/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/120309.mbx         T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

             Friday, March 9, 2012, Vol. 13, No. 50

                            Headlines



F R A N C E

CMA CGM: Mulls Asset Sales; Wants to Reschedule Debt Payments
COMPAGNIE GENERALE: Fitch Affirms Hybrid Bond Rating at 'BB+'
OBERTHUR TECHNOLOGIES: S&P Assigns 'B' LT Corp. Credit Rating


G E R M A N Y

SOLAR MILLENNIUM: Dr. Jan Withag Steps Down as Chairman
TS CO.MIT: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCC-'


G R E E C E

NATIONAL BANK: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
PIRAEUS BANK: S&P Cuts Rating on Series 21 Sub. Notes to 'D'


H U N G A R Y

HEROSZ EPITOIPARI: Capital City Court Enters Liquidation Order


I C E L A N D

TITAN EUROPE: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rated Class B Notes on Watch Neg.


I R E L A N D

CELTIC BOOKMAKERS: Creditors' Meeting Scheduled for March 16
INTERMEDIATE FINANCE: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
IRISH LIFE: S&P Retains Watch Developing on 'BB' Sub. Note Rating
IRISH LIFE: S&P Puts BB- Counterparty Credit Rating on Watch Neg.
QUIRINUS ELOC 23: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to 'B-'


I T A L Y

AEROPORTI DI ROMA: S&P Puts BB Corp. Credit Rating on Watch Neg.
CELL THERAPEUTICS: Posted US$5.1 Million Net Loss in January
EDISON SPA: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Ratings to 'BB+/B'
SEAT PAGINE: More Than 97% of Senior Bondholders Back Debt Plan


K A Z A K H S T A N

KAZAKH AGRARIAN: S&P Raises Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB+'
OIL INSURANCE: S&P Assigns 'B+' LT Counterparty Credit Rating


L A T V I A

SIA PALINK: High Court Reverses Riga Court Insolvency Ruling


N E T H E R L A N D S

GROSVENOR PLACE I: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
HIGHLANDER EURO IV: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'
JUBILEE CDO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'


R U S S I A

VODOKANAL ST: S&P Revises Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'


S P A I N

BANKINTER 14: S&P Maintains Rating Class E Notes at 'D(sf)'
SANTANDER EMPRESAS: Moody's Rates EUR742MM Serie C Notes at (P)Ca


S W E D E N

SSAB AB: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corporate Credit Ratings


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

AUCTION ATRIUM: Formally Names James Cowper as Liquidators
FORDGATE COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB'
HOLLYMEAD PLC: Provisional Liquidator Appointed
LUDGATE FUNDING: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CC'
MANOR ROSE: Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator

RANGERS FOOTBALL: Owner Denies Liquidation Claims
RANGERS FOOTBALL: Administrators Seek Quick Sale
RMAC 2004-NS4: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B1 Notes to 'BB+'
ROCKINGHAM RETIREMENT: Mounting Complaints Prompt Liquidation


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: European Union Court Questions Tough Bank Downsizings
* BOOK REVIEW: Fraudulent Conveyances


                            *********


===========
F R A N C E
===========


CMA CGM: Mulls Asset Sales; Wants to Reschedule Debt Payments
-------------------------------------------------------------
Robert Wright at The Financial Times reports that France's CMA
CGM plans asset sales to raise cash and has asked its banks to
reschedule debt payments for this year and next, demonstrating
how slumping container ship earnings have undermined the finances
of the world's third-biggest line.

Rodolphe Saade, the Marseilles-based company's executive
director, told the FT that the company had outlined the request
for a debt restructuring to its bankers at a meeting on Tuesday
where it had given details of its 2011 performance.

According to the FT, the company also planned to keep selling
ships and, within the next few months, sell a stake in Terminal
Link, CMA CGM's container terminal operator, which holds minority
stakes in 20 terminals in ports worldwide.

Mr. Saade was speaking on Wednesday after the privately held
container shipping line published full-year figures showing a
US$30 million net loss for 2011, the FT relates.

However, Mr. Saade said the loss, struck on revenues up 4% on
2010 to US$14.9 billion, was reduced by US$350 million in profits
of asset sales, including ships and part of its stake in the
company's terminals in Malta, where CMA CGM operates a
significant hub for moving containers between ships, the FT
notes.

France-based CMA CGM -- http://www.cma-cgm.com/-- ships freight
PDQ.  The marine transportation company is one of the world's
leading container carriers.  Through subsidiaries it operates a
fleet of about 370 vessels that serve more than 400 ports around
the globe, and it maintains a network of about 650 facilities in
about 150 countries.  In addition to hauling containers by sea,
CMA CGM provides logistics services, arranging the transportation
of containerized freight by river, road, and rail.  The company's
tourism division arranges cruises and other travel services.
Jacques Saade founded the company in 1978.

                           *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Dec. 7,
2011, Moody's Investors Service downgraded CMA CGM's corporate
family rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) to B2
from B1. Concurrently, Moody's downgraded to Caa1 from B3 CMA
CGM's EUR325 million and US$475 million worth of senior unsecured
notes maturing in 2019 and 2017, respectively.  Moody's said the
outlook is negative.


COMPAGNIE GENERALE: Fitch Affirms Hybrid Bond Rating at 'BB+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed France-based Compagnie Generale des
Etablissements Michelin's (Michelin) and Compagnie Financiere
Michelin's (CFM) Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) and
senior unsecured ratings at 'BBB'.  The Outlooks on the Long-term
IDRs are Positive. Fitch has also affirmed both entities' Short-
term IDRs at 'F2' and Michelin's hybrid bond rating at 'BB+'.
CFM is the group's finance arm and the intermediate holding
entity for Michelin's non-domestic operations.

The Positive Outlook reflects Fitch's expectations that
Michelin's revenue growth potential and profitability will
further improve in the next three years.  Revenue growth is
driven by the increased demand for tyres in emerging markets (EM)
as well as Michelin's increasing global tyre production capacity.
Rapid recent increases in raw material costs have had an impact
on profitability, with Michelin's EBIT margin falling in 2011 to
9.3% from 9.6% in 2010.  However, in 2012 and the medium term,
Fitch expects profitability to return to above 10%.  As the
leading price-setting company in the industry, Michelin is able
to compensate increases in raw material costs by adjusting tyre
sales prices in a timely manner, although practically, there is a
three to six month lag before pricing changes impact
profitability and cash flow.

The 'BBB' ratings reflect Michelin's strong business profile,
supported by its large manufacturing operations, global
footprint, top ranking positions in the markets in which it
operates, solid end-market diversification with a majority of
sales in the less volatile replacements business and strong R&D
capability.  The ratings also acknowledge Michelin's relatively
stable performance over the past four years with EBITDAR margins
never falling below 12%.

The relatively volatile and low margin new-vehicle-related tyre
business where margins are considerably affected by aggressive
pricing pressures from OEMs is more than mitigated by Michelin's
stable and higher margin tyre replacement business, which
accounted for about 75% of Michelin's total revenue in 2011, as
well as Michelin's successful presence in the profitable
speciality tyre market.  However, volatile medium- to long-term
commodity price developments, especially of natural and synthetic
rubber remain a key structural risk and a constraining rating
factor for Michelin.

In addition, Fitch will closely monitor Michelin's new intensive
global investment plans. Michelin has announced that it intends
to invest EUR2 billion p.a. during 2012-2015, including
approximately EUR1.3 billion p.a. for increasing global
production capacity by 22% during this period with the balance
applied to maintenance capex.  Fitch expects that Michelin will
invest 45% of the expansion capex into EM capacity expansion, 17%
in Europe and 12% in North America.  These investments should
enhance Michelin's revenue and profitability in the medium to
long term, but they are also subject to execution risk and will
weigh on the company's FCF generation ability over the next two
to three years.  Fitch expects that although Michelin has a
strong ability to generate a healthy funds from operations (FFO)
margin of at least 11.5% in 2012 and beyond, the FCF margin will
remain at 1%-2% during the period of intensive investment
activity.

Following a severe tyre shortage in 2009/2010, and market
observers' estimates that demand for tyres will grow by more than
35% during 2010-2015, most tyre producers, from both developed
markets and EM, have formulated targets to significantly increase
tyre capacity.  Premium tyre makers have identified significant
opportunities to benefit from domestic demand in EM.  Michelin
expects to invest about US$1.35 billion in China.  Conversely, EM
tyre producers, especially from China and South Korea expect to
significantly increase market share in Europe.

Michelin has considerably improved its financial flexibility
since 2009.  The refinancing risk of EUR1.4 billion debt maturing
in 2012 was covered by cash of EUR1.59bn at end-2011 and an
undrawn committed EUR1.5 billion credit line maturing in July
2016.  The agency expects FFO adjusted leverage to decrease to
around 1.8x at end-2012, significantly down from about 4.1x at
end-2008, and to further decline to approximately 1.5x at end-
2013.

Positive rating action could be considered if the group's FFO
gross adjusted leverage is reduced to below 1.5x, the operating
EBIT margin exceeds 10%, FFO margin exceeds 13%, and the company
generates positive FCF margin in excess of 1%.  Negative rating
pressure could return if the group's operating EBIT margin
declines below 8% or if it incurs sizeable negative FCF.


OBERTHUR TECHNOLOGIES: S&P Assigns 'B' LT Corp. Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B' long-term
corporate credit rating to Oberthur Technologies Holding SAS, a
holding company within the France-based Oberthur Technologies
group. The outlook is stable.

"At the same time, we assigned a 'B' issue rating to proposed
term loans of EUR510 million due in 2017 and 2018 and a proposed
EUR160 million bank facility (due in 2017). We also assigned a
'3' recovery rating to these instruments, indicating our
expectation of meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in an event of
payment default," S&P said.

"The ratings on the proposed term loans and bank facility are
subject to our satisfactory review of the final documentation. In
the event of any changes to the amount, terms, or conditions of
the instruments, we could review and revise the issue ratings,"
S&P said.

"The ratings are constrained by the group's 'highly leveraged'
financial risk profile, following its acquisition by private-
equity company Advent International for EUR1.15 billion. They are
supported by our assessment of the group's business risk profile
as 'fair'," S&P said.

"The financial risk profile reflects our view that the group has
only moderate deleveraging potential due to sizable interest
charges, increasing capital expenditure, and significant
shareholder loans. This is partly offset by the group's proposed
long-term capital structure with limited debt amortization until
2018 and our expectation of good free cash flow generation, which
support our assessment of Oberthur Technologies' liquidity as
'adequate' under our criteria," S&P said.

"Our assessment of Oberthur Technologies' business risk profile
as 'fair', is underpinned by the group's secure market positions
and resilient business model based on renewals, particularly for
banking and telecommunications smart cards. It further reflects
significant barriers to entry and the growth potential of the
banking card and identity sectors in view of security concerns.
This is, however, partly offset by the highly competitive market
in which Oberthur Technologies operates, moderate margins, the
medium-term risks associated with technology changes, and a
potential security breach of one of the group's products
(although we understand that the latter could be mitigated by
insurance)," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Oberthur Technologies'
credit metrics will strengthen, while remaining in line with a
'highly leveraged' financial risk profile as defined by our
criteria. The outlook also reflects our opinion that the group
will maintain an 'adequate' liquidity profile," S&P said.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


SOLAR MILLENNIUM: Dr. Jan Withag Steps Down as Chairman
-------------------------------------------------------
Following last week's initiation of insolvency proceedings for
Solar Millennium AG by the local Court of Furth, the chairman of
Solar Millennium's management board, Dr. Jan Withag, announced
last Friday his resignation from all his offices taking effect on
March 8, 2012.

This includes the resignation from his position as chairman of
the management board of Solar Millennium AG as well as from the
board of Solar Trust of America LLC and from the advisory board
of Flagsol GmbH.  Dr. Withag also resigns from his management
roles at SMAGSOL GmbH, Solar Millennium Verwaltungs GmbH, Solanda
GmbH, Solar Millennium Beteiligungs GmbH, SM USA 1 GmbH as well
as from his post as director of Solar Millennium Inc.

Dr. Withag explained: "Since the insolvency proceedings have been
initiated and the right to manage and transfer has been vested in
the insolvency administrator, the opportunities for action left
to me are limited. Time has therefore come for me to transfer the
management of the Group and my offices at the subsidiaries to the
insolvency administrator."  Dr. Withag said further: "It is not
easy for me to leave my office at Solar Millennium. I can
understand investors and employees are disappointed. The
employees in particular have time and again invested incredible
amounts of energy into the company over recent years. I sincerely
hope my colleague on the management board, Mr. Beltle, as well as
the insolvency administrator, will have much success with meeting
upcoming challenges, and I will continue to support them to the
best of my ability, even after my resignation from office."

At the same time, the search for investors for the Group is
continued. The insolvency administrator sees chances for a
takeover of subsidiary Flagsol GmbH in Cologne as well as for
some Spanish power plant projects, especially for Arenales.
There is also some investor interest in a complete takeover of
the Solar Millennium AG Group. However, prospects for the success
of this are highly uncertain.

Solar Millennium AG is an Erlangen-based solar company.  It had
focused on developing solar-thermal plants in Europe and the U.S.

The Local Court of Fuerth initiated the insolvency proceedings
for Solar Millennium AG on Feb. 28.  The court appointed Volker
Boehm, lawyer from Nuremberg, as insolvency administrator.  An
interim insolvency administrator was appointed last December.
Upon the initiation of insolvency proceedings, Mr. Boehm assumes
power of administration and disposal from the former Company
organs.


TS CO.MIT: S&P Lowers Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CCC-'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
TS Co.mit One GmbH's class D, E, and F notes.

TS Co.mit One is a collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that closed in July 2006. A portfolio of Schuldschein
loan agreements granted to German small and midsize enterprises
(SMEs) backs the transaction.

"The rating actions reflect our assessment of the effects of the
approaching legal final maturity, the credit quality and maturity
of the remaining performing assets, and the servicer's recovery
expectations on the assets undergoing workout. We have based our
analysis on the latest available investor report, as of December
2011, and on portfolio data received from the servicer in
relation to the Dec. 20, 2011 determination date," S&P said.

"The transaction has already reached its scheduled maturity date,
which was in June 2011. The class A, B, and C notes in the
capital structure have been fully repaid. The class D, E, and F
notes remain partially outstanding. As a result of the
transaction's former pro rata redemption mechanism, the class D
outstanding notional amount of about EUR6.42 million equals 63%
of its initial amount, and the class E and F outstanding notional
amounts of about EUR8.89 million and EUR4.96 million each equal
79% of their initial amounts. Available proceeds are now used to
redeem the notes in a fully sequential order starting with the
class D notes," S&P said.

The remaining portfolio comprises 32 Schuldschein loans totaling
about EUR38.6 million. Of those:

* EUR27.3 million have experienced a principal-deficiency event
   (PDE) and are undergoing workout,

* EUR5.8 million have had a PDE but are currently not undergoing
   workout, and

* EUR5.5 million have been restructured.

"Thus, full repayment of the class D, E, and F notes is fully
dependent on the recovery proceeds. The recovery expectations, as
specified by the servicer in the investor report, are very
limited--averaging about 15%, with zero recoveries expected on
some of the larger defaulted loans. In addition, the servicer
expects the recovery process for a number of loans to last well
beyond the transaction's legal final maturity date in June 2013,"
S&P said.

