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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

          Friday, September 23, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 189

                            Headlines



A U S T R I A

A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Sale in Doubt After One Investor Pulls Out


B U L G A R I A

ALMA TOUR: Armeetz Ready to Accept Refund Claims From Customers


F R A N C E

PERNOD RICARD: Fitch Affirms Issuer Default Rating at 'BB+'


G E R M A N Y

HAPAG-LLOYD HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Issuer Rating
HSH NORDBANK: EU to End State Aid Proceedings After Settlement
PRIMUS MULTI: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
TAURUS CMBS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B (sf)'


G R E E C E

REVOLVER 2008-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'CCC'
* GREECE: Unveils New Austerity Measures Amid Bailout Talks


H U N G A R Y

* HUNGARY: Construction Company Liquidations Up 43.6% in August


I C E L A N D

LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: ESA Agrees to Defer Icesave Decision


K A Z A K H S T A N

ASTANA FINANCE: Int'l Creditors to Absorb 80% of Bond Losses
KAZKOMMERTSBANK JSC: Unit in Voluntary Liquidation


L A T V I A

SC CITADELE: Moody's Reviews Ba3 LT Deposit Ratings for Downgrade


N E T H E R L A N D S

CADOGAN SQUARE: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
EUROCREDIT CDO: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Note Classes to Caa2
HARBOURMASTER CLO: Fitch Keeps 'Bsf' Ratings on Three Tranches


N O R W A Y

NORSKE SKOG: S&P Puts 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating on Watch Negative


R U S S I A

SVYAZINVEST OJSC: May Delay Liquidation Until 2017


S P A I N

FTYPYME TDA: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class D Notes


S W E D E N

SWEDISH AUTOMOBILE: Voluntary Reorganization Gets Court Okay


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRINTONS LTD: Scheme Enters PPF Assessment After Insolvency
FISHGATE HULL: In Liquidation; Charterfields Looks for Buyer
LONDON & REGIONAL: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating on GBP50MM Notes
NAVYBLUE DESIGN: Has More Than 100 Creditors, Liquidator Reveals
R&R ICE CREAM: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corporate Credit Rating

SEMPERIAN SENIOR: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B'
STAGELIVE (PETERBOROUGH): In Talks With Insolvency Firm


X X X X X X X X

* EUROPE: EU May Write Down Derivatives Under Bank Bailout Plan
* BOOK REVIEW: The Health Care Marketplace


                            *********


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A U S T R I A
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A-TEC INDUSTRIES: Sale in Doubt After One Investor Pulls Out
------------------------------------------------------------
Boris Groendahl at Bloomberg News, citing Austrian magazine
Format, reports that the sale of A-Tec Industries AG is in doubt
because one investor of the group that agreed to buy it has
pulled out.

According to Bloomberg, Vienna-based Format reported that
Pakistani investor Alshair Fiyaz's Solstice International is no
longer interested in buying A-Tec's Montanwerke Brixlegg unit.
Solstice was part of a group led by Contor Industries GmbH whose
offer for A-Tec was accepted Sept. 5, Bloomberg notes.

A-Tec Chairman Freimut Dobretsberger told the magazine in an
interview that the group's supervisory board is planning to
restart talks with Czech investor Penta Investments Ltd.,
Bloomberg relates.

On Oct. 22, 2010, the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe, citing
Bloomberg News, related that A-Tec sought court clearance to
reorganize debt after losing access to its line of credit because
of an Australian power-station project's financial difficulties.
A-Tec said in an Oct. 20 statement that it had filed for self-
administered reorganization proceedings at the Vienna Commercial
Court and appointed trustees for bondholders, Bloomberg
disclosed.  The company has a EUR798 million (US$1.11 billion)
revolving credit facility and EUR302 million in outstanding
bonds, according to Bloomberg data.

A-TEC Industries AG engages in plant construction, drive
technology, machine tools, and minerals and metals businesses in
Europe and internationally.  The company is based in Vienna,
Austria.


===============
B U L G A R I A
===============


ALMA TOUR: Armeetz Ready to Accept Refund Claims From Customers
---------------------------------------------------------------
Novinite.com reports that insurance company Armeetz has said that
it is ready to accept refund claims from customers of Bulgarian
tour operator Alma Tour, which went out of business for an
indefinite period Tuesday.

Armeetz related that Alma Tour's activity is insured for the sum
of BGN200,000, Novinite.com relates.

Refund claims can be filed on the Web site of the insurance
company and at its headquarters on 2 Stefan Karadzha Str, Sofia,
Novinite.com discloses.

The total number of people whose trips have been cancelled is yet
unclear, but unconfirmed reports put the figure at 2500,
Novinite.com notes.

If the sum of BGN200,000 is not enough to cover all refund
claims, the rest of the scammed tourists will have to seek their
money from Alma Tour in court, according to Novinite.com.

Insurance company Armeetz is majority-owned by Bulgarian
industrial conglomerate Chimimport, whose portfolio includes
companies like national air carrier Bulgaria Air and Corporate
Commercial Bank (CCB), Novinite.com discloses.

In a Wednesday media statement, Chimimport refuted allegations
that it intended to take over debt-ridden Alma Tour, insisting
that it had shown patience to the systemic "financial
irregularity" of the tour operator in its relations with CCB and
Armeetz, Novinite.com recounts.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 22,
2011, Novinite.com related that problems with Alma Tour surfaced
some ten days ago, when close to 1,000 international tourists,
most of them Russians, were stranded at Bulgarian Black Sea
airports of Burgas and Varna.  Their flights were cancelled by
carrier Bulgaria Air over what it claimed to be EUR3.6 million in
debt from Alma Tour, which had booked the tourists' trips,
Novinite.com noted.  According to information released Tuesday,
the biggest creditor of Alma Tour is the Bulgarian Commercial
Corporate Bank, with which the company has pledged its assets for
EUR13 million, Novinite.com disclosed.


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F R A N C E
===========


PERNOD RICARD: Fitch Affirms 'BB+' LongTerm Issuer Default Rating
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has revised Pernod Ricard SA's rating Outlook to
Positive from Stable and affirmed its Long-term Issuer Default
Rating (IDR) at 'BB+'.  The agency has also affirmed Pernod's
senior unsecured rating at 'BB+' and Short-term IDR at 'B'.
"The Positive Outlook reflects Pernod's steady progress in
reducing net debt and move towards credit metrics consistent with
an investment grade rating since completing the EUR5.7 billion
Vin & Sprit (V&S, the maker of Absolut vodka) transaction in
July 2008," says Giulio Lombardi, Senior Director in Fitch's
European Retail, Leisure, and Consumer Products Group.  "Fitch
also believes that in the absence of M&A activity, Pernod's
credit metrics, which remain weak by comparison to similarly
rated alcoholic beverages, tobacco and leisure companies, should
continue to strengthen in FY12 and support an upgrade," says Mr.
Lombardi.

Pernod's ratings benefit from the resilient nature of its cash
flow, its geographic diversity and position as the number two
player in the international spirits industry, a large proportion
(close to 40%) of sales in high growth emerging and developing
markets, a strong portfolio of brands, as well as management's
continuing focus on achieving more conservative credit metrics.

Pernod's profit growth has maintained momentum since the
inception of the economic crisis, with organic profit growth of
no less than 4% over FY09-FY10.  During FY09 and FY10, despite
periods of weak consumer spending in its core markets of the US
and Europe, the company has been able to protect profits thanks
to its effective routes to markets in the developing countries
where demand for its high-end products remains dynamic as well as
some tactical adjustments of advertisement and promotion spend in
the countries where demand was slower.

In FY11, with an improving consumer and trading environment in
the U.S., the company's profits recorded a stronger growth of 8%.

However, the agency notes that Pernod's liquidity profile is
burdened by a heavy concentration of debt maturities in July
2013, when EUR4.3 billion of term debt matures and the majority
of the company's current liquidity buffer from undrawn committed
lines also elapses.  While debt capital markets remain volatile,
these concerns are mitigated by both Pernod's regular issuance
activity over the past 18 months, during which the company raised
a total of EUR3 billion, and its strong free cash flow generation
ability instead.

During FY10 and FY11, Pernod generated solid annual free cash
flow of EUR500 million to EUR600 million (excluding factoring
lines used to smooth out working capital absorption) and
maintained a disciplined focus on its credit protection measures,
largely applying these resources to paying down debt.  In
addition, management took additional one-off corrective measures
over 2009 and 2010 to further reduce debt, completing a
EUR1 billion asset disposals program, a EUR1 billion equity
raising and cutting down FY10's cash dividend outflow.

These actions brought net debt down to EUR9.0 billion as of YE11
(from EUR13 billion at end December 2008).  However, Fitch
calculates that net lease- and factoring-adjusted leverage
equalled 4.7x at FYE11 (from FYE08's pro-forma peak, including
the price of V&S, of 5.9x).  Funds from operations (FFO)/interest
expense cover, although still weak for the rating category, also
improved to 3.3x in FY11 (FY09: 2.5x).

Pernod's Long-term IDR could be upgraded once refinancing risk
for the July 2013 maturities has abated and lease- and factoring-
adjusted leverage has fallen to 4.0x or below on a sustainable
basis.  Fitch also notes that the current rating does not
withstand large debt-funded acquisitions; therefore, for the
rating to be upgraded, the company would need to maintain a
prudent approach towards acquisitions as well as evidence of
continuing strong EBITDA margin and free cash flow generation.

Conversely, an increase of lease- and factoring-adjusted leverage
to above 5.0x as a result of M&A activity, a severe contraction
of free cash flow and profitability or the emergence of major
liquidity concerns could result in a negative rating action or,
at least, a stabilization in the rating outlook.


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G E R M A N Y
=============


HAPAG-LLOYD HOLDING: S&P Affirms 'BB-' Long-Term Issuer Rating
--------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Germany-based container ship operator Hapag-Lloyd Holding AG to
negative from stable. "At the same time, we affirmed the 'BB-'
long-term issuer credit rating and the 'B' issue rating on the
EUR480 million senior unsecured notes due 2015 and the US$250
million senior unsecured notes due 2017 issued by Hapag-Lloyd AG.
The recovery rating on these notes is unchanged at '6',
indicating our expectation of negligible (0%-10%) recovery for
noteholders in the event of a payment default," S&P stated.

"The outlook revision reflects Hapag-Lloyd's significantly lower
profitability in the first half of this year than we previously
anticipated," said Standard & Poor's credit analyst Izabela
Listowska. "Given the persisting difficult industry conditions,
we believe the company's cash flow protection measures may now
fall short of the levels we view as rating-commensurate."

Similar to industry peers, Hapag-Lloyd's earnings have suffered
this year on account of elevated costs of bunker fuel and
depressed tariffs resulting from overcapacity, most importantly
on Asia-Europe trades, which account for about 20% of Hapag-
Lloyd's trade volumes. Hapag-Lloyd was able to increase volumes
by 3% and freight rates by 4% in the first half of 2011.
Nevertheless, its profitability came under pressure because of
the significant rise in bunker costs, up 23% year on year, which
it could only partly counterbalance by hedging contracts.

"We now forecast that Hapag-Lloyd's EBITDA margin will be
somewhat below 5% for the full year ending Dec. 31, 2011, which
is well below our original forecasts of about 10%. We note that
any turnaround in profitability measures could be vulnerable to
weak industry prospects, given structural overcapacity and the
slowing pace of expansion in the global economy -- particularly
in U.S. and European consumption -- and aggravated by
persistently high bunker fuel prices," S&P said.

"Our revised base-case forecasts estimate that Hapag-Lloyd's
adjusted FFO to debt will continue to deteriorate in 2011 and
might fall short of the 16%-20% we view as rating-commensurate.
We believe that any improvement will depend on Hapag-Lloyd's
ability to continue to increase freight tariffs to recover bunker
cost inflation, which we view as uncertain. Furthermore, we
understand that Hapag-Lloyd intends to accelerate capital
spending for vessels on order in 2012 and 2013, which will put
additional strain on cash flow measures," S&P noted.

"We could consider a downgrade, for example if the company
continued to face sustained competitive pressure on freight
tariffs and/or bunker fuel cost increases, which would hinder an
expected profitability improvement and turnaround in cash flow
measures," said Ms. Listowska. "We believe that the ratings on
Hapag-Lloyd could also come under pressure if confronted with a
substantial weakening in liquidity."


HSH NORDBANK: EU to End State Aid Proceedings After Settlement
--------------------------------------------------------------
James Wilson at The Financial Times reports that competition
authorities in the EU have reached a settlement with HSH
Nordbank, one of the world's largest providers of shipping
finance, ending state aid proceedings in return for tough limits
on the size of the German bank's balance sheet and a financial
penalty.

According to the FT, the deal means competition watchdogs in
Brussels are close to the end of a series of cases involving
German banks that needed to be propped up during the financial
crisis.

Brussels has modified expectations that HSH Nordbank would have
to be privatized by its majority owners, the German states of
Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein, the FT relates.

But the bank is required to cut its balance sheet by more than
40% from its 2008 size to EUR120 billion (US$164 billion) by the
end of 2014, the FT notes.   Some EUR38 billion of this figure
comprises non-core assets to be wound down, the FT states, to
leave a core bank with EUR82 billion in assets.

HSH Nordbank, the FT says, will also have to make a payment to
its owners of EUR500 million as compensation for a EUR10 billion
"risk shield" they put in place to protect the bank from losses
on impaired assets.

In total, HSH Nordbank received EUR3 billion of capital as well
as the risk shield, the FT discloses.  The bank also benefited
from EUR17 billion of liquidity guarantees, the FT says.

According to the FT, Joaquin Almunia, the EU's competition
commissioner, said the balance sheet cuts amounted to 61% of
HSH's core businesses and were "necessary to refocus the bank on
its core business and to reverse the unsustainable expansion in
which it engaged in the past."

HSH Nordbank -- http://www.hsh-nordbank.com/-- is a commercial
bank in northern Europe with headquarters in Hamburg as well as
Kiel, Germany.  It is active in corporate and private banking.
HSH's main focus is on shipping, transportation, real estate and
renewable energy.


PRIMUS MULTI: S&P Withdraws 'BB' Rating on Class E Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services withdrew its credit ratings on
primus MULTI HAUS 2006 GmbH's class A+, A, B, C, D, and E notes.

At closing, Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (NORD/LB)
entered into a credit default swap (CDS) with KfW to obtain
credit protection for the overall reference portfolio. In turn,
KfW bought credit protection on the reference portfolio through
two separate instruments: a super-senior CDS; and a hedge through
the credit-linked certificates issued by KfW as collateral and
the associated note issuances of the issuer.

The issuer used the proceeds of the notes to acquire KfW's
Schuldscheine (KfW certificates). The terms and conditions of the
certificates fully match each class of rated notes issued by
primus MULTI HAUS 2006. The certificates generate all interest
and principal payments needed to make payments on the notes,
subject to loss allocations and redemptions from the reference
portfolio. Therefore, KfW is the source of payments on the notes.

The rating is due to the early redemption of the notes following
Kfw exercising its prepayment option under the certificates,
which it did as a result of NORD/LB's termination of the CDS.

primus MULTI HAUS 2006 is a synthetic, partially funded
commercial mortgage-backed securities transaction. Its purpose
was to transfer credit risk associated with an initial portfolio
of 133 commercial mortgage loans originated by NORD/LB between
1993 and 2005.

Ratings List

Class            Rating
            To             From

primus MULTI HAUS 2006 GmbH
EUR126.65 Million Floating-Rate Credit-Linked Notes

Ratings Withdrawn

A+         NR              AAA (sf)
A          NR              AAA (sf)
B          NR              AAA (sf)
C          NR              A (sf)
D          NR              BBB (sf)
E          NR              BB (sf)

NR--Not rated.


TAURUS CMBS: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B (sf)'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered its credit ratings on
Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1 PLC's class A, B, C, and D notes.

"The rating actions follow our review of the six loans in the
transaction. We believe the creditworthiness of the loan pool has
deteriorated. Three of the six loans failed to repay at maturity
and are in standstill after being transferred into special
servicing. The remaining three loans (which account for 76.3% of
the pool) mature in 2013, and two of these have had loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio covenant breaches," S&P related.

"In view of the performance of the three loans that have already
reached maturity, the reported updated values of two of the
remaining loans (indicating potential difficulties in obtaining
refinancing for the full loan amount at maturity in 2013), and
current stagnant market conditions, we have lowered our ratings
on all classes of notes," S&P said.

           Specially Serviced Loans (23.8% of the Pool)

The Bremen loan (16.3% of the pool) is the largest loan in
special servicing and is secured by a shopping center located in
a suburban area of Bremen. The loan failed to repay in full at
maturity in October 2010 and the parties agreed to a standstill
period until Sept. 30, 2011, to allow time for further
discussions regarding the restructuring of the loan with the
borrower and subordinate lender. Based on a 2010 valuation of
EUR47.4 million, the reported LTV ratio is 124.1% for the whole
loan and 98.7% for the securitized loan.

"The 2010 valuation is a 36% decrease from the value at closing
and reflects that approximately 50% of the total rental income
will be expiring in the next three years. We await information on
the status of the restructuring discussions. If the loan were to
be extended, this would allow time for the senior loan to be
further amortized after the change from a fixed to floating
interest rate, and time for leases to be renewed -- thereby
increasing property value. Based on our current view of the value
of the property, we do not anticipate losses to the securitized
portion of the loan," S&P stated.

The Ruhr Portfolio loan (6.6% of the pool) is the second-largest
loan in special servicing and is secured by 13 properties
(office, industrial, retail, and warehouse) located throughout
Germany. The loan failed to repay at maturity in January 2011 and
there has been an extension of the standstill period until
Nov. 30, 2011, to allow time for further discussions with the
borrower regarding a loan extension and disposal strategy. Based
on a 2010 valuation of EUR28.6 million, the reported LTV ratio is
74.3% for the whole loan and 66.2% for the securitized portion of
the loan. After accounting for the one property that was sold,
the 2010 valuation reflects a 21% decrease from the value at
closing. Net operating income has declined by approximately 20%
since closing, and the average vacancy for the past four quarters
is 17.8%, compared with 9.8% at closing. If this loan were to be
extended, it would allow time for the assets to be sold. "Based
on our view on the current portfolio value, we do not currently
anticipate losses to the issuer," S&P said.

The Carl Benz loan (1.0% of the pool) is the smallest loan in
special servicing and is secured by three adjacent retail
buildings located 33 km southeast of Dortmund. They are let to
three tenants under leases that expire in 2020. The loan failed
to repay in full at maturity in April 2011 and there was an
extension of the standstill period until Sept. 18, 2011. The
borrower had indicated that repayment will be made on or before
this date. "We await further information on the status of this.
Based on a 2010 valuation of EUR3.9 million, the reported LTV
ratio is 84.2% for the whole loan and 71.9% for the securitized
portion of the loan. Given the current stable cash flow and long
remaining lease term, in our view the property would likely be an
attractive asset to investors. We do not currently expect
principal losses on this loan," S&P stated.

                Other Loans (76.3% of the Pool)

The remaining three loans in the portfolio account for 76.3% of
the total pool balance and mature in 2013. All three of these
loans are current in their payment obligations and have leases to
what we regard as strong tenants. However, two of the loans
(Bewag Berlin and Hanse Centre) have had LTV ratio covenant
breaches, which may expose the loans to refinancing difficulties.
"As all three loans have junior loans to absorb losses, we
currently anticipate losses on only one of the securitized loans
-- the Bewag Berlin loan -- based on our view on the current
property value," S&P related.

The Bewag Berlin loan (42.7% of the pool) is currently secured by
a purpose-built office property located 7.9 km southeast of the
Berlin city center. The property acts as the headquarters of
Bewag AG, whose parent company is Vattenfall Europe AG
(A/Negative/A-1). The property is subject to a single lease,
which expires in October 2017, 4.5 years after loan maturity.
Based on a 2010 valuation of EUR118.3 million, the reported LTV
ratio is 129.2% for the whole loan and 103.9% for the securitized
loan. The 2010 valuation is a 36% decrease from the value at
closing and reflects that the property is significantly over-
rented. The loan is currently in breach of its LTV ratio
covenant. "If the borrower fails to repay the loan in full, we
believe that the proceeds from an asset sale may be lower than
the projected loan amount outstanding at the maturity date and
the associated loan workout costs," S&P stated.

The Hanse Centre loan (17.3% of the pool) is currently secured by
a retail park complex located in a suburb of Rostock, in eastern
Germany. Based on a 2011 valuation of EUR72.5 million, the
reported LTV ratio is 87.4% for the whole loan and 68.7% for the
securitized loan. The 2010 valuation is a 15% decrease from the
value at closing. Current net operating income for the property
is in line with that at closing. Of the total rent, 43% is from
Kaufland Center, which belongs to one of the largest supermarket
groups in German (Lidl & Schwarz) and has a lease expiring in
2020. The loan had breached its LTV ratio covenant, but a partial
repayment of the loan was made to cure the breach on the July
2011 interest payment date. The cash trap continues to operate,
as the whole-loan LTV ratio is between 85% and 88%. "Based on our
view of the property value, we currently do not anticipate losses
on the securitized portion of the loan," S&P related.

The Walzmuehle loan (16.2% of the pool) is currently secured by a
shopping center and office complex 500 meters from the centre of
Ludwigshafen, in southwest Germany. Based on a 2005 valuation,
the reported LTV ratio is 75.9% for the whole loan and 63.5% for
the securitized loan. Current net operating income for the
property is slightly lower than at closing. The largest tenant
(accounting for 80% of the total rent) is Metro Group Asset
Management Service GmbH (parent company METRO AG; which is rated
BBB/Stable/A-2), with a lease until 2019 that covers the entire
shopping center. "Based on our view on the property value, we
currently do not anticipate losses on the securitized portion of
the loan," S&P stated Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1 closed in July
2006 with a total issuance of EUR571.25 million. The legal final
maturity is in April 2015. Of the nine loans that originally
backed the transaction, three have repaid. The note balance has
reduced to EUR287.87 million.

Ratings List

Taurus CMBS (Germany) 2006-1 PLC
EUR571.25 Million Commercial Mortgage-Backed Floating-Rate Notes

Class              Rating
            To                From

Ratings Lowered

A           A (sf)            A+ (sf)
B           BBB (sf)          A+ (sf)
C           BB (sf)           A (sf)
D           B (sf)            BB+ (sf)


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G R E E C E
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REVOLVER 2008-1: S&P Lowers Rating on Class A Notes to 'CCC'
------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered to 'CCC (sf)' from
'BB+ (sf)' its credit rating on Revolver 2008-1 PLC's class A
notes.

The rating action follows the removal and transfer of the
commingling reserve account and cash reserve account to National
Bank of Greece S.A. (CCC/Negative/C) from Citibank N.A.
(A+/Negative/A-1).

"Following the transfer, under our 2010 counterparty criteria the
rating on the transaction is now capped at the issuer's long-term
credit rating (see 'Counterparty And Supporting Obligations
Methodology And Assumptions,' published on Dec. 6, 2010). If
National Bank of Greece defaults as counterparty, the credit
enhancement the cash reserve account provides would be lost. The
amounts held in the cash reserve (EUR339 million) and commingling
reserve (EUR170.4 million) are unchanged," S&P said.

"We previously lowered our rating on these notes to 'BB+ (sf)',
following our conclusion that ratings on securitization notes
backed by Greek assets should no higher than 'BB+' (see 'S&P
Downgrades 29 Tranches In 15 Greek ABS And RMBS Transactions,'
published on June 15, 2011)," S&P stated.


* GREECE: Unveils New Austerity Measures Amid Bailout Talks
-----------------------------------------------------------
Novinite.com reports that Greece's Finance Minister Evangelos
Venizelos has announced new austerity measures a day after Athens
moved a step closer to getting the international bailout funds it
needs to avoid a default next month.

Greece will thus lay off more civil servants than originally
planned and will impose new pension cuts to persuade
international creditors from the euro zone, the IMF, and the
private sector to continue bailout payments needed to avoid a
chaotic default, Novinite.com discloses.

Greece, Novinite.com says, is under growing pressure from its
international creditors, the European Union, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Commission, to speed up the
reduction of its bloated public sector and shut down inefficient
state organizations.

The government has also promised to get rid of 150,000 public
sector jobs by 2015 and place many civil servants on a reduced
pay scale, Novinite.com discloses.

The European Commission on Tuesday said debt inspectors will
return to Greece early next week to resume their review of strict
budget targets, which are a precondition for continued payment of
emergency loans for the cash-strapped country, Novinite.com
relates.

The resumption of the review is an important step toward securing
the next installment of bailout funds worth EUR8 billion that is
needed to keep the country from bankruptcy, Novinite.com notes.

The installment had been expected in September, but international
creditors said a decision on whether to release the funds will
not be made until early October, according to Novinite.com.

Without the aid, Greece will default on its debt within weeks,
possibly triggering a domino effect throughout the rest of
Europe, Novinite.com states.


=============
H U N G A R Y
=============


* HUNGARY: Construction Company Liquidations Up 43.6% in August
---------------------------------------------------------------
MTI-Econews, citing Opten, which compiles information on
companies, reports that creditors and suppliers launched
liquidation procedures against 237 companies in the construction
industry in Hungary in August, down from 339 in July, but up
43.6% from the same month a year earlier.

According to MTI, Opten said that the number of voluntary
liquidations totaled 208 in August, 86 more than in the same
month in 2010.

MTI notes that Opten said there were 386 construction companies
established in Hungary in August, down from 417 in July and from
408 in August 2010.


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I C E L A N D
=============


LANDSBANKI ISLANDS: ESA Agrees to Defer Icesave Decision
--------------------------------------------------------
Iceland Review Online reports that the EFTA Surveillance
Authority (ESA) has agreed with the reasoning of the Icelandic
government that it is right to wait for documents on the
bankruptcy estate of Landsbanki Islands hf before making a
decision on whether the Icesave dispute should be taken to court.

Minister of Economic Affairs Arni Pall Arnason met the high
command of the ESA in early September, Iceland Review Online
relates.  Icelandic authorities were to respond to the ESA's last
letter on Icesave by Sept. 10, Iceland Review Online says, citing
Frettabladid.

According to Iceland Review Online, Mr. Arnason said that the ESA
requested statistics, which are now being worked on in his
ministry.  They will be delivered to the ESA before the end of
this month, Iceland Review Online notes.

                     About Landsbanki Islands

Landsbanki Islands hf, also commonly known as Landsbankinn in
Iceland, is an Icelandic bank.  The bank offered online savings
accounts under the "Icesave" brand.  On October 7, 2008, the
Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority took control of
Landsbanki and two other major banks.

Landsbanki filed for Chapter 15 protection on Dec. 9, 2008
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y. Case No.: 08-14921).  Gary S. Lee, Esq., at
Morrison & Foerster LLP, represents the Debtor.  When it filed
for protection from its creditors, it listed assets and debts of
more than US$1 billion each.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


ASTANA FINANCE: Int'l Creditors to Absorb 80% of Bond Losses
------------------------------------------------------------
Nariman Gizitdinov at Bloomberg News reports that AO Astana
Finance's international creditors will absorb a loss of 80% on
its bonds under an agreement reached with the Kazakh financial
company that defaulted in 2009.

Holders of Astana Finance's foreign-currency debt will be repaid
20 cents on the dollar, receiving cash and bonds maturing in one
and four years, Bloomberg says, citing the term sheet published
by the company on Wednesday and signed with its international
creditors' committee on Sept. 15.

According to Bloomberg, Astana Finance said the company will
allocate US$100 million in cash to distribute to creditors and
issue US$75 million of one-year zero-coupon bonds.  The company
said that it will also issue four-year bonds so that total
compensation reaches 20% of the debt value now held by creditors,
Bloomberg relates.

Astana Finance said that international creditors will also get at
least 60% of shares in the company as well as 12-year recovery
notes, under which they will receive a share of anything
recovered from impaired assets, Bloomberg recounts.  The company,
as cited by Bloomberg, said trade-finance lenders are likely to
accept the option.

Bloomberg notes that the statement said Kazakh creditors will
receive subordinated notes amortizing after the four-year bonds
issued to international creditors come due.

Joint Stock Company Astana Finance (Astana Finance), through its
subsidiaries, provides various financial products and services in
the Republic of Kazakhstan.  It provides current accounts, saving
accounts, and other deposits; investment savings products; and
various loans comprising mortgage, consumer, and car loans, as
well as other credit facilities.


KAZKOMMERTSBANK JSC: Unit in Voluntary Liquidation
--------------------------------------------------
JSC Kazkommertsbank, one of the largest banks in Kazakhstan and
Central Asia, disclosed that on September 9, 2011, the Board of
Directors of the Bank decided to voluntary liquidate the 100%
subsidiary of Kazkommertsbank, Kazkommerts Capital 2 B.V.

Kazkommerts Capital 2 B.V. is a special-purpose vehicle
registered in the Netherlands with the Bank being a sole
shareholder.  The Company was established for international fund-
raising purposes.  Since the Company is not currently active, the
Board of Directors of the Bank has made a decision to liquidate
the Company.

The procedure on voluntary liquidation will take place in
accordance with the requirements of the respective legislations.

                      About Kazkommertsbank

Kazkommertsbank (KKB) is one of the largest banks in Kazakhstan
and Central Asia with total assets of KZT2,779.8 billion
(US$19.1 billion equivalent) at June 30, 2011.  In addition to
its core banking business (retail and corporate) KKB has
subsidiaries active in pension fund management, asset management,
insurance and brokerage.  KKB also has foreign subsidiaries in
the Russian Federation, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Major shareholders of Kazkommertsbank include the Central Asian
Investment Company and Chairman of the Board Mr. Nurzhan
Subkhanberdin, Alnair Capital Holding, the Kazakh Government
through the Samruk-Kazyna National Wealth Fund and the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  KKB's predecessor,
Medeu Bank, was founded in July 1990, and re-registered as
Kazkommertsbank in October 1991.  KKB completed an IPO in GDR
form on  the London Stock Exchange in November 2006, the first
CIS bank to do so, in a deal totaling $845 million.  The Bank's
shares are listed on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange.


===========
L A T V I A
===========


SC CITADELE: Moody's Reviews Ba3 LT Deposit Ratings for Downgrade
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade the Ba3 long-term deposit ratings of SC Citadele Banka.
Concurrently, Moody's affirmed the bank's the E+ standalone bank
financial strength rating (BFSR) and Not Prime short-term rating.

Ratings Rationale

The review for possible downgrade of Citadele's ratings primarily
reflects concerns surrounding the deterioration of asset quality
beyond Moody's expectations at the bank's inception in August
2010 and the deteriorated low capitalization levels. Whilst
Moody's recognizes the relative stabilization in both asset
quality and capital during 2011, together with improvements in
profitability, the deterioration has placed downward pressure on
the ratings.

Problem loans (90+ days in arrears, impaired past due, and
restructured loans) at YE 2010 constituted 19% of gross loans
compared to around 4% at inception in August 2010. The inclusion
of restructured loans constitutes just over 50% of the total
problem loan figure. Whilst Moody's expected a deterioration in
this metric as the under 60 days in arrears loans aged, the scale
of deterioration over 2010 has become a source of concern.
Interim 2011 results show a small fall in absolute problem loans
(excluding restructured loans), moving from LVL 81.1 million at
YE 2010 to LVL79.6 million, although as a proportion of gross
loans it rose slightly and levels remain high.

Citadele's Tier 1 capital ratio at YE 2010 was low at 6.7%,
marking a deterioration from the August 2010 figure due to losses
and lack of earnings due to start up costs. At H1 2011, the Tier
1 ratio had improved slightly to 7.2% although this remains low
with only a small improvement expected over the rest of 2011.

During its rating review, Moody's will further assess the
underlying causes of the asset quality and capital deteriorations
and will focus particularly on the sustainability of the
stabilization observed during H1 2011, together with the bank's
strategy in these areas.

Citadele's Ba3 long-term rating incorporates a one-notch uplift
from its B1 Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA), which maps from its
E+ BFSR. This reflects the rating agency's assessment of a high
probability of systemic support, given the state's 75% (minus one
share) ownership of the bank. The BFSR is unaffected by the
review as the E+ rating can map to several BCAs meaning that any
potential downgrade following the review is likely to result only
in movement in the BCA and long term deposit rating.

Moody's previous rating action on Citadele was implemented on
September 6, 2010, when the Ba3/NP/E+ ratings were assigned with
a stable outlook.

The methodologies used in this rating were Bank Financial
Strength Ratings: Global Methodology published in February 2007,
and Incorporation of Joint-Default Analysis into Moody's Bank
Ratings: A Refined Methodology published in March 2007.  Other
Factors used in this rating are described in Moody's Approach to
Rating Banks and Finance Companies with Limited Financial History
published in August 2009.

Headquartered in Riga, Latvia, Citadele reported total
consolidated assets of around LVL1,416 million (EUR1,995 million)
at the end of June 2011.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


CADOGAN SQUARE: Moody's Lifts Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
-------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Cadogan Square CLO III B.V.:

   -- EUR342.65MM Class A Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR36.1MM Class B Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes due
      2023, Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa2
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR27.5MM Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun
      22, 2011 Ba2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR30MM Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR18.75MM Class E Senior Secured Deferrable Floating Rate
      Notes due 2023, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR7MM Class X Combination Notes due 2023 (currently EUR
      5.36M outstanding Rated Balance), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. Class X
'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount of
the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the Rated
Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated
Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

Ratings Rationale

Cadogan Square CLO III B.V, issued in December 2006, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is
managed by Credit Suisse Alternative Capital Inc. This
transaction will be in reinvestment period until January 17,
2013. It is predominantly composed of senior secured loans
(85.59%) but also with exposure to mezzanine loans (3.38%),
second lien loans (7.20%) and CLO securities (2.19%).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions also reflect consideration of credit improvement of
the underlying portfolio since the rating action in December
2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to
the modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling
of collateral amortization profile and (2) changing certain
credit estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward
looking indicators as well as time lags in receiving information
required for credit estimate updates, and (3) adjustments to the
equity cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Improvement in the credit quality is observed through a stronger
average credit rating of the portfolio (as measured by the
weighted average rating factor "WARF") and a decrease in the
proportion of securities rated Caa1 or below by Moody's (8.4%
currently, compared to 13.9% in December 2009). As of the latest
trustee report dated July 2011, the WARF is currently 2932
compared to 2917 in the November 2009 report. However, the
reported WARF understates the actual improvement in credit
quality because of the technical transition related to rating
factors of European corporate credit estimates, as announced in
the press release published by Moody's on September 1, 2010.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have improved
slightly since the rating action in December 2009. The Class A/B,
Class C and Class D and Class E overcollateralization ratios are
reported at 125.90%, 117.22%, 109.02% and 104.46%, respectively,
versus November 2009 levels of 121.78%, 113.51%, 105.68% and
101.32% respectively and all related overcollateralization tests
are currently in compliance.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 475.31m,
defaulted par of EUR 15.91m, a weighted average default
probability of 22.87% (consistent with a WARF of 2904), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.49% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 43 and a weighted
average spread of 2.95%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 85% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by (1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy especially as 15.90% of
the portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Greece, Ireland,
Spain and Italy and (2) the large concentration of speculative-
grade debt maturing between 2012 and 2015 which may create
challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO notes' performance may
also be impacted by (1) the manager's investment strategy and
behavior and (2) divergence in legal interpretation of CDO
documentation by different transactional parties due to embedded
ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

(1) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
    defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
    be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
    overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
    recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
    defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's
    analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the
    market price and the recovery rate in order to account for
    potential volatility in market prices. Moody's applied a
    recovery rate of 19% to the defaulted securities in the
    portfolio.

(2) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
    the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
    risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that at transaction
    maturity such an asset has a liquidation value dependent on
    the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
    asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Moody's notes
    that the underlying portfolio includes two CLO securities
    that mature after the maturity date of the notes and make up
    a modest 1.15% of the underlying reference portfolio. For
    these assets, a liquidation value of 19% was applied,
    consistent with the standard recovery table from the
    structured finance CDO methodology.

(3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to
    the weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which
    may be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest
    into new issue loans or other loans with longer maturities
    and/or participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's
    tested for a possible extension of the actual weighted
    average life in its analysis.

(4) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
    reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
    collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
    covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming
    lower of reported and covenanted values for weighted average
    rating factor, weighted average spread and diversity score.
    However, as part of the base case, Moody's considered spread
    levels higher than the covenant levels due to the large
    difference between the reported and covenant levels.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's CDOEdge
model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


EUROCREDIT CDO: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Two Note Classes to Caa2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Eurocredit CDO III B.V.:

   -- EUR20.5MM Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes, Upgraded to
      A1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A3 (sf) Placed Under
      Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10MM Class C-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR12MM Class C-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed Rate
      Notes, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba3
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR12.5MM Class D-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR1.5MM Class D-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes, Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR2.3MM Class E-1 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Floating
      Rate Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR1.5MM Class E-2 Senior Subordinated Deferrable Fixed
      Rate Notes, Upgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22,
      2011 Caa3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Eurocredit CDO III B.V., issued in September 2003, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Intermediate Capital Managers Limited. The reinvestment period of
this transaction ended in October 2008.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of the increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and deleveraging of the senior notes
since the rating action in November 2009.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates.

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 and Class A-2 notes have been
paid down by approximately 4.7% since the rating action in
November 2009. As a result of the deleveraging, the
overcollateralization ratios have since increased. As of the
latest trustee report dated August 20, 2011, the Class A/B and
Class E overcollateralization ratios are reported at 130.2% and
106.8%, respectively, versus October 2009 levels of 124.4% and
102.8%, respectively.

Reported WARF has increased from 2731 to 2860 between October
2009 and August 2011.

However, this reported WARF overstates the actual deterioration
in credit quality because of the technical transition related to
rating factors of European corporate credit estimates, as
announced in the press release published by Moody's on 1
September 2010. Additionally, defaulted securities total about
EUR1.7 million of the underlying portfolio compared to EUR18.9
million in November 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR237.698
million, defaulted par of EUR1.707 million, a weighted average
default probability of 22.4% (consistent with a WARF of 3156), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 44.95% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 32 and a weighted
average spread of 2.94%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 87% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy and 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
   proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
   accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the bond/loan
   market and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
   significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Moody's also notes that around 72% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single
   exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been
   subject to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per
   the report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
   Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's
   analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
   price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
   volatility in market prices.

4) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
   be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


HARBOURMASTER CLO: Fitch Keeps 'Bsf' Ratings on Three Tranches
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has maintained 17 tranches from three
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) of leveraged loans,
Harbourmaster CLO 9 B.V., Harbourmaster CLO 10 B.V. and
Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 3 B.V. on Rating Watch Negative (RWN).

The maintenance of the RWN reflects continuing uncertainty over
the treatment of defaulted assets for the purpose of the over-
collateralization and interest coverage tests.

The RWN will be resolved once the definition of defaulted assets
is clarified.  If defaulted obligations were to be treated as
performing for the purpose of calculating coverage tests, the
resolution of the RWN would likely be a downgrade by a rating
category or less.

The rating actions are as follows:

Harbourmaster CLO 9 B.V.

  -- Class A2: 'AAsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class B: 'Asf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class C: 'BBBsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class D: 'BBsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class E: 'Bsf'; maintained on RWN

Harbourmaster CLO 10 B.V.

  -- Class A2: 'AAAsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class A3: 'AAsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class A4: 'BBBsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class B1: 'BBsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class B2: 'Bsf'; maintained on RWN

Harbourmaster Pro-Rata CLO 3 B.V.

  -- Class A2: 'AAAsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class A3: 'Asf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class A4: 'BBBsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class B1: 'BBsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class B2: 'Bsf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class S3: 'B+sf'; maintained on RWN
  -- Class S4: 'BBBsf'; maintained on RWN


===========
N O R W A Y
===========


NORSKE SKOG: S&P Puts 'B-' Corp. Credit Rating on Watch Negative
----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services placed all of its ratings on
Norway-based forest product group Norske Skogindustrier ASA
(Norske Skog), including the 'B-' long-term corporate credit
rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications.

The CreditWatch placement primarily reflects tight headroom under
the group's EUR140 million (Norwegian krone (NOK) 1.1 billion)
revolving credit facility. "It also reflects our assessment that
the risk of a covenant breach, which would prevent the group from
drawing on the facility, is material, and could cause a liquidity
shortage at the beginning of 2012, unless the group can put in
place additional liquidity resources," S&P related.

"Contrary to our expectations when we affirmed the ratings and
revised the outlook to stable in June 2011, Norske Skog's current
covenant headroom is tight. As of June 30, 2011, the group
reported net interest-bearing debt to adjusted gross operating
earnings of about 6x against the 6.5x allowed under the
documentation. A weak operating performance driven by a strong
Norwegian krone, high input costs, and significantly lower
magazine paper volumes due to a fire at one of the group's mills
in early 2011, were the main reasons for the poor results," S&P
stated.

"Although we believe that the group can improve its operating
cash flows in the second half of 2011, primarily on the back of
higher selling prices, we believe that the risk of a covenant
breach in the next two quarters is material," S&P noted.

"We will monitor covenant headroom and the group's efforts to
secure additional liquidity resources, and review the CreditWatch
placement as information becomes available. We expect to resolve
the CreditWatch placement over the next two months. If the group
is unable to secure additional liquidity resources or obtain
adequate headroom under its covenants, we may lower the ratings.
A downgrade would not necessarily be limited to one notch.
Conversely, we may affirm the ratings, should the liquidity
position improve to the extent that we view it as adequate. This
could result from better than expected operating cash flows and
improved covenant headroom, or access to additional liquidity
resources," S&P said.


===========
R U S S I A
===========


SVYAZINVEST OJSC: May Delay Liquidation Until 2017
--------------------------------------------------
According to Telecom.paper, Kommersant reported that the
liquidation of Svyazinvest OJSC could be postponed at least until
2017.

Telecom.paper relates that the Russian government is considering
the opportunity for Svyazinvest to buy out the 25% plus one share
stake that Rostelecom holds in Svyazinvest.  The deal would be
worth RUB59.165 billion, most of which would be paid using
credit. Svyazinvest would not be liquidated until the credit was
repaid.

Svyazinvest also controls 43.4% stake in Rostelecom indirectly,
via the State Property Fund, Telecom.paper notes.

                         About Svyazinvest

Svyazinvest OJSC is a Russian telecommunications holding company.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 21,
2010, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said that its ratings on
five regional subsidiaries of Svyazinvest remain on CreditWatch,
where they were placed with developing implications in June 2010.

The CreditWatch refers to the 'BB-' long-term corporate credit
ratings on North-West Telecom (JSC), VolgaTelecom (OJSC), and
Central Telecommunications Co. (OJSC); the 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating on Uralsvyazinform (OJSC); and the 'B'
long-term corporate credit rating on Southern Telecommunications
Co. (OJSC), as well as the national scale and debt ratings on all
five companies.

The extension of the CreditWatch status follows the change of the
timeframe for receipt of early repayment claims from the
creditors of the companies, which arose as a result of their
reorganization and merger into OJSC Rostelecom (BB/Stable/--).
S&P originally expected the claim period to expire in September,
but it has been extended to November 2010 because of technical
and legal constraints.


=========
S P A I N
=========


FTYPYME TDA: Fitch Affirms 'Csf' Rating on Class D Notes
--------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed FTPYME TDA CAM 4, FTA, a
securitization of secured and unsecured loans to small and medium
sized Spanish enterprises (SMEs) and self-employed individuals
granted by Caja de Ahorros Del Mediterraneo (CAM,
'BB+'/Stable/'B'), as follows:

  -- EUR240,148,990 Class A2 (ISIN:ES0339759013): affirmed at
     'Asf', Outlook Positive

  -- EUR127,000,000  Class A3(CA) (ISIN:ES0339759021): affirmed
     at 'AA+sf', Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

  -- EUR66,000,000 Class B (ISIN:ES0339759039): affirmed at
     'BBsf', Outlook Negative

  -- EUR38,000,000 Class C (ISIN:ES0339759047): affirmed at
     'CCCsf', assigned Recovery Rating 'RR-4'

  -- EUR29,300,000 Class D (ISIN:ES0339759054): affirmed at
     'Csf', assigned Recovery Rating 'RR-6'

The affirmations reflect the credit enhancement (CE) available
for the notes, commensurate with the rating stresses that Fitch
assumes for this portfolio, and the performance of the collateral
since the last review, (i.e. 90d+ arrears which peaked at 3.8% in
April 2011 and averaged 2.7% last year).  90d+ arrears and
defaults currently represent 3.1% and 5.4% of the current
portfolio balance respectively.  The CE for classes A2, A3(CA),
B, C, and D is 25.1%, 25.1%, 11.1%, 3.1% and 0%, respectively.
The mean expected loss rate for this portfolio is 7.7%, assuming
Fitch's expected probability of default benchmark for Spanish SME
transactions.

Fitch maintains a Positive Outlook on the Class A2 notes
reflecting the low obligor concentration and growing credit
enhancement due to deleveraging (the portfolio has amortized down
to 31%), coupled with the transaction's sequential amortization
schedule.

The agency has revised the Outlook on the Class A3(CA) notes to
reflect the Negative Outlook on the guarantor of the class, the
Kingdom of Spain ('AA+'/Negative/'F1+').  This is an indication
that the rating will follow any migration of the sovereign rating
for Spain.  The Class A3(CA) notes rank pari-passu with the Class
A2 notes.

Fitch has also maintained the Negative Outlook on the Class B
notes to highlight that the sequential amortization schedule is
expected to prolong the life of the notes which could expose them
to tail risk.  The agency believes that tail risk could be
material, especially if the currently underfunded reserve fund
(at EUR14.4m, down from the required level of EUR29.3 m) is
further drawn as a result of the transaction's 20% exposure to
the real estate industry and 50% geographical concentration in
Alicante and Valencia.

Fitch considers it unlikely that the reserve fund will be repaid
in full at transaction's maturity.  Hence, the agency has
affirmed the Class D notes' 'Csf' rating, the proceeds of which
were used to fund the reserve fund.  Fitch has also assigned a
Recovery Rating of 'RR-6' to indicate poor recovery prospects.

Fitch has assigned an Issuer Report Grade (IRG) of one star
("poor"), to the publically available reports on the transaction.
The reporting is accurate and timely and contains detailed
information on delinquencies, defaults, liabilities and various
portfolio stratifications.  However, the assignment of IRG one
star reflects the lack of information in the investor report on
the transaction's counterparties rating triggers.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SWEDISH AUTOMOBILE: Voluntary Reorganization Gets Court Okay
------------------------------------------------------------
Swedish Automobile N.V. disclosed that Saab Automobile AB and its
subsidiaries Saab Automobile Powertrain AB and Saab Automobile
Tools AB (collectively Saab Automobile) received approval for
their proposal for voluntary reorganization from the Court of
Appeal in Gothenburg, Sweden on Tuesday.  The purpose of the
voluntary reorganization process is to secure short-term
stability while simultaneously attracting additional funding,
pending the inflow of the equity contributions by Pang Da and
Youngman.

The Swedish Company Reorganization Act says that an application
shall not be approved unless there is reasonable cause to assume
that the purpose of the reorganization will be achieved.  In
Tuesday's decision, the Court of Appeal has found that such
conditions exist, thereby overturning an earlier ruling by the
District Court in Vanersborg, Sweden.

As a consequence of the Court of Appeal ruling, Saab Automobile
will request for the bankruptcy filings by unions IF Metall,
Unionen and Ledarna to be cancelled.

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BRINTONS LTD: Scheme Enters PPF Assessment After Insolvency
-----------------------------------------------------------
Jack Jones at Professional Pensions reports that the Brintons
Limited Staff Pension and Life Assurance Plan has entered Pension
Protection Fund assessment after private equity firm Carlyle
triggered its sponsor's insolvency then bought the business.

The report relates that Carlyle placed Brintons into
administration on September 2, a week after acquiring its senior
debt, and bought its business and assets through a newly-created
vehicle Brintons Carpets on the same day.

"It's a great transaction because all the jobs are preserved, all
the creditors are being paid, and the company's moving forward
and it's got new money to invest in the future," the report
quotes Brintons financial director Peter Johansen as saying.
Mr. Johansen will remain in the role at the new company, the
report notes.

According to the report, Brintons Carpets will invest about
GBP20 million in the business and take on the same amount in
debt, with the capital coming from Carlyle's distressed assets
arm Carlyle Strategic Partners.

But Mr. Johansen confirmed that, as a contingent creditor, the
1,500-member scheme, which had a deficit of about GBP10.5 million
on an FRS17 basis, would receive nothing.

Professional Pensions relates that law firm Nabarro, on behalf of
the trustees, said they had been kept fully informed during the
restructuring and had communicated to members the role of the PPF
and impact on their benefits.

The scheme closed to new members in 2003 and to future accrual in
2006, since when Mr. Johansen said the employer had been
contributing approximately GBP1 million a year to recover the
deficit.

Mr. Johansen said the company had been in contact with The
Pensions Regulator throughout but had not applied for clearance
for the transaction as this was not possible when dealing with an
insolvent company.

But the deal could raise fresh concerns over 'pre-pack' sales
where a transaction is negotiated in advance of an insolvency and
then concluded shortly after an administrator is appointed,
Professional Pensions notes.

The Pensions Regulator is currently investigating the
circumstances in which Silentnight shed its pension obligations
during insolvency before being acquired by private equity group
HIG, the report adds.

Headquartered in Kidderminster, the United Kingdom, Brintons
Limited manufactures and sells residential and commercial
carpets.  The company serves customers through its factory
outlet, as well as through stockists in the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and the Republic of Ireland.


FISHGATE HULL: In Liquidation; Charterfields Looks for Buyer
------------------------------------------------------------
FISHupdate.com reports that an international search has been
launched to find a buyer for Fishgate Hull Fish Auction following
its liquidation.

According to the report, international asset consultants
Charterfields have been appointed to sell the facility, which was
the centrepoint of Fishgate Hull's seafood trade before it was
forced to close in June, due to the withdrawal of Icelandic fish
supplies.

FISHupdate.com quotes liquidator John Russell from The P & A
Partnership as saying that, "The company was not only a casualty
of the financial crisis in Iceland but also the reduced haddock
quota."

Charterfields have been appointed to sell the processing assets
and business, in partnership with property agents GVA Grimley,
FISHupdate.com discloses.

"We will be exploring all avenues in our attempt to find a buyer
and will be looking not only within the UK but also in Europe,
Iceland and Norway.  Ideally, we would like a buyer that could
continue to operate the business -- if not the auction side, then
at least the processing plant.  However we are considering all
options," the report quotes Charterfields director Roger Cutting
as saying.

The Fishgate Hull Fish Auction was built in 2000 with
GBP5 million of public and private investment. It provides a
state-of-the-art facility where fish brought from the northern
seas off Iceland, Faroe, and Norway can be weighed, graded and
packed, then sold to buyers or wholesalers.  The 56,000 sq. ft.
temperature-controlled premises include a processing plant and an
electronic auction room.


LONDON & REGIONAL: Moody's Reviews 'Ba1' Rating on GBP50MM Notes
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has placed on review for possible
downgrade the Class A, Class B and Class C Notes issued by London
& Regional Debt Securitisation No. 2 plc (amounts reflecting the
initial outstanding amount):

   -- GBP190MM A Commercial Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
      Certificate, Aaa (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Jul 28, 2006 Definitive Rating
      Assigned Aaa (sf)

   -- GBP16MM B Commercial Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
      Certificate, A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to A3 (sf)

   -- GBP50MM C Commercial Mortgage Backed Floating Rate Notes
      Certificate, Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade; previously on Mar 27, 2009 Downgraded to Ba1
      (sf)

Ratings Rationale

The rating action has been prompted by the further increased
refinancing risk in the light of the loan maturity in October
2013 and the final legal maturity of the Notes in 2015.

London & Regional Debt Securitisation No. 2 plc closed in July
2006 and represents the securitisation of one commercial mortgage
loan advanced to a borrower which is part of the London &
Regional Group. The securitized loan is the senior portion of a
senior/junior loan structure secured by 24 commercial properties
(27 originally) located across the UK. The A-loan currently
amounts to GBP237.7 million and the B-loan to GBP106.2 million.
The A-loan is interest-only, while the B-loan amortizes via cash
sweep. The loan which matures in Oct 2013, is current and no
disruptions have occurred to the interest payments to-date
including the July 2011 IPD.

The current underwriters' loan-to-value on the A-Loan and Whole
loan basis are 57.7% and 82.9%, respectively based on valuations
at closing. No external valuations have been reported since
closing.

Moody's will conclude its review of the Notes once it has more
clarity on (i) the current and future performance of the
underlying property portfolio, and (ii) the impact of a potential
work-out scenario of this large single borrower transaction
considering the absence of a third-party servicer in the
structure.

Rating Methodology

The methodologies used in this rating were 'Moody's Approach to
Real Estate Analysis for CMBS in EMEA: Portfolio Analysis (MoRE
Portfolio)', published April 2006 and 'Update on Moody's Real
Estate Analysis for CMBS Transactions in EMEA', published in
June 2005.


NAVYBLUE DESIGN: Has More Than 100 Creditors, Liquidator Reveals
----------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Lepitak at The Drum reports that the liquidators of
Navyblue Design Group Ltd have revealed that there are over
100 creditors of the design company.

French Duncan has been appointed as provision liquidator a week
after the agency announced its voluntary liquidation, the report
says.

The Drum quotes Annette Menzies, partners for French Duncan
Business Recovery, as saying that, "French Duncan was appointed
as provisional liquidator on Sept. 9, 2011.  There are, in this
case, over 100 creditors plus potential employee claims."

According to the Drum, Ms. Mezies said the company was yet
unaware of the final debt, as it was still ascertaining the
figural and that it was also conducting initial investigations
into the affairs of the company.

"We are currently awaiting a winding up order to be granted by
the court and will call a first meeting of creditors once that
has been received.  Any former director of the company in the
three years preceding the liquidation will also be contacted by
the Liquidator," the report quotes Ms. Menzies as saying.

As for the offices of Navyblue in Leith, the Drum notes, the
liquidator has said they were leased and not owned by the
company, and that it was also not owned by the Royal Bank of
Scotland, which, it has been reported, was involved in the
running of the agency for some time.

The Drum states that the directors of Navyblue have denied that
its liquidation was part of a pre-pack deal, following director
Geoff Nicol's inference that the agency could rise again in some
form in the future.

Meanwhile, The Drum reports that it has been claimed that the
agency closed owing over GBP80,000 to its landlords for the Corn
Exchange in Leith.

The building, rented by the agency alongside its gallery, is
owned by an owners group that apparently included several former
senior staff members, as well as the directors of the agency
itself, Douglas Alexander, Geoff Nicol and Bernie Shaw-Binns, the
Drum discloses.

A source close to the group has informed the Drum that the group,
with the exception of the Navyblue directors, is now working to
find new tenants for the building, while digital agency Storm
ID's lease is unaffected, and they continue to work in the former
1576 office space.

It is understood that prior to the liquidation of Navyblue, the
agency was also subletting part of the offices out, a move which
was not sanctioned by the owners group, the Drum adds.

As reported in the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Sept. 15,
2011, The Scotsman said Navyblue Design Group Ltd has blamed
"internal" problems and poor trading for forcing it into
voluntary liquidation with the loss of about 20 jobs.  Navyblue,
which had offices in Edinburgh and London as well an outpost in
Oman, confirmed that it would shut its doors in the UK after 17
years of trading, despite the firm's directors having invested an
undisclosed sum in the business over the past year in an effort
to keep it afloat.

Navyblue Design Group Ltd -- http://www.navyblue.com/-- is a
design agency.  It had about 20 staff in both London and
Edinburgh.  At its peak, the firm employed about 100.


R&R ICE CREAM: S&P Affirms 'B+' Corporate Credit Rating
-------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on U.K.-
based private-label ice cream manufacturer R&R Ice Cream PLC
(R&R) to negative from stable. "At the same time, we affirmed our
'B+' long-term corporate credit rating on R&R," S&P related.

The rating actions reflect a reduction in R&R's margins in the
first half of 2011 due to a lag between increases in commodity
prices and actions to increase product prices. This was followed
by a temporary reduction in purchasing volumes due to poor
weather conditions.

"Earlier this year, we anticipated that R&R would be able to
improve its debt metrics materially with free operating cash flow
and probable acquisitions. However, we believe that increasing
commodity prices will weaken EBITDA margins for the year ending
Dec. 31, 2011. Consequently, we believe that internal cash flow
generation might not be sufficient for R&R's debt protection
metrics to reach the level that we consider commensurate with the
current rating by the end of 2011. We define this level as
Standard & Poor's-adjusted EBITDA to cash interest of about 2.5x.
We estimate that this ratio will remain close to 2.2x in 2011,
but we believe that a material improvement to close to 2.5x is
likely in 2012," S&P stated.

"We believe that R&R's EBITDA margin could slide by 50-70 basis
points in the year to Dec. 31, 2011, on account of shrinking
consumer baskets and sluggish market conditions. Total sales
remained at EUR266.1 million in the first half of 2011, with an
EBITDA margin of 14.4% on a rolling 12-month basis, versus 15.9%
in the same period last year. However, R&R has been able to pass
some of the commodity price increases on to its customers by
negotiating increases in product prices. We can already see the
effect of these price increases in the U.K., since R&R's
contracts with its U.K. customers are on a 13-week rolling basis.
We expect to see the full effect of price increases in the other
European countries in 2012," S&P stated.

"We believe that there is a risk associated with R&R's ability to
bring its ratio of adjusted EBITDA to cash interest close to 2.5x
over the next 12 months due to negative growth in the EBITDA
margin. We believe that ratings downside could stem primarily
from extraordinary spikes in raw material prices, which could
prevent a near-term improvement in credit measures or weaken
liquidity. Consequently, we could downgrade R&R if profitability
did not improve such that adjusted EBITDA to cash interest
dropped to 2.0x," S&P said.

"We consider that stable operating cash flow generation should
continue to support R&R's ability to balance its business
development needs with capital structure stability over the
medium term. We consider positive growth in profitability and
fully adjusted EBITDA to cash interest of about 2.5x to be
commensurate with the current rating. We anticipate that R&R
should be able to achieve this by the end of 2012. Clear progress
in that direction would likely result in us revising the outlook
to stable," S&P added.


SEMPERIAN SENIOR: S&P Lowers Rating on Class D Notes to 'B'
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services lowered and removed from
CreditWatch negative its credit ratings on all classes of notes
in Semperian Senior Funding PLC.

"The rating actions follow our assessment of the transaction's
performance using data from the latest available quarterly report
(dated July 18, 2011), in addition to a cash flow analysis. We
have taken into account recent developments in the transaction
and reviewed the transaction under our 2010 counterparty criteria
(see 'Counterparty And Supporting Obligations Methodology And
Assumptions,' published Dec. 6, 2010)," S&P stated.

"We subjected the capital structure to a cash flow analysis to
determine the break-even default rate for each rated class. In
our analysis, we used the reported portfolio balance that we
consider to be performing, the asset-specific spread, and the
weighted-average recovery rates that we considered appropriate.
We incorporated various cash flow stress scenarios using
alternative default patterns, levels, and timings for each
liability rating category, in conjunction with different interest
stress scenarios," S&P said.

"The portfolio is highly concentrated in 12 assets, with the
largest asset making up 21.59% of the performing assets. To
address concentration and event risk, we performed an analysis to
see if each tranche is able to withstand certain combinations of
underlying asset defaults across different recovery scenarios,"
S&P noted.

"In addition to the rating indicated by this analysis, we also
considered other factors such as the seniority of the notes in
the waterfall, the credit quality of the portfolio which is
mainly in the 'BBB' rating category, and higher recoveries for
project finance assets compared with corporate assets," S&P said.

"In our opinion, the credit enhancement available to the class A,
C, and D notes is no longer commensurate with their current
ratings. We have therefore lowered our rating on the class A
notes to 'BBB (sf)', the class C notes to 'BB (sf)', and the
class D notes to 'B (sf)'. At the same time, we removed the
ratings from CreditWatch negative," S&P said.

"As the updated ratings on these notes are currently lower than
the ratings on any of the counterparties in the transaction, they
are not affected by the application of our 2010 counterparty
criteria," according to S&P.

Semperian Senior Funding is a cash flow collateralized loan
obligation (CLO) transaction that securitizes loans to individual
infrastructure projects originated under the U.K.'s private
finance initiative (PFI) or public-private partnership (PPP)
program. The transaction closed in December 2007 and is managed
by Semperian Capital Management Ltd.

Ratings List

Semperian Senior Funding PLC
GBP363.035 Million Floating-Rate Notes

Class                 Rating
               To                From

Ratings Lowered and Removed From CreditWatch Negative

A              BBB (sf)          A+ (sf)/Watch Neg
C              BB (sf)           A (sf)/Watch Neg
D              B (sf)            BBB- (sf)/Watch Neg


STAGELIVE (PETERBOROUGH): In Talks With Insolvency Firm
--------------------------------------------------------
The Peterborough Evening Telegraph reports that Stagelive
(Peterborough) Ltd has opened discussions with Harrisons Business
and Insolvency Ltd, almost two months after the firm last put on
a show at the Broadway Theatre at the end of June.

The building's owner Rinaldo Fasulo confirmed last week that all
shows advertised by StageLive had been cancelled, and he had put
the Broadway back on the market for GBP6 million, the report
says.

An ET investigation has put in numerous phone calls and even
visits to former directors, but no answers have been given to
people with tickets to cancelled shows or any of the theatre's 46
employees over what is happening.

However, ET says, the new development that a representative has
been talking to the insolvency firm was confirmed on Friday.

"We have been speaking to a representative of StageLive. I can't
say who that is because it's confidential information.  The
company didn't have any real people as directors, which has made
it a bit different," the report quotes Paul Walker, a director
from Harrisons Business and Insolvency Ltd, as saying.

"We are not their liquidators, and the company is not in
liquidation. But it may go into liquidation.  No formal
instructions have been given to them and it is still at an early
stage. If a company decides to go into liquidation, it tends to
be about four weeks after informal discussions begin," Mr. Walker
said.

As well as putting the theatre up for sale, says ET, Mr. Fasulo
has also taken steps to wrest control of the building's alcohol
licence.

An application has been made to Peterborough City Council by
Mr. Fasulo to transfer the licence from previous holder Joe
Cormack, a former director of Stagelive (Peterborough) Ltd, to
himself.  The council is expected to make a decision over the
coming weeks, the report notes.

Stagelive (Peterborough) Ltd is a UK-based theatrical venue owner
and operator.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* EUROPE: EU May Write Down Derivatives Under Bank Bailout Plan
---------------------------------------------------------------
Jim Brunsden at Bloomberg News reports that European Union
regulators may write down the value of outstanding derivatives
contracts issued by banks in crisis as part of broader plans to
protect taxpayers from having to bail out failing lenders.

According to Bloomberg, a draft EU document outlining the plans
said that bank supervisors should be given power to impose losses
on "as wide a range of the unsecured liabilities of a failing
institution as possible," to help cover winding-up costs.  This
may include liabilities from "derivatives that are not fully
secured by collateral," as well as unsecured senior bonds,
according to the document obtained by Bloomberg.

The document said that unsecured derivatives "should, in
principle, be within the scope of the debt write down powers,"
Bloomberg notes.  Exceptions could apply if imposing losses would
have a negative impact on the banking system, adversely affect
counterparties or harm clearinghouses, Bloomberg says, citing the
EU document.

According to Bloomberg, two people familiar with the situation
said that the European Commission delayed publishing the plans
this month because of concerns the measures may spook investors
at a time of market turbulence and that they need more work.  The
final proposals may be released next month, Bloomberg discloses.


* BOOK REVIEW: The Health Care Marketplace
------------------------------------------
Author: Warren Greenberg, Ph.D.
Publisher: Beard Books
Softcover: 179 pages
List Price: $34.95
Review by Henry Berry

Greenberg is an economist who analyzes the healthcare field from
the perspective that "health care is a business [in which] the
principles of supply and demand are as applicable . . . as to
other businesses."  This perspective does not ignore or minimize
the question of the quality of health, but rather focuses sharply
on the relationship between the quality of healthcare and
economic factors and practices.

For better or worse, the American healthcare system to a
considerable degree embodies the beliefs, principles, and aims of
a free-market capitalist economic system driven by competition.
In the early sections of The Health Care Marketplace, Greenberg
takes up the question of how physicians and how hospitals compete
in this system.  "Competition among physicians takes place
locally among primary care physicians and on a wider geographical
scale among specialists.  There is competition also between M.D.s
and allied practitioners: for example, between ophthalmologists
and optometrists and between psychiatrists and psychologists.
Regarding competition between physicians in a fee-for-service
practice and those in managed care plans, Greenberg cites
statistics and studies that there was lesser utilization of
healthcare services, such as hospitalization and tests, with
managed care plans.

Some of the factors affecting the economics of different areas of
the healthcare field are self-evident, albeit may be little
recognized or little realized by consumers.  One of these factors
is physician demeanor.  Most readers would see a physician's
demeanor as a type of personality exhibited during the course of
the day.  But after the author notes that "[c]ompetition also
takes place in professional demeanor, location, and waiting
time," the word "demeanor" takes on added meaning. The demeanor
of a big-city plastic surgeon, for example, would be markedly
different from that of a rural pediatrician.  Thus, demeanor has
a relationship to the costs, options, services, and payments in
the medical field, and also a relationship to doctor education
and government funding for public health.

Greenberg does not follow his economic data and summarizations
with recommendations or advice. He leaves it to the policymakers
to make decisions on the basis of the raw economic data and
indisputable factors such as physician demeanor.  Nor does he
take a political position when he selects what data to present or
emphasize.  It is this apolitical, unbiased approach that makes
The Health Care Marketplace of most value to readers interested
in understanding the economics of the healthcare field.

Without question, a thorough understanding of the factors
underlying the healthcare marketplace is necessary before changes
can be made so that the health needs of the public are better
met.  Conditions that are often seen as intractable because they
are regarded as social or political problems such as the
overcrowding of inner-city health centers or preferential
treatment of HMOs are, in Greenberg's view, problems amenable to
economic solutions.  According to the author, the basic economic
principle of supply-and-demand goes a long way in explaining
exorbitantly high medical costs and the proliferation of
specialists.

Greenberg's rigorous economic analysis similarly yields an
informative picture of the workings of other aspects of the
healthcare field.  Among these are hospitals, insurance, employee
health benefits, technology, government funding of health
programs, government regulation, and long-term health care.  In
the closing chapter, Greenberg applies his abilities as a keen-
eyed observer of the economic workings of the U.S. healthcare
field to survey healthcare systems in three other countries:
Canada, Israel, and the Netherlands.  "An analysis of each of the
three systems will explain the relative doses of competition,
regulation, and rationing that might be used in financing of
health care in the United States," he says.  But even here, as in
his economic analyses of the U.S. healthcare system, Greenberg
remains nonpartisan and does not recommend one of these three
foreign systems over the other.  Instead he critiques the
Canadian, Israel, and Netherlands systems -- "none [of which]
makes use of the employer in the provision of health insurance,"
he says -- to prompt the reader to look at the present state and
future of U.S. healthcare in new ways.

The Health Care Marketplace is not a book of limited interest,
and the author's focus on the economics of the health field does
not make for dry reading.   Healthcare is a central concern of
every individual and society in general.  Greenberg's book
clarifies the workings of the healthcare field and provides a
starting point for addressing its long-recognized problems and
moving down the road to dealing effectively with them.

Warren Greenberg is Professor of Health Economics and Health Care
Sciences at George Washington University, and also a Senior
Fellow at the University's Center for Health Policy Research.
Prior to these positions, in the 1970s he was a staff economist
with the Federal Trade Commission.  He has written a number of
other books and numerous articles on economics and healthcare.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


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S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
publication in any form (including e-mail forwarding, electronic
re-mailing and photocopying) is strictly prohibited without prior
written permission of the publishers.

Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
be reliable, but is not guaranteed.

The TCR Europe subscription rate is US$625 per half-year,
delivered via e-mail.  Additional e-mail subscriptions for
members of the same firm for the term of the initial subscription
or balance thereof are US$25 each.  For subscription information,
contact Christopher Beard at 240/629-3300.


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