Wood
and Blair Nimmo were appointed to Blane Leisure Ltd and Brian
Green and David Costley-Wood were appointed to SSL Retail Ltd.

Following their appointment, the administrators completed an
agreement to sell part of the business to Sports Direct
International.   Sports Direct has acquired 20 of JJB's stores,
all brands and domain names and all trademarks (excluding JJB),
securing around 550 jobs in the UK (including the staff at the
company's warehouse).  Unfortunately the remaining 133 stores
were closed, resulting in approximately 2,200 redundancies. A
total of 167 employees have been retained to assist the
administrators.


VERSAILLES CLO I: Moody's Confirms 'Ba3' Rating on Class E Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following notes issued by Versailles CLO M.E. I p.l.c.:

    EUR102.75M Class A-1-D Senior Delayed Draw Floating Rate
    Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 10,
    2012 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR95.3M Class A-1-T Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Aa1
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR33M Class A-2 Senior Variable Funding Floating Rate Notes
    due 2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012
    Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR22.5M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2023,
    Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 A2 (sf)
    Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR18M Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2023, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Baa2
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR12.2M Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2023, Confirmed at Ba1 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Ba1
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR14M Class E Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2023, Confirmed at Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Ba3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Versailles CLO M.E. I p.l.c., issued in November 2006, is a
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by BNP
Paribas. This transaction will be in reinvestment period until
January 2013. It is predominantly composed of senior secured
loans.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes
reflect a resilient performance, the benefit regarding Moody's
modelling assumptions of the short period of time remaining
before the end of the deal's reinvestment period in January 2013.
The actions also reflect a correction to the rating model Moody's
used for this transaction. Moody's corrected the rating model and
put the ratings of above tranches on review for upgrade on 10
July, 2012.

In consideration of the reinvestment restrictions applicable
during the amortization period, and therefore the limited ability
to effect significant changes to the current collateral pool,
Moody's analyzed the deal assuming a higher likelihood that the
collateral pool characteristics will continue to maintain a
positive buffer relative to certain covenant requirements. In
particular, the deal is assumed to benefit from a shorter
amortization profile, higher spread and diversity levels compared
to the levels assumed at the last rating action in October 2011.

Moody's notes that the reported proportion of senior secured debt
within the portfolio increased to 94.6% from 91.6% between July
2011 and August 2012. All overcollateralization tests are
currently in compliance. However the overcollateralization ratios
of the rated notes have decreased since the rating action in
October 2011. The Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E
overcollateralization ratios are reported at 123.52%, 115.34%,
110.38% and 105.19%, respectively, versus July 2011 levels of
126.07%, 117.71%, 112.65% and 107.35%, respectively. In addition,
securities rated Caa or lower make up approximately 15.09% of the
underlying portfolio versus 14.77% in July 2011. Additionally,
defaulted securities total about EUR8.8 million of the underlying
portfolio compared to EUR 2.5 million in July 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR323 million,
defaulted par of EUR12.6 million, a weighted average default
probability of 21.14% (consistent with a WARF of 2972), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 47.67% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 37 and a weighted
average spread of 3.7%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 94% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

In the process of determining the final ratings, Moody's took
into account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Deterioration of credit quality to address the refinance and
sovereign risks -- Approximately 25% of the obligors in the
portfolio are rated B3 and below with their loans maturing
between 2014 and 2016, which may create challenges for those
obligors to refinance. Approximately 16% of the portfolio is
exposed to obligors located in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain
and Italy. Moody's considered a scenario where the WARF was
increased to be 3645 by forcing the credit quality on 25% of such
exposure to Ca. This scenario generated model outputs that were
one to two notches lower than the base case results.

(2) Lower Weighted Average Recovery Rate and Diversity Score
Levels - Moody's also tested the sensitivity of the rated
tranches to certain key parameters, Moody's modelled a lower
weighted average recovery rate of 46% as well as a lower
diversity score of 34, which are corresponding to the covenanted
level of senior secured loans and Moody's minimum diversity test
level. This scenario generated model outputs that were zero to
one notch lower than the base case results.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy, especially as 15.8% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Greece, Portugal,
Ireland, Spain and Italy and 2) the large concentration of
speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2015 which may
create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Moody's also notes that around 62% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Further information
regarding specific risks and stresses associated with credit
estimates are available in the report titled "Updated Approach to
the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in
October 2009.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices. Realization of higher than expected recoveries
would positively impact the ratings of the notes.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modelling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action may be negatively affected.



=========
I T A L Y
=========


GOLDEN BAR: Moody's Assigns 'Ba1' Rating to Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the definitive ratings to
the ABS notes issued by Golden Bar (Securitisation) S.r.l. (the
"Issuer").

- A3 (sf) to EUR955.4 Class A -- 2012-2 Asset-Backed Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2030;

- Ba1 (sf) to EUR72.6 Class B -- 2012-2 Asset-Backed Fixed Rate
   Notes due 2030;

Moody's ratings were not assigned to EUR181.4 Class C -- 2012-2
Asset-Backed Fixed Rate Notes due 2030.

Ratings Rationale

The subject transaction is a cash securitization of Cessione del
Quinto loans ("CDQ") and Delegazione di Pagamento loans ("DP")
extended to borrowers resident in Italy by Santander Consumer
Bank S.p.A. ("SCB"). Under a CDQ Loan, the debtor assigns to the
lender one fifth of his net monthly salary or pension to cover
his loan obligations; loans are collateralised by a maximum of
20% of the monthly salary of the employee/pension (net of taxes),
plus any eventual Severance pay (Trattamento Fine Rapporto --
"TFR"). In addition, an obligatory insurance policy protects
against loss of job, resignation and death of the debtor. DP
loans are similar to CDQ loans, except for the following
fundamental differences: (a) The monthly instalment can represent
up to half of the borrower's net salary, although SCB grants DP
loans up to one fifth of the net salary of the borrower, (b) the
lender has a direct claim towards the employer only if the
employer expressly accepts the delegation of payment, (c) the
severance pay (TFR) is not automatically attached in favor of the
lender unless the debtor and employer expressly provide their
written consent, (d) if the employer becomes insolvent, the
payment delegation is automatically terminated, (e) the DP can be
terminated in the event of insolvency of the originator, and (f)
the quota of salary delegated does not benefit of the exemption
from seizure and attachment proceedings as for CDQ loans.

The portfolio as of September 5, 2012 was made of 74,942 loans
granted to 67,621 debtors with a total outstanding principal
amount of approximately Euro 1.2 billion. The weighted average
current loan amount equal to Euro 16,137. Around 79% of the
portfolio is made of CDQ loans and 21% of DP loans. The top 1 and
top 10 obligor exposures are 0.01% and 0.09%, respectively,
whereas the top 1 and top 10 employer exposures are 17% and 64%,
respectively.

The portfolio is heavily concentrated in employees working for
the Italian public sector, and specifically central governmental
entities, as well as pensioners receiving payments from INPS (the
Italian social security institute). At closing, 16.5% of the
obligors are pensioners/retired receiving their pension from
INPS. Around 59.7% of the obligors work for other Italian public
sector entities (central state administration, healthcare
authorities, military and police forces, etc.), or public
companies (such as Poste Italiane), and the remaining 23.8% are
employed in the private sector. As stated above, the employer
plays a key part in the CDQ and DP product (from an operational,
legal and credit aspect) and hence was part of Moody's analysis.

The rating on the notes takes into account, among other factors,
(i) an evaluation of the underlying portfolio of loans and
insurance coverage; (ii) macro-economic forecasts and historical
performance information; (iii) the credit enhancement provided by
the excess spread and the reserve fund; (iv) the liquidity
support available in the transaction, by way of principal to pay
interest, the liquidity reserve, and the reserve fund; (v) the
back-up servicer and computation agent arrangements that mitigate
operational risks; and (vi) the legal and structural integrity of
the transaction.

This deal benefits from credit strengths, such as the low
historical losses, loan protections through salary/TFR
assignment, and insurance coverage, as well as certain structural
features such as a computation agent able to estimate and make
payments under the notes in case of a servicer disruption.
Moody's however notes that the transaction features a number of
credit weaknesses, as there is exposure to commingling risk as
well as operational risk, which is mitigated by the appointment
of a back up servicer facilitator from day one, which undertakes
to nominate a back up servicer at loss of Baa3 of Santander
Consumer Finance (Baa2/P-2), which is the parent company of the
originator. The portfolio concentration in terms of employers is
higher than usually seen in a typical consumer loan transaction,
especially that linked to one particular employer or sector as
stated above. Moody's has treated this in its quantitative
assessment.

One of the particular aspects of CDQ and DP products is that all
the loans are partially guaranteed by insurance coverage. There
are specific concentrations to insurance companies in the
transaction. The top life insurer, Ergo Assicurazione S.p.A.,
provides coverage to 75% of the individual loans in the
portfolio, and CF Assicurazione S.p.A. provides coverage against
unemployment to 67% of the portfolio. Hence, the transaction
would be exposed to potential default risk of insurance
companies. These characteristics, amongst others, were considered
in Moody's quantitative analysis and ratings.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium, which is higher than
the score assigned for the Italian Consumer loan sector. Some
notable features pertain to the M score for
"Issuer/Sponsor/Originator's Historical Performance Variability",
which considers the uncertainty regarding the effect on portfolio
performance of a severe sovereign crisis, the fact that
unemployment risk and arrears due to financial problems of
employers are procyclical, as well as the lack of historical data
covering a scenario of default of one of the insurers that
provides life and unemployment risk protection. In addition, the
"Analytic Complexity" have been assigned a M score given the
higher complexity compared to the average transaction in the
market as Cessione del Quinto and Delegazione di Pagamento are
products containing specific features, such as insurance coverage
and TFR coverage that requires more complex analysis.

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed a mean default
rate of 16% for the initial portfolio, with a coefficient of
variation of 45% and a recovery rate of 70% (non-insurance
default-see explanation above) as the main input parameters to
derive the lognormal portfolio loss distribution, in the scenario
where the insurance companies fulfill their obligations. Moody's
also considered the insurance company exposure in the transaction
considering scenarios where one or more insurance companies
default and its impact on the recovery figure above. This was
weighted by the credit quality of the insurance entities to
derive a joint loss distribution, then used in Moody's cash-flow
model ABSROM. In its base case scenario, Moody's also assumed a
constant prepayment rate of 5% and a sinus-shape timing of
defaults, considering a 240 days default definition.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating Consumer Loan ABS Transactions published in
October 2012.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in Global
Structured Finance Operational Risk Guidelines: Moody's Approach
to Analyzing Performance Disruption Risk published in June 2011,
and The Lognormal Method Applied to ABS Analysis, published in
July 2000 and those present in this press release to reflect the
product characteristics.

For rating this transaction Moody's used ABSROM (v.3.1.1) to
model the cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. In
the cash flow model, once all of the asset-side modelling
assumptions are input, the model produces a series of default
scenarios that are weighted considering the probabilities of the
lognormal distribution assumed for the portfolio defaults. In
each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of
notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets
and the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario; and (ii) the loss expected in each default scenario for
each tranche.

Moody's Parameter Sensitivities: Moody's principal portfolio
model inputs are Moody's cumulative default rate assumption and
the recovery rate. Moody's tested various scenarios derived from
different combinations of mean default rate (i.e. adding a stress
on the expected average portfolio quality) and recovery rate. For
example, Moody's tested for the mean default rate: 16% as base
case ranging to 18% and for the recovery rate (non-insurance
default-see explanation above): 70.0% as base case ranging to
50.0%. At the time the rating was assigned, the model output
indicated that class A would have achieved Baa2 output even if
the cumulative mean default probability (DP) had been as high as
18%, and the recovery rate as low as 50.0% (all other factors
being constant). Moody's Parameter Sensitivities provide a
quantitative / model-indicated calculation of the number of
rating notches that a Moody's-rated structured finance security
may vary if certain input parameters would change. The analysis
assumes that the deal has not aged. It is not intended to measure
how the rating of the security might migrate over time, but
rather, how the initial rating of the security might have
differed if the two parameters within a given sector that have
the greatest rating impact were varied.

The ratings address the expected loss posed to investors by the
legal final maturity date of the notes. Moody's ratings address
only the credit risks associated with the transaction. Other non-
credit risks have not been addressed, but may have a significant
effect on yield to investors.

No previous ratings were assigned to this transaction.

On 21 August 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment seeking
market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modelling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action may be negatively affected.


* ITALY: Moody's Says ABS Performance Deteriorates in July 2012
---------------------------------------------------------------
The performance of the Italian leasing asset-backed securities
(ABS) market deteriorated in the three-month period leading to
July 2012, according to the latest index report published by
Moody's Investors Service.

Moody's cumulative default index (as a percentage of original
balance + cumulated replenishments) rose marginally to 5.6% in
July 2012 from 5.5% in April 2012, showing however a 16% year-on-
year increase from 4.82% in July 2011.

Moody's notes a deteriorating trend in the total delinquencies
index, as of current pool balance, showing a 14.6% quarter-on-
quarter increase to 6.3% in July 2012 from 5.5% in April 2012.
The average constant prepayment rate remained stable and low at
0.7% in the three-month period leading to July 2012. Prepayments
are structurally low in Italian leasing asset-backed securities
as leasing contracts typically do not provide right for borrowers
to prepay.

We expect continued weak domestic demand will weaken SME revenues
and increase borrower defaults. Moody's expects Italian GDP to
contract by 2.4% in 2012 (see "Credit Opinion: Government of
Italy", October 2012), which will likely drive up leases in
arrears.

As of July 2012, the total outstanding pool balance was EUR13.4
billion, which represents a year-on-year increase of around 9.1%.
In July 2012, a new transaction was issued in the Italian leasing
makert (Salina Leasing S.r.l,) for an original portfolio of
around EUR585 million.

As of July 2012, three out of 26 outstanding transactions (Locat
SV S.r.l. - Serie 2006 (LSV4), Locat SV S.r.l. -- Serie 2006 and
Zephyros Finance S.r.l.), reported an unpaid principal deficiency
ledger.

Additional information regarding the number of outstanding deals,
number of outstanding rated tranches, the average pool factor and
the average of Moody's performance expectations are available in
the summary sheet of the Italian leasing index report.

Moody's indices are usually published mid-month and can be found
on www.moodys.com in the Structured Finance sub-directory under
the Research & Ratings tab. In the left-hand side bar, under the
Research Type category heading, select Statistical Data. Finally,
on the Research tab in the middle of your screen, select the
third option, Indices & Data.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


E-MAC DE 2005: Fitch Confirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class E Notes
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has confirmed E-MAC DE 2005-I B.V.'s ratings.

The confirmation comes ahead of the put option in November 2012.
The transactions' note holders hold a put option to have their
notes redeemed upon exercising their rights on and after the
first put dates.  The agency understands that the mortgage
payment transactions provider (CMIS Investments B.V.) will not
provide the necessary funds to the issuer.

Fitch also highlights that the issuer has not engaged any third
party that would be willing to purchase the mortgage portfolio.
As a result, none of the notes will be redeemed and the
transaction will continue to operate as before, with the addition
of the extension margins.  These rank subordinate to the notes'
interest payments based on the initial margins and the reserve
fund in the interest priority of payments.  Failure to pay the
extension margin would not constitute an event of default.
Fitch's ratings do not address the payment of the extension
margins.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Class A (ISIN XS0221900243): confirmed at 'AAsf'; Stable
     Outlook
  -- Class B (ISIN XS0221901050): confirmed at 'Asf'; Stable
     Outlook
  -- Class C (ISIN XS0221902538): confirmed at 'BBB-sf'; Stable
     Outlook
  -- Class D (ISIN XS0221903429): confirmed at 'B+sf'; Stable
     Outlook
  -- Class E (ISIN XS0221904237): confirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Estimate (RE) of 100%


JUBILEE CDO VI: Moody's Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has taken rating actions on the
following notes issued by Jubilee CDO VI:

Issuer: Jubilee CDO VI

    EUR25M Class A1-b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Aa3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR12.5M Class A2-b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
    2022, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Aa3
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR13M Class A3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
    Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Aa1 (sf)
    Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR32M Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
    Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 Baa1 (sf)
    Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR27M Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
    due 2022, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012
    Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR21M Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
    due 2022, Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012 B1
    (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR17M Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
    due 2022, Upgraded to B3 (sf); previously on Jul 10, 2012
    Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

    EUR3.15M Class Q Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Ba1
    (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

    EUR6M Class S Combination Notes due 2022, Upgraded to Baa1
    (sf); previously on Sep 23, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class Q,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of
all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either
through interest or principal payments. For Class S, the 'Rated
Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount of the
Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the Rated Coupon
of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated Balance on
the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all payments
made from the Issue Date to such date, either through interest or
principal payments. The Rated Balance may not necessarily
correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported by the
trustee.

Jubilee CDO VI, issued in August 2006, is a Collateralised Loan
Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield
European loans. The portfolio is managed by Alcentra Ltd. This
transaction exited its reinvestment period on September 20, 2012.
It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are a
result of resilient performance since the last rating action in
September 2011 in conjunction with a correction to the rating
model Moody's used for this transaction. Moody's corrected the
rating model and put the ratings of the above tranches on review
for upgrade on July 10, 2012.

Moody's notes that between August 2011 and September 2012 the
weighted average spread increased from 3.49% to 4.10%. In
addition, the reported WARF has only increased from 3008 to 3059
despite a substantial rise in securities rated Caa or lower make
up approximately 15.35% of the underlying portfolio versus 8.22%
in August 2012.

The reported overcollateralization ("OC") ratios of the rated
notes have decreased since the rating action in September 2011.
The Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 127.57%, 116.88%, 109.72% and 104.54%,
respectively, versus August 2011 levels of 130.95%, 119.97%,
112.63% and 107.31%, respectively. All coverage tests are
currently in compliance. However, Moody's computed OC levels have
remain stable since last action.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR393 million,
defaulted par of EUR2.5 million, a weighted average default
probability of 24.06% (consistent with a WARF of 3229), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 42.27% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 34 and a weighted
average spread of 4.0%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 81% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

In the process of determining the final ratings, Moody's took
into account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Deterioration of assets credit quality to address the loan
refinancing and sovereign risks specific to some assets in the
portfolio-- 20% of the obligors in the portfolio have a credit
quality consistent with B3 rating or below with their loan
maturing between 2014 and 2016, which may create challenges for
those obligors to refinance. 10% of the portfolio is also exposed
to obligors located in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and
Italy. Moody's considered a scenario where the WARF was increased
to 3527 by forcing the credit quality on 25% of such exposures to
Ca. This scenario generated model outputs that were one to two
notches lower than the base case results.

(2) Lower Weighted Average Recovery Rate and Diversity Score
Levels - Moody's also tested the sensitivity of the rated
tranches to lower diversity score and recovery rate upon default
scenarios. Moody's modelled a lower weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 40% for a Aaa liability target rating as
well as a lower diversity score of 31. This scenario generated
model outputs that were within one or one notch off the base case
results.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration
of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2014 and 2016 which
may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes'
performance may also be impacted either positively or negatively
by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

1) Amortization: Pace of amortization could vary significantly
subject to market conditions and this may have a significant
impact on the notes' ratings. In particular, amortization could
accelerate as a consequence of high levels of prepayments in the
loan market or collateral sales by the Collateral Manager or be
delayed by rising loan amend-and-extent restructurings. Fast
amortization would usually benefit the ratings of the notes.

2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be
defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries
and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted
assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed
defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and
the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in
market prices.

3) Moody's also notes that around 47% of the collateral pool
consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures
to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a
stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled
"Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
Transactions" published in October 2009.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios that are then weighted considering the probabilities of
the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's
analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

On August 21, 2012, Moody's released a Request for Comment
seeking market feedback on proposed adjustments to its modelling
assumptions. These adjustments are designed to account for the
impact of rapid and significant country credit deterioration on
structured finance transactions. If the adjusted approach is
implemented as proposed, the rating of the notes affected by the
rating action may be negatively affected.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


EUROPLANS: Fitch Rates RUB3-Bil. Sr. Unsecured Bonds 'BB-(EXP)'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Europlan's Series 03 RUB3 billion
five-year issue of senior unsecured bonds, due 04 November 2017,
an expected Long-term local currency rating of 'BB-(EXP)' and an
expected National Long-term rating of 'A+(rus)(EXP)'.

The final rating is contingent upon the receipt of final
documents conforming to information already received.

The bonds will have an expected maturity of five years and semi-
annual coupons.  There will be a put option on November 4, 2014.

Europlan has a Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB-'
with a Stable Outlook, Short-term IDR of 'B', and a National
Long-term rating of 'A+(rus)' with Stable Outlook.

If material, the share of assets pledged against Europlan's bank
funding could limit recoveries for the company's other senior
creditors in a hypothetical default scenario.  The share of
pledged net investments in leases was 60% at end-2011, according
to the company's IFRS accounts.  Any future large increase in the
proportion of encumbered assets could lead to a downward revision
of the rating of senior unsecured bonds and, according to Fitch's
methodology, a notching down of the Long-term rating of the notes
from the company's Long-term IDR.

Europlan is a one of the leaders of automotive leasing in Russia.
It is majority-owned (62%) by Baring Vostok Private Equity Fund.
The business model targets small and medium-sized enterprises
(83% of the lease book), with the lease book comprising mostly
foreign economy and medium-class passenger cars, trucks
(including minivans) and other equipment (mostly specialized
vehicles).  Europlan operates a nationwide network of 74 offices
(at end-2011) with over 600 sales staff in total.  Its leasing
portfolio (at end-2011) includes around 15,000 lessees and 30,000
vehicles rented.


SYNERGY OAO: Fitch Affirms 'B' Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed OAO Synergy's (Synergy) Long-term
foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) at 'B'.
The agency has also affirmed Synergy's senior unsecured rating at
'B'/'RR4' and its National Long-term Rating at 'BBB+(rus)'.  The
Outlook on the IDRs and National Rating is Stable.

The affirmation reflects Synergy's number-one market position in
the Russian spirits market achieved during 2012 thanks to its
effective distribution network, well recognized brands and a
diversified portfolio by pricing points.  These aspects have
turned Synergy into one of the leaders in the industry.  However,
this is contrasted with a likely increase in leverage as a result
of Fitch's expectation of weak profitability due to heavy
marketing investments in the short term and the ongoing increases
in excise duties applied to vodka in Russia.

Synergy managed its balance sheet conservatively during 2010 and
2011, with net FFO leverage of around 1.5x.  Fitch expects
leverage to increase by FYE12 towards 2.5x-2.8x and probably
remain high during 2013.  The increase will be driven by the
continuing absorptions from working capital outflows --
especially as the industry stocks up ahead of the sharp excise
duty increase coming into force from January 2013 -- and further
investments in the food unit, in addition to share buybacks
conducted during the year.

Fitch considers leverage of 3.0x high and at the top end of the
band compatible with the company's current 'B' IDR.  However, the
agency takes some comfort from the fact that the company holds
treasury shares currently worth over RUB2.5 billion (equal to
0.8x annual EBITDA), which can be monetized when their valuation
improves.

In 2013, Fitch expects the planned duty increases to accelerate
the pace of decline for consumption of vodka in Russia and to
especially affect demand in the duty-paying portion of the
market, as well as to constrain Synergy's ability to raise prices
for its products sold in the low-middle, middle and lower tier of
the sub-premium pricing point segments of the Russian vodka
market.  Fitch estimates that Synergy's exposure to these
segments accounts for approximately half of the company's bottled
spirits volumes.

Additionally, the agency notes that further excise duty increases
are planned for 2014.  While Synergy's sales volumes could remain
partly insulated by the compounded adverse effect of these
increases that commenced in 2012, its resilience will be
dependent on the severity with which the authorities are able to
minimize a migration of consumption to cheaper non-duty paying
products.

In assessing the above risks and challenges on Synergy's credit
profile, Fitch also takes comfort from the company's stronger
control of its distribution network and its ability to tactically
reduce A&P expenses from 2013 onwards when it will no longer be
allowed to advertise alcoholic beverages in Russia.

In its stress projections, Fitch also analyzed a scenario with a
10% decline in volumes and no price increases in 2013, followed
by a further volume decline and very limited price increases in
2014.  The agency concluded that despite a likely profits drop
and spike in leverage towards 3.0x in 2013, the company's
leverage should return comfortably below 3.0x by FY14.

What Could Trigger A Rating Action?

Negative: Future developments that may, individually or
collectively, lead to a negative rating action include:

  -- Deterioration of net lease adjusted FFO leverage above 3.0x
  -- Persistently negative FCF from high investments in working
     capital or capex, or aggressive acquisitive activity, if not
     mitigated by asset disposal or equity injections
  -- More adverse than unanticipated regulatory changes in
     Russian spirits sector that will be difficult to offset by
     stronger market position

Positive: Subject to the absence of liquidity concerns and to
maintaining well spread out maturities covered by available
committed lines, as well as evidence of resilience to the ongoing
excise duty increases, future developments that may, individually
or collectively, lead to a positive rating action include:

  -- FCF turning and remaining positive, with EBITDA margin
     maintained above 13%.
  -- Net lease adjusted debt / FFO below 1.5x on a sustained
     basis


* KALUGA REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Currency Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed the Russian Kaluga Region's Long-term
foreign and local currency ratings at 'BB' and National Long-term
rating at 'AA-(rus)'.  The Outlooks are Stable.  The region's
Short-term foreign currency rating has been affirmed at 'B'.

The affirmation reflects the high quality of the region's
management, its rapid economic development and expected
stabilization of direct risk.  The ratings also factor in the
increasing pressure from operating expenditure and contingent
risk, stemming from the liabilities of public sector entities
(PSEs), although the profile is long term.

Fitch notes an upgrade would be subject to a continuous sound
operating performance with operating margins at about 12%-14%
underpinned by economic buoyancy, containment of refinancing risk
and maintenance of debt coverage (direct risk to current balance)
in line with average debt maturity.  Conversely, widening of the
deficit before debt variation leading to significant direct risk
increase and deterioration of debt coverage above 10 years would
lead to a downgrade.

The administration of the Kaluga region is aimed at industrial
development through the formation of industrial zones and techno
parks, and the attraction of direct foreign investment into the
region.  This underpinned the fast expansion of the local economy
with an accumulated 23% growth in 2010-2011, far above the growth
of 9% for the Russian Federation.  The administration forecasts
further economic development, with growth of 11.8% in 2012 and
average annual growth of 10% in 2013-2014.

Fitch expects that continuous economic growth would lead to a
further tax base expansion, which will compensate increasing
pressure from operating expenditure.  Fitch expects the region's
full-year operating balance to stabilize at about 12%-14% of
operating revenue in 2012-2014.  The region recorded a moderate
deterioration in the operating balance in 2011 due to a one-off
drop in corporate income tax proceed and increasing operating
expenditure pressure. However, operating margin was still sound
at 12.6% (2010: 16.4%).

The region actively uses its PSEs to finance investment projects
in the region.  It established the Development Corporation of
Kaluga Region, which borrowed RUB5.7 billion to finance the
development of the regional industrial zones.  Three other
regional public companies are also involved in various investment
projects and took RUB1.9 billion for this purpose.  The region
provides subsidies to cover the principal and interests of the
debt of these PSEs. Consequently, Fitch considers the liabilities
of those PSEs as direct risk.

Kaluga is exposed to refinancing risk as it needs to repay
RUB3.1bn (about 18% of direct risk) in November-December this
year.  This includes RUB2 billion of bank loans and RUB700
million of maturing domestic debt.  Fitch expects that the region
will roll over the bank loans and substitute the remaining
maturing liabilities with new bank loans.  For this purpose,
Kaluga has an already committed RUB4 billion credit line with
Sberbank ('BBB'/Stable/'F3').

Fitch expects a stabilization in Kaluga's direct risk at about
RUB21 billion and a gradual decline in the debt burden to 52%-55%
during the next three years from a peak of 65% of current revenue
in 2011.  The debt burden, including the principal of several
PSEs, will reach RUB20.5 billion be year-end up from RUB18.9
billion at the beginning of 2012.  However, the debt coverage
ratio remains satisfactory at about seven years in 2012, which is
in line with the debt maturity that stretches until 2019.

Kaluga Region is in the centre of the European part of the
Russian Federation, bordering the Moscow Region to the south-
west.  The region's capital, the City of Kaluga, has 325,200
inhabitants and is located 180km from Moscow.  The region
accounted for 0.5% of the country's GDP and 0.7% of its
population.


* VORONEZH REGION: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Long-Term Currency Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Russia's Voronezh Region's Outlook to
Positive from Stable and affirmed its Long-term foreign and local
currency ratings at 'BB'.  The agency has also affirmed the
region's National Long-term rating at 'AA-(rus)' and Short-term
foreign currency rating at 'B'.

The revision of the Outlook reflects the expected consolidation
of the region's sound budgetary performance, underpinned by the
well-diversified local economy, moderate direct risk and sound
self-financing capacity on capex.  The ratings also factor in the
limited flexibility of the region's operating expenditure.

Fitch notes that any further positive rating action is subject to
consolidation of the region's sound operating performance, with
margins in line with expectations, and maintenance of direct risk
coverage at about 20%-25% of current revenue.

Fitch expects consolidation of the region's sound budgetary
performance in 2012-2014, with the margin at about 13%-15%.  The
region's 2011 operating balance improved to 12.9% of operating
revenue, while its deficit before debt variation stabilized at
RUB2bn. However, the region's budget remains rigid as the
proportion of inflexible spending items accounted for 85.5% of
operating expenditure in 2011 (2010: 84.7%)

The agency expects the region to maintain sustainably sound self-
financing capacity on capital outlays in the medium term.  The
region's improved current balance covered 52% of annual capex
followed by capital revenue (33%) by end-2011.

Voronezh region's direct risk accounted for 22.1% of current
revenue in 2011 (2010: 14.9%).  The increase is attributed to
contraction of medium-term bank and budget loans, replacing
matured domestic bond. Fitch expects a decrease in direct risk to
about 18% of current revenue in 2012 and further stabilization at
this level in 2013-2014.  The direct risk/current balance ratio
is likely to remain below two years, exceeding the average
maturity of the region's debt.

The region's cash position increased to RUB6.2bn in 2011 (2010:
RUB3.2bn).  However, Fitch expects outstanding cash to be lower
by the year-end, close to average balances of 2009-2010, or about
RUB3.4bn mitigating immediate refinancing risk.

The Voronezh region is a part of the Central Federal District,
which lies in the southern part of European Russia.  Its economy
is well diversified across several sectors and large number of
companies.  The region contributed 0.9% of the Russian
Federation's GDP in 2010 and accounted for 1.6% of the country's
population.



=========
S P A I N
=========


UNION FENOSA: Fitch Maintains RWN on 'BB+' Subordinated Debt
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained on Rating Watch Negative (RWN)
Spanish integrated utilities Iberdrola, S.A., Endesa, S.A., Gas
Natural SDG, S.A. and Enel, S.p.A., which has sizeable exposure
to Spain through its ownership of Endesa, and their related
entities.

All the ratings were downgraded by one notch and maintained on
RWN in August 2012 pending the announcement of regulatory
measures by the government that would have negative implications
for companies' credit profiles.

The regulatory measures were published in September, but are yet
to be approved by parliament by year end.  The package envisages
a tax scheme for the electricity generation segment.  It
introduces a 6% flat rate tax for electricity sold, a tax on
radioactive waste, a tax on hydropower for inland water use, and
a green cent scheme for coal and gas.  According to the
government, these measures, together with EUR2.2 billion
contribution of deficit annuities in the electricity tariff
passed to the state budget and c.  EUR0.5 billion generated from
CO2 rights auctions should contribute to reducing the tariff
deficit for 2012 to EUR1.5 billion and down to zero from 2013.

Fitch is currently assessing the financial impact on the
companies of the proposed regulatory measures and will also take
into consideration the companies' strategic readjustments for the
purpose of resolving the RWN, provided that they are communicated
in a timely manner.  The maintained RWN is to comply with Fitch's
internal review policy pending further analysis to resolve the
Rating Watch.

The rating actions are as follows:

Iberdrola, S.A.

  -- Long-term IDR of 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- Short- term IDR of 'F2' maintained on RWN
  -- Senior unsecured 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- National Long-term rating 'AAA(mex)' maintained on RWN

Iberdrola International BV

  -- Senior unsecured rating of 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- Commercial Paper rating 'F2' maintained on RWN

Iberdrola Finanzas, S.A.U.

  -- Senior unsecured 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- National Long-term rating 'AAA(mex)' maintained on RWN

Iberdrola Finance Ireland Limited

  -- Senior unsecured of 'BBB+' maintained on RWN

Scottish Power Limited (SPL)

  -- Long-term IDR of 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- Short- term IDR of 'F2' maintained on RWN
  -- Senior unsecured 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- SPL's ratings are equalised with the ratings of its Spanish
     parent Iberdrola, S.A.

Scottish Power UK (SPUK)

  -- Long-term IDR of 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- Short- term IDR of 'F2' maintained on RWN
  -- Senior unsecured 'A-' maintained on RWN
  -- SPUK's IDRs are capped by the ratings of Iberdrola, S.A.

Gas Natural SDG, S.A.

  -- Long-term IDR of 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- Short- term IDR of 'F2' maintained on RWN

Gas Natural Finance BV

  -- Senior unsecured 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- Euro commercial Paper program 'F2' maintained on RWN

Gas Natural Capital Markets

  -- Senior unsecured 'BBB+' maintained on RWN

Union Fenosa Finance BV

  -- Commercial Paper 'F2' maintained on RWN

Union Fenosa Financial Services USA LLC

  -- Subordinated debt 'BB+' maintained on RWN

Union Fenosa Preferentes, S.A.

  -- Subordinated debt 'BB' maintained on RWN

Enel, S.p.A.

  -- Long-term IDR of 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR of 'F2' maintained on RWN
  -- Senior unsecured rating 'BBB+' maintained on RWN

Enel Finance International NV

  -- Senior unsecured rating of 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- Short term IDR of 'F2' maintained on RWN

Enel Investment Holding BV

  -- Senior unsecured rating 'BBB+' maintained on RWN

Endesa, S.A.

  -- Long-term IDR of 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR of 'F2' maintained on RWN
  -- Senior unsecured rating 'BBB+' maintained on RWN
  -- Preferred Stock affirmed to 'BB+', maintained on RWN
  -- Endesa's ratings are equalised with the ratings of its

Italian parent Enel S.p.A.

International Endesa BV

  -- Commercial paper rating of 'F2' maintained on RWN



===========
S W E D E N
===========


PERSTORP HOLDING: Moody's Assigns '(P)Caa1' Corp. Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Caa1
corporate family and probability of default rating to Perstorp
Holding AB, a Swedish chemicals company. The rating agency has
also assigned a (P)B2 to the US$660 million equivalent Senior
Secured First Lien Notes due in May 2017, which are expected to
be split equally in EUR and USD, and (P)Caa2 to the US$430
million Senior Secured Second Lien Notes due in August 2017. The
notes will be used to partially refinance the company's existing
debt, and benefit from a guarantee package covering 87% of total
group assets. The outlook on all ratings is stable. The
provisional ratings are assigned pending the completion of the
refinancing transaction.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these reflect Moody's credit opinion regarding
the transaction only. Upon a conclusive review of the final
documentation Moody's will endeavor to assign definitive ratings.
A definitive rating may differ from a provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's decision to assign a (P)Caa1 speculative-grade rating to
Perstop reflects the combination of strengths and weaknesses that
characterize the company's creditworthiness. Perstorp has a
strong position as an established independent player in the niche
chemical markets for Polyols and Oxo intermediates, and benefits
from an integrated business model that underpins solid margins.
These strengths are balanced by (1) a degree of concentration in
the company's operating capacity, with facilities at Stenungsund
and Perstorp; (2) its exposure to cyclical customer industries;
as well as (3) challenges from volatile feedstock prices, despite
the company's track record of passing on price variations.
Importantly, the rating also reflects Perstorp's high leverage
following the refinancing, including a Mezzanine layer that
accrues non-cash interest to existing debt levels. Moody's
believes that Perstop's limited free cash flow generation offers
only modest deleveraging opportunities and highlights the need
for continued profit growth in a challenging macroeconomic
operating environment.

Perstorp enjoys global leading positions in several niche
markets, including a number of its main products such as Penta,
TMP and Capa, which together act as key contribution margin
drivers. Many of the company's other activities, such as its Oxo
division in Europe and Neo production, are among the top three
(regional) players in terms of capacity respectively. In
addition, Perstorp operates an integrated production system that
allows for a flexible and efficient production process and the
ability to optimise product output mix. Together with its
longstanding relationships with suppliers and customers, Moody's
views these considerations as key strengths of Perstorp's
business model that allow for solid Ebitda margin generation.

Perstorp's products are mainly used for coating/resin and
plasticiser applications across a range of industries that
include construction, industrial, automotive and consumer goods.
The cyclicality of these end markets provides for exposure to
general economic activity in the regions in which Perstop
operates. While Moody's particularly notes the currently
challenging conditions in automotive and construction markets
(including coatings), the rating agency derives a degree of
comfort from the fact that around half of Perstop's construction
exposure is geared towards renovation and maintenance rather than
new build.

Perstorp operates eight production sites across Europe, one in
Asia and one in America. Nevertheless, the Stenungsund facility
in Sweden is the sole producer of Oxo intermediates, which
account for a substantial part of revenue and profits. In
addition, it also supplies Oxo intermediates to the Perstorp site
as input for the production of a number of other products
including Penta, Neo and TMP. Perstorp has the largest capacity
for these products within the company which, together with the
Oxo intermediates, account for the majority of revenue and
contribution margin. Moody's notes that the degree of production
concentration introduces some operational risk but also
recognises the company's good operating track record.

Perstop's (P)Caa1 rating is also informed by its exposure to raw
material prices. The company's operations require largely oil-
and natural-gas-based raw materials, which experience significant
price volatility over time. The supply contracts largely allow
for pass-through of raw material price changes through pricing
formulas or European contract prices. While contracts with
customers have more limited built-in flexibility for raw material
price changes, they are generally renegotiated on a monthly basis
in the US and Asia, and on a quarterly basis in Europe. However,
the company has also demonstrated a track record of contribution
margin sustainability and Moody's recognizes the company's
efforts to establish reduced lead times in its European business.

Moody's also considers the capital structure of the company to be
highly leveraged. While the potential sale of the minority stake
in VENCOREX could provide for an additional deleveraging
opportunity over time, the mezzanine instrument will accrue a
considerable amount of interest every year which, together with
the absence of amortizing debt offers limited opportunities to
deleverage from internally generated cash flows. Combining these
factors, the company will need to show continued Ebitda growth to
support its capital structure. In this context, Moody's
positively recognizes the growth opportunities, particularly
those stemming from the capacity expansions for Capa at its
Warrington site and Neo at its Zibo facility together with a
number of additional initiatives. However, the current challenges
in a number of the company's more cyclical end markets may, in
Moody's opinion, pressure Perstop's near-term growth potential.
An additional element of uncertainty arises from currency
exposure to the euro and US dollar.

The (P)B2 rating on the Senior Secured First Lien Notes reflects
their priority ranking ahead of the Senior Secured Second Lien
Notes and Mezzanine facility, as outlined in the intercreditor
agreement. The (P)Caa2 rating for the Senior Secured Second Lien
Notes reflects the relatively large amount of first priority
debt. Moody's notes that the revolving credit facility (unrated)
ranks ahead of all notes with regard to priority of payment
according to the intercreditor agreement.

Moody's views Perstorp's near-term liquidity profile as adequate.
As of June 2012 pro-forma for the transaction, the company will
have SEK739 million in cash and SEK350 million available under
the undrawn revolving facility due in February 2017. In
combination with operating cash flows, this should be sufficient
to compensate for swings in working capital and fund maintenance
capex. The next debt maturity will be in February 2017 when the
revolving facility expires. Moody's also expects Perstorp to
invest in growth projects through a mix of reinvested operating
cash flows and potentially additional shareholder funding, which
could weight on free cash flow generation over coming years.
Moody's assumes that the company will maintain full flexibility
in determining the pace of the investments depending on operating
cash flow generation.

The stable outlook incorporates Moody's expectation that the
company will maintain an adequate liquidity profile.

What Could Move The Rating Up/Down

Positive pressure on the rating may occur if the company
successfully executes on its growth plans, resulting in growing
contribution margins and adjusted Debt/Ebitda below 5.5x,
together with sustained free cash flow generation while
maintaining solid liquidity.

Conversely, negative pressure could develop if Ebitda growth
cannot compensate for the growing Mezzanine debt, as this would
translate into a negative trajectory for adjusted Debt/Ebitda in
2013 and beyond. In addition, any concerns over liquidity would
pressure the rating.

The principal methodology used in rating Perstorp Holding AB was
the Global Chemical Industry Methodology published in December
2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Perstorp, Sweden, Perstorp Holding AB, is a
chemical company mainly producing Polyols and Oxo intermediates
that are used in a variety of products, including resins,
coatings and plasticizers for various end markets. The company is
owned by funds managed by private equity firm PAI partners SAS
(86%) and management (14%). For the year ending December 2011,
Perstorp reported SEK11.3 billion in revenues and Ebitda of
SEK1.5 billion.


PERSTORP HOLDING: S&P Assigns Prelim. 'B-' LT Corp. Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'B-'
long-term corporate credit rating to Sweden-headquartered
specialty chemicals company Perstorp Holding AB (Perstorp). The
outlook is stable.

"At the same time, we assigned our preliminary 'B' issue rating
to Perstorp's proposed US$660 million (Swedish krona [SEK] 4.4
billion) first-lien senior secured notes due May 2017. The
preliminary recovery rating on the US$660 million notes is '2',
indicating our expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery for
creditors in the event of a payment default," S&P said.

"In addition, we assigned our preliminary 'CCC' issue rating to
Perstorp's proposed $430 million (SEK2.9 billion) second-lien
senior secured notes due August 2017. The preliminary recovery
rating on the $430 million notes is '6', indicating our
expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery for creditors in the
event of a payment default," S&P said.

"We have not assigned ratings to Perstorp's currently undrawn
SEK350 million revolving credit facility (RCF), nor the SEK2.1
billion (US$329 million) part of the mezzanine loan that we
understand mezzanine lenders have consented to roll over. This
constitutes more than 75% of the outstanding loan," S&P said.

"The issue ratings on the senior secured notes are based on draft
documentation and are subject to our review of the final terms
and conditions. Any change to the final terms and conditions
could affect the ratings," S&P said.

                             Rationale

"The preliminary ratings on Perstorp factor in the company's
capital structure pro forma for the placement of the proposed
$660 million and US$430 million senior secured notes. We
understand that Perstorp will use the funds to repay its existing
debt," S&P said.

"The preliminary ratings reflect our assessment of Perstorp's
business risk profile as 'fair' and its financial risk profile as
'highly leveraged.' Funds managed by French private equity fund
PAI Partners SAS (PAI; not rated) have owned Perstorp since 2005.
We forecast Standard & Poor's-adjusted financial debt at year-end
2012 of SEK10.3 billion or SEK9.4 billion excluding a SEK0.9
billion shareholder loan," S&P said.

"In 2011, Perstorp reported SEK11.3 billion (US$1.7 billion) of
sales and SEK1.5 billion (US$233 million) of EBITDA. The company
holds leading market positions as a manufacturer of niche
chemicals, notably aldehydes-driven production trees (oxo-
chemical derivatives). It notably serves end markets in the
resins and coatings, and plastics materials industries that in
2011 accounted for 33% and 20% of Perstorp's sales, respectively.
The company operates eight plants in Europe, one in North
America, and one in China. In 2011, Perstorp generated 64% of its
revenues in Western Europe (mainly Sweden, Germany, The
Netherlands, and the U.K.), 18% in the Americas, and 15% in
Asia," S&P said.

"We consider one of the main rating constraints to be Perstorp's
'highly leveraged' financial risk profile, with initial adjusted
debt to EBITDA that we forecast at 7.7x (or 7.0x excluding the
SEK0.9 billion shareholder loan) at year-end 2012. The other main
constraint is the limited deleveraging we forecast under our
base-case credit scenario, and the potential for negative free
operating cash flow (FOCF) in view of sustained capital
expenditure (capex) on expansion projects," S&P said.

"Partly mitigating these constraints are, however, Perstorp's
'adequate' liquidity position after the proposed refinancing,
with long-dated debt maturities and our calculation of sufficient
headroom under the EBITDA-based maintenance covenants in the RCF
and mezzanine loan documentation. We take a positive view of
PAI's historically supportive stance; its EUR45 million equity
injection as part of the refinancing; and its commitment to
provide a further EUR30 million of additional subordinated equity
to fund expansion capex, if needed. However, this commitment is
still subject to board approval," S&P said.

"Our assessment of Perstorp's business risk profile as "fair"
takes into account the company's mixed track record of profit and
FOCF generation. Such generation has been weakened by
unsuccessful acquisitions, such as that of highly cyclical
isocyanate activities, which Perstorp has since transferred to
its joint venture Vencorex. Our assessment also factors in the
risks of near-term margin pressures due to weakening
macroeconomic conditions in Europe, and Perstorp's exposure to
this region," S&P said.

"Other weaknesses are, in our view, the limited size and scope of
Perstorp's operations compared with competitors such as BASF SE
(A+/Stable/A-1) or Eastman Chemical Co. (BBB/Stable/A-2); and
Perstorp's exposure to volatile feedstock prices, with 75%-80% of
its raw materials based on oil (notably propylene) and natural
gas)," S&P said.

"Business strengths include Perstorp's leading market positions
in niche segments, notably its 30% global market share in
oxoaldehyde (oxo) products. The company has refocused its
strategy on its core chemical derivatives and expansion projects.
The latter include a new butylene-based oxo reactor; the ramp-up
of newly completed capacity at a caprolactones plant; and the
construction of a new Neo (neopentylglycol) plant in China. We
also recognize Perstorp's diversified product portfolio, and
longstanding relationships with a well-diversified group of
customers, of which the largest five account for only 10% of
sales. Finally, we believe that Perstorp's profitability derives
support from its track record of successfully passing through
feedstock costs and its integrated business model, whereby it
uses a significant share of production internally," S&P said.

"Under our base-case credit scenario, we forecast that Perstorp's
EBITDA from continuing operations will decline to about SEK1.35
billion in 2012, from SEK1.5 billion in 2011. This forecast
factors in EBITDA of SEK0.8 billion in the first half of 2012,
but a substantial weakening in the second half, reflecting more
challenging market conditions in Europe and the negative effect
of the strengthening Swedish krona against the euro. Perstorp's
EBITDA in the third quarter of 2012 was weak, in our view, at
only SEK325 million. In 2013, we assume flat growth in EBITDA of
SEK1.3 billion-SEK1.4 billion, factoring in a continued strong
Swedish krona, persisting weak economic conditions, but also some
contribution from Perstorp's growth projects. However, in our
alternative downside scenario whereby we extrapolate Perstorp's
performance in the second half of 2012, we believe that 2013
EBITDA could be lower at SEK1.2 billion-SEK1.3 billion. Our base-
case assumption assumes negative growth of 0.8% in the eurozone
(European Economic and Monetary Union) in 2012 and 0% GDP growth
in 2013," S&P said.

"Under our base case, we forecast broadly flat adjusted debt to
EBITDA of about 7x in 2013 (excluding the shareholder loan). Our
projection of limited deleveraging over the medium term stems
from a combination of projected negative FOCF due to ambitious
capex plans of about SEK0.8 billion per year. We also forecast
high interest costs, notably on Perstorp's SEK2.1 billion (EUR255
million) mezzanine loan," S&P said.

"Having said that, we believe that Perstorp's capex is relatively
flexible, and that the company could generate what we would
consider a reasonable amount of FOCF if it limited its
investments to maintenance capex that we estimate at about SEK0.3
billion. Over the medium term, Perstorp's ability to deleverage
will ultimately depend on its ability to grow EBITDA materially.
In our view, this will depend in turn on improving market
conditions in Europe, increased globalization of Perstorp's
sales, and the successful execution of the aforementioned
expansion projects," S&P said.

"Our adjustments to Perstorp's net financial debt pro forma the
refinancing are sizable at SEK1.8 billion. These comprise SEK0.9
billion for the shareholder loan; SEK0.5 billion for unfunded
pensions; SEK0.2 billion for operating leases; and SEK0.2 billion
for cash that we estimate is tied to operations and therefore do
not net from debt," S&P said.

                            Liquidity

"We assess Perstorp's liquidity as 'adequate' under our criteria,
pro forma for the issuance of the proposed notes. We estimate
that liquidity sources should cover liquidity uses by more than
1.5x over the next 12 months," S&P said.

"Our liquidity assessment reflects the absence of medium-term
debt maturities and our assumption of a fair degree of headroom
under the maintenance covenants in both the SEK350 million RCF
and mezzanine loan documentation. The RCF covenant stipulates a
minimum level of EBITDA of about SEK940 million, which is about
30% below our base-case forecast. We anticipate a similar degree
of headroom under the mezzanine loan covenants, which stipulate
reported net debt to EBITDA of a maximum of 9.75x, and EBITDA
interest coverage of a minimum of 1.20x," S&P said.

Liquidity sources post refinancing over the next 12 months may
include:

  * SEK350 million of availability under the proposed long-term
    committed RCF, due March 2017;

  * About SEK400 million of estimated surplus cash (deducting
    SEK200 million that S&P considers as tied to operations.

  * About SEK0.6 billion of funds from operations under S&P's
    base case.

  * A EUR30 million undrawn committed capex facility in the form
    of a subordinated equity contribution from PAI, if management
    needs to draw on it in the future.

Key liquidity uses over the next 12 months include:

  * No material medium-term debt maturities, with both the first-
    and second-lien notes maturing in 2017; and

  * About SEK0.8 billion of capex, although S&P believes that
    maintenance capex is closer to SEK0.3 billion.

"We do not anticipate any acquisitions or dividends," S&P said.

                        Recovery analysis

"The preliminary issue rating on the proposed approximately $660
million first-lien senior secured notes due May 2017, to be
issued by Perstorp, is 'B', one notch higher than the corporate
credit rating. The preliminary recovery rating on the first-lien
notes is '2', indicating our expectation of substantial (70%-90%)
recovery in the event of a payment default. The first-lien notes
are available in both U.S. dollars and euros," S&P said.

"The issue rating on the proposed US$430 million second-lien
senior secured notes due August 2017, to be issued by Perstorp,
is 'CCC', two notches lower than the corporate credit rating. The
recovery rating on the second-lien notes is '6', indicating our
expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery in the event of a
payment default," S&P said.

"The recovery rating of '2' on the first-lien senior secured
notes derives support from our fair valuation of Perstorp as a
going concern. This valuation is itself a function of Perstorp's
broad and coherent business portfolio; the non-comprehensive, but
in our view reasonable second-lien security package; and our view
that the Swedish jurisdiction is creditor-friendly. The recovery
ratings on the first-lien senior secured notes are constrained by
the existence of a material amount of prior-ranking debt in the
company's capital structure; the material debt baskets permitted
for unsecured and secured debt; the limitations of the proposed
notes' security package; and the complexity of the company's
organizational and capital structure," S&P said.

"The recovery rating of '6' on the second-lien notes reflects
these notes' contractual subordination to a significant amount of
debt, including the RCF of SEK 350 million and the first-lien
senior secured notes of $660 million," S&P said.

"The proposed debt structure is multi-layered. Perstorp will
issue all the debt instruments, including the SEK350 million RCF,
the $660 million first-lien notes, and the $430 million second-
lien notes. The three categories of debt will share the same
security package, but an intercreditor agreement will establish
their first, second, and third pledges, respectively, on the
security. The security consists mainly of tangible assets from
Perstorp's subsidiaries in Sweden, Germany, the U.S., and the
U.K., and other share pledges. We understand that these assets
account for about 50% of the company's total assets. The proposed
notes will also benefit from a guarantee from subsidiaries
representing about 85% of the company's EBITDA," S&P said.

"The documentation for the super senior RCF provides lenders with
fairly typical credit protections. However, atypically, its
documentation only includes one maintenance financial covenant,
specifying a minimum SEK940 million of EBITDA, regardless of the
level of outstanding debt. This amount of EBITDA is equivalent to
60% of the SEK1.6 billion reported in the 12 months to June 30,
2012," S&P said.

"In our view, the documentation for the first- and second-lien
notes has relatively weak terms and conditions, and significantly
weaker credit protection than for the RCF, with additional debt
only limited by incurrence-based covenants, and significant
permitted debt and permitted collateral liens. In particular, the
documentation allows for the establishment of a securitization
facility of an unlimited amount. In light of the non-debt-related
covenant on the RCF, we will monitor in particular the level of
debt that the company incurs to assess whether the recovery
prospects for the first-lien noteholders remain in the 70%-90%
range," S&P said.

"Furthermore, atypically, the mezzanine loan includes the two
maintenance financial covenants outlined above. A breach of this
covenant would trigger a cross-default on the first- and second-
lien notes after different cure periods for each note type. While
the cross-default clauses provide protection for the noteholders,
we note that the presence of this type of covenant in a
contractually subordinated debt instrument is unusual and in our
view provides the mezzanine lenders with some power to adversely
influence negotiations on the path to a default," S&P said.

"In line with our criteria, to calculate potential recoveries, we
simulate a hypothetical default scenario. The trigger for default
is a combination of revenue deflation (due to intensified
competition and slowing demand from European markets); margin
pressure (due to inflation in raw material costs); and an
increase in variable interest rates. This scenario would lead to
a default in 2015 due to the company's inability to pay
interests, with EBITDA declining to about SEK1.05 billion," S&P
said.

"We envisage a stressed enterprise value of about SEK5.4 billion
at the point of hypothetical default, which is equivalent to 5.0x
stressed EBITDA. After deducting priority liabilities, mainly
comprising enforcement costs, 50% of the unfunded pension
deficit, and finance leases, we arrive at a net enterprise value
of about SEK4.6 billion. We consider that the RCF would be fully
drawn, leaving about SEK4.2 billion of value available for the
proposed first-lien senior secured notes. This results in
substantial (70%-90%) recovery prospects for the first-lien
noteholders, but negligible (0%-10%) value for the second-lien
noteholders," S&P said.

                              Outlook

"The stable outlook reflects our view of Perstorp's 'adequate'
liquidity and our projection that its EBITDA and EBITDA margin
will show a degree of resilience to the likely difficult European
macroeconomic environment in 2013. This also assumes that the
negative FOCF we forecast will remain limited, with the company
managing expansion capex or otherwise receiving support from a
EUR30 million undrawn committed capex facility from PAI in the
form of a subordinated equity contribution," S&P said.

"We view a ratio of adjusted debt to EBITDA (excluding the
shareholder loan) of about 6x-7x through the cycle as
commensurate with the current rating. Including the shareholder
loan, this ratio would be closer to 7x-8x," S&P said.

"Rating downside could occur if Perstorp's covenant headroom or
liquidity deteriorated materially. A material deviation from our
base case, such as EBITDA dropping to SEK1.2 billion-SEK1.3
billion in 2013 could also result in rating pressure," S&P said.

"Rating upside is unlikely over the coming years, in our view, as
it would require substantial EBITDA growth from expansion
projects and a more supportive macroeconomic environment, such
that adjusted debt to EBITDA (excluding the mezzanine loan)
improved to 5.5x or less on sustainable basis," S&P said.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


COMET: May File for Administration; 6,000 Jobs at Risk
------------------------------------------------------
Graham Ruddick and Richard Blackden at The Telegraph report that
Comet has confirmed to staff that it plans to file for
administration, putting another 6,000 jobs under threat on
Britain's struggling high street.

The company has told its workforce that it is likely to enter
administration next week and is "urgently" working to try to
secure its future, the Telegraph relates.

Comet has been under increasing pressure from suppliers to pay
upfront for stock before the critical Christmas trading period,
the Telegraph notes.  The company is trading without credit
insurance, which protects suppliers against the failure of a
retailer, the Telegraph discloses.

Those demands are understood to have intensified in the past
fortnight after it emerged that OpCapita, the private equity
company that owns Comet, had received approaches for the chain,
the Telegraph states.

Deloitte, the Telegraph says, has been lined up as an
administrator in what will be the 29th high street retailer to go
into administration since the turn of the year.

Comet is an electrical retailer.


DREAMS: Needs to Inject More Funds; Chairman Steps Down
-------------------------------------------------------
Helia Ebrahimi at The Telegraph reports that Dreams is facing
questions over its future after its main lender called on the
company's owners to inject much-needed funds.

Steve Johnson, Dreams' chairman, unexpectedly stepped down on
Wednesday after what insiders called "differences of opinion"
with banks, led by Royal Bank of Scotland, the Telegraph relates.

Exponent, Dreams' private equity backer, has already put
GBP20 million of new money into the retailer, but will have to
come up with more cash in the next two months or face the
prospect of losing control, the Telegraph notes.

Lenders have expressed support for the company, confirming that
Dreams has enough money to last until Christmas, the Telegraph
discloses.  However, from then on the retailer's future could
hang in the balance without new capital or a new deal with
lenders, the Telegraph says.

The retailer, which has brought in KPMG as an adviser, has faced
mounting pressure amid a slowdown in consumer spending, according
to the Telegraph.

Dreams is Britain's biggest beds retailer.  The company employs
1,800 people and has 270 stores across the country.  It has
GBP40 million of debts despite refinancing its loans twice last
year.


HIBU PLC: S&P Cuts Corp. Credit Rating to 'SD' on Missed Payment
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'SD' from 'CC' its
long-term corporate credit rating on U.K.-based international
publisher of classified directories hibu PLC (hibu).

                            Rationale

"The downgrade reflects hibu's decision not to pay interest
(GBP160,000) and principal (GBP64 million equivalent) on its 2006
facility, following the group's announcement on Oct. 25, 2012,
that it will suspend all further payments to its lenders. The
payment due date fell on Oct. 29, 2012, and hibu did not meet its
payment obligations. We believe that the group will not make
these payments within the following five business days, because
it is contemplating a financial restructuring over the coming
months.  It is our understanding that hibu is still current on
its 2009 facility for which upcoming payments are not due until
February 2013. We could lower the rating on hibu to 'D' (default)
if the company fails to pay substantially all of its obligations
under its current indebtedness when these fall due," SP said.

"Under our criteria, we consider the extension of a due payment
of interest or principal as tantamount to a default if the
payment falls later than five business days after the scheduled
due date. This is irrespective of any grace period stipulated in
the debt documentation," S&P said.

"Although we believe that hibu's liquidity at the time of the
missed payments was sufficient to cope with the requirements, and
will be sufficient to cover upcoming obligations, with reported
balance-sheet cash of approximately GBP135 million on March 31,
2012, we take a strict view on any payment deferral, in line with
our criteria. We consider an extension of a due payment of
interest or principal as equivalent to a debt restructuring below
par by a distressed issuer, and therefore tantamount to a
default.  hibu is in the process of restructuring its balance
sheet with the aim of reducing leverage in a mutually agreeable
way with the main stakeholders. The group's decision not to pay
its interest and debt amortization requirements is in the context
of ongoing negotiations for the approval of a consensual
restructuring agreement by the stakeholders involved," S&P said.

"We will follow the progress of hibu's pending debt restructuring
over the coming months. If and when hibu emerges from any form of
reorganization, we will reassess the ratings, taking into account
business prospects, the factors that precipitated the default,
the new capital structure, and any gains the group achieves
through the reorganization process," S&P said.

                              Liquidity

"We assess hibu's liquidity as 'weak' under our criteria. This
primarily reflects management's decision to delay interest and
debt amortization payments on its outstanding debt instruments.
Given the continuous deterioration in the business, we also
believe that the group could breach its covenants if the Nov. 30,
2012, test is not waived (after the recent extension agreed with
lenders to Nov. 30, 2012, from Sept. 30, 2012)," S&P said.\

"That said, we note hibu's material cash on balance sheet, some
cash flow generation, and the lack of material debt maturities
and debt amortization requirements until 2014. The group recently
cancelled its GBP75 million undrawn revolving credit facility. A
capital restructuring that addresses the above weaknesses could
be positive for liquidity and may lead us to reassess hibu's
creditworthiness when we return to reviewing conventional default
risks," S&P said.


RFC 2012: Judge Approves Winding-Up Petition
--------------------------------------------
Herald Scotland reports that Oldco Rangers have formally entered
liquidation after the move was approved by a senior judge.

Insolvency firm BDO has been appointed to wind up the company,
now known as RFC 2012 plc, Herald Scotland relates.

The move brings to an end the period of administration by Duff
and Phelps, which began in February this year, Herald Scotland
notes.

The Glasgow club went into administration after the taxman lodged
a petition over the non-payment of tax to the tune of millions of
pounds, Herald Scotland recounts.

Liquidation was given the green light by Judge Lord Hodge at the
Court of Session in Edinburgh, after a day-long hearing on the
issue, Herald Scotland discloses.

Duff and Phelps had gone to the court themselves, seeking an
order to end the firm's time as administrators and asking for the
oldco to be handed to liquidators, Herald Scotland notes.

The court heard that the move, opposed at this stage by lawyers
Collyer Bristow, would involve the handover to liquidators of
GBP1.7 million in cash and other assets, Herald Scotland says.

The club was consigned to liquidation in June when HM Revenue and
Customs (HMRC), who are owed up to GBP94 million, rejected an
offer to creditors, according to Herald Scotland.

Duff and Phelps sold the business and assets of Rangers to a
consortium fronted by Charles Green for GBP5.5 million when the
Company Voluntary Arrangement was rejected, Herald Scotland
discloses.

The sale relaunched Rangers on the pitch while the original
company, renamed RFC 2012, headed for liquidation, Herald
Scotland relates.

Earlier this month, Duff and Phelps revealed that creditors had
approved the end of the administration process, Herald Scotland
recounts.

It is understood that Malcolm Cohen and James Stephen of BDO have
now been appointed joint interim liquidators, Herald Scotland
notes.  Part of their role will be to work to recover funds for
creditors, Herald Scotland says.

Duff and Phelps have previously stated that liquidation will not
affect the current operations of The Rangers Football Club in any
way, according to Herald Scotland.


SPIRIT ISSUER: Fitch Affirms 'BB' Ratings on Five Note Classes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Spirit Issuer plc's (Spirit) notes at
'BB' and revised the Outlook to Positive from Stable.

Spirit has performed well since the last review in November 2011
with FY2012 (ending 18 August 2012) EBITDA growth of 4.4% leading
to combined EBITDA of GBP146.0 million, exceeding Fitch's base
case due to the outperformance of the managed division (10.5%
EBITDA growth, reaching GBP108.4 million).  This was offset to
some extent by the poorer tenanted division results (10.0% EBITDA
decline, half of which is estimated to be caused by the disposals
of pubs).  However, as about three-quarters of total EBITDA is
generated by the managed division, the weaker tenanted
performance has less impact on the combined results, and carries
less weight in Fitch's analysis.  The Positive Outlook is driven
by the strong growth potential in the managed division despite
the ongoing weak UK economic environment, in addition to the
expected stabilization of the tenanted division over the next two
years, and the relatively low leverage for the current rating
(6.17x, 5.80x non-lease adjusted).

The managed division performance continued to be mostly driven by
the three-year capex program, with investment peaking in FY12 at
GBP67m at plc level, with the securitized group representing over
80% of the managed pubs.  Fitch therefore expects further growth
(albeit at a lower rate in the low single digits) as a direct
result of improvement in estate quality and an increase in
brands' awareness.  Fitch also sees potential for EBITDA growth
via margin improvement.  Spirit's managed division already
generates sales per pub above comparable transactions such as
Marston's and Greene King (ca. GBP900,000 per annum vs. ca.
GBP780,000).  However, EBITDA per pub remains lower by ca. 10%
due to its lower EBITDA margin (ca. 18% vs. ca. 24%). As Spirit
optimizes its new operating model independent from Punch Taverns
(following its recent demerger in August 2011), some uplift in
the margins could occur.  While this is not yet embedded in the
forecast cash flows, any improvements could positively impact the
FCF DSCR metrics.

The tenanted division has continued to suffer due to ongoing
industry structural changes and the persistently weak economic
environment.  Performance is expected to decline in the short
term, primarily due to forecast reductions in the rental revenue
stream following scheduled rent reviews.  Re-basing is expected
to continue as a result of the unsustainable levels reached in
the build up to the financial crisis in 2008.  Performance is
expected to stabilize thereafter.

Spirit's stated strategy in relation to the tenanted division has
changed during the previous year, having moved away from the goal
of becoming a fully managed operator, towards maintaining a
stronger performing portion of the leased estate.  Management has
also recently launched a pilot scheme to test a franchise-style
agreement.  While the managed model is still perceived as
stronger than the tenanted model, other operators have
demonstrated in recent years that they can generate stable
performance by maintaining performing tenanted pubs, sometimes in
combination with new types of agreements which allow them to
leverage existing management expertise, while continuing to sell
off the weakest pubs.  Spirit's tenanted division therefore has
some turnaround potential.  However, it is too early to give
credit for this new strategy in the forecast cash flow.

In terms of metrics, the reported annual free-cash-flow (FCF)
debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) as of August 2012 was 1.98x.
This is forecast to decrease significantly as principal payments
begin in 2014.  Additionally, in view of the substantial rental
expense associated with the managed division, and the debt-like
characteristics of the rental expense, rent adjusted FCF DSCR has
been calculated.  The annual FCF DSCR is therefore expected to
fluctuate around 1.4x (1.6x on a non-lease adjusted basis),
reaching a forecast minimum of 1.2x in 2026.  It is also forecast
to approach this level during 2015.  These point-in-time
stresses, caused by the uneven debt profile following the
prepayment of 29.2% (GBP364.9m) of the initial debt prior to
FY12, are partly mitigated by the transaction's credit
enhancements such as the substantial liquidity facility (covering
18 months of peak debt service) and the potentially significant
amount of trapped cash which could accumulate by then (given the
RPC covenant level of 1.7x which includes an annuity style
amortization schedule).

Further improvement in the FCF DSCR metrics, to above 1.45x on a
lease adjusted basis, as a result of consistently improving (and
sustainable) performance could lead to an upgrade of the notes.

Spirit is a whole business securitization of 647 managed pubs and
487 leased and tenanted pubs across the UK owned and operated by
Spirit Pub Company plc.

Fitch used its UK whole business securitization criteria to
review the transaction structure, financial data and cash flow
projections.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- GBP144.7m Class A1 notes due 2028: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
     revised to Positive from Stable

  -- GBP188.6m Class A2 notes due 2031: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
     revised to Positive from Stable

  -- GBP116.7m Class A3 notes due 2021: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
     revised to Positive from Stable

  -- GBP223.3m Class A4 notes due 2027: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
     revised to Positive from Stable

  -- GBP174.0m Class A5 notes due 2034: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
     revised to Positive from Stable



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The Health Care Marketplace
------------------------------------------
Author: Warren Greenberg, Ph.D.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 179 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry

Greenberg is an economist who analyzes the healthcare field from
the perspective that "health care is a business [in which] the
principles of supply and demand are as applicable . . . as to
other businesses."  This perspective does not ignore or minimize
the question of the quality of health, but rather focuses sharply
on the relationship between the quality of healthcare and
economic factors and practices.

For better or worse, the American healthcare system to a
considerable degree embodies the beliefs, principles, and aims of
a free-market capitalist economic system driven by competition.
In the early sections of The Health Care Marketplace, Greenberg
takes up the question of how physicians and how hospitals compete
in this system.  "Competition among physicians takes place
locally among primary care physicians and on a wider geographical
scale among specialists.  There is competition also between M.D.s
and allied practitioners: for example, between ophthalmologists
and optometrists and between psychiatrists and psychologists.
Regarding competition between physicians in a fee-for-service
practice and those in managed care plans, Greenberg cites
statistics and studies that there was lesser utilization of
healthcare services, such as hospitalization and tests, with
managed care plans.

Some of the factors affecting the economics of different areas of
the healthcare field are self-evident, albeit may be little
recognized or little realized by consumers.  One of these factors
is physician demeanor.  Most readers would see a physician's
demeanor as a type of personality exhibited during the course of
the day.  But after the author notes that "[c]ompetition also
takes place in professional demeanor, location, and waiting
time," the word "demeanor" takes on added meaning. The demeanor
of a big-city plastic surgeon, for example, would be markedly
different from that of a rural pediatrician.  Thus, demeanor has
a relationship to the costs, options, services, and payments in
the medical field, and also a relationship to doctor education
and government funding for public health.

Greenberg does not follow his economic data and summarizations
with recommendations or advice. He leaves it to the policymakers
to make decisions on the basis of the raw economic data and
indisputable factors such as physician demeanor.  Nor does he
take a political position when he selects what data to present or
emphasize.  It is this apolitical, unbiased approach that makes
The Health Care Marketplace of most value to readers interested
in understanding the economics of the healthcare field.

Without question, a thorough understanding of the factors
underlying the healthcare marketplace is necessary before changes
can be made so that the health needs of the public are better
met. Conditions that are often seen as intractable because they
are regarded as social or political problems such as the
overcrowding of inner-city health centers or preferential
treatment of HMOs are, in Greenberg's view, problems amenable to
economic solutions. According to the author, the basic economic
principle of supply-and-demand goes a long way in explaining
exorbitantly high medical costs and the proliferation of
specialists.

Greenberg's rigorous economic analysis similarly yields an
informative picture of the workings of other aspects of the
healthcare field.  Among these are hospitals, insurance, employee
health benefits, technology, government funding of health
programs, government regulation, and long-term health care.  In
the closing chapter, Greenberg applies his abilities as a keen-
eyed observer of the economic workings of the U.S. healthcare
field to survey healthcare systems in three other countries:
Canada, Israel, and the Netherlands.  "An analysis of each of the
three systems will explain the relative doses of competition,
regulation, and rationing that might be used in financing of
health care in the United States," he says.  But even here, as in
his economic analyses of the U.S. healthcare system, Greenberg
remains nonpartisan and does not recommend one of these three
foreign systems over the other.  Instead he critiques the
Canadian, Israel, and Netherlands systems -- "none [of which]
makes use of the employer in the provision of health insurance,"
he says -- to prompt the reader to look at the present state and
future of U.S. healthcare in new ways.

The Health Care Marketplace is not a book of limited interest,
and the author's focus on the economics of the health field does
not make for dry reading.   Healthcare is a central concern of
every individual and society in general.  Greenberg's book
clarifies the workings of the healthcare field and provides a
starting point for addressing its long-recognized problems and
moving down the road to dealing effectively with them.

Warren Greenberg is Professor of Health Economics and Health Care
Sciences at George Washington University, and also a Senior
Fellow at the University's Center for Health Policy Research.
Prior to these positions, in the 1970s he was a staff economist
with the Federal Trade Commission.  He has written a number of
other books and numerous articles on economics and healthcare.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *