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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Thursday, July 12, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 138

                            Headlines



B E L A R U S

* BELARUS: Moody's Issues Annual Credit Report


B O S N I A   &   H E R Z E G O V I N A

* BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Sovereign Ratings


C Y P R U S

BANK OF CYPRUS: Chief Executive Andreas Eliades Steps Down


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Confirms 'B3' CFR/PDR; Outlook Positive


G E R M A N Y

CENTROTHERM PHOTOVOLTAICS: Files for Bankruptcy Protection


I R E L A N D

CURLEY FURNITURE: Goes Bust with EUR3.8 Million Debt
* IRELAND: Moody's Says Insolvency Bill Has Mixed Credit Impact
* IRELAND: Liquidations, Examinerships & Receiverships Up by 8%


I T A L Y

BANCA MONTE: S&P Raises Issue Ratings on Tier 1 Secs. to 'CCC+'
FONDIARIA-SAI: Fitch Withdraws 'B+' IFS Ratings


N E T H E R L A N D S

REFRESCO GROUP: Moody's Lowers CFR/PDR to 'B2'; Outlook Stable


P O L A N D

BOMI SA: Files for Bankruptcy; Owes More Than PLN220 Million


P O R T U G A L

LUSITANO SME: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class C Notes


R U S S I A

RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL: Fitch Assigns 'b+' Viability Rating
RUSSIAN STANDARD: Fitch Rates US$350-Mil. Recourse Loan 'B+'


S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O

KOSOVO PROCREDIT: Fitch Upgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
* SERBIA: Must Approve Program to Avert Bankruptcy


S W E D E N

STENA AB: Moody's Lowers CFR/PDR to 'Ba3'; Outlook Negative


S W I T Z E R L A N D

SUNRISE COMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Rates Sr. Secured Notes '(P)Ba3'


U K R A I N E

UKRAINE: Fitch Affirms 'B' Issuer Default Ratings; Outlook Stable


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

SANDWELL COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'CC'
STICHTING PROFILE: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
UBC GROUP: Creditors May Not Recover Claims
* UK: Moody's Comments on Weak Bank Counterparty Creditworthiness


X X X X X X X X

* Moody's Reviews 78 Tranches from European CLOs for Upgrade
* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars


                            *********


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B E L A R U S
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* BELARUS: Moody's Issues Annual Credit Report
----------------------------------------------
In its annual credit report on Belarus, Moody's Investors Service
says that the country's B3 government bond rating and the
negative outlook on the rating reflect the country's moderate
economic strength, as well as its very low institutional strength
and low government financial strength, which raise its
susceptibility to event risk.

Moody's report is an annual update to the markets and does not
constitute a rating action. The rating agency determines a
country's sovereign rating by assessing it on the basis of four
key factors -- economic strength, institutional strength,
government financial strength and susceptibility to event risk --
as well as the interplay between them.

The moderate assessment of economic strength is based on
Belarus's high real GDP growth rate (7% annually, on average
between 2000 and 2011), its diversified industrial sector and
relatively high levels of per capita income, which are reflected
in a workforce that is generally well-educated and, thanks to low
unemployment, maintains strong job-related skills.

On the other hand, Moody's notes that growth is increasingly
reliant on external debt, and is vulnerable to fluctuations in
foreign financial flows. Moreover, international surveys rank
Belarus's governance as well as regulatory and judicial
effectiveness as very low relative to other countries. Lack of
policy predictability, transparency and public debates on
economic policy weaken institutional capacity.

Belarus' fiscal deficits are lower than those of other B-rated
countries. However, the government's fiscal position appears less
strong when adjusted for expenditure related to bank-
restructuring measures, net lending to financial institutions,
and outlays related to guaranteed debt. The significant increase
in government debt over the last few years and the likely
continued reliance on external debt to fund domestic growth
initiatives weaken the government's credit profile. In addition,
approximately 70% of the country's economic enterprises
(including the banking system) are government-owned, and any
potential losses they incur represent contingent liabilities for
the government.

Belarus's high susceptibility to event risk was a key driver in
Moody's decision to downgrade the government's bond ratings to B2
from B1 in March 2011 and to B3 in July 2011. It also underpins
the negative outlook on Belarus's rating. Official foreign
exchange reserves and annual foreign exchange earnings are low
relative to external debt levels and debt repayment obligations.
Therefore, debt repayment capacity is vulnerable to fluctuations
in the availability of international financing, for which Belarus
currently depends mostly on Russia and Russian supported
multilateral institutions. The country's external vulnerability
indicator (short-term external debt + currently maturing long-
term external debt + total non-resident deposits over one year /
official foreign-exchange reserves), exceeded 600% in 2011.
Although it has since declined to about 350%, it still exceeds
the median ratio for B-rated countries.



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B O S N I A   &   H E R Z E G O V I N A
=======================================


* BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA: Moody's Confirms 'B3' Sovereign Ratings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the B3 sovereign ratings of
Bosnia & Herzegovina, concluding a review for possible downgrade
that began on April 3, 2012. The sovereign rating outlook is now
stable.

The main drivers for the confirmation of Bosnia & Herzegovina's
(BiH) B3 ratings are the following:

(1) Legislation is being put in place to strengthen the external
     debt payments process and remove some of the key roadblocks
     that led to brief delays on debt service to several
     multilateral financial institutions and one commercial bank
     in January-February of this year.

(2) Negotiations over a new IMF stand-by agreement are beginning
     this week, which should revive a stalled program of
     structural economic reform and allow the country to regain
     access to external finance at concessional rates from the
     IMF, European Union, World Bank and other sources.

(3) Slow but positive progress is being made on critical
     components of Bosnia's EU agenda following the formation of
     new State-level institutions in February, although
     significant challenge lie ahead.

(4) Economic growth prospects have weakened, given the
     dependence on exports and foreign direct investment and
     foreign credit for growth, most of which comes from a
     crisis-struck Europe.

The B3 country ceilings for foreign and local currency debt and
deposits were also confirmed.

Ratings Rationale

Rationale for Confirming Ratings at B3

One of the most important considerations behind Moody's
confirmation of Bosnia & Herzegovina's sovereign ratings is that
measures are being taken to strengthen the debt service
procedures, in particular to assure that such payments would not
be caught up in political infighting as occurred earlier this
year. It was clear that those delays related only to the
processes, not the capacity to pay. The money needed to make the
payments was already on deposit with the Central Bank, which
operates as the fiscal agent for the payment of Bosnia &
Herzegovina's debt service. All that was lacking was the payments
instruction from the State Ministry of Finance. Once that was
resolved, all payments were made within the relevant grace
periods.

In Moody's view, the necessary changes to debt payments
procedures are being made with an appropriate degree of urgency.
The indicated amendments to the relevant statutes regarding the
payment of Bosnia & Herzegovina's debt were approved last week by
the Council of Ministers of BiH and submitted to Parliament.
These changes are meant to ensure that the external debt will be
serviced even if there is no State budget in place nor a
temporary decision on financing. Moreover, the Central Bank will
be empowered to solicit payments orders from the entity-level
governments if they still fail to receive payments instructions
from the State. Moody's would expect the approval of such
amendments to be a prior action for a new IMF stand-by agreement.

The second driver for Moody's confirmation of the BiH
government's B3 relates to the imminent start of negotiations
over a new IMF stand-by agreement (SBA). Although there is no
guarantee that these negotiations will actually lead to a new
program within a few months, Moody's believes the motivation of
the Bosnian sub-sovereign entities for a program is stronger than
it has been since the last one lapsed in 2010. Wage and benefit
cuts and pension reforms are already underway or planned at
various levels of Bosnia's complex, multi-layered government,
which indicates there could be a sound basis for negotiations. At
the same time, the IMF would likely require additional fiscal
consolidation at the entity level, which would go a long way
towards mitigating Moody's concerns about the relatively large
sub-national budget deficits in recent years as well as the cost
and availability of financing.

A disbursing IMF program would permit the release of other
multilateral funds, such as a tranche from the EU's EUR100
million financial assistance program, and potentially new credit
from the World Bank following an agreement on additional
structural reforms. These new funds would allow the refinancing
of the roughly $500 million coming due over the next two years
from the 2009 IMF SBA, and reduce reliance on more expensive
domestic financing.

The third rating driver for confirming BiH's ratings is the
recent progress being made on the country's agenda to eventually
join the EU. Two of the major requirements from the EU -- the law
on state aid and the national census -- were approved soon after
the State-level government was formed in mid-February. The third,
which involves changes in the constitution to comply with the
judgment of the European Court on Human Rights, is in serious
negotiations.

An EU Roadmap for Bosnia was presented at a high-level summit in
Brussels recently. The Roadmap includes an August 2012 deadline
for an agreement on the constitutional reform in order to
finalize the country's EU Stabilization and Association
Agreement. They also instructed Bosnian officials to devise a
constructive system for dialogue with the EU once/if the
country's EU candidacy is approved, with a November 2012
deadline. Moody's expects slippage on the latter target date,
however, given continued resistance from some sub-national
governments to relinquishing their sovereignty in this area.

Finally, Moody's has kept Bosnia & Herzegovina's rating at B3
because of continued uncertainty about the country's near- to
medium-term economic growth prospects. The slowdown in the
European economy, Bosnia's main trading partner and the source of
most of its foreign investment and credit, is likely to constrain
Bosnia's growth for several years given the deleveraging taking
place in the domestic economy.

Rationale for the Stable Outlook

In Moody's view, the main stumbling block to the 16-month impasse
over formation of the State-level institutions -- and ultimately
the dispute that led to the late debt payments -- concerned the
size of the State budget. Moody's say the accord on a multi-year
State budget between the State and the lower levels of government
suggests that a similar stalemate is unlikely to occur in the
near future.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down?

The next rating action would be in a positive direction in the
event that the country submits its candidacy application to the
EU, since this would mean that additional reforms would have been
taken and/or be underway in both the economic and political
sphere. Continuous compliance with a new IMF stand-by agreement,
especially if accompanied by World Bank lending related to
fundamental structural reform, would also be credit positive.

The next rating action could be downward in the event that there
are slippages in compliance with the IMF stand-by program that
would lead to interruptions in program disbursements and put
concessional external financing out of reach. Any such
development would create uncertainty concerning the governments'
ability to roll over the large repayments due to the IMF over the
next two years.

The principal methodology used in this rating was Sovereign Bond
Methodology published in September 2008.



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C Y P R U S
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BANK OF CYPRUS: Chief Executive Andreas Eliades Steps Down
----------------------------------------------------------
Kerin Hope and Andreas Hadjipapas at The Financial Times report
that Andreas Eliades, the chief executive of Bank of Cyprus,
resigned on Tuesday, claiming his efforts to shore up the
island's largest lender were not being supported by board members
and the government.

Mr. Eliades' departure followed an unexpected last-minute request
by Bank of Cyprus for EUR500 million in emergency state aid in
order to meet EU bank capitalization rules that came into effect
on June 30, after announcing earlier that it would have enough
funds of its own, the FT relates.

As a result Mr. Eliades came under pressure to resign from both
the finance ministry and the central bank, the FT says, citing
people involved in handling the banking crisis.

The Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission has begun an
investigation into accusations that the bank misled shareholders
by failing to disclose its capital shortfall, the FT discloses.

Bank of Cyprus provides banking and financial services on the
Mediterranean island of Cyprus (about 145 branches), in Greece
(some 160 branches), and through its 80%-owned Uniastrum Bank, in
Russia (more than 200 branches).  The company also operates in
the UK, the Ukraine, Romania, Canada, South Africa, the Channel
Islands, and Australia.  In addition to retail and commercial
banking services, Bank of Cyprus and its subsidiaries offer asset
management, investment banking, factoring, leasing, credit card
processing, property investment, and insurance services. The bank
was founded in 1899.



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C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
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CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Confirms 'B3' CFR/PDR; Outlook Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service confirmed the B3 corporate family
rating ("CFR") and probability of default rating ("PDR") of
Central European Media Enterprises Ltd. The rating outlook is
positive.

Concurrently, Moody's has also confirmed the Caa1 rating for the
senior floating-rate notes due 2014 and the Ba3 rating for the
senior secured notes due 2017 assigned at the CET21 level.

The rating action concludes the rating review that Moody's
initiated on May 2, 2012.

On June 12, 2012, CME concluded a tender offer process through
which the company repurchased US$109 million of its 2013 Notes
(tendered at par) and EUR60.5 million of its 2014 Notes (at 93.75
percent). These debt repurchases were initially funded by a
US$180 million credit facility provided by Time Warner, which was
subsequently fully equitized on July 3, 2012 into class A shares
equivalent.

Ratings Rationale

CME's current B3 CFR is supported by its successful debt
reduction, with Moody's adjusted leverage falling to 7x from 8.1x
at the end of December 2011 on a pro-forma basis. In addition,
CME has emerged from the transaction with an improved liquidity
profile, as the company repaid most of its March 2013 convertible
bond.

The positive outlook reflects the improved financial metrics and
liquidity of the company. In addition, the outlook incorporates
expectations that free cash flow generation should become
positive in 2013 and enable the company to achieve management's
stated intentions to decrease leverage (on an unadjusted net debt
basis) to around 4.0x in the coming two years. It also assumes
that CME will address its 2014 debt maturities on a timely basis.

The current rating and outlook continue to recognize the
company's strong market positions across all its markets - as of
March 2012, the company had a revenue-weighted average market
share of 65%, ranging from 55% in Croatia to 80% in Slovenia.
Moody's considers CME to be well positioned for future growth as
its high market shares and strong operating leverage should allow
it to recover swiftly when the advertising market picks up again
in the meantime, the rating incorporates Moody's expectations for
a lower than anticipated performance in 2012 and the absence of
positive free cash flow as the company continues investing in
content.

Finally, CME's rating recognizes the strong shareholder
commitment shown by Time Warner. However with the US media group
now owning 49.9% of the company, further financial support is
very limited as ownership above this level would require Time
Warner to consolidate CME within its financial reporting.

Moody's also notes the voting structure where Ronald Lauder
retains voting rights on his and Time Warner's shares after the
transaction. This arrangement will expire in May 2013 at which
time 49.9% of voting rights will revert back to Time Warner.

CME has an adequate liquidity profile with only US$21 million of
debt coming due in the next 18 months while the company had
approximately US$150 million cash in hand at the end of March
2012. However, CME's longer term liquidity is still uncertain as
the company's next sizable maturities are EUR87.5 million bonds
due in May 2014 and approximately US$8 million drawn revolving
facility due in October 2014. The current rating and outlook
assume that CME will devise plans to tackle these maturities well
in advance of their coming due.

What Could Change the Rating Down

Downward rating pressure could arise should CME incur a
meaningful loss in market position or should the company fails to
deleverage towards 6x debt to EBITDA (as adjusted by Moody's) in
the medium term. Downward pressure could also be exerted if a
significant deterioration in the macroeconomic environment in CEE
regions were to affect CME's growth prospects, or (if absent any
additional equity issuance) Time Warner were to reduce its
ownership in CME.

What Could Change the Rating Up

Upward pressure on the rating will hinge on the ability of CME to
continue to deliver on its business plan, while continuing with
its deleveraging efforts, such that debt to EBITDA (as adjusted
by Moody's) is sustained below 6x and the company generates
growing positive free cash flow and successfully refinances its
2014 maturities.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Broadcast amd Advertising Related Industries published in May
2012.



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G E R M A N Y
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CENTROTHERM PHOTOVOLTAICS: Files for Bankruptcy Protection
----------------------------------------------------------
Natalie Obiko Pearson and Stefan Nicola at Bloomberg News report
that Centrotherm Photovoltaics AG sought bankruptcy protection,
at least the 14th U.S. and European company to founder amid a
global oversupply of photovoltaic modules.

According to Bloomberg, Centrotherm said in a statement late on
Tuesday that the Blaubeuren-based company filed for Chapter 11-
type protection in Ulm's district court to start insolvency
proceedings.  The company, as cited by Bloomberg, said that for
three months, it will be shielded from creditors while its
management tries to restructure.

Centrotherm "continues to be able to manage its operations
itself," Bloomberg quotes Chief Executive Officer Robert Hartung
as saying in a separate statement.  "Since we remain solvent, we
can both process customer orders to schedule, and also pay our
suppliers."

Centrotherm said in the statement that the activities of
Centrotherm Management Services GmbH and Centrotherm Cell &
Module GmbH are to be prospectively bundled within the parent
company as part of the reorganization, Bloomberg notes.  It said
that all other subsidiaries in Germany and abroad will continue
to operate as before and not participate in the insolvency
protection proceedings, according to Bloomberg.

The company named insolvency lawyer Tobias Hoefer to the board in
a bid to oversee the restructuring, Bloomberg discloses.

The company in May reported a EUR42.9 million (US$53 million)
loss before interest and tax in the first three months of 2012
and said it sees no improvement in the first half, Bloomberg
recounts.

Centrotherm Photovoltaics AG is a German solar manufacturing
equipment-maker.  The company sells production lines used to make
polysilicon, ingots, wafers, cells and panels.



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I R E L A N D
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CURLEY FURNITURE: Goes Bust with EUR3.8 Million Debt
----------------------------------------------------
Gordon Deegan at Irish Examiner reports that Curley Furniture and
Carpets Ltd. collapsed owing EUR3.8 million to the Ulster Bank
and EUR600,000 to the Bank of Scotland.

According to Irish Examiner, a statement of affairs circulated to
creditors shows the firm had a deficit of EUR6.6 million when it
went into receivership last month.  The figures show preferential
creditors -- made up of Revenue and monies due to employees --
are owed EUR750,000, Irish Examiner discloses.

Unsecured creditors are owed over EUR1.1 million, that includes
EUR1 million to other firms in the Curley group along with
EUR105,000 owed to suppliers, Irish Examiner says.  Last month,
Ulster Bank -- which has a floating charge over the company's
assets -- appointed Aengus Burns of Grant Thornton as receiver,
Irish Examiner recounts.

Separately, the company's directors have appointed Tony
Fitzpatrick as liquidator, Irish Examiner notes.

In such a case, the bank's receiver has first call on the
company's assets after the preferential creditors are satisfied,
Irish Examiner states.

In an interview on Tuesday, Mr. Burns, as cited by Irish
Examiner, said he "is exploring avenues for the sale of the
business and assets of the company".

Curley Furniture and Carpets Ltd. is a Co Galway-based firm.


* IRELAND: Moody's Says Insolvency Bill Has Mixed Credit Impact
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service believes that the publication of
Ireland's Personal Insolvency Bill, which will introduce debt
forgiveness for borrowers deemed to have unsustainable mortgage
debt, has mixed credit implications for residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS), banks and covered bonds. Moody's
expects debt forgiveness -- rather than repossession -- to become
the preferred option for lenders dealing with borrowers that have
unsustainable mortgage debt, once all other alternatives have
been deemed inappropriate or unsuitable.

Long term, the legislation provides an efficient mechanism to
deal with the current mortgage arrears and negative equity issue.
Moody's says that resolving this issue will help expedite the
recovery and strengthening of Irish banks' balance sheets, which
would be a long-term credit positive for banks and their covered
bonds. However, in the short to medium term, the rating agency
expects that the legislation will increase arrears and losses on
existing mortgage loans, which is a credit negative for RMBS,
banks and covered bonds.

-- LEGISLATION OFFERS BORROWERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO REDUCE THEIR
    LOANS, SUBJECT TO ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA

The key element of the new legislation relates to residential
mortgage loans. Borrowers who are certified as cash flow
insolvent, as described below, could be eligible to enter into a
Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA) with their creditors. If at
least 50% of secured creditors and 65% of total creditors agree,
the PIA could reduce the mortgage down to the relevant property's
current market value and the borrower would continue to live in
the property.

Moody's notes that house prices have dropped by 50% from their
peak 2007 level (according to Central Statistics Office,
Ireland), leaving over half of Irish residential mortgage loans
in negative equity. In two special reports published earlier this
year, Moody's commented that without tight controls in place,
especially around the measurement of cash flow insolvency, the
scale of the negative equity issue in Ireland could cause
substantial write-offs under the new legislation (see "Related
Research" at the end of this press release).

-- NEGATIVE SHORT-TERM IMPACT EXPECTED

In the short to medium term, the introduction of the new
legislation will lead to an increase in arrears and losses. Under
current Irish Law, a borrower defaulting on their mortgage loan
could lose their home, but also remain liable for the full
outstanding debt for at least 12 years. These 'full recourse'
arrangements provide a strong incentive for financially
distressed borrowers to meet their mortgage loan repayments.
However, the new legislation poses the risk of moral hazard
because it reduces borrowers' incentive to repay. Moody's
believes that the credit-negative implications of an increase in
arrears and losses will be most acute for RMBS pools, since those
pools will not experience the long-term benefits available to
banks and their covered bonds.

-- BANKS AND COVERED BONDS LIKELY TO BENEFIT OVER THE LONGER
    TERM

In the long term, the legislation will help resolve the current
mortgage arrears and negative equity issue and therefore quicken
the recovery and strengthening of Irish banks' balance sheets.
All of the rated Irish banks have been recipients of substantial
capital support from either the Irish government or, in the case
of foreign-owned banks, their parents. Moody's therefore
considers that the banks will be able to cope with substantial
losses from their mortgage books.

For covered bonds specifically, the mechanics of the Irish Asset
Covered Securities (ACS) Act and standard practice by the issuers
imply that investors should be insulated from any rise in arrears
until the point of a potential issuer default. The ACS act does
not permit mortgage loans that are more than three consecutive
payment dates in arrears to be included in the cover pool. In
practice, the issuers have so far not added to the cover pools
any loans in arrears and have actually removed mortgage loans
that have become delinquent.

-- DEBT FORGIVENESS LIKELY TO BE THE PREFERRED OPTION

An independent third party, yet to be established, will assess a
borrower's eligibility for a PIA. At present, the precise details
are unclear, but the basic criteria requires the borrower to be
unable to pay their debts when due and be expected to continue in
this position for the next five years. Other alternative
restructurings must also have been considered and viewed as
ineffective to restore the borrower's solvency. Thus far, banks
have shown limited appetite to enforce security due to political
pressure and alternatives to repossession have been sought
because of the costs involved in the current process.

The bill was published on June 29 and is expected to come into
force in 2013.


* IRELAND: Liquidations, Examinerships & Receiverships Up by 8%
---------------------------------------------------------------
Vincent Ryan at Irish Examiner, citing information services
company Experian, reports that almost EUR500 million in judgments
have been registered in the courts in the first six months of the
year.

According to Irish Examiner, there have been 3,164 judgments
registered in the first half of 2012, with a total value of
EUR482,718,200.  This is lower than the same period in 2011, when
3,949 judgments were registered and the value reached
EUR515,313,671, Irish Examiner notes.

Irish Examiner notes that while the value of judgments being
registered against companies and individuals may have declined in
the first six months of the year, the number of liquidations,
examinerships, and receiverships increased by 8%.

While the registering of court orders was marginally down, the
first six months of 2012 were still tough on businesses, Irish
Examiner says.

Figures from RSM Farrell Grant Sparks show that 1,036 companies
were placed in liquidation, receivership, or examinership -- an
increase of 8% on the 963 failures for the same period in 2011,
Irish Examiner discloses.



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I T A L Y
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BANCA MONTE: S&P Raises Issue Ratings on Tier 1 Secs. to 'CCC+'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its issue ratings to
'CCC' from 'C' on Tier 1 securities and to 'CCC+' from 'C' on
Upper Tier 2 securities issued by  Italy-based Banca Monte dei
Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS; BBB/Watch Neg/A-2).

The upgrades follow MPS' announcement on July 6, 2012, that it
has completed the tender offer launched on its outstanding Tier 1
and Upper Tier 2 securities. These rating actions do not affect
the counterparty credit ratings on MPS or any other issue ratings
on MPS' debt, which remain on CreditWatch negative.

"In our previous article published on July 3, 2012, we said that
we considered MPS' proposed tender offer to be a "distressed
exchange" under our criteria. We therefore lowered our issue
ratings on its Tier 1 securities and Upper Tier 2 debt to 'C',"
S&P said.

"At the same time, we said we would review the ratings on any
hybrid instruments that were subject to the offer, but that had
not been exchanged upon completion of the offer," S&P said.

On July 6, 2012, MPS announced that it had completed its offer,
under which it has accepted a total amount of about EUR244
million for the exchange of Tier 1 securities and about EUR334
million for Upper Tier 2 debt.

Following the exchange settlement, the remaining amount of Tier 1
securities and Upper Tier 2 debt is about EUR402 million and
EUR667 million, respectively.

"Based on our criteria, we have reviewed the issue ratings on the
securities that have not been exchanged after the completion of
the tender offer. As such, we are raising the issue ratings to
'CCC' from 'C' on Tier 1 securities and to 'CCC+' from 'C' on
Upper Tier 2 debt," S&P said.

"The ratings reflect our view that the European authorities and
the Italian regulator might impose restrictions on coupon
payments, where possible according to the contractual terms of
the instruments. MPS has publicly stated that it will recognize
additional impairments on goodwill in 2012. We therefore consider
that MPS might report a loss in 2012, which could trigger a
deferral of the coupon payment on the bank's hybrid capital
instruments. Under the terms and conditions of the Tier 1
securities, we note that dividend deferral can only occur after
12 months have elapsed since the last dividend distribution or
other discretionary distribution," S&P said.

"The 'CCC+' rating on Upper Tier 2 debt factors in our
understanding that the activation of principal write-down for
such an issue can only occur when capital has been lowered below
the minimum level requested by civil law. This level is below the
minimum regulatory capital that would trigger the principal
write-down for a hybrid Tier 1 security.  If MPS were to suspend
the coupon payment on its hybrid capital instruments, we could,
according to our criteria, lower the issue rating on the
instruments to 'C'," S&P said.

Ratings List
Upgraded
                                        To                 From
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA
Junior Subordinated                    CCC+               C

MPS Capital Trust I
Preferred Stock*                       CCC                C

MPS Preferred Capital I LLC
Preferred Stock*                       CCC                C

*Guaranteed by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA.


FONDIARIA-SAI: Fitch Withdraws 'B+' IFS Ratings
-----------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has withdrawn Fondiaria-SAI (FonSAI) and its main
subsidiary, Milano Assicurazioni (Milano)'s Insurer Financial
Strength (IFS) ratings of 'B+'/Rating Watch Evolving.

Fitch considers that it does not have sufficient publicly
available information to maintain the ratings.  As a result,
Fitch will no longer provide ratings or analytical coverage on
FonSAI and Milano.



=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


REFRESCO GROUP: Moody's Lowers CFR/PDR to 'B2'; Outlook Stable
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to B2 from B1 the
corporate family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating
(PDR) of Refresco Group B.V. Concurrently, the rating agency has
downgraded to B2 from B1 the rating on Refresco's EUR660 million
of senior secured notes due 2018. The outlook on the ratings is
stable.

Ratings Rationale

"The rating action reflects our view that the challenging
European market environment and dramatically increased packaging
and commodity prices will negatively affect Refresco's
profitability levels and credit metrics," says Anthony Hill, a
Moody's Vice President -- Senior Analyst and lead analyst for
Refresco.

Moody's had previously expected that Refresco would have been
able to increase and maintain its coverage of financial interest
expense and its leverage at around 1.3x EBIT/interest and 4.8x
debt/EBITDA, respectively and on a Moody's-adjusted basis.
However, in the fiscal year ended 31 December 2011, coverage was
1.0x and leverage was near 6.0x. While Refresco reported a 24%
increase in revenues from fiscal year 2010 to 2011, Moody's-
adjusted EBITDA has declined by nearly 4% over the same period
(EUR151 million in 2010 compared with EUR145 million in 2011).
This reduction reflects weaker margins given the difficult
European economic environment and the increased level of
packaging and commodity prices. Against this backdrop, Moody's
does not expect a material near-term improvement in the company's
financial metrics.

Refresco's ratings reflect the company's (1) weak credit metrics
including weak margins and high adjusted financial leverage; (2)
exposure to high packaging costs and commodity prices, especially
sugar sourced from within the European Union (EU) where
structural market and political forces continue to work against
buyers of EU produced sugar; (3) high customer concentration; and
(4) exposure to a constrained European consumer.

However, Refresco's ratings continue to be supported by the
company's (1) solid position as a leading European producer of
private-label beverages with a strengthening European A-brand
contract manufacturing business; (2) relatively strong product
diversity and good geographic diversity; and (3) solid liquidity
profile, which Moody's projects will be maintained as such
through the current credit cycle.

Refresco's liquidity includes a current cash balance at 31 March
2012 of EUR80 million, and a committed revolving credit facility
(RCF) of EUR75 million. Seasonal working capital movements, while
negatively affected by the adverse economic environment, remain
disciplined and sufficiently managed with cash on hand and free
cash flow generation. Additionally, Refresco continues to exhibit
a constrained dividend policy and has no debt maturities due
until 2018.

The stable rating outlook is based on Moody's expectation that
Refresco will be able to maintain its current profitability
levels and generate gradual revenue growth. This will enable the
company to at least maintain its current credit metrics and an
acceptable liquidity profile, with sufficient headroom under its
financial covenants.

What Could Change the Ratings Up/Down

Upward pressure on the rating could arise if the company were to
consistently sustain positive free cash flow, and exhibit a
Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA ratio of below 5.0x.

Conversely, downward pressure on the rating could arise if there
were a further deterioration in Refresco's operating performance
that results in (1) Moody's-adjusted debt/EBITDA above 6.0x; or
(2) negative free cash flow; or (3) reduced covenant headroom.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating Refresco Group B.V was
the Global Soft Beverage Industry Methodology published in
December 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Refresco Group B.V., headquartered in the Netherlands, is a
leading European manufacturer of private label soft beverages.
For the financial year ended December 31, 2011, Refresco reported
revenues of EUR1.5 billion.



===========
P O L A N D
===========


BOMI SA: Files for Bankruptcy; Owes More Than PLN220 Million
------------------------------------------------------------
David McQuaid at Bloomberg News reports that Bomi SA filed for
bankruptcy on Tuesday with the aim of reaching a settlement with
its creditors at the Gdansk district court.

According to Bloomberg, Bomi said in a regulatory statement that
the filing included a proposal for a partial reduction and
delayed repayment of debt to creditors owed more than PLN15,000
(US$4,396).

Separately, Bloomberg News' Piotr Bujnicki relates that Bomi
Chief Executive Officer Witold Jesionowski said the company owes
financial institutions more than PLN220 million (US$64.7 million)
and needs a capital injection of PLN40 million to PLN50 million.

Bomi SA is a Polish grocery chain.



===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


LUSITANO SME: Fitch Affirms 'CCCsf' Rating on Class C Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Lusitano SME No.1 as follows:

  -- EUR182,860,201 Class A (ISIN XS0272317990): affirmed at
     'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR35,931,170 Class B (ISIN XS0272318295): affirmed at
     'AAAsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- EUR29,879,503 Class C (ISIN XS0272318378): affirmed at
     'CCCsf'; assigned RE50%

The affirmation of the class A notes reflects the increased
credit enhancement, which is provided by subordination and a
reserve fund, which as of the May investor report stands at
EUR7.5 million, below its required amount of EUR8.6 million.
Credit enhancement is sufficient to withstand Fitch's 'BBB'
rating stress despite the worsening of the transaction's
performance since the last surveillance review in August 2011.
Current defaults have increased since August 2011 and they stand
at EUR67.5 million and account for 7.8% of initial balance,
compared to EUR58.7 million and 6.7% of initial balance
respectively.  Loans more than 90 days in arrears remain stable
representing 1.7% of the outstanding balance.

The rating of the class B notes is based on the rating of the
European Investment Fund ('AAA'/Stable/'F1+'), which guarantees
the notes' timely payment of interest and ultimate repayment of
principal.

The junior class C notes are affirmed at 'CCC' as their credit
enhancement, provided by the underfunded reserve fund, remains
below the agency's 'B' rating stress expected loss rate.

The transaction is a revolving cash flow securitization of loans
granted to Portuguese small-and-medium enterprises granted by
Banco Espirito Santo.  The revolving period ended in February
2010 and since then the collateral loan portfolio has amortized
to 30.5% of its initial balance.



===========
R U S S I A
===========


RUSSIAN AGRICULTURAL: Fitch Assigns 'b+' Viability Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russian Agricultural Bank's (RusAg)
US$850 million senior unsecured bond issue due December 2017 a
Long-term foreign currency rating of 'BBB'.

The bonds were issued in two tranches: US$500 million on June 27,
2012 and US$350 million on July 5, 2012.  The interest
commencement date for both tranches is June 27, 2012.  The bonds
have a maturity of 5.5 years and a semi-annual coupon at 5.298%.
The bonds were issued under the US$15 billion LPN program, which
allows for issuance of both senior unsecured and subordinated
debt.  Terms of the program include a change of control clause
should the Russian Federation cease to own at least 50% plus one
share of the bank.

RusAg is the fourth-largest bank in Russia in terms of assets.
The bank has an estimated 60% market share in agribusiness
lending and a leading presence in rural areas across Russia.
RusAg is fully owned by the state, via the Federal Agency on
Federal Property Management.  The privatization of up to a 25%
stake is possible in the period up to 2016, although there are no
concrete privatization plans at present.  RusAg's Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) reflects Fitch's view of the high
probability of support being available from the Russian
authorities.

RusAg ratings are:

  -- Long-term IDR 'BBB', Stable Outlook
  -- Short-term IDR 'F3'
  -- Viability Rating 'b+'
  -- National Long-term rating 'AAA(rus)', Stable Outlook
  -- Support Rating '2'
  -- Support Rating Floor 'BBB'


RUSSIAN STANDARD: Fitch Rates US$350-Mil. Recourse Loan 'B+'
------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Russian Standard Finance S.A.'s
US$350 million Series 10 issue of limited recourse loan
participation notes a Long-term rating of 'B+' and a Recovery
Rating of 'RR4'.

The bonds bear a 9.25% coupon rate.  The issue is due in July
2017 and bondholders have a put option exercisable in July 2015.
The notes are issued under RSB's US$2.5 billion loan
participation notes program, rated 'B+'/'B'/'RR4' which terms
have been updated recently.

The proceeds are to be used solely for financing a loan to JSC
Russian Standard Bank ('RSB'), rated Long-term Issuer Default
'B+' with a Stable Outlook, Short-term Issuer Default 'B',
Support '5', Viability 'b+' and Support Rating Floor 'No Floor'.
At end-2011, RSB was the 27th-largest bank in Russia by assets
and according to management's estimates held 17.2% market share
in credit cards and 11.7% in POS loans.  Roustam Tariko
indirectly owns 99.9% of RSB's shares.



=====================================
S E R B I A   &   M O N T E N E G R O
=====================================


KOSOVO PROCREDIT: Fitch Upgrades Issuer Default Rating to 'B'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ProCredit Holding AG & Co. KGaA's
(PCH) Long-term foreign currency Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at
'BBB-'with a Stable Outlook.  At the same time, the agency has
upgraded PCH's subsidiary bank in Kosovo ProCredit Bank
(Kosovo)'s (PCBK) IDR to 'B' from 'B-', and affirmed the IDRs of
its subsidiary banks in Serbia (PCBS) and Bosnia (PCBiH).

PCH's IDRs and Support Rating reflect the support it could expect
to receive from its owners, and in particular from a group of
international financial institutions (IFIs) which are key
shareholders of PCH.

The IDRs and Support Ratings of PCH's bank subsidiaries in
Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia reflect the likelihood of support from
their parent, PCH.  However, potential support for those entities
is constrained by Fitch's assessment of risks relating to their
respective countries.

PCH's Viability Rating (VR) is supported by solid corporate
governance, robust risk management systems and practices, and
since January 2012, consolidated group supervision by the German
Banking Regulator (BaFin).  It also reflects a track record of
solid asset quality of many of its subsidiary banks through the
crisis, and its improved profitability outlook given resumed
growth for group subsidiaries in Eastern Europe in 2011 (FYE11:
Eastern Europe subsidiaries accounted for 68% of group operating
income).  Profitability improved in 2011 (FYE11 operating
profit/average total equity: 13.7%) , and in 2012 is likely to be
driven by loan growth (about 10%), a still wide net interest
margin, and PCH's strong focus on cost efficiency.

However, the VR is constrained by an uncertain economic outlook
for many of its key operating countries in Eastern Europe, and a
high double leverage ratio at the holding company level (FYE11:
169%;), given that PCH channels external borrowings into equity
investments in subsidiary banks.  Fitch views PCH's capital
levels as moderate, in light of the emerging market environment
of many of the subsidiary banks, with the Fitch core capital
ratio standing at 8.9% at FYE11.  PCH aims to maintain Basel II
Tier 1 and total capital ratios at current levels (FYE11: 11.2%
and 15.0%, respectively); the difference between Fitch core
capital and Basel Tier 1 ratios being due mainly to PCH's Trust
Preferred Securities ('BB-').

Upward movement on PCH's VR could result from a significant
improvement in the double leverage ratio, and increased capital
levels on a consolidated basis, providing additional cushions for
potential losses.  A gradual improvement in the operating
environments of the emerging markets where the group operates
could also be positive for the VR in the medium term.  A renewed
marked deterioration in asset quality would be negative for the
VR.

The rating actions for PCBK were driven by changes in Fitch's
perception of the risks relating to Kosovo.  While political
risks persist, the resumption of an IMF Stand-By Agreement (April
2012; following prior withdrawal in 2010) and use of the euro in
Kosovo, have helped keep macroeconomic policy on track and the
banking system stable.  The banking system is almost exclusively
foreign-owned and mostly funded by local customer deposits.  The
country's external finances remain a weakness, with a heavy
dependence on foreign direct investment inflows.

Changes in Fitch's perception of risks relating to Kosovo in
either direction could affect the bank's IDRs and Support Rating.
Significant and persistent deterioration in asset quality,
performance and capitalization could put downward pressure on
the VR which is unlikely in the near term.

PCBS's Long-term foreign currency IDR is constrained by Serbia's
Country Ceiling of 'BB-'.  Movements in Serbia's sovereign rating
are likely to affect PCBS's IDRs.  Upside potential for the VR
depends on an improvement in the domestic economic outlook as
well as a decrease in the bank's high loan/deposit ratio (end-
Q112: 182%).  A sharp deterioration in performance putting
pressure on capitalization could lead to a downgrade of the VR,
which Fitch does not expect at present.

PCBiH's Long-term IDRs would be affected by changes in Fitch's
perception of Bosnia's country risks.  Upside potential to the VR
is limited in light of the bank's weak profitability, modest
prospects and capitalization, and a difficult operating
environment.  Downward pressure on the VR could result from a
sharp deterioration in asset quality.

PCH is the Frankfurt-based holding company for the PCH group with
operations in 22 countries (end-Q112 total assets: EUR5.5bn);
primarily in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa.  PCH banks
aim to act as responsible "neighbourhood banks" for small
businesses and ordinary savers.  PCBK, PCBS and PCBiH are
majority-owned by PCH.

The rating actions are as follows:

PCH

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BBB-'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'F3'
  -- VR: affirmed at 'bb-'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '2'
  -- Tier 1 trust preferred securities (TPS): affirmed at 'BB-'

PCBK

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: upgraded to 'B' from 'B-';
     Outlook Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- VR: upgraded to 'b' from 'b-'
  -- Support Rating: upgraded to '4' from '5'

PCBS

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB-'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Long-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'BB'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term local currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- VR: affirmed at 'b'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '3'

PCBiH Long-term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'; Outlook
Stable

  -- Short-term Foreign Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Long-term Local Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B+'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Short-term Local Currency IDR: affirmed at 'B'
  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '4'


* SERBIA: Must Approve Program to Avert Bankruptcy
--------------------------------------------------
Gordana Filipovic at Bloomberg News reports that Serbia Finance
Minister-Designate Mladjan Dinkic said the country must approve a
program by the end of the third quarter to stave off bankruptcy
amid a record-high budget deficit.

Bloomberg relates that Mr. Dinkic said the Balkan nation's fiscal
position is "very difficult" and the government needs to embark
on fiscal consolidation, draw up anti-crisis measures to
safeguard liquidity and investment and speak with international
lenders.

Serbia has been struggling to dodge a new recession and attract
outside investment after inconclusive elections May 6 triggered a
two-month stalemate over the make-up of a coalition government,
Bloomberg discloses.  According to Bloomberg, Stojan Stamenkovic,
the chief economist at the state Economics Institute, said on
Tuesday that the country may need to ask the International
Monetary Fund to allow it to reschedule or write off debts.

"We need to prepare a program which will enable Serbia to avoid
the situation of bankruptcy," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Dinkic as
saying.  "We will certainly adopt the program before the end of
September and talk with the IMF and the World Bank but we'll try
to work out measures on our own."



===========
S W E D E N
===========


STENA AB: Moody's Lowers CFR/PDR to 'Ba3'; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Stena AB's corporate
family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) to
Ba3 from Ba2. Concurrently, Moody's has downgraded Stena's senior
unsecured rating by two notches to B2 (LDG6/93%) from Ba3
(LDG5/85%). The outlook on the ratings is negative.

Ratings Rationale

"The rating action reflects our view that, over the medium term,
the Stena group is unlikely to achieve a consolidated financial
profile that would be commensurate with the guidance previously
outlined for maintaining a Ba2 rating," says Marco Vetulli, a
Moody's Vice President -- Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst
for the company. "This view reflects the fact that the pace of
Stena's deleveraging process is being impeded by the combined
effect of higher-than-anticipated capital investment spending for
the period 2008-12 and the lackluster performance of some of the
company's activities -- notably its ferry and tanker operations,"
explains Mr. Vetulli.

Moody's had previously indicated that it expected Stena to
maintain its operating profile and improve its credit metrics on
a sustainable basis, with EBIT interest coverage of above 2.0x
and debt/EBITDA trending to 5.5x on a consolidated level.

Stena's Ba3 corporate family rating (CFR) reflects (1) the
company's relatively high leverage -- on-balance-sheet and on a
lease-adjusted basis -- with debt/EBITDA of 6.7x on a
consolidated level as at end-March 2012; (2) its exposure to
economic downturns and charter rate volatility; and (3) the risks
involved in Stena's investment and trading activities, albeit
outside of the Restricted Group and therefore limited to the
Unrestricted Group.

However, the rating also recognizes (1) Stena's diversified
operations (ferry, shipping, off-shore drilling, real estate),
including the company's leading positions in the markets in which
it operates; (2) the company's strong brand name and share of the
ferry market in Scandinavia, the UK and Germany; (3) its strong
asset base; and (4) its backlog of contracted revenues derived
from real estate, drilling and liquefied natural gas (LNG)
activities. The rating also incorporates the resilience of the
activities carried out in the Unrestricted Group, which lends
some credit support to the Restricted Group.

What Could Change The Rating Down/Up

"Stena remains weakly positioned in its current rating category:
should the company's metrics not improve during 2012 and in 2013,
further downward pressure would arise, hence our decision to
maintain a negative outlook on the rating," adds Mr. Vetulli.

In order to maintain the current rating, Moody's considers that
by year-end 2012, Stena would need to exhibit the following
credit metrics: (1) debt/EBITDA approaching 6.0x and EBIT
interest coverage of more than 1.5x on a consolidated level; and
(2) debt/EBITDA towards 5.5x and retained cash flow (RCF)/net
debt approaching the low teens in percentage terms at the
Restricted Group level.

Moreover, Moody's could make a further downward adjustment of
Stena's CFR if the company were unable to strengthen its credit
metrics profile by 2013. For instance, financial leverage
exceeding 5.5x at the Restricted Group level could indicate
management's unwillingness or inability to de-risk the company's
capital structure. In addition, downward rating pressure could
result not only from an increased appetite for risk in Stena's
trading activities, but also from any significant deterioration
in the company's liquidity profile.

Upward pressure on Stena's ratings -- albeit not expected in the
medium term -- could develop following (1) a sustainable increase
in internal cash flow generation, with consolidated RCF/net debt
approaching the high teens in percentage terms; and (2) a
progressive deleveraging of the company's balance sheet, with
consolidated debt/EBITDA below 5.5x.

Moody's previously rated Stena's senior unsecured debt one notch
higher than the outcome of the loss given default (LGD)
assessment, in consideration of the company's strong asset base
and its relatively secured loan-to-value (LTV) structure.
However, given the downgrade of Stena's CFR to Ba3, the rating on
the bonds is now in line with the outcome of the LGD assessment,
in light of the increase in the probability of default. As a
result, the gap between the CFR and the senior unsecured rating
has widened to two notches.

The notes are generally unsecured obligations, which rank equally
in right of payment with all the unsecured and unsubordinated
debt of the group. Furthermore, given that Stena is a holding
company, the noteholders are structurally subordinated to the
subsidiaries' operating liabilities.

Based on the indenture governing the senior notes, the
subsidiaries that conduct the real estate operations, and the two
that primarily invest in securities, are designated as
unrestricted subsidiaries. As a result, they will not be bound by
the restrictive provision of the indenture. As the indenture
contains no limitation as to the amount of debt an unrestricted
subsidiary may incur, it requires that any indebtedness of
unrestricted subsidiaries incurred after offering the notes must
be non-recourse to Stena and its restricted subsidiaries.

Therefore, in Moody's LGD assessment, the secured debt included
in unrestricted subsidiaries has been excluded from the waterfall
used for restricted subsidiaries, taking into account that (1) no
cross guarantees link unrestricted and restricted subsidiaries
(in the event of default, neither group can claim any recourse on
the asset of the other); and (2) no cross-default clauses link
the debt of restricted and unrestricted subsidiaries related to
real estate activities.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating Stena was the Global
Shipping Industry Methodology published in December 2009. Other
methodologies used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-
Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June.

Headquartered in Gothenburg, Sweden, Stena AB is one of the
largest entities within the "Stena Sphere" of companies, fully
controlled by the Olsson Family. Stena AB is a holding company
engaged in various business divisions, including ferry
operations, shipping, offshore drilling, real estate and other
investment/trading activities. At the end of first quarter 2012,
the company reported a last-12-months consolidated turnover of
approximately SEK25 billion (US$3.8 billion) .



=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


SUNRISE COMMUNICATIONS: Moody's Rates Sr. Secured Notes '(P)Ba3'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a provisional (P)Ba3
rating and loss-given-default (LGD) assessment of LGD3 (36%) to
the proposed CHF400 million of senior secured floating-rate notes
(FRNs) and the CHF465 million of senior secured fixed-rate notes
to be issued by Sunrise Communications International S.A., a
wholly owned subsidiary of Sunrise Communications Holdings S.A.

Sunrise will use the proceeds from the offering plus CHF200
million of existing cash on the balance sheet to repay all
indebtedness outstanding under the group's existing senior
secured term loan facilities. Concurrently, Sunrise will merge
its existing acquisition and revolving credit facilities ("RCF")
into a combined CHF250 million RCF facility, with a lighter
covenant package. Moody's expects to withdraw the ratings on the
CHF500 million Term Loan A and the CHF320 million Term Loan B
facilities upon their repayment.

The following ratings of different group entities remain
unchanged:

- Corporate family rating (CFR) and probability of default
   rating (PDR) of Sunrise Communications Holdings S.A.: B1

- EUR561 million of 8.5% senior notes due 2018 issued by Sunrise
   Communications Holdings S.A.: B3

- CHF300 million and EUR371 million of senior secured bonds due
   2017 issued by Sunrise Communications International S.A.: Ba3

The outlook for all the ratings is stable.

Moody's issues provisional ratings in advance of the final sale
of securities and these ratings reflect the rating agency's
preliminary credit opinion regarding the transaction only. Upon a
conclusive review of the final documentation, Moody's will
endeavor to assign a definitive rating to the group's proposed
senior secured fixed- and floating-rate notes. The definitive
ratings may differ from the provisional rating.

Ratings Rationale

The (P)Ba3 rating on the proposed senior secured fixed- and
floating-rate notes is one notch above the CFR, reflecting the
impact of the presence of junior debt in Sunrise's capital
structure. The new notes rank pari passu with the existing senior
secured notes and the new RCF. In addition, the new fixed- and
floating-rate senior secured notes will carry the same covenants
as the existing senior secured notes.

In Moody's view, the refinancing of the existing bank debt with
senior secured bonds has no impact on Sunrise's rating, which
remains well positioned in the B1 category.

In terms of credit metrics, Moody's considers that the
transaction is broadly neutral. This view is based on the fact
that although Sunrise has achieved a gross debt reduction by
utilizing CHF200 million of cash balances, this will be offset by
the adjustment that Moody's will make to the company's debt
figure to capture the deferred consideration of the spectrum
auction to be paid in June 2015 (CHF97 million) and December 2016
(CHF97 million).

Nevertheless, Moody's notes that this refinancing, which
represents a demonstration of Sunrise's focus on reducing
financial debt, is a positive development in a number of ways.
The refinancing will allow the company to extend its debt
maturity profile, as all term debt amortizations until 2017 will
be removed. In addition, by maximizing the amount of CHF-
denominated debt on its balance sheet, Sunrise is reducing its
exposure to currency swings and its need for foreign currency
hedging will diminish.

From a liquidity perspective, Moody's expects that Sunrise's cash
position will materially decline at the outset, but the company's
liquidity profile will be supported by a large and unused RCF and
strong cash flow generation capacity. Moreover, the new RCF will
have only two covenants, and the headroom will be reset,
improving the company's financial flexibility.

The B1 CFR reflects the strength of Sunrise's business-risk
profile, which is mitigated by the weakness of its financial
profile following the leveraged acquisition of the company in
2010 by funds advised by CVC Capital Partners. The rating
primarily reflects the company's high leverage as a result of the
acquisition debt, with debt/EBITDA of 4.4x (as adjusted by
Moody's) for financial year (FY) 2011. However, these factors are
balanced by (1) Sunrise's strong position in the Swiss telecoms
market, as the leading integrated alternative operator with
reported market shares of 16% and 24% in the fixed and mobile
telephony segments respectively; (2) the relative stability of
the competitive, regulatory and macroeconomic environments in
Switzerland; (3) the company's expected strong and stable cash
flow generation; and (4) a comfortable liquidity position.

The stable outlook reflects that Sunrise is well positioned in
the B1 rating category, as well as Moody's expectation that the
company's credit metrics will gradually improve over time, with
no major competitive, macro or regulatory threat envisaged over
the near to medium term.

What Could Change the Rating Up/Down

Upward pressure on the rating could develop if Sunrise's
management team delivers on its business plan, such that the
company's (i) debt/EBITDA ratio (as adjusted by Moody's) reaches
4.0x or below; and (ii) retained cash flow (RCF)/debt ratio (as
adjusted by Moody's) trends towards 15% or higher.

Conversely, downward pressure could be exerted on the rating if
Sunrise's operating performance weakens such that debt/EBITDA (as
adjusted by Moody's) is higher than 5.0x and RCF/debt (as
adjusted by Moody's) is below 10% on a sustained basis.

Principal Methodology

The methodologies used in these ratings were Global
Telecommunications Industry published in December 2010, and Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Sunrise Communications Holdings S.A. is the ultimate parent of
Sunrise Communications AG. Headquartered in Zurich, Sunrise is
the second-largest integrated telecommunications operator in
Switzerland. In 2011, the company reported revenues of CHF1,984
million (c. EUR1.6 billion) and EBITDA of CHF608 million (c.
EUR500 million). The company is owned by funds advised by private
equity firm CVC Capital Partners.



=============
U K R A I N E
=============


UKRAINE: Fitch Affirms 'B' Issuer Default Ratings; Outlook Stable
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Ukraine's Long-term foreign currency
and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B' with a
Stable Outlook.  The agency has also affirmed the Short-term IDR
at 'B' and the Country Ceiling at 'B'.

The affirmation reflects the finely poised external financing
situation.  International reserves of the National Bank of
Ukraine (NBU) were steady in January-April 2012 at around USD31bn
(or three months of current account payments) before posting
falls in May and June, partly because of large external debt
repayments. Pressure on reserves could re-emerge from Q312.

Fitch expects the current account deficit to reach 6% of GDP in
2012, but the main stresses are on the capital account.
Household demand for foreign currency -- which led to reserve
falls in Q411 - appears to have picked up in June, and could
accelerate.

Ukraine's external liquidity ratio is one of the lowest among
Fitch-rated sovereigns at a prospective 55% in 2012.  Private
sector external debt accounts for much of the debt service due,
but on aggregate, rollover rates have been over 100% since the
crisis.  Ukraine's limited ability to refinance sovereign
external debt obligations risks pressure on the exchange rate and
a decline in reserves.

The sovereign faces USD6.4 billion in repayments and interest to
the IMF in 2013, combining payments due from the government and
the NBU.  Fitch believes the government will likely re-access
eurobond markets and IMF funding in 2013, allowing it to
refinance IMF repayments, but will need to take the unpopular
step of raising household gas tariffs in order to do so.  By
comparison, external market debt maturities are relatively low,
at US$1 billion in the remainder of 2012 and USD1bn in 2013.

Fitch's end-year exchange rate forecast reflects devaluation
risks, which could lead to overshooting given fragile confidence
in the hryvnia.  A weaker hryvnia would increase the burden of
external debt, including sovereign debt.  Fitch notes that a more
flexible exchange rate would help Ukraine absorb external shocks
and adjust to movements in trading partners' exchange rates.  The
exchange rate has shown greater flexibility since May, weakening
slightly from its post-crisis anchor of UAH8 against the USD.

Fitch expects real GDP growth to slow to 2.4% in 2012 but recover
to 3.5% in 2013.  Economic performance is dependent on the highly
cyclical steel sector, and growth is sensitive to a downturn in
the global economy or a eurozone growth shock.

The government successfully narrowed the general government
deficit to 4.2% of GDP in 2011 from 7.7% of GDP in 2010, but it
will widen slightly in 2012.  A supplementary budget in April
2012 lifted spending and may overestimate revenues, while losses
at state-owned energy firm Naftogaz will increase.

The general government debt/GDP ratio fell in 2011, ending the
year at 27% of GDP, not including NBU debt to the IMF.  Including
state-guaranteed debt, government debt was 36% of GDP.  The
future path of the debt ratio will depend partly on the exchange
rate.  The government has increasingly issued foreign currency
bonds on the local market as it lost access to the eurobond
market and faced high borrowing costs in local currency, but at
shorter tenors and high rates.  Fitch estimates that around 10%
of the domestic debt stock is now in foreign currency.

Banks' fragile balance sheets make them vulnerable to any
devaluation or renewed economic slowdown, with potential costs to
the sovereign, which has already injected up to 9% in capital
into banks since 2009.  However, in view of declining loan
dollarization and the decreasing importance of external funding,
banks are less at risk from devaluation than in 2008.

The Party of the Regions-led government faces legislative
elections on 28 October 2012 with its popularity reduced, but
should still win a majority.  This would pave the way for fiscal
tightening and action on outstanding IMF commitments.  An
election outcome that reduced governability and the government's
ability to take necessary policy steps could increase pressure on
the sovereign rating.

The immediate rating Outlook is highly dependent on Ukraine's
ability to weather external and domestic shocks and secure
external financing.  A failure to secure IMF financing by early
2013 or improve confidence sufficiently to regain sovereign
external market access over a sustained period would lead to
dwindling reserves and sharp hryvnia falls.  In this case Fitch
would likely downgrade the sovereign. Successful refinancing and
further consolidation of the public finances could lead to a
positive rating action.



===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


SANDWELL COMMERCIAL: Fitch Cuts Ratings on 2 Note Classes to 'CC'
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has downgraded and affirmed Sandwell Commercial
Finance No.1 plc (Sandwell 1), Sandwell Commercial Finance No.2
plc (Sandwell 2) and Sandwell Commercial Finance No.3 Limited's
(Sandwell 3) mortgage-backed floating rate notes (FRN) as shown
below:

Sandwell 1 FRNs due 2039:

  -- GBP34.9 million class A (XS0191369221) affirmed at 'Asf';
     Outlook Stable

  -- GBP17.5 million class B (XS0191371391) affirmed at 'Asf';
     Outlook Stable

  -- GBP12.5 million class C (XS0191372522) downgraded to 'BBBsf'
     from 'Asf'; Outlook Stable

  -- GBP10 million class D (XS0191373686) downgraded to 'CCCsf'
     from 'Bsf'; Recovery Estimate RE80%

  -- GBP5 million class E (XS0191373926) affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE0%

Sandwell 2 FRNs due 2037:

  -- GBP112.4 million class A (XS0229030126) downgraded to
     'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Negative

  -- GBP13.0 million class B (XS0229030472) downgraded to 'BBsf'
     from 'Asf'; Outlook Negative

  -- GBP11.8 million class C (XS0229030712) downgraded to 'Bsf'
     from 'BBBsf'; Outlook Stable

  -- GBP14.9 million class D (XS0229031017) downgraded to 'CCsf'
     from 'Bsf'; RE20%

  -- GBP9.6 million class E (XS0229031280) affirmed at 'CCsf';
     RE0%

Sandwell 3 FRNs due 2032:

  -- GBP67.5 million class A1 (XS0357081032) affirmed at 'Asf';
     Outlook Stable

  -- GBP14.7 million class A2 (XS0357081206) downgraded to
     'BBBsf' from 'Asf'; Outlook Negative

  -- GBP3.6 million class A3 (XS0357088631) downgraded to 'BBBsf'
     from 'Asf'; Outlook Negative

  -- GBP19.2 million class B (XS0357088987) downgraded to 'Bsf'
     from BBsf; Outlook Negative

  -- GBP10.2 million class C (XS0357089100) downgraded to 'CCCsf'
     from 'Bsf'; RE20%

  -- GBP12.6 million class D (XS0357089365) downgraded to 'CCsf'
     from 'CCCsf'; RE0%

  -- GBP10.8 million class E (XS0357089951) affirmed at 'CCsf';
     RE0%

The rating actions reflect the increased leverage in all three
transactions, the ongoing weakness in secondary UK commercial
real estate markets, and the rising number (both actual and
expected) of loan defaults and subsequent losses.  For each
transaction, the majority of loans had their collateral revalued
during the last two years, resulting in current weighted average
(WA) loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) of 82.5%, 103% and 132% in
Sandwell 1, 2 and 3, respectively.

As of the March/April 2012 reporting cycle, Sandwell 1, 2, and 3
had five (20% by loan balance), 17 (29%) and 9 (33%) loans in
various stages of enforcement, respectively.  This is primarily
due to maturity and payment defaults, with impairments set to
increase.

To date, loan level losses have totalled GBP3.7 million, GBP1.4
million and GBP0.3 million in Sandwell 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
While these losses are yet to exhaust first-loss credit
enhancement, loss severities have been volatile.  In Fitch's
view, this level of idiosyncratic risk reflects how many loans
are secured on single-occupancy property most exposed to weak
occupational markets.  With very high average loan leverage,
especially for Sandwell 2 and 3, as more loans default there is a
high risk of outsized loss severities arising.  Credit
enhancement is unlikely to be sufficient to prevent subordinate
classes of notes realizing losses, as reflected in Fitch's
ratings.

As these transactions were originally granular in nature,
individual tenancy schedules have not been provided by the
servicer.  In its analysis, Fitch compares the protection against
further property market value declines afforded to various notes
from credit enhancement.  In Fitch's view, the relationship
between market value declines and pool losses is not linear, with
notes secured on higher leverage loan pools having to absorb
higher market value declines to be rated in a given category.
More credit enhancement is needed for Sandwell 3 than for
Sandwell 2, and for Sandwell 2 than for Sandwell 1, on account of
the potential for lower borrower commitment and higher costs in
the higher-levered pools.

The rating action is more severe for Sandwell 2 than for the
other two transactions.  This is because Sandwell 1 benefits from
lower leverage loans, while Sandwell 3 has higher credit
enhancement levels.  However, all three transactions show a
decline in performance, as reflected in the negative rating
action in each case.


STICHTING PROFILE: Fitch Affirms 'Bsf' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Stichting Profile Securitisation I's
notes, as follows:

SCDS: affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Stable Outlook

  -- Class A+ (XS0235101119): affirmed at 'AA+sf'; Stable Outlook
  -- Class A (XS0235101465): affirmed at 'A+sf'; Stable Outlook
  -- Class B (XS0235102190): affirmed at 'BBB+sf'; Stable Outlook
  -- Class C (XS0235102513): affirmed at 'BBBsf'; Stable Outlook
  -- Class D (XS0235102943): affirmed at 'BB+sf'; Stable Outlook
  -- Class E (XS0235103248): affirmed at 'Bsf'; Stable Outlook

The affirmations reflect the levels of credit enhancement (CE)
commensurate with the notes' ratings.  The increase in the CE
levels since close has been driven by the deleveraging of the
transaction.  The transaction is static as the replenishment
period ended in December 2009.  The super senior class and class
A+ notes balances have reduced to 79% of their original size.  As
such, CE has increased for all classes.  The agency expects the
CE levels to increase as the transaction continues to delever
according to an amortization schedule.

There has been some negative migration in the portfolio since the
last rating action in July 2011.  Speculative grade reference
entities make up 28% of the portfolio compared to 25% in 2011,
with the investment grade reference entities which make up 72% of
the portfolio being rated within the 'BBB*' rating category.  In
Fitch's view, the portfolio deterioration is mitigated by the
portfolio's deleveraging and subsequent increase in CE levels.

The transaction is a securitization of exposures to Public
Private Partnership / Private Finance Initiative project loans in
the UK.  The current reference portfolio comprises 30 loans from
29 obligors with all the loans in the operation phase.  The top
two industry sectors are education at 47% of the portfolio and
healthcare at 39% of the portfolio.


UBC GROUP: Creditors May Not Recover Claims
-------------------------------------------
Sue Restan at The Press and Journal reports that UBC Group's
administrators said businesses owed money by the company are
unlikely to get any of it back.

According to the Press and Journal, the collapse of the Inverness
and UBC Group affected more than 500 companies and individuals,
including businesses in the Highlands and islands.

UBC Group went into administration in May with debts of almost
GBP11.5 million, the Press and Journal recounts.

Glasgow-based Zolfo Cooper, who was appointed as administrators
for the company, on Tuesday revealed there was unlikely to be any
money to pay the company's unsecured creditors, who are owed
almost GBP7.9 million, the Press and Journal discloses.

UBC Group is an Inverness and Hebrides-based construction group.


* UK: Moody's Comments on Weak Bank Counterparty Creditworthiness
-----------------------------------------------------------------
The ratings of UK infrastructure and utility companies should be
able to accommodate some deterioration in bank counterparty
creditworthiness provided that they maintain a diversified
exposure and, more generally, counterparty requirements
consistent with prudent investment-grade corporate policies, says
Moody's Investors Service in a Sector Comment published on
July 10.

The new report, entitled "UK Infrastructure and Utility
Companies: Highly leveraged issuers largely insulated from
weakened bank counterparty creditworthiness", is available on
www.moodys.com. Moody's subscribers can access this report via
the link provided at the end of this press release.

Recent pressure on bank creditworthiness has raised questions
regarding the potential impact on the ratings of highly leveraged
infrastructure and utility issuers in the UK, especially with
respect to changes in bank counterparty creditworthiness .
However, Moody's notes that none of the UK's highly leveraged
infrastructure and utility issuers currently have a significant
reliance -- in terms of creditor protection -- on a single
counterparty. Furthermore, ratings are generally at a level which
can tolerate a modest increase in counterparty risk. Accordingly,
issuers' ratings should be able to accommodate some deterioration
in counterparty creditworthiness provided that they maintain a
diversified exposure and, more generally, counterparty
requirements consistent with prudent investment-grade corporate
policies.

In situations where more material counterparty exposure may arise
but the issuer would likely have the financial flexibility to
accommodate the consequences of any loss of hedging, Moody's does
not anticipate that the assigned ratings would be affected by
exposure to swap counterparties.

Moody's does note, however, that if there were to be a material
risk of an issuer becoming unhedged and its ability to
accommodate any loss was likely to be limited, the assigned
rating could be impacted. Where the rating agency has given a
single notch of uplift for structural features, the rating is not
generally expected to be downgraded by more than one notch due to
a weakness in those features; however, a greater reduction is
possible where there is a significant risk of an issuer becoming
unhedged and it is poorly positioned to accommodate the loss of
such hedging.

With respect to liquidity facilities and other bank counterparty
exposure, Moody's will consider the likelihood of the loss of the
facility or service, the potential impact on the issuer of the
loss and its ability to accommodate the same. A small risk of the
loss of, for example, some part of its liquidity facilities would
not be expected to affect the rating of a well-performing issuer;
however, if there was a strong possibility that facilities may
not be available to a weakly positioned issuer, then that would
weigh upon its rating and argue against uplift for structural
features.



===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* Moody's Reviews 78 Tranches from European CLOs for Upgrade
------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed 78 tranches from among 15
European collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions on
review for upgrade. The affected 78 tranches are currently rated
Aa1(sf) and below. This rating announcement is driven by a
correction to the rating model Moody's used for these
transactions, as well as by the generally stable performance of
the affected tranches since the last rating action in 2011.

As a result of the aforementioned correction and slight
collateral performance improvements, Moody's has also upgraded
the ratings on the notes issued by Vallauris II CLO plc. and Wood
Street CLO I B.V.

Ratings Rationale

The actions reflect the correction Moody's has made to the rating
model for these transactions. Prior to the correction, the rating
model had not been grossing up the lagged recoveries on
defaulting loans in the pool when modelling counterparty risk
associated with loan participations. Had the recoveries been
grossed up correctly, the model would have indicated a lower
expected loss for each of the classes of notes at the time of the
last rating action in 2011. A lower expected loss could have
positively influenced the ratings of the affected notes. Moody's
has now corrected the rating model, and only 17 European CLO
transactions will be affected.

15 European CLO Transactions on Review for Upgrade

Moody's decision to place the ratings of 15 European CLO
transactions on review for upgrade reflects the rating model
correction and the fact that the performance of the transactions
has generally been stable since the last rating action in 2011.
Moody's has not updated key modelling assumptions, sensitivities,
cash flow analysis and stress scenarios for these 15 European CLO
transactions as the rating announcement has been primarily driven
by the model correction. Moody's will immediately begin
reassessing all of its outstanding ratings on these transactions
on an individual basis.

Upgrade of Vallauris II CLO Notes

Further to the above-mentioned correction to the rating model, as
well as a slight improvement in collateral performance, Moody's
has upgraded the notes issued by Vallauris II CLO.

Improvements in the credit quality of the transaction are
reflected in the better-than-average credit rating of the
portfolio, as measured by the weighted average rating factor
(WARF). As of the latest trustee report dated 31 May 2012, the
WARF for the transaction is currently 2889 compared to 3126 in
the June 2011 report.

However, although not outweighing the positive impact from WARF
improvement, the over-collateralization ratios of the rated notes
have deteriorated since the rating action in August 2011. Current
over-collateralization ratios for the Class II, Class III and
Class IV notes stand at 118.27%, 104.67% and 100.50%,
respectively, compared with 124.52%, 110.35% and 105.77% in June
2011. Over-collateralization ratios for both the Class III and
Class IV notes are failing the trigger levels. Moody's also notes
that the Class IV notes are still deferring interest. In
addition, securities rated Caa or lower currently make up
approximately 9.8% of the underlying portfolio versus 6.36% in
June 2011. Additionally, defaulted securities total about EUR32
million of the underlying portfolio, compared with EUR19 million
in June 2011.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations", published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. Under its base
case scenario, Moody's assessed the underlying collateral pool as
having a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR223
million, defaulted par of EUR39 million, a weighted average
default probability of 22.92% (consistent with a WARF of 3196), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 48.31% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 26 and a weighted
average spread of 3.47%.

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Lower Weighted Average Spread - To test the deal sensitivity
to key parameters, Moody's modelled a lower weighted average
spread of 3.01%, which is the midpoint between reported and
covenanted values. This model-run generated outputs that were
within one notch of the base case scenario results.

(2) Deterioration of Credit Quality - Moody's considered a model-
run where the base case WARF was increased by 10%. This case
yielded model outputs that are within one notch of the base case
scenario results.

Upgrade of Wood Street CLO I Notes

Similarly to the Vallauris notes, Moody's has also upgraded the
notes issued by Wood Street CLO I as a result of the correction
to the rating model as well as a slight improvement in collateral
performance.

Since the September 2011 rating action, the Class A notes have
been paid down by approximately EUR32.5 million, which has
increased over-collateralization ratios. As of the latest
noteholder valuation report dated 22 May 2012, the Class A/B,
Class C, Class D and Class E over-collateralization ratios have
increased by 7.23%, 5.58%, 4.36% and 3.59%, respectively, to
134.71%, 122.69%, 112.85% and 109.67%, since the last rating
action in September 2011. All coverage tests are compliant.

Under its base case scenario, Moody's assesses the underlying
collateral pool as having a performing par and principal proceeds
balance of EUR410.4 million, defaulted par of EUR7.78 million, a
weighted average default probability of 20.38% (consistent with a
WARF of 3042), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of
46.22% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 30
and a weighted average spread of 3.60%.

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Lower Weighted Average Spread - To test the deal sensitivity
    to key parameters, Moody's modelled a lower weighted average
    spread of 3.03%. This model-run generated outputs that were
    within one notch off the base case scenario results.

(2) Deterioration of Credit Quality - Moody's considered a model-
    run where the base case WARF was increased by 10%. This case
    yielded model outputs that are within two notches off the
    base case scenario results and are consistent with the rating
    actions.

For both the Vallauris II CLO and Wood Street CLO I deals,
Moody's derive the default probability from the credit quality of
the collateral pool and its expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For an Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that more than 90% of the portfolio that is
exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon
default, while the remaining non first-lien loan corporate assets
would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market
performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading
the collateral are also relevant factors. These default and
recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in
cash flow model analysis in which they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Both transactions are subject to a high level of macroeconomic
uncertainty, which could negatively impact the ratings of the
notes, as evidenced by (1) uncertain credit conditions in the
general economy; and (2) the large concentration of speculative-
grade debt maturing between 2014-16, which may be challenging for
issuers to refinance. The performance of CLO notes may also be
affected either positively or negatively by (1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior; and (2) a divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are described
below:

(1) Moody's also notes that a significant percentage of the
    collateral pool consists of debt obligations whose credit
    quality has been assessed using the rating agency's credit
    estimates. Large single exposures to obligors bearing a
    credit estimate have been subject to a stress applicable to
    concentrated pools, as per the report titled "Updated
    Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated
    Transactions", published in October 2009.

(2) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
    defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
    be "defaulted" by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
    over-collateralization levels. Furthermore, the timing of
    recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
    defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. In
    analyzing defaulted recoveries, Moody's has assumed the lower
    of the market price and the recovery rate in order to account
    for potential volatility in market prices. Realization of
    higher-than-expected recoveries would positively affect the
    ratings of the notes.

Vallauris II CLO, issued in July 2006, is a single-currency CLO
backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield European loans. The
portfolio is managed by Natixis Banques Populaires and Natixis
Asset Management. This transaction is predominantly composed of
senior secured loans and will be in reinvestment mode until 26
July 2012.

Wood Street CLO 1, issued in September 2005, is a single-currency
CLO backed by a portfolio of mostly high-yield European loans.
The portfolio is managed by Alcentra Limited and is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans. This transaction exited its
reinvestment period in November 2011.

The ratings of the 'combination notes' address the repayment of
the 'rated balance' on or before the legal final maturity. For
the Class Y notes, the rated balance is equal at any time to the
principal amount of the combination note on the 'issue date,'
increased by the 'rated coupon' of 0.25% per annum accrued on the
rated balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate
of all payments made from the 'issue date' to such date, either
through interest or principal payments. For the Class W and Z
notes, the rated balance is equal at any time to the principal
amount of the combination note on the issue date minus the
aggregate of all payments made from the issue date to such date,
either through interest or principal payments. The rated balance
may not necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled these transactions using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology, published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for these transactions, whose
description can be found in the methodology listed above, is
Moody's CDOEdge model.

This model was used to represent the cash flows and determine the
loss for each tranche. The cash flow model evaluates all default
scenarios which are then weighted considering the probabilities
of the binomial distribution assumed for the portfolio default
rate. In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each
class of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from
the assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche
is the sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each
default scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow
model in each default scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors form part of the rating committee's
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.

RATING LIST

Issuer: Vallauris II CLO PLC

    EUR52.3MM Class II Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Aug 23, 2011 Upgraded to A3
(sf)

Issuer: Wood Street CLO I B.V.

    EUR310.5MM Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes,
Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1
(sf)

    EUR36MM Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded
to Aa3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

    EUR29.925MM Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2011 Upgraded
to Baa2 (sf)

    EUR27.75MM Class D1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

    EUR1.5MM Class D2 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2011 Upgraded
to Ba2 (sf)

    EUR4MM Class Y Combination Notes (outstanding rated balance
is EUR 3m), Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2011
Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

    EUR5MM Class Z Combination Notes (outstanding rated balance
is EUR 2.8m), Upgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on Sep 28, 2011
Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Boyne Valley B.V.

    EUR33.2M Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct
13, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

    EUR38.8M Class C-1 Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 13, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

    EUR6.8M Class C-2 Deferrable Interest Fixed Rate Notes due
2022, Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 13, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

    EUR15.6M Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 13, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

    EUR13.5M Class E Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
2022, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 13, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: CELF Loan Partners II plc

    EUR50MM Class B-1 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2021, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 5, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

    EUR7MM Class B-2 Senior Secured Fixed Rate Notes due 2021, A2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Jul
5, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

    EUR42.5MM Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2021, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Jul 5, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

    EUR19.5MM Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2021, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 5, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: COUGAR CLO II B.V.

    EUR124.3MM Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2025, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 12, 2011 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

    EUR45M Class B Subordinated Floating Rate Notes due 2025, B1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Sep
12, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Harvest CLO II S.A.

    EUR66.15MM Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes, A1 (sf) Placed
Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct 7, 2011
Upgraded to A1 (sf)

    EUR32.1MM Class C-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

    EUR3MM Class C-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

    EUR17.25MM Class D-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

    EUR3MM Class D-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

    EUR11.5MM Class E-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
Rate Notes, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

    EUR2MM Class E-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

Issuer: Jubilee CDO I-R B.V.

    EUR594MM Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2024,
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on
Aug 9, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

    EUR74.25MM Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2024, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Aug 9, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

    EUR72MM Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2024, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Aug 9, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

    EUR43.2MM Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2024, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Aug 9, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

    EUR33.75MM Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2024, B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Aug 9, 2011 Upgraded to B3 (sf)

Issuer: Jubilee CDO V B.V.

    EUR28.9MM Class A-1B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Sep
21, 2011 Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

    EUR155.55MM Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, Aa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Sep
21, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

    EUR45.8MM Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, A3 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Sep 21,
2011 Confirmed at A3 (sf)

    EUR46.8MM Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 21, 2011 Confirmed at Ba2 (sf)

    EUR8.475MM Class D-1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 21, 2011 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

    EUR12.725MM Class D-2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate
Notes, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 21, 2011 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Jubilee CDO VI

    EUR25MM Class A1-b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 23, 2011 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

    EUR12.5MM Class A2-b Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Aa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 23, 2011 Confirmed at Aa3 (sf)

    EUR13MM Class A3 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on
Sep 23, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

    EUR32MM Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on
Sep 23, 2011 Confirmed at Baa1 (sf)

    EUR27MM Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 23, 2011 Confirmed at Ba1 (sf)

    EUR21MM Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 23, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)

    EUR17MM Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 23, 2011 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Kintyre CLO I P.L.C.

    EUR239.75MM Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded to Aa1 (sf)

    EUR20.3MM Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2023, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

    EUR21.7MM Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2023, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

    EUR19.95MM Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2023, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

    EUR11.55MM Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2023, Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Sep 2, 2011 Upgraded to Caa1 (sf)

Issuer: Leopard CLO IV B.V.

    EUR26.25MM Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 4, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

    EUR15.5MM Class C1 Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Oct 4, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

    EUR7MM Class C2 Senior Secured Deferrable Fixed Rate Notes
due 2022, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 4, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

    EUR20.65MM Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Oct 4, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

    EUR11.25MM Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 4, 2011 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: LEVERAGED FINANCE EUROPE CAPITAL IV B.V.

    EUR30MM Revolving Facility Notes, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under
Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct 26, 2011 Confirmed
at Aa2 (sf)

    EUR26.3MM Class II Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Baa1
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct
26, 2011 Upgraded to Baa1 (sf)

    EUR11.7MM Class III Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 26, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

    EUR19.9MM Class IV Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 26, 2011 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

    EUR7.4MM Class V Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 26, 2011 Confirmed at Caa2 (sf)

    EUR26MM Class I-D Senior Floating Rate Delayed Funding Notes
due 2022, Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 26, 2011 Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

    EUR158.3MM Class I-N Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, Aa2
(sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct
26, 2011 Confirmed at Aa2 (sf)

Issuer: RMF Euro CDO IV PLC

    EUR310.2MM Class I Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due
2022, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 19, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

    EUR39.3MM Class II Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes, due
2022, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 19, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

    EUR15.3MM Class III Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
due 2022, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 19, 2011 Upgraded to A3 (sf)

    EUR21.6MM Class IV-A Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate
Notes, due 2022, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Jul 19, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

    EUR3.5MM Class IV-B Deferrable Mezzanine Fixed Rate Notes,
due 2022, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 19, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

    EUR12.6MM Class V Deferrable Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes,
due 2022, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Jul 19, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

Issuer: Skellig Rock B.V.

    EUR38MM Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022, A1 (sf)
Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct 20,
2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

    EUR34MM Class C Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

    EUR27MM Class D Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
2022, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

    EUR13.5MM Class E Deferrable Interest Floating Rate Notes due
2022, B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 20, 2011 Upgraded to B2 (sf)

Issuer: Versailles CLO M.E. I p.l.c.

    EUR102.75MM Class A-1-D Senior Delayed Draw Floating Rate
Notes due 2023, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Oct 7, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

    EUR95.3MM Class A-1-T Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

    EUR33MM Class A-2 Senior Variable Funding Floating Rate Notes
due 2023, Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Confirmed at Aa1 (sf)

    EUR22.5MM Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, A2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Upgraded to A2 (sf)

    EUR18MM Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

    EUR12.2MM Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Upgraded to Ba1 (sf)

    EUR14MM Class E Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2023, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 7, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Windmill CLO I Limited

    EUR55MM EUR55,000,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2029, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct 6, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

    EUR32MM EUR32,000,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Baa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct 6, 2011 Upgraded to Baa2 (sf)

    EUR21MM EUR21,000,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct 6, 2011 Upgraded to Ba2 (sf)

    EUR15MM EUR15,000,000 Class E Senior Secured Deferrable
Floating Rate Notes due 2029, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
Possible Upgrade; previously on Oct 6, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

Issuer: Wood Street CLO III B.V.

    EUR49.5MM Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
2022, A1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 5, 2011 Upgraded to A1 (sf)

    EUR44MM Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate Notes
due 2022, Baa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 5, 2011 Upgraded to Baa3 (sf)

    EUR24.75MM Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
Upgrade; previously on Oct 5, 2011 Upgraded to Ba3 (sf)

    EUR16.5MM Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
Notes due 2022, B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade;
previously on Oct 5, 2011 Upgraded to B1 (sf)


* Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars
---------------------------------------------

July 14-17, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop
        The Ritz-Carlton Amelia Island, Amelia Island, Fla.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

Aug. 2-4, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop
        Hyatt Regency Chesapeake Bay, Cambridge, Md.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

November 1-3, 2012
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Annual Convention
        Westin Copley Place, Boston, Mass.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

Nov. 29 - Dec. 2, 2012
  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE
     Winter Leadership Conference
        JW Marriott Starr Pass Resort & Spa, Tucson, Ariz.
           Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/

April 10-12, 2013
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Spring Conference
        JW Marriott Chicago, Chicago, Ill.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/

October 3-5, 2013
  TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
     TMA Annual Convention
        Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, D.C.
           Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *