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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, December 23, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 254

                            Headlines



B E L G I U M

DEXIA CREDIT: Fitch Affirms Rating on Hybrid Securities at 'CC'
KBC BANK: Fitch Retains 'B' Rating on Preferred Stock


B U L G A R I A

INTERNATIONAL ASSET: Moody's Withdraws 'E+' Standalone BFSR


C Y P R U S

MARFIN POPULAR: Fitch Retains 'D' Individual Ratings


C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C

CESKOSLOVENSKA PLAVBA: 50% of Creditors' Claims Satisfied


D E N M A R K

FJORDBANK MORS: Creditors to Recover Money, Government Says


F R A N C E

AREVA: S&P Lowers Stand-Alone Credit Profile to 'bb-'
LABCO SAS: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
NEXANS SA: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Corporate Credit Rating
SEAFRANCE: Liquidation Hearing Continued Until January 3


G E R M A N Y

DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA: Moody's Maintains 'Ba1' Corp. Family Rating
GELDILUX-TS-2011: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to EUR4.3MM Certs.
NRW.BANK: Moody's Downgrades BFSR to 'D-'; Outlook Negative
SOLAR MILLENNIUM: Files for Insolvency on Lack of Investors


H U N G A R Y

FHB MORTGAGE: Moody's Lowers Rating on Covered Bonds to 'Ba1'


I R E L A N D

ALLIED IRISH: Fitch Puts Issuer Default Ratings on Watch Negative
AQUARIUS + INVESTMENTS: S&P Raises Credit Rating to 'BB+ (sf)'
DUNCANNON CRE: Fitch Says Repurchase Wont' Affect Note Ratings
FASTNET LINE: Needs to Raise GBP840,000 to Avert Liquidation
IRISH LIFE: Fitch Puts 'BB+' Sub. Debt Rating on Negative Watch


L U X E M B O U R G

SESTANTE FINANCE: S&P Affirms 'B' Ratings on Class C2 Notes
TMD FRICTION: S&P Raises Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB'


N E T H E R L A N D S

FAB CBO: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class B Notes
LAURELIN II: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB (sf)'
ODEON ABS: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on Five Note Classes
* NETHERLANDS: Decline in 2011 Corporate Bankruptcies Expected


P O L A N D

CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Corporate Family Rating


R U S S I A

BANK OBRAZOVANIE: S&P Assigns 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
BANK ROSSIYA: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Currency Deposit Ratings
OTP BANK: Moody's Confirms 'Ba2' Long-term Deposit Ratings
OTP BANK: Moody's Confirms Long-Term National Scale Credit Rating
PROPINVEST GROUP: Guernsey Court Appoints Joint Administrators

ROSAGROLEASING JSC: Fitch Puts 'BB+' Long-Term IDR on RWN
STARBANK: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Long-Term National Scale Rating
VELES CAPITAL: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B/B'


S P A I N

BBVA EMPRESAS 6: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating to EUR156-MM Notes


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: North America Unit Seeks Out-of-Court Solution
SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Top Executives Seek Relief in Turkey


T U R K E Y

GLOBAL YATIRIM: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)' Rating to New Notes


U K R A I N E

OTP BANK: Moody's Confirms 'Ba2' Long-Term Deposit Rating
UKRAINE ISSUANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating to LPN Program


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

ENTERPRISE INNS: S&P Cuts Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'B'
INMARSAT INVESTMENTS: S&P Assigns Rating to Credit Facility
SHAMROCK CREDIT: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR50-Mil. Notes to Caa3


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: Performance Evaluation of Hedge Funds


                            *********


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B E L G I U M
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DEXIA CREDIT: Fitch Affirms Rating on Hybrid Securities at 'CC'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Outlook on Societe Generale (SG),
Groupe BPCE (GBPCE), Dexia Credit Local (DCL) and La Banque
Postale (LBP) to Negative from Stable.  The Issuer Default
Ratings (IDRs), Viability Ratings (VRs), Support Ratings, Support
Rating Floors and debt ratings for these groups have been
affirmed or are unaffected.  The Outlook on a number of group
entities has also been revised to Negative.

The rating actions follow the revision of France's Outlook to
Negative from Stable.

SG's, GBPCE's and DCL's Long-term IDRs are at their Support
Rating Floor and reflect potential support from the French state,
in case of need.  A downgrade of France's Long-term IDR by one
notch (to 'AA+') would lead to a downgrade of SG's, GBPCE's and
DCL's Long-term IDRs to 'A' as long as their VR does not exceed
'a'.  In the case of DCL, this considers Dexia's VR (currently
'f').

LBP's IDRs are based on support from its parent, France's La
Poste ('AA'/Negative), whose ratings reflect potential support
from its parent, the French state.  A downgrade of La Poste's
Long-term IDR by one notch would lead to a downgrade of LBP's
Long-term IDR to 'A+'.

In the absence of a material adverse shock, most likely
associated with dramatic worsening of the Eurozone crisis, Fitch
would not expect to resolve the Negative Outlook on France until
2013.

The agency has also placed DCL's debt guaranteed by the States of
France, Belgium and Luxembourg on Rating Watch Negative to
reflect a similar action on Belgium.

The rating actions are as follows:

GBPCE

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Viability Rating: 'a-' unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'C' unaffected
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+'

BPCE S.A.

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook Revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- BMTN programme: long-term affirmed at 'A+'
  -- EMTN programme: long-term affirmed at 'A+' and short-term
     affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Innovative Tier 1: 'BBB-' maintained on Rating Watch
     Negative
  -- Non-innovative tier 1: 'BBB-' maintained on Rating Watch
     Negative
  -- Lower Tier 2: 'A' maintained on Rating Watch Negative
  -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'

Natixis:

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook Revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Individual Rating: 'C/D' Unaffected
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Market linked notes: affirmed at 'A+emr'
  -- Lower Tier 2: 'A' maintained on Rating Watch Negative
  -- Hybrid capital instruments: 'BBB-' maintained on
     Rating Watch Negative
  -- BMTN programme: long-term affirmed at 'A+'
  -- EMTN programme: long-term affirmed at 'A+' and short-term
     affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Debt issuance programme guaranteed by Caisse des Depots et
     Consignations (CDC): long-term affirmed at 'AAA' and short-
     term affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Debt issuance programme guaranteed by BPCE S.A.: long-term
     affirmed at 'A+' and short-term affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Senior unsecured debt guaranteed by Caisse des Depots et
     Consignations (CDC): affirmed at 'AAA'
  -- Senior unsecured debt guaranteed by BPCE: affirmed at 'A+'
     Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'

NBP Capital Trust I

  -- Preferred stock: 'BBB-' maintained on Rating Watch Negative

Credit Foncier de France

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook Revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Individual Rating: 'C' unaffected
  -- BMTN programme: long-term affirmed at 'A+'
  -- EMTN programme: long-term affirmed at 'A+' and short-term
     affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'

Banque Palatine

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook Revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Individual Rating: 'D' unaffected
  -- BMTN Programme: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Certificate of Deposits: affirmed at 'F1+'

The following entities' Long-term IDR of 'A+' and Short-term IDRs
of 'F1+' have been affirmed; their Outlook has been revised to
Negative from Stable:

Banque Populaire Atlantique
Banque Populaire Bourgogne, Franche-Comte
Banque Populaire Centre Atlantique
Banque Populaire Cote d'Azur
Banque Populaire d'Alsace
Banque Populaire de l'Ouest
Banque Populaire de Lorraine-Champagne
Banque Populaire des Alpes
Banque Populaire du Massif-Central
Banque Populaire du Nord
Banque Populaire du Sud
Banque Populaire du Sud-Ouest
Banque Populaire Loire et Lyonnais
Banque Populaire Occitane
Banque Populaire Provencale et Corse
Banque Populaire Rives de Paris
Banque Populaire Val-de-France
BRED - Banque Populaire
CASDEN - Banque Populaire
Groupe Credit Cooperatif
Credit Maritime Mutuel
Societe Centrale de Credit Maritime Mutuel
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance d'Alsace
Caisse d'Epargne Aquitaine Poitou Charentes
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance d'Auvergne et du Limousin
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance de Bourgogne Franche-Comte
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Bretagne-Pays de Loire
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Cote d'Azur
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Ile-de-France
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance du Languedoc Roussillon
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Loire-Centre
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Loire Drome Ardeche
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance de Lorraine Champagne-Ardenne
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance de Midi Pyrenees
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Nord France Europe
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Normandie
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance de Picardie
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance Provence Alpes Corse
Caisse d'Epargne et de Prevoyance de Rhone Alpes

Credit Cooperatif:

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook Revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- BMTN Programme: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'

Societe Generale

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook Revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Viability Rating: 'a-' unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'B/C' unaffected
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Senior unsecured debt: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Lower Tier 2 notes: 'A' maintained on Rating Watch Negative
  -- Upper Tier 2 notes: 'BBB' maintained on Rating Watch
     Negative
  -- Hybrid capital instruments: 'BBB' maintained on Rating Watch
     Negative

Societe Generale SFH

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Mortgage Covered Bonds: 'AAA' Unaffected

Societe Generale Acceptance N.V.

  -- Market-linked guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'A+emr'
  -- Senior notes: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Senior guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'A+'

SG Option Europe

  -- Market-linked guaranteed notes: affirmed at 'A+emr'
  -- Short-term debt: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Senior notes: affirmed at 'A+'

SG Capital Trust III

  -- Preferred stock: 'BBB' maintained on Rating Watch Negative

Credit du Nord

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook Revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bbb+' Unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'B/C' Unaffected
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Short-term debt: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Long-term debt: affirmed at 'A+'

La Banque Postale

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'AA-';
     Outlook revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bbb' Unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'C' Unaffected
  -- Senior unsecured long-term debt affirmed at 'AA-'
  -- Short-term debt: affirmed at 'F1+'

Dexia Credit Local

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Senior debt: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- Market linked notes: affirmed at 'A+emr'
  -- Subordinated debt: 'B-' remains on Rating Watch Negative
  -- Hybrid securities: affirmed at 'CC'
  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Commercial paper: affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Individual Rating: 'F' unaffected
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'A+'
  -- State guaranteed debt: 'AA+' placed on Rating Watch Negative

Dexia Municipal Agency

  -- Long-term IDR: affirmed at 'A+';
     Outlook Revised to Negative from Stable
  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '1'
  -- Public Sector Covered Bonds: 'AAA' unaffected


KBC BANK: Fitch Retains 'B' Rating on Preferred Stock
-----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed KBC Bank, KBC Group and Dexia Bank
Belgium's 'A' Long-term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) on Rating
Watch Negative (RWN).  The agency has also revised the Outlook on
Dexia's 'A+' Long-term IDR to Negative from Stable.

The rating actions on KBC Bank, KBC Group, and Dexia Bank Belgium
follows Belgium's Long-term IDR being placed on RWN.  KBC Bank,
KBC Group and Dexia Bank Belgium's Long-term IDRs are at their
Support Rating Floors, reflecting the agency's view that there
would be an extremely high probability of potential additional
support from the Belgian state if required.  A downgrade of
Belgium's Long-term IDR could lead to a downgrade of all three
institutions Support Rating Floors and consequently of their
Long-term IDRs, both currently at 'A'.  The RWN on these
institutions will be resolved once Fitch has resolved the RWN on
the Belgian sovereign rating.

The rating action on Dexia follows the revision of France's
Outlook to Negative from Stable. While Dexia's Long-term IDR is
also at its Support Rating Floor, potential additional support if
required would come not only from Belgium, but also from France
('AAA'/Negative) and Luxembourg ('AAA'/Stable).  A downgrade of
France's Long-term IDR would lead to a downgrade of Dexia's
Support Rating Floor and thus its Long-term IDR.

The ratings actions are as follows:

KBC Bank

  -- Long-term IDR: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bbb-' unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'C/D' unaffected
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '1'
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Senior debt affirmed: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Commercial paper affirmed at 'F1'
  -- Preferred stock: 'B', remains on RWP

KBC Group

  -- Long-term IDR: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Senior debt: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '1'
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'A' placed on RWN

KBC Funding Trust II hybrid: 'B', remains on RWP
KBC Funding Trust III hybrid: 'B', remains on RWP
KBC Funding Trust IV hybrid: 'B', remains on RWP

KBC Bank Ireland plc

  -- Commercial paper affirmed at 'F1'

KBC Financial Products International, Ltd.

  -- Senior debt affirmed: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Commercial paper affirmed at 'F1'

KBC IFIMA N.V.

  -- Senior debt affirmed: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Short term debt affirmed at 'F1'
  -- Subordinated: 'A-', remains on RWN
  -- Market linked securities: 'Aemr' placed on RWN

KBC North America Finance Corp.

  -- Commercial paper affirmed at 'F1'

KBC Verzekeringen N.V. (KBC Insurance)

  -- Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Long-term IDR: 'A', placed on RWN

KBC Group Re

  -- IFS rating: 'A', placed on RWN

Dexia Bank Belgium:

  -- Long-term IDR: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1'
  -- Viability Rating: 'bb' unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'D' unaffected
  -- Support Rating affirmed at '1'
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Senior debt affirmed: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Upper Tier 2 subordinated debt: 'BBB-', remains on RWN

Dexia Delaware LLC:

  -- Commercial paper affirmed at 'F1'

Dexia Financial Products:

  -- Commercial paper affirmed at 'F1'

Dexia Funding Netherlands:

  -- Senior debt: 'A', placed on RWN
  -- Market linked notes: 'Aemr', placed on RWN
  -- Subordinated debt: 'BBB-', remains on RWN

Dexia:

  -- Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A+'; Outlook revised to Negative
     from Stable
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F1+'
  -- Viability Rating: 'f' unaffected
  -- Individual Rating: 'F' unaffected
  -- Support rating affirmed at '1',
  -- Support Rating Floor affirmed at 'A+'

Dexia Funding Luxembourg:

  -- Hybrid securities affirmed at 'CC'

Dexia Banque Internationale a Luxembourg:

  -- Long-term IDR: 'A+' remains on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F1+' remains on RWN
  -- Individual Rating: 'D' remains on RWN
  -- Support Rating: '1' remains on RWN
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'A+' remains on RWN
  -- Senior debt: 'A+' remains on RWN
  -- Short-term debt: 'F1+' remains on RWN
  -- Market linked notes: 'A+emr' remains on RWN
  -- Subordinated debt: 'BBB-' remains on RWN
  -- Hybrid securities: 'CCC' remains on RWN


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


INTERNATIONAL ASSET: Moody's Withdraws 'E+' Standalone BFSR
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has withdrawn the E+ standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) of International Asset Bank
(IAB), which maps to B2 on the long-term scale, and the B2 long-
term and Not-Prime short-term local and foreign-currency deposit
ratings. At the time of the withdrawals, the deposit ratings had
a negative outlook, while the outlook on the BFSR was stable.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's has withdrawn the rating for its own business reasons.

Headquartered in Sofia, Bulgaria, IAB reported consolidated total
assets of BGN717 million (EUR366 million) at the end of September
2011.


===========
C Y P R U S
===========


MARFIN POPULAR: Fitch Retains 'D' Individual Ratings
----------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed Bank of Cyprus (BoC), Marfin Popular
Bank (MPB) and Hellenic Bank's (HB) Issuer Default Ratings,
Support Ratings and Support Rating Floors on Rating Watch
Negative (RWN).

All three banks' Long-term IDRs are at their Support Rating
Floors (SRF), reflecting Fitch's view that potential support
would be made available by the Cypriot authorities and ultimately
by international authorities in the case of need.  However, the
RWN reflects the fact that if Cyprus's sovereign rating is
downgraded or the eurozone crisis developed in a way that reduced
the likelihood of international support in case of need, the
banks' Support Ratings, SRFs and consequently Long-term IDRs
could be downgraded.

Fitch continues to see Cypriot banks' capital as a concern.  This
is driven by the banks' deteriorating credit risk profiles and
weakened profitability due to their sizeable exposure to the
Greek sovereign and economy, albeit to different degrees.  In
addition, Cypriot banks are facing a more challenging domestic
operating environment due to the need to adopt austerity measures
to address fiscal slippage and the negative consequences of this
on economic growth prospects.

The ratings actions are as follows:

BoC

  -- Long-term IDR at 'BBB-'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR at 'F3' placed on RWN
  -- Viability Rating unaffected at 'bb'
  -- Individual Rating unaffected at 'C/D'
  -- Support Rating at '2', placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating Floor at 'BBB-, placed on RWN
  -- Senior notes at 'BBB-', placed on RWN
  -- Commercial Paper at 'F3', placed on RWN

MPB

  -- Long-term IDR at 'BBB-'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR at 'F3' placed on RWN
  -- Viability Rating unaffected at 'b+'
  -- Individual Rating unaffected at 'D'
  -- Support Rating at '2', placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating Floor at 'BBB-, placed on RWN
  -- Senior notes at 'BBB-', placed on RWN

HB

  -- Long-term IDR at 'BBB-'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR at 'F3', placed on RWN
  -- Viability Rating unaffected at 'bb'
  -- Individual Rating unaffected at 'C/D'
  -- Support Rating at '2', placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating Floor at 'BBB-', placed on RWN


===========================
C Z E C H   R E P U B L I C
===========================


CESKOSLOVENSKA PLAVBA: 50% of Creditors' Claims Satisfied
---------------------------------------------------------
According to CTK, a final report published in the Commercial
Bulletin on Wednesday, disclosed that Ales Klaudy, the receiver
of Ceskoslovenska plavba labska (CSPL), has settled up the
company's assets.

Mr. Klaudy told CTK that net revenues from the sales of CPLS's
assets total about CZK600 million.

Employees' claims were satisfied at 100%, claims of secured
creditors at about 50% and claims of unsecured creditors at
around 30%, CTK discloses.

CSPL was declared bankrupt in 2001, CTK recounts.

Ceskoslovenska plavba labska is a Czech river shipping company.


=============
D E N M A R K
=============


FJORDBANK MORS: Creditors to Recover Money, Government Says
-----------------------------------------------------------
Christian Wienberg at Bloomberg News reports that Denmark's
government said creditors at Fjordbank Mors A/S will get more
money back after the value of the bank's loans was calculated to
be higher than previously expected.

According to Bloomberg, the Copenhagen-based Financial Stability
Company, the government's bank wind-down unit, said by e-mail on
Wednesday that eligible creditors will get a dividend of 86%
instead of 73.6%, equivalent to DKK1.3 billion more
(US$229 million).

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 28,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Denmark's government agreed to
take over Fjordbank, which had requested to be bailed out June 24
after facing higher writedowns on bad loans.

Fjordbank Mors A/S is a Nykoebing Mors, Denmark-based bank.  It
was formed November 2010 in a merger of Morsoe Sparekasse A/S and
Morsoe Bank A/S.


===========
F R A N C E
===========


AREVA: S&P Lowers Stand-Alone Credit Profile to 'bb-'
-----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its long- and short-
term corporate credit ratings to 'BBB-/A-3' from 'BBB+/A-2' on
France-based, state-owned nuclear services provider AREVA. The
outlook is stable.

"The two-notch downgrade reflects the lowering of our assessment
of AREVA's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to 'bb-' from 'bb+',
and our downward revision of its financial risk profile to
'aggressive' from 'significant.' The long-term rating on AREVA
continues to benefit from three notches of uplift for
extraordinary state support in the event of financial distress,"
S&P said.

"Our downward assessment of AREVA's SACP factors in a combination
of several negative factors. Particularly, these include AREVA's
extremely low EBITDA guidance for 2011 and the challenges facing
the company's management in 2012-2013 to improve profitability
and curb negative free cash flow. The additional EUR800 million
in provisions (of which EUR150 million set aside for the
distressed Finish OL3 EPR project) relate to likely further
unforeseen cash expenditures and still important execution risks
ahead. In addition, the near complete write-down of AREVA's $2.5
billion Uramin acquisition in 2007 has raised further questions
about historic strategic decisions. Notwithstanding the announced
supportive management actions on drastic cost-cutting and debt
containment, we have revised down our forecasts, with Standard &
Poor's-adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt metrics
likely to reach a low 10%-15% over 2012-2013 (from close to 20%
forecast previously for 2012)," S&P said.

"Management's guidance in its strategy update of Dec. 13, 2011,
projects a low EUR240 million of EBITDA (before changes in
provisions and excluding the EUR648 million penalty from Siemens)
for 2011, which is less than half the EBITDA we forecasted at the
beginning of this year. It also implies hardly any EBITDA
generation in the second half of 2011. Moreover, we anticipate
that negative free cash flow (defined as FFO minus working
capital and capital expenditures) in 2011 will likely approach
EUR2 billion. As a result, we have slightly revised up AREVA's
adjusted debt forecast to about EUR6 billion by year-end 2011
(about EUR4 billion in net financial debt before our
adjustments)," S&P said.

"In addition, we have aligned our medium-term forecasts with
management's guidance, including EBITDA (before changes in
provisions) of more than EUR750 million in 2012 (down from well
above EUR1 billion assumed previously) and EUR1.25 billion in
2013. The EBITDA guidance factors in the announced cost reduction
plan, but is also negatively affected by cash outlays relating to
the additional provisions. Our downward revision reflects the
changed landscape for the nuclear sector following the Fukushima
incident, and our resulting expectation of materially lower
prices and growth prospects in the medium term. We believe this
has placed significant pressure on AREVA's management to adjust
its cost base and downsize its investment plans, as evidenced by
its drastic cost reduction plan, including EUR300 million of
internal and EUR700 million of external cost cuts," S&P said.

"Capital spending should remain higher than we anticipated over
2012-2013 at EUR1.9 billion per year, before declining in the
coming years. We understand that a substantial part of AREVA's
continued high capital spending over 2012-2013 will be used to
finance the strategic GB-II enrichment project. Management also
confirmed that free cash flow will remain very negative in
2012, amounting to a deficit of potentially EUR1.5 billion.
Notwithstanding this, we expect future debt increases to be
limited as our baseline scenario assumes disposals of EUR1.2
billion in 2012. We think that these could include AREVA's stake
in Eramet and its minority stakes in GB-II or uranium mining
assets," S&P said.

"Our base-case scenario focuses primarily on the near-term 2012-
2013 transition years, in view of the company's historic
underperformance and execution challenges ahead, even if we
anticipate continued improvement from 2014 onward. If the
turnaround plan is successfully executed, we believe that
AREVA's ratio of adjusted FFO to debt, for example, could improve
to 20% by 2014, combined with positive free cash flow," S&P said.

"We consider AREVA, which is 87% directly or indirectly state-
owned, to be a government-related entity (GRE). As such, we
continue to factor into the rating three notches of uplift over
AREVA's SACP, reflecting our opinion that there is a 'high'
likelihood that the French state would provide timely and
sufficient extraordinary support in the event of financial
distress. We base our opinion on AREVA's 'important' role and
'very strong' link with the Republic of France (AAA/Watch Neg/A-
1+)," S&P said.

"The stable outlook factors in the new management's focus on
improving AREVA's profitability through drastic cost reductions
and curbing negative free cash flow through disposals and
delaying large projects. It also factors in our expectation of
continued 'adequate' liquidity and the benefit of a long-term
debt maturity profile.  At the same time, we expect 2012 to be
another highly challenging year for the company. An adjusted
ratio of FFO to debt of 10%-15% in 2012-2013 under our scenario
would be commensurate with the current ratings, if accompanied by
expected substantial improvements in profitability," S&P said.

"We could lower the ratings if management's cost reductions and
the company's EBITDA do not clearly demonstrate operational
improvement in 2012 from the 2011 trough, in line with the
company's guidance, or if debt increases more than we anticipate
as a result of fewer disposals than targeted. In addition, we
will continue to monitor political developments in France and the
degree of state support for AREVA, which we currently view as
'high.' That said, a downgrade of France to the 'AA' category
would not in itself alter the three notches of uplift that we
currently factor into the ratings," S&P said.

"We could raise the ratings if, by 2013-2014, management is able
to demonstrate improving profitability as outlined in its
strategic plan, and once we believe that AREVA should achieve
neutral free cash flow and improve adjusted FFO to debt to 15%-
20%," S&P said.


LABCO SAS: Fitch Affirms 'B+' Long-Term Issuer Default Rating
-------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed France-based clinical laboratory
services company Labco SAS's Long-term Issuer Default Rating
(IDR) at 'B+'.  The Outlook on the IDR is Stable.  Fitch has also
affirmed the senior secured notes at 'BB-' with a Recovery Rating
of 'RR3' and the super senior revolving credit facility rating at
'BB' with a Recovery Rating of 'RR2'.

The affirmations reflect Labco's solid YTD financial performance
with revenue, EBITDA and key credit metrics in line with Fitch's
expectations. Labco has further demonstrated its ability to
gradually de-lever through selective acquisitions, despite
slightly declining underlying EBITDA (excluding acquisitions)
seen in YTD9M11.  Nevertheless, leverage and interest cover
credit metrics remain weak for the rating level.

"Labco has improved its credit metrics despite difficult macro-
economic conditions, with pricing pressure from government and
insurance payers, in its major markets, mitigated by increased
volumes and mix," says Malcolm O'Connell, an Associate Director
in Fitch's Corporates team.  "This underlines the stability of
Labco's revenues and profitability," he adds.

The ratings continue to reflect Labco's leading positions in the
stable and non-cyclical European clinical laboratory servicing
market.  This market is underpinned by favorable demographics and
socio-economic conditions, albeit with low organic growth.  Labco
also benefits from its good geographical diversification, which
reduces reliance on single country healthcare systems.

Labco's financial risk is considered high for the rating, with
LTM Q311 net lease adjusted leverage of 5.1x (pro forma for
acquisitions) and FFO interest cover of 1.8x.  Despite high
EBITDA margins and low working capital investment, Free Cash Flow
generation is currently minimal mainly as a result of interest
payments.  In the near term, this acts as a constraining factor
on the ratings.

Reported revenues for 9M11YTD were 11% ahead of the previous year
driven mainly by acquisitions but also due to organic growth of
2%. 9M11YTD adjusted EBITDA was 7% ahead although this was mainly
due to the impact of acquisitions held back by higher UK start-up
costs and increased overheads.  Recent weak performance in Iberia
is expected to be mitigated in 2012 by increasing volumes, mix
and cost savings.

A negative rating action could be driven by net lease adjusted
leverage greater than 5.5x and FFO gross interest cover of less
than 1.5x (both on a pro forma basis annualizing the EBITDA of
any acquisitions).  In addition, since Labco's ability to source,
execute and extract additional cost savings from acquiring
laboratories at attractive EBITDA multiples is a key factor
underpinning the current rating, a larger acquisition not
complying with these parameters could lead to a negative rating
action.


NEXANS SA: S&P Affirms 'BB+' Corporate Credit Rating
----------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised to '3' from '4' the
recovery rating on the EUR350 million 5.75% unsecured notes (due
2017), EUR213 million 4.0% convertible bonds (due 2016), and
EUR280 million 1.5% convertible bonds (due 2013) issued by French
cable manufacturer Nexans S.A. (BB+/Stable/B).

"At the same time, we affirmed our 'BB+' issue rating on these
three issues in line with the corporate credit rating on Nexans,"
S&P said.

"The recovery rating of '3' indicates our expectation of
meaningful (50%-70%) recovery in the event of a payment default,"
S&P said.

"The upgrade reflects our view that the recent refinancing of the
EUR540 million senior unsecured revolving credit facility (RCF;
due 2016) would better position the existing notes and
convertibles (versus our previous assumption of a potential
refinancing of the RCF on a secured basis) in an event of
default," S&P said.

Ratings List

Nexans S.A.
Corporate Credit Rating       BB+/Stable/B

Ratings Affirmed; Recovery Ratings Changed
                         To              From
Senior Unsecured        BB+             BB+
  Recovery Rating        3               4


SEAFRANCE: Liquidation Hearing Continued Until January 3
--------------------------------------------------------
The Connexion reports that workers at troubled cross-Channel
ferry company SeaFrance have been given an extra few days in
which to try to pull together a deal to take over the company --
although the present offer from the Scop [workers cooperative] is
still EUR50 million short of vital funds.

According to the report, the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris on
December 19 rejected a call from SeaFrance administrators to
liquidate the company.  They continued the hearing until
January 3, which may give the Scop time to come up with concrete,
funded plans for its future, the report notes.

The Connexion relates that workers are also trying to get the
ferries back on the Dover-Calais route as they have been tied up
at the quayside in Calais since the middle of November.

SeaFrance management ordered the ferries to remain in port as the
tribunal debated earlier buy-out plans from the Scop and a rival
ferry consortium DFDS Seaways and LD Lines, the report says.

The company, says The Connexion, was reacting to reports that
union activists were preparing to board the ships if the tribunal
backed the DFDS bid.

DFDS later withdrew its offer after facing hostility from unions,
angry because more than 400 jobs would go in France, the report
recalls.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Nov. 18,
2011, The Telegraph said Seafrance was put into liquidation by a
Paris commercial court, which rejected two bids to save the
cross-Channel operator. According to the Telegraph, the court
said that new bids to take over the company will be accepted
until December 12. French shipping firm Louis Dreyfus Armateurs
and Danish ferry company DFDS Seaways had made a joint EUR5
million GBP4.3 million) offer for some of the firm's assets and
planned o keep on half its workforce, the Telegraph disclosed.
The second offer, organized by the trade union involved, CFDT,
would have turned the ferry operator into a workers' co-
operative, but the court, as cited by the Telegraph, said there
was no capital to finance this.

SeaFrance was put into receivership last year after suffering
from competition from the Channel Tunnel, the Telegraph
recounted. Its management previously attempted to buy out the
company with backing from its parent company SNCF, the French
state-owned rail firm, but Brussels rejected the restructuring
plan as it was based on state aid, the Telegraph stated.  The
French government said it will appeal the ruling, the Telegraph
noted.

Seafrance is a French ferry company.  SeaFrance carries 3.5
million passengers a year between Dover and Calais and employs
850 staff in the UK and France.


=============
G E R M A N Y
=============


DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA: Moody's Maintains 'Ba1' Corp. Family Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's maintains these ratings on Deutsche Lufthansa
Aktiengesellschaft and its following affiliates:

Long Term Corporate Family (domestic currency) ratings of Ba1

Probability of Default ratings of Ba1

Senior Unsecured (domestic currency) ratings of Ba1

Senior Unsecured MTN Program (domestic currency) ratings of
(P)Ba1

Other Short Term ratings of NP

Other Short Term (domestic currency) ratings of (P)NP

LGD Senior Unsecured (domestic currency) ratings of 52 - LGD4

Lufthansa Malta Finance Ltd.

BACKED Senior Unsecured MTN Program (domestic currency) ratings
of (P)Ba1

BACKED Other Short Term (domestic currency) ratings of (P)NP

RATINGS RATIONALE

Lufthansa's current ratings reflect its very diversified route
network and business segments and its solid liquidity position,
as well as the improvement in metrics since FYE2009. They also
reflect Moody's cautious outlook for the industry at this time,
given the recent high levels of fuel prices which Moody's
believes could hamper industry profitability if they are
sustained; as well as the general economic outlook in the
Eurozone.

The stable outlook reflects Moody's view that the industry
recovery in 2010 and a more conservative financial policy have
enabled Lufthansa to restore metrics to levels in line with the
rating category. A continuation of this trend could be positive
for the rating or outlook, although as noted earlier Moody's
believes that fuel prices and generally weak economic growth in
Europe in particular may delay or impede a further recovery in
industry earnings.

For positive pressure on the rating or outlook, Moody's expects
to see gross leverage remain close to or below 4x with RCF/Net
debt remaining at least at 25% on a pro forma basis for the
resumption in dividend payments.

Although not expected at this time, downward pressure on the
rating or outlook could occur if gross leverage were to remain
above 5x on a continued basis, of if there were a substantial
deterioration in liquidity.

The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global
Passenger Airlines published in March 2009. Other methodologies
used include Loss Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-
Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in
June 2009.

Lufthansa, headquartered in Cologne, Germany, is the leading
European airline in terms of revenues. In FY2010 it reported
revenues and an operating result of EUR27.3 billion and EUR876
million, respectively. The group's revenue base consists
primarily of four divisions (excluding IT services): the
Passenger Airline Group, or the passenger division (74% of the
group's external 2010 revenues) is the largest in Europe in terms
of passenger numbers; Lufthansa Cargo (10.1% of group revenues)
which, is the third-largest cargo airline in the world behind
Korean Air Cargo and Cathay Pacific Cargo; Lufthansa Technik
("the MRO division") (8.7% of group revenues) which is a supplier
of engineering services for civil aircrafts; and LSG Sky Chefs
(the catering division) (6.3% of FY10 revenues) which is a
leading airline caterer.


GELDILUX-TS-2011: Moody's Assigns Ba3 Rating to EUR4.3MM Certs.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to the
following class of notes issued by GELDILUX-TS-2011 S.A.:

Issuer: GELDILUX-TS-2011 S.A.

   -- EUR150M A1 Certificate, Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR200M A2 Certificate, Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR42.5M B Certificate, Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR17.1M C Certificate, Assigned A2 (sf)

   -- EUR3.5M D Certificate, Assigned Baa3 (sf)

   -- EUR4.3M E Certificate, Assigned Ba3 (sf)

   -- EUR6.4M Secured Floating Rate Liquidity Notes Certificate,
      Assigned Aa2 (sf)

Moody's Investors Service has not assigned ratings to the EUR
7.7M Class F Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2016.

Geldilux-TS-2011 S.A. is a cash securitization of short-term euro
loan receivables granted to small and medium-sized enterprises
(SME) and/or individuals domiciled in Germany and extended by
UniCredit Luxembourg S.A. in cooperation with UniCredit Bank AG.

Ratings Rationale

The ratings of the notes take account of UniCredit Luxembourg
S.A. (currently rated Baa1/P-2/both on watch for possible
downgrade) and UniCredit Bank AG (currently rated A2/P-1/both on
watch for possible downgrade), as the major transaction parties
in this transaction, being experienced originators and servicers
respectively. In the past, they have used ABS term financing via
the previously issued ten GELDILUX transactions in respect of
which the securitized portfolios have shown excellent performance
to date (i.e. in total over all transactions only 12 obligors
have defaulted since 1996). Moody's valued positively the
limitation of the potential deterioration of credit quality
during the 2.5-years revolving period via eligibility criteria
and portfolio limits as the portfolio turns around very quickly
(with a max. weighted average life of 90 days). Similarly, in its
analysis Moody's relied strongly on the early amortization
triggers, especially the one stopping the replenishment period in
case UniCredit Bank AG loses a minimum long term rating of A3. In
such situation the portfolio becomes static and - due to the 90
days weighted average life constraint - amortizes quickly. In
addition, upon UniCredit Bank AG losing a Baa2 rating obligors
will be notified and are also asked to pay directly to the
issuer's account. The liquidity cushion in the transaction is
provided by (i) the interest rate swap counterparty (paying 0.50%
of extra spread to the structure) and (ii) the EUR 6.4 million
issuer interest reserve, which is funded by the liquidity note
and available to fund shortfalls in respect of senior fees,
interest on the class A to E notes as well as interest on the
liquidity notes.

Moody's main modeling assumption for this transaction is the
bespoke default distribution derived via the Monte Carlo
simulation in CDOROM (v2.8). Moody's derived this default
distribution from (i) the most concentrated pool composition
(with the minimum limit of 500 obligors) that would be possible
in terms of industry and single obligor concentration during the
lifetime of the transaction (based on the portfolio limits
defined in the transaction documents), (ii) a global correlation
of 5% and (iii) the average expected portfolio quality. Moody's
expects the average default probability of the pool to be a Baa3
Moody's equivalent (translating into 0.1% cumulative default rate
over a weighted average life of 90 days) taking into account: (i)
the product characteristics and the historical performance data
and (ii) potential fluctuations of the macroeconomic environment
during the lifetime of this transaction (including the 2.5 years
revolving period). The average fixed recovery rate assumption was
set at 25% in line with previous transactions because the non-
accessory collateral is not assigned to the SPV since it is
granted by the borrower on a relationship level rather than for
the euro loan specifically. Therefore, in case of UniCredit Bank
AG's insolvency the issuer depends on recoveries assigned by the
insolvency administrator, leaving the issuer in the position of a
senior unsecured creditor. Finally, no prepayments were assumed
because of the short-term nature of the underlying loan
receivables there are no prepayments for these loan receivables.

Moody's also tested other set of assumptions under its Parameter
Sensitivities analysis. The results show that the model output
for the Class A1 and A2 notes would not change, while the model
output for Class B notes would be 4 notches lower if the mean
default rate assumption was to increase to 0.4% (reflecting a
two-notch-worse pool quality), all other parameters kept
unchanged. Similarly, the model output would be unchanged for the
Class A1 and A2 notes, while the Class B model output would be 1
notch lower if the mean recovery rate assumption was to decrease
to 15%. For more details, please refer to the full Parameter
Sensitivity analysis included in the New Issue Report of this
transaction.

The main source of uncertainty in the analysis relates to (i) the
high level of dependency on the originator to roll-over the
expriring euro loan into a new euro loan and / or other means of
bank financing (such as a working capital line) and (ii)
uncertainty regarding the European macroeconomic conditions and
resulting negative effects on borrowers' credit quality. These
aspects are reflected in the Medium V-Score for the transaction
which is in line with the German SME ABS sector overall.
Nonetheless, for three sub-categories Moody's considers this
transaction better than the market. First, the originator
provided a comprehensive set of different historical data
covering more than 10 years of data. Second, Moody's believes
that the historical data performance variability is significantly
lower than for other German SME loan receivable portfolios, which
is caused by (i) the short-term nature of the loan contracts and
(ii) the specific origination and collection process applied to
this product type. Third, UniCredit Bank AG retains the Class B
to Class F notes, which ensures a stronger alignment of interests
than observed in the German ABS SME market.

As noted in Moody's comment 'Rising Severity of Euro Area
Sovereign Crisis Threatens Credit Standing of All EU Sovereigns'
(28 November 2011), the risk of sovereign defaults or the exit of
countries from the Euro area is rising. As a result, Moody's
could lower the maximum achievable rating for structured finance
transactions in some countries, which could result in rating
downgrades.

The methodologies used in rating were Moody's Approach to Rating
CDOs of SMEs in Europe, published in February 2007, Refining the
ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Default assumptions in
the rating analysis of granular Small and Mid-sized Enterprise
portfolios in EMEA published in March 2009, and Moody's Approach
to Rating Granular SME Transactions in Europe, Middle East and
Africa published in June 2007.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in "V Score and
Parameter Sensitivities in the EMEA Small-to-Medium Enterprise
ABS Sector" published in June 2009.

For rating this transaction Moody's used the following model. (i)
ABSROM (v.2.2.16) to model the cash flows and determine the loss
for each tranche and (ii) CDOROM(TM) (v.2.8) to determine the
transaction specific default distribution.

More specifically, Moody's ABSROM cash flow model evaluates all
default scenarios that are then weighted considering the
probabilities of such default scenarios as defined by the
transaction-specific default distribution (as simulated in
CDOROM(TM)). On the recovery side Moody's assumes a fixed rate
recovery. In the cash flow model Moody's modeled the initial as
well as each replenished portfolio separately with equally
distributed amortization and timing of default vectors over 90
days. Similarly, the above described transaction specific default
distribution is applied to each portfolio when determining the
cash flows for each portfolio period. The non defaulted amount is
used to purchase the new portfolio with the same characteristics
in terms of amortization and yield during the replenishment
period and as long as no early amortization event occurs.
Thereafter the principal collections are used to pay down the
notes. The ultimate losses in the portfolio are allocated to the
Class A1 / A2 to Class F notes in full reverse sequential order.
In each default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class
of notes is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the
assets and the outgoing payments to third parties and
noteholders. Therefore, the expected loss for each tranche is the
sum product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's analysis
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

Moody's used CDOROM to simulate the default distribution for this
transaction. The Moody's CDOROM(TM) model is a Monte Carlo
simulation which takes borrower specific Moody's default
probabilities as input. Each borrower reference entity is
modelled individually with a standard multi-factor model
incorporating intra- and inter-industry correlation. The
correlation structure is based on a Gaussian copula. In each
Monte Carlo scenario, defaults are simulated.


NRW.BANK: Moody's Downgrades BFSR to 'D-'; Outlook Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has revised the baseline credit
assessment for NRW.BANK to 13 from 11. The BCA (which is measured
on a scale from 1 to 21, where 1 represents the lowest credit
risk) forms one of the four rating inputs in accordance with
Moody's methodology for Government-Related Issuers ("GRIs"). The
lower BCA is based on NRW.BANK's standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) which has been downgraded to D-, mapping
to Ba3 on the long-term scale, from D+, mapping to Ba1,
previously. A negative outlook has been assigned to the BFSR, and
concurrently the rating was withdrawn.

Moody's has withdrawn NRW.BANK's D- BFSR for its own business
reasons, whilst the BCA of 13 will be maintained. Please refer to
Moody's Investors Service's Withdrawal Policy, which can be found
on Moody's Web site, http://www.moodys.com

The Aa1 long-term and Prime-1 short-term ratings are not affected
by the rating action.

The rating action concludes the review of the BFSR initiated on
July 29, 2011.

Ratings Rationale

The downgrade of the BFSR was triggered by Moody's previous
concerns about NRW.BANK's increased risk positioning especially
in view of the sizeable security investments and credit default
swaps (CDS protection sold) which are currently adversely
affected by spread widening in financial institutions and by the
sovereign credit markets during the second half of 2011.

While NRW.BANK is not directly affected by mark-to-market
valuations under local German GAAP reporting, the rating agency
is concerned about the increase in the contingent liabilities
from the investment portfolios. Moody's cautions that any
potential future crystallization of these valuation losses under
an adverse scenario of the ongoing European debt crisis could
severely affect the bank's financial position. In particular, the
rating agency regards the bank's regulatory capital position as
vulnerable given the acceleration of the current debt crisis.
NRW.BANK's capital position is still developing and, in spite of
the significant book equity, its regulatory capital remains (for
the time being) materially lower, thereby reducing the scope to
absorb potential future losses.

Furthermore, Moody's assessment also incorporates the risks
represented by confidence-sensitive money market funding and the
resulting funding imbalances. Due to its special status as a
regional promotional bank that benefits from the fully guaranteed
status by the Federal State of North-Rhine Westphalia, NRW.BANK
is currently in a position to raise a significant portion of its
funding needs in the international short-term money markets at
competitive pricing. While Moody's understands that adequate
back-up liquidity is available, which can be used as collateral
for repo transactions with the ECB; however, the rating agency is
concerned about the short-dated funding profile in the current
market environment.

In the absence of further risk mitigating strategies by the bank
and its owner, the State of North Rhine-Westphalia (rated Aa1),
the banks standalone profile is therefore more commensurate with
a BFSR at the D- level with a negative outlook.

What could change the rating Up / Down

Positive rating actions on the State of North Rhine-Westphalia
could result in upward pressure on NRW.BANK's long-term debt
ratings.

Negative rating actions on the State of North Rhine-Westphalia or
a change in the guaranteed status of NRW.BANK could exert
downward pressure on the bank's long-term debt ratings.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007, and
Government-Related Issuers: Methodology Update published in July
2010.


SOLAR MILLENNIUM: Files for Insolvency on Lack of Investors
-----------------------------------------------------------
Stefan Nicola at Bloomberg News reports that Solar Millennium AG
has filed for insolvency.

According to Bloomberg, the company said in a statement that the
filing cited slow progress in selling U.S. projects and a failure
to reach an agreement to bring in investors to the Ibersol
project in Spain.

"Both transactions would have generated funds beyond the current
need for liquidity which would have laid the foundation for a
further development of the company," Bloomberg quotes Solar
Millennium as saying.

The firm said in a statement on Wednesday that the insolvency
administrator, Volker Boehm from law firm Schultze & Braun, went
to company headquarters to determine whether business can be
maintained, Bloomberg relates.

Solar Millennium on Tuesday warned that the sale of its 2,250
megawatt-project pipeline wouldn't be concluded by year-end,
Bloomberg discloses.

Germany's Solarhybrid AG had asked Tempe, Arizona-based First
Solar Inc., the world's biggest maker of thin-film panels, to
form a joint venture to pursue the deal, Bloomberg notes.

Solar Millennium AG is an Erlangen-based solar company.


=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


FHB MORTGAGE: Moody's Lowers Rating on Covered Bonds to 'Ba1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded to Ba1 from Baa3 (on
review for downgrade) FHB Mortgage Bank's (FHB) covered bonds.
This rating action follows Moody's downgrade of the issuer rating
of FHB to Ba3 from Ba2 (on review for downgrade). FHB's covered
bonds were previously placed on review for downgrade on
October 5.

The covered bonds issued by OTP Mortgage Bank (OTP) under its
covered bond program were confirmed at Baa3. The confirmation
follows the confirmation of the long-term senior unsecured rating
of OTP Bank Nyrt at Ba1. The covered bonds of OTP were previously
placed on review for downgrade on October 5.

Ratings Rationale

The rating action on FHB's covered bonds was prompted by the
rating action taken by Moody's Financial Institutions Group on
the issuer rating of FHB Mortgage Bank, which was downgraded to
Ba3/Not-Prime from Ba2/Not-Prime on 16 December. For further
information on the rating actions taken by Moody's Financial
Institutions Group, please refer to "Moody's takes multiple
rating actions on Hungarian banks", published on 16 December
2011.

The confirmation of OTP's covered bonds at Baa3 follows the
confirmation of the Ba1/Not-Prime senior unsecured rating of OTP
NyRt by Moody's Financial Institutions Group on December 16.
While the issuer of the covered bonds is OTP, Moody's uses the
senior unsecured rating of OTP Bank NyRt, the parent bank of OTP,
as the "issuer rating" for its covered bond analysis as OTP NyRt
provides a full, irrevocable and unconditional guarantee of OTP's
obligations.

The difficulties for the Hungarian economy have been highlighted
by rating actions and opinions issued by Moody's sovereign rating
group. On December 1, 2011, Moody's published a special comment,
"Key Drivers of Hungary's Downgrade to Ba1", in which Moody's
expressed its concerns about the rising uncertainty surrounding
Hungary's ability to meet its medium-term targets for fiscal
consolidation and public sector debt reduction as well as the
increased susceptibility to event risk stemming from the
government's high debt burden, heavy reliance on external
investors and large financing needs.

A downgrade of an issuer's senior unsecured ratings negatively
affects the covered bonds through its impact on both the timely
payment indicator (TPI) framework and the expected loss method.

Both covered bond programs are assigned a TPI of "Very
Improbable". Under Moody's TPI table a maximum rating of Baa3
would be indicated for both issuers. This is where OTP's covered
bond ratings have been positioned, at one notch above the issuer
rating.

In the case of FHB, against the backdrop of sovereign stress and,
in particular, covered bondholders' exposure to both refinancing
and foreign-exchange risk, Moody's has continued to position the
covered bond ratings two notches above the issuer rating and
believes that further uplift is not appropriate in the current
environment. FHB's program has material amounts of both euro-
denominated covered bonds and swiss-franc denominated cover pool
loan exposures. In that context, Moody's believes recoveries for
covered bondholders may be threatened by political and economic
factors, such as devaluation and redenomination, particularly in
the event of a Hungarian Government default. Factoring the
resulting uncertainties into Moody's timely payment analysis has
therefore constrained the rating to Ba1.

KEY RATING ASSUMPTIONS/FACTORS

Covered bond ratings are determined after applying a two-step
process: expected loss analysis and TPI framework analysis.

EXPECTED LOSS: Moody's determines a rating based on the expected
loss on the bond. The primary model used is Moody's Covered Bond
Model (COBOL), which determines expected loss as (i) a function
of the issuer's probability of default (measured by the issuer's
rating); and (ii) the stressed losses on the cover pool assets
following issuer default.

The cover pool losses are based on Moody's most recent modelling
and are an estimate of the losses Moody's currently models if the
relevant issuer defaults. Cover pool losses can be split between
Market Risk and Collateral Risk. Market Risk measures losses as a
result of refinancing risk and risks related to interest-rate and
currency mismatches (these losses may also include certain legal
risks). Collateral Risk measures losses resulting directly from
the credit quality of the assets in the cover pool. Collateral
Risk is derived from the Collateral Score.

For further details on Cover Pool Losses, Collateral Risk, Market
Risk, Collateral Score and TPI Leeway across all covered bond
programs rated by Moody's please refer to "Moody's EMEA Covered
Bonds Monitoring Overview", published quarterly. These figures
are based on the latest data that has been analyzed by Moody's
and are subject to change over time. Quarterly these numbers are
updated in Performance Overview published by Moody's.

TPI FRAMEWORK: Moody's assigns a "timely payment indicator" (TPI)
which indicates the likelihood that timely payment will be made
to covered bondholders following issuer default. The effect of
the TPI framework is to limit the covered bond rating to a
certain number of notches above the issuer's rating.

Moody's has assigned a TPI of "Very Improbable" to the covered
bonds of OTP and FHB.

SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

The robustness of a covered bond rating largely depends on the
credit strength of the issuer.

The TPI Leeway measures the number of notches by which the
issuer's rating may be downgraded before the covered bonds are
downgraded under the TPI framework.

The TPI assigned to both programs is "Very Improbable". The TPI
Leeway for both programs is limited, and thus any downgrade of
the issuer ratings may lead to a downgrade of the covered bonds.

A multiple-notch downgrade of the covered bonds might occur in
certain limited circumstances. Some examples might be (i) a
sovereign downgrade negatively affecting both the issuer's senior
unsecured rating and the TPI; (ii) a multiple notch downgrade of
the issuer; or (iii) a material reduction of the value of the
cover pool.

RATING METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Covered Bonds" published in March 2010.


=============
I R E L A N D
=============


ALLIED IRISH: Fitch Puts Issuer Default Ratings on Watch Negative
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed all the support-driven ratings of Allied
Irish Banks plc (AIB), Bank of Ireland (BOI), Irish Life and
Permanent (ILP) and their subsidiaries on Rating Watch Negative
(RWN).  The agency has also maintained the RWN on the support-
driven ratings of Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd (IBRC).
The government-guaranteed debt of Irish banks has also been
placed on RWN.

The rating action follows the Irish sovereign being placed on
RWN.  All Irish banks' Long term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs)
are at their Support Rating Floors, reflecting Fitch's view that
the Irish authorities will continue to support the domestic
banking system.  However, the RWNs reflect the fact that if
Ireland's sovereign rating is downgraded, the IDRs, Support
Ratings and Support Rating Floors of the Irish banks' could also
be downgraded.  The RWN will be resolved in the coming weeks once
Fitch has completed its review of the Irish sovereign rating.

In addition to sovereign concerns, the RWN on IBRC continues to
reflect the ongoing political risks surrounding the issue of
burden-sharing for senior unsecured creditors.  However, Fitch
continues to believe that the Irish authorities are likely to
avoid a default or coercive burden sharing for Anglo's senior
unsecured, unguaranteed creditors.

At end-Q311, IBRC had about EUR3.5 billion of senior unsecured
debt securities not benefiting from government guarantees.  In
November 2011, the bank paid in full a US$1.0 billion maturity,
with the next large maturities in January and June 2012 (EUR1.25
billion and EUR1.1 billion, respectively), after which there will
be about EUR0.15 billion of securities outstanding.

The rating actions are as follows:

IBRC

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BB-'; RWN maintained
  -- Short-term IDR: 'B'; RWN maintained
  -- Support Rating: '3'; RWN maintained
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BB-'; RWN maintained
  -- Short-term debt: 'B'; RWN maintained
  -- Senior unsecured: 'BB-'; RWN maintained
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: 'BBB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed commercial paper: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: 'BBB+'; placed on
     RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: 'F2'; placed on
     RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     'BBB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities: 'F2';
     placed on RWN

IBRC Mortgage Bank

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BB-'; RWN maintained
  -- Short-term IDR: 'B'; RWN maintained
  -- Support Rating: '3'; RWN maintained

AIB

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Viability Rating: 'ccc'; unaffected by current rating action
  -- Individual Rating: 'E' ; unaffected by current rating action
  -- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
  -- Senior unsecured notes: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term debt: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Lower tier 2 subordinated debt: 'C'; unaffected by current
     rating action
  -- Upper tier 2 subordinated notes: 'C'; unaffected by current
     rating action
  -- Tier 1 notes: 'C'; unaffected by current rating action
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: 'BBB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed commercial paper: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: 'BBB+'; placed on
     RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: 'F2'; placed on
     RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     'BBB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities: 'F2';
     placed on RWN

AIB Group (UK) PLC

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Viability Rating: 'ccc'; unaffected by current rating action
  -- Individual Rating: 'E'; unaffected by current rating action
  -- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: 'BBB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: 'F2'; placed on RWN

BOI

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Viability Rating: 'b-'; unaffected by current rating action
  -- Individual Rating: 'D/E'; unaffected by current rating
     action
  -- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
  -- Senior unsecured notes: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term debt: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Upper tier 2 subordinated notes: 'C' unaffected by current
     rating action
  -- Preference shares: 'C' unaffected by current rating action
  -- Subordinated debt: 'C' unaffected by current rating action
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed notes: 'BBB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: 'BBB+'; placed on
     RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: 'F2'; placed on
     RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     'BBB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities: 'F2';
     placed on RWN

BOI Mortgage Bank

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN

BOI UK Plc

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Individual Rating: 'D/E'; unaffected by current rating
     action
  -- Support Rating: '2'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: 'BBB+'; placed on
     RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: 'F2'; placed on
     RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     'BBB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities: 'F2';
     placed on RWN

EBS

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB-'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F3'; placed on RWN
  -- Viability Rating: 'ccc'; unaffected by current rating action
  -- Individual Rating: 'E'; unaffected by current rating action
  -- Support Rating: '2', placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BBB-'; placed on RWN
  -- Senior unsecured notes: 'BBB-'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term debt: 'F3'; placed on RWN
  -- Preferences shares: 'C' unaffected by current rating action
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term notes: 'BBB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term notes: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign guaranteed commercial paper: 'F2'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term deposits: 'BBB+'; placed on
     RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term deposits: 'F2'; placed on
     RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Long-term interbank liabilities:
     'BBB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Sovereign-guaranteed Short-term interbank liabilities: 'F2';
     placed on RWN

EBS Mortgage Finance

  -- Long-term IDR: 'BBB-'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term IDR: 'F3'; placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating: '2', placed on RWN

ILP

  -- Viability Rating: 'ccc'; unaffected by current rating action
  -- Individual Rating: 'E'; unaffected by current rating action
  -- Support Rating: '2', placed on RWN


AQUARIUS + INVESTMENTS: S&P Raises Credit Rating to 'BB+ (sf)'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit rating to
'BB+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)' on Aquarius + Investments PLC's series
2010-3 EUR50 million secured floating-rate notes.

"The rating action follows BNP Paribas' (as arranger)
restructuring of the transaction. As a result of the
restructuring, the scheduled maturity was extended to June 2017
from December 2015, there were changes to the reference
portfolio, and the level of credit enhancement was increased,"
S&P said.

"In our opinion, the level of credit enhancement is now
sufficient to support a 'BB+ (sf)' rating. We have therefore
raised our rating to 'BB+ (sf)' from 'BB- (sf)'. The synthetic
rated overcollateralization (SROC) level achieved at the 'BB+'
rating level is 100.8510%," S&P said.

                         What is SROC?

"One of the main steps in our rating analysis is the review of
the credit quality of the securitized assets. SROC is one of the
tools we use for this purpose when rating and surveilling ratings
assigned to most synthetic CDO tranches. SROC is a measure of the
degree by which the credit enhancement (or attachment point) of a
tranche exceeds the stressed loss rate assumed for a given rating
scenario. It is comparable across different tranches of the same
rating," S&P said.

               Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

         http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com


DUNCANNON CRE: Fitch Says Repurchase Wont' Affect Note Ratings
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings says that the recently proposed partial repurchase
of Duncannon CRE CDO I PLC's class A notes will not in itself
impact the notes' ratings.

The notes are rated as follows:

  -- EUR2.9m class X: 'Bsf'; Outlook Stable
  -- EUR171.0m class A: 'CCCsf';
  -- EUR93.8m class RCF: 'CCCsf';
  -- EUR40.0m class B: 'CCsf'
  -- EUR40.7m class C-1: 'Csf'
  -- EUR20.4m class C-2: 'Csf'
  -- EUR21.4m class D-1: 'Csf'
  -- EUR21.4m class D-2: 'Csf'
  -- EUR21.6m class D-3: 'Csf'
  -- EUR22.4m class E-1: 'Csf'
  -- EUR22.6m class E-2: 'Csf'

As per Condition 7 (h) of the Duncannon CRE CDO I PLC prospectus,
the issuer may at any time, at the direction of the portfolio
manager, purchase senior or mezzanine notes in the open market or
in privately negotiated transactions, at a price not exceeding
the notes' par value.  Under the proposed buyback, the repurchase
of EUR9.3 million of the class A notes will be undertaken at a
discounted purchase price.  The repurchased notes will
subsequently be cancelled, thereby marginally increasing the
available credit enhancement to all rated notes.  The proposed
buyback follows earlier buybacks of class A notes in 2009 and
2010.

The repurchase will be funded using cash available in the
principal collection account.  As of November 2011, approximately
EUR23.6 million is available in the principal collection account.
Generally, proceeds in the principal collection account can be
used by the portfolio manager to invest in new portfolio assets,
limited by the eligibility criteria, or they may be distributed
to noteholders, if no such investment opportunity exists.  Due to
the funding of the proposed repurchase of the class A notes, the
amount of principal proceeds available for immediate distribution
to the remaining noteholders will be substantially lower.  At the
same time, noteholders will benefit from an increase in credit
enhancement due to the relative increase of assets compared with
liabilities in the structure.

The second senior and mezzanine par value tests are currently
breaching their limits. Fitch notes that all par value ratios
will improve as a result of the repurchase.  Consequently, the
amount of interest required to be diverted on future payment
dates to the senior notes to cure the par value tests may be
reduced.


FASTNET LINE: Needs to Raise GBP840,000 to Avert Liquidation
------------------------------------------------------------
Sion Barry at Western Mail reports that Fastnet Line has to raise
GBP840,000 by the end of next month or face being liquidated.

Fastnet Line, which is owned by the West Cork Tourism Cooperative
Society, is currently in examinership in the Irish Republic,
Western Mail notes.

Having raised GBP555,450, Fastnet needs to secure a further
GBP840,000 by January 30 as it seeks to reach a repayment deal
with existing creditors as well as having enough financial
firepower to relaunch its ferry service next March, Western Mail
says.

However, chairman elect of Fastnet, John Williams, said that
without Government backing -- whether from Wales, the Republic of
Ireland or both -- there was little prospect of securing the
necessary funding, with the only option then being to liquidate
the business, Western Mail relates.

Fastnet began operating its ferry service in March 2010 and up to
ceasing in October had taken 153,000 passengers.

However, Mr. Williams, as cited by Western Mail, said it had been
hindered by a sharp rise in fuel cost and the impact of the
continuing tough economic climate -- resulting in passenger
numbers being slightly below initial forecasts.

According to Western Mail, Mr. Williams said the new business
plan, with its greater focus on marketing of the route -- coupled
with the expertise of the management team -- meant the business
could have a viable and sustainable future.

Fastnet Line Ship Holdings Ltd., 100%-owned by the West Cork
Tourism Co-operative Society Ltd) and related companies, operate
the Cork-Swansea ferry service based at Ferry Terminal,
Ringaskiddy, Co Cork.


IRISH LIFE: Fitch Puts 'BB+' Sub. Debt Rating on Negative Watch
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised the Rating Watch on Irish Life
Assurance plc's 'BBB+' Insurer Financial Strength (IFS) rating
and 'BBB' Long-term Issuer Default Rating (LT IDR) to Negative
(RWN) from Evolving (RWE).  The Rating Watch on Irish Life's
subordinated debt rating of 'BB+' has also been revised to
Negative from Evolving.

The RWN reflects that placed on Ireland's ratings.  The ratings
reflect the close link between Irish Life and the Irish economy
and the shareholder exposure to the Irish sovereign through
material shareholder exposure (relative to regulatory capital) to
Irish government debt.  However, Fitch notes that this sovereign
exposure is unlikely to directly decrease security for
policyholders of unit-linked policies, which form 94% of the
business measured by reserves.

Irish Life was put up for sale by its parent Irish Life &
Permanent plc (ILP) in August 2011. ILP announced on 25 November
2011 that no buyer had been found. The revision to RWN from RWE
on Irish Life reflects Fitch's opinion that it will be
challenging to find a suitable buyer in the current macroeconomic
environment.

Fitch expects to resolve the RWN once the RWN on Ireland has been
resolved.  A downgrade of Ireland's ratings would be likely to
lead to a similar downgrade for Irish Life's ratings.


===================
L U X E M B O U R G
===================


SESTANTE FINANCE: S&P Affirms 'B' Ratings on Class C2 Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
all classes of notes in Sestante Finance S.r.l.'s series 1, 2, 3,
and 4.

"The rating actions follow our analysis, which took into account
updated credit amounts and the structural mechanisms providing
enhancement in these transactions. We based the updated credit
analysis on our assessment of the characteristics of the residual
collateral portfolios, factoring in the transactions'
performance," S&P said.

For all four transactions, the increases in cumulative default
rates have been leveling off: The current levels of defaults and
cumulative defaults are:

    Series 1: 0.28% and 5.11%;
    Series 2: 0.78% and 6.36%;
    Series 3: 0.52% and 6.37%; and
    Series 4: 0.55% and 8.83%.

As of the end of the latest collection period, the levels of
mortgage loans in arrears for more than 90 days are:

    Series 1: 5.36%;
    Series 2: 4.13%;
    Series 3: 5.20%; and
    Series 4: 5.84%.

As a result of the high level of defaults recorded, the reserve
funds in series 2, 3, and 4 have been fully depleted since H1
2010, H2 2009, and H1 2009, and the series 1 reserve fund is at
65% of its target balance. All four transactions feature a
structural mechanism, which requires the use of excess spread --
and eventually the reserve funds -- to cover the full balance of
defaulted mortgage loans.

Due to the lack of available funds, series 2, 3, and 4 are
showing unpaid principal deficiency ledger (PDL) amounts, which
after a step increase have stabilized or decreased. Specifically:

    Series 4 had an unpaid PDL of about EUR24.3 million at the
    last interest payment date (IPD), slightly up from EUR23.9
    million at the previous IPD;

    Series 3 had an unpaid PDL of about EUR11.0 million at the
    last IPD -- slightly up from EUR10.7 million at the previous
    IPD, but down from EUR11.5 million recorded two IPDs ago; and

    Series 2 had an unpaid PDL of about EUR4.6 million at the
    last IPD, in line with EUR4.6 million at the previous IPD,
    but down from EUR5.5 million recorded two IPDs ago.

Reserve fund depletions in series 2, 3, and 4 are also affecting
the repayment rate of the class C2 excess-spread-backed notes.
Given that the issuer repays principal on these notes before
replenishing the reserve fund, a reserve fund depletion implies a
lower level of available funds to redeem those notes.

"Interest payments on series 3 and 4's class B, C1, and C2 notes
can be deferred if the cumulative gross default ratio rises above
certain levels, the lowest being 12%. Given the current
cumulative default ratios and the outstanding level of
delinquencies, we do not think it likely that any of these
triggers will be breached in the short term," S&P said.

"Meliorbanca SpA, the originator and servicer of the Sestante
Finance transactions, has informed us that it transferred the
servicing of Sestante Finance series 1 to 4 to Italfondiario SpA
on May 23, 2011," S&P said.

"In addition, we have conducted further analysis of the
macroeconomic situation in Italy and Europe, and we believe that
the weak economic environment would not substantially affect
these transactions in the near future," S&P related.

         Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Reports
included in this credit rating report are available at:

     http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class            Rating

Ratings Affirmed

Sestante Finance S.r.l.
EUR412.3 Million Fixed- And Floating-Rate Mortgage-Backed Notes
(Series 1)

A1                A+ (sf)
A2                A+ (sf)

Sestante Finance S.r.l.
EUR647.2 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Series 2

A                 A+ (sf)
B                 A+ (sf)
C1                BB+ (sf)
C2                B+ (sf)

Sestante Finance S.r.l.
EUR899.51 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Series 3

A                 A+ (sf)
B                 A+ (sf)
C1                BB (sf)
C2                B (sf)

Sestante Finance S.r.l.
EUR647.9 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Series 4

A1                A+ (sf)
A2                A+ (sf)
B                 BBB- (sf)
C1                BB (sf)
C2                B (sf)


TMD FRICTION: S&P Raises Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'BB'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term corporate
credit rating on Luxemburg-based automotive supplier TMD Friction
Group S.A. (TMD) to 'BB' from 'B+', following the announcement
that Japan-based conglomerate Nisshinbo Holdings Inc. (not rated)
had completed the acquisition of 100% of TMD's capital. The
outlook is stable.

"We also raised our issue rating on TMD's EUR160 million senior
secured notes to 'BB' from 'B+'. The recovery rating on the notes
is unchanged at '4', reflecting our expectation of average (30%-
50%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment default," S&P
said.

"We removed all ratings from CreditWatch, where they were placed
with positive implications on Sept. 30, 2011," S&P said.

"The rating action primarily reflects full ownership of TMD by
Nisshinbo, a company we do not rate but view--based on public
information -- as having a credit profile in the 'bb' category,
that is, stronger than TMD's stand-alone credit profile (SACP)
that we assess at 'b+'. We view TMD as a strategically important
entity for Nisshinbo," S&P said.

Nisshinbo is a Japanese conglomerate with activities in
automobile brakes like TMD, as well as textiles, paper products,
mechatronics, chemicals, electronics, and real estate businesses,
primarily in Japan and the rest of Asia. On March 30, 2011,
Nisshinbo reported annual revenues of JPY325 billion (equivalent
to EUR3.1 billion at current exchange rates). Nisshinbo is listed
on the Tokyo stock exchange.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectations for TMD's SACP and
the benefits of the new ownership. We expect that Nisshinbo will
progressively integrate TMD operationally, therefore reinforcing
the ties between the two companies and supporting the business
profile. We also expect that Nisshinbo will assume any financial
obligation related to redeeming the TMD notes should some
noteholders exercise their put option. In our base-case
projections, we have assumed a partial redemption of the notes.
Any redemption that Nisshinbo finances would be supportive for
TMD's financial risk profile and for our assumptions about
support from Nisshinbo for TMD," S&P said.

"With respect to TMD's SACP, under our base case we have assumed
a slight decrease in revenues and a limited deterioration in
adjusted EBITDA margins in 2012 by 150 bps to slightly below 7%.
This is based on a macroeconomic slowdown in Europe and our view
that following its operational restructuring, TMD is better
prepared to weather an economic downturn than it was in 2008.
Under our downside case, ratios would come under pressure and
would result in a downward revision of the SACP," S&P said.

"We could lower the rating if support and benefits from the new
ownership were less than we assume. Likewise, should TMD's stand-
alone performance in 2012 fall below our expectations in 2012,
resulting in an adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio below the 15%
threshold, which we view as commensurate with TMD's SACP
of 'b+', this would likely have negative implications for the
rating," S&P said.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


FAB CBO: S&P Affirms 'CCC-' Rating on Class B Notes
---------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its credit ratings on
F.A.B. CBO 2002-1 B.V.'s class A-1, A-2, and B notes.

"The rating actions follow our performance review of the
transaction, applying our 2010 counterparty criteria (see
'Counterparty And Supporting Obligations Methodology And
Assumptions,' published on Dec. 6, 2010) and our updated
corporate cash flow and synthetic CDO criteria (see 'Update To
Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow And
Synthetic CDOs,' published on Sept. 17, 2009)," S&P said.

"Since our last review in December 2009, we have observed a
negative rating migration of the performing assets, marked by a
noticeable increase of 'B' and 'CCC-' rated assets. The decline
in credit quality and the application of our updated corporate
cash flow criteria to assets with corporate exposure
(collateralized loan obligations [CLOs] and synthetic
collateralized debt obligations [CDOs] account for 32% of the
current portfolio) have led to higher scenario default rates
generated by our CDO Evaluator," S&P said.

"At the same time, the credit enhancement available to each class
of notes has significantly increased due to the amortization of
class A-1. Another positive factor in our analysis is the
mechanical reduction of the weighted-average life of the
transaction/portfolio," S&P said.

"Overall and according to our analysis, our ratings appropriately
reflect the current levels of credit enhancement and portfolio
credit quality in this transaction," S&P said.

F.A.B. CBO 2002-1 is a CDO of asset-backed securities (ABS)
transaction backed primarily by European CDO assets, and
residential and commercial mortgage-backed assets.
Geographically, the portfolio is concentrated in Germany, the
U.K., and the Netherlands, which together account for over 80% of
the portfolio. F.A.B. CBO 2002-1 closed in April 2002 and is in
its amortization phase.

            Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

      http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class       Rating

F.A.B. CBO 2002-1 B.V.
EUR309.5 Million Asset-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Affirmed

A-1         AA (sf)
A-2         BB (sf)
B           CCC- (sf)


LAURELIN II: S&P Raises Rating on Class E Notes to 'BB (sf)'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its credit ratings on
all classes of notes in Laurelin II B.V.

Laurelin II is a cash flow collateralized loan obligation (CLO)
transaction that securitizes loans to primarily speculative-grade
corporate firms. The transaction closed in July 2007 and its
reinvestment period ends in July 2014. The CLO is managed by
GoldenTree Asset Management, L.P.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the latest available trustee report,
dated Oct. 31, 2011, in addition to a cash flow analysis. We have
taken into account recent developments in the transaction and
reviewed it under our 2010 counterparty criteria (see
'Counterparty And Supporting Obligations Methodology And
Assumptions,' published Dec. 6, 2010)," S&P said.

"From our analysis, we note from the October 2011 trustee report
that the overcollateralization test results for all classes of
notes have improved and are currently passing their required
levels. At the same time, the weighted-average spread earned on
the collateral pool has also increased since our last rating
review," S&P said.

"In addition, our analysis indicates that the weighted-average
maturity of the portfolio since our last transaction update has
decreased, which has led to a reduction in our scenario default
rates (SDRs) for all rating categories," S&P said.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class, which
we then compare against its SDR to determine the rating level for
each class of notes. In our analysis, we used the reported
portfolio balance that we consider to be performing, the
weighted-average spread, and the weighted-average recovery rates
that we considered appropriate. We incorporated various cash flow
stress scenarios using our standard default patterns, levels, and
timings for each rating category assumed for all classes of
notes, in conjunction with different interest rate stress
scenarios," S&P said.

"In our view, the improvements we have seen in the transaction's
performance since our last transaction update indicate that the
credit enhancement available to the class A-1 and A-2 notes is
consistent with higher rating levels than previously assigned.
These higher rating levels are also consistent with the
application of our 2010 counterparty criteria. We have therefore
raised our ratings on the class A-1E, A-1R, and A-1S notes to
'AA- (sf)', and our rating on the class A-2 notes to 'AA- (sf)',"
S&P said.

"Also, the improvements in the transaction's performance since
our last transaction update have benefited the class B to E
notes, and we believe the credit enhancement levels available to
these classes are now commensurate with higher rating levels. We
have therefore raised our ratings on these classes of notes," S&P
said.

"None of the notes issued by Laurelin II were constrained by the
application of the largest obligor default test, a supplemental
stress test we introduced in our 2009 criteria update for
corporate collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) (see 'Update To
Global Methodologies And Assumptions For Corporate Cash Flow
And Synthetic CDOs,' published Sept. 17, 2009)," S&P said.

             Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report

SEC Rule 17g-7 requires an NRSRO, for any report accompanying a
credit rating relating to an asset-backed security as defined in
the Rule, to include a description of the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and
a description of how they differ from the representations,
warranties and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar
securities. The Rule applies to in-scope securities initially
rated (including preliminary ratings) on or after Sept. 26, 2011.

If applicable, the Standard & Poor's 17g-7 Disclosure Report
included in this credit rating report is available at:

       http://standardandpoorsdisclosure-17g7.com

Ratings List

Class               Rating
            To                 From

Laurelin II B.V.
EUR405 Million, GBP30.405 Million Secured Floating-Rate Notes

Ratings Raised

A-1E        AA- (sf)           A (sf)
A-1R        AA- (sf)           A (sf)
A-1S        AA- (sf)           A (sf)
A-2         AA- (sf)           A- (sf)
B-1         A+ (sf)            BBB+ (sf)
B-2         A+ (sf)            BBB+ (sf)
C           BBB+ (sf)          BB+ (sf)
D-1         BB+ (sf)           BB (sf)
D-2         BB+ (sf)           BB (sf)
E           BB (sf)            B (sf)


ODEON ABS: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Ratings on Five Note Classes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed ODEON ABS 2007-1 B.V.'s notes, as
follows:

  -- Class X note due 2012 (XS0308504751): affirmed at 'Bsf';
     Stable Outlook

  -- Class A-1 secured floating-rate notes due 2096
     (XS0308505568): affirmed at 'Csf'

  -- Class A-2 secured floating-rate notes due 2096
     (XS0308507267): affirmed at 'Csf'

  -- Class A-3 secured floating-rate notes due 2096
     (XS0308534154): affirmed at 'Csf'

  -- Class B secured floating-rate notes due 2096 (XS0308534311):
     affirmed at 'Csf'

The transaction is a partially funded synthetic securitization of
primarily mezzanine structured finance assets, which contains
cash flow structural features such as over-collateralization (OC)
and interest coverage (IC) tests.

The affirmation reflects the notes' levels of credit enhancement
relative to the portfolio's credit quality.  Since the last
review in January 2011, the 'CCCsf' and below bucket has
increased to 15.1% of the portfolio from 12.5% in January.  The
two largest industry sectors are CMBS at 45% of the portfolio and
CDOs at 23%.  Fitch believes that a material risk for the
transaction is that the underlying structured finance assets'
maturity may extend beyond their reported weighted average
expected life. This is taken into account in the agency's
portfolio analysis.

All OC tests are failing but there is currently a healthy cushion
on the Class A-2 IC test.  Classes A-1 and A-2 are timely on
their interest payments while classes A-3 and B are deferring
interest.

The senior swap notional has reduced via interest and principal
diversion due to OC tests breach since May 2009.  Any excess
spread used to reduce the senior swap notional due to OC tests
breaches will be invested in eligible investments, and this has
led to an increase in the eligible investments amount to EUR78.4
million from EUR71.1 million since close.

The 'Bsf' rating on the class X notes reflects its structural
features.  Class X has a fixed amortization schedule that ranks
after the senior swap in the interest waterfall and is expected
to mature in August 2012.


* NETHERLANDS: Decline in 2011 Corporate Bankruptcies Expected
--------------------------------------------------------------
SeeNews, citing data of credit agency Dun & Bradstreet (D&B),
released on Thursday, reports that the number of corporate
bankruptcies in the Netherlands is expected to decrease by 2% in
annual terms to 6,866 in 2011.


===========
P O L A N D
===========


CENTRAL EUROPEAN: Moody's Reviews 'B3' Corporate Family Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed the B3 corporate family
rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) of Central
European Distribution Corporation (CEDC) on review for downgrade.
The rating on the company's senior secured notes due in 2016
issued by CEDC Finance Corporation International has also been
placed on review.

Ratings Rationale

"[The] rating action reflects Moody's view that the unsolicited
offer made by Russian Standard to exchange some assets for an
increased participation in CEDC has created significant
uncertainty on the future capital structure of the company,
including on the refinancing plans for the US$ 310 million
convertible notes, which was not incorporated in Moody's decision
to downgrade CEDC's ratings in early November," says Paolo
Leschiutta, a Moody's Vice President-Senior Credit Officer and
lead analyst for CEDC. This view follows CEDC's announcement that
its Board of Directors received a letter from Russian Standard
Corporation outlining a general proposal to acquire an additional
19.9% of CEDC in exchange for Roust Inc., Russian Standard
Corporation's spirits distribution activities in Russia. Moody's
notes that the offer also included a reference to a potential
financial restructuring of CEDC's indebtedness, which is cause of
concern for the agency, as details of the plan in the public
domain remain limited.

Moreover, ongoing difficult trading conditions in Russia and the
current distress in the financial markets could challenge the
company in addressing its refinancing needs associated with the
US$310 million convertible notes becoming due in March 2013.

FOCUS OF THE REVIEW

Moody's rating review will focus on (i) the likelihood that the
Russian Standard proposal will progress; (ii) an assessment of
the strategic benefit of a potential merger and possible
financial support provided by an external party; (iii) the
potential impact on the capital structure of CEDC post such a
transaction including the possibility that the current creditors
may have to be involved and suffer loss; (iv) CEDC's progress in
managing the maturity of the US$310 million convertible notes in
a timely manner; and (v) CEDC's operating performance in Q4 2011.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY

The principal methodology used in rating CEDC was the Global
Alcoholic Beverage Rating Methodology published in August 2009.
Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009.

Headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, CEDC is one of the largest vodka
producers in the world, with annual sales of around 32.7 million
nine-litre cases, mainly in Russia and Poland. Following
investments in Russia over the past two years and the recent
disposal of its distribution business in Poland, CEDC generated
net revenues of around US$711 million during FYE December 2010.
This amount excludes Whitehall Group, the importer and
distributor of premium spirits and wine in Russia which was
consolidated since February 2011 (Whitehall generated
approximately US$190 million revenues during 2010).


===========
R U S S I A
===========


BANK OBRAZOVANIE: S&P Assigns 'B-/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B-' long-term
and 'C' short-term counterparty credit ratings to Russia-based
Bank OBRAZOVANIE. The outlook is stable. At the same time, a
'ruBBB-' Russia national scale rating was assigned to Bank
OBRAZOVANIE.

"The ratings on Russia-based Bank OBRAZOVANIE reflect its 'bb'
anchor, as well as our view of the bank's 'moderate' business
position, 'weak' capital and earnings and risk position,
'average' funding, and 'adequate' liquidity, as our criteria
define these terms. The stand-alone credit profile is 'b-'," S&P
said.

"Under our bank criteria, we use the Banking Industry Country
Risk Assessment economic and industry risk scores to determine a
bank's anchor, the starting point in assigning an issuer credit
rating. Our anchor for a commercial bank operating only in Russia
is 'bb', based on Russia's economic risk score of '7'and industry
risk score of '7'," S&P said.

"Our assessment of Bank OBRAZOVANIE's business position as
'moderate' balances the bank's small size and niche business
position with its relationship-driven customer base of
educational and related institutions and favorable management
track record. We assess the bank's capital and earnings as
'weak', reflecting a projected risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio
before adjustments for diversification in the 4%-5% range over
the next 12-18 months. We assess Bank OBRAZOVANIE's risk position
as 'weak', mostly due to what we consider to be extremely high
single-name concentrations. The top 20 borrowers represented as
much as 57% of the loan book and 5x adjusted total equity (ATE)
as of June 30, 2011," S&P said.

"Our assessment of Bank OBRAZOVANIE's funding as 'average' and
liquidity as 'adequate' balance the bank's quite concentrated,
though relatively stable, depositor base against its adequate
liquidity buffer," S&P said.

"Bank OBRAZOVANIE is owned by several private individuals. The
issuer credit rating does not include any notches for
extraordinary parental support, which, we believe, is uncertain.
We consider the bank to be of 'low' systemic importance and do
not give any uplift to the rating for extraordinary government
support," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Bank OBRAZOVANIE's
business and financial profile will remain relatively unchanged
over the next 12 months," S&P said.

"We would consider a downgrade if the bank's asset quality
deteriorated and significantly pressured profitability and
capitalization, reflected in a RAC ratio before adjustments below
3%, or if the current adequate liquidity cushion reduced
significantly. A significant trading loss would also be a
negative rating factor," S&P said.

"Even though we consider the possibility remote, we would
consider an upgrade if the bank's RAC ratio before adjustments
rose to more than 7%, or if Bank OBRAZOVANIE significantly
improved loan-portfolio diversification by reducing the ratio of
the top-20 borrowers to ATE to a level closer to that of peers
while maintaining adequate asset quality and liquidity," S&P
said.


BANK ROSSIYA: Moody's Affirms 'B2' Currency Deposit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed the B2 long-term local and
foreign currency deposit ratings of Bank Rossiya. The standalone
bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of E+, the Not Prime short-
term local and foreign currency bank deposit ratings were also
affirmed.

Moody's said the rating action is based on Bank Rossiya's audited
financial statements for 2010 prepared under IFRS, and its H1
2011 unaudited standalone results prepared under IFRS.

Ratings Rationale

"The affirmation of Bank Rossiya's ratings reflects the bank's
healthy profitability that improved as at H1 2011, good asset
quality and historically conservative liquidity management," says
Semyon Isakov, a Moody's Assistant Vice-President and lead
analyst for the bank. "At the same time, high single-name
concentration in assets and, particularly, in the loan book,
exposes the bank's capital to the threat of impairment of the
largest exposures. A high concentration in the deposit base also
renders liquidity and revenue highly vulnerable to the potential
departure of the largest customers," adds Mr. Isakov. Moody's
also considers that Bank Rossiya's exposure to Sobinbank (B3/Not
Prime/E+, stable outlook) -- which, as of end-June 2011,
accounted for 40% of Bank Rossiya's shareholder equity -- weighs
negatively on the bank's ratings.

In 2011, Bank Rossiya improved its profitability. For the first
six months of 2011 (standalone IFRS results), the bank reported
Return on Average Assets of 1.7% and Return on Average Equity of
17.6% compared to 0.8% and 9.4%, respectively, at YE2010. The
liquidity cushion remains healthy, with liquid assets (cash,
deposit with banks and securities) exceeding 50% of the bank's
assets, and the loan-to-deposit ratio at 53% as of end-June 2011.
Overdue loans accounted for 2.0% of gross loans at end-June 2011
and were fully covered with loan loss reserves (2.79% at end-June
2011). At the same time, Moody's notes that individually impaired
but not overdue loans accounted for an additional 8% of the gross
loan book.

Given the above-mentioned considerations, Moody's notes the key
drivers constraining Bank Rossiya's ratings are (i) historically
high single-name credit risk concentrations, whereby the 20
largest credit exposures accounted for 264% of shareholder
equity, an increase compared to 210% at YE2010; (ii) high deposit
base concentration (eight largest groups maintained with the bank
as of YE2010 accounted for 72% of total customer deposits, while
the largest group of customers accounted for 52% of total
deposits), which renders the bank's liquidity and revenue
potentially vulnerable; and (iii) corporate governance weaknesses
related to occasional related-party lending and weak financial
transparency.

PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGIES

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in St. Petersburg, Russia, Bank Rossiya reported
total assets of RUB268 billion (US$9.5 billion) under IFRS
(unaudited) as of end-June YE2011, up 3.0% compared to YE2010.
The bank's net profit totaled RUB2.2 billion (US$78 million) in
the first six months of 2011.


OTP BANK: Moody's Confirms 'Ba2' Long-term Deposit Ratings
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed the Ba2 long-term local
and foreign-currency deposit ratings of OJSC OTP Bank Russia (OTP
Russia) with a stable outlook.

Ratings Rationale

The confirmation of OTP Russia's long-term ratings follows
Moody's recent announcement that it has confirmed the standalone
bank financial strength rating (BFSR) of OTP Bank (Hungary) at D+
(mapping to Ba1 on the long-term scale), with a negative outlook.
OTP Bank (Hungary) is OTP Russia's parent bank.

OTP Russia's Ba2 deposit ratings continue to incorporate a high
probability of parental support from OTP Bank (Hungary), and OTP
Russia consequently receives a one-notch uplift from its Ba3
standalone credit strength (mapped from its own standalone BFSR
of D-). Moody's assessment of a high probability of parental
support is based on (i) OTP Russia's significant operational
integration with its parent, (ii) the strong strategic fit of OTP
Russia with OTP Bank Group, as Russia is one of most strategic
foreign markets for the group, and (iii) the parent's
demonstrated willingness to provide ongoing capital and liquidity
support when needed.

The stable outlook on the long-term ratings reflects Moody's
opinion that the Ba2 ratings of OTP Russia would not be affected
by a one-notch downgrade of the parent's standalone BFSR, based
on the following elements:

(i) OTP Russia has a good strategic fit within OTP group, as the
significant and growing revenue contributor on a group-wide level
(approximately 20% in H1 2011). As a result, Moody's believes
that the group will continue to support OTP Russia's operations,
even in the currently more difficult operating environment.

(ii) OTP Russia has a relatively low dependence on parental
funding. Parental funding does not exceed 15% of total funding of
OTP Russia (as of end-Q3 2011); as a result, due to OTP Russia's
diversified funding profile and prudent liquidity management,
Moody's believes that the bank can withstand a potential
reduction in parental funding without significantly affecting its
operations.

(iii) The need for external capital support is relatively low,
given OTP Russia's adequate capital adequacy (a total capital
adequacy ratio of over 20% and Tier 1 at 17%), slow assets growth
and robust internal capital generation (e.g., return on equity
was 26% in 2010).

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, OTP Russia reported total assets
of RUB97.5 billion (US$3.2 billion) and equity of RUB14.5 billion
(US$476 million), according to the bank's audited IFRS financial
report at year-end 2010. The bank is one of the market leaders in
unsecured retail lending in Russia, with the target products
being point-of-sale (POS) and credit cards. OTP Bank (Hungary)
controls over 97% of OTP Russia's shares.


OTP BANK: Moody's Confirms Long-Term National Scale Credit Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax Rating Agency has confirmed the long-term
national scale credit rating (NSR) of OJSC OTP Bank (Russia) (OTP
Russia) at Aa2.ru. The NSR carries no specific outlook.

Ratings Rationale

OTP Russia's Aa2.ru NSR maps to the Ba2 global-scale long-term
local-currency rating (assigned by Moody's Investors Service).

The confirmation of OTP Russia's NSR reflects the confirmation of
the bank's long-term global-scale ratings at Ba2 by Moody's
Investor's Service. The confirmation of OTP Russia's global-scale
ratings, in turn, reflects the confirmation of OTP Bank
(Hungary)'s D+ standalone bank financial strength rating (BFSR)
mapping to Ba1 on the long-term scale.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, OTP Russia reported total assets
of RUB97.5 billion (US$3.2 billion) and equity of RUB14.5 billion
(or US$$476 million), according to the bank's IFRS financial
report at year-end 2010. The bank is one of the market leaders in
unsecured retail lending in Russia, with the target products
being point-of-sale (POS) and credit cards. OTP Bank (Hungary)
controls over 97% of OTP Russia's shares.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs)
are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia. For
further information on Moody's approach to national scale
ratings, please refer to Moody's Rating Implementation Guidance
published in March 2011 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale
Ratings to Global Scale Ratings".

About Moody's and Moody's Interfax

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk
analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's
Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research
and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the
global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).


PROPINVEST GROUP: Guernsey Court Appoints Joint Administrators
--------------------------------------------------------------
The Guernsey Royal Court has delivered its first judgment on a
contested company administration application since the
introduction of the Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008.  The Court
has ordered the appointment of Joint Administrators to Propinvest
Group Limited, the Guernsey holding company of a substantial
property group.

The application for the appointment of administrators was brought
by DnB Nor Bank, Norway's largest financial services company, and
arose from a lending facility which exceeded GBP200 million.  The
Court accepted that the Company was insolvent, rejecting
assertions by the Company that it had a genuine and substantial
dispute in respect of the debt.

In this briefing, Mourant Ozannes outlines why the decision
provides useful guidance on the factors the court will consider
in exercising its discretion to make an administration order, and
how it affirms that the Court in Guernsey will follow closely the
approach adopted in administration applications by the English
courts.


ROSAGROLEASING JSC: Fitch Puts 'BB+' Long-Term IDR on RWN
---------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has placed JSC Rosagroleasing's (RAL) Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) of 'BB+' on Rating Watch Negative
(RWN).

The RWN reflects the increased uncertainty about RAL's asset
quality due to a long delay in publication of its IFRS accounts
for 2010, which according to management is due to a dispute with
auditors about the level of impairment charges.  Furthermore,
Fitch also notes public reports about recently initiated new
legal cases against the former management alleging them of
fraudulent activities.

RAL's ratings reflect the potential government support, given the
company's 99.9% state ownership and policy role in providing
leasing services to the agriculture sector.  The ratings also
consider the track record of capital support, and the fact that
the company has been managed with low leverage to date.

The RWN will be resolved once Fitch is able to conduct a
comprehensive review of the company's financial position,
including that of its asset quality.  This will draw on the IFRS
accounts for 2010, the publication of which is now expected in
January 2012, according to RAL, as well as the company's latest
statutory accounts and management disclosures.  The review will
also consider the bank's liquidity position and the extent to
which the delayed publication of the 2010 accounts could result
in an acceleration of any of the company's borrowings.

Fitch understands that losses are likely to be concentrated in
advances for suppliers, while the quality of the lease book is
already quite poor.  According to management, non-performing
leases (defined as more than 90 days overdue) stood at a high 27%
at end-Q311.  As a mitigating factor, RAL has low leverage (debt-
to-equity of only 9.2% at Q311 according to RAS), and leverage
should remain moderate even in case of substantial write-downs of
both advances to suppliers and leases.

However, Fitch also notes that the company's balance sheet is
segregated by management into two parts, one of 'federal leases'
(about 90% of lease assets) funded by equity, and another one of
'commercial leases' financed by local and international bank
borrowings.  Although legally these two business parts are not
separate, Fitch believes, there is some risk that the company's
equity base would not always be available to absorb losses in the
'commercial' lease portfolio, possibly resulting in problems with
servicing of obligations to creditors.  As part of its review,
Fitch will seek to confirm that cash flows from the whole of
RAL's lease portfolio will be available to service creditors.

The ratings may be downgraded if the amount of additional asset
quality problems is substantial, resulting in a significant
increase in the company's leverage.  The ratings may also be
downgraded in case of heightened vulnerabilities in the company's
liquidity position, or if Fitch is unable to receive confirmation
that cash flows from the full portfolio are available to service
creditors.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: 'BB+'; placed on RWN
  -- Short-term foreign currency IDR:'B'; not affected
  -- National Long-term Rating: 'AA(rus)'; placed on RWN
  -- Support Rating: '3': not affected
  -- Support Rating Floor: 'BB+'; placed on RWN


STARBANK: Moody's Assigns 'Ba2' Long-Term National Scale Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Interfax has assigned a long-term national scale rating
of Ba2.ru to StarBank.

Moody's Interfax assessment is primarily based on StarBank's
financial statements for 2010 (audited) -- prepared under IFRS,
and (unaudited) Russian GAAP as at 30 November 2011.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's Interfax, StarBank's Ba2.ru is constrained
by (i) the bank's small size and narrow market franchise; (ii)
corporate governance and risk management deficiencies leading to
potentially high exposure to related-party lending; (iii) weak
core profitability and efficiency demonstrated by three
consecutive years of losses; and (iv) low capitalization. At the
same time, the rating reflects the bank's currently stable
liquidity position as illustrated by increasing customer
deposits, and liquid assets accounting for over 20% of the bank's
total assets.

According to Moody's Interfax, StarBank is a small bank in Russia
ranked 196 by total assets (RUB11.6 billion) as at September 30,
2011. Moody's Interfax notes that the bank's small size, weak
deposit-taking franchise and limited access to long-term funding
along with its unclear business strategy will remain key factors
constraining the rating in the medium term.

Moody's Interfax also notes that StarBank has been loss-making
over the past three years. Although Moody's Interfax expects the
bank to return to profitability in 2011, the rating agency
believes that StarBank's core profitability will remain weak and
unsustainable in the medium term. With an underdeveloped market-
based franchise and high funding costs, the bank's net interest
and fees and commission income is unlikely to be sufficient to
cover operating expenses. Potential increase of impairment
provisions is also likely to exert negative pressure on
StarBank's profitability in 2011 and 2012. Moody's Interfax
observes that the level of loan loss reserves (LLR) created by
StarBank under IFRS accounted for 6% of gross loans at YE2010
which covers only 41% of loans overdue by more than 90 days.

Another constraining factor is StarBank's low capitalization,
which stood at 11.5% as reported under (unaudited) Russian GAAP
on November 30, 2011, which is not sufficient to absorb expected
medium-term credit losses in Moody's stress case scenario. Low
capital against the background of potentially high exposure to
related-party lending is a further factor constraining Starbank's
rating.

According to Moody's Interfax, StarBank's Ba2.ru national scale
deposit rating have limited prospects for upgrade in the short to
medium term. In the longer term, the rating could be upgraded if
the bank expands its market franchise, while also maintaining
adequate financial fundamentals and demonstrating profitable
performance. Conversely, negative pressure could be exerted on
the rating as a result of (i) any failure by StarBank to maintain
a stable liquidity profile, or (ii) deterioration of the bank's
asset quality, profitability and/or capital levels.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Moscow, Russia, StarBank reported audited IFRS
total assets of RUB6.6 billion, shareholder equity of
RUB852million and net loss of RUB127 million at YE2010.

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency's National Scale Ratings (NSRs)
are intended as relative measures of creditworthiness among debt
issues and issuers within a country, enabling market participants
to better differentiate relative risks. NSRs differ from Moody's
global scale ratings in that they are not globally comparable
with the full universe of Moody's rated entities, but only with
NSRs for other rated debt issues and issuers within the same
country. NSRs are designated by a ".nn" country modifier
signifying the relevant country, as in ".ru" for Russia. For
further information on Moody's approach to national scale
ratings, please refer to Moody's Rating Implementation Guidance
published in March 2011 entitled "Mapping Moody's National Scale
Ratings to Global Scale Ratings".

About Moody's and Moody's Interfax

Moody's Interfax Rating Agency (MIRA) specializes in credit risk
analysis in Russia. MIRA is a joint-venture between Moody's
Investors Service, a leading provider of credit ratings, research
and analysis covering debt instruments and securities in the
global capital markets, and the Interfax Information Services
Group. Moody's Investors Service is a subsidiary of Moody's
Corporation (NYSE: MCO).


VELES CAPITAL: S&P Raises Counterparty Credit Ratings to 'B/B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services raised its long-term
counterparty credit rating on Russia-based Investment Company
Veles Capital LLC (Veles) to 'B' from 'B-', and its short-term
counterparty credit rating to 'B' from 'C'. In addition, the
Russia national scale rating was raised to 'ruA-' from 'ruBBB'.
The outlook is stable.

"The upgrade reflects our view of the proven resilience of Veles'
business and financial profiles to the challenging operating
conditions in Russia. The company has performed adequately in a
volatile environment, maintaining adequate financial results,
strong capitalization, and a below sector-average risk appetite.
At the same time, the ratings are constrained by the company's
narrow though improving customer base, revenue concentration,
high reliance on speculative market-related income, and high
systemwide risks," S&P said.

"We view Veles' strong capitalization as a key positive rating
factor; the ratio of total equity to assets has been maintained
at more than 50% since 2009. According to the owners, they are
willing to keep capitalization at the current levels at least
over the next 18-24 months," S&P related.

"The ratings reflect the company's stand-alone credit profile and
do not include any benefit for extraordinary external support,
either from the owners or the government," S&P said.

"On Oct. 1, 2011, Veles had total assets of about $120 million
according to Russian Accounting Standards. Veles is a leading
operator in Russia's promissory note market, possessing a
respectable 50% of market share, and is also involved in domestic
bond trading. Since its inception in 1995, the company has been
ultimately controlled by its founders, managing partner
Dmitry Bugaenko and CEO Alexey Gnedovsky. This, in our view,
raises concerns about key-person risk," S&P said.

"During 2011, Veles' revenues have been buoyed by the recovery in
trading volumes in the Russian promissory note market, after a
significant drop since the beginning of 2009. It is our
understanding, however, that the Russian Central Bank plans to
materially increase the risk weights on banks' investments in
promissory notes for calculating the regulatory capital adequacy
ratio. The effect of this change would likely be a reduction in
issuance and consequently the liquidity of these instruments in
the future. In the medium term, this could undermine Veles'
revenues from promissory note trading, which comprised one-third
of its operating income for the first nine months of 2011. In
anticipation of this change, the company is proactively
aiming to diversify its customer and revenue bases. In our view,
Veles' future profitability will remain dependent on developments
in Russia's securities market, which is inherently volatile," S&P
said.

"In response to the adverse market conditions since 2008, the
company has reduced leverage significantly, increased capital,
enhanced risk management, and discontinued equity investments. In
our view, Veles' risk appetite is relatively moderate. It
currently invests in fairly liquid securities, including bonds
and promissory notes issued by the Russian Federation (foreign
currency BBB/Stable/A-3; local currency BBB+/Stable/A-2; Russia
national scale 'ruAAA'), large government-related entities,
banks, and blue-chip corporations. These investments are funded
mainly by equity and are unlikely to increase in size in the
medium term in the light of the continually unfavorable market
conditions," S&P said.

"The stable outlook reflects our view that Veles' strong
capitalization provides a good cushion against potential trading
losses, somewhat offsetting the inherently high earnings
volatility of its business and its dependence on developments in
financial markets," S&P related.

"We may raise the ratings if Veles achieved further material
improvements in profitability and business diversification, while
maintaining at least adequate capitalization and controlling its
risk appetite, accompanied by a sustainable stabilization of the
financial markets," S&P said.

"We may consider a downgrade if we saw significant deterioration
of the company's liquidity position or a sharply increased risk
appetite, reflected in an adjusted total equity-to-proprietary
securities portfolio ratio of less than 50%," S&P said.


=========
S P A I N
=========


BBVA EMPRESAS 6: Moody's Assigns 'Ba3' Rating to EUR156-MM Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has assigned definitive ratings to
three series of Notes issued by BBVA EMPRESAS 6, FTA:

   -- EUR 804M Serie A Notes, Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- EUR 240M Serie B Notes, Assigned Ba3(sf)

   -- EUR 156M Serie C Notes, Assigned B3(sf)

BBVA EMPRESAS 6 is a securitization of loans granted by BBVA (Aa3
/P-1, Negative Outlook) to corporate obligors and small- and
medium-sized enterprises (SME). The portfolio consists of secured
and unsecured loans, mainly used to fund general working capital
and long-term business expansion. BBVA is acting as Servicer of
the loans while Europea de Titulizacion S.G.F.T., S.A. is the
Management Company ("Gestora").

Ratings Rationale

Moody's analysis focused primarily on (i) an evaluation of the
underlying portfolio of loans; (ii) historical performance
information and other statistical information; (iii) the credit
enhancement provided by the swap spread, the cash reserve and the
subordination of the notes.

The provisional pool of underlying assets was, as of November
2011, composed of a portfolio of 4,381 contracts granted to
obligors located in Spain. The loans were originated between 2000
and June 2011, and have a weighted average seasoning of 1.9 years
and a weighted average remaining term of 7.3 years. Around 60% of
the outstanding the portfolio is secured by first-lien mortgage
guarantees over different types of properties. Geographically,
the pool is concentrated mostly in Catalonia (24%), Madrid
(19.1%) and Andalusia (13.7%).

According to Moody's, this deal benefits from several credit
strengths, such as a portfolio with a relatively short weighted
average life of 4.3 years (assuming a prepayment rate of 0%) and
a simple, fully sequential, pass-through structure. Moody's notes
that the transaction features a number of credit weaknesses: (i)
a high concentration in the Construction and Building sector,
which according to Moody's classification represents 39.8% of the
pool volume, including a 14.5% linked to real estate developers;
(ii) bullet loans amount to 13.9% of the pool volume, while 17.1%
benefits from a grace period with regards to principal payments
and 28.2% consists of loans with predefined amortization
schedules including in some cases balloon payments; and (iii) a
relatively low portfolio granularity (Effective Number of
Obligors below 300) and a degree of obligor concentration as the
top ten names represent around 12.9% of the pool volume. These
characteristics were reflected in Moody's analysis, where several
simulations tested the available excess spread (including 50bp
guaranteed by a hedging mechanism) and 12% reserve fund to cover
potential shortfalls in interest or principal envisioned in the
transaction structure.

The resulting key assumptions of Moody's analysis for this
transaction are a mean default rate of 20.2% with a coefficient
of variation of 40.1% and a stochastic mean recovery rate of
51.5%.

Moody's also ran sensitivities around key parameters for the
rated notes. For instance, if the assumed default probability of
20.2% used in determining the initial rating was changed to 29.4%
and the recovery rate of 51.5% was changed to 41.5%, the model-
indicated rating for the Serie A, Serie B and Serie C notes would
change from Aaa(sf), Ba3(sf) and B3(sf), respectively, to
Aa3(sf), B3(sf) and Ca(sf), respectively.

The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is in line
with the score assigned for the Spanish SME sector and
representative of the volatility and uncertainty in the Spanish
SME sector. V-Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of
available credit information and of the degree of dependence on
various assumptions used in determining the rating. For more
information, the V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the
report " V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the EMEA Small-
to-Medium Enterprise ABS Sector " published in June 2009.

The methodologies used in this rating were "Moody's Approach to
Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe", published in February 2007,
"Refining the ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Defaults
Assumptions in the Rating Analysis of Granular SME Portfolios in
EMEA", published in March 2009 and "Moody's Approach to Rating
Granular SME Transactions in Europe, Middle East and Africa",
published in June 2007.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used a combination of its
CDOROM model (to generate the default distribution) and ABSROM
cashflow model to determine the potential loss incurred by the
notes under each loss scenario.

The cash flow model evaluates all default scenarios that are then
weighted considering the probabilities of the lognormal
distribution assumed for the portfolio default rate. In each
default scenario, the corresponding loss for each class of notes
is calculated given the incoming cash flows from the assets and
the outgoing payments to third parties and noteholders.
Therefore, the expected loss or EL for each tranche is the sum
product of (i) the probability of occurrence of each default
scenario; and (ii) the loss derived from the cash flow model in
each default scenario for each tranche. As such, Moody's analysis
encompasses the assessment of stressed scenarios.

As noted in Moody's comment "Rising Severity of Euro Area
Sovereign Crisis Threatens Credit Standing of All EU Sovereigns",
published on 28 November 2011, the risk of sovereign defaults or
the exit of countries from the Euro area is rising. As a result,
Moody's could lower the maximum achievable rating for structured
finance transactions in some countries, which could result in
rating downgrades.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: North America Unit Seeks Out-of-Court Solution
---------------------------------------------------------------
Saab Cars North America on Dec. 21 elected to pursue an out-of-
court resolution for SCNA operations.  The SCNA Board of
Directors believes this is the best course of action to maximize
the enterprise value for its customers, dealers and creditors.
McTevia & Associates, a nationally renowned and respected
financial advisor to companies in transition, has been chosen to
direct the process.  In the interim, SCNA continues its day-to-
day operations.

"The SCNA Board's decision to explore all possibilities out-of-
court is the most appropriate direction to take for customers,
dealers and creditors," said Tim Colbeck, President and COO, Saab
Cars North America.  "By having an experienced, outside
Administrator oversee the process, the interests of all
parties are better served."

Most importantly, SCNA is committed to developing a solution that
would provide warranty coverage for Saab vehicles covering model
year 2010 and 2011 models.  As has been previously reported, GM
is honoring Saab warranties for model year 2009 and prior years,
per agreements.

SCNA is aggressively investigating all options aimed at
reinstating its parts business in North America in a timely
manner.  Saab Parts Company in Sweden remains operational and not
impacted by the recent announcement regarding Saab Automobile AB.

On Dec. 19, 2011, Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab
Automobile AB (Saab Automobile), Saab Automobile Tools AB and
Saab Powertrain AB filed for bankruptcy with the District Court
in Vanersborg, Sweden.  After having received the recent position
of GM on the contemplated transaction with Saab Automobile,
Youngman informed Saab Automobile that the funding to continue
and complete the reorganization of Saab Automobile could not be
concluded.  The Board of Saab Automobile subsequently decided
that the company without further funding will be insolvent and
that filing bankruptcy is in the best interests of its creditors.
Swan does not expect to realize any value from its shares in Saab
Automobile and will write off its interest in Saab Automobile
completely.

                            About Saab

Saab, or Svenska Aeroplan Aktiebolaget (Swedish Aircraft
Company), was founded in 1937 as an aircraft manufacturer and
revealed its first prototype passenger car 10 years later after
the formation of the Saab Car Division.  In 1990, Saab
Automobile AB was created as a separate company, jointly owned by
the Saab Scania Group and General Motors, and became a wholly-
owned GM subsidiary in 2000.  In February 2010, Spyker Cars N.V.
was renamed Swedish Automobile N.V. (Swan) on June 15, 2011.

Saab Automobile AB currently employs approximately 3,700 staff in
Sweden, where it operates production and technical development
facilities at its headquarters in Trollhattan, 70 km north of
Gothenburg.  Saab Cars North America is located in Royal Oak,
Michigan employing approximately 50 people responsible for sales,
marketing and administration duties for the North American
market.


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Top Executives Seek Relief in Turkey
-----------------------------------------------------
Steel Guru, citing Hurriyet Daily News, reports that top
executives from Saab Automobile, recently met with Turkey's
consulate general to Stockholm to discuss details about the
company's current position and future plans in Turkey.

According to Seel Guru, Zergun Korutuerk, the consulate general,
told the Hurriyet Daily News that "A mission, including Saab
Chairman Victor Muller, has visited. And we have passed the
information to our foreign ministry."

The Turkish government is urging local companies to start up
projects to launch the country's first nationally produced car,
Steel Guru says.  Turkish media has speculated that a Turkish
firm or a consortium might buy out bankrupt Saab as a part of the
Turkey made car bid, Steel Guru notes.

On Dec. 19, 2011, Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab
Automobile AB (Saab Automobile), Saab Automobile Tools AB and
Saab Powertrain AB filed for bankruptcy with the District Court
in Vanersborg, Sweden.  After having received the recent position
of GM on the contemplated transaction with Saab Automobile,
Youngman informed Saab Automobile that the funding to continue
and complete the reorganization of Saab Automobile could not be
concluded.  The Board of Saab Automobile subsequently decided
that the company without further funding will be insolvent and
that filing bankruptcy is in the best interests of its creditors.
Swan does not expect to realize any value from its shares in Saab
Automobile and will write off its interest in Saab Automobile
completely.

                            About Saab

Saab, or Svenska Aeroplan Aktiebolaget (Swedish Aircraft
Company), was founded in 1937 as an aircraft manufacturer and
revealed its first prototype passenger car 10 years later after
the formation of the Saab Car Division.  In 1990, Saab
Automobile AB was created as a separate company, jointly owned by
the Saab Scania Group and General Motors, and became a wholly-
owned GM subsidiary in 2000. In February 2010, Spyker Cars N.V.
was renamed Swedish Automobile N.V. (Swan) on June 15, 2011.

Saab Automobile AB currently employs approximately 3,700 staff in
Sweden, where it operates production and technical development
facilities at its headquarters in Trollhattan, 70 km north of
Gothenburg.  Saab Cars North America is located in Royal Oak,
Michigan employing approximately 50 people responsible for sales,
marketing and administration duties for the North American
market.


===========
T U R K E Y
===========


GLOBAL YATIRIM: Fitch Assigns 'B-(EXP)' Rating to New Notes
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Turkey-based Global Yatirim Holding
A.S.'s new notes an expected rating of 'B-(EXP)' and a Recovery
Rating of 'RR4'.  Global's Long-term foreign and local currency
Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) are 'B-'.

Global has commenced an exchange offer and consent solicitation
for the US$100 million 9.25% 'B-' rated loan participation notes
(LPN) due 2012 issued by Deutsche Bank Luxembourg S.A. in
exchange for USD-denominated fixed rate new notes due 2017 to be
issued directly by Global.  The final ratings on the new notes
are contingent upon receipt of final documents conforming to
information already received by Fitch.

The total size of the issue is expected to be between US$100
million and US$150 million of new notes depending on the amount
of acceptance under the exchange offer and consent solicitation
for the existing US$100 million LPNs.  Proceeds from the new
notes will be used to lengthen Global's debt maturity profile.
Global also intends to raise additional funding of up to US$50
million to be used for general corporate purposes or future
investments.

Fitch has updated its recovery analysis for Global, related to
net additional new funds of up to US$50 million that may be
raised through this transaction.  The current 'RR4' rating on the
unsecured notes reflects a good recovery on the senior unsecured
debt, given default. Nonetheless, recoveries are capped at 'RR4'
due to the Turkish jurisdiction of the guarantors.  Assuming that
the net additional funds will not increase cash-orientated EBITDA
in the immediate future, Fitch calculates that net additional new
issuance above US$50 million could pressure the current IDR due
to resultant higher leverage metrics, as these new funds are
expected to be channelled to new investments in the form of
subordinated debt or equity.

The new notes include the same limitation on the group's
indebtedness (debt-incurrence) as in the original notes, with the
ratio of the group's relevant financial expenses to the group's
EBITDA (adjusted for the deferred subscription revenues of gas
distribution subsidiaries) less than 1.0/1.2.  Other negative
pledges include covenants limiting the incurrence of additional
indebtedness within the port infrastructure business (Global
Ports).  Noteholders also benefit from a put option at 101% in
the event of change of control at Global Ports; if Global Ports
ceases to carry on the whole or a substantial part of its
business or any port asset sale as defined occurs.  Global Ports
remains by far the largest EBITDA generator in the group, of
nearly 88% of Fitch calculated group EBITDA, while the other main
business -- Energaz -- made up the remaining 12% at FY10.

The voluntary exchange offer with consent solicitation would not
constitute a distressed debt exchange (DDE) based on Fitch's
"Distressed Debt Exchange" criteria published on August 12, 2011.
Fitch notes that the reported cash balance at the Global parent
company level and future dividends from the ports, real estate
and securities business should be more than adequate to cover the
outstanding Eurobond of approximately US$73 million should no
bondholder consent to exchange. (US$26.9 million nominal amount
is held by Global and its affiliates.)

Fitch has conducted a Rating Assessment Service for Global.


=============
U K R A I N E
=============


OTP BANK: Moody's Confirms 'Ba2' Long-Term Deposit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has confirmed Ba2 long-term local
currency deposit rating of OTP Bank (Ukraine) (OTBU) with
negative outlook. The D- Bank's Financial Strength Rating with
stable outlook, the B3 long-term foreign currency deposit rating
with negative outlook and Not-Prime short-term local and foreign
currency deposit ratings remained unchanged, Aa1.ua National
Scale deposit Rating remained unchanged as well but carries no
specific outlook.

This rating action concludes the review for possible downgrade
initiated on November 29, 2011.

Ratings Rationale

According to Moody's, the confirmation of OTPU's local currency
deposit rating with negative outlook follows Moody's recent
announcement that it has confirmed the standalone bank financial
strength rating (BFSR) of OTPU's parent - OTP Bank (Hungary) at
D+ (mapping to Ba1 on the long-term scale), with a negative
outlook.

The negative outlook on the long-term rating reflects Moody's
opinion that the Ba2 ratings of OTPU would be affected by a one-
notch downgrade of the parent's standalone BFSR, which also
carries a negative outlook.

OTPU's Ba2 deposit ratings incorporate a high probability of
parental support from OTP Bank (Hungary), and consequently
receive a one-notch uplift from the bank's Ba3 standalone rating
(BCA). Moody's assessment of a high probability of parental
support is based on (i) the significant operational integration,
(ii) strong strategic fit of OTP with OTP Bank Group, as Ukraine
is one of three strategic foreign markets for the group, and
(iii) the parent's demonstrated willingness to provide ongoing
capital and liquidity support when needed.

Principal Methodologies

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.

Headquartered in Kyiv, Ukraine, as of December 31, 2010 OTP
reported total audited IFRS assets of UAH25 billion (US$ 3.1
billion) and net income of UAH344 million (US$43.2 million).


UKRAINE ISSUANCE: Fitch Assigns 'B-' Rating to LPN Program
----------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has assigned Ukraine Issuance PLC's US$2 billion
loan participation note (LPN) program and the program's Series 6
USD840,630,000 issue a Long-term 'B-' rating and a Recovery
Rating of 'RR4'.  At the same time, the agency has assigned PJSC
Alfa-Bank's (ABU) local currency bond issues F, G and H a 'B-'
Long-term rating with a Recovery Rating of 'RR4' and National
Long-term rating of 'BBB-(ukr)'.

The notes issued under the LPN program are being used solely for
financing a US dollar-denominated loan to ABU.  ABU's Long-term
foreign and local currency IDRs of 'B-' and National rating of
'BBB-(ukr)' reflect Fitch's assessment of potential support from
its shareholders, including support from the shareholders'
largest financial asset, Russia-based OJSC Alfa-Bank (AB,
'BB+'/Stable) and their other substantial business interests in
Ukraine

The notes bear a 13% fixed rate and amortize quarterly with final
maturity on July 30, 2012.  Currently, the outstanding principal
amount of the notes equals US$315 million.

The loan agreement between Ukraine Issuance PLC and ABU contains
a set of covenants, including ones which limit disposals and
mergers and stipulate that transactions with affiliates should be
conducted on an arm's-length basis.  ABU and its banking
subsidiaries also commit to comply with any capital adequacy
ratio requirements set by the relevant banking authority (minimum
capital adequacy ratio is currently 10% for Ukraine).  The
noteholders also have a put option exercisable following the
change of control in ABU if this event triggers a downgrade of
ABU's rating.

The local currency bonds issued by ABU include series F with a
principal amount of UAH290 million maturing on September 12,
2012, series G (UAH310 million, September 10, 2012) and series H
(UAH195 million, March 14, 2013).  All series have been placed,
but currently only the series H are in circulation, while the
other bonds have been repurchased by ABU.

ABU's obligations under the local currency bonds as well as under
the loan agreement with Ukraine Issuance PLC will rank at least
equally with the claims of other senior unsecured and
unsubordinated creditors of ABU, save those preferred by relevant
laws.  Under Ukrainian law, the claims of retail depositors rank
above those of other senior unsecured creditors.  At end-Q310,
retail depositors accounted for around 25% of ABU's non-equity
funding, according to the bank's local GAAP accounts.

ABU is ranked tenth by total assets in Ukraine at end-Q311.
ABU's main focus has been on corporate business, although the
retail and SME franchises are also being developed, in line with
ABU's strategic positioning as a universal bank.  The bank is
ultimately controlled by three Russian businessmen Mr.  Fridman,
Mr. Khan and Mr. Kuzmichev through ABH Ukraine (which holds 80%
in the bank) and AB (20%).


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


ENTERPRISE INNS: S&P Cuts Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating to 'B'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Rating Services lowered its long-term corporate
credit rating on U.K. tenanted public house (pub) operator
Enterprise Inns PLC (ETI, the company) to 'B' from 'B+'. "At the
same time, we lowered our issue ratings on the company's five
senior secured bonds to 'BB-' from 'BB'. The recovery rating of
'1' on these bonds is unchanged, reflecting our expectation of
very high (90%-100%) recovery for senior secured lenders in the
event of a payment default," S&P said.

"The downgrades reflect an increase in ETI's consolidated
Standard & Poor's-adjusted leverage in the financial year to
Sept. 30, 2011, and our view that the company's liquidity
position is under pressure despite ongoing disposal-funded debt
repayments. The downgrades also reflect the tight headroom under
ETI's bank covenants, the threat of a future dividend lock-up at
ETI's Unique Pub Finance Co. PLC (Unique) securitization
materially reducing ETI's solo earnings, as well as rising lease
liabilities as a result of sale-and-leasebacks," S&P said.

In financial year 2011, the company repaid GBP222 million of bank
debt and reduced the balances on its Unique bonds by GBP71
million using net proceeds from property sales. Nevertheless,
adjusted consolidated net debt to EBITDA rose further to 8.6x on
Sept. 30, 2011, from 8.4x one year earlier. More positively,
ETI's solo EBITDA interest coverage was stable at 2.66x over the
same period.

"ETI's 'highly leveraged' financial risk profile is unlikely to
improve in the next 12 months, in our view. For the financial
year to Sept. 30, 2012, we anticipate a mid-single-digit fall in
ETI's revenues, with adjusted EBITDA down by nearly 10%. Declines
in revenues and EBITDA are primarily the result of the company's
pub disposals. We anticipate that the trading performance of the
substantive estate will stabilize in the period, but we see
low-single-digit negative like-for-like sales across the whole
estate. Our base-case assumptions take into account pressure on
U.K. consumers' disposable incomes, low consumer confidence, and
the possibility of a further deterioration in the U.K.
macroeconomic environment," S&P said.

"In our view, ETI's earnings are likely to remain under pressure
due to adverse consumer spending trends in 2012, as well as to
continuing disposals. Furthermore, the outlook reflects ETI's
tight headroom under bank covenants, and our view that weaker
credit metrics could persist for some time despite ongoing debt
repayments from disposals. We view the sale-and-leasebacks as at
best neutral for ETI's lease-adjusted credit metrics. Poorer
trading conditions than we anticipate and any shortfalls in
anticipated disposal proceeds could adversely affect the
company's ability to finance debt amortizations, Unique dividend
payments, and covenant compliance. Limited headroom under the
Unique dividend lock-up threshold could have implications for
ETI's future covenant compliance under its bank facilities," S&P
said.

"We could lower the ratings if liquidity were to weaken further
or if solo EBITDA interest coverage were to drop to less than 2x.
This could result from deterioration in operating performance,
Unique entering dividend lock-up, or an inability to refinance
bank facilities. In our opinion, rating upside is currently
minimal," S&P said.


INMARSAT INVESTMENTS: S&P Assigns Rating to Credit Facility
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BBB' issue
rating to the $750 million revolving credit facility (RCF) issued
by U.K-based satellite operator Inmarsat Investments Ltd.
(Inmarsat; BB+/Negative/--). "The recovery rating on this senior
secured facility is '1', indicating our expectation of very high
(90%-100%) recovery prospects in the event of a payment default,"
S&P said.

"The US$750 million RCF replaces a US$500 million forward start
facility. That facility comprised a term loan that was repaid,
and an RCF that was cancelled, in June 2011. The recovery rating
of '1' on the new RCF reflects our view that although the
security package provided to senior secured lenders is relatively
weak, this is mitigated by the contractual subordination of the
guarantee in favor of unsecured lenders vis a vis the senior
guarantee in favor of the RCF. We see this subordination as the
main structural protection for senior secured lenders," S&P said.

                       Recovery Analysis

Inmarsat's US$750 million RCF ranks pari passu with senior
secured loans provided by the European Investment Bank (AAA/Watch
Neg/A-1+) and ExIm Bank (not rated) and benefits from the same
security package. The security package, in our view, is
relatively weak, comprising share pledges over the equity in the
holding company Inmarsat Ventures Ltd. (BB+/Negative/--).
Guarantees from group companies are provided to senior secured
and unsecured lenders, with the guarantee in favor of the
unsecured lenders being contractually subordinated to the
guarantee in favor of senior secured lenders. Companies providing
the guarantees account for more than 85% of EBITDA and total
assets of the group.

The documentation of the senior secured credit facilities
contains maintenance financial covenants, including an interest
coverage ratio and a leverage ratio. Nonfinancial covenants are
relatively typical for speculative-grade issues, with a negative
pledge and limitations on additional indebtedness, disposals,
mergers, and acquisitions.

"In order to determine recoveries, we simulate a hypothetical
default scenario. Our analysis assumes that Inmarsat would most
likely default from an inability to refinance its senior secured
credit facility in 2016 as a result of excessive leverage and a
significant deterioration in market conditions. Under such a
scenario, we assume that demand for the group's services would
decline, thereby increasing price pressure and eroding revenues.
These conditions could be compounded by potential satellite
failures," S&P said.

"We value Inmarsat on a going-concern basis, given the nature of
the assets and high barriers to entry in the satellite
communications industry. However, we believe recovery values are
likely to be intrinsically linked to the value of the satellites.
We have therefore used a discrete-asset valuation to estimate
the value available to creditors," S&P said.

"We value Inmarsat's assets at about US$1.8 billion at our
hypothetical point of default in 2016, allowing for a haircut to
asset values. Our valuation takes into account the group's
current asset base, its US$370 million investment in the new
AlphaSat satellite to be launched in 2013, and the US$1.2 billion
investment program for the construction and launch of the three
Ka-band satellites in 2013-2014," S&P said.

"From our valuation of US$1.8 billion, we deduct priority
liabilities of around US$140 million, primarily comprising the
enforcement costs and 50% of pension liabilities. This leaves
about US$1.66 billion available for senior secured lenders, for
whom we envisage about US$1.43 billion senior secured debt
outstanding at default, which includes six months of prepetition
interest, and assumes a fully drawn RCF at default. However, we
do not assume that the US$150 million uncommitted RCF is
utilized. We therefore envisage very high (90%-100%) recovery
prospects for lenders to the RCF, with an issue rating of 'BBB',
two notches above the long-term corporate credit rating on
Inmarsat," S&P said.

"Notwithstanding our current negative outlook on Inmarsat, we
could align the issue rating on the RCF with the corporate credit
rating on Inmarsat if the latter were raised to 'BBB-' in the
future (that is, one notch below the current issue rating). This
is due to the different criteria that we apply to rating
investment-grade debt issues versus speculative-grade debt
issues," S&P said.

A detailed recovery report on Inmarsat will be available shortly.

Ratings List

New Rating

Inmarsat Investments Ltd.
Senior Secured
  US$750 mil fltg rate RCF bank ln    BBB
  due 06/30/2016
   Recovery Rating                    1


SHAMROCK CREDIT: Moody's Cuts Rating on EUR50-Mil. Notes to Caa3
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the rating of these
Credit Default Swap entered into by Merrill Lynch International,
a transaction referencing a static portfolio of corporate
entities:

Issuer: Merrill Lynch International Credit Default Swaps
(Shamrock)

   -- EUR50,000,000 Shamrock Class 1 (Reference Nø 06ML19662A)
      Notes, Downgraded to Caa3 (sf); previously on Aug 24, 2010
      Downgraded to Ba1 (sf)

Merrill Lynch International CDS (Shamrock), issued in April 2006,
is a credit default swap referencing a portfolio of senior
unsecured, subordinated and preferred stock.

Ratings Rationale

Moody's explained that the rating action taken is the result of
the overall credit deterioration of the portfolio. Since
inception, the subordination of the rated tranche has been
reduced due to credit events. Since the last rating action, there
have been six credit events on, among others, Bank of Scotland
Plc and The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc in respect to the
preferred stock. The rest, Ambac Financial Group Inc and Allied
Irish Banks, plc, Bank of Ireland and Irish Life & Permanent plc
were in respect to the subordinate debt. The notes have a
remaining life of 4.27 years and credit enhancement of
approximately 0.43%. The Banking, Insurance and Finance sectors
are the most represented, weighting 79.69%, 12.5%, and 4.7%,
respectively, of the portfolio initial notional.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Corporate
Collateralized Synthetic Obligations", key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis may be different from the
manager/arranger's reported numbers. In particular, rating
assumptions for all publicly rated corporate credits in the
underlying portfolio have been adjusted for "Review for Possible
Downgrade", "Review for Possible Upgrade", or "Negative Outlook".

In its base case Moody's ran the CDORom (as described below)
using the senior unsecured rating for all the exposures in the
portfolio and specifying senior unsecured or subordinated
seniorities depending on the type of exposure. The preferred
stock exposures were run with the senior unsecured rating, 0%
recovery rate and 100% DP stress.

In the process of determining the final rating, Moody's took into
account the results of a number of sensitivity analyses:

(1) Use of subordinated ratings-- Moody's tested the deal
sensitivity to the actual ratings of the subordinated debt
exposures as they constitute approximately 64% of the current
reference portfolio. This run generated a result that was 3
notches lower than the one modelled under the base case.

(2) Use of preferred stock ratings - Including consideration of a
variability of recovery rates of preferred stock which constitute
approximately 15% of the current reference portfolio. Moody's
reviewed model outputs that included referencing the actual
ratings of the preferred stocks as well as stressing the senior
unsecured rating default probabilities and recoveries. These runs
generated results that one notch lower than those modelled under
the base case.

Taking into consideration the result of these sensitivity
analyses the rating committee vote resulted in a downgrade of the
tranche's rating to a level three notches lower than the base
case result.

The action also reflects the correction of a numerical input with
respect to the credit enhancement amount used in previous rating
actions. In previous actions, Moody's input a lower subordination
than was the case. Had this not occurred, the rating of the notes
may have been downgraded by a further notch. The correct input is
now included in the rating of the notes.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which could negatively impact the
ratings of the notes, as evidenced by uncertainties of credit
conditions in the general economy especially as 15% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Portugal, Spain and
Italy. CSO notes' performance may also be impacted either
positively or negatively by 1) variations over time in default
rates for instruments with a given rating, 2) variations in
recovery rates for instruments with particular seniority/security
characteristics, 3) uncertainty about the default and recovery
correlations characteristics of the reference pool and 4)
divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by
different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.
Given the tranched nature of Corporate CSO liabilities, rating
transitions in the reference pool may have leveraged rating
implications for the ratings of the Corporate CSO liabilities,
thus leading to a high degree of volatility. All else being
equal, the volatility is likely to be higher for more junior or
thinner liabilities.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Corporate Collateralized Synthetic
Obligations" published in September 2009.

In rating this transaction, Moody's used CDOROM to model the cash
flows and determine the loss for each tranche. The Moody's
CDOROM(TM) is a Monte Carlo simulation which takes the Moody's
default probabilities as input. Each corporate reference entity
is modelled individually with a standard multi-factor model
incorporating intra- and inter-industry correlation. The
correlation structure is based on a Gaussian copula. In each
Monte Carlo scenario, defaults are simulated. Losses on the
portfolio are then derived, and allocated to the notes in reverse
order of priority to derive the loss on the notes issued by the
Issuer. By repeating this process and averaging over the number
of simulations, an estimate of the expected loss borne by the
notes is derived. As such, Moody's analysis encompasses the
assessment of stressed scenarios

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: Performance Evaluation of Hedge Funds
----------------------------------------------------
Edited by Greg N. Gregoriou, Fabrice Rouah, and Komlan Sedzro
Publisher: Beard Books
Hardcover: 203 pages
Listprice: $59.95
Review by Henry Berry

Hedge funds can be traced back to 1949 when Alfred Winslow Jones
formed the first one to "hedge" his investments in the stock
market by betting that some stocks would go up and others down.
However, it has only been within the past decade that hedge funds
have exploded in growth.  The rise of global markets and the
uncertainties that have arisen from the valuation of different
currencies have given a boost to hedge funds.  In 1998, there
were approximately 3,500 hedge funds, managing capital of about
$150 billion.  By mid-2006, 9,000 hedge funds were managing $1.2
trillion in assets.

Despite their growing prominence in the investment community,
hedge funds are only vaguely understood by most people.
Performance Evaluation of Hedge Funds addresses this shortcoming.
The book describes the structure, workings, purpose, and goals of
hedge funds.  While hedge funds are loosely defined as "funds
with no rules," the editors define these funds more usefully as
"privately pooled investments, usually structured as a
partnership between the fund managers and the investors."  The
authors then expand upon this definition by explaining what sorts
of investments hedge funds are, the work of the managers, and the
reasons investors join a hedge fund and what they are looking for
in doing so.

For example, hedge funds are characterized as an "important
avenue for investors opting to diversify their traditional
portfolios and better control risk" -- an apt characterization
considering their tremendous growth over the last decade.  The
qualifications to join a hedge fund generally include a net worth
in excess of $1 million; thus, funds are for high net-worth
individuals and institutional investors such as foundations, life
insurance companies, endowments, and investment banks.  However,
there are many individuals with net worths below $1 million that
take part in hedge funds by pooling funds in financial entities
that are then eligible for a hedge fund.

This book discusses why hedge funds have become "notorious as
speculating vehicles," in part because of highly publicized
incidents, both pro and con.  For example, George Soros made $1
billion in 1992 by betting against the British pound.
Conversely, the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCP)
imploded in 1998, with losses totalling $4.6 billion.
Nonetheless, these are the exceptions rather than the rule, and
the editors offer statistics, studies, and other research showing
that the "volatility of hedge funds is closer to that of bonds
than mutual funds or equities."

After clarifying what hedge funds are and are not, the book
explains how to analyze hedge fund performance and select a
successful hedge fund.  It is here that the book has its greatest
utility, and the text is supplemented with graphs, tables, and
formulas.

The analysis makes one thing clear: for some investors, hedge
funds are an investment worth considering.  Most have a
demonstrable record of investment performance and the risk is
low, contrary to common perception.  Investors who have the
necessary capital to invest in a hedge fund or readers who aspire
to join that select club will want to absorb the research,
information, analyses, commentary, and guidance of this unique
book.

Greg N. Gregoriou teaches at U. S. and Canadian universities and
does research for large corporations.  Fabrice Rouah also teaches
at the university level and does financial research.  Komlan
Sedzro is a professor of finance at the University of Quebec and
an advisor to the Montreal Derivatives Exchange.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
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members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


                 * * * End of Transmission * * *