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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

            Wednesday, May 16, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 97

                            Headlines



F R A N C E

CREDIT IMMOBILIER: Credit Agricole Eyes Real-Estate Business
EUROPCAR GROUPE: S&P Affirms 'B' Corporate Credit Rating


G E R M A N Y

GROHE HOLDING: Moody's Rates EUR375MM Sr. Secured Loan '(P) B2'
SOVELLO GMBH: Files for Insolvency; Seeks Restructuring


G R E E C E

NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Neg


H U N G A R Y

MAGYAR TELECOM: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'B3'; Outlook Negative


I R E L A N D

CELTIC RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 Note Classes to Ca
PROMETHEUS CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class 2007-1D to 'CCC-'


I T A L Y

BANCA DELLE MARCHE: Moody's Downgrades Rating to 'Ba1'
FONDAZIONE MONTE: Has Debt Restructuring Deal with Creditors
* ITALY: Moody's Cuts Debt Ratings on Five Banks; Outlook Neg.


L U X E M B O U R G

INEOS GROUP: Moody's Rates US$775MM Senior Secured Notes 'B1'
INTELSAT SA: Receives Additional Tenders of US$1.5MM 9 1/2% Notes
MAGIC NEWCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' Corp. Credit Rating


P O L A N D

PBG: Expects to Obtain Emergency Bridge Financing by May 25


P O R T U G A L

BANCO PORTUGUES: Moody's Withdraws B3 Deposits Rating & E+ BFSR


R O M A N I A

CAN SERV: Declared Insolvent by Bucharest Court


R U S S I A

* Moody's Says Russian SMEs Still Face Cyclical Credit Risks


S W I T Z E R L A N D

PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms 'D' Corporate Credit Rating


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRITISH MIDLAND: IAG to Sell Regional Division for GBP8 Million
CEVA GROUP: S&P Puts 'B+' Rating on Sr. Sec. Debt on Watch Neg.
PREFERRED RESIDENTIAL 7: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
SHOON: Rescued Out of Administration by GA Europe
* UK: Q1 Administration Figures in England & Wales Down 7%


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F R A N C E
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CREDIT IMMOBILIER: Credit Agricole Eyes Real-Estate Business
------------------------------------------------------------
David Whitehouse at Bloomberg News, citing La Tribune, reports
that Credit Agricole SA is ready to study Credit Immobilier de
France's Immo France real-estate business.

According to Bloomberg, the newspaper said that Credit Agricole
doesn't plan to buy the whole of Credit Immobilier de France.
Bank of France Governor Christian Noyer said on Monday that
Credit Immobilier de France is solvent, Bloomberg relates.

In a separate report, Bloomberg News' Phil Serafino, citing Le
Figaro, relates that Credit Immobilier de France's auditors won't
sign off on the 2011 accounts because Moody's Investors Service
has said it may cut the real-estate lender's credit rating by
four levels.

The newspaper, as cited by Bloomberg, said on May 10 that the
auditors say they can't attest to Credit Immobilier's "operating
continuity".

Le Figaro reported that the firm doesn't collect deposits, and
instead borrows money in financial markets to lend for home
loans, Bloomberg notes.

According to Bloomberg, the newspaper, citing a person close to
the situation, reported that Credit Immobilier had profit of
about EUR78 million (US$101 million) last year, equal to the
level of 2010.

The daily said that the situation may prompt the Finance Ministry
to seek a way reinforce Credit Immobilier, because its model of
financing in the markets is too fragile, Bloomberg relates.


EUROPCAR GROUPE: S&P Affirms 'B' Corporate Credit Rating
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on France-
based car rental firm Europcar Groupe S.A. (Europcar) and
Europcar's subsidiary, Europcar International S.A.S.U (ECI), to
stable from negative. At the same time, Standard & Poor's
affirmed its 'B' long-term corporate credit ratings on both
entities.

"At the same time, we affirmed our 'B-' rating to Europcar's
proposed EUR324 million secured subordinated notes due 2017. The
recovery rating on the proposed notes remains unchanged at '5',
indicating our expectation of modest (10%-30%) recovery in the
event of a payment default," S&P said.

"We also affirmed our issue ratings on Europcar's various other
debt instruments," S&P said.

"The outlook revision mainly reflects our view that Europcar no
longer faces execution risk relating to its current refinancing
plan following the successful placement of its EUR324 million
notes to replace the existing EUR425 million floating rate notes
(FRNs) maturing in May 2013. We now believe that Europcar will
complete its refinancing plan in the coming weeks by finalizing
the documentation on its U.K. fleet financing facilities, for
which we understand the company has received written commitments
from banks," S&P said.

"In addition, we revised our assessment of Europcar's liquidity
profile to 'adequate' from 'less than adequate,' reflecting the
absence of debt maturities until August 2014, once the
refinancing has been completed," S&P said.

"To facilitate the new issuance, shareholder Eurazeo (not rated)
injected EUR110 million of equity into Europcar to repay part of
its EUR425 million outstanding FRNs, which marginally improved
the company's credit metrics," S&P said.

"We also anticipate that Europcar's cost of funding will slightly
increase as a result of the refinancing. Nonetheless, Europcar
has just entered into a new swap, which will result in a more
favorable swap rate (0.7% versus 2.4%) and a significant decrease
in interest outflows. The new swap, however, resulted in a large
one-off cash settlement of EUR67 million), thereby constraining
Europcar's 2012 credit metrics," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that Europcar's
credit metrics will remain in line with levels we consider to be
commensurate with the current 'B' rating, including FFO to debt
above 10% and EBITDA interest cover of more than 2x. We forecast
these metrics despite the negative effect of the challenging
economic environment in Western Europe on Europcar's operating
performance, and the costs associated with the refinancing
process," S&P said.

"If Europcar does not achieve credit ratios in line with these
benchmark levels, we could lower the ratings. A downgrade could
also result from a deterioration of the group's liquidity
profile, if the company does not proactively refinance its senior
asset revolving facility maturing in 2014," S&P said.

"We might consider raising the ratings if Europcar's operating
performance strengthened over the coming years, leading to a
meaningful improvement in credit ratios, with FFO to debt above
12% and EBITDA interest cover above 2.5x on a sustainable basis,"
S&P said.


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GROHE HOLDING: Moody's Rates EUR375MM Sr. Secured Loan '(P) B2'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service assigned a '(P)B2' rating to the new
EUR375 million Senior Secured loan issued by Grohe Holding GmbH's
(due 2017) announced on May 14. The outlook on Grohe's ratings
remains stable.

The proceeds of the term loan will be used to fully repay
borrowings outstanding under the EUR300 million Senior Secured
Floating Rate Notes (FRN) due 2014 (rated B2) and partially repay
EUR335 million senior notes due in 2014.

Ratings Rationale

The (P) B2 rating assigned to the proposed term loan reflects
their positioning in Grohe's capital structure, which will
consist of the proposed loan, EUR260 million senior notes due
2014 (rated B3), EUR500 million senior secured FRNs due 2017
(rated B2) and a EUR150 million revolving credit facility (RCF)
due 2016 (unrated).

The EUR500 million FRNs maturing in 2017 and the proposed EUR375
million term loan share the same ranking, security and
guarantees. The FRNs, the term loan and the RCF rank above the
senior unsecured notes, both in terms of priority of payment and
security. The RCF ranks above the other debt via the terms of
intercreditor agreement.

The PDR of B1, one notch above CFR of B2, reflects the covenant-
lite nature of the structure leading to the assumption of a 35%
recovery rate.

In 2011, Grohe's Group (excluding Joyou AG (Joyou)) reported a 4%
year-on-year growth in sales and 3% growth in Normalised EBITDA,
leading to a stable EBITDA margin. Despite a challenging
macroeconomic environment, growth was reported across all of
Grohe's key regions and products, although markedly below the
growth demonstrated in 2010. Including six months of contribution
from Joyou, Grohe's sales and Normalised EBITDA increased by 19%
and 16% respectively.

As of July 1, 2011, Grohe fully consolidates the results of
Joyou, however Grohe's economic interest in Joyou is limited to
c. 36% and is effected through Joyou Grohe Holding AG, a joint-
venture outside of the restricted group. Nevertheless, Grohe's
business profile benefits from the exposure to fast-growing Asian
markets and improving geographic diversification as a result of
the ownership of majority stake in Joyou. The full consolidation
of Joyou in Grohe's financial accounts results in a reduction in
total gross leverage of the combined entity. However this has a
negative impact on cash flow, given negative free cash flow
generation at Joyou from high capex and working capital outflows.
Gross leverage (as adjusted by Moody's) is estimated at c. 6.6x
as of December 31, 2011, including Joyou's consolidation.

The company's liquidity remains adequate, supported by EUR215
million cash on balance sheet (including EUR70 million cash of
Joyou) and a EUR42.5 million unutilized revolving credit
facility. As of December 31, 2011, EUR85 million of RCF was drawn
in cash and another EUR22.5 million was utilized for an ancillary
facility and bank guarantees.

Whilst the issuance of the new EUR375 million term loan improves
the company's debt-maturity profile, refinancing requirement
remains with respect of the remaining EUR260 million of senior
notes due in October 2014. Moody's notes that the RCF has a
springing maturity feature, leading to a potentially accelerated
refinancing date, ahead of its maturity in March 2016, if the
2014 notes have not been refinanced three months prior to their
maturity date.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's expectations that Grohe is
well positioned to weather challenging conditions in the water
technology products market and will maintain stable growth in
sales and profitability. The stable outlook also assumes a
successful refinancing of the remaining 2014 notes in a timely
manner.

Headquartered in Dsseldorf, Germany, Grohe Holding GmbH is a
leading single-brand supplier of sanitary fittings for bathrooms
and kitchens. Grohe operates six production facilities, which are
located in Germany, Portugal, Canada and Thailand.

The principal methodology used in rating Grohe Holding GmbH was
the Global Consumer Durables Industry Methodology published in
October 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default
for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada
and EMEA published in June 2009.


SOVELLO GMBH: Files for Insolvency; Seeks Restructuring
-------------------------------------------------------
Karin Matussek at Bloomberg News report that Sovello GmbH filed
for insolvency and will attempt to restructure in the process.

According to Bloomberg, Sovello said in a statement on its
Web site on Monday that the company cannot pay its debts and has
asked the Dessau insolvency court to be allowed to restructure
under its management.  The company said that attorney Bernd
Depping has been appointed as preliminary administrator,
Bloomberg relates.

"We have checked alternative scenarios to regain solvency,"
Bloomberg quotes Sovello Chief Executive Officer Reiner Beutel as
saying in the statement.  "Even if our debts are low, in the
current market environment the company can be sustainably
restructured with the instruments of the insolvency code."

German solar companies have struggled with reduced government aid
and competition from Chinese companies amid a glut of solar
panels, Bloomberg notes.

Sovello GmbH is a solar-power company based in Bitterfeld-Wolfen,
Germany.


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NAVIOS MARITIME: S&P Affirms 'B' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Neg
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Marshall Island-registered tanker shipping company Navios
Maritime Acquisition Corp. (Navios Acquisition) to negative from
stable. "At the same time, we affirmed our 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating on the company," S&P said.

"The outlook revision reflects what we view as difficult trading
conditions in the product tanker shipping industry, which have
prompted us to revise our charter rate assumptions for 2012-2013
downward. We believe the pressure on Navios Acquisition's
earnings and credit measures has increased, given the uncertain
industry outlook and the company's higher debt due to the recent
acquisition of new vessels. We now see a risk that Navios
Acquisition's credit measures may not improve to a rating-
commensurate level in the near to medium term," S&P said.

"According to our revised base-case scenario, Navios
Acquisition's credit measures will gradually improve over 2012-
2013. However, we believe they could remain below our guidelines
for the rating: ratios of adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to
debt of 9%-12% and adjusted debt to EBITDA of 5x-7x. We
previously anticipated the recovery of credit metrics to rating-
commensurate levels by 2013," S&P said.

"The delayed recovery could, in our view, result from potentially
weaker-than-expected charter rates and Navios Acquisition's debt-
funded acquisition of three new medium-range product tankers for
about US$107 million. The company has already assumed about US$75
million of debt for this transaction in 2012, while the vessels
will start generating cash flows only after delivery, largely
during the second half of 2014," S&P said.

"We note that 2012-2014 will remain an expansion period for the
company; therefore the credit measures are distorted by cash flow
and debt mismatches. We forecast, for example, that in 2012
Navios Acquisition's actual ratio of adjusted FFO to debt will be
about 5%. This compares with a pro forma ratio of about 9% if the
proportionate EBITDA contribution from vessels that are not in
the water, but have been financed with debt, is included. Our
base-case forecast is that the company's credit ratios will
improve to rating-commensurate levels by 2014. We consider 2014
to be a more representative year for Navios Acquisition's credit
ratios than 2012 or 2013 because all but three of the vessels to
be delivered would have been operating, and therefore generating
cash flows for 12 months," S&P said.

"Under our base-case operating scenario, we assume a sustained
but moderate recovery of charter rates from 2012 and an
increasing number of vessel-available days as new tankers enter
the fleet. We also forecast that Navios Acquisition's debt will
slowly decline from 2013, after peaking in 2012, assuming that it
makes no additional investments in new vessels beyond the current
new-build program of about US$210 million, with vessels to be
delivered in 2012-2014," S&P said.

"The rating on Navios Acquisition continues to reflect our view
that the company's business risk profile is 'weak', constrained
by the above-average industry risk of the tanker shipping sector
and the company's aggressive growth strategy. The rating is also
constrained by our view of Navios Acquisition's 'highly
leveraged' financial risk profile and currently weak credit
measures," S&P said.

"We consider these risks to be partly offset by Navios
Acquisition's conservative charter policy, competitive break-even
rates, and adequate liquidity. Our rating reflects Navios
Acquisition's stand-alone credit quality. Although the company is
partly owned by and shares links with Navios Maritime Holdings
Inc. (BB-/Stable/--), these companies have different shareholder
groups and are separately listed. Furthermore, management has
informed us that, financially, each company is to operate on a
stand-alone basis," S&P said.

"The negative outlook reflects our view that, given the uncertain
trading conditions, Navios Acquisition might be unable to improve
its credit measures to a rating-commensurate level in the near to
medium term. We believe a downgrade would primarily stem from a
prolonged weakness in the product tanker shipping industry,
absent prospects for a sustained recovery in charter rates from
2012. Continually weak industry conditions would likely prevent
Navios Acquisition from achieving favorable employment for
vessels not yet delivered and contracted, and those up for
recharter. They would also hinder the company from earning a
profit-share income from the employed vessels, resulting in
continually weak credit measures and potential liquidity
pressure," S&P said.

"Moreover, rating pressure could arise if Navios Acquisition's
debt were to increase on account of additional investments in new
vessels beyond the current new-build program. Our base-case
operating scenario estimates that the company's debt will decline
slowly from 2013 and that its cash flow measures will show a
gradual improvement to rating-commensurate levels in the near to
medium term, such as a ratio of FFO to debt of 9%-12% and debt to
EBITDA of 5x-7x. Nevertheless, we might consider lowering the
rating if we saw clear signs that Navios Acquisition's
performance were not in line with what we had anticipated," S&P
said.

"We could revise the outlook to stable if we observed a gradual
market recovery and considered the company's cash flow measures
to be sustainably commensurate with the rating. Furthermore, an
outlook revision to stable would be subject to our assessment of
a continued, adequate liquidity profile, manageable covenant
compliance tests, and reasonable expansion plans," S&P said.


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MAGYAR TELECOM: Moody's Cuts CFR to 'B3'; Outlook Negative
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the corporate family
rating (CFR) of Magyar Telecom B.V. ("Invitel") to B3 from B2.
Moody's also downgraded the company's probability of default
rating (PDR) to B3 from B1 and the rating on the senior secured
notes due 2016 to B3 from B2. The outlook remains negative.

Ratings Rationale

Invitel's B3 CFR is supported by the company's (i) leading
position as the second-largest fixed-line telecommunications
service provider in Hungary; (ii) sound profitability levels with
EBITDA margin between 40%-50%; (iii) long dated maturity profile
as the company has no scheduled debt repayment before 2016.

The downgrade of Invitel's ratings mainly reflects (i) the
continued decline in voice revenues, Invitel's highest margin
product, to the benefit of mobile substitution and triple-play
cable operators which could put pressure on Invitel's EBITDA
margins (ii) weaker than expected growth in the internet segment
as the company struggles to sign on new users to counter a drop
in ARPU (iii) an uncertain macro-economic environment compounded
by aggressive policy-making (iv) continued generation of negative
free cash-flow (negative EUR13 million in FY2011 vs. negative
EUR4 million in FY2010) following increased capex spending on
network upgrades which, although essential to maintain market
share, are unlikely to drive sufficient growth in the short term
to reverse the decline in performance.

The downgrade comes on the back of Invitel's FY2011 performance
which shows no halting of the declining trends observed in voice
revenues and margins. In addition to fixed to mobile substitution
and the bundled telephone offers from cable operators, the
increasingly tough competitive environment has also driven prices
down as both residential and corporate clients look for best-
value alternatives in a tough domestic economic climate.

With this macro-economic picture not expected to substantially
change in the short term, Invitel is likely to see those trends
persisting through 2012. In addition, the Hungarian Forint
(Invitel's main operating currency), which declined to a record
low at the end of 2011, could continue to be volatile and
experience jitters from larger European countries. This is
compounded by an aggressive strategy from the government to
impose taxes on the telecommunication industry. First, since
2010, through a three year "crisis-tax" on the operators which
cost Invitel EUR10.9 million in 2011 and now through a "Telecom
Tax" levied on the end-user which will indirectly lead to a
decline in voice volume and an increase in churn.

Although Invitel's liquidity is adequate at the moment, it is
fully reliant on current cash positions as the company does not
benefit from a revolving credit facility. With capex spending
needed to upgrade networks and/or maintain market position in
certain regions, Invitel is burning through its cash at a slow
but consistent pace and although the company has no debt maturing
before 2016, an unexpected drop in the performance of the
business could put material strain on Invitel's liquidity
profile.

The negative outlook reflects Moody's views that (i) the current
overall decline in performance will persist in the coming year
(ii) the competitive and macro-economic landscapes will continue
to put pressure on Invitel's end-customers and hence limit a
potential recovery in pricing (iii) the cash-flow profile of the
issuer will remain constrained by continued investment in its
network infrastructure to maintain its market share.

What Could Change the Rating - Up

Whilst Invitel's ratings are currently constrained by the
company's limited financial flexibility, its rating outlook could
stabilize following (i) tangible signs of a stabilizing market
environment; (ii) meaningful growth in Internet and broadband
activity; and (iii) sustained free cash flow generation.

What Could Change the Rating -- Down

Negative ratings pressure would arise should the company's
strategy fail to show signs of positive traction during 2012,
thereby reducing the company's EBITDA and free cash flow
generation. Negative pressure would also arise should Invitel's
liquidity profile deteriorate further.

The principal methodology used in rating Magyar Telecom B.V. was
the Global Telecommunications Industry Methodology published in
December 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.


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CELTIC RESIDENTIAL: Moody's Cuts Ratings on 4 Note Classes to Ca
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of Irish
RMBS notes issued by CELTIC RESIDENTIAL IRISH MORTGAGE
SECURITISATION NO. 12 LIMITED (Celtic 12) and Fastnet Securities
2 Plc (Fastnet 2).

Ratings Rationale

The rating action takes into account (i) the continued rapid
deterioration in performance of the transactions; (ii) Moody's
outlook for Irish RMBS sector; and (iii) structural features in
place such as amount of available credit enhancement.

Key collateral assumptions revised

Celtic 12 and Fastnet 2 are performing worse than Moody's
expectations as of the latest review in July 2011. As of April
2012, loans more than 90 days in arrears have increased to 16.8%
of current balance in Celtic 12 and 13.2% in Fastnet 2, which
constitutes an approximately 30% and 50% increase, respectively,
compared to the levels as of June 2011. Cumulative losses
realized since closing remain very low at 0.05% of original pool
balance in Celtic 12 and 0.01% in Fastnet 2. Moody's notes that
loss realization is slow for Irish RMBS given lengthy enforcement
procedures in Ireland and moratorium imposed. For this reason,
Moody's considers loans with delinquencies exceeding 360 days as
a proxy for defaults. As of April 2012, the 360+ delinquencies in
the transactions have increased by 50% to 70% compared to June
2011, reaching 6.4% of the current pool balance in both Celtic 12
and Fastnet 2.

Moody's expects that the increasing unemployment and lower income
arising from the austerity measures will continue to hurt
borrower's ability to fulfil their financial obligations. In
addition to high arrears the loss severity will also be high as a
result of the oversupply of housing, lack of refinancing and
further decline in house prices, expected to be equal to
approximately 60% to 70% decline from peak to trough in the base
case. Approximately 60% of the portfolio in Celtic 12 and 55% in
Fastnet 2 is currently in negative equity. Moody's has increased
the portfolio expected loss assumptions to 11% of current pool
balance for Celtic 12 and 10% for Fastnet 2, corresponding to
7.3% of original pool balance for Celtic 12 and 5.9% on original
balance for Fastnet 2. Moody's has also increased its MILAN CE
assumption to 30% in Celtic 12 and 27% for Fastnet 2.

Class A2 and A3 notes in Celtic 12 are paying sequentially
switching to pro-rata payment in case of enforcement. The ratings
of these notes take into account their relative position in the
waterfall as well as the probability of a missed interest payment
triggering a swith to a pro-rata repayment.

Factors and Sensitivity Analysis

Expected loss assumptions remain subject to uncertainty with
regard to general economic activity, interest rates and house
prices. Lower than assumed realised recovery rates or higher than
assumed default rates would negatively affect the ratings in
these transactions.

The new Irish personal insolvency legislation proposed in January
could also have a negative impact on the ratings of the notes as
it might lead to a write-down of the mortgage debt supporting the
notes (see Moody's special report Proposed Irish Legislation
Opens the Door To Widespread Debt Forgiveness published in
February 2012).

As the euro area crisis continues, the ratings of the notes
remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit conditions in the
general economy. The deteriorating creditworthiness of euro area
sovereigns as well as the weakening credit profile of the global
banking sector could negatively impact the ratings of the notes.

Following the downgrade of Ireland's long-term government bond
rating to Ba1, Moody's lowered the maximum achievable ratings in
Ireland to A1 (sf). Furthermore, as discussed in Moody's special
report "Rating Euro Area Governments Through Extraordinary Times
-- An Updated Summary," published in October 2011, Moody's is
considering reintroducing individual country ceilings for some or
all euro area members, which could affect further the maximum
structured finance rating achievable in those countries. Moody's
is also continuing to consider the impact of the deterioration of
sovereigns' financial condition and the resultant asset portfolio
deterioration on mezzanine and junior tranches of structured
finance transactions.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa
published in October 2009.

In reviewing these transactions, Moody's used ABSROM to model the
cash flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the lognormal distribution
assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each default scenario,
the corresponding loss for each class of notes is calculated
given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the outgoing
payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore, the
expected loss for each tranche is the sum product of (i) the
probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and (ii) the
loss derived from the cash flow model in each default scenario
for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

LIST OF AFFECTED RATINGS

Issuer: Celtic Residential Irish Mortgage Securitisation No.12
Ltd.

    EUR487.5M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
    Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded to A1 (sf)

    EUR1010.685M A3 Notes, Downgraded to Ba3 (sf); previously on
    Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to Baa3 (sf)

    EUR39M B Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 10,
    2011 Downgraded to Caa1 (sf)

    EUR87.75M C Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
    Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to Caa3 (sf)

Issuer: Fastnet Securities 2 PLC

    EUR1656M A2 Notes, Downgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on
    Jul 21, 2011 Downgraded to Baa2 (sf)

    EUR50M B Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
    Mar 10, 2011 Downgraded to Ba2 (sf)

    EUR44M C Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 10,
    2011 Downgraded to B1 (sf)

    EUR56M D Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on Mar 10,
    2011 Downgraded to Caa2 (sf)


PROMETHEUS CAPITAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class 2007-1D to 'CCC-'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' from 'B
(sf)' its credit rating on Prometheus Capital PLC's class 2007-1D
foreign-exchange-linked limited-recourse secured floating-rate
notes. "Our ratings on the other classes of notes are
unaffected," S&P said.

"The rating action follows a depreciation of the U.S. dollar, the
Swiss franc, and New Zealand dollar during the past few months.
This depreciation has led us to lower our rating on individual
foreign exchange (FX) trigger swaps in the underlying portfolio,"
S&P said.

"Currently, several FX rates are currently breaching their
trigger levels, so that a positive trend would have to occur to
avoid a loss for the remaining class 2007-1D tranche," S&P said.

"In addition, the downgrade takes into account the reduced time
to maturity since our last rating action in December 2008," S&P
said.

"In our opinion, these factors have increased the likelihood that
there will be a breach of trigger at maturity in this
transaction, which may lead to investors suffering a loss in
repayment of principal on the rated notes at maturity. As a
consequence of the increased risk of loss, we have lowered our
rating on the notes," S&P said.

"A collateralized FX obligation's ability to repay principal
depends on the reference portfolio performance, which relates to
different FX rates and various trigger levels (FX trigger swaps).
Each FX trigger swap can only trigger a loss at maturity
(European option), depending on the level of the relevant FX rate
at maturity. Therefore, although FX movements before the maturity
of the notes would not cause a breach or loss, the movements can,
in our opinion, increase or decrease the likelihood of a breach
of the triggers at maturity, and can therefore signal the risk of
increased losses on the notes at maturity," S&P said.

"We continue to monitor the movements of FX rates and any effect
these movements may have on the transactions that we rate," S&P
said.

Prometheus Capital's series 2007-1 is a synthetic CDO
(collateralized debt obligation) transaction that closed in 2007.

              STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                   Ratings
               To                     From

Rating Lowered

Prometheus Capital PLC
EUR156 Million FX-Linked Limited-Recourse Secured Floating-Rate
Notes Series 2007-1

2007-1D        CCC- (sf)              B (sf)


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BANCA DELLE MARCHE: Moody's Downgrades Rating to 'Ba1'
------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded six, affirmed one and
confirmed three ratings of various covered bonds issued by
Italian banks. This announcement was prompted by Moody's decision
on May 14, 2012 to downgrade the senior debt ratings of the banks
supporting the relevant covered bond programs. This also
concludes the review of Banca Popolare di Milano's covered bonds
ratings, initiated on February 16, 2012.

Ratings Rationale

The covered bond downgrades and announcements follow Moody's
rating actions on the relevant issuers' senior unsecured ratings.
This also concludes the review of Banca Popolare di Milano's
covered bonds ratings, initiated on February 16, 2012. The
covered bonds of six programs have been downgraded as a result of
the impact of the senior unsecured downgrades under Moody's
Timely Payment Indicator (TPI) framework. The covered bond rating
of one program has been affirmed and the covered bonds of three
programs have been confirmed as, following the senior unsecured
downgrades, (i) the expected loss of the covered bonds remain
commensurate with their current ratings; and (ii) the TPI
framework does not constrain the ratings below their current
level.

The rating actions on the issuers' ratings conclude the review
for downgrade of Italian banks, initiated on February 15, 2012.
That review was part of Moody's wider review of European
financial institutions, driven in part by (i) the difficult
European operating environment caused by the prolonged euro area
crisis; and (ii) the deteriorating creditworthiness of certain
euro area sovereigns.

Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a two-step
process: an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.

(1) Expected Loss Method

Moody's expected loss analysis is negatively affected by the
downgrade of the issuer's rating. As the credit strength of the
issuer is incorporated into Moody's expected loss methodology,
any downgrade of the issuer's ratings will increase the expected
loss on the covered bonds. However, Moody's notes that issuers
may be able to offset any deterioration in the expected loss
analysis if sufficient collateral is held in the cover pool.

(2) TPI Framework

The TPI framework limits the covered bond ratings to a certain
number of notches above the senior debt ratings of the banks
supporting the covered bonds. For each combination of the
issuer's senior debt rating and the assigned TPI -- which for all
Italian covered bonds is currently "Improbable"-- Moody's TPI
table indicates where the covered bond rating is likely to be
positioned. However, Moody's highlights that there are additional
factors that might influence final positioning of the rating
under the application of TPIs framework, in particular for sub-
investment-grade-rated issuers.

Based on the current "Improbable" TPI for the Italian covered
bond programs, the combination of the lower issuer ratings and
TPIs constrains the covered bond ratings to the following levels
(as indicated by the TPI table):

-- Banca Carige's covered bond ratings capped at A1, given its
    Baa2 issuer rating

-- Banca Monte Dei Paschi di Siena's covered bond ratings capped
    at A2, given its Baa3 issuer rating

-- Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa's covered bond ratings
    capped at A2, given its Baa3 issuer rating

-- Credito Emiliano's covered bond ratings capped at A1, given
    its Baa2 issuer rating

-- UBI's covered bond ratings capped at A1, given its Baa2
    issuer rating

Following the downgrade of Banca delle Marche to Ba1, Moody's
downgraded the corresponding mortgage covered bonds to A3, which
is two notches above the Baa2 level indicated by the TPI table.
The higher final rating was driven by a number of factors,
including (i) the issuer's Ba1 rating which is at the high end of
the range indicated by the TPI table for a Baa2 covered bond
rating; (ii) high level of committed over-collateralization
(27%); and (iii) a four-year extension period for the payment of
principal under the covered bonds.

KEY RATING ASSUMPTIONS/FACTORS

The ratings assigned by Moody's address the expected loss posed
to investors. Moody's ratings address only the credit risks
associated with the transaction. Other non-credit risks have not
been addressed, but may have a significant effect on yield to
investors. Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a
two-step process: an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework
analysis.

- EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's determines a rating based on the
expected loss on the bond. The primary model used is Moody's
Covered Bond Model (COBOL), which determines expected loss as (i)
a function of the issuer's probability of default (measured by
the issuer's rating); and (ii) the stressed losses on the cover
pool assets following issuer default.

- TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a TPI, which indicates the
likelihood that timely payment will be made to covered
bondholders following issuer default. The effect of the TPI
framework is to limit the covered bond rating to a certain number
of notches above the issuer's rating.

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

The robustness of a covered bond rating largely depends on the
issuer's credit strength.

A multinotch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances, such as (i) a sovereign downgrade
that negatively affects both the issuer's senior unsecured rating
and the TPI; (ii) a multinotch downgrade of the issuer; or (iii)
a material reduction of the value of the cover pool.

As the euro area crisis continues, the covered bond ratings
remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit conditions in the
general economy. The deteriorating creditworthiness of euro area
sovereigns as well as the weakening credit profile of the global
banking sector could negatively affect the ratings of covered
bonds.

Over and above any TPI consideration, country risk constrains the
CTs' ratings at Aa2.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds", published in March 2010.


FONDAZIONE MONTE: Has Debt Restructuring Deal with Creditors
------------------------------------------------------------
Sonia Sirletti at Bloomberg News, citing Il Sole 24 Ore, reports
that Fondazione Monte Paschi reaches accord with all its
financial creditors on EUR1 billion debt restructuring.

According Bloomberg, Sole said Fondazione agreed to repay EU664
million cash.  Sole said Fondazione is to extend the remaining
EUR350 million loans to 2017, Bloomberg notes.

Fondazione's bank creditors include Mediobanca, JPMorgan, Credit
Suisse, Bloomberg discloses.

Fondazione Monte dei Paschi di Siena is the Italian banking
foundation that controls Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA.


* ITALY: Moody's Cuts Debt Ratings on Five Banks; Outlook Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by one to four notches
the long-term debt and deposit ratings for 26 Italian banks,
including five banks that are part of larger groups. In almost
all cases, the rating actions reflect concurrent downgrades of
these banks' standalone credit assessments, rather than changes
in Moody's assumptions about levels of third party support,
including Government support.

The debt and deposit ratings declined by one notch for 10 banks,
two notches for eight banks, three notches for six banks, and
four notches for two banks. The short-term ratings for 21 banks
have also been downgraded by one to two notches, triggered by the
long-term rating downgrades. The rating outlooks for all affected
entities are negative; a Moody's rating outlook is an opinion
regarding the likely direction of an issuer's rating over the
medium term.

Furthermore, Moody's changed the rating outlooks for the
standalone BFSR of five Italian banks to negative from stable.
The debt and deposit ratings for nine more Italian banks remain
on review for further downgrade, for reasons specific to each
bank.

The ratings for Italian banks are now amongst the lowest within
advanced European countries, reflecting these banks'
susceptibility to the adverse operating environments in Italy and
Europe. The rating actions reflect, to differing degrees for each
affected bank, the following key drivers:

1.) Increasingly adverse operating conditions, with Italy's
economy back in recession and government austerity reducing near-
term economic demand;

2.) Mounting asset-quality challenges and weakened net profits,
as problem loans and loan-loss provisions are rising; and

3.) Restricted access to market funding which, if persistent,
will exert added pressure on banks to reduce assets, posing risks
to their franchises and earnings.

Furthermore, recent events highlight the risks for creditors from
potential weaknesses in governance, controls and risk management,
especially at some smaller, privately-held banks. In addition,
the actions reflect drivers specific to some banks, which are
detailed at the end of this release.

Moody's notes that several mitigating issues have limited the
magnitude of the downgrades. Specifically, Moody's cites the
substantial liquidity support that the European Central Bank
(ECB) has made available, significantly reducing near-term
default risk. Furthermore, many banks have strengthened their
capital levels and continue to generate sizeable pre-provision
earnings under difficult conditions.

Nevertheless, given already elevated problem loan levels and
weakened profitability, Italian banks are particularly vulnerable
to adverse operating conditions, which are likely to cause
further asset quality deterioration, earnings pressure, and
restricted market funding access. These risks are exacerbated by
investor concerns over the sustainability of the Italian
government's debt burden, which has contributed to the difficult
wholesale funding conditions faced by Italian banks.

RATING OUTLOOKS ARE NEGATIVE

The rating outlooks for all banks affected by the actions are
negative. The revised rating levels reflect currently foreseen
risks and the ratings are expected to be resilient to a degree of
further stress. However, Moody's considers that there are several
factors that could cause further downward adjustments, such as
(i) increasing funding stress; (ii) a prolonged recession; (iii)
crystallization of corporate governance, control and risk
management weaknesses; or (iv) further weakening of the Italian
government's creditworthiness. Moody's noted that the potential
for further rating transition is heightened by the possibility of
rapid increases in problem loans, as has been evident following
supervisory inspections of certain Italian banks.

Moody's has published a special comment on May 14 titled "Key
Drivers of Italian Bank Rating Actions," which provides more
detail on the rationales for these rating actions.

RATINGS RATIONALE -- STANDALONE CREDIT STRENGTH

As stated, the rating actions primarily reflect Moody's view that
the standalone credit strength of the affected banks has
weakened. Based on their standalone creditworthiness, the banks
downgraded now fall into the following four broad groups:

- The first group comprises UniCredit (deposit rating A3; bank
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) C- / baseline
credit assessment (BCA) baa2) and Intesa Sanpaolo (deposits A3;
BFSR C- / BCA baa1), which together account for almost one third
of the Italian market by assets. Their standalone credit
assessments reflect solid, diversified franchises that generate
sizeable pre-provision earnings.

- The second group (six banks) comprises other Italian banks
with standalone profiles of baa3 or higher -- including the
fifth-largest bank, Unione di Banche Italiane (deposits Baa2;
BFSR D+ / BCA baa3). Banks in this group are better positioned
than most domestic peers to cope with the current recession,
helped by overall solid franchises and above-average earnings
capacity.

- The third group (seven banks) consists of banks with ba1
standalone credit assessments. These institutions -- including
the fourth-largest Banco Popolare (deposits Baa3; BFSR D+ / BCA
ba1) -- face more significant challenges, often including a
combination of weak capital levels under Moody's adverse
scenarios, insufficient internal capital generation and funding
constraints.

- The fourth group (11 banks) comprises banks with standalone
credit assessments below ba1, including the third-largest Banca
Monte Dei Paschi (deposits Baa3; BFSR D / BCA ba2). This bank
faces more substantial challenges, often due to asset quality,
capital and/or funding issues.

FIRST DRIVER -- INCREASINGLY ADVERSE OPERATING CONDITIONS

An important driver of the action is the banks' deteriorating
operating environment, as demonstrated by Italy's relapse into
recession in early 2012, with no clear signs of recovery. This
deterioration followed a brief and shallow recovery after the
2008-09 recession and many prior years of slow growth. Italy's
GDP is still below the level it recorded in 2007. Moreover,
Moody's notes that the Italian government's austerity measures
and structural reforms are weighing on the country's near-term
economic outlook. Moody's expects the weak economic environment
to cause further growth in loan delinquencies, particularly for
corporate and small business borrowers; as well as persistent
high provisioning costs, restricted revenue growth and ongoing
investor concerns.

SECOND DRIVER -- MOUNTING ASSET-QUALITY PROBLEMS AND WEAKENED
PROFITABILITY

Most banks affected by the rating actions already have elevated
levels of problem loans, and their net earnings are weakened by
substantial loan-loss provisioning expenses. Consequently, they
are vulnerable to further asset-quality deterioration caused by
the renewed recession and the ongoing euro area debt crisis,
which has led to high inflows of problem loans in 2011. The
resulting high provisioning costs may further erode net
profitability and could weaken some banks' capital levels.

THIRD DRIVER -- RESTRICTED ACCESS TO MARKET FUNDING

The third driver underlying the rating action is the increased
uncertainty and risk resulting from the prolonged period of
restricted market access for most Italian banks. These banks
complement their core retail deposit and retail bond funding with
less stable market funding, which funded approximately 36% of
rated banks' total assets at year-end 2011. Indicating funding
pressures, Italian banks' debt issuance fell sharply in second-
half 2011. Though Moody's-tracked debt issuance of Italian banks
(mostly long-term bonds) recovered in first-quarter 2012, at
their recent pace new debt issuances would not fully cover the
amounts maturing in 2012.

Due to the continuing euro area debt crisis, access to non-retail
funding sources has become more costly and restricted and has led
many of these banks to borrow significant amounts from the ECB.
Gross ECB borrowings of Italian banks amounted to EUR271 billion
at the end of April 2012, up sharply from EUR41 billion at the
end of June 2011; the current level is amongst the highest in
Europe. The availability of three-year funds from the ECB has
mitigated near-term funding stress; however, the significant
reliance on such funds raises the issue of whether these banks
will be able to normalize their funding bases over the medium-
term.

Moody's recognizes that many Italian banks rely more on retail
funding (including bonds issued to retail investors) than some
European peers. However, balance sheet growth in recent years has
increasingly been funded by market funds, resulting in loan-to-
deposit ratios significantly above 100% even for traditionally
retail-funded institutions. Structural reliance on market funds
now poses a key challenge for many banks.

RATINGS RATIONALE -- LONG- AND SHORT-TERM DEBT & DEPOSIT RATINGS

In most cases, Moody's did not change its assumptions about the
availability of support from a bank's parent, its cooperative
group, regional or local government or the central government.
The sovereign's own reduced credit strength -- reflected in the
recent government bond rating downgrade to A3, with a negative
outlook, from A2 -- did not cause any of the downgrades following
reduced capacity of support embedded in the sovereign rating.

Moody's assessment of Italy's cooperative group (Banche di
Credito Cooperativo) led to a reduction of the uplift due to
cooperative support factored into the debt and deposit ratings
for several members of this group.

OVERVIEW AND RATINGS RATIONALE -- SUBORDINATED DEBT AND HYBRID
RATINGS

In addition, Moody's has downgraded the subordinated and hybrid
ratings for 17 Italian banks by one to five notches. For banks
whose senior subordinated debt ratings had incorporated
assumptions about government (or systemic) support, these
assumptions have been removed. The removal of support from this
debt class reflects Moody's view that in Italy, systemic support
for subordinated debt may no longer be sufficiently predictable
or reliable to be a sound basis for incorporating uplift into
Moody's ratings.

In addition, Moody's now rates junior subordinated debt two
notches (previously one notch) below a bank's adjusted baseline
credit assessment (which reflects a bank's standalone strength,
parent and cooperative group support, but not government
support).

THE ACTIONS FOLLOW REVIEW ANNOUNCENTS ON 15 FEBRUARY 2012 AND
OTHER DATES

The rating actions follow Moody's decision to review for
downgrade the ratings for 114 European financial institutions,
including Italian banks. Some banks downgraded had been placed on
review for downgrade on other dates.

Separate from the actions, Moody's has recently downgraded the
ratings for Banca Tercas and Banca Monastier.

WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATINGS UP/DOWN

Upgrades of the banks' ratings are unlikely in the near term,
given the factors previously cited that have led to Moody's
continuing negative outlooks. However, a limited amount of upward
rating pressure could develop if any bank substantially improves
its credit profile and resilience to the prevailing conditions.
This may occur through increased standalone strength, e.g.
bolstered capital and liquidity buffers, work-out of asset
quality challenges or improved earnings. Improved credit strength
could also result from external support, e.g. via a change in
ownership or the receipt of capital or liquidity injections.

Several factors could cause further downward rating changes, such
as (i) increasing funding stress and reliance on central bank
support, which would raise pressure on banks to deleverage, with
adverse consequences for asset quality; (ii) a prolonged
recession, which could similarly further exacerbate already
adverse asset-quality trends and impair capital; or (iii) a
weakening of the Italian government's credit strength.

The methodologies used in these ratings were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology, published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: Global Methodology, published in March 2012.

BANK-SPECIFIC RATING CONSIDERATIONS

UNICREDIT SPA

UniCredit's standalone credit assessment was lowered to baa2 from
baa1, within the C- standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR) category, which was confirmed at this level, whilst its
long- and short-term deposit and debt ratings were downgraded to
A3/Prime-2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1. The outlook on the C-
standalone BFSR and on the A3 long-term deposit rating is
negative.

Moody's says that the lowering of the standalone credit
assessment to baa2 reflects (i) UniCredit's weakening
profitability and asset quality; (ii) its restricted access to
market funding; and (iii) the increasingly difficult operating
environment that the group faces, particularly in the Italian
market, where conditions have deteriorated significantly since H1
2011. The expectation that these rating drivers may persist for
some time, and possibly intensify, underlies the negative outlook
on the bank's standalone BFSR.

The rating agency notes that in this environment, the financial
targets set out in the bank's November 2011 strategic plan,
including a net profit of EUR3.8 billion by 2013, and EUR6.5
billion by 2015, are likely to have become more difficult to
achieve. Pre-provision operating profit for 2011 declined by 9.4%
to EUR9.7 billion. Gross impaired loans increased by 6.3% in
2011, with the increase relating mainly to exposures in Italy,
and this trend has continued in Q1 2012. Although UniCredit has
significant geographic diversification, Italy remains its single
largest market, and conditions in the country will therefore
significantly affect the group's performance. With Italy now in
recession, there is potential for profitability and asset quality
to weaken further during 2012.

Moody's notes that UniCredit has a relatively robust liquidity
framework, including a substantial portfolio of ECB eligible
assets, which are sufficient to cover wholesale maturities for a
period significantly in excess of 12 months. However, the rating
agency notes that UniCredit has significant reliance on
confidence sensitive, more restricted, and costly funding
sources, and there is a risk that the current more restricted and
costly market access will continue for an extended period.
Uncertainty regarding when UniCredit will again be able to fund
itself regularly -- and on an economic basis -- is therefore a
key credit and rating driver. The group's geographic
diversification does however provide some benefits. UniCredit's
operations in certain markets, such as Germany, improve its
funding diversification and provide some mitigant to a more
sensitive funding market in Italy.

Moody's notes that UniCredit's capital adequacy has been
strengthened, through the successful completion of a EUR7.5
billion capital increase in January 2012, contributing to a Core
Tier 1 ratio of 10.3% at March 2012. This has provided a more
substantial buffer against potential losses, also in Moody's
stressed scenario.

Moody's also acknowledges the group's strong franchises in
several markets, including Italy, where the profitability of
UniCredit's commercial banking business has improved in 2011 and
into the first quarter of 2012. However, further improvements may
prove more challenging given the recession in Italy.

Important elements that limited the lowering of BCA to one notch
only are (i) the resilience of the group's profitability,
stemming from its wide geographic and business-line
diversification; and (ii) the strengthening of capital adequacy,
after the recent capital raising.

UniCredit's A3 long-term deposit and debt rating is now at the
same level as the Italian sovereign, and benefits from a very
high expectation of systemic support, resulting in a two notch
uplift from the BCA. The outlook on the A3 long-term deposit
rating is negative, reflecting both the negative outlook on the
Italian government bond rating, and the negative outlook on
UniCredit's standalone BFSR.

INTESA SANPAOLO

Intesa Sanpaolo's standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR) was downgraded to C- (mapping to a standalone credit
assessment of baa1) from C+/a2. At the same time, Moody's
downgraded Intesa's long- and short-term debt and deposit ratings
to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1, directly following
the downgrade of Intesa's standalone BFSR. The outlook on the C-
standalone BFSR and on the the A3 long-term deposit rating is
negative.

Moody's says that the downgrade of Intesa's BFSR to C-/baa1 from
C+/a2 reflects the significant deterioration in the operating
environment within Italy since the middle of 2011 and the
negative effects this is having on Italian banks' profitability,
asset quality and access to market funding. This is highly
relevant for Intesa, given its high focus on domestic business.

The Italian economy is now in recession, and economic conditions
are unlikely to significantly improve for some time. Intesa's
asset quality continued to decline during 2011 and this is likely
to deteriorate further in 2012. Moody's said that it believes
that the weak performance of its asset quality combined with the
fragile economic conditions may lead to weaker profitability
during 2012.

Moody's notes that Intesa has a strong retail funding base and a
substantial portfolio of ECB eligible assets, which are
sufficient to cover wholesale maturities for a period
significantly in excess of 12 months. However, the rating agency
notes that there is a risk that restricted and costly market
access will continue for an extended period. As a result,
uncertainty regarding when Intesa will again be able to fund
itself regularly -- and on an economic basis -- is a key credit
risk and an important rating driver.

In terms of capital adequacy, Moody's notes that this was
considerably strengthened by the EUR5 billion capital increase
completed in 2011, with a Core Tier 1 ratio of 10.1% at 2011
year-end, providing the bank with an adequate resilience to both
the rating agency's anticipated and stressed scenarios.
Furthermore, and importantly, Moody's also acknowledges Intesa's
leading and well diversified franchise in Italy, which supports
the standalone credit assessment at its current level.

Moody's adds that the difficult prospects for profitability and
asset quality -- and the uncertainties regarding market access --
are important drivers underlying the negative outlook for the C-
standalone BFSR.

Intesa's A3 long-term deposit rating is now at the same level as,
and constrained by, the Italian sovereign rating. The A3 long-
term deposit rating benefits from a very high expectation of
systemic support, providing one notch of rating uplift from the
baa1 standalone credit assessment. The outlook on the A3 long-
term deposit and debt ratings is negative, reflecting the
negative outlook on the Italian government bond rating, and on
Intesa's standalone BFSR.

BANCA IMI

Banca IMI's long- and short-term debt and deposit ratings were
downgraded to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from A2/Prime-1, directly
following the downgrade of the ratings of its parent Intesa
Sanpaolo (Intesa). The outlook on the bank's C- standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR), mapping to a standalone credit
assessment of baa2, was changed to negative from stable.

Intesa Sanpaolo's standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR) was downgraded to C- (mapping to a standalone credit
assessment of baa1) from C+/a2, while its long- and short-term
debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A3/Prime-2,
respectively, from A2/Prime-1.

The downgrade of Banca IMI's deposit ratings reflects the lower
capability of Intesa to provide support, as evidenced by the
downgrade of its own standalone BFSR and long-term deposit
ratings. Banca IMI's A3 long-term deposit rating benefits from a
very high expectation of parental support, providing two notches
of rating uplift from its baa2 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for Banca IMI's standalone BFSR was changed to
negative from stable, reflecting the challenges for profitability
and asset quality arising from the difficult operating
environment within Italy. The outlook for the bank's A3 long-term
deposit rating is negative, reflecting the negative outlook on
its standalone BFSR, and also the negative outlook on the long-
term deposit rating of its parent and support provider, Intesa.

BANCA CR FIRENZE

Banca CR Firenze's (Carifirenze) long- and short-term debt and
deposit ratings were downgraded to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from
A2/Prime-1, directly following the downgrade of the ratings of
its parent Intesa Sanpaolo (Intesa). The outlook on the bank's C-
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR), mapping to a
standalone credit assessment of baa2, was changed to negative
from stable.

Intesa Sanpaolo's standalone bank financial strength rating
(BFSR) was downgraded to C- (mapping to a standalone credit
assessment of baa1) from C+/a2, while its long- and short-term
debt and deposit ratings were downgraded to A3/Prime-2,
respectively, from A2/Prime-1.

The downgrade of Carifirenze's deposit ratings reflects the lower
capability of Intesa to provide support, as evidenced by the
downgrade of its own standalone BFSR and long-term deposit
ratings. Carifirenze's A3 long-term deposit rating benefits from
a very high expectation of parental support, providing two
notches of rating uplift from its baa2 standalone credit
assessment.

The outlook for Carifirenze's standalone BFSR was changed to
negative from stable, reflecting the challenges for profitability
and asset quality arising from the difficult operating
environment within Italy. The outlook for the bank's A3 long-term
deposit rating is negative, reflecting the negative outlook on
its standalone BFSR, and also the negative outlook on the long-
term deposit rating of its parent and support provider, Intesa.

BANCA MONTE PARMA

Banca Monte Parma's long-term deposit rating was downgraded to
Baa1 from A3, directly following the downgrade of the ratings of
its parent Intesa Sanpaolo (Intesa). The outlook on the bank's D+
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR), mapping to a
standalone credit assessment of baa3, was changed to negative
from stable.

Intesa's standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) was
downgraded to C- (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of
baa1) from C+/a2, while its long- and short-term debt and deposit
ratings were downgraded to A3/Prime-2, respectively, from
A2/Prime-1.

The downgrade of Banca Monte Parma's long-term deposit rating
reflects the lower capability of Intesa to provide support, as
evidenced by the downgrade of its own standalone BFSR and long-
term deposit ratings. Banca Monte Parma's Baa1 long-term deposit
rating benefits from a very high expectation of parental support,
providing two notches of rating uplift from its baa3 standalone
credit assessment.

The outlook for Banca Monte Parma's standalone BFSR was changed
to negative from stable, reflecting the challenges for
profitability and asset quality arising from the difficult
operating environment within Italy. The outlook for the bank's
Baa1 long-term deposit rating is negative, reflecting the
negative outlook on its standalone BFSR, and also the negative
outlook on the long-term deposit rating of its parent and support
provider, Intesa.

BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Banca Monte dei Paschi
di Siena's (MPS) standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR)
to D, mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba2, from D+ /
baa3, its long-term debt and deposit ratings to Baa3 from Baa1
and its short-term debt and deposit ratings to Prime-3 from
Prime-2. The outlook on all ratings is negative.

Moody's says that the lowering of MPS' standalone credit
assessment reflects pressures on financial fundamentals arising
from the difficult operating environment in Italy and the impact
of restricted and costly access to market funding. In particular,
Moody's notes MPS' increased capital needs deriving from the
European Banking Authority's (EBA) requirement that the bank
cover its sovereign exposures by June 2012, as well as the
challenges the bank has in meeting these capital requirements.
MPS' asset quality has deteriorated significantly (to 12.1%
Problem Loans/Gross Loans in 2011) and Moody's expects this trend
to continue, whereas profitability is weak and likely to come
under further pressure this year, exposing MPS' vulnerability to
Moody's stress scenario.

MPS' funding profile also shows some heightened reliance on
wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio stands at
11%), with a significant reliance on foreign investors. Due to
the restricted market access, MPS' reliance on ECB funding has
increased substantially, whereas Moody's liquidity-gap analysis
over a 12 month horizon suggests a significant dependence on ECB
funding. In combination, these factors have largely contributed
to the two-notch lowering of MPS' standalone credit assessment to
ba2.

The bank's national market share remains the key factor
underpinning Moody's standalone credit assessment at its current
level.

The Baa3 long-term deposit rating benefits from Moody's very high
expectation of systemic support, providing two notches of uplift
from the ba2 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook on all ratings is negative, reflecting the
challenging operating environment and uncertainties on covering
the bank's capital needs and future market access.

MPS CAPITAL SERVICES

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the standalone BFSR of
MPS Capital Services (MPSCS) to D- (mapping to a standalone
credit assessment of ba3) from D+/ ba1. At the same time, Moody's
downgraded MPSCS's long-term deposit ratings to Baa3 from Baa2
and its short-term deposit ratings to Prime-3 from Prime-2. The
outlook on the aforementioned ratings is negative, in line with
the parent (Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena).

According to Moody's, the two-notch downward adjustment of the
standalone credit assessment to ba3 primarily reflects the bank's
weak asset quality, which exposes the bank's vulnerability to
Moody's stress scenario.

Moody's also acknowledges the bank's integration with and ongoing
funding from the parent, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS),
underpinning the D-/ba3 standalone ratings

MPSCS's Baa3 long-term deposit rating benefits from three-notch
uplift from Moody's assessment of the very high probability of
support from the parent Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS,
rated Baa3; D/ba2) in the event of a crisis.

The outlook on all ratings is negative, in line with the parent.

BANCO POPOLARE SOCIETA' COOPERATIVA

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long- and short-term
deposit ratings of Banco Popolare (BP) to Baa3/Prime-3 (negative
outlook) from Baa2/Prime-2. Concurrently, BP's standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) was confirmed at D+, but the
standalone credit assessment was lowered to ba1 (formerly baa3).

Moody's says that key drivers of the one-notch lowering of the
standalone credit assessment are pressures on capital, asset
quality and internal capital generation stemming from the
challenging operating environment and the impact of restricted
and costly access to market funding. In particular, Moody's notes
that BP has a low (7.3%) Core Tier 1 ratio and displays a capital
shortfall in relation to the higher capital requirements (9%)
mandated by the European Banking Authority (EBA) -- to which it
must comply with by end-June 2012.

Moody's believes BP should be able to reach the 9% EBA target, as
it largely depends on regulatory approval of the Advanced
Internal Ratings Based (AIRB) model. Asset quality and internal
capital generation are both modest and unlikely to improve in
2012. However, despite the lower capital levels than similar
rated peers, BP is less sensitive, but still vulnerable, under
Moody's stress scenarios. The bank's relatively high reliance on
market funds (and a largely international investor base) caused a
recent surge in ECB reliance, highlighting the bank's funding
vulnerabilities and exposing it to a significant deleveraging or
an ongoing reliance on ECB funding in the case that funding
markets do not normalize soon, with both scenarios containing
risks and potentially contributing to further negative ratings
pressure.

BP's Baa3 long-term debt and deposit ratings benefit from a one-
notch uplift from the bank's standalone credit assessment based
on Moody's assessment of a high probability of systemic support.

The outlook is negative reflecting the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access.

BANCA ITALEASE

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term deposit
ratings of Banca Italease (Italease) to Ba1 from Baa3 and its
short-term deposit ratings to Not-Prime from Prime-3. The
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) -- which was not
subject to the rating review -- remains at E+, mapping to a
standalone credit assessment of b1.

Moody's says that the downgrade of Italease's Ba1 long-term
deposit rating follows the one-notch downgrade of the parent
Banco Popolare (rated Baa3; D+/ba1), reducing the parental
support uplift from the standalone credit assessment to three
notches (from four notches).

The outlook on all Italease's ratings is negative, in line with
the parent, but also reflecting the bank's relatively high
standalone rating positioning at E+/b1 for a company in run-off
situation.

UNIONE DI BANCHE ITALIANE

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) of Unione di Banche Italiane
(UBI) to D+ with a negative outlook (mapping to a standalone
credit assessment of baa3), from C- / baa1 and its long-term
global local currency (GLC) deposit rating to Baa2 (negative
outlook) from A3.

Moody's says that the downgrade of the standalone BFSR reflects
pressures on capital and profitability from the difficult
operating environment and the impact of restricted and costly
access to market funding. Moody's acknowledges UBI's capital
needs to comply with the more stringent standards of the European
Banking Authority (EBA), and the current ratings incorporate the
expectation that UBI will achieve compliance with the 9% EBA
target. Profitability is low and has deteriorated more than some
of its peers, and is likely to come under further pressure in
2012, exposing UBI's vulnerability under Moody's stress scenario.

UBI's funding profile also shows some heightened reliance on
wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio stands at
8.4%), with a meaningful reliance on foreign investors. Due to
the restricted market access, UBI's reliance on ECB funding has
increased to a significant level.

In combination, these factors have largely contributed to the
downgrade of UBI's standalone ratings to D+/baa3.

Moody's also notes the bank's strong market shares, which support
the baa3 standalone credit assessment.

UBI's long-term global local currency (GLC) deposit rating is at
the Baa2 level, based on Moody's assessment of a high probability
of systemic support, which results in one-notch uplift from the
baa3 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook on all ratings is negative, reflecting the
challenging operating environment and uncertainties on future.

BANCA POPOLARE DI MILANO

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the subordinated and
Tier III debt and MTN program ratings of Banca Popolare di Milano
to Ba2 (from Ba1) and its junior subordinated MTN program rating
to (P)Ba3 (from (P)Ba2). All other ratings and negative outlook
are unaffected by this rating action.

Moody's says that the downgrade reflects the removal of the
systemic support uplift (one notch in the bank's case) from
subordinated and Tier III and notch widening for junior
subordinated debt rating, in line with other Italian banks.

BANCA CARIGE

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the following ratings of
Banca Carige (Carige): its standalone bank financial strength
rating (BFSR) to D+ from C- (the standalone BFSR now maps to a
standalone credit assessment of baa3, formerly baa2). At the same
time, Carige's long-term deposit ratings were downgraded to Baa2
from Baa1. The aforementioned ratings now carry a negative
outlook.

Moody's says that the key drivers for the one-notch downgrade of
the standalone BFSR are pressure on capital from the challenging
operating environment and the impact of restricted and costly
access to market funding. Carige reported a very low 6.7% Core
Tier 1 ratio, exposing the bank's vulnerability to Moody's stress
scenario; however, Moody's understands that a strengthening of
this ratio is likely during 2012 through valorisation of
goodwill. Carige's funding profile shows lower-than peers
reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio
stands at 1.1%), with a moderate reliance on foreign investors.
And even though Carige's reliance on ECB funding has increased
due to the restricted market access, Moody's believes this is
more manageable than for many of its peers whose dependence has
become much more significant.

In Moody's opinion, the rating is underpinned by the bank's 25-
30% market shares in Carige's home region, contributing to
adequate profitability, which is more resilient than peers.

In combination, these factors have limited the extent of the
downgrade to one notch and a standalone rating at D+/baa3, higher
than many of its peers.

The outlook on all ratings is nevertheless negative, reflecting
the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding
future market access which may continue to place pressure also on
Banca Carige.

CREDITO EMILIANO

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) of Credito Emiliano (Credem) to
D+ (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of baa3), from C-
/baa1). At the same time, its long-term deposit ratings were
downgraded to Baa2 from A3. The outlook on all ratings is
negative.

According to Moody's, the key drivers for the one-notch downgrade
of the BFSR reflect pressure on capital from the difficult
operating environment and the impact of restricted and costly
access to market funding. Credem's Italian government bond
portfolio is larger than average, which, together with the bank's
exposure to small and medium-sized enterprises, renders Credem
vulnerable under Moody's adverse scenario analysis, which factors
in a mark-to-market stressed valuation loss on holdings of
sovereign bonds.

Moody's notes that Credem's funding profile also shows some
heightened reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted
liquidity ratio stands at 4.8%), with a low reliance on foreign
investors. Due to restricted market access, Credem's reliance on
ECB funding has increased substantially whereas Moody's
liquidity-gap analysis over a 12 month horizon suggests a
significant dependence on ECB funding.

In combination, these factors have largely contributed to the
downgrade of Credem's standalone BFSR.

In Moody's opinion, the rating is supported by Credem's
satisfactory asset quality and profitability, which indicates a
somewhat greater resilience of Credem against the pressures from
the operating environment than its lower-rated peers.

Credem's Baa2 long-term deposit ratings benefit from a one-notch
uplift from the bank's standalone credit assessment based on
Moody's assessment of a moderate probability of systemic support.

The outlook on all ratings is negative, reflecting the
challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding
future market access.

CREDITO VALTELLINESE

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Credito Valtellinese's
(Creval) standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D+
(mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba1) from C- /
baa2, its long-term deposit ratings to Baa3 from Baa1 and its
short-term deposit ratings to Prime-3 from Prime-2.

Moody's says that the key drivers of the BFSR downgrade were
pressure on the bank's asset quality arising from the difficult
operating environment and the impact of restricted and costly
access to market funding. Moody's believes Creval has modest
asset quality coupled with a low capital adequacy, even
considering the conversion of a convertible bond in May 2012,
which expose the bank's vulnerability under Moody's stressed
scenario. Creval's funding profile also shows some heightened
reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio
stands at 10%), with a low reliance on foreign investors. Due to
restricted market access, Creval's reliance on ECB funding has
increased substantially.

In combination, these factors have largely contributed to the
downgrade of Creval's standalone BFSR.

In Moody's opinion, the rating is supported by Creval's
profitability, which is more resilient than that of peers, and
largely due to lower goodwill impairment than larger banks.

Creval's Baa3 long-term deposit ratings benefit from a one-notch
uplift from the bank's standalone credit assessment based on
Moody's assessment of a moderate probability of systemic support.

The outlook is negative reflecting the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access.

BANCA DELLE MARCHE

Banca delle Marche's standalone BFSR was downgraded to D (mapping
to a ba2 standalone credit assessment) from C-, mapping to baa2.
Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to
Ba1/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa1/Prime-1.

The lowering of the standalone credit strength reflects the
challenges the bank faces -- caused by restricted and more
expensive wholesale funding -- as well as the pressures on
profitability and asset quality arising from the Italian banking
system's difficult operating environment. Banca delle Marche's
asset quality declined sharply during 2011, and there is
potential for it to deteriorate further in 2012. As of year-end
2011, problem loans as percentage of gross loans stood at 12.2%
(2011: 8.3%), which is significantly worse than average, and in
the current conditions, there seems little prospect for
improvement in profitability or asset quality in the next 12
months. The recent capital increase, completed in Q1 2012,
increases the bank's Tier 1 ratio to about 8.3% (from 7.2% at
year-end 2011) and provides an additional buffer for potential
credit losses. Funding remains restricted and more costly.
Moody's notes that Banca delle Marche's use of central bank
funding is higher than its peers. However, this is partly
mitigated by the bank's solid retail funding base -- which
provides about 70% of the bank's total funding -- as well as a
sufficient central bank eligible assets portfolio.

The Ba1 long-term deposit rating benefits from a moderate
likelihood of systemic support, providing one notch of uplift
from the ba2 standalone credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank's ratings is negative. The negative
outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The
negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the
negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

BANCA SELLA HOLDING

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Banca Sella's (Sella)
standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR) to D+ (mapping
to a standalone credit assessment of ba1) from C- / baa2 and the
bank's long- and short-term deposit ratings to Baa3/Prime-3 from
Baa1/Prime-2. The outlook is negative.

Moody's says that the standalone BFSR's downgrade captures
Sella's weak internal capital generation, low capital and modest
asset quality, together exposing Sella's vulnerability under
Moody's stress scenario.

However, Moody's notes the bank's above-average retail funding
and revenue diversification. Sella's funding profile shows lower-
than peers reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted
liquidity ratio stands at negative 1.1%), with a low reliance on
foreign investors. Due to restricted market access, Sella's
reliance on ECB funding has however increased whereas Moody's
liquidity-gap analysis over a 12 month horizon suggests a lower
than peers dependence on ECB funding. Profitability, although
modest, has deteriorated less than Italian peers.

In combination, these factors have largely contributed to the
downgrade of Sella's standalone financial strength rating.

Sella's long term global local currency (GLC) deposit rating is
Baa3, based on Moody's expectation of a moderate probability of
systemic support, providing a one notch uplift.

The outlook is negative reflecting the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access.

ICCREA BANCAIMPRESA

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Iccrea BancaImpresa's
(Iccrea BI, formerly Banca Agrileasing) standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) to D (mapping to a standalone credit
assessment of ba2) from D+/ba1, its long-term debt and deposit
ratings to Ba1 from Baa2 and its short-term debt and deposit
ratings to Not-Prime from Prime-2.

Moody's says that the key drivers for the downgrade of the BFSR
were the bank's weak asset quality and low profitability,
exposing the bank's sensitivity to Moody's stress scenario.

In Moody's opinion, the downgrade of the deposit rating is also a
reflection of Moody's assessment of its support provider, the
Italian co-operative credit banks (Banche di Credito Cooperativo
or BCCs, unrated) given pressure from the challenging operating
environment. This resulted in a one-notch reduction of the uplift
from the ba2 standalone credit assessment, beyond what Moody's
had initially anticipated.

The outlook on all ratings is now negative, reflecting the
difficult operating environment.

CASSA DI RISPARMIO DI BOLZANO

Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano's standalone BFSR was downgraded to
D+ (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba1) from C/
baa2. Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to
Ba1/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa2/Prime-2.

The lowering of the standalone credit assessment reflects the
challenges the bank faces -- caused by restricted and more
expensive wholesale funding, resulting in an increasing
dependence on ECB funding or in significant deleveraging pressure
if the bank was intending on reducing this funding -- as well as
the pressures on profitability and asset quality arising from the
Italian banking system's difficult operating environment. The
bank is planning to increase its capital; this would provide an
additional buffer against further credit losses, and enable the
bank's capital to withstand Moody's anticipated stress scenario.
However, capital would remain vulnerable in Moody's stress
scenario.

The Ba1 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood
of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba1 standalone
credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank's ratings is negative. The negative
outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The
negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the
negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

CASSA DI RISPARMIO DI FERRARA

Moody's Investor Service has downgraded the junior subordinated
debt rating of Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara's to (P)B2 from
(P)B1.

Moody's says that the downgrade reflects the widening of the
notching to standalone credit assessment -- 2 notches, from
standalone credit assessment -1 notch, in line with other Italian
banks. This follows the removal of systemic support for
subordinated debt, which is now notched one notch below the
standalone rating of banks (but incorporating group or parental
support).

The outlook on the junior subordinated rating remains negative,
in line with the bank's standalone credit assessment of ba3.

BANCAPULIA

In May 2012, Moody's changed the outlook on BancApulia's ratings
to negative. The negative outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects
the challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding
future market access. The negative outlook on the long-term
deposit rating reflects the negative outlook on the standalone
BFSR.

BANCA POPOLARE DELL'ALTO ADIGE

Banca Popolare dell'Alto Adige's standalone BFSR was downgraded
to D+ (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba1) from C-/
baa1. Consequently, its long and short-term deposit ratings were
downgraded to Ba1/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa1/Prime-2.

The downgrade of the standalone credit assessment reflects the
bank's weak profitability, which will continue to be further
challenged given the weak operating environment, and scarce
availability of and high competition for cost-effective retail
funding and weakening asset quality. The downgrade also reflects
the wholesale funding reliance, resulting in increasing ECB
funding and which Moody's expects will increase further in the
coming 12 months. Capital adequacy withstands Moody's central
scenario, but remains vulnerable in the stressed scenario.

The Ba1 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood
of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba1 standalone
credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank's ratings is negative. The negative
outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The
negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the
negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

CASSA DI RISPARMIO DI CESENA

Cassa di Risparmio di Cesena's standalone BFSR was downgraded to
D- (mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba3) from D+ /
baa3. Consequently, its long and short-term deposit ratings were
downgraded to Ba3/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa3/Prime-3.

The downgrade of the standalone BFSR beyond initial expectations
reflects the bank's modest capital adequacy, as well as its weak
and deteriorating asset quality arising from the Italian banking
system's difficult operating environment, which exposes the
bank's vulnerability to Moody's scenario analysis, resulting in
significant lower capital levels in Moody's anticipated and to
capital shortfalls in Moody's stress scenario. The new rating
levels also take into consideration the bank's reliance on market
funds, resulting in an increasing dependence on ECB funding or in
significant deleveraging pressure if the ECB was intent on
reducing this funding.

The Ba3 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood
of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba3 standalone
credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank's ratings is negative. The negative
outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The
negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the
negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

BANCA POPOLARE DI CIVIDALE

Banca Popolare di Cividale's standalone BFSR was downgraded to D
(mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba2) from C-/baa1.
Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to
Ba2/Non-Prime respectively from Baa1/Prime-2.

The downgrade of the standalone BFSR reflects the funding
challenges the bank faces, with higher central bank funding use
relative to peers -- caused by restricted and more expensive
wholesale funding-- as well as pressure on its asset quality and
profitability (also due to the higher cost of retail funding).
The bank's use of central bank funding is above average and
Moody's expects this dependence to increase in the coming 12
months. However, this is partially mitigated by a sizeable and
increasing eligible assets portfolio.

The Ba2 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood
of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba2 standalone
credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank's ratings is negative. The negative
outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The
negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the
negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

CASSA DI RISPARMIO DELLA PROVINCIA DI CHIETI

Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Chieti's standalone BFSR
was downgraded to D- (mapping to a standalone credit assessment
of ba3) from D+/ baa3. Its long and short-term deposit ratings
were downgraded to Ba3/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa3/Prime-
3.

The downgrade of the standalone credit assessment below initial
expectations was triggered by the bank's weak and deteriorating
asset quality -- arising from the Italian banking system's
difficult operating environment -- as well as weak core
profitability and capital levels that could protect the bank
against asset quality pressures. Capital levels are only just
adequate under Moody's central scenario, but remain vulnerable in
the stress scenario.

The Ba3 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood
of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba3 standalone
credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank's ratings is negative. The negative
outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The
negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the
negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

BANCA POPOLARE DI SPOLETO

Banca Popolare di Spoleto's standalone BFSR was downgraded to D
(mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba2) from C-/baa1.
Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to
Ba2/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa1/Prime-2.

The lowering of the standalone credit assessment reflects the
bank's weak and deteriorating asset quality -- caused by the
challenging operating environment in the Italian banking system,
the bank's very weak profitability, with a loss recorded in 2011,
that will continue to weaken given scarcity of cost-effective
retail funding, as well as its dependence on ECB funding and
capital levels. Capital levels are declining, and while
sufficient under Moody's central scenario, are vulnerable in the
stress scenario. Another significant bank-specific rating driver
is Moody's view that BPS's risk profile could increase as a
result of the bank's growth strategy (announced in H1 2011 and
recently confirmed), which targets expansion outside of its
traditional territory, in Italy's major cities.

The combination of all these factors have lead to a four notch
lowering off the standalone credit assessment.

The Ba2 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood
of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba2 standalone
credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank's ratings is negative. The negative
outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The
negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the
negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

BANCA PADOVANA CREDITO COOPERATIVO

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the long-term deposit
ratings of Banca Padovana to Ba2 from Ba1. Banca Padovana's
standalone D- bank financial strength rating (BFSR) and its ba3
standalone credit assessment with a negative outlook were
unaffected. All ratings now carry a negative outlook.

Moody's says that the downgrade of Banca Padovana's long-term
rating reflects Moody's assessment of its support provider, the
group of Italian banche di credito cooperativo (BCCs, unrated),
given the pressure from the challenging operating environment.
This resulted in a reduction of the uplift provided to the bank's
long-term rating to one from two notches.

The outlook is negative, reflecting the significant challenges of
turning around the bank in a difficult operating environment.

BANCA POPOLARE DI MAROSTICA

Banca Popolare di Marostica's standalone BFSR was downgraded to D
(mapping to a standalone credit assessment of ba2) from C-, baa2.
Its long and short-term deposit ratings were downgraded to
Ba2/Non-Prime, respectively, from Baa2/Prime-2.

The downgrade of the standalone BFSR reflects the bank's weak and
deteriorating asset quality -- arising from the Italian banking
system's difficult operating environment -- low funding
diversification, as well as the continued integration and de-
risking challenges stemming from the bank's acquisition of Banca
Treviso. Low funding diversification has resulted in a relatively
low central bank eligible assets portfolio which makes the bank
vulnerable in a liquidity stress scenario and in the medium term
will weigh on profitability given the increase of retail funding
costs. Capital adequacy is sufficient to withstand both Moody's
central and stress scenario analysis.

The Ba1 long-term deposit rating benefits from a low likelihood
of systemic support, providing no uplift from the ba1 standalone
credit assessment.

The outlook for the bank's ratings is negative. The negative
outlook on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The
negative outlook on the long-term deposit rating reflects the
negative outlook on the standalone BFSR.

BANCA DELLA MARCA CREDITO COOPERATIVO

Moody's Investors Service has downgraded Banca della Marca
Credito Cooperativo's (Banca Marca) standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) to D+ (mapping to a standalone credit
assessment of ba1) from C-/baa1, its long-term deposit ratings to
Baa3 from A3 and its short-term deposit ratings to Prime-3 from
Prime-2.

Moody's says that the key reasons for the downgrade of the BFSR
were (i) the bank's asset-side vulnerability, stemming from its
small size and loan concentration and pressure on the bank's
profitability, which, although modest, deteriorated less than
peers. These factors expose the bank's sensitivity to Moody's
stress scenario; and (ii) the impact of restricted and costly
access to market funding.

In combination, the above factors have largely contributed to the
downgrade of the bank's standalone BFSR.

Moody's also acknowledges the bank's above-average retail funding
and capital. Banca Marca's funding profile shows lower-than peers
reliance on wholesale market funds (the adjusted liquidity ratio
stands effectively at zero), with a very low reliance on foreign
investors. Due to the restricted market access, Banca Marca's
reliance on ECB funding has however increased whereas Moody's
liquidity-gap analysis over a 12 month horizon suggests a lower
than peers dependence on ECB funding.

The Baa3 long-term deposit rating benefits from Moody's
expectation of moderate support from the Italian co-operative
credit banks (Banche di Credito Cooperativo or BCCs, unrated),
providing one notch of uplift from the ba1 standalone credit
assessment.

The outlook on all ratings is negative, reflecting the
challenging operating environment and uncertainty regarding
future market access.

MEDIOCREDITO TRENTINO-ALTO ADIGE

In May 2012, Moody's lowered the standalone credit assessment of
Mediocredito Trentino Alto Adige to ba1 from baa3, within the
standalone D+ BFSR category. The bank's long and short-term
deposit ratings were downgraded to Baa1/Prime 2, respectively,
from A2/Prime-1.

The lowering of the standalone credit assessment reflects the
challenges caused by restricted and more expensive wholesale
funding access, as well as challenges that this presents to
MTAA's business model. The liquidity-gap analysis over a 12-month
period reveals a significant dependence on central bank and
shareholder funding.

The downgrade of the long-term deposit ratings reflects:

(i) The lower ba1 standalone credit assessment.

(ii) The downgrade on 15 February 2012 of the Autonomous Province
of Trento and Autonomous Province of Bolzano to A1 (outlook
negative) from Aa3. The Autonomous Province of Trento and
Autonomous Province of Bolzano -- together with the Autonomous
Region of Trentino Alto Adige -- own a controlling 52.5% stake in
MTAA. MTAA's ratings, which benefit from uplift from regional
government support from these entities, are sensitive to any
change in their ratings, and subsequently their ability to
provide support to MTAA, if required.

(iii) A reassessment of the local-government support assumptions
that Moody's currently incorporates into MTAA's deposit ratings,
to reflect the evolving support environment across Europe.

The outlook for these ratings is negative. The negative outlook
on the standalone BFSR reflects the challenging operating
environment and uncertainty regarding future market access. The
negative outlook on the long-term ratings reflects the negative
outlook on the standalone BFSR, as well as the negative outlook
on the two support providers, the Autonomous Province of Trento
and Autonomous Province of Bolzano.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


INEOS GROUP: Moody's Rates US$775MM Senior Secured Notes 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned a definitive B1 rating to
the new US$775 million of senior secured notes due in 2020 issued
by Ineos Group Holdings S.A., and to the group's new cov-lite
Term Loan B, comprising (i) a six-year tranche denominated in
euros and US dollars (Eur 500 million and US$2 billion
respectively) and (ii) a three-year tranche denominated in US
dollars only (US$375 million).

In addition, Moody's has downgraded Ineos's other existing senior
secured notes to B1 from Ba3, and has withdrawn the rating on the
group's outstanding bank facilities (Term Loan C and D and the
group's revolving credit facility), which the issuer has fully
refinanced with the proceeds of the new notes and Term Loan B.
The Caa1 rating on the senior unsecured notes due 2016 is
unaffected by the rating announcements.

At the same time, Moody's has affirmed the B2 corporate family
rating (CFR) and the positive outlook on all ratings.

Ratings Rationale

The positive outlook on Ineos's B2 CFR reflects the expected
benefits of the successfully closed refinancing on the group's
financial profile. Specifically, the refinancing has addressed
some of Moody's main concerns regarding the high vulnerability of
Ineos's current capital structure in the event of a downturn,
especially given the tight financial covenants which were
attached to all the group's bank facilities -- now entirely
refinanced - and several other restrictive covenants that lenders
imposed on the issuer during the recent severe recession.

Moody's considers that the refinancing allows Ineos to (i)
achieve a much higher degree of financial flexibility; and (ii)
further improve its debt maturity profile:

The refinancing provides Ineos with enhanced financial
flexibility given that it removes (i) maintenance financial
covenants; and (ii) the previous margin ratchet feature of the
group's refinanced bank debt, which in the past led to escalating
funding costs when leverage ratios were high.

The refinancing further extends Ineos's debt maturity profile,
which had included the repayment in full of its revolving credit
facility due in 2013, its term loan C due in 2014 and the second-
lien tranche -- term loan D - due in 2015. The new debt
instruments therefore remove Ineos's refinancing risks in 2013
and 2014 and, in Moody's view, reduces it in 2015, when the
group's first senior secured notes come due, together with the
US$375 million three-year sub-tranche of the new Term Loan B.
Moody's positively notes that the amount of this new sub-tranche
is relatively modest compared with the amount of the second lien
tranche due in 2015 - EUR650 million -- which has been fully
refinanced. While addressing some of Moody's previous concerns
about Ineos's capital structure, these positive developments will
allow management to better focus on the further development of
the group's core business strategy, which in the past was
partially constrained by several restrictive covenants under the
senior facility agreement.

However, Moody's affirmation of the B2 CFR reflects that Ineos
remains constrained by its high level of financial debt, both in
absolute terms and relative to the group's EBITDA. This is
despite the group having achieved a material reduction in its
debt in 2011 by using the cash proceeds resulting from the sale
of 50% of its refining division to Petrochina to form a new joint
venture. In particular, Moody's notes that Ineos's financial debt
will increase further as a result of the announced refinancing,
in view of the group's plans to replace the revolving credit
facility with a cash overfund in excess of EUR600 million. Ineos
has created this cash overfund by issuing more debt than the
amount that was strictly needed to refinance the bank facilities
and cover transaction costs. The rating agency is concerned that
this additional debt would result in Ineos incurring higher
financial charges, thereby reducing the positive deleveraging
impact of the Petrochina deal closed last year.

Nevertheless, the risks associated with Ineos's higher debt
level, its higher associated costs and the removal of the
revolving credit facility as a committed external source of
liquidity are more than adequately offset by (i) the group's
materially reduced refinancing risks over the coming years; and
(ii) its cash overfund mechanism. Moody's expects that the cash
overfund created through the refinancing will have the same
purpose as the revolving credit facility, i.e., to mainly fund
working-capital-related swings and cash collateralization of
letters of credit and guarantees. At the same time, the cash
overfund would have an advantage over the revolving credit
facility as it would offer Ineos unrestricted access to liquidity
when urgently needed. This contrasts with the arrangement with
the revolving credit facility, whereby the group had to pass
strict financial covenants tests in order to be able to
continuously use it.

Moody's believes that the size of the cash overfund, together
with the continuous availability of the EUR1.2 billion under the
outstanding securitization facility (which will only expire in
December 2014), will be more than adequate to address liquidity
needs associated with working capital over the coming several
quarters. At the same time, Ineos's ability to continue to
generate robust operating cash flows will provide sufficient
headroom to accommodate a more ambitious capital expenditure
(capex) plan than in the past, especially considering several
organic growth projects that the group intends to execute in 2012
and 2013. However, despite a possible material increase in capex
over the coming quarters, Moody's believes that Ineos will (i)
continue to generate positive free cash flows; and (ii) retain
sufficient flexibility to reduce or postpone capex, should it
need to do so to address an unforeseen deterioration in the
operating environment that leads to bottom-of-cycle
profitability.

WHAT COULD CHANGE THE RATING UP/DOWN

Moody's would consider upgrading Ineos's rating in the event that
the group achieves a material reduction in its gross amount of
debt, which would lead to improved leverage, with a net
debt/EBITDA ratio below 4.0x. This would also imply the
maintenance of a strong liquidity profile, with no or limited
erosion in the cash buffer created via the refinancing. An
upgrade of the rating would also require Ineos to display an
interest coverage ratio that is comfortably above 2.75x, as well
a retained cash flow (RCF)/debt ratio that is above 10% on a
sustained basis.

Negative rating pressure, although unlikely at this stage, could
arise in the event of the group suffering a material
deterioration in operating performance, leading to (i) a
sustained weakness in cash flow generation, with RCF/debt falling
to the low single digits in percentage terms; (ii) weaker debt
coverage metrics, with net debt/EBITDA deteriorating above 5.0x.
Moreover, the ratings could also come under negative pressure in
the event of sustained negative free cash flow generation
materially weakening Ineos's liquidity profile.

Principal Methodology

The principal methodology used in rating Ineos Group Holdings plc
was the Global Chemical Industry Rating Methodology, published in
December 2009. Other methodologies used include Loss Given
Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the
U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009.

Ineos Group Holdings S.A. was established in 1998 via a
management buy-out -- which was led by Mr Ratcliffe, who is now
chairman of Ineos -- of the former BP petrochemicals asset in
Antwerp. The group has subsequently grown through a series of
acquisitions and at the end of 2005 acquired Innovene Inc., a
100% subsidiary of BP, in a US$9 billion buyout, transforming
Ineos into one of the world's largest chemical companies
(measured by turnover). In 2011, Ineos reported a turnover of
EUR17.6 billion and EBITDA (excluding the discontinued refining
division) of EUR1.71 billion.


INTELSAT SA: Receives Additional Tenders of US$1.5MM 9 1/2% Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Intelsat Jackson Holdings S.A. commenced tender offers to
purchase for cash any and all of its outstanding US$701,913,000
aggregate principal amount of 9 1/2% Senior Notes due 2016 and up
to US$470,000,000 aggregate principal amount of its outstanding
US$1,048,220,000 aggregate principal amount of 11 1/4% Senior
Notes due 2016.  On April 26, 2012, Intelsat Jackson purchased
US$48,042,000 aggregate principal amount of the 9 1/2% Notes and
US$10,059,000 aggregate principal amount of the 11 1/4% Notes, in
each case that were tendered prior to 5:00 p.m. New York City
time on Wednesday, April 25, 2012, pursuant to the Tender Offers.
Each of the Tender Offers expired at 12:00 midnight, New York
City time on Wednesday, May 9, 2012.

On May 10, 2012, Intelsat Jackson was advised by Global
Bondholder Services Corporation, as the depositary for the Tender
Offers, that after the Early Tender Time and prior to the
Expiration Time, Intelsat Jackson had received tenders of an
additional US$1,502,000 aggregate principal amount of the 9 1/2%
Notes and no additional tenders of the 11 1/4% Notes pursuant to
the Tender Offers. Including accrued and unpaid interest, on
May 10, 2012, Intelsat Jackson paid US$1,618,305 in consideration
for the 9 1/2% Notes tendered after the Early Tender Time and
prior to the Expiration Time.

                          About Intelsat

Intelsat S.A., formerly Intelsat, Ltd., provides fixed-satellite
communications services worldwide through a global communications
network of 54 satellites in orbit as of Dec. 31, 2009, and ground
facilities related to the satellite operations and control, and
teleport services.  It had US$2.5 billion in revenue in 2009.

Washington D.C.-based Intelsat Corporation, formerly known as
PanAmSat Corporation, is a fully integrated subsidiary of
Intelsat S.A., its indirect parent.  Intelsat Corp. had US$7.70
billion in assets against US$4.86 billion in debts as of Dec. 31,
2010.

The Company reported a net loss of US$433.99 million in 2011, a
net loss of US$507.77 million in 2010, and a net loss of
US$782.06 million in 2009.

The Company's balance sheet at March 31, 2012, showed US$17.40
billion in total assets, US$18.52 billion in total liabilities,
US$49.51 million in noncontrolling interest and a US$1.16 billion
total Intelsat S.A. shareholder's deficit.

                          *     *     *

Luxembourg-based Intelsat S.A. carries 'B' issuer credit ratings
from Standard & Poor's.  It has 'Caa1' corporate family and
probability of default ratings from Moody's Investors Service.


MAGIC NEWCO: S&P Assigns Preliminary 'B' Corp. Credit Rating
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its preliminary 'B'
corporate credit rating to Magic Newco 2 S.a.r.l. The outlook is
stable.

"At the same time, we assigned our preliminary 'B+' issue rating
to the $1.06 billion senior secured loan and to a revolving
credit facility of up to US$125 million; and our preliminary
'CCC+' issue rating to the US$615 million unsecured loan to be
issued by subsidiaries of Magic Newco 2," S&P said.

"The final ratings will depend on the receipt and satisfactory
review of all final transaction documentation. Accordingly, the
preliminary ratings should not be construed as evidence of the
final ratings. If we do not receive the final documentation
within a reasonable time frame, or if the final documentation
departs from the materials we have already reviewed, we reserve
the right to withdraw or revise our ratings," S&P said.

"The ratings on Magic Newco 2 reflect our anticipation that it
will assume a material amount of debt and therefore will become
highly leveraged on completion of its acquisition of U.K.-based
software company Misys PLC," S&P said.

"The ratings are also based on our anticipation that, despite
significant deleveraging prospects over the medium term, Magic
Newco 2's financial risk profile will remain 'highly leveraged',
and our view of its financial policy as aggressive on account of
its ownership by a private equity fund. Furthermore, we consider
Magic Newco 2 to be highly exposed to financial institutions,
which, in view of the weak macroeconomic conditions across
Europe, could reduce Information Technology budgets for the
group's European domiciled clients," S&P said.

"These weaknesses are partially offset by our anticipation that
the combined group will hold a solid position in the global
treasury, risk management, and core banking software markets, and
have significant potential for cost cutting over the next couple
of years. Furthermore, we anticipate that the group will have a
relatively high share of recurring maintenance revenues and an
'adequate' liquidity profile under our criteria, resulting from
what we see as adequate cash flow generation and minimal annual
debt amortization scheduled over the next six years," S&P said.

"We assess the group's business risk profile as 'fair', supported
by the combined group's leading market positions in its treasury
and risk management software solutions markets and the solid
position of the group's core banking solutions, demonstrated by
its high market share, extensive product portfolio compared with
peers, highly diversified geographic footprint and high retention
rates," S&P said.

"The preliminary issue ratings on the US$1,060 million equivalent
first lien bank facilities and revolving credit facility is 'B+,'
one notch above the corporate credit rating on Magic Newco 2. The
preliminary recovery rating on the senior secured facilities is
'2,' indicating our expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default," S&P said.

"The preliminary issue rating on the US$615 million unsecured
term loan is 'CCC+', two notches below the corporate credit
rating on Magic Newco 2. The preliminary recovery rating on the
loan is '6' indicating our expectation of negligible (0%-10%)
recovery prospects in the event of a payment default," S&P said.

"Recovery prospects for the first lien bank debt are supported by
our valuation of the company as a going concern, based on the
significant barriers to exit for existing customers and our view
of the relatively creditor-friendly jurisdiction in the U.K. On
the other hand, we believe that the recovery ratings are
constrained by potential integration risk of combining the two
entities and the multijurisdictional nature of the group's
operations and assets. We see potential ratings upside on the
recovery rating on the first lien facilities over the medium term
if integration risk falls away," S&P said.

"We value Magic Newco as a going concern, in view of the
company's existing customer relationships and our view of the
significant barriers to exit for existing customers to transfer
to alternative providers. We envisage a stressed enterprise value
of about US$1.14 billion, which is equivalent to a 6.0x stressed
EBITDA multiple. Our recovery analysis and stressed enterprise
value is neutral to the accounting treatment of research and
development costs," S&P said.

"After deducting priority liabilities, mainly comprising of
enforcement costs, and 50% of the unfunded pension deficit, we
arrive at a net enterprise value of about US$1.0 billion for
first lien lenders. We envisage $1.18 billion of first lien debt
(including a fully drawn revolver and six months prepetition
interest). This equates to recovery prospects of between 70%-90%,
and leaves no value for the unsecured lenders, where we see
negligible (0%-10%) recovery prospects for unsecured lenders,"
S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our anticipation of stable revenue
growth and an increase of the EBITDA margin toward the high 20%
to low 30% range. The outlook also reflects our anticipation that
Magic Newco 2 will maintain an 'adequate' liquidity position and
cash EBITDA interest coverage of about 2.0x," S&P said.

"We believe that rating downside is currently limited due to our
assessment of the company's 'fair' business risk profile and our
forecast of relatively solid cash flow generation. Rating
pressure could arise, however, as a result of a downward revision
of the group's business risk profile, for example if merger-
related challenges lead to a significant decline in retention
rates; or if ILF revenues decrease significantly on the back of
banks' declining budgets, leading to a drop in EBITDA cash
interest coverage toward 1.5x. Rating downside may also be
triggered by a decline in covenant headroom to less than 15%,
placing pressure on our liquidity assessment," S&P said.

"We see limited rating upside over the next 12 months, given the
high leverage on balance sheet and our forecast of adjusted
leverage remaining higher than 5.0x," S&P said.


===========
P O L A N D
===========


PBG: Expects to Obtain Emergency Bridge Financing by May 25
-----------------------------------------------------------
Polska Agencja Prasowa reports that PBG related in a market
filing that it secured a stand-down agreement with its banking
creditors and should receive emergency bridge financing by
May 25.

PBG admitted in the filing that debt restructuring negotiations
with banks have been underway since April 17 and have run
parallel to more widely known talks on bridge financing, PAP
relates.

According to PAP, the filing notes that sides have now given
themselves until July 19 to secure a broader restructuring deal
on PBG bank debt.

Banks BZ WBK, ING Bank Slaski, Nordea Bank Polska and PKO BP are
in for no less than PLN200 million in bridge financing and will
seek to secure credit committee approval for the new volumes by
May 18 for a May 25 issuance target, PAP discloses.  Those sums
are to be repaid from the take on a planned convertible bond
issue, already approved by PBG shareholders, PAP says.

PBG is a listed Polish builder.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


BANCO PORTUGUES: Moody's Withdraws B3 Deposits Rating & E+ BFSR
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the B3 long-term deposits
ratings and the E bank financial strength rating of Banco
Portugues de Negocios (BPN).

Ratings Rationale

The rating action follows the conclusion of the privatization
process where BPN was acquired by Banco BIC Portuguese.

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.


=============
R O M A N I A
=============


CAN SERV: Declared Insolvent by Bucharest Court
-----------------------------------------------
SeeNews relates that a Bucharest court has granted an insolvency
request filed by Can Serv.

According to See News, data from the court's Web site showed that
Can Serv filed for insolvency on May 7 and the request was
granted on May 11.

The court said it has appointed Casa de Insolventa Transilvania
as administrator of the company, See News relates.

Can Serv turned to a loss of RON4.9 million (US$1.4 million
/EUR1.1 million) in 2010 from a profit of RON1.9 million a year
earlier, SeeNews says, citing the latest data available from the
Romanian finance ministry.  The company had RON161 million in
debts at the end of 2010, SeeNews discloses.

Romania-based Can Serv is the owner of local supermarket chain
Primavara.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


* Moody's Says Russian SMEs Still Face Cyclical Credit Risks
------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2010-11, banks' origination of credit to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) has grown in Russia, and the banks'
strategies for expansion within the SME sector exceed that of
lending to large corporates, says Moody's Investors Service in a
new Special Comment published on May 14. The overall growth trend
is credit positive; however, if the economy contracts SME loans
are likely to incur higher credit losses compared to other asset
classes.

The new report is entitled "SME Lending in Russia: Growth
Supports Profitability, but Cyclical Credit Risks Remain".

"Overall, we believe that the banks' expansion of their SME
portfolios and their plans to further this expansion are credit
positive. The SME sector supports the banks' net interest
margins, provides cross-selling opportunities and contributes to
further diversification of banks' risks," explains Olga Ulyanova,
a Moody's Vice President and author of the report. "However, if
the economic cycle enters another phase of downturn, SME loans
are likely to be the segment most vulnerable to weakened
conditions, and credit losses might reach levels seen during
2008-09," adds Ms. Ulyanova.

Moody's says that relative to other asset classes, SME lending
poses greater risks to banks credit profiles, due to (i) the weak
corporate governance and financial reporting practices of many
SMEs; (ii) their concentration and dependence on only a handful
of large customers and/or suppliers; (iii) fewer refinancing
options available to SMEs as opposed to large corporates; (iv)
SMEs' elevated exposure to domestic currency fluctuations; and
(v) a poor track record of SME loan recoveries, partly because of
the low realisable value of collateral.

Credit risks for Russian banks are further aggravated by the
country's evolving legal systems and practices, making it
difficult for banks to settle bad debts via court and to secure
recovery through repossession and sale of collateral.

Moody's report identifies several key trends in Russian SME
lending over the next 12-18 months. The total volume of bank
loans to SMEs will surpass 10% of the country's GDP (compared
with 9.3% at year-end 2011). By 2015, SME lending will likely
stabilize at around 15% of GDP, a level comparable with that of
peer countries.

By expanding their SME lending operations, Russian banks seek to
improve their revenue generation through wider net interest
margins and additional cross-selling opportunities; however, the
credit risks of SME lending continue to be higher compared with
the risks posed by larger corporate or secured retail loans.

Moody's says that credit losses generated by SME loans originated
after 2008-09 are currently lower than those for pre-crisis
vintages, reflecting post-crisis economic stabilization in Russia
and the somewhat tightened credit underwriting procedures that
the banks implemented. Moody's believes that banks are unlikely
to relax their credit underwriting standards in the next 12-18
months and expects credit losses on newly generated SME loans to
remain contained in the current economic environment.


=====================
S W I T Z E R L A N D
=====================


PETROPLUS HOLDINGS: S&P Affirms 'D' Corporate Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services had affirmed its 'D' long-term
corporate credit rating on Switzerland-based refiner Petroplus
Holdings AG. It then withdrew the rating at the company's
request.

"Consequently, Petroplus and its associated financial debt are no
longer under our surveillance," S&P said.

"We understand that at the point of withdrawal, insolvency
proceedings were ongoing, with agreements recently signed for the
sale of the company's Cressier refinery in Switzerland," S&P
said.

"Prior to the rating withdrawal, our recovery rating of '5' on
the Petroplus' senior secured debt reflected our expectation of
modest (10%-30%) recovery based primarily on the assumed sale of
the company's Coryton refinery in the U.K. Although we have no
information about the sale of this asset, we continue to believe
it will be sold as a going concern. To the extent that debt
holders achieve recoveries from other asset sales (e.g. the sale
of the Cressier refinery), this could enhance recovery
prospects," S&P said.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BRITISH MIDLAND: IAG to Sell Regional Division for GBP8 Million
---------------------------------------------------------------
Duncan Robinson at The Financial Times reports that International
Airlines Group has agreed to sell the regional division of
British Midland International's bmi regional to a group of
Scottish investors for GBP8 million (US$12.9 million) in cash.

IAG, which bought BMI on April 20 from Lufthansa, will sell the
unit to Sector Aviation Holdings, a consortium of Scottish
businessmen, the FT discloses.

BMI Regional operates 18 Embraer jets on 14 different routes
across the UK and northern Europe.

According to the FT, Willie Walsh, IAG chief executive, said:
"This deal provides a future for BMI Regional and should secure
around 330 jobs."

IAG negotiated a "significant price reduction" from the original
BMI sale price of GBP172.5 million following the German carrier's
failure to offload two of BMI's divisions, BMI Regional and
BMIbaby, before the sale, the FT recounts.

Mr. Walsh previously admitted that BMIbaby could be shut down in
September if a buyer for the European no-frills airline could not
be found, the FT relates.

                           IAG Losses

Meanwhile, Andrew Parker at The Financial Times reports that IAG
incurred worse than expected first-quarter operating loss of
EUR249 million and expects to break even only in 2012 because of
high fuel costs and charges relating to its acquisition of BMI
British Midland.

IAG, created last year from the merger of British Airways and
Iberia, said that its 2012 profitability would be hit by EUR240
million of operating losses and restructuring charges at BMI, the
UK airline bought from Lufthansa last month, the FT relates.

IAG expects to absorb EUR150 million of operating losses at BMI
this year, according to the FT.  There will also be EUR90 million
of restructuring charges relating to BMI, partly because up to
1,200 jobs are being cut, the FT discloses.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Jan. 12,
2012, the Financial Times related that auditors to BMI raised
doubts about its ability to continue as a going concern.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, as cited by the FT, said several
uncertainties surrounding BMI, including plans to sell the
airline to IAG, "may cast significant doubt over the ability of
the company to continue as a going concern".

British Midland Airways, which does business as bmi, --
http://www.iflybritishmidland.com/-- carries passengers to some
30 countries, mainly in the UK but also in continental Europe,
the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.  It operates a fleet of about
50 jets, including Airbus and Embraer models.


CEVA GROUP: S&P Puts 'B+' Rating on Sr. Sec. Debt on Watch Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'B+' issue rating
on the senior secured debt issued by U.K.-based logistics
provider CEVA Group PLC (CEVA; B/Stable/--) with negative
implications. The debt is made up of a EUR179 million revolving
credit facility (RCF) due 2015 which was partly drawn as of
March 31, 2012; a EUR468 million term loan facility B, including
a recent increase of US$150 million; and US$775 million first
lien senior secured notes due 2017.

"The recovery rating on the senior secured debt is unchanged at
'2', indicating our expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery
prospects in the event of a payment default, with coverage at the
low end of this range," S&P said.

"At the same time, we affirmed our 'B-' issue rating on CEVA's
existing US$210 million 1.5-lien secured notes due 2016; $702
million junior-priority senior secured notes due 2018; EUR11
million senior unsecured notes due 2014; and US$620 million
senior unsecured notes due 2020. The 'B-' issue rating is one
notch below the corporate credit rating. The recovery rating on
these notes is '5', indicating our expectation of modest (10%-
30%) recovery in the event of a payment default," S&P said.

"The CreditWatch placement on the senior secured debt reflects
our view that the recent increase in the term loan B facility by
US$150 million (EUR113 million equivalent) has reduced the
recovery prospects for senior secured lenders in CEVA's capital
structure to less than 70%. Consequently, We could lower the
issue rating on the senior secured debt to 'B' and revise the
recovery rating to '3', indicating our expectation of meaningful
(50%-70%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment default.
While the refinancing of the synthetic letter of credit facility
due in 2013, by increasing the amount under the Facility B term
loan and using the proceeds to pay down revolving facilities,
leads to only a modest increase in gross debt relative to total
debt, coverage is already at the low end of the (70%-90%) range
consistent with a recovery rating of '2'," S&P said.

"However, at the same time, we believe that if CEVA completes an
IPO, as per its recent filing, it could lead to some senior
secured debt being repaid. This could restore recovery prospects
for the senior secured debt to more than 70%, which would be
commensurate with a recovery rating of '2'," S&P said.

"We aim to resolve the CreditWatch within three months, once it
is clear to us whether CEVA will go ahead with the IPO. The
CreditWatch resolution will take into account the extent to which
CEVA uses the proceeds from any IPO to repay debt, and will
depend on which tranches it repays," S&P said.

RATINGS LIST
Ratings Affirmed

CEVA Group PLC
Senior Secured                         B-
Senior Unsecured                       B-

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                        To                 From
CEVA Group PLC
Senior Secured                         B+/Watch Neg       B+

Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
                                        To                 From
CEVA Group PLC
Senior Secured
  US$1 bil var rate sr secd due         B+ /Watch Neg      B+
  11/04/2013 bank ln due 08/31/2016
   Recovery Rating                      2                  2

  EUR179 mil sr secd revolving credit   B+ /Watch Neg      B+
  fac bank ln due 11/04/2015
   Recovery Rating                      2                  2

  US$210 mil  11.625% nts due           B-                 B-
  10/01/2016
   Recovery Rating                      5                  5

  US$702 mil  11.5% bnds due 04/01/2018 B-                 B-
   Recovery Rating                      5                  5

  US$325 mil  8.375% nts due 12/01/2017 B+ /Watch Neg      B+
   Recovery Rating                      2                  2

  US$450 mil  8.375% nts due 12/01/2017 B+ /Watch Neg      B+
   Recovery Rating                      2                  2

Senior Unsecured
  US$620 mil  12.75% nts due 03/31/2020 B-                 B-
   Recovery Rating                      5                  5

  EUR11 mil  12.% nts due 09/01/2014    B-                 B-
   Recovery Rating                      5                  5


PREFERRED RESIDENTIAL 7: S&P Affirms 'BB' Rating on Class D Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in Preferred Residential Securities 7 PLC (PRS 7) and
Preferred Residential Securities 8 PLC (PRS 8).

In PRS 7, S&P has:

   - raised and removed from CreditWatch negative its rating on
     the class C notes; and

   - affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings
     on the class A2, B, and D notes.

In PRS 8, S&P has:

   - raised and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
     the class C1a and C1c notes;

   - affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings
     on the A1a1, A1a2, A1b, A1c, B1a, and B1c notes; and

   - lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative its ratings on
     the class D1a, D1c, and E notes.

"Our analysis reflects our December 2011 U.K. residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) criteria. Additionally, we have
applied our 2010 counterparty criteria, given our recent
downgrades of the transaction counterparties," S&P said.

"On Dec. 12, 2011, we placed on CreditWatch negative our ratings
on all classes of notes in PRS 7 and 8, following the
implementation of our 2011 U.K. RMBS criteria," S&P said.

"The class A and B notes in PRS 8 were also on CreditWatch
negative following a breach of the documented collateral-posting
triggers. This was a result of our Nov. 29, 2011 lowering to 'A+'
from 'AA-' of our long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on PRS 8's
swap counterparty, Barclays Bank PLC (A+/Stable/A-1)," S&P said.

PRS 7 and 8 are U.K. nonconforming RMBS transactions originated
by Preferred Mortgages Ltd. Half of the borrowers in each
transaction are classified as "self-certified" borrowers.

Credit enhancement has increased for all rating levels in both
transactions, due to deleveraging of the transactions and to
fully funded reserve funds.

Total delinquencies in both transactions have increased in the
past year; 90+ day arrears (including repossessions) have
increased by 2.52 percentage points to 26.04% in PRS 7, and by
3.75 percentage points to 32.21% in PRS 8.

"Both transactions are currently paying sequentially, as 90+ day
delinquencies are greater than the pro rata payment triggers of
22.5%. We have considered the possibility of this trigger being
breached and have taken into account historical arrears
movements, to determine when the transactions would be likely to
pay pro rata. We have incorporated this in our cash flow
analysis," S&P said.

"In both transactions, our 2011 U.K. RMBS criteria credit
adjustments have given rise to higher weighted-average
foreclosure frequencies (WAFF) and weighted-average loss
severities (WALS) at each rating level--leading to an overall
increase in the credit enhancement required to reach these
levels," S&P said.

"Our analysis indicates that the class A and B notes in both
transactions have sufficient levels of credit enhancement to
offset the increase in required credit coverage. We have
therefore affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative our
ratings on the class A and B notes in both transactions, which
are no longer on CreditWatch negative for credit reasons," S&P
said.

                            PRS 7

"The reserve fund provides 21.53% of credit enhancement to the
class D notes. This level of credit enhancement is significantly
higher than the required credit coverage for the class D notes.
We have therefore affirmed and removed from CreditWatch negative
our rating on the class D notes in PRS 7. The class C notes pass
our cash flow scenarios at a higher rating level. We have
therefore raised and removed from CreditWatch negative our rating
on the class C notes in PRS 7," S&P said.

                             PRS 8

"The class D notes have 15.91% credit enhancement, provided by
the reserve fund and the subordinated class E notes. The class E
notes have 12.66% of credit enhancement, provided by the reserve
fund. Our analysis indicates that the level of credit enhancement
available for both of these classes of notes is insufficient to
cover the required increase in credit coverage under our 2011
U.K. RMBS criteria. We have therefore lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative our ratings on the class D and E notes in
PRS 8," S&P said.

"The class C notes pass our cash flow scenarios at a higher
rating level. We have therefore raised and removed from
CreditWatch negative our rating on the class C notes in PRS 8,"
S&P said.

                         COUNTERPARTIES

"The currency swap documentation in PRS 8 reflects our 2003/2004
counterparty criteria, which has now been superseded by our 2010
counterparty criteria. Under our 2010 counterparty criteria, the
highest potential rating that the notes in PRS 8 can achieve is
equal to the ICR plus one notch on the swap counterparty.
Therefore, the highest potential rating in PRS 8 is currently
'AA- (sf)'," S&P said.

"Since Barclays Bank's breach of its collateral-posting trigger
in PRS 8, we have received confirmation that it is now posting
collateral. Based on this information, we have affirmed and
removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings on the class A and
B notes in PRS 8, which are no longer on CreditWatch negative for
counterparty reasons," S&P said.

"Since our downgrade of Barclays Bank, it has also been in breach
of its replacement triggers documented in the bank account
agreements, which require a short-term rating of 'A-1+'. We have
received a definitive plan from the cash/bond administrator to
update the replacement trigger. If the documentation is not
amended, this may lead to downgrades in both transactions, as the
highest potential rating that the notes in these transactions
could then achieve would be 'A+ (sf)'," S&P said.

                       CREDIT STABILITY

"Our credit stability analysis indicates that the maximum
projected deterioration that we would expect at each rating
level, for time horizons of one year and three years, under
moderate stress conditions, are in line with our 2010 credit
stability criteria," S&P said.

              STANDARD & POOR'S 17G-7 DISCLOSURE REPORT

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

RATINGS LIST

Class                 Rating
            To                    From

PREFERRED RESIDENTIAL SECURITIES 7 PLC
GBP600 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

C           A+ (sf)               BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A2          AAA (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
B           AAA (sf)              AAA (sf)/Watch Neg
D           BB (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg

PREFERRED RESIDENTIAL SECURITIES 8 PLC
EUR108.5 Million, GBP336.2 Million, and
US$100 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

C1a         A+ (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg
C1c         A+ (sf)               A (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A1a1        AA- (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A1a2        AA- (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A1b         AA- (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A1c         AA- (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B1a         AA- (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
B1c         AA- (sf)              AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

D1a         B (sf)                BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
D1c         B (sf)                BBB+ (sf)/Watch Neg
E           B- (sf)               BB (sf)/Watch Neg


SHOON: Rescued Out of Administration by GA Europe
-------------------------------------------------
GA Europe(TM), a subsidiary of Great American Group, Inc. (R)
GAMR, has invested in the footwear chain Shoon which entered into
bankruptcy on Feb. 6.

GA Europe is supporting a buyout by Shoon's management team and
will provide funding for working capital and development as well
as taking a direct equity stake in the company, according to
Gavin George, a Managing Director of GA Europe.

"We are very excited to be making this investment in Shoon, which
is a distinctive retail brand with significant potential for
development," Mr. George said.  "This deal further underlines our
creative approach to investing in distressed retail situations
where we can successfully apply our specialist skills and
experience."

Shoon's management team, led by Managing Director Stephen
Sanders, will be joined by non-executive chairman Carolyn Simons,
a former managing director of Homestyle Group Plc. and commercial
director of Homebase.

"We are delighted to have a supportive investor in GA Europe, and
this will give us a firm financial platform from which to
continue the process of stabilizing and reviving the business,"
Sanders said.  Shoon continues to operate 11 stores in Bath,
Brighton, Cheltenham, Epsom, Guildford, Kingston-upon-Thames,
Reading, Salisbury, St Albans, Tunbridge Wells and Winchester.
In addition, Shoon has a significant online business which is
operated from the head office and distribution facility in Wells,
Somerset.

"This deal represents a very successful outcome for the
administration (bankruptcy) and ensures the survival of a long
established retail brand, as well as the preservation of over 150
jobs in both the stores and head office in Wells," said Ian
Robert, administrator of Shoon Ltd. from Kingston Smith &
Partners LLP.

Shoon operates a chain of footwear stores, selling mainly women's
branded shoes.  Shoon opened its first store in 2000 and expanded
rapidly over the last decade.  However, its move into large
stores in major shopping centers was ill-timed and ultimately led
to the family-owned business entering into bankruptcy earlier
this year. Restructuring has allowed the business to refocus on
locations better suited to its niche market.

                       About Great American

Great American Group, LLC -- http://www.greatamerican.com/-- is
a provider of asset disposition solutions and valuation and
appraisal services to a wide range of retail, wholesale and
industrial clients, as well as lenders, capital providers,
private equity investors and professional service firms.  Great
American Group has offices in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas,
London, Los Angeles, New York and San Francisco.

                          About GA Europe

GA Europe is a 100 percent subsidiary of the publicly listed
Great American Group, operating in partnership with retailers and
their financial stakeholders across Europe to resolve complex or
distressed situations.  Over the last five years, Great American
Group/GA Europe has handled more than $10 billion of retail stock
clearance and has provided nearly 4,000 appraisals.

                            About Shoon

Based in Wells, Somerset in England, Shoon --
http://www.shoon.com/-- is a family owned retail footwear and
fashion company.

The footwear retailer collapsed into administration on Feb. 6,
2012, after it was unable to sell loss making shops.


* UK: Q1 Administration Figures in England & Wales Down 7%
----------------------------------------------------------
Simon Mundy at The Financial Times reports the number of
companies entering administration in England and Wales fell 7% in
the first quarter, supporting hopes that insolvency rates are
gradually declining from their levels over the past three years.

Administrators were appointed to 516 companies in the first three
months, typically the busiest period of the year for insolvency
practitioners, the FT says, citing data compiled by Deloitte.
This compares with 557 administrations in the first quarter of
2011 and means that the number has fallen on an annual basis in
eight of the past nine quarters, the FT notes.

According to the FT, Graeme Fisher, head of policy at the
Federation of Small Businesses, said that the decline in
administrations was in part because a large amount of "dead wood
had already been eliminated from many business sectors.
Mr. Fisher, as cited by the FT, said "Most of the weakest
companies would have gone under by now."

Despite the overall decline, the Deloitte data showed signs of
unrelenting pressure on some sectors, including retail, which
suffered a 15% rise in administrations, and recruitment and
similar business services, where there was a 13% increase, the FT
says.

This was outweighed by improved figures from sectors including
transport and communications, hospitality and leisure, and
manufacturing, the FT states.  There were 110 administrations in
property, construction and related sectors, against 126 a year
earlier, according to the FT.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *