/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR

/raid1/www/Hosts/bankrupt/TCREUR_Public/111027.mbx T R O U B L E D C O M P A N Y R E P O R T E R E U R O P E Thursday, October 27, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 213 Headlines D E N M A R K AMAGERBANKEN A/S: FSA Underestimated Bankruptcy Risk, Report Says G E R M A N Y BAUER AG: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Corporate Credit Rating KIRCHMEDIA: Ex-Deutsche CEO Not Aware of 2002 Meeting's Subject G R E E C E * GREECE: Insolvency Must Be Avoided, Eurogroup Chief Says I R E L A N D INTERNATIONAL INNS: Goes Into Receivership, Owes EUR2.3-Mil. N E T H E R L A N D S AI FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Rating on Senior Secured Bond to 'Ca' CONTEGO CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B2' LEVERAGED FINANCE: Moody's Raises Rating on Class IV Notes to B2 MARCO POLO: Banks' Motions to Dismiss Chapter 11 Filings Tossed R U S S I A TRANSCONTAINER JSC: Fitch Maintains 'BB+' Long-Term IDR S P A I N EMPRESAS BANESTO 6: Moody's Assigns 'Ca' Rating to Serie C Note SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO: S&P Withdraws D Ratings on 4 Note Classes U N I T E D K I N G D O M CLOUGHVALLEY STORES: Goes Into Administration, Seeks Buyer GRIMSBY TOWN: Supporters Fear Possible Administration JGP ENGINEERING: Goes Into Administration, 50 Jobs at Risk NORIAN BEDS: Goes Into Administration, 140 Jobs at Risk ROSSETT HALL HOTEL: Enters Receivership, In Liquidation ROYAL BANK: CIC Might Team With Blackstone in Distressed-Loan Buy TALENTNATION: Creditor Wants Scottish Enterprise to Pursue Owner TRADE MANUFACTURING: Ceases Trading; Up to 40 Workers Lose Jobs * UK: Daniels Silverman Calls for Clampdown on Pre-pack Deals * UK: Economic Slump Affects Most Firms in North East, R3 Says X X X X X X X X * EUROPE: European Union Intends to Pursue Plan on Failed Banks * EUROPE: Highest-Rated States Not Ready to Provide Fresh Capital * Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars ********* ============= D E N M A R K ============= AMAGERBANKEN A/S: FSA Underestimated Bankruptcy Risk, Report Says ----------------------------------------------------------------- According to Bloomberg News' Frances Schwartzkopff, Borsen reported that Denmark's auditor general said the country's financial watchdog underestimated the risk that Amagerbanken A/S might collapse, costing taxpayers US$392 million. Borsen, citing the agency's Rigsrevisionen report, said the Financial Supervisory Authority should have been more alert to the "especially risky" strategies Amagerbanken used last year when the government granted the regional lender DKK13.5 billion (US$2.5 billion) in state-guaranteed loans. Borsen said six months later, Amagerbanken collapsed, costing taxpayers DKK2.1 billion to date, Bloomberg notes. About Amagerbanken Amagerbanken, the 8th largest bank in Denmark, was hit in 2008 by the financial crisis and needed to refinance it on the market, in order to balance necessary asset write-downs. After continuous unsuccessful efforts to obtain new financing or to find other solutions, Amagerbanken was declared bankrupt on Feb. 7, 2011. Previously, Feb. 6, 2011, Amagerbanken had entered into a conditional transfer agreement with the Danish publicly owned Financial Stability Company (FSC), as part of the Danish bank wind-up scheme. ============= G E R M A N Y ============= BAUER AG: S&P Withdraws 'BB+' Corporate Credit Rating ----------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'BB+' long-term corporate credit rating on Germany-based engineering group Bauer AG. The rating was then withdrawn at the issuer's request. At the time of the withdrawal, the outlook was stable. "The rating was constrained, in our view, by the group's dependence on the cyclical and competitive construction industry, the exposure of about one-third of its earnings to project risk, and the high capital intensity of its equipment operations. Furthermore, we considered the group's financial risk profile to be 'significant', according to our classification. These factors were partly offset by our view of Bauer's 'satisfactory' business risk profile, underpinned by the group's leading global market positions in foundation construction equipment, which is less risky and has higher margins than construction activities. In addition, we considered Bauer to have critical know-how in foundation construction services worldwide and a good track record of profitability over the industry cycle," S&P related. "We considered Bauer's liquidity position to be less than adequate, under our criteria. This is a change from our previous assessment of adequate and reflected our view that Bauer's sources of liquidity over the next year would likely be less than 1.2x its uses of liquidity. This, we believe, is due to the group's continued reliance on short-term credit lines. However, in our view, the group has displayed a good track record of renewing these lines well before their maturity (see 'Methodology And Assumptions: Liquidity Descriptors For Global Corporate Issuers,' published on Sept. 28, 2011, on RatingsDirect on the Global Credit Portal)," S&P said. Ratings List Ratings Affirmed; Ratings Withdrawn To From Bauer AG Corporate Credit Rating NR BB+/Stable/-- KIRCHMEDIA: Ex-Deutsche CEO Not Aware of 2002 Meeting's Subject --------------------------------------------------------------- Karin Matussek at Bloomberg News reports that former Deutsche Bank AG Chief Executive Officer Rolf Breuer told a court he wasn't told beforehand that a 2002 meeting with then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder would include discussing the situation of the late Leo Kirch's media group. When he was invited by the chancellor's office he wasn't told the subject of the meeting, Mr. Breuer, as cited by Bloomberg, said at a Munich appeals court in one of the cases Mr. Kirch filed against Mr. Breuer and the lender. Mr. Breuer said he assumed Mr. Schroeder wanted to discuss foreign investors' ambitions for Germany's cable market, Bloomberg relates. "When the discussion touched Kirch's situation I understood from the context the others were hoping we would take an active role to help him," Bloomberg quotes Mr. Breuer as saying. "But I was pretty tight-lipped on all of this." The Kirch lawsuits, which continued after the media entrepreneur's July death, claim Deutsche Bank secretly plotted the company's demise, Bloomberg discloses. Mr. Kirch argued the meeting with Mr. Schroeder was part of a plan that included a February 2002 interview on Bloomberg Television in which Mr. Breuer said "everything that you can read and hear" is that "the financial sector isn't prepared to provide further" loans or equity to Mr. Kirch, Bloomberg notes. Within months, Mr. Kirch's media group filed the country's biggest bankruptcy since World War II, Bloomberg recounts. Mr. Kirch sued Frankfurt-based Deutsche Bank and Mr. Breuer in lawsuits that seek about EUR3.3 billion (US$4.6 billion), Bloomberg relates. According to Bloomberg, Mr. Breuer also told the judges he wasn't approached by Erich Schumann, then head of publisher WAZ Group, before a Jan. 27, 2002, meeting about its interest in acquiring Mr. Kirch's stake in Axel-Springer AG. He said that he only learned about the interest during that evening, Bloomberg relates. Mr. Kirch pledged the stake to Deutsche Bank as loan collateral, Bloomberg notes. Mr. Breuer told the judges on Tuesday that selling Mr. Kirch's assets was discussed as one possible option to avoid bankruptcy, Bloomberg relates. He said he explained to the meeting's participants that Deutsche Bank couldn't sell the Axel-Springer stake it held as collateral because Mr. Kirch wasn't in default with payments on his loan, according to Bloomberg. About KirchMedia Headquartered in Ismaning, Germany, KirchMedia GmbH -- http://www.kirchmedia.de/-- was the country's second largest media company prior to its insolvency filing in June 2002. The firm's collapse, caused by a US$5.7 billion debt incurred during an expansion drive, was Germany's biggest since World War II. Taurus Holding is the former holding company for the Kirch group. The case is docketed under Case No. 14 HK O 1877/07 at the Regional Court of Munich. =========== G R E E C E =========== * GREECE: Insolvency Must Be Avoided, Eurogroup Chief Says ---------------------------------------------------------- Dow Jones Newswires, citing Neue Zuercher Zeitung, reports that Jean-Claude Juncker, head of the Eurogroup, said a Greek insolvency, or anything that could be judged as such by the rating agencies, had to be avoided at all costs. According to Dow Jones, Mr. Juncker, who is also prime minister of Luxembourg, as cited by NZZ, said in an interview that one way of avoiding such an eventuality was for banks to voluntarily accept a haircut of around 50% on their holdings of Greek government bonds. Dow Jones notes that Mr. Juncker is cited as saying a Greek bankruptcy could have fatal consequences for the country, and could lead to a collapse of its banks and financial system, and given the current social tensions, to "civil-war-like" confrontations in Greece. He told the newspaper that Greece would thus become the first industrialized European nation in half a century to go bankrupt, and this would threaten the cohesion in Europe, Dow Jones relates. He said that it would also raise the risk of contagion for countries like Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, which in turn would have grave consequences for the whole of Europe, including Switzerland, Dow Jones discloses. ============= I R E L A N D ============= INTERNATIONAL INNS: Goes Into Receivership, Owes EUR2.3-Mil. ------------------------------------------------------------ Noel O'Driscoll at Kildare Nationalist reports that International Inns Ltd. has gone into receivership with debts of EUR2.3million. The debts have accrued to the state-owned, Anglo Irish Bank who appointed the receiver to take control of the company, according to Kildare Nationalist. The report relates that Mr. Dooley told the Kildare Nationalist that International Inns Limited has no connection with his main operating companies and he added that the other businesses are not affected by the Anglo move. "There are no job losses; the only person employed by this company is myself. Apart from the banks there are no creditors and no taxation issues arising from this," Kildare Nationalist quoted Mr. Dooley as saying. The latest set of accounts filed with the Companies Office show International Inns had assets, including an ACC bond, valued at EUR500,000 and properties valued at EUR3.6 million, Kildare Nationalist notes. International Inns Ltd owns White's Castle in Athy. White's Castle is one of the properties within the International Inns portfolio. ===================== N E T H E R L A N D S ===================== AI FINANCE: Moody's Cuts Rating on Senior Secured Bond to 'Ca' -------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has lowered the corporate family rating of Agri International Resources Pte Ltd (AIRPL) as well as its rating on the senior secured bond issued by AI Finance B.V., which is wholly owned and guaranteed by AIRPL, to Ca from Caa1. The outlook of the ratings is developing. RATINGS RATIONALE "The rating action follows the downgrade of AIRPL's parent company, Bakrie Sumatera Plantations (BSP), to Ca/developing and reflects both the close operating and financial dependencies between the two companies" says Alan Greene, a Moody's Vice President and Senior Credit Officer. AIRPL's standalone performance has improved year on year in 1H 2011 but cash generation and liquidity remain weak. "Interest cover remains weak and AIRPL will need external support to refinance its bonds due in July 2012. In light of BSP's troubles, it is difficult to ascertain at this stage from where such support will come", adds Greene, also Lead Analyst for AIRPL. The rating outlook reflects the uncertainty over BSP's refinancing situation, the ramifications of which are critical for AIRPL given its role as a captive supplier of palm oil to BSP. A rapid resolution of its own refinancing challenge well in advance of its due date would be viewed favorably. The last rating action with respect to AIRPL was taken on January 13, 2011, when its Caa1 corporate family and secured bond ratings were confirmed having previously been placed on review for potential downgrade. AIRPL's ratings were assigned by evaluating factors that Moody's considers relevant to the credit profile of the issuer, such as the company's (i) business risk and competitive position compared with others within the industry; (ii) capital structure and financial risk; (iii) projected performance over the near to intermediate term; and (iv) management's track record and tolerance for risk. Moody's compared these attributes against other issuers both within and outside AIRPL's core industry and believes AIRPL's ratings are comparable to those of other issuers with similar credit risk. These attributes were compared against other issuers both within and outside of AIRPL's core industry; its ratings are believed to be comparable to those of other issuers of similar credit risk. Agri International Resources Pte Ltd was incorporated in Singapore in May 2007. AIRPL became a subsidiary of BSP in March 2010 and is now 99%-owned by BSP. It accounted for 32% of BSP's mature palm oil plantations as of June 2011. AIRPL's operating subsidiary (Agri Resources B.V.) owns two oil palm plantations in Sumatra, with a total land utilization rights covering 56,618 hectares, of which 35,876 hectares were planted and 29,553 hectares were mature as at June 30, 2011. CONTEGO CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B2' ------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes issued by Contego CLO I B.V.: -- EUR75M Multicurrency Senior Secured Floating Rate Variable Funding Notes due 2026, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade -- EUR120M Class A-1-a Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade -- EUR21.75M Class B Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade -- EUR18.15M Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade -- EUR20.55M Class D Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade -- EUR11.75M Class E Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes due 2026, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade RATINGS RATIONALE Contego CLO I B.V., issued in July 2007, is a multi currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by Rothschild (NM) & Sons Limited. This transaction will be in reinvestment period until April 15, 2013. It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans (92.5%) with some exposure to mezzanine and second lien loans (7.5%). According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect consideration of an increase in the transaction's overcollateralization ratios due to deleveraging of the senior notes since the rating action in August 2009. The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions, which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling of collateral amortization profile and (2) changing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required for credit estimate updates. Moody's notes that the senior notes have been paid down by approximately 3.5%, or EUR6.5 million, since the rating action in August 2009. The overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating action in August 2009. As of the latest trustee report dated August 31, 2011, the senior, Class B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at 149.20%, 132.73%, 121.54%, 110.94% and 105.68% respectively, versus June 2009 levels of 143.93%, 128.67%, 118.21%, 108.25% and 103.27%, respectively. The reported WARF has increased from 2640 to 2941 since the last rating action. However, this reported WARF partially overstates the actual deterioration in credit quality because of the technical transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's on September 1, 2010. Additionally, there are currently no defaulted securities in the portfolio compared to EUR10.4 million in June 2009. Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR267.2 million, a weighted average default probability of 20.83% (consistent with a WARF of 3075), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.97% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 29 and a weighted average spread of 2.975%. The default probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 92.5% of the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities. Sources of additional performance uncertainties are: 1) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its analysis. 2) The deal has exposure to non-EUR denominated assets. Volatilities in foreign exchange rate will have a direct impact on interest and principal proceeds available to the transaction, which may affect the expected loss of rated tranches. 3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming the worse of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating factor, weighted average spread and diversity score. However, as part of the base case, Moody's considered spread levels higher than the covenant levels due to the large difference between the reported and covenant levels. 4) Moody's also notes that around 75% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through Moody's credit estimates. The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011. Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in June 2011. The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA Cash-Flow model. In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the final rating decision. LEVERAGED FINANCE: Moody's Raises Rating on Class IV Notes to B2 ---------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes issued by Leveraged Finance Europe Capital II B.V.: Issuer: LEVERAGED FINANCE EUROPE CAPITAL II B.V. -- EUR7.1M (with current outstanding EUR6.86M) Class I-A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade -- EUR101.8M (with current outstanding EUR98.32M) Class I-B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade -- EUR38.5M Class II Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded to A3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade -- EUR10.7M Class III Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade -- EUR7.2M Class IV (with current outstanding EUR6.84M) Mezzanine Floating Rate Notes due 2020, Upgraded to B2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade -- EUR2.3M (with current outstanding Rated Balance EUR1.16M) Class R Combination Notes due 2020, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade The rating of the Class R Combination Note addresses the repayment of the Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class R, 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus the aggregate of all payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount reported by the trustee. RATINGS RATIONALE Leveraged Finance Europe Capital II B.V., issued in September 2003, is a single currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by BNP Paribas. This transaction will be in reinvestment period until 2 March 2012. It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans. According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions, which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2) increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to the modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling of collateral amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required for credit estimate updates, and (3) adjustments to the equity cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes. Moody's notes that including the latest payment which took place on September 2, 2011, the Class I notes have been paid down by approximately 1.93% or EUR2.10 million since the last rating action in December 2009. At the same time, Class IV notes have been partially redeemed by approximately 5.07% or EUR0.36 million since the last rating action in December 2009, due to the diversion of interest following the failure of Class IV overcollateralization test. As of the latest trustee report dated 30 September 2011, the OC ratio related to Class II, Class III and Class IV are reported at 116.89% and 108.79% and 104.18% respectively, versus October 2009 levels of 116.48% and 105.51% and 103.74% respectively. Reported WARF has increased from 2663 to 3139 between October 2009 and September 2011. However, this reported WARF overstates the actual deterioration in credit quality because of the technical transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's on September 1, 2010. Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF, diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case, Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR166.6 million, defaulted par of EUR8.5 million, a weighted average default probability of 22.33% (consistent with a WARF of 3089), a weighted average recovery rate upon default of 45.15% for a Aaa liability target rating, a diversity score of 34 and a weighted average spread of 3%. The default probability is derived from the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 87.88% of the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the covenant levels. However, in this case given the limited time remaining in the deal's reinvestment period, Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming weighted average spread consistent with the midpoint between reported and covenanted values. Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of credit conditions in the general economy especially as 14.7% of the portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Ireland, Spain and Italy, and 2) the large concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities. Sources of additional performance uncertainties are: 1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential volatility in market prices. 2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or participate in amend-to-extend offerings. 3) Moody's also notes that around 73.4% of the collateral pool consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been subject to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per the report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009. The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in June 2011. Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating methodology published in June 2011. The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA Cash-Flow model. In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in the current market environment, the legal environment, specific documentation features, the collateral manager's track record, and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All information available to rating committees, including macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the final rating decision. MARCO POLO: Banks' Motions to Dismiss Chapter 11 Filings Tossed --------------------------------------------------------------- Bracewell & Giuliani LLP on Oct. 25 disclosed that it won a major bankruptcy verdict on behalf of Netherlands-based global maritime shipping company Marco Polo Seatrade BV and three of its affiliates in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. The decision rendered by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James M. Peck rejects motions by Marco Polo's secured banks seeking dismissal on jurisdictional and other grounds of the Chapter 11 filings. The Marco Polo litigation was widely followed in the global maritime community. The decision validates that U.S. Chapter 11 proceedings are a viable restructuring strategy for international shipping companies as long as they have the minimal connections needed to satisfy U.S. jurisdictional requirements. The decision also confirms that U.S. Bankruptcy Courts will maintain jurisdiction over foreign debtors as long as the Chapter 11 filings were made in good faith and with the intention to properly reorganize the business. After three days of trial, Judge Peck agreed with Bracewell that the working capital reserve maintained by Marco Polo's New York- based pool manager and the unused fee retainer held by Bracewell comprised sufficient "property" in the U.S. to sustain Chapter 11 jurisdiction. Judge Peck also found that Marco Polo had acted in complete good faith in seeking Chapter 11 relief. Judge Peck further agreed with Bracewell that, in fact, Chapter 11 was likely the only forum in which shipping companies like Marco Polo could have a reasonable opportunity to reorganize their businesses rather than liquidate. "This victory puts to rest any concerns as to Marco Polo's eligibility for and good faith in seeking Chapter 11 relief," said Evan Flaschen, counsel to Marco Polo and partner and chair of the Financial Restructuring Group at the firm. "Now it is our responsibility to take advantage of the opportunities that Chapter 11 offers and we look forward to working with our banks and other constituencies to develop a reorganization plan that will enable the company to emerge as a revitalized competitor in the international shipping market," he added. "The decision also has significant positive implications for other troubled international shipping companies which need a forum in which to reorganize their businesses. In the current difficult market environment, sometimes all that a maritime shipping company needs is a chance to catch its breath while its creditors are held at bay, and that is precisely what Chapter 11 provides," Ms. Flaschen noted. Bracewell attorneys involved in the matter include: Partners: Evan Flaschen, Robert Burns, Andrew Schoulder and Michael Hefter Associates: Mark Dendinger, Seth Cohen, Adam Shane and Brendan Derr A Bracewell team led by Evan Flaschen, Trey Wood, Greg Nye and Jason Cohen is also representing the global shipping businesses operated by Omega Navigation Enterprises and its affiliates in their Chapter 11 cases currently pending in the Houston Bankruptcy Court, where similar motions filed by Omega Navigation's banks are scheduled for trial beginning on November 28. About Bracewell & Giuliani LLP Bracewell & Giuliani LLP -- http://www.bgllp.com/-- is an international law firm with more than 470 lawyers in Texas, New York, Washington, D.C., Connecticut, Seattle, Dubai, and London. The firm serves Fortune 500 companies, major financial institutions, leading private investment funds, governmental entities and individuals concentrated in the energy, technology and financial services sectors worldwide. About Marco Polo Marco Polo Seatrade B.V. operates an international commercial vessel management company that specializes in providing commercial and technical vessel management services to third parties. Founded in 2005, the Company mainly operates under the name of Seaarland Shipping Management and maintains corporate Headquarters in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The primary assets consist of six tankers that are regularly employed in international trade, and call upon ports worldwide. Marco Polo and three affiliated entities filed for Chapter 11 protection (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Lead Case No. 11-13634) on July 29, 2011. The other affiliates are Seaarland Shipping Management B.V.; Magellano Marine C.V.; and Cargoship Maritime B.V. Marco Polo is the sole owner of Seaarland, which in turn is the sole owner of Cargoship, and also holds a 5% stake in Magellano. The remaining 95% stake in Magellano is owned by Amsterdam-based Poule B.V., while another Amsterdam company, Falm International Holding B.V. is the sole owner of Marco Polo. Falm and Poule didn't file bankruptcy petitions. The filings were prompted after lender Credit Agricole Corporate & Investment Bank seized one ship on July 21, 2011, and was on the cusp of seizing two more on July 29. The arrest of the vessel was authorized by the U.K. Admiralty Court. Credit Agricole also attached a bank account with almost US$1.8 million on July 29. The Chapter 11 filing precluded the seizure of the two other vessels. Evan D. Flaschen, Esq., Robert G. Burns, Esq., and Andrew J. Schoulder, Esq., at Bracewell & Giuliani LLP, serve as bankruptcy counsel. The cases are before Judge James M. Peck. The petition said assets and debt are both more than US$100 million and less than US$500 million. =========== R U S S I A =========== TRANSCONTAINER JSC: Fitch Maintains 'BB+' Long-Term IDR ------------------------------------------------------- Fitch Ratings has maintained Russia-based JSC TransContainer's Issuer Default Rating (IDR) on Rating Watch Negative (RWN). TransContainer's 'BB+' Long-term IDR currently includes a one- notch uplift for parental support from JSC Russian Railways (RZD, 'BBB'/Stable/'F3'), its majority shareholder. The maintained RWN reflects RZD's decision to further reduce its stake in TransContainer and uncertainty remains regarding the percentage of shares to be disposed, the timing of the disposal given that it is no longer expected to occur by the end of 2011, and the identify of the future majority shareholder. RZD's intention is to dispose of a 25% stake in TransContainer but maintain a 25% +1 share stake. However, the Russian government, RZD's sole shareholder, is now considering plans for RZD to fully divest its stake in the company. Discussions between RZD and the Russian government are still ongoing and a final decision regarding the precise dilution of RZD's stake is not expected until the end of 2011. The agency emphasizes that TransContainer's ratings may be impacted by the relative credit strength of a new majority shareholder and the parent-subsidiary arrangements put in place, including the effect of possible acquisition funding. To resolve the RWN, Fitch will therefore seek clarification about the new ownership structure and details of any acquisition financing. The one-notch uplift for parental support from RZD applied to TransContainer's ratings is in accordance with Fitch's Parent- Subsidiary Rating Linkage methodology. The agency recognizes the moderate operational and strategic ties between TransContainer and RZD, whose intentions to maintain a 25% stake implies a continued commitment to TransContainer and its perceived importance to RZD in terms of strategy and operations. TransContainer's standalone rating continues to reflect its market position as the leading rail container operator in Russia, geographical reach and relatively diversified customer base. As at June 30, 2011, the company owned c.60% of total flatcars in Russia and holds an estimated 52% of all rail container transportation. It owns and operates more than 24,000 flatcars and c.60,000 containers. Leverage of <2.0x net adjusted debt/EBITDA as at H111 is considered commensurate with the standalone 'BB' rating. Fitch expects this ratio to remain below 2.0x in the medium term. The rating actions are as follows: -- Long-term IDR: 'BB+'; RWN maintained -- Short-term IDR: 'B'; Affirmed -- Local currency long-term IDR: 'BB+'; RWN maintained -- Local currency short-term IDR: 'B'; Affirmed -- National Long-term rating: 'AA'(rus)'; RWN maintained -- Senior Secured Rating: 'BB+'; RWN maintained ========= S P A I N ========= EMPRESAS BANESTO 6: Moody's Assigns 'Ca' Rating to Serie C Note --------------------------------------------------------------- Moody's has assigned these definitive ratings to the debt issued by EMPRESAS BANESTO 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos: -- EUR935M Serie A Note, Assigned Aaa (sf) -- EUR165M Serie B Note, Assigned Baa2 (sf) -- EUR264M Serie C Note, Assigned Ca (sf) RATINGS RATIONALE EMPRESAS BANESTO 6, Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos is a securitization of a EUR1.1 billion portfolio consisting of loans granted by Banco Espanol de Credito, S.A. (Banesto, A2/P- 1/Negative Outlook) to micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and corporate obligors. Banesto is acting as Servicer of the loans while Santander de Titulizacion S.G.F.T., S.A. is the Management Company (the Gestora). The provisional pool analysed had, as of September 2011, an outstanding balance of EUR1,185.9M and was composed of 5,731 loans granted to obligors located in Spain. The assets were originated between 2004 and 2011 (86.7% between 2008 and 2011), and have a weighted average seasoning of 2 years and a weighted average remaining term of 3.7 years. All exposures are unsecured loans. Geographically, obligors within the pool are mostly located in the regions of Catalonia (26.3%), Madrid (22.1%) and Valencia (10.1%). The provisional portfolio, as of its cut-off date, included 2.5% of loans in arrears between 31 and 90 days. However, loans in arrears exceeding 30 days will be excluded from the final pool at closing. According to Moody's, the deal has the following credit strengths: (i) the pool is well diversified both geographically and in terms of industry, with a relatively low exposure to obligors in the construction and real estate sector (which according to Moody's represents 13.8% of the pool); (ii) the portfolio has a significant presence of large corporate obligors (according to Banesto 16.6% of the pool consists of companies with annual turnovers exceeding EUR500 million) which are normally considered as having a stronger credit quality than smaller obligors; (iii) the transaction has a weighted average life (WAL) of around 2 years which is relatively short and implies a lower degree of uncertainty regarding quantitative assumptions, (iv) the transaction structure includes a swap hedging against interest rate risks and guaranteeing 90bps excess spread; and (v) a reserve fund of EUR264 million (and equivalent to 24% of the outstanding balance of Serie A and Serie B) will be funded with the proceeds of Serie C at closing. Moody's notes that the transaction features a number of credit weaknesses, including: (a) high obligor concentration as the top exposure represents 5% of the pool balance and the top 25 names amount to 41.5%; (b) significant exposure (21.5% of the pool balance) to loans with bullet amortization schedules; (c) as of the cut-off date of the provisional portfolio, 11.7% of the outstanding balance was linked to loans under a grace period with regards to principal payments; and (d) the pool is entirely composed of unsecured loans which leads to an expectation of lower recovery rates. These characteristics were reflected in Moody's analysis and ratings, where several simulations tested the available credit enhancement for the notes to cover potential shortfalls in interest or principal envisioned in the transaction structure. The resulting key assumptions of Moody's analysis for this transaction are a mean default rate of 14.4% (including a 30% default-probability stress on all credit estimates, forward- looking adjustments and a two-notch haircut of the largest credit estimates representing up to 30% of the pool), and a stochastic mean recovery rate of 35%. The methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to Rating CDOs of SMEs in Europe, published in February 2007, Refining the ABS SME Approach: Moody's Probability of Defaults Assumptions in the Rating Analysis of Granular Small and Mid-sized Enterprise portfolios in EMEA, published in March 2009 and Moody's Approach to Rating Granular SME Transactions in Europe, Middle East and Africa, published in June 2007. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of these methodologies. As mentioned in the methodology papers, Moody's used a combination of its CDOROM model (to generate the default distribution) and ABSROM cash-flow model to determine the potential loss incurred by the notes under each loss scenario. In parallel, Moody's also considered non-modeled risks (such as counterparty risk). The V Score for this transaction is Medium/High, which is in line with the score assigned for the Spanish SME sector and representative of the volatility and uncertainty in the Spanish SME sector. V-Scores are a relative assessment of the quality of available credit information and of the degree of dependence on various assumptions used in determining the rating. For more information, the V-Score has been assigned accordingly to the report "V Scores and Parameter Sensitivities in the EMEA Small-to- Medium Enterprise ABS Sector" published in June 2009. Moody's also ran sensitivities around key parameters for the rated notes. For instance, if the assumed default probability of 14.4% used in determining the initial rating was changed to 19.9% and the recovery rate of 35% was changed to 25%, the model-indicated rating for Serie A, Serie B and Serie C of Aaa(sf), Baa2(sf) and Ca(sf), respectively, would have changed to A1(sf), B1(sf) and C(sf) respectively. SANTANDER HIPOTECARIO: S&P Withdraws D Ratings on 4 Note Classes ---------------------------------------------------------------- Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'D (sf)' and withdrew, effective in 30 days' time, its credit ratings on Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 4's class C and D notes. "At the same time, we withdrew our ratings on the class A1, A2, A3, and B notes. The class E and F notes are rated 'D (sf)', as they have already defaulted," S&P related. The early redemption of all classes of notes in Santander Hipotecario 4 occurred on Oct. 17, 2011. "As stated in our previous rating action on this transaction dated Oct. 14, Santander Hipotecario 4 has suffered from continuous deteriorating performance, which has created a principal deficiency amount of 16.62% of the outstanding secured notes. This together with the previous information provided by the trustee, Santander de Titulizacion S.G.F.T., resulted in the recent downgrade of the class A1 to D notes (see 'Ratings Lowered In Spanish RMBS Transaction Santander Hipotecario 4 Due To Early Redemption,' published on Oct. 14, 2011)," S&P related. The information provided by the trustee dated Oct. 17 (the early redemption date), indicates that the class A1, A2, A3, and B notes have fully repaid interest and principal, but the class C, D, E, and F notes have not. "We have therefore withdrawn our ratings on the class A1, A2, A3, and B notes. We have lowered to 'D (sf)' our ratings on the class C and D notes before withdrawing them. These ratings will remain at 'D (sf)' for a period of 30 days before the withdrawal becomes effective. We also withdrew, effective in 30 days' time, our ratings on the class E and F notes as they have already defaulted," S&P related. The portfolio, originated by Banco Santander S.A., comprises residential mortgage-backed loans granted to individuals in Spain for the acquisition of a property. Ratings List Class Rating To From Fondo de Titulizacion de Activos Santander Hipotecario 4 EUR1.245 Billion Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes Ratings Lowered and Withdrawn[1] C D (sf) CC (sf) NR D (sf) D D (sf) CC (sf) NR D (sf) Ratings Unaffected and Withdrawn[1] E NR D (sf) F NR D (sf) Ratings Withdrawn A1 NR CCC- (sf) A2 NR CCC- (sf) A3 NR CCC- (sf) B NR CC (sf) [1]The withdrawals become effective in 30 days' time. NR--Not rated. =========================== U N I T E D K I N G D O M =========================== CLOUGHVALLEY STORES: Goes Into Administration, Seeks Buyer ---------------------------------------------------------- BBC News reports that Cloughvalley Stores (NI) Ltd has gone into administration and is being sold as a going concern. The administrator was appointed to the company last week, according to BBC News. A sister business, which operated the Quinns superstore in Carrickmacross, was placed into receivership by Allied Irish Bank (AIB) earlier this year, the report notes. BBC News relates that AIB appointed the receiver to recover a debt of around EUR7 million. Cloughvalley Stores (NI)'s last accounts for the year ending December 2009 showed an annual loss of GBP138,000, BBC News discloses. The report relates that the firm's liabilities exceeded its assets by GBP2.7 million. The independent retail sector in Northern Ireland has been under pressure due to weak consumer spending, BBC News notes. Government figures released earlier this month suggest that retail spending in Northern Ireland has fallen by nearly 10% over the last year, the report says. Headquartered in Crossmaglen, Cloughvalley Stores (NI) Ltd is a retail business firm. GRIMSBY TOWN: Supporters Fear Possible Administration ----------------------------------------------------- BBC News reports that supporters are concerned Grimsby Town Football Club could be forced into administration if former chairman John Fenty does not continue his financial support. Grimsby Town Supporters Trust spokesman Dave Otter raised the concerns at a meeting of the Trust at Blundell Park, according to BBC News. "The very worst scenario is the money runs out and we go into administration. . . . I honestly don't think John will allow that to happen," Mr. Otter told BBC Radio Humberside in an interview. BBC News notes that Mr. Otter insists he remains optimistic about the club's future, but nothing will be decided until the club's annual general meeting, which takes place on November 24, and at which Mr. Fenty will seek re-election to the board. BBC News discloses that Mr. Fenty stepped down as chairman earlier in the summer and Mr. Otter said the future of the club remains in limbo. "We don't have a chairman and we don't know what the financial situation will be, if not from December, certainly next season. . . . We are going to have to tighten the purse strings and that's going to mean cuts within the club," BBC News quoted Mr. Otter as saying. Earlier this month the Supporters Trust accepted the offer of a controlling balance of shares in the club from leading shareholder Mike Parker, the report says. Grimsby Town Football Club is an English football club based in the seaside town of Cleethorpes, in North East Lincolnshire, England, who compete in the Conference National. They were formed in 1878 as Grimsby Pelham and later became Grimsby Town. The club is located at Blundell Park where it has been since 1898. JGP ENGINEERING: Goes Into Administration, 50 Jobs at Risk ---------------------------------------------------------- The Star reports that JGP Engineering has gone into administration putting 50 jobs at risk. Simon Plant, at London-based SFP Group, is handling the administration, according to The Star. The report notes that JGP Engineering Managing Director Gary Phillis declined to comment about the decision to call in administrators. An unnamed spokeswoman for the firm said the administrators were hoping to sell the business, The Star notes. The Star discloses that JGP Engineering is the latest firm to be hit by problems in the housing market, which caused developers of several apartment projects in Sheffield to go to the wall, notably City Lofts. The report relates that its tower was completed by the firm's creditors. Headquartered in Mitchells Industrial Park, Wombwell, Barnsley, JGP Engineering is a balcony and architectural steelwork specialist. It supplies balconies for main contractors including Bam Construct, GB Building Solutions, Shepherd Homes and Inspace. NORIAN BEDS: Goes Into Administration, 140 Jobs at Risk ------------------------------------------------------- BBC News reports that Norian Beds has gone into administration, putting 140 jobs at risk. The company, which employs 90 staff in Trowbridge and 50 in Bridgwater, ceased manufacturing, according to BBC News. BBC News says company managers claim cashflow problems arose, after Focus DIY went into administration owing the firm GBP250,000. Norian Beds is a family-run firm that manufactures beds and mattresses for 27 years. It has sites in Trowbridge in Wiltshire and Bridgwater in Somerset. ROSSETT HALL HOTEL: Enters Receivership, In Liquidation ------------------------------------------------------- wrexham.com reports that Rossett Hall Hotel has entered receivership and a specialist company has been appointed to run the business by insolvency firm Begbies Traynor after they were called in by the bank. The 18th century, Grade II listed property officially entered receivership last month and Rossett Hall Hotel Limited is listed as in liquidation on the Companies House website, according to wrexham.com. The report relates that Bolton-based Convivial Management Services has confirmed that it is now running the business and that Rossett Hall went into Law of Property Act receivership on September 26. wrexham.com relays that Convivial Management Services said the property's directors had left and no longer had responsibility for the business. Rossett Hall continues to trade as normal and an unnamed spokesperson for Begbies Traynor said that there were currently no redundancies planned, the report discloses. Begbies Traynor also said that there were no immediate plans to sell the property, but added that it could be put on the market in the New Year, wrexham.com adds. ROYAL BANK: CIC Might Team With Blackstone in Distressed-Loan Buy ----------------------------------------------------------------- Dow Jones' Daily Bankruptcy Review reports that in another sign of China Investment Corp.'s interest in overseas real estate, the sovereign-wealth fund is considering teaming up with Blackstone Group LP to buy a stake in a portfolio of distressed property loans from Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, people familiar with the matter said. The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc (NYSE:RBS) -- http://www.rbs.com/-- is a holding company of The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (Royal Bank) and National Westminster Bank Plc (NatWest), which are United Kingdom-based clearing banks. The company's activities are organized in six business divisions: Corporate Markets (comprising Global Banking and Markets and United Kingdom Corporate Banking), Retail Markets (comprising Retail and Wealth Management), Ulster Bank, Citizens, RBS Insurance and Manufacturing. On October 17, 2007, RFS Holdings B.V. (RFS Holdings), a company jointly owned by RBS, Fortis N.V., Fortis SA/NV and Banco Santander S.A. (the Consortium Banks) and controlled by RBS, completed the acquisition of ABN AMRO Holding N.V. (ABN AMRO). In July 2008, the company disposed of its entire interest in Global Voice Group Ltd. TALENTNATION: Creditor Wants Scottish Enterprise to Pursue Owner ---------------------------------------------------------------- The Drum reports that the first creditors meeting for liquidated TalentNation Plc was held Monday, where one creditor called on Scottish Enterprise to pursue its owner Steve Sampson, after it lost around GBP1 million in funding the site. The meeting, which took place over a month after the official liquidation of the website by the Court of Session, saw Grant Thornton, which has been appointed as liquidator for the company, tell creditors that Mr. Sampson was proving difficult to track down and had been uncooperative of the process, according to The Drum. The Drum relates that only a partial list of creditors had yet been compiled and that the company owed GBP320,000, mainly to former members of staff, although according to court documents the company had made a loss of nearly GBP2 million by April 2010 ahead of further significant losses being made. The complete list of investors had also not yet been drawn up, the report notes. The Drum says court documents also claimed that Mr. Sampson has moved GBP575,000 out of the TalentNation account and into his own personal account in two transactions in December 2009. According to the report, Mr. Sampson has denied accusations that he had ?misappropriated? funds meant for use by the business, but one creditor called on Scottish Enterprise to purse him further following the completion of the liquidation process. "By calling in liquidators Scottish Enterprise effectively wrote off GBP1 million of public investment. They also prevented ordinary creditors pursuing TalentNation through the courts, as you can?t sue a business that is bust. What I want them to ensure now is that they do not let Steve Sampson off the hook, embarrassing as that process may be for them," The Drum quotes a creditor as saying. A Scottish Enterprise spokesperson told The Drum: "Our priority at this point in time is to allow the liquidator to proceed with winding up the company and it is unlikely any decision on further action will be taken until the liquidation is complete." As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on June 14, 2011, The Drum said Scottish Enterprise had successfully petitioned the courts to have a provisional liquidator appointed to TalentNation PLC, a company in which it invested GBP1 million in December 2009. The economic regeneration body said it was forced to make the move because of concerns about the financial affairs and governance of TalentNation. TRADE MANUFACTURING: Ceases Trading; Up to 40 Workers Lose Jobs --------------------------------------------------------------- BBC News reports that up to 40 people have lost their jobs after Trade Manufacturing Facility (TMF) of Newtown ceased trading. The union Unite said staff had turned up for work last week, but were told the company had stopped trading. Administrators Smith and Williamson said it had been instructed to place the company into voluntary liquidation. According to BBC News, Howard Wright, of Unite in Newtown, said the jobs were reasonably well-paid and people would struggle to find similar work in the area. "The staff turned up for work as normal on 18 October to be told there was no work, and the shutters were coming down and the company was to cease trading," BBC News quotes Mr. Wright as saying. "The workers have been made redundant. People are still waiting for wages from the last couple of weeks." A Smith and Williamson spokeswoman confirmed that TMF stopped trading on 18 October and the workforce was dismissed by the "principal director". Trade Manufacturing Facility (TMF) of Newtown made small buildings and ecopods, a form of cheap housing. * UK: Daniels Silverman Calls for Clampdown on Pre-pack Deals ------------------------------------------------------------- Liverpool Daily Post reports that a Merseyside debt collection agency, Daniels Silverman, has launched a petition calling for the law on pre-pack administrations to be tightened. Pre-pack deals, which see companies go into administration and have their assets sold on immediately, have become increasingly popular, according to Liverpool Daily Post. The report relates that in many cases, assets are sold back to the company?s previous directors, who can carry on the business debt-free. But, because a deal is done before the administration is made public, small creditors can often lose out, Liverpool Daily Post says. Liverpool Daily Post notes that Daniels Silverman said it wants to see the law tightened to stop directors using repeated pre-packs to buy back the assets of their old companies and continue trading while shedding debts. The report relates that the petition wants SIP 16, a piece of guidance issued by the Insolvency Service on how pre-packs are conducted, to be put into law. And it wants a clampdown on insolvency practitioners who advertise pre-packs as a way for companies to avoid their debts, Liverpool Daily Post notes. * UK: Economic Slump Affects Most Firms in North East, R3 Says -------------------------------------------------------------- Iain Laing at The Journal reports that a new research said businesses in the North are suffering more from the economic downturn than anywhere else in the UK. The Journal relates that insolvency trade body R3 said the North had the smallest percentage of firms that had experienced a rise in turnover over the last three months. Just a 10th of businesses saw turnover rise compared with a third in London, the report discloses. According to The Journal, fewer than one in 14 firms in the region saw an increase in their workforce in the last quarter, while the numbers seeing increased profits (17%), investing in new equipment (21%) or planning to enter new markets (13%) were below the national average. However, the survey?s findings weren?t all bad news for companies in the North, with 29% of firms reporting a growth in their market share -- the highest percentage in the country, The Journal adds. The Journal says that across England and Wales as a whole, businesses are experiencing increased signs of distress compared with the last quarter, with overall increases in 11 of the 13 survey categories. Almost a quarter of firms are making frequent use of their maximum overdraft facility as were doing so three months ago while the percentage of businesses experiencing decreased profits has also grown in the last quarter, from 35% to 43%, The Journal relays. "Businesses in our region are clearly not out of the woods yet, with signs of distress increasing compared with last quarter on most key indicators," Linda Farish, chairwoman of the North East arm of insolvency trade body R3, and director of Recovery & Insolvency at Newcastle-based accountants RMT, as saying. =============== X X X X X X X X =============== * EUROPE: European Union Intends to Pursue Plan on Failed Banks --------------------------------------------------------------- Jonathan Stearns and Jim Brunsden at Bloomberg News report that EU Financial Services Commissioner Michel Barnier said the European Union still intends to propose legislation this year on winding down or restructuring failed banks after pushing back the initial timetable amid the euro-area debt crisis. "I am nearly ready" with the draft rules, Mr. Barnier, as cited by Bloomberg, said in an interview on Tuesday in Strasbourg, France. The European Commission, the 27-nation EU's regulatory arm, had planned to make its proposals in September, Bloomberg notes. According to Bloomberg, an EU official said last week that the plans, which will need the support of EU governments and the European Parliament, may include writing down or converting bondholders' stakes to bolster the financial position of crisis- hit lenders. * EUROPE: Highest-Rated States Not Ready to Provide Fresh Capital ----------------------------------------------------------------- Boris Groendahl and Zoe Schneeweiss at Bloomberg News report that Austria's Finance Minister Maria Fekter said Europe's highest- rated countries aren't ready to provide "considerably" more "fresh capital" than agreed at the European Union's July summit. "The AAA countries Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland have signaled that they won't consider putting up very much in fresh cash," Bloomberg quotes Ms. Fekter as saying in Vienna on Tuesday. "We're committed to our contribution, but the measures can't cost much more than that because we've got to look after our AAA ratings." According to Bloomberg, Ms. Fekter said she prefers a voluntary agreement with private creditors to cut Greece's debt, because "a voluntary restructuring is better and carries fewer risks than a full bankruptcy." * Upcoming Meetings, Conferences and Seminars --------------------------------------------- Oct. __, 2011 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE International Insolvency Symposium Dublin, Ireland Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ Oct. 25-27, 2011 TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION Hilton San Diego Bayfront, San Diego, CA Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/ Nov. 28, 2011 BEARD GROUP, INC. 18th Annual Distressed Investing Conference The Helmsley Park Lane Hotel, New York City Contact: 1-240-629-3300 Dec. 1-3, 2011 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE 23rd Annual Winter Leadership Conference La Quinta Resort & Spa, La Quinta, Calif. Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ April 3-5, 2012 TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION TMA Spring Conference Grand Hyatt Atlanta, Atlanta, Ga. Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/ Apr. 19-22, 2012 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Annual Spring Meeting Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center, National Harbor, Md. Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ July 14-17, 2012 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop The Ritz-Carlton Amelia Island, Amelia Island, Fla. Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ Aug. 2-4, 2012 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Mid-Atlantic Bankruptcy Workshop Hyatt Regency Chesapeake Bay, Cambridge, Md. Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ November 1-3, 2012 TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION TMA Annual Convention Westin Copley Place, Boston, Mass. Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/ Nov. 29 - Dec. 2, 2012 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE Winter Leadership Conference JW Marriott Starr Pass Resort & Spa, Tucson, Ariz. Contact: 1-703-739-0800; http://www.abiworld.org/ April 10-12, 2013 TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION TMA Spring Conference JW Marriott Chicago, Chicago, Ill. Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/ October 3-5, 2013 TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION TMA Annual Convention Marriott Wardman Park, Washington, D.C. Contact: http://www.turnaround.org/ ********* Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par. Prices are obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during the prior week we think are reliable. Those sources may not, however, be complete or accurate. The Monday Bond Pricing table is compiled on the Friday prior to publication. Prices reported are not intended to reflect actual trades. Prices for actual trades are probably different. Our objective is to share information, not make markets in publicly traded securities. Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any security of any kind. It is likely that some entity affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers' public debt and equity securities about which we report. Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per share in public markets. At first glance, this list may look like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell short. Don't be fooled. Assets, for example, reported at historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value of a firm's assets. A company may establish reserves on its balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize. The prices at which equity securities trade in public market are determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test. A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency- related conferences are encouraged. Send announcements to conferences@bankrupt.com Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book of interest to troubled company professionals. All titles are available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com. Go to http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today. ********* S U B S C R I P T I O N I N F O R M A T I O N Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co- published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills, Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland USA. Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T. Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Julie Anne G. Lopez, Ivy B. Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors. Copyright 2011. All rights reserved. ISSN 1529-2754. This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior written permission of the publishers. Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but is not guaranteed. The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year, delivered via e-mail. Additional e-mail subscriptions for members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription or balance thereof are US$25 each. For subscription information, contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300. * * * End of Transmission * * *