"In light of the limited recovery expectations, and the expected
length of the workout process compared with the time remaining
until the transaction's legal final maturity date, we consider it
highly unlikely that the issuer will be able to fully repay the
class E and F notes, and we have therefore lowered to 'CC (sf)'
our ratings on these classes of notes," S&P said.

"Four performing loans (totaling EUR5.5 million) remain in the
portfolio. All four of those loans have been restructured in the
past. We note that the maturity date for two loans (EUR1.0
million) now extends beyond the transaction's legal final
maturity date, which could further restrict the proceeds
available for the repayment of the notes. We note however, that
EUR4.7 million of loans that experienced a principal-deficiency
event have still been able to make their regular debt payments,"
S&P said.

"In our opinion, the class D notes are likely to receive further
principal payments on the next payment dates--from the performing
assets in the pool and from recovery proceeds. In addition, the
class D notes still benefit from a very limited amount of excess
spread as available proceeds are used, after payment of interest
on the class D, E, and F notes, to repay the class D principal
balance. In our view, the class D notes have a very limited
chance only of fully repaying, depending on the performance of
the remaining performing assets in the pool and on the recoveries
achieved until the legal final maturity date in June 2013.
Accordingly, we have lowered to 'CCC- (sf)' our rating on these
notes," S&P said.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

TS Co.mit One GmbH
EUR503 Million Floating-Rate Asset-Backed Notes

Class          Rating
         To             From

Ratings Lowered

D        CCC- (sf)     B (sf)
E        CC (sf)       CCC- (sf)
F        CC (sf)       CCC- (sf)


===========
G R E E C E
===========


NATIONAL BANK: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC/C' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on four Greek banks --
National Bank of Greece S.A. (NBG), EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A.
(EFG), Alpha Bank A.E. (Alpha), and Piraeus Bank S.A. (Piraeus).
"We have also affirmed our 'CC' issue ratings on their hybrid
securities," S&P said.

The outlooks on the long-term ratings on the four banks are
negative.

                            Rationale

"The affirmations follow our downgrade of the Hellenic Republic
(Greece) to 'SD', on Feb. 27, 2012. Our downgrade of Greece was
partly based on the Greek government's bond exchange offer
launched last week, which we believe will likely lead to sizable
losses for rated Greek banks. That said, based on Greek
government and EU authorities' public statements, we believe that
sufficient public funds should be available to recapitalize all
the banks and enable them to comply with regulatory capital
requirements. The rating actions also reflect our expectation
that these banks' funding capacity and liquidity position will
likely not further deteriorate, based on the European Council's
statement that Greek banks will continue to receive financial
support. Such support in our view should allow these banks to
maintain eligible collateral for discounting through European
liquidity support mechanisms, including the Emergency Liquidity
Assistance (ELA) set up at the Bank of Greece, even if the
relevant ratings on Greek sovereign debt are lowered to 'D'
(default)," S&P said.

"We assess the stand-alone credit profiles (SACPs) for all four
banks at 'cc'. Our 'CCC' long-term ratings on these banks show a
two-notch differential from their SACPs, indicating the uplift we
factor in for extraordinary liquidity support provided by EU
authorities," S&P said.

"On Feb. 24, 2012, the Greek government launched an exchange
offer on its outstanding sovereign bonds. According to the
publicly available terms of the swap, while the nominal value
haircut on the bonds will account for about 53.5%, we currently
estimate that the net present value potential losses could be
significantly higher and potentially reach a total of about 65%-
75% of the nominal initial value. In our view, the Greek banks we
rate are directly and significantly exposed--to varying degrees--
to Greek country risk through these rated banks' large government
bond portfolios. We therefore believe that these banks will
likely incur sizable losses on their government bond holdings
upon completion of the deal, which would, in our view,
substantially impair their capital bases," S&P said.

"According to Greek and EU authorities' public statements,
however, public funds will be made available to recapitalize all
Greek banks if needed. In this context, we understand that the
European Central Bank (ECB; AAA/Stable/A-1+), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and EU authorities have already allocated a
total of EUR30 billion from the 'first aid' package provided to
Greece to cover the banks' capital needs. Moreover, according to
Greek government public statements, we think that the total
recapitalization fund could be enhanced by an additional EUR10
billion to foster its capacity to support banks under stress.
Based on these statements, we have taken the view that these
facilities should backstop these banks' ability to continue
meeting their regulatory capital requirements once losses arising
from their Greek government bond portfolios are recognized," S&P
said.

"Our ratings also reflect our view that Greek banks should be
able to continue pledging Greek sovereign debt collateral
eligible for discounting at European funding facilities--
including the ELA set up at the Bank of Greece-- even if the
relevant ratings on Greek sovereign debt are lowered to 'D'
(default). We base our opinion on the European Council's
statement that it will offer credit enhancement to underpin the
quality of pledged Greek sovereign debt and therefore allow
continued use of that collateral by Greek banks to access
European liquidity facilities," S&P said.

"Our current ratings on the four Greek banks continue to factor
in a 'b+' anchor, which draws on our Banking Industry Country
Risk Assessment (BICRA) methodology and our view on both the
economic risk of the main countries where they operate and the
industry risk of Greece, where the banks are incorporated. They
also reflect our view of the banks' 'adequate' business position,
'weak' capital and earnings, 'weak' risk position, 'average'
funding, and 'very weak' liquidity, as our criteria define these
terms," S&P said.

                             Outlook

"The negative outlooks reflect the possibility that we could
downgrade EFG, Alpha, Piraeus, or NBG, if we believe they will
default on their obligations, as defined by our criteria. Taking
into consideration what we see as a meaningful possibility of
default, there is an inherent CreditWatch with negative
implications associated with our 'CCC' long-term ratings," S&P
said.

"We could lower the ratings on the four banks if their access to
liquidity support from extraordinary mechanisms set up by EU
authorities, including the ELA discount facility, is impaired for
any reason, given that this support currently underpins the
banks' capacity to meet their financing requirements. In this
context, we also note that persistently high pressure on banks'
retail funding bases may lead to further deposit outflows, which
could in our opinion increase the need for Greek banks to receive
additional extraordinary liquidity support from European
authorities. Should the banks' access to the abovementioned
liquidity support deteriorate, we would conclude that the four
banks are likely to default as defined under our criteria," S&P
said.

"We could also lower the ratings on the four banks if we believe
they are likely to default, as defined by our criteria, due to
any developments associated with a substantial impairment of
their solvency. This could happen if, for any reason, Greek banks
cannot access external capital support, or if we consider such
support as insufficient to allow the banks to continue meeting
regulatory capital requirements once the potentially large losses
on their holdings of Greek government bonds are recognized or the
potentially sizable credit impairments arising from lending
portfolios are taken into account," S&P said.

"The outlooks could be revised to stable if the risks we see to
all four banks' financial profiles abate, and if we perceive that
extraordinary financial support will likely enable them to
survive without defaulting on any of their obligations," S&P
said.

Ratings List
Ratings Affirmed

NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE

National Bank of Greece S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating             CCC/Negative/C
Certificate Of Deposit                 CCC/C
Preference Stock                       CC

NBG Finance PLC
Subordinated*                          CC

National Bank of Greece Funding Ltd.
Preferred Stock*                       CC

*Guaranteed by National Bank of Greece S.A.

PIRAEUS BANK

Piraeus Bank S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating             CCC/Negative/C
Certificate Of Deposit                 CCC/C

Piraeus Group Capital Ltd.
Preferred Stock*                       CC

Piraeus Group Finance PLC
Senior Unsecured*                      CCC
Subordinated*                          CC
Commercial Paper*                      C

*Guaranteed by Piraeus Bank S.A.

ALPHA BANK

Alpha Bank A.E.
Counterparty Credit Rating             CCC/Negative/C
Certificate Of Deposit                 CCC/C

Alpha Credit Group PLC
Senior Unsecured*                      CCC
Subordinated*                          CC
Commercial Paper*                      C

Alpha Group Jersey Ltd.
Junior Subordinated*                   CC
Preferred Stock*                       CC
Preference Stock*                      CC

*Guaranteed by Alpha Bank A.E.

EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS

EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A.
Counterparty Credit Rating             CCC/Negative/C
Certificate Of Deposit                 CCC/CC

EFG Hellas (Cayman Islands) Ltd.
Senior Unsecured*                      CCC

EFG Hellas Funding Ltd.
Preference Stock*                      CC

EFG Hellas PLC
Senior Unsecured*                      CCC
Subordinated*                          CC
Commercial Paper*                      C

EFG Ora Funding Limited III
Senior Unsecured*                      CCC

*Guaranteed by EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A.


PIRAEUS BANK: S&P Cuts Rating on Series 21 Sub. Notes to 'D'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'C' from 'CC' its
issue ratings on the series A outstanding preferred securities
issued by Piraeus Group Capital Ltd. and guaranteed by Greece's
Piraeus Bank S.A. (Piraeus; CCC/Negative/C). "We also lowered to
'D' from 'CC' our issue ratings on the series 21 subordinated
medium-term notes due 2016 issued by Piraeus Group Finance PLC
and guaranteed by Piraeus," S&P said.

"The downgrades follow Piraeus' announcement of the launch of a
tender offer on its outstanding hybrid capital and dated
subordinated debt securities on March 2, 2012. As of [March 6,
2012], the total amounts of preferred securities and of dated
subordinated debt subject to this offer account for about EUR159
million and EUR330 million. These rating actions do not affect
our counterparty credit on Piraeus or any other debt issue
rating," S&P said.

"We consider Piraeus' proposed tender offer to be a 'distressed
exchange' under our criteria. This is because it implies that
investors will receive less value than the promise of the
original securities--the tender proposes to buy back the
preferred securities at 37% of its nominal amount and the
subordinated debt at 50% of its nominal amount. It also reflects
Piraeus' financial distress, evidenced by our assessment of its
stand-alone credit profile at 'cc'. The tender offer is aimed at
allowing Piraeus to enhance its capitalization," S&P said.

"Our different ratings on both debt instruments reflect the
different features that we believe are incorporated in hybrid
capital instruments, compared with other instruments. As
explained in our criteria, an exchange offer on an equity hybrid
instrument may reflect the possibility that, absent the exchange
offer taking place, the issuer would exercise the coupon deferral
option, in accordance with the terms of the instrument. In such
instances, the rating on the hybrid would go to 'C', rather than
the 'D' rating used for nonhybrids. Since deferral on a hybrid in
accordance with its terms (outside of the offer scenario) would
result in a rating of 'C', a distressed exchange offer should
not result in a lower rating," S&P said.

"In our view, these rating actions do not affect our counterparty
credit ratings on Piraeus or any other related issue ratings.
According to our criteria, an 'SD' rating is assigned when we
believe that the obligor has selectively defaulted on a specific
issue or class of obligations, excluding those that qualify as
regulatory capital. Even if we consider the tender offer as a
distressed exchange under our criteria, the notes subject to the
exchange offer qualify as regulatory capital. As a result, our
downgrade of the hybrid and subordinated debt instruments has no
implications on our counterparty credit ratings on Piraeus," S&P
said.

"On completion of the offer, we will review the ratings on any
untendered hybrid securities," S&P said.

Ratings List
Downgraded
                                        To               From
Piraeus Group Capital Ltd.
Preferred Stock (Series A)             C                CC

Piraeus Group Finance PLC
Subordinated (Series 21)               D                CC


=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


HEROSZ EPITOIPARI: Capital City Court Enters Liquidation Order
--------------------------------------------------------------
All Hungary News reports that the Capital City Court ordered the
liquidation of Herosz Epitoipari Zrt in late February, following
an unsuccessful attempt to save the once-high-flying construction
firm from insolvency.

Herosz participated in several large construction projects in the
last few years, including building college dormitories, hospitals
and other instalments in PPP projects, according to All Hungary
News.

The report says the creditors may file their claims to Vectigalis
Zrt., the liquidator supervising the winding down of the firm.


=============
I C E L A N D
=============


TITAN EUROPE: S&P Puts 'BB-' Rated Class B Notes on Watch Neg.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its credit rating on
Titan Europe 2006-1 PLC's class B notes on CreditWatch negative
following a declaration of a liquidity facility event of default.
"At the same time, we have kept our ratings on the class A and X
notes on CreditWatch negative. The ratings on all other classes
of notes are unaffected," S&P said.

On Feb. 15, 2012, HSBC Bank PLC, the liquidity facility provider,
issued a letter stating that:

* A liquidity facility event of default is outstanding because,
   on the Jan. 23, 2012 interest payment date (IPD), prepayment
   amounts received on one of the loans were applied to repay the
   noteholders instead of repaying the liquidity facility;

* It is canceling the liquidity facility commitment;

* No further liquidity drawings or stand-by drawings can be made
   under the liquidity facility; and

* All amounts outstanding under the agreement are immediately
   due and payable.

"We understand that the issuer is conducting an independent
review of the transaction documents and that it will consult with
the note trustee, the servicer, and other relevant parties. We
await the outcome of this review and consultation to see what
course the issuer adopts and how this issue will be resolved,"
S&P said.

In the interim, the risks this event poses for the transaction
are:

* In the immediate term, an interest shortfall could occur on
   all notes on the next IPD, as a result of the demand that all
   amounts outstanding (EUR3.2 million) under the liquidity
   facility are immediately due. To repay this amount on the next
   IPD, interest on all classes of notes would have to be
   diverted to repay the liquidity facility, resulting in an
   interest shortfall on all classes.

* Thereafter, timely payment of interest on the notes is at risk
   if the transaction loses this liquidity facility or another
   facility is not found to replace it.

* "If interest shortfalls occur, we could lower our ratings on
   the class A to D notes to 'D (sf)'," S&P said.

"As our ratings on these notes address the likelihood that
noteholders will receive full and timely payments of interest, we
have placed on CreditWatch negative our rating on the class B
notes," S&P said.

"We have also kept on CreditWatch negative our ratings on the
class A and X notes. We previously placed these ratings on
CreditWatch negative following the application of our revised
bank criteria. These ratings are now additionally on CreditWatch
negative for the credit reasons mentioned," S&P said.

"We have not taken action on the class C and D notes, because our
current 'CCC- (sf)' ratings are an indicator that we anticipate
near-term defaults. Our ratings on the class E to H notes are
already 'D (sf)', because of interest shortfalls that occurred in
2010, and are unaffected by the rating actions," S&P said.

"Titan Europe 2006-1 closed in March 2006, with notes totaling
EUR723.3 million. The notes have a legal final maturity in
January 2016. Of the 10 loans that originally backed the
transaction, five have repaid. The note balance has reduced to
EUR270.3 million," S&P said.

         Potential Effects of Proposed Criteria Changes

"We have taken the rating action based on our criteria for rating
European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). However,
these criteria are under review," S&P said.

"As highlighted in the Nov. 8 Advance Notice of Proposed Criteria
Change, we expect to publish a request for comment (RFC)
outlining our proposed criteria changes for rating European CMBS
transactions. Subsequently, we will consider market feedback
before publishing our updated criteria. Our review may result
in changes to the methodology and assumptions we use when rating
European CMBS, and consequently, it may affect both new and
outstanding ratings on European CMBS transactions," S&P said.

"Until such time that we adopt new criteria for rating European
CMBS, we will continue to rate and surveil these transactions
using our existing criteria," S&P said.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Titan Europe 2006-1 PLC
EUR723.303 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate and
Variable-Rate Notes

Class                 Rating
            To                    From

Rating Placed on CreditWatch Negative

B           BB (sf)/Watch Neg     BB (sf))

Ratings Kept on CreditWatch Negative[1]

A           AA (sf)/Watch Neg
X           AA (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Unaffected

C           CCC- (sf)
D           CCC- sf)
E           D (sf)
F           D (sf)
G           D (sf)
H           D (sf)

[1]"Our ratings on these notes are now on CreditWatch negative
for credit reasons, in addition to the criteria-related reasons
for which they were previously placed on CreditWatch negative,"
S&P said.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


CELTIC BOOKMAKERS: Creditors' Meeting Scheduled for March 16
------------------------------------------------------------
Donal O'Donovan at Irish Independent reports that Ivan Yates will
next week come face to face with the creditors he owes
EUR6 million as the final carve-up of Celtic Bookmakers, his
collapsed business empire.

Mr. Yates, the high-profile former politician, businessman and
current broadcaster now called a "creditors' meeting" for
March 16, Irish Independent relates.

Suppliers who were left out of pocket when the chain collapsed
will be asked to back Mr. Yates's plan to put the business into
liquidation, Irish Independent discloses.  It means any remaining
assets will be sold off to pay the debts of the firm, the report
notes.

In a notice on Tuesday, Mr. Yates asked creditors to come forward
and say how much they are owed ahead of the meeting at the Pearse
Hotel, Irish Independent discloses.

Losses were mounting at Celtic Bookmakers in 2011, Irish
Independent relates.  High rents and falling incomes sounded a
death knell for the business, the report cites.

Receivers took control of Celtic Bookmakers in January last year,
Irish Independent recounts.

But Mr. Yates is still liable for EUR5 million bank loans taken
out by the business because he gave personal guarantees, Irish
Independent notes.

Celtic Bookmakers once boasted 60 shops and an annual turnover of
close to EUR200 million.


INTERMEDIATE FINANCE: S&P Affirms 'B+' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on Intermediate Finance
II PLC's class A notes. "At the same time, we affirmed our
ratings on the class A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2, C, and D notes," S&P
said.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance, and the application of our relevant criteria for
transactions of this type," S&P said.

"For our review of the transaction's performance, we used data
from the trustee report (dated Dec. 31, 2011) in addition to our
cash flow analysis. We have taken into account recent
developments in the transaction and have applied our 2010
counterparty criteria, as well as our cash flow criteria," S&P
said.

"From our analysis, we have observed an increase in the
proportion of assets that we consider to be rated in the 'CCC'
category ('CCC+', 'CCC', and 'CCC-') and a small degree of
negative rating migration in the collateral pool. This has
resulted in an increase of scenario default rates for the senior
classes of notes compared with our last analysis. However, the
proportion of defaulted assets (rated 'CC', 'SD' [selective
default], and 'D') in the portfolio have decreased since we last
reviewed the transaction. We have also noted an increase in the
weighted-average spread earned on Intermediate Finance II's
collateral pool, and an increase in the par coverage test results
for all classes of notes," S&P said.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate. In our analysis, we used
the reported portfolio balance that we consider to be performing,
the principal cash balance, the current weighted-average spread,
and the weighted-average recovery rates that we considered to be
appropriate. We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios
using various default patterns, levels, and timings for each
liability rating category, in conjunction with different interest
rate stress scenarios," S&P said.

"Taking into account our credit and cash flow analyses and our
2010 counterparty criteria, we consider the credit enhancement
available to the class A-1 notes in this transaction to be
commensurate with a lower rating level than previously assigned,
and the credit enhancement for the class A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2, C,
and D notes to be commensurate with their current rating levels.
We have therefore lowered and removed from CreditWatch negative
our rating on the class A-1 notes to 'AA+ (sf)'. We have also
affirmed our ratings on the class A-2, A-3, B-1, B-2, C, and D
notes at 'A+ (sf)', 'A+ (sf)', 'BBB+ (sf)', 'BBB+ (sf)', 'BB+
(sf)', and 'B+ (sf)'," S&P said.

"None of the classes of notes was constrained by the application
of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental stress test
we introduced in our 2009 criteria update for corporate
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)," S&P said.

"We have analyzed the derivative counterparties' exposure to the
transaction under scenarios where individual counterparties
failed to perform. We have concluded that the derivative exposure
is currently sufficiently limited so as not to affect the ratings
assigned," S&P said.

"The issuer currently holds more than 25% of the current pool
balance in a 'AAAm' rated money market fund, we have therefore
also reviewed scenarios where the issuer reinvests cash from the
money market fund in speculative-grade corporate loan
obligations, in accordance with the transaction's documented
investment guidelines. The ratings we have assigned are
consistent with the assumption that such cash is reinvested," S&P
said.

Intermediate Finance II is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes primarily mezzanine
loans to speculative-grade corporate obligors.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class               Rating
            To                 From

Intermediate Finance II PLC
EUR520 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A-1         AA+ (sf)           AAA (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Affirmed

A-2         A+ (sf)
A-3         A+ (sf)
B-1         BBB+ (sf)
B-2         BBB+ (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)
D           B+ (sf)


IRISH LIFE: S&P Retains Watch Developing on 'BB' Sub. Note Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services maintained its 'BBB-' long-
term counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings
on Irish insurer Irish Life Assurance PLC (ILA) on CreditWatch
with developing implications. The 'BB' rating on the EUR200
million junior subordinated notes also remains on CreditWatch
developing.

"We originally placed the ratings on ILA on CreditWatch with
negative implications on Nov. 26, 2010. We lowered the ratings to
'BBB-' from 'BBB' on Feb. 2, 2011, and kept them on CreditWatch
negative. The CreditWatch was revised to developing on April 5,
2011," S&P said.

"Early in 2011, the Irish bank stress tests indicated that ILA's
banking parent, Irish Life & Permanent PLC (IL&P; BB-/Watch
Neg/B), required EUR4 billion in additional capital. IL&P
therefore announced on March 31, 2011, its plan to sell ILA," S&P
said.

"We understand that IL&P is working toward a clean separation of
the insurance company from the bank. Recent public statements
from the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund,
and the Irish government indicate that the Irish government plans
to acquire ILA from IL&P by end-June 2012. If this were to occur,
we believe it would significantly reduce ILA's risks and
exposures that relate to its weaker banking parent. The 'BBB-'
long-term rating on ILA is two notches below its 'bbb+' stand-
alone credit profile, reflecting our view of residual risks that
stem from IL&P," S&P said.

"The CreditWatch placement reflects our view of ongoing
uncertainties over the future ownership of ILA. We expect to be
able to resolve the CreditWatch as greater certainty over the
future ownership of ILA emerges. This could occur on completion
by the government of the legal process to acquire ILA from IL&P,
which is currently scheduled for the end of March. If this occurs
according to schedule, we would expect to resolve the CreditWatch
in early April, even though we do not expect the capital
injection to occur until end-June 2012," S&P said.

"If the government acquires ILA, we would likely raise the
ratings on ILA to 'BBB+'. An upgrade to 'BBB+' would also depend
on our assessment of ILA's financial profile at that time and the
overall business environment remaining unchanged. The ratings and
outlook on ILA would be constrained by the rating and outlook on
the Irish sovereign (Republic of Ireland; BBB+/Negative/A-2),"
S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings on ILA if the sale to the government
does not complete as expected. In this case a downgrade may occur
as a result of a downgrade of its parent or through the
application of our financial institutions group rating
methodology. Our criteria state that insulated subsidiaries can
be rated up to three notches above the group credit profile if
certain characteristics are met," S&P said.


IRISH LIFE: S&P Puts BB- Counterparty Credit Rating on Watch Neg.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed its 'BB-' long-term
counterparty credit rating on Irish Life & Permanent PLC (IL&P)
on CreditWatch with negative implications. The 'B' short-term
rating was affirmed. The rating announcement does not affect the
ratings on debt issues of IL&P, which are guaranteed by the
Republic of Ireland (BBB+/Negative/A-2).

"We also maintained our 'BBB-' ratings on IL&P's wholly owned
subsidiary, Irish Life Assurance PLC (ILA), on CreditWatch with
developing implications," S&P said.

"The CreditWatch placement follows the announcement on March 1,
2012, that the authorities (which we define as the Irish
government, European Commission, European Central Bank, and the
International Monetary Fund) intend to finalize the details of
the restructuring, and related recapitalization, of IL&P by the
end of the first half of 2012. We understand that the authorities
will decide on the future direction of IL&P by end-April and that
an updated restructuring plan for IL&P will be completed by end-
June 2012," S&P said.

"The issuer credit rating on IL&P is two notches higher than its
'b' stand-alone credit profile (SACP), reflecting our view of
IL&P's 'high' systemic importance in Ireland and our assessment
of the Irish government as 'supportive' under our criteria. We
base our view of IL&P's systemic importance on its market share
of domestic retail deposits, which is in excess of 10%, its
current account franchise, and its share of outstanding mortgage
stock, which is roughly 20%," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the likelihood of the authorities finding a
viable long-term solution for IL&P is constrained by the bank's
high loan-to-deposit ratio--227% at June 30, 2011--and its
reported EUR16 billion book of loss-making Irish tracker
mortgages, among other factors. We note that the Irish government
remains committed to purchasing IL&P's wholly owned subsidiary,
ILA. We understand that the capital injection into IL&P as a
result of the purchase will be EUR1.3 billion and that the
authorities have agreed on the end of June 2012 as a deadline,"
S&P said.

"The authorities have not disclosed the possible outcomes of
their restructuring review. We do not question the Irish
government's stated commitment to support IL&P--most obviously
demonstrated by the forthcoming capital injection. However, we
are increasingly unsure whether IL&P will continue to qualify for
an assessment of 'high' systemic importance under our criteria,"
S&P said.

"In addition, on Feb. 28, 2011, IL&P announced that it expected
its loan impairment charge for 2011 to be about EUR1.4 billion
(compared with EUR420 million in 2010). The increase, which is
larger than we expected, reflects tighter regulatory provisioning
requirements with respect to house price decline and mortgage
arrears, as well as a worsening in borrower behavior, in our
view. The reported mortgage arrears rate was a high 11.5% of
total cases at Dec. 31, 2011, up from 6.8% a year earlier. IL&P
also reported that its Tier 1 capital ratio was 18.3% at Dec. 31,
2011. However, this ratio benefited from the first part of IL&P's
recapitalization by the government in July 2011. As a result,
IL&P became more than 99% owned by the government at that point,"
S&P said.

"Our ratings on IL&P continue to reflect our view of its 'bb'
anchor, 'moderate' business position, 'moderate' capital and
earnings, 'adequate' risk position, 'below average' funding, and
'weak' liquidity, as our criteria define these terms. The SACP of
IL&P is 'b'. Our view of the bank's SACP excludes its life
operations, which we understand will be legally separated from
IL&P by the end of June 2012. Our assessment of IL&P's risk
position as 'adequate' reflects our economic risk score of '7'
for Ireland. This score is one component of our Banking Industry
Country Risk Assessment (BICRA)," S&P said.

"The CreditWatch placement primarily reflects our view that we
could revise our assessment of IL&P's systemic importance as a
result of the restructuring, as we are unsure whether IL&P will
continue to qualify for an assessment of 'high' systemic
importance under our criteria," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings on IL&P if the restructuring leads to
a shift in its deposit base, loan book, or market position to the
extent that its market share and importance to the banking system
decrease. Our review will also take into account the impact of
the restructuring plan on our assessment of IL&P's SACP, over and
above its deteriorating financial performance as indicated by
its recently announced impairment charge. As a result, we could
lower the ratings by more than one notch, or affirm them. Our
current ratings reflect our expectation that IL&P will receive
the EUR1.3 billion capital injection from the government in June
2012," S&P said.


QUIRINUS ELOC 23: S&P Lowers Rating on Class F Notes to 'B-'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Quirinus (European Loan Conduit No. 23) PLC's class B, C, D, E,
and F notes. "We have also removed from CreditWatch negative our
ratings on the class B and C notes. Our rating on the class A
notes is unaffected by 's rating actions," S&P said.

"The transaction, which closed in July 2006, was originally
backed by 10 loans. Four loans remain outstanding, with a total
balance of EUR497.48 million, backed by 52 commercial properties.
Loan maturities date between February 2011 and February 2016,
with note maturity in February 2019. The Fairacre Loan matured in
February 2011, but did not repay. 's rating actions reflect our
revised expectations of principal recoveries from the loans," S&P
said.

                       The Lumiere Loan

"The Lumiere loan is the largest loan in this transaction,
accounting for approximately 75% of the securitized loan pool. It
is backed by a single asset. The loan matures in February 2013,
when the balloon payment of EUR376.8 million becomes due on the
senior portion. It is backed by a large, multi-let office
building on the outskirts of Paris, located in what we consider
to be a
good district. The office is a very large lot-size for its
location, with approximately 124,000 sq m of office and
supporting retail space," S&P said.

"The asset has historically had a high tenant turnover and is
management-intensive. A recently reported new substantial letting
for 11 years to the French government will also boost the current
net operating income (NOI) after the expiry of the rent-free
period in March 2014. The French government will occupy 29% of
the total available floor space," S&P said.

"We believe that the refinancing of this asset at scheduled
maturity in February 2013 will be challenging, given the loan
size and concentration of the single asset. We view the low
leverage of 63% reported by the servicer as positive, and
refinancing will depend on the borrower's ability to actively
manage the tenant profile to keep the cash flow stable. However,
there is a six-year period between loan maturity and the note
maturity to work out the loan, and if the borrower fails to repay
at loan maturity, we consider that a loan extension would be
likely, given the interest coverage ratio, which currently stands
at 1.80x (senior) as reported by the servicer, Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Servicing Ltd. We do not anticipate any losses on this
loan," S&P said.

                    The Eurocastle Loan

The Eurocastle loan represents 17.14% of the pool and does not
mature until February 2016. It is secured by 41 local
supermarkets, let to 64 tenants in secondary-locations in
Germany.

"The supermarkets are each valued between EUR1 million and EUR7
million, being relatively small lots, with six pre-dating 2000,
and the remainder built between 2000 and 2005. There is a
weighted-average lease term of 4.67 years. Most of the
supermarkets are leased to a principal tenant on a long lease,
with smaller tenants making up the rest of the space on shorter
leases. The current reported loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is
81.43%," S&P said.

Supermarket operator space requirements will continue to change
over the next five years; it is therefore likely that some of the
units will become obsolete for their current use, whereas others
will be suitable for re-letting and lease renewal before loan
maturity.

If the loan fails to pay at the scheduled maturity date in 2016,
the servicer will only have 2.25 years to note maturity to work
out the loan.

"Given the short tail and age of the assets at maturity, we have
revised downward our expectation of asset recoveries and
anticipate that there may be a small loss on the loan," S&P said.

                            The H&B Loan

The H&B loan represents 5.4% of the pool and matures this year
(November 2012). It is secured by five local supermarkets in
secondary locations throughout Germany.

All five supermarkets were constructed between the early '90s and
2005. The weighted-average lease expiry across the assets is 4.88
years, and the assets are almost fully let.

"In our view, the loan is likely to experience problems repaying
at maturity, given that the reported LTV of 79.92% is based on a
2005 valuation, which represents a net cap rate of approximately
6%. If the properties were revalued, we believe the LTV ratio
would be higher," S&P said.

"There will be a 6.25-year tail to work out the loan, if it does
not repay at maturity. We currently anticipate small losses on a
recovery of the assets for the H&B loan," S&P said.

                        The Fairacre Loan

The Fairacre loan is the smallest loan in the transaction,
representing only 1.69% of the pool. The loan defaulted at
maturity in February 2011 and is in workout with the special
servicer, Morgan Stanley Mortgage Servicing.

The loan is secured by five local supermarkets in secondary
locations throughout Germany. The assets are all let on 15-20
year leases, and continue to benefit from good covenants and a
consistent NOI. There is some element of single tenant exposure,
with Netto occupying approximately 79%. The leases now have a
weighted-average lease term of 7.17 years remaining. The assets
were revalued by the borrower in 2009 at EUR11.4 million,
representing a LTV ratio of 74.21%.

"We believe it is likely that the assets will be put up for sale
in the near term. Given current constrained lending conditions,
which in turn affects investors' yield expectations, we consider
that there may be a small loss on this loan," S&P said.

               Tishman Valentinskamp Loan Prepayment

"The Tishman Valentinskamp loan prepaid on Jan. 17, 2011. This
prepayment has reduced the credit enhancement for the more senior
notes because principal repayments for this loan were applied to
the notes on a modified pro rata basis: The class A and B notes
received 80% of the proceeds; the class C and D notes each
received 5.5%; and the class E notes received the remaining 9%.
As
a result, the class E notes amortized by 27.6% on the February
2011 interest payment date, whereas the class A to D notes only
amortized by 6.9%, 6.9%, 8.7%, and 8.0%. The relative protection
against potential losses from the remaining loans for the class A
to D notes has reduced as a result," S&P said.

                          Rating Actions

"In our view, the risk of losses for some of the loans has
increased. In consideration of this, as well as the reduced
credit enhancement for some of the classes, we have lowered our
ratings on the class B, C, D, E, and F notes. We have also
removed from CreditWatch negative our ratings on the class B and
C notes," S&P said.

"We have taken no rating action on the class A notes. This class
is currently on CreditWatch negative due to the change in our
rating on the liquidity facility provider (Lloyds TSB Bank PLC;
A/Stable/A-1). The CreditWatch placements will be resolved
separately," S&P said.

         Potential Effects of Proposed Criteria Changes

"We have taken the rating actions based on our criteria for
rating European CMBS. However, these criteria are under review,"
S&P said.

"As highlighted in the Advance Notice of Proposed Criteria
Change, we expect to publish a request for comment (RFC)
outlining our proposed criteria changes for rating European CMBS
transactions. Subsequently, we will consider market feedback
before publishing our updated criteria. Our review may result in
changes to the methodology and assumptions we use when rating
European CMBS, and consequently, it may affect both new and
outstanding ratings on European CMBS transactions," S&P said.

"Until such time that we adopt new criteria for rating European
CMBS, we will continue to rate and surveil these transactions
using our existing criteria mentioned above," S&P said.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class                Rating
            To                    From

Quirinus (European Loan Conduit No. 23) PLC
EUR497.483 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

B           A (sf)                A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C           A- (sf)               A+ (sf)/ Watch Neg

Ratings Lowered

D           BBB (sf)              A (sf)
E           BB (sf)               BBB- (sf)
F           B- (sf)               BB (sf)

Rating Unaffected

A           A+ (sf)/Watch Neg


=========
I T A L Y
=========


AEROPORTI DI ROMA: S&P Puts BB Corp. Credit Rating on Watch Neg.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services has said that it placed its
'BB' long-term corporate credit and issue ratings on Italian
airport operator, Aeroporti di Roma SpA (AdR) on CreditWatch with
developing implications. "At the same time, we affirmed our 'B'
short-term corporate credit rating on the company," S&P said.

"The CreditWatch placement reflects our view that AdR will need
to raise new financing in order to repay Tranche A1 of the debt
held by its finance subsidiary Romulus Finance Srl, the balance
of which is due in February 2013. This facility has a current net
balance of EUR448 million, adjusted for cash held in a restricted
collateralization account," S&P said.

"We understand that AdR plans to establish a committed credit
facility, which in our opinion may restore liquidity to
'adequate,' from 'less than adequate' currently. This could
eliminate the refinancing risk that has been weighing on
the rating. We see AdR's solid relationship with its main banks,
notably Mediobanca SpA (BBB+/Negative/A-2), which has a modest
stake in AdR's parent company, Gemina SpA (not rated), as
supportive of the refinancing," S&P said.

"If AdR executes the refinancing as planned and thereby restores
its liquidity to 'adequate,' this could result in positive rating
momentum. This is because the ratings on AdR currently reflect
our view of the airport's material refinancing risk in February
2013. A positive rating action would be consistent with Standard
& Poor's-adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to adjusted debt
remaining at its current level of about 12%, despite the weak
macroeconomic outlook in Italy and the European Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU or eurozone)," S&P said.

"However, if refinancing takes longer to execute than we
currently anticipate, or if our view of AdR's ability to
refinance changes, for instance as a result of adverse market
conditions, we could lower the ratings by more than one notch.
This would reflect the near-term expiry of the Romulus debt
maturity and the increasing risk this poses for the company's
financial health," S&P said.

"The current long-term rating and the potential for rating upside
or downside do not incorporate proposed changes to AdR's
regulatory framework. In our opinion, if the new regulation is
implemented as proposed, it could lead to a marked improvement in
credit metrics compared to our current base-case scenario, and
therefore support a higher rating. This is because the proposed
framework incorporates a considerable improvement in tariffs,
somewhat offset by higher capital spending requirements. We do
not incorporate such improvement into our base-case scenario
because, despite considerable progress within the past year, the
new regulation remains subject to approval from several parties,"
S&P said.


CELL THERAPEUTICS: Posted US$5.1 Million Net Loss in January
------------------------------------------------------------
Cell Therapeutics, Inc., provided the information pursuant to a
request from the Italian securities regulatory authority, CONSOB,
pursuant to Article 114, Section 5 of the Unified Financial Act,
that the Company issue at the end of each month a press release
providing a monthly update of certain information relating to the
Company's management and financial situation.

The Company estimates a net loss attributable to common
shareholders of US$5.06 million on US$0 of net revenue for the
month ended Jan. 31, 2012, compared with a net loss attributable
to common shareholders of US$16.67 million on US$0 of net revenue
during the prior month.

Estimated research and development expenses were US$3.0 million
for the month December 2011 and US$2.5 million for the month
January 2012.

A full-text copy of the report is available for free at:

                       http://is.gd/jmsmeJ

                     About Cell Therapeutics

Headquartered in Seattle, Washington, Cell Therapeutics, Inc.
(NASDAQ and MTA: CTIC) -- http://www.CellTherapeutics.com/-- is
a bi4opharmaceutical company committed to developing an
integrated portfolio of oncology products aimed at making cancer
more treatable.

The Company reported a net loss of US$82.64 million in 2010 and a
net loss of US$82.64 million in 2009.  The Company also reported
a net loss attributable to CTI of US$53.39 million for the nine
months ended Sept. 30, 2011.

The Company's balance sheet at Sept. 30, 2011, showed
US$62.85 million in total assets, US$33.89 million in total
liabilities, US$13.46 million in common stock purchase warrants,
and US$15.49 million total shareholders' equity.

Marcum LLP, in San Francisco, Calif., expressed substantial doubt
about the Company's ability to continue as a going concern in its
audit reports for the financial statements for 2009 and 2010.
The independent auditors noted that the Company has incurred
losses since its inception, and has a working capital deficiency
of approximately US$14.2 million at Dec. 31, 2010.

                       Bankruptcy Warning

The Company has incurred losses since inception and expect to
generate losses for the next few years primarily due to research
and development costs for Pixuvri, OPAXIO, tosedostat,
brostallicin and bisplatinates.

If the Company receives approval of Pixuvri by the European
Medicines Agency or the Food and Drug Administration, the Company
would anticipate additional commercial expenses associated with
Pixuvri operations.  Accordingly, the Company will need to raise
additional funds and is currently exploring alternative sources
of equity or debt financing.  The Company may seek to raise such
capital through public or private equity financings,
partnerships, joint ventures, disposition of assets, debt
financings or restructurings, bank borrowings or other sources of
financing. However, additional funding may not be available on
favorable terms or at all.  If additional funds are raised by
issuing equity securities, substantial dilution to existing
shareholders may result.  If the Company fails to obtain
additional capital when needed, the Company may be required to
delay, scale back, or eliminate some or all of its research and
development programs and may be forced to cease operations,
liquidate its assets and possibly seek bankruptcy protection.


EDISON SPA: S&P Lowers Corporate Credit Ratings to 'BB+/B'
----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long- and short-
term corporate credit ratings on Italy-based utility Edison SpA
to 'BB+/B' from 'BBB-/A-3'. "At the same time, we revised
Edison's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) downward to 'bb' from
'bb+'. In addition, we kept the long-term rating on CreditWatch,
where it was originally placed with negative implications on Dec.
5, 2011," S&P said.

"The ratings on Edison continue to reflect a one-notch uplift for
shareholder support from Edison's joint owner Electricite de
France S.A. (EDF; A+/Stable/A-1)," S&P said.

"The downgrade reflects our view that repeated delays to the
completion of Edison's shareholder restructuring have impaired
the group's ability to secure long-term funding to address its
significant short-term refinancing needs. Therefore, we have
revised our assessment of Edison's liquidity downward to 'less
than adequate' from 'adequate,' as defined in our criteria," S&P
said.

"Furthermore, ongoing challenging market conditions in Edison's
key midstream gas operations and the continued pressure on
Edison's Italian electricity operations will lead to slower cash
flow recovery than we previously anticipated over 2012 and 2013.
As a result of this and the downward revision of our liquidity
assessment, we have revised our assessment of Edison's financial
risk profile downward to 'aggressive,' from 'significant'
previously. In turn, this led us to revise Edison's SACP downward
to 'bb' from 'bb+'," S&P said.

"Our base-case credit scenario factors in a weak generation
margin and only a mild recovery in the gas margin in the medium
term, mainly owing to our assumption that Edison will renegotiate
its unprofitable long-term take-or-pay gas contracts," S&P said.

"We anticipate that the binding agreement for the reorganization
of the ownership structure, signed by Edison's shareholders on
Feb. 16, 2012, will be completed by June 30, 2012," S&P said.

"There is a possibility that we could lower our long-term rating
on Edison if there are additional delays in the completion of
Edison's shareholder restructuring such that its ability to
refinance significant upcoming debt maturities is further
impaired," S&P said.

"We could consider a multinotch downgrade if, as a result of
Edison's inability to extend its debt maturities in the coming
months, we assess the group's liquidity as 'weak.' Under our
criteria, a 'weak' liquidity profile is consistent with a maximum
rating of 'B-'. Such a deterioration in liquidity could be
triggered by additional delays in the completion of the
shareholder restructuring," S&P said.

"The stability of the ratings and SACP on Edison depend on Edison
strengthening its liquidity position and stabilizing its
operating and financial risk profiles. These are affected by
Edison's weak profitability and cash flow generation, which,
however, should be supported by the renegotiation of Edison's
unprofitable long-term take-or-pay gas contracts," S&P said.

"Furthermore, we could affirm the ratings if the shareholder
restructuring is executed and if EDF obtains full control of
Edison as currently proposed," S&P said.

"This would support our assessment of shareholder support from
EDF that we currently factor into our corporate credit ratings on
Edison. We believe that EDF is more likely to act as a supportive
shareholder if it has full control of Edison, which could lead to
upside for our ratings on Edison over the longer term," S&P said.

"We aim to review the CreditWatch placement before the end of the
second quarter ending June 30, 2012," S&P said.


SEAT PAGINE: More Than 97% of Senior Bondholders Back Debt Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Chiara Remondini at Bloomberg News reports that SEAT Pagine
Gialle SpA said its debt restructuring plan won the backing of
more than 97% of senior bondholders, the last class of creditors
required to approve the proposal.

According to Bloomberg, SEAT Pagine said in a statement on
Wednesday that senior bondholders now have to "formally" give
their consent to the plan at a meeting convened for March 29 or
March 30.

Bloomberg relates that SEAT Pagine said the plan has already been
endorsed by more than the required threshold of junior
noteholders and senior lenders.

Once creditors give consent, "it will be possible to proceed with
the implementation of the restructuring transaction," Bloomberg
quotes SEAT Pagine as saying in the statement.

                        About Seat Pagine

SEAT Pagine Gialle SpA (PG IM) -- http://www.seat.it/-- is an
Italy-based company that operates multimedia platform for
assisting in the development of business contacts between users
and advertisers.  It is active in the sector of multimedia
profiled advertising, offering print-voice-online directories,
products for the Internet and for satellite and ortophotometric
navigation, and communication services such as one-to-one
marketing.  Its products include EuroPages, PgineBianche,
Tuttocitta and EuroCompass, among others.  Its activity is
divided into four divisions: Directories Italia, operating
through, Seat Pagine Gialle; Directories UK, through TDL
Infomedia Ltd. and its subsidiary Thomson Directories Ltd.;
Directory Assistance, through Telegate AG, Telegate Italia Srl,
11881 Nueva Informacion Telefonica SAU, Telegate 118 000 Sarl,
Telegate Media AG and Prontoseat Srl, and Other Activitites
division, through Consodata SpA, Cipi SpA, Europages SA, Wer
liefert was GmbH and Katalog Yayin ve Tanitim Hizmetleri AS.

                        *     *     *

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 10,
2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long-term
corporate credit rating on Italy-based international publisher of
classified directories SEAT PagineGialle SpA (SEAT) to 'D'
(Default) from 'SD' (Selective Default).  "At the same time, we
lowered our issue rating on SEAT's outstanding EUR750 million
senior secured bonds due 2017 to 'D' from 'CCC-'. The recovery
rating on this debt instrument remains unchanged at '2',
indicating our expectation of substantial (70%-90%) recovery in
the event of a payment default," S&P said.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


KAZAKH AGRARIAN: S&P Raises Issuer Credit Rating to 'BB+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term issuer
credit rating on Kazakh Agrarian Credit Corp. (KACC) to 'BB+'
from 'BB' and affirmed the 'B' short-term issuer credit rating.
The outlook is stable. "We also raised the Kazakhstan national
scale rating to 'kzAA-' from 'kzA+'," S&P said.

"The 'BB+' long-term rating on KACC reflects its stand-alone
credit profile (SACP), which we assess at 'b+', along with our
opinion of a 'high' likelihood that KACC would receive timely and
sufficient extraordinary support from the government of the
Republic of Kazakhstan (BBB+/Stable/A-2; Kazakhstan national
scale 'kzAAA'), its 100% owner. The 'b+' SACP reflects KACC's
'moderate' business position, 'very strong' capital and earnings,
'moderate' risk position, 'below-average' funding, and 'moderate'
liquidity, as our criteria define these terms," S&P said.

"In accordance with our criteria for government-related entities,
our opinion of a 'high' likelihood of extraordinary government
support for KACC is based on our view of the company's
'important' role for and 'very strong' link with the Kazakh
government," S&P said.

"As a result, our rating on KACC is three notches higher than its
SACP, which we assess at 'b+'," S&P said.

"We use our bank criteria to assess KACC's SACP," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation of continued strong
ongoing government support to KACC, resulting in maintenance of
its 'very strong' capitalization levels and 'moderate' liquidity.
It also reflects our assessment that KACC can continue to expect
a 'high' likelihood of timely and sufficient extraordinary
government support," S&P said.

"A stronger probability of extraordinary support might lead to
positive rating actions on KACC," S&P said.

"Negative rating actions on the sovereign, or signs of a lower
probability of extraordinary government support, might result in
negative rating actions on KACC. Deterioration of the stand-alone
credit profile, with sharply weaker capitalization or growing
problem assets in KACC's portfolio, might also result in negative
rating actions, although we do not think it is likely," S&P said.

Ratings Score Snapshot
Issuer Credit Rating           BB+
SACP                           b+
Anchor                        bb-
Business Position             Moderate (-1)
Capital and Earnings          Very strong (+2)
Risk Position                 Moderate (-1)
Funding and Liquidity         Below average and Moderate (-1)

Support                        +3
GRE Support                   +3
Group Support                 0
Sovereign Support             0

Additional Factors             0


OIL INSURANCE: S&P Assigns 'B+' LT Counterparty Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' long-term
counterparty credit and insurer financial strength ratings and
'kzBBB' Kazakhstan national scale rating to Kazakhstan-based JSC
Oil Insurance Co (NSK). The outlook is stable.

"The ratings reflect our view of NSK's weak competitive position
in international terms, the high industry and country risks in
the Republic of Kazakhstan (BBB+/Stable/A-2; Kazakhstan national
scale 'kzAAA'), and high credit and market risks in the
investment portfolio. These factors are offset by NSK's marginal
operating performance and capitalization," S&P said.

"NSK was established in 1995 and has focused on the retail market
since 1997, when obligatory motor third-party liability insurance
(OMTPL) was introduced. The current shareholder structure was
adopted in 2005 when a 50%-plus-1 share was bought by Russian
businessmen, brothers Sergey and Nikolay Sarkisov (48.50% split
equally) and Andrey Saveliev (1.5% of shares). The three men are
shareholders of a large Russian retail insurer, OSAO RESO
Garantia (BB+/Stable/--; Russia national scale 'ruAA+'), which is
part of the RESO Group. Tlek Alzhanov, the head of NSK's board of
directors, is the final beneficiary of 49.85% of NSK's shares,"
S&P said.

"As the company mostly operates in the retail market (70% of net
premium written), NSK is vulnerable to the tough competition that
characterizes this segment, in particular OMTPL. NSK is the
second-largest insurance company in Kazakhstan's OMTPL insurance
market, with a share of 11% or Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) 3 billion
($20 million), after Nomad Insurance JSC (not rated), which
generated KZT4.1 billion (US$27.5 million)," S&P said.

"We view NSK's operating performance as marginal, reflecting a
low net loss ratio, but a very high expense ratio compared with
that of its international peers, although on par with levels
observed among Kazakh companies with similar portfolio mixes,"
S&P said.

"NSK's five-year average return on revenues (ROR) and return on
equity (ROE) were quite strong, at about 20% and 30%. However,
2010 results prepared under International Financial Reporting
Standards were relatively weaker, with ROR and ROE at 5% and 7%,
respectively, which was due to a decrease in net profits driven
by lower investment income," S&P said.

"We assess NSK's capitalization as marginal, reflecting marginal
risk-adjusted capital adequacy and modest regulatory solvency
margins. This assessment is somewhat mitigated by adequate
reinsurance protection and adequate reserving," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that NSK will be
able to show marginal underwriting performance in 2012. We expect
this to be supported by a consistently low loss ratio of about
30%, although the expense ratio should remain high, at about 60%-
70%," S&P said.

"We could consider negative rating actions if NSK's operating
performance meaningfully deteriorated, reflected in higher-than-
expected net expense ratios or significant losses that started to
pressure capital. Negative rating actions could also result if
the company's risk-adjusted capital fell below marginal levels,"
S&P said.

"The probability of positive rating actions is limited in the
near future, in our view. However, we could consider positive
rating actions if NSK's risk-adjusted capital improved to an
adequate level, combined with improvements in the quality of the
investment portfolio," S&P said.


===========
L A T V I A
===========


SIA PALINK: High Court Reverses Riga Court Insolvency Ruling
------------------------------------------------------------
The Baltic Course reports that the Supreme Court Senate has
overruled the January 5 Riga Kurzeme District Court's insolvency
ruling against Palink.

The report relates that the Palink insolvency case was once again
submitted for review to the Riga Kurzeme District Court.  The
Supreme Court Senate's verdict cannot be appealed, The Baltic
Court reports, citing LETA.

The full verdict will be available after March 26, the report
notes.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Feb. 1,
2012, The Baltic Times said Palink was ruled insolvent by the
Riga Kurzeme District Court on Jan. 5.  But on Jan. 13,
Prosecutor General Arvids Kalnins handed in an official protest
to the Supreme Court Senate's Civil Cases Department over the
court's ruling on Palink insolvency.

The insolvency case against Palink was opened following a
petition filed by private individual Sergejs Guscins, who claimed
that Palinkhad not paid for work done by the construction company
Landekss, according to Baltic Times.

Based in Latvia, SIA Palink operates Cento and IKI supermarket
chains.  Its largest owner is the pan-European retailer alliance
Coopernic.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


GROSVENOR PLACE I: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'B+'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit rating on
Grosvenor Place CLO I B.V.'s class D notes. "At the same time, we
have affirmed our ratings on the class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B, C,
and E notes," S&P said.

Grosvenor Place CLO I is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that closed in June 2006. The
portfolio of loans to primarily speculative-grade corporate firms
is managed by CQS Cayman Limited Partnership.

Ratings Details
                                    Notional
                         Current       as of
      Rating   Rating   notional  March 2010
Class to       from   (mil. EUR)  (mil. EUR)  Interest
A-1   AA(sf)   AA(sf)     171.01      128.00  3mE+0.25%
A-2   AA(sf)   AA(sf)      32.97       30.26  3mGBPL+0.26%
A-3   AA(sf)   AA(sf)      37.21       33.62  VR+0.28%
A-4   A+(sf)   A+(sf)      20.00       20.00  3mE+0.38%
B     BBB(sf)  BBB(sf)     47.00       47.50  3mE+0.43%
C     BB+(sf)  BB+(sf)     19.00       19.00  3mE+0.80%
D     BB(sf)   BB-(sf)     14.50       14.50  3mE+1.70%
E     B+(sf)   B+(sf)      10.00       10.00  3mE+4.50%
F     NR       NR          41.50       41.50  7.5%

3mE--Three-month EURIBOR (Euro interbank offered rate).
3mGBPL--Three-month British pound sterling LIBOR.
VR--Variable rate.
NR--Not rated.

Note: "We converted British pound sterling and U.S. dollar
amounts to euro at the applicable spot rate," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the overcollateralization available to each
rated class of notes has remained largely unchanged since our
review on March 16, 2010," S&P said.

However, since March 2010, S&P believes that the transaction has
benefited from:

* Positive ratings migration of the performing assets in the
   portfolio: S&P's analysis shows that the proportion of assets
   rated in the 'CCC' category (i.e., 'CCC+', 'CCC', or 'CCC-')
   has decreased to 0.3% from 5.1%;

* A reduction in S&P's expected portfolio weighted-average life
   to 4.2 years from 5.6 years; and

* An increase in the performing portfolio weighted-average
   spread to 3.45% from 3.00%.

"We have subjected the capital structure to various cash flow
scenarios--incorporating different default patterns, as well as
exchange rate and interest rate curves, to determine each
tranche's break-even default rate at each rating level. In our
analysis, we used the portfolio balance that we consider to be
performing, the principal cash balance, the current weighted-
average spread and weighted-average additional payment-in-kind
(PIK) interest, and the weighted-average recovery rates that we
considered appropriate," S&P said.

"Interest on the notes is payable quarterly. In transactions such
as this, we typically find that the transaction benefits from a
smoothing account and/or a liquidity facility. The absence of
such features in this transaction was mitigated, in our view, by
the flexibility that the manager has to retain within the
transaction amounts that would otherwise be distributed as
subordinated management fees or as payments to the class F
noteholders. We will continue to monitor the interest coverage of
the rated notes," S&P said.

"In view of the developments, and as a result of our credit and
cash flow analysis, we consider that the credit enhancement
available to the class D notes is now commensurate with higher
ratings than we previously assigned. We have therefore raised our
rating on the class D notes," S&P said.

"Our credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the credit
enhancement available to each of the class A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, B,
C, and E notes remains commensurate with our current ratings on
them. Therefore, we have affirmed our ratings on these classes,"
S&P said.

"Our rating on the class E notes was constrained by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test we introduced as part of our criteria update," S&P
said.

"None of the ratings was affected by the largest industry default
test, another of our supplemental stress tests," S&P said.

"Elavon Financial Services Ltd. (A+/Stable/A-1) currently acts as
account bank and custodian. We have applied our 2010 counterparty
criteria and, in our view, Elavon is appropriately rated to
support our ratings on the notes. Morgan Stanley (A-/Negative/A-
2) is the currency options counterparty. We have reviewed the
downgrade provisions in the documentation, and, in our opinion,
they do not comply with our 2010 counterparty criteria.
Therefore, for the class A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4 notes, we
conducted our cash flow analysis assuming nonperformance of the
options counterparty," S&P said.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class            Rating
            To            From

Grosvenor Place CLO I B.V.
EUR366 Million and GBP27.528 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Rating Raised

D           BB (sf)       BB- (sf)

Ratings Affirmed

A-1         AA (sf)
A-2         AA (sf)
A-3         AA (sf)
A-4         A+ (sf)
B           BBB (sf)
C           BB+ (sf)
E           B+ (sf)


HIGHLANDER EURO IV: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB-'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
all classes of notes in Highlander Euro CDO IV B.V.

"The rating actions follow our credit and cash flow analysis of
the transaction using data from the latest available trustee
report, dated Jan. 18, 2012 and our application of the relevant
criteria for transactions of this type. We have taken into
account recent developments in the transaction and reviewed the
transaction under our 2010 counterparty criteria. We have also
based our analysis on our 2009 CDO criteria," S&P said.

Highlander Euro CDO IV is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms. The transaction closed in June
2008 and was originally managed by Highland Capital Management
(Europe) Ltd. As of Feb. 28, 2012, CELF Advisors LLP manages the
transaction.

"The trustee report shows that all classes of notes are currently
passing the overcollateralization tests, and that the reported
weighted-average spread earned on the collateral pool has
increased to 3.0% from 2.7% since we published our last
transaction update. In addition, it shows that the
percentage of portfolio assets that we treat as defaulted (debt
obligations of obligors rated 'CC', 'SD' [selective default], or
'D') in our analysis has dropped since our previous review to
0.0% from 3.5%. This, in addition to the amortization of the
class A notes, has increased the credit enhancement available to
all classes of notes," S&P said.

"From our analysis, we have also observed a decrease in the
portfolio's weighted-average maturity and a negative rating
migration within the portfolio of the performing assets. The
reduction in the weighted-average life of the assets has balanced
the effect of the negative rating migration on the scenario
default rates that the CDO Evaluator has calculated," S&P said.

"We have subjected the transaction's capital structure to a cash
flow analysis to determine the break-even default rate for each
rated class. In our analysis, we used the portfolio balance that
we consider to be performing (assets rated 'CCC-' or above), the
reported weighted-average spread of 3.0%, and the weighted-
average recovery rates that we considered to be appropriate. We
incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using our
standard default patterns, levels, and timings for each rating
category assumed for each class of notes, in conjunction with
different interest rate and exchange rate stress scenarios," S&P
said.

"We have observed that the credit support available to all
classes of notes is now commensurate with higher ratings. We have
therefore raised our ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes,"
S&P said.

"Approximately 2% of the assets in the transaction's portfolio
are not euro-denominated. Since all liabilities in the
transaction are denominated in euros, the issuer has entered into
asset swap agreements throughout the life of the transaction in
order to mitigate the risk of foreign exchange-related losses,"
S&P said.

"Our analysis of the swap counterparty and the associated
documentation indicates that it is not consistent with our 2010
counterparty criteria, and it cannot support a rating higher than
'AA- (sf)'. To assess the potential effect of this on our
ratings, we have assumed that the transaction does not benefit
from the currency swap. We concluded that, under this scenario,
the class A notes would achieve a 'AAA (sf)' rating, and have
therefore raised our rating on this class of notes. Under our
2010 counterparty criteria, our ratings on the swap counterparty
support our ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes.
Consequently, we have not applied any additional foreign-
exchange-related stresses to these notes," S&P said.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class                  Rating
                To              From

Highlander Euro CDO IV B.V.
EUR415.5 Million, US$43.3 Million Floating-Rate Notes and
Subordinated Notes

Ratings Raised

A               AAA (sf)         AA- (sf)
B               A+ (sf)          A- (sf)
C               A- (sf)          BBB (sf)
D               BB+ (sf)         BB (sf)
E               BB- (sf)         B+ (sf)


JUBILEE CDO: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'CCC+'
---------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions on all rated classes of notes in Jubilee CDO VIII B.V.

Specifically, S&P has:

* Lowered its rating on the class A-1 notes;

* Affirmed its rating on the class A-2 notes; and

* Raised its ratings on the class B, C, D, and E notes.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance--using data from the latest available trustee report
dated Jan. 4, 2012--and a cash flow analysis. We have taken into
account recent transaction developments and applied our 2010
counterparty criteria," S&P said.

"Our analysis indicates that the credit enhancement available for
all the rated classes of notes has increased since we took rating
action in the transaction on April 16, 2010. In our opinion, this
is due to an increase in the portfolio's aggregate collateral
balance to EUR382.5 million from EUR375.5 million--largely as a
result of higher recoveries than we previously assumed on assets
that we considered as defaulted (i.e., rated 'CC', 'SD'
[selective default], or 'D'). From the January 2012 trustee
report, we have observed an improvement in the coverage tests,
and an increase in the weighted-average spread to 3.39% from
2.87%," S&P said.

"In addition, our analysis indicates that the portfolio's
weighted-average maturity has decreased to 4.8 years from 6.3
years since our April 2010 review. This has resulted in a
reduction of our scenario default rates (SDRs) for all rating
categories in our analysis of this transaction," S&P said.

"We have subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis
to determine the break-even default rate for each rated class. In
our analysis, we used the reported portfolio balance that we
considered to be performing, the current weighted-average spread,
and the weighted-average recovery rates that we considered to be
appropriate. We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios,
using alternative default patterns, levels, and timings for each
liability rating category, in conjunction with different interest
rate stress scenarios," S&P said.

"From our analysis, we have observed that non-euro-denominated
assets currently compose 30.0% of the portfolio. British pound
sterling-denominated assets composing 20.8% portfolio are being
hedged by a portfolio currency swap, with any mismatches hedged
by options. Additionally, sterling-denominated and U.S. dollar-
denominated assets together composing 9.2% of the portfolio are
being hedged by cross-currency swaps," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the documentation for the portfolio currency
swap, options and cross-currency swaps does not fully reflect our
2010 counterparty criteria. Hence, in our cash flow analysis, we
have also considered scenarios where the portfolio currency swap
counterparty, options, and cross currency swap counterparty ('the
hedge counterparties') do not perform and where, as a result, the
transaction may be exposed to greater currency risk," S&P said.

"We recently lowered our long-term issuer credit rating (ICR) on
Barclays Bank PLC, the transaction's portfolio currency swap and
options provider, to 'A+' from 'AA-'. Our credit and cash flow
analysis, without giving credit to the portfolio currency swap
and options counterparty, indicate that the credit enhancement
available to the class A-1 and A-2 notes is at a level that we
consider commensurate with a rating no higher than 'AA- (sf)'--
the equivalent of our long-term ICR plus one notch on Barclays
Bank. Hence, we have lowered to 'AA- (sf)' from 'AA (sf)' our
rating on the class A-1 notes, and affirmed our 'AA- (sf)' rating
on the class A-2 notes," S&P said.

"Our credit and cash flow analysis indicates that the credit
enhancement available to the class B, C, D, and E notes is now
commensurate with higher ratings than previously assigned. We
have therefore raised our ratings on these classes of notes. As
our ratings on all of these classes of notes are now lower than
those on the hedge counterparties in the transaction, they are
not constrained by our ratings on the hedge counterparties," S&P
said.

"Our rating on the class E notes were constrained by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test that we introduced in our 2009 criteria update for
corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)," S&P said.

Jubilee CDO VIII is a managed cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to primarily
speculative-grade corporate firms. It closed in December 2007 and
is managed by Alcentra Ltd.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Jubilee CDO VIII B.V.
EUR400 Million Senior Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Class                  Rating
            To                      From

Rating Lowered

A-1         AA- (sf)                AA (sf)

Rating Affirmed

A-2         AA- (sf)

Ratings Raised

B           A (sf)                  BBB+ (sf)
C           BBB (sf)                BB+ (sf)
D           BB+ (sf)                B+ (sf)
E           CCC+ (sf)               CCC- (sf)


===========
R U S S I A
===========


VODOKANAL ST: S&P Revises Corporate Credit Rating to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services changed its short-term
corporate credit rating on Russian regional water utility
Vodokanal St. Petersburg (VKSPB) to 'B' from 'B-1'. "At the same
time, we affirmed all other ratings on the company, including the
'BB+' long-term corporate credit and 'ruAA+' Russia national
scale ratings. The outlook is stable," S&P said.

"The revision of the short-term rating to 'B' from 'B-1' follows
the update of our short-term rating definitions for the 'B'
category, in which we removed the 'B-1', 'B-2', and 'B-3' rating
definitions," S&P said.

"The ratings reflect our opinion that there is a 'very high'
likelihood that the company's 100% owner, the City of St.
Petersburg (BBB/Stable/--), would provide timely and sufficient
extraordinary support to VKSPB in the event of financial
distress. We assess VKSPB's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at
'b+'," S&P said.

"In accordance with our criteria for rating government-related
entities, our current view of a 'very high' likelihood of
extraordinary government support is based on our assessment of
VKSPB's 'very important' role for and 'very strong' link with the
city government," S&P said.

"The company's SACP reflects its monopoly position in its
franchise area, diverse customer base, stable cash flows derived
primarily from regulated activities, and a favorable, albeit
opaque and short-term, tariff regulation regime," S&P said.

"These strengths are offset by VKSPB's aging operating assets and
resulting heavy medium-term investment needs, significant
operating risk resulting from the deteriorating quality of its
water supply, tightening quality standards, a historical lack of
prudent financial management, and less-than-adequate liquidity,"
S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that VKSPB will continue to
benefit from a 'very high' likelihood of extraordinary support
from St. Petersburg," S&P said.

"We could take negative rating actions if we saw signs that the
city's support for VKSPB were weakening, for example if we took
the view that the city's willingness or ability to provide
tangible financial support had decreased, or if privatization
plans were to emerge, indicating that VKSPB's importance to the
city had reduced. A one-notch deterioration in the company's SACP
would not automatically cause a downgrade, provided that we
continued to see a high likelihood of support for VKSPB from St.
Petersburg," S&P said.

"We could take positive rating actions if we took positive rating
actions on St. Petersburg, or if we saw a more predictable and
long-term tariff regime, moderate financial policies, adequate
liquidity management, and greater transparency. If we were to
lift VKSPB's SACP by one notch, it would result in a one-notch
upgrade of the long-term corporate credit rating, provided that
the company's role for and link to the city remain the same," S&P
said.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BANKINTER 14: S&P Maintains Rating Class E Notes at 'D(sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
the class A2, A3, B, and C notes in Bankinter 14, Fondo de
Titulizacion Hipotecaria.

"On Feb. 23, 2012, we lowered our ratings on these notes, due to
the existing link between those tranches and the downgraded
counterparty -- Bankinter S.A. (BBB/Negative/A-2), as swap
provider.

"We made those downgrades on the basis of the information the
trustee provided to us and the application of our 2010
counterparty criteria. More than 60 days had elapsed since we
lowered our short-term rating on Bankinter, to below the level
required by the transaction documents, on Oct. 11, 2011," S&P
said.

"Since then, we have received evidence that, effective Feb. 20,
2012), Bankinter (as swap provider) was replaced with an entity
having the minimum required rating as per the transaction
documents--Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (A/Negative/A-1).
As the documentation related to the swap agreement does not fully
reflect our 2010 counterparty criteria, we have conducted our
cash flow analysis assuming that the transaction does not benefit
from any support under the swap agreement. After conducting this
cash flow analysis, we have determined that these tranches cannot
achieve higher ratings than the issuer credit rating on BBVA, as
swap provider, plus one notch ('A+')," S&P said.

"We have therefore raised our ratings on the class A2, A3, B, and
C notes to 'A+ (sf)'. These ratings are now at the same level as
they were before our Feb. 23 downgrades, when they were also
capped at 'A+ (sf)'," S&P said.

"Our ratings on the class D and E notes are unaffected by the
rating action. The class E notes, issued at closing to fund the
reserve fund, have failed to pay interest since January 2011,"
S&P said.

Bankinter originated the Spanish mortgage loans that back this
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) transaction, which
closed in March 2007.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class              Rating
            To                  From

Bankinter 14, Fondo de Titulizacion Hipotecaria
EUR964 Million Residential Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A2          A+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
A3          A+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
B           A+ (sf)             BBB+ (sf)
C           A- (sf)             BBB+ (sf)

Ratings Unaffected

D           BB- (sf)
E           D (sf)


SANTANDER EMPRESAS: Moody's Rates EUR742MM Serie C Notes at (P)Ca
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned the following provisional
ratings to the debt to be issued by FTA SANTANDER EMPRESAS 11
(the Fondo):

  EUR2,120.0MM Serie A notes, Assigned (P)Aa2 (sf)

  EUR530.0MM Serie B notes, Assigned (P)B1 (sf)

  EUR742.0MM Serie C notes, Assigned (P)Ca (sf)

FTA SANTANDER EMPRESAS 11 is a securitization of standard loans
and credit lines mainly granted by Banco Santander (Aa3 Possible
Downgrade /P-1) to corporate and small and medium-sized
enterprise (SME).

At closing, the Fondo -- a newly formed limited-liability entity
incorporated under the laws of Spain -- will issue three series
of rated notes. Santander will act as servicer of the loans and
credit lines for the Fondo, while Santander de Titulizacion
S.G.F.T., S.A. will be the management company (Gestora) of the
Fondo.

Ratings Rationale

As of February 2012, the provisional asset pool of underlying
assets was composed of a portfolio of almost 9,800 contracts
granted to companies in Spain.

In terms of outstanding amounts, around 34% corresponds to
standard loans and 66% to credit lines. The assets were
originated mainly between 2008 and 2011.

The weighted-average seasoning is 0.91 years for the loans sub-
pool and 1.15 years for the credit-lines sub-pool, while the
weighted-average remaining terms for these pools are 5.0 years
and 1.4 years, respectively. Around 5% of the portfolio is
secured by first-lien mortgage guarantees. Geographically, the
pool is concentrated mostly in Madrid (45%), Catalonia (21%) and
Andalusia (10%). At closing, there will be no loans more than 30
days in arrears.

In Moody's view, the strong credit positive features of this deal
include, among others: (i) a relatively short weighted average
life of 2.0 years; and (ii) a swap agreement guaranteeing an
excess spread of 1.0%. However, the transaction has several
challenging features: (i) a very low portfolio granularity
(effective number of obligors below 40); (ii) a high exposure to
the construction and building industry sector (34.6% according to
Moody's industry classification) and specifically to Real Estate
Developers (almost 20%); (iii) a low percentage of assets secured
by a first-lien mortgage guarantee (4.8%); and (iv) a complex
mechanism that allows the Fondo to compensate (daily) the
increase on the disposed amount of certain credit lines with the
decrease of the disposed amount from other lines, and/or the
amortization of the standard loans.

These characteristics were reflected in Moody's analysis and
provisional ratings, where several simulations tested the
available credit enhancement and 28% reserve fund to cover
potential shortfalls in interest or principal envisioned in the
transaction structure.

The ratings are primarily based on the credit quality of the
portfolio, its diversity, the structural features of the
transaction and its legal integrity.

In its quantitative assessment, Moody's assumed a mean default
rate of 21.7%, with a coefficient of variation of 48.3% and a
recovery rate of 35.0%. Moody's also tested other set of
assumptions under its Parameter Sensitivities analysis.

For instance, if the assumed default probability of 21.7% used in
determining the initial rating was changed to 26.6% and the
recovery rate of 35% was changed to 25%, the model-indicated
rating for Serie A, Serie B and Serie C of (P)Aa2(sf), (P)B1(sf)
and (P)Ca(sf) would have changed to (P)A1(sf), (P)B3(sf) and
(P)Ca(sf) respectively. For more details, please refer to the
full Parameter Sensitivity analysis included in the New Issue
Report of this transaction.

The global V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is
in line with the score assigned for the Spanish SME sector and
representative of the volatility and uncertainty in the Spanish
SME sector. V-Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and of the degree of dependence on
various assumptions used in determining the rating. The main
sources of uncertainty in the analysis relate to the Transaction
Complexity and to the Disclosure of Securitisation Collateral
Pool Characteristics. These elements have been assigned a
Medium/High V-Score, as opposed to Medium and Low/Medium
assignments for the sector V-Score, respectively. For more
information, the V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the
report " V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the EMEA Small-
to-Medium Enterprise ABS Sector" published in June 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February 2007,
"Refining the ABS SME Approach:

Moody's Probability of Default assumptions in the rating analysis
of granular Small and Mid-sized Enterprise portfolios in EMEA",
published in March 2009 and "Moody's Approach to Rating Granular
SME Transactions in Europe, Middle East and Africa", published in
June 2007.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used ABSROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The cash flow
model evaluates all default scenarios that are then weighted
considering the probabilities of the default distribution assumed
(generated using CDOROM) for the portfolio default rate.

The Moody's CDOROM(TM) is a Monte Carlo simulation which takes
the Moody's default probabilities as input. Each corporate
reference entity is modelled individually with a standard multi-
factor model incorporating intra- and inter-industry correlation.
The correlation structure is based on a Gaussian copula. On the
recovery side Moody's assumes a stochastic recovery distribution
which is correlated to the default distribution. In each default
scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes is
calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and the
outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders. Therefore,
the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum product of
(i) the probability of occurrence of each default scenario; and
(ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in each default
scenario for each tranche.

As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the assessment of stressed
scenarios.

As the Euro area crisis continues, the rating of the structured
finance notes remain exposed to the uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy.

The deteriorating creditworthiness of euro area sovereigns as
well as the weakening credit profile of the global banking sector
could negatively impact the ratings of the notes. For more
information please refer to the Rating

Implementation Guidance published on 13 February 2012 "How
Sovereign Credit Quality May Affect Other Ratings".


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SSAB AB: S&P Affirms 'BB+/B' Corporate Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------
On March 2, 2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its
outlook on Swedish steelmaker SSAB AB to negative from stable. At
the same time, it affirmed its 'BB+' long-term and 'B' short-term
corporate credit ratings on the company.

"The outlook revision reflects our view that the weak
macroeconomic environment in Europe could prolong SSAB's
deleveraging and extend the time it takes to improve credit
metrics to a level we consider to be commensurate with the
rating, such as a Standard & Poor's-adjusted funds from
operations (FFO)-to-debt ratio of 25%-30%. Support for this view
comes from SSAB's results in Europe in the second half of 2011,
and from the company's overall profitability in terms of margins
and return on capital, which are below the levels we consider
commensurate with the current rating. We believe that SSAB will
continue to record a weaker return on its capital compared with
its peers, due mainly to the company's lack of vertical
integration, and product diversification," S&P said.

"More positively, we consider SSAB's liquidity position to be
'strong' under our criteria. We also take account of the
anticipated continued strong performance of the company's U.S.
activities, the recently announced Swedish krona (SEK) 500-SEK800
million efficiency program to address high-cost European
operations, and contribution from its ongoing capex program. In
our view, SSAB's new quenched and tempered (Q&T) capacity should
make gradual contributions over time, as the share of specialty
steel increases to 50% from 37% currently. While the company does
not disclose its distribution, we estimate a contribution of
SEK220 million in 2013 growing to SEK450 million by 2015," S&P
said.

"Under our base-case credit scenario, we project that SSAB will
generate EBITDA of SEK4.9 billion in 2012, compared with SEK4.6
billion in 2011. This scenario takes account of our expectation
of a mild recession in Europe in the first half of 2012 (GDP
growth of 0.4% for full year 2012), and slower growth in China,
but slightly better GDP recovery in the U.S. of about 2%. We
estimate that this may lead to a reduction of about 5% in the
demand for steel in Europe in 2012, and flat demand in 2013. On
the other hand, under our downside scenario, to which we assign a
40% probability, GDP would contract by 1%-2% in Europe in 2012.
We project that this would lead to a decline in SSAB's EBITDA to
SEK3.4 billion in 2012," S&P said.

"Based on our projection of cash flow and current capital
structure, we assume the adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio will be 22%
in 2012 (in line with the ratio in 2011, and less than our
previous forecast of 27%), and about 28% in 2013. While the
company has a public financial policy of debt to equity of 30%,
this ratio remained high at 60% as of December 2011; we
nevertheless expect debt to decline over the medium term, albeit
at a slower pace than we have assumed so far. The deleveraging
process will be supported by positive free operating cash flow
(FOCF) commencing in the second half of 2012, as capital spending
is reduced to maintenance level (about SEK1 billion a year)," S&P
said.

"We assess SSAB's liquidity as 'strong' under our criteria. We
estimate that the ratio of sources to uses of liquidity will
remain materially above 2x for the next 24 months. Our assessment
reflects sizable credit facilities available for general
corporate purposes, with no financial covenants or rating
triggers. It also reflects positive FOCF going forward, after
SSAB's strategic investment, which is set for completion in the
first half of 2012," S&P said.

S&P projects the sources of liquidity under its base-case
scenario as of Dec. 31, 2011:

* SEK1.6 billion cash, excluding SEK0.5 billion that S&P
   considers tied to operations;

* SEK11.7 billion undrawn committed credit facilities, of which
   SEK4.5 billion will be available beyond 2013. Cash flow from
   operations of about SEK3.8 billion in 2012 and SEK4.4 billion
   in 2013.

No contribution from available emission rights, despite the
low utilization rate (idling the blast furnace in Oxel”sund in
the second half of 2011 translated into proceeds of SEK270
million).

S&P projects the uses of liquidity as of Dec. 31, 2011:

* SEK1.7 billion in capital expenditures (capex) in 2012.
   "Starting 2013 we assume maintenance capex of about SEK1.0
   billion per annum. That said, if we see strong demand for the
   new special steel capacity, we can assume additional strategic
   investments in late 2013 and early 2014," S&P said.

* SEK1.5 billion long-term maturities in 2012 and minor
   maturities in 2013.

* SEK3.0 billion short-term debt, including commercial papers
   and an Alabama tax revenue (ATR) bonds facility after
   deducting related cash in an escrow account.

"Despite the nature of the ATR bonds facility as a long-term
instrument, we classify it as a short-term instrument, as the
investors can call for immediate repayment and the guarantying
bank provides a back up facility of one year," S&P said.

* Restoring the dividend policy to 50% of net income.

* No working capital outflow.

"In our liquidity analysis, we also factor in the supporting
domestic capital market in the Nordic region. This support is
reflected mainly by relatively low interest rates compared with
the finance costs of SSAB's main peers," S&P said.

"We believe that SSAB's liquidity position is unlikely to change
materially under a mild recession scenario. In this case, we
anticipate some working capital inflow, which will offset the
lower operating cash flow in the short term, and some flexibility
in capex and dividends over the medium term," S&P said.

"Our rating on SSAB's senior unsecured debt is 'BB+', in line
with the corporate credit rating. The recovery rating on this
debt is '3', indicating our expectation of meaningful (50%-70%)
recovery in the event of a payment default. We base our analysis
and ratings on current levels of issuance under the various debt
programs that SSAB has in place. Additional issuance under
the programs would be subject to our further review of our
recovery rating assumptions, depending on the planned issuance
amount and use of the proceeds. Our recovery expectations are
based on our view of ultimate recovery and do not factor in the
benefit of any credit guarantees provided on certain facilities,"
S&P said.

"We believe that recovery prospects are underpinned by SSAB's
substantial asset base, our assessment of the business as a going
concern post-default, and what we consider to be the favorable
insolvency regimes of the countries where SSAB has its key
manufacturing assets. Furthermore, we view SSAB's capital
structure as fairly simple, with virtually all debt issued at the
parent company level and very little secured or structurally
senior debt that we believe might rank ahead of the rated debt in
the event of a payment default," S&P said.

"To determine recoveries, we simulate a hypothetical payment
default. Given the cyclical markets in which SSAB operates, we
assume a period of sustained weakness in steel demand, leading to
a drop in volumes sold and prices. In our view, this would, in
turn, push down utilization rates as new capacity in global steel
comes on stream. In our hypothetical scenario, a default would be
triggered due to the inability of SSAB to refinance its maturing
debt. Under this scenario, we assume that a default would occur
in 2016. Under our scenario, EBITDA at default would be SEK3
billion. We assume that SSAB would repay all commercial paper
through drawings under its bank facilities and that, as a result
of declining credit quality or a demand for increasing risk
premiums, holders of the Alabama revenue bonds would exercise
their put option, resulting in a requirement for SSAB to repay
this obligation," S&P said.

"We believe SSAB would be reorganized as a going concern, given
its leading market position in special-grade steel products and
its status as a key supplier to the Nordic markets. We value the
business at a multiple of 5x default EBITDA, which leads to a
stressed valuation of about SEK15.1 billion. From this, we deduct
priority liabilities, including enforcement costs and 50% of
pension liabilities. This leaves about SEK13.9 billion available
for senior unsecured creditors. Assuming about SEK23.5 billion of
senior unsecured debt outstanding at default, full drawings on
the revolving credit facilities, and six months of prepetition
interest, there would be sufficient residual value for recovery
in the 50%-70% range, hence our recovery rating of '3'," S&P
said.

"The negative outlook reflects the possibility of us downgrading
SSAB by one notch in 2012, if profitability falls below our base-
case scenario assumption of EBITDA of about SEK4.9 billion, and
if free cash-flow does not support SSAB's deleveraging to a level
we see commensurate with the current rating by 2013, an adjusted
ratio FFO-to-debt of 25%-30%. We believe a downgrade would
materialize if Europe's economy experiences a recession in 2012,"
S&P said.

"Moreover, pressure on the rating could occur if we reassess
downward SSAB's business risk profile, based on our concerns of
ongoing weak profitability at its operations in Europe. This will
likely depend on SSAB's ability to meet the objectives of its
efficiency plan and utilize its new Q&T capacity. Such pressure
could be offset by a stronger financial risk profile, including
FFO to debt of 30%-35%," S&P said.

"We could revise the outlook back to stable if the European
macroeconomic and steel environment proves to be better than we
anticipate, and if we have increased visibility on stronger
metrics and better profitability," S&P said.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


AUCTION ATRIUM: Formally Names James Cowper as Liquidators
----------------------------------------------------------
Antiques Trade Gazette reports that Thames Valley accountants
James Cowper have been formally appointed as liquidators to
online firm Auction Atrium.

Following a series of meetings of the shareholders and creditors
on February 22, the liquidators are now seeking a buyer for its
website and auction bidding platform, the report says.

According to the report, proceeds from the sale will benefit the
firm's creditors who include consignors to sales Auction Atrium
held in November, December and January.

Additional money is owed to other parties, including the firm's
financial backer, whose loans to the company make him Auction
Atrium's largest creditor, the report notes.

"This is a sad case of a visionary business idea which has simply
run out of money. As liquidators, our first priority will be to
seek a buyer for the company's state-of-the-art on-line auction
capabilities," the report quotes Peter Whalley --
pwhalley@jamescowper.co.uk -- of James Cowper as saying.

"Indications are that there are a number of potential bidders for
this and we are confident that a buyer will be found."

Auction Atrium is a Kensington Church-based online auction house.


FORDGATE COMMERCIAL: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B Notes to 'BB'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Rating Services lowered its credit ratings on
Fordgate Commercial Securitisation No. 1 PLC's class A and B
notes.

Fordgate Commercial Securitisation No. 1 is a secured single-loan
transaction. The loan is backed by a granular pool of 21
properties throughout the U.K. and is scheduled to mature in
October 2013. The notes are scheduled to mature in October 2016.

"We have taken rating actions in light of our view of the
refinance risks associated with the loan maturity," S&P said.

"The loan was initially secured by 22 properties, one of which
one has been sold. The portfolio is geographically diverse, with
properties in England and Scotland. The greatest concentration of
properties by value is in Scotland (five properties accounting
for 37% of the reported portfolio value) followed by Yorkshire
and Humberside (five properties, 17%), the northeast (two
properties, 15%), and Greater London (one property, 12%)," S&P
said.

There are 12 office buildings, accounting for approximately 75%
of overall portfolio value and passing rent. Other property types
in the portfolio are: mixed retail, leisure, logistics, and car
showrooms.

"The properties are generally geographically well located within
their submarkets, especially those in Aberdeen. Overall occupancy
rate is approximately 79%, down from 97% at closing. The decline
in occupancy occurred shortly after closing and we factored it
into our analysis at that time. This is largely attributable to a
single distribution unit, which became vacant shortly after
closing and has not been occupied since. Since then, occupancy
has remained fairly stable (currently at 75%)," S&P said.

"The borrower continues to actively manage the portfolio. There
are 105 tenants and the largest by rental income are the
Secretary of State (12%) and HSBC (11%). The top 10 tenants, in
terms of income, account for 72% of the total rental income," S&P
said.

The financial ratios remain relatively stable: The current
interest coverage ratio is 1.53x, down from 1.78x at closing, and
the current senior loan-to-value ratio is 54%.

"Nonetheless, we have observed a gradual credit deterioration in
the performance of the properties: Net operating income has
declined by 5.5% since our previous rating actions in February
2010. This has occurred as a result of tenants exercising break
options or vacating on lease expiry," S&P said.

"Loan maturity is less than two years away and lending conditions
remain constrained. The signs are that borrowers are struggling
more than ever in recent times to repay their loans: Our data
indicate that the 12-month-rolling unpaid rate for European CMBS
loans has reached 50% by total maturing balance; and in January
alone, only one in four loans managed to repay its maturity
obligations. Against this background, we consider that the
refinancing risk associated with this loan has increased," S&P
said.

"However, given the size and quality of the portfolio, if the
loan fails to refinance at scheduled maturity, we consider that
the three-year tail period until note maturity is likely to be
sufficient time for a loan workout to repay the notes in full,"
S&P said.

"We have lowered our ratings on all classes of notes in Fordgate
Commercial Securitisation No. 1 to reflect the increased
refinance risk," S&P said.

         Potential Effects of Proposed Criteria Changes

"We have taken rating actions based on our criteria for rating
European commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). However,
these criteria are under review," S&P said.

"As highlighted in the Nov. 8 Advance Notice of Proposed Criteria
Change, we expect to publish a request for comment (RFC)
outlining our proposed criteria changes for rating European CMBS
transactions. Subsequently, we will consider market feedback
before publishing our updated criteria. Our review may result in
changes to the methodology and assumptions we use when rating
European CMBS, and consequently, it may affect both new and
outstanding ratings on European CMBS transactions," S&P said.

"Until such time that we adopt new criteria for rating European
CMBS, we will continue to rate and surveil these transactions
using our existing criteria," S&P said.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

          http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Fordgate Commercial Securitisation No. 1 PLC
GBP264.3 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class               Rating
             To                From

Ratings Lowered

A            BBB- (sf)         A- (sf)
B            BB (sf)           BBB- (sf)


HOLLYMEAD PLC: Provisional Liquidator Appointed
-----------------------------------------------
Petitions to wind up Hollymead Plc and Sovereign Clearing House
Limited, two companies offering internet banking and securities
dealing services, have been presented to the High Court by the
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, following
an investigation by Company Investigations of the Insolvency
Service.

As a result of the petitions heard on November 11, the Official
Receiver has been made the Provisional Liquidator of Hollymead
Plc and Sovereign Clearing House Limited.

Hollymead plc, formerly known as O3 Fincoop plc operating through
service addresses in London and more recently in Leeds, offered
internet banking services to potential clients through its
website www.o3fincoop.com which has now been closed down by The
Financial Services Authority.

Sovereign Clearing House Limited, operating from an address in
Birmingham, claimed to sell volumes of securities for which
advance fees were paid by prospective buyers including off shore
customers from the USA, Canada and Hong Kong.


LUDGATE FUNDING: Fitch Cuts Ratings on Two Note Classes to 'CC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded one tranche, affirmed 18 tranches and
downgraded seven tranches of Ludgate Funding Plc Series), a set
of three UK non-conforming transactions.

The affirmations reflect underlying asset performance that has
remained broadly unchanged in the past year as well as credit
enhancement levels that remain commensurate with their current
ratings.  Fitch believes that the stable performance across the
Ludgate series is due to the prevailing environment of low
interest rates that has continued to support borrower
affordability.

The agency notes that the volumes of loans in arrears by three
months or more, particularly for Ludgate 2006 and Ludgate 2007,
remain lower than the majority of other UK non-conforming
transactions.  As of the latest collateral reporting date, the
three-month plus arrears level stood at 5.4% for Ludgate 2006 (as
of January 2011), 4.3% for Ludgate 2007 and 9.1% for Ludgate 2008
(both as of November 2011).

Repossession activities, in terms of both new repossessions and
the sale of repossessed properties remained relatively stable
over the past year.  With low associated losses, Ludgate 2006 was
thus able to generate sufficient excess spread in the past four
quarters to replenish the reserve fund, which had previously been
fully depleted from December 2008 to March 2011.  At the present
rates, the reserve is expected to be fully replenished within the
next two quarters.  Once the reserve is fully funded,
amortization of the excess spread notes, Class S, will begin,
which supports their upgrade to 'CCsf' from 'Csf'.

Similarly, Ludgate 2007 has been able to clear losses without
needing to draw on its reserve fund in the past six quarters.
However, In Ludgate 2008, high loss severities to date, averaging
about 41% per quarter in the past year, compared to about 26% and
33% in Ludgate 2006 and Ludgate 2007, respectively, have
translated into the continual need to draw on the transaction's
reserve fund.  While the draws were relatively limited in the
past two years, a large draw of GBP421,427 was made in the latest
quarter.  If the utilization of the reserve fund continues at
such amounts, which is possible given the high level of unsold
repossessions at 2.4% (compared to 0.5% and 1.1% in Ludgate 2006
and Ludgate 2007) of the outstanding balance, the reserve could
be fully depleted within six quarters. Subsequently, the credit
enhancement for the junior notes, in particular Classes D and E,
is likely to continue to decrease with the declining reserve
fund.  These resulting low levels of credit support available for
the Classes D and E, combined with Ludgate 2008's weaker
performing pool have led to the downgrade of the Class D notes to
'CCCsf' from 'Bsf' and the Class E notes to 'CCsf' from 'CCCsf'.

Additionally, the downgrades of Ludgate 2007's Class B, C, D and
E reflect credit enhancement levels that are no longer considered
commensurate with their present ratings.  Despite the stable
performance, the agency is concerned about the eventual impact on
the transaction's performance of a rise in interest rates.
Although arrears levels remain low, cumulative defaults currently
stand at 5.2% of the initial collateral balance, which is likely
a reflection of the reduced borrower affordability in the earlier
years of the transaction, when interest rates were higher.

In contrast to the later issuances of the Ludgate series, Fitch
notes the absence of a basis rate swap in Ludgate 2006, which
leaves the mismatch risk between the BBR-linked loans and the
LIBOR-linked notes unhedged.  The BBR-Libor differential is
currently covered as the margin earned on the loans provides an
adequate buffer.  However, if the BBR- LIBOR spread differential
converges further, the transaction will experience a greater
stress on cash flows, which could contribute to reserve fund
draws, as Ludgate 2006 experienced at the end of 2007 and
throughout 2008 when the mismatch levels were at their peak.

Sequential amortization is currently taking place for all three
transactions, which should continue to provide credit support for
the senior notes.  However, the full replenishment of the reserve
fund in Ludgate 2006 in subsequent quarters could lead to a
switch of note amortization to pro-rata basis, benefiting the
junior notes.

The rating actions are as follows:

Ludgate Funding Plc Series 2006 FF1:

  -- Class A2a (ISIN XS0274267862): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A2b (ISIN XS0274271203): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ba (ISIN XS0274268241): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Bb (ISIN XS0274271898): affirmed at 'AAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class C (ISIN XS0274272359): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class D (ISIN XS0274272862): affirmed at 'CCCsf'; Recovery
     Estimate (RE) 100%
  -- Class E (ISIN XS0274269645): affirmed at 'CCsf'; RE 25%
  -- Class S (ISIN XS0274270221): upgraded to 'CCsf' from 'Csf';
     RE 0%

Ludgate Funding Plc Series 2007 FF1:

  -- Class A1a (ISIN XS0304500431): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A1b (ISIN XS0304502130): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A1c (ISIN XS0307157486): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A2a (ISIN XS0304503534): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A2b (ISIN XS0304504003): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Ma (ISIN XS0304504698): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Mb (ISIN XS0304505232): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Bb (ISIN XS0304508681): downgraded to 'Asf' from
     'AAsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- Class Cb (ISIN XS0304509739): downgraded to 'BBBsf' from
     'Asf'; Outlook revised to Stable from Negative
  -- Class Da (ISIN XS0304510158): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
     'B+sf'; RE 95%
  -- Class Db (ISIN XS0304512105): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
     'B+sf'; RE 95%
  -- Class E (ISIN XS0304515546): downgraded to 'CCsf' from
     'CCCsf'; RE 0%

Ludgate Funding Plc Series 2008-W1

  -- Class A1 (ISIN XS0353588386): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class A2b (ISIN XS0353589608): affirmed at 'AAAsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Bb (ISIN XS0353591505): affirmed at 'Asf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class Cb (ISIN XS0353594434): affirmed at 'BBsf'; Outlook
     Stable
  -- Class D (ISIN XS0353595597): downgraded to 'CCCsf' from
     'Bsf'; RE 30%
  -- Class E (ISIN XS0353600348): downgraded to 'CCsf' from
     'CCCsf'; RE 0%


MANOR ROSE: Court Appoints Provisional Liquidator
-------------------------------------------------
The petitions to wind up Manor Rose Limited, a land banking
company, and its connected company MR Investment Club Limited
followed confidential enquiries carried out by Company
Investigations, part of The Insolvency Service.

Manor Rose Limited marketed land and other investment
opportunities to the public including the sale of shares in MR
Investment Club Limited.

The court has appointed the Official Receiver to act as
provisional liquidator of the companies on the application of the
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills.

The petitions are listed for hearing on May 30, 2012.


RANGERS FOOTBALL: Owner Denies Liquidation Claims
-------------------------------------------------
Liam Apicella at Sport Mole reports that Rangers owner Craig
Whyte has dismissed claims from director Dave King that it is
"inevitable" that the club will be liquidated.

The club is currently in administration and Mr. King believes
that there is a real danger of them going out of business, says
Sport Mole.

However, Mr. Whyte remains confident that a buyer will be found
in the near future, according to Sport Mole.

"There is absolutely no necessity for Rangers to go into
liquidation, I believe we will come out of administration by way
of a CVA that is in the interest of all the stockholders," Sport
Mole quotes Mr. Whyte as saying in a statement.

Independent Online relates that Mr. King, Rangers' second-largest
shareholder, said Wednesday the club faced "inevitable"
liquidation as the Glasgow giants would be unable to solve its
crippling financial crisis.

IOL relates that Mr. King said in a 1,200-word statement he plans
to sue Mr. Whyte after the Scottish powerhouses were forced into
administration last month.

"I do not believe that there is a reasonable prospect that the
company can come out of administration," IOL quotes Mr. King as
saying.  "I believe that liquidation is inevitable."

In a bleak assessment of the turmoil gripping Rangers, IOL
relates, Mr. King said the "footballing institution" of the club
would survive but the company would not.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, BBC News
related that Rangers appointed administrators on Feb. 14, with
Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs pursuing an unpaid GBP9 million
tax bill accrued since owner Craig Whyte assumed control at Ibrox
last May.

                   About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv.  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.


RANGERS FOOTBALL: Administrators Seek Quick Sale
------------------------------------------------
Christopher Elser at Bloomberg News reports that Rangers, the
defending Scottish soccer champion, must be sold quickly after
administrators failed to reach an agreement with players on how
to cut salaries at the bankrupt Glasgow team.

"The Club is in a perilous financial situation and that
should not be under-estimated," Bloomberg quotes administrator
David Whitehouse as saying on Wednesday on the team's Web site.
"Regrettably, we have been unable to agree cost-cutting measures
with the playing staff on terms that will preserve value in the
business.  We understand the players' position as the scale of
wage cuts required to achieve these savings without job losses
were very substantial indeed."

According to Bloomberg, the Duff & Phelps administrators said
that the club needs to be sold quickly because the squad
reductions would be on "such a scale that would materially erode
the value".  Talks with prospective purchasers will start in the
next few days, Bloomberg notes.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, BBC News
related that Rangers appointed administrators on Feb. 14, with
Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs pursuing an unpaid GBP9 million
tax bill accrued since owner Craig Whyte assumed control at Ibrox
last May.

                   About Rangers Football Club

Rangers Football Club PLC -- http://www.rangers.premiumtv.co.uk/
-- is a United Kingdom-based company engaged in the operation of
a professional football club.  The Company has launched its own
Internet television station, RANGERSTV.tv.  The station combines
the use of Internet television programming alongside traditional
Web-based services.  Services offered include the streaming of
home matches and on-demand streaming of domestic and European
games, which include dedicated pre-match, half-time and post-
match commentary.  The Company will produce dedicated news
magazine and feature programs, while the fans can also access a
library of classic European, Old Firm and Scottish Premier League
(SPL) action.  Its own dedicated television studio at Ibrox
provides onsite production, editing and encoding facilities to
produce content for distribution on all media platforms.


RMAC 2004-NS4: S&P Lowers Rating on Class B1 Notes to 'BB+'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services took various credit rating
actions in U.K. nonconforming residential mortgage-backed
securities (RMBS) transactions RMAC 2004-NSP 2 PLC and RMAC
2004-NSP 4 PLC.

Specifically:

* "In RMAC 2004-NSP 2, we have lowered and removed from
   CreditWatch negative our rating on the class A3 notes. Our
   ratings on the class A2a, A2b, and A2c notes remain on
   CreditWatch negative for counterparty reasons," S&P said.

* "In RMAC 2004-NSP 4, we have lowered and removed from
   CreditWatch negative our ratings on the class M2 and B1 notes.
   Our ratings on the class A2 and M1 notes remain on CreditWatch
   negative for counterparty reasons," S&P said.

"Our rating actions follow our assessment of the latest pool of
assets in each transaction, and the publication of our 2011 U.K.
RMBS criteria," S&P said.

"We placed all of the notes in these transactions on CreditWatch
negative on Dec. 12, 2011 as a consequence of the publication of
our 2011 U.K. RMBS criteria," S&P said.

                           RMAC 2004-NSP 2

"The performance of this pool has been improving since the level
of arrears peaked at 21.79% in March 2009. This pool of mortgages
has always outperformed our U.K. nonconforming RMBS index since
the transaction closed in June 2004. Cumulative losses have
stabilized, and have only increased by 0.04% since September
2009," S&P said.

"The issuer issued the class A2b notes in U.S. dollars, and the
class A2c notes in euros, where the underlying assets are British
pound sterling-denominated. At closing, the transaction entered
into cross currency swaps with Ambac Assurance Corp. (not rated),
which we no longer rate. To address this risk, we have modeled
the transaction without giving full credit to the swaps, while
stressing the applicable foreign exchange rate to each note. The
transaction's foreign currency exposure will decrease as these
notes pay down and we believe that the class A2b and A2c notes
will have fully paid-off within 12 months," S&P said.

"When this deal closed in June 2004, Ambac Assurance provided a
guarantee to the payment of interest and payment of principal for
the class A notes. Since we no longer rate Ambac, we have not
given any credit to this guarantee in our analysis," S&P said.

"Following our review, we have lowered to 'A- (sf)' and removed
from CreditWatch negative our rating on RMAC 2004-NSP 2's class
A3 notes. We have lowered our rating on this class of notes due
to the foreign exchange exposure in this transaction," S&P said.

"Our 'AA- (sf)' ratings on the class A2a, A2b, and A2c notes are
no longer on CreditWatch for credit and cash flow reasons as a
result of our analysis, but remain on CreditWatch negative for
counterparty reasons," S&P said.

RMAC 2004-NSP 2 is a U.K. nonconforming RMBS transaction, which
closed in June 2004. GMAC Residential Funding Co. LLC is the
originator of the loans.

                        RMAC 2004-NSP 4

"The total arrears performance of the pool of mortgages in this
transaction has started to improve since it peaked at 27.57% in
March 2009, and has remained stable since then. The pool has
performed similarly to those listed in our U.K. nonconforming
RMBS index. Cumulative losses have slowed since 2010," S&P said.

"In light of weak economic conditions, the portfolio's highly
seasoned assets, and the geographic distribution of the pool, we
consider that the overall performance of the pool is likely to
remain stable. Although the pool comprises nonconforming
borrowers, we would expect the borrowers in this pool to be
adversely affected if the economy were to deteriorate, which
would in turn, weaken the pool's performance," S&P said.

"Following our review, we have lowered to and removed from
CreditWatch negative our ratings on the class M2 and B1 notes. As
a result of the application of our 2011 U.K. RMBS criteria, the
required credit enhancement for all rating levels has increased,"
S&P said.

"Our 'AA- (sf)' ratings on the class A2 and M1 notes are no
longer on CreditWatch for credit and cash flow reasons as a
result of our analysis, but remain on CreditWatch negative for
counterparty reasons," S&P said.

RMAC 2004-NSP 4 is a U.K. nonconforming RMBS transaction, which
closed in December 2004. GMAC Residential Funding Co LLC is the
originator of the loans.

                       Credit Stability

"We also consider credit stability in our analysis, to determine
whether or not an issuer, or security, has a high likelihood of
experiencing adverse changes in the credit quality of its pool
when we apply moderate stresses. However, the scenarios that we
considered under moderate stress conditions did not result in the
ratings deteriorating below the maximum projected deterioration
that we would associate with each relevant rating level, as
outlined in our credit stability criteria," S&P said.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

Sec Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class               Rating
           To                   From

Ratings Lowered and Removed From Creditwatch Negative

RMAC 2004-NSP 2 PLC
GBP350.25 Million, EUR409.0 Million, and US$1.618 Billion
Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A3         A- (sf)              A (sf)/Watch Neg

RMAC 2004-NS4 PLC
GBP814.4 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

M2         BBB (sf)             A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
B1         BB+ (sf)             BBB (sf)/Watch Neg

Ratings Remaining on Creditwatch Negative

RMAC 2004-NSP 2 PLC
GBP350.25 Million, EUR409.0 Million, and US$1.618 Billion
Mortgage-Backed
Floating-Rate Notes

A2a        AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A2b        AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
A2c        AA- (sf)/Watch Neg

RMAC 2004-NS4 PLC
GBP814.4 Million Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

A2         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg
M1         AA- (sf)/Watch Neg


ROCKINGHAM RETIREMENT: Mounting Complaints Prompt Liquidation
-------------------------------------------------------------
Citywire.co.uk reports that Rockingham Retirement has been placed
in liquidation after complaints over its sale of troubled life
settlement fund ARM took its toll on the business.

Around 800 of the firm's clients invested a total of GBP40
million in ARM, with around 300 investing on an advised basis,
the report discloses.

Citywire.co.uk relates that many of those clients have already
lodged complaints with the Financial Ombudsman Service and could
look to pursue those claims with the Financial Services
Compensation Scheme, if it declares Rockingham in default.

Following a review of client files by the Financial Services
Authority (FSA), it emerged Rockingham would not be able to meet
the level of redress due to complaining clients, the report
relays.

According to Citywire.co.uk, Rockingham director Steven Hunt said
the collapse of a proposed takeover of the ARM fund, which has
been threatened with liquidation, had led to an increased number
of complaints against Rockingham.

Citywire.co.uk notes that the fund was suspended from issuing
bonds in November 2009 by the regulator in Luxembourg, where it
is domiciled, and its license was withdrawn in August 2011.  Life
settlement fund Insetco mounted a bid to take over the fund at
the end of last year, which collapsed, although the firm has
indicated it may rekindle talks, the report says.

"This situation has led to a significant number of complaints,
and without the recommencement of coupons and ongoing commissions
to service the client base, the company is no longer able to
maintain sufficient solvency to remain in business," Rockingham
said in a statement.

Former Rockingham director Gary Forster, who left the Rockingham
group of companies in September 2011, added that the firm's
liquidation left investors with a choice of claiming for their
money back via the FSCS or waiting for a takeover deal to
complete, Citywire.co.uk reports.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: European Union Court Questions Tough Bank Downsizings
---------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew Dalton at The Wall Street Journal reports that a decision
from the European Union's highest court has called into question
the tough downsizings imposed on many of the region's banks as
the price of approval for the giant government bailouts they
received during the financial crisis.

The ruling, issued last week by the European Union Court of
Justice, said the EU misstepped and ultimately overreached in
settlement talks with the Netherlands over the Dutch bank and
insurance group ING Groep NV, the Journal relates.  The European
Commission, the EU's executive arm, has dictated the terms of
bank restructurings using its near unilateral power to regulate
aid that private-sector companies receive from national
governments, the Journal discloses.

According to the Journal, lawyers involved in other
restructurings say the ruling shows that Europe's strategy of
seeking huge reductions in the size of bailed-out banks - already
criticized by some economists as inflicting heavy damage on the
European economy - has been sloppily executed.  Some settlements
are likely to be revisited, lawyers say, and those banks still
negotiating with the EU will have a stronger hand, the Journal
notes.

EU officials say the balance-sheet reductions are needed to
ensure banks receiving aid get rid of unsustainable businesses,
repay the aid and don't gain a competitive advantage because they
received government support, according to the Journal.  They also
estimate that just 2.5% of EU banking assets have been subject to
selling requirements since the crisis hit, the Journal states.

Antoine Colombani, a spokesman for Joaquin Almunia, the chief EU
competition regulator, said that the commission is considering
whether to appeal the ING decision, the Journal relates.


* BOOK REVIEW: Fraudulent Conveyances
-------------------------------------
Author: Orlando F. Bump
Publisher: Beard Books, Washington, D.C. 2000 (reprint of book
first published in 1872 by Orlando F. Bump)
657 pages
$34.95 trade paper
ISBN 1-893122-78-6

The book is a legal classic for adding American law on fraudulent
conveyances up to the 1870s when it first appeared to English law
going back much further; which in turn grew out of Roman law.
Bump's first chapter on the history of such law will be of
interest to readers looking for this perspective; though the
large bulk of the content is a meticulous, lawyerly organization
and expounding of the many facets of the law on fraudulent
conveyances as this has formed over centuries.

As Bump notes, this area of law has a larger number of "opposing
authorities . . . than can be found in any other branch of the
law."  In order to keep the treatment as simple as possible while
still being true to its many facets and opposing authorities and
relevant to legal practice of readers for whom it is intended,
the author takes fraudulent conveyances as a part of common law.
"This work simply considers the subject as it was at common law
with the remedies afforded by the common law."  Bump's treatment
thus does not go into criminal law or law with reference to
statutes.  Though statutes regarding fraudulent conveyances have
been passed in each state, these statutes have basically copied
Elizabethan Anglo-Saxon law and have "always been considered as
merely declaratory of the common law."  Since there is thus no
wide or radical difference between common law and state statutes
concerning fraudulent conveyance, nearly all of Bump's work bears
as well on law associated with the statutes.  He brings this up
in the work's Preface so readers will understand the framework by
which he treats the subject.  In the regular text, Bump does not
take up state fraudulent conveyance statutes except where ones
vary from the common law "to warn the practitioner [reader] that
the text is not applicable to his particular State."  The author
does not however discuss grounds for this variance between a
state's statutes and common law.

Bump begins the voluminous study with definitions at the
foundation of fraudulent conveyance.  Fraudulent conveyances are
all transfers made "to the end, purpose, and intent to delay,
hinder, or defraud creditors."  Whether a conveyance to a
creditor is fraudulent is determined by the three "points" (as
the author calls them) of intent, the consideration, and the bona
fides of the transfer.  Consideration generally refers to the
right of the debtor to use certain property or other assets to
settle a debt.  Bona fide means that the debtor was not given the
property, loan, etc., fraudulently by the creditor.

From the basics of the definitions, Bump moves on to the many
facets of this area of law dealing with circumstances in all
types of human relationships.  Not only business dealings, but
transactions establishing a debtor-creditor relationship between
members of a family, neighbors, governments, and just about any
two legally recognized parties are covered by the law of
fraudulent conveyances.  Subsequent creditors, ambiguous
contracts, and determining the value of property to pay debts are
all factors bringing complications to such law which Bump
systematically takes up.

Though the book was written in the mid latter 1800s, since the
basics of the law of fraudulent conveyances have not changed much
since then--or from when such law was formulated for that matter
-- Bump's work remains relevant and educating for anyone from
lawyers to businesspersons to lay persons interested in the
topic.  A detailed index running close to 50 pages takes readers
to specific topics of this involved legal subject.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S.
Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2012.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Peter Chapman at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *