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        T R O U B L E D   C O M P A N Y   R E P O R T E R

                           E U R O P E

           Friday, September 9, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 179

                            Headlines


F R A N C E

RHODIA SA: Fitch Raises LR Issuer Default Rating to BBB+ From BB


G E O R G I A

LIBERTY BANK: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable


G R E E C E

ALPHA BANK: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
* GREECE: French Parliament Backs Second Rescue Plan


I R E L A N D

BALLANTYNE RE: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on Three Note Classes
CURA PROPERTIES: High Court Confirms Appointment of Examiner
EGRET FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
EUROPEAN ENHANCED: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Three Notes to 'Ba2'
RIVER MEDIA: Exits Receivership; More Than 80 Jobs Saved

SM MORRIS: KBC Bank Appoints Kieran Wallace as Receiver
TBS INTERNATIONAL: Reaches Deal With Banks on Payment Deferral


I T A L Y

BORMIOLI ROCCO: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating


K A Z A K H S T A N

BTA BANK: Kazakhstan Blacklists Two Banks Linked to Default


N E T H E R L A N D S

PROSPERO CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'B3'


P O R T U G A L

POLO SECURITIES: Moody's Lowers Ratings on Instruments to 'B3'
* PORTUGAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings of Two GRIs to 'B2'


S W E D E N

SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Sweden Debt Office Not Opposed to Reconstruction


U N I T E D   K I N G D O M

BRUNTWOOD ALPHA: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'BBsf'
EMI GROUP: Guy Hands Launches New Legal Action Over Citi Takeover
HEALTHCARE LOCUMS: In Dispute with Two Investors Over Refinancing
JAGUAR LAND: S&P Gives 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Positive
NEWGATE FUNDING: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ca'

PACIFIC HORIZON: Calls On Investors to Vote Against Liquidation


X X X X X X X X

* BOOK REVIEW: The Outlaw Bank


                            *********


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F R A N C E
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RHODIA SA: Fitch Raises LR Issuer Default Rating to BBB+ From BB
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has upgraded France-based Rhodia SA's Long-term
Issuer Default Rating (IDR) and senior unsecured rating to 'BBB+'
from 'BB'.  The ratings have been removed from Rating Watch
Positive (RWP) and assigned a Stable Outlook.

Simultaneously, the agency has withdrawn the IDR and will no
longer provide analytical coverage on Rhodia, which is due to be
fully consolidated into the Solvay group.  The senior unsecured
rating on Rhodia's outstanding bonds will be maintained for the
duration of the instruments and as long as Rhodia provides
audited financial statements.

Fitch has also affirmed Belgium-based Solvay SA's (Solvay) Long-
term IDR and senior unsecured ratings at 'A-'.  The ratings have
been removed from Rating Watch Negative (RWN) and assigned a
Stable Outlook.

The rating actions follow the announcement on August 31, 2011, of
the closing of Solvay's cash tender offer for Rhodia within the
terms initially proposed by Solvay in April 2011.

Rhodia's ratings were put on RWP in April 2011 following the
announcement of Solvay's friendly EUR3.4 billion cash offer for
the company.  The upgrade of Rhodia's IDR to 'BBB+' reflects its
strategic importance to Solvay and Fitch's view that Solvay has
strong interest in supporting its new subsidiary and in honoring
its obligations.  The one-notch differential between Rhodia's and
Solvay's IDRs and senior unsecured ratings reflects the limited
operational overlap and legal ties between the companies (see
"Parent and Subsidiary Rating Linkage" dated August 12, 2011 at
www.fitchratings.com).

The RWN on Solvay's rating primarily reflected Fitch's concerns
about the potential execution risks associated with the
transaction. The affirmation of its ratings reflects the agency's
opinion that the companies' complementary offerings should
enhance the new group's business profile and that the combined
entity will exhibit operational features and financial metrics
commensurate with the 'A-' rating level.

Gross FFO adjusted leverage at or above 2.0x through the cycle,
sustained negative free cash flow generation and though-the-cycle
EBITDAR margin below 15% would be negative rating factors.

The full list of affected ratings is as follows:

Solvay SA

  -- Long-term IDR affirmed at 'A-'; off RWN, Outlook Stable
  -- Senior unsecured rating affirmed at 'A-'; off RWN
  -- Short-term IDR affirmed at 'F2' ;
  -- Subordinated debt rating affirmed at 'BBB'; off RWN

Rhodia SA

  -- Long-term IDR upgraded to 'BBB+'; off RWP, Stable Outlook;
     Withdrawn

  -- Senior unsecured rating upgraded to 'BBB+'; off RWP


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G E O R G I A
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LIBERTY BANK: Fitch Affirms Long-Term IDR at 'B'; Outlook Stable
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Georgia-based Liberty Bank's (LB)
Long-term Issuer Default Rating (IDR) at 'B' with a Stable
Outlook.

LB's Long-term IDR is driven by Fitch's view that the Georgian
authorities would likely have a high propensity to support the
bank if needed.  This view is based on the bank's important
social function in providing banking services in remote parts of
the country -- in particular the distribution of pensions and
social benefits -- and the track record of support in 2008-2009.

However, uncertainty about the ability of the authorities to
always be able to provide support over the horizon of the Long-
term rating (as reflected in the sovereign's Long-term IDR of
'B+'/Positive) limits the extent to which such support can be
relied upon.

LB's 'b-' Viability Rating (VR) reflects the bank's reliance on a
waiver in respect to regulatory capital requirements, its limited
track record since the takeover by new owners in 2009 and risks
inherent in the bank's rapid loan growth. However, LB's
standalone profile benefits from its strong pre-impairment
profitability, the absence of debt funding and good standards of
management, governance and disclosure.

LB's loan book increased by a rapid 42% in H111 after a 71%
expansion in 2010, mainly driven by a further expansion of the
retail book (73% of total loans at end-H111).  LB forecasts
ambitious 70% growth of loans for FY11, then a doubling of the
portfolio by end-2013.

Asset quality improved in 2010-H111, with non-performing loans
(NPLs; loans overdue more than 90 days) and restructured loans
decreasing to 7.5% and 4% at end-H111 from 15.9% and 18.9% at
end-H110, respectively.  Problems relate mainly to legacy
exposures issues before the bank's takeover, and have decreased
in absolute, as well as relative terms.  The performance of loans
issued under new management has been good to date, although the
track record is limited. Reserve coverage of NPLs was 108% at
end-H111.

After fresh capital injections of GEL34m in 2010-H111 and
improved internal capital generation, the bank's Fitch core
capital/risk-weighted assets ratio increased to a reasonable
10.6% at end-H111.  However, the Basel I and regulatory Tier 1
ratios were a more moderate 6.9% and 5.6%, respectively, at end-
H111 (mainly due to non-inclusion of property revaluation
reserves in Tier 1 capital), and the bank is reliant upon a
waiver from the National Bank of Georgia (valid until September
2012) in respect of regulatory capital ratios.  Fitch's base case
expectation is that internal capital generation and conversion of
an outstanding GEL18.6m contingent capital facility will be
sufficient, even without new capital raising, to ensure
conformity with regulatory ratios by September 2012.

LB's performance has improved on the back of the increased loan
portfolio, supported by strong interest margins, and bottom-line
results were also helped by moderate credit costs.  Pre-
impairment profit/average assets was 3.7% in H111, and return on
average assets was 1.6%.

Funding is mostly sourced from customer accounts (87% of
liabilities at end-H111), with deposits from government and
public sector entities representing a significant 36% of the
bank's liabilities at end-H111.  Customer funding remained highly
concentrated, with the largest 20 clients accounting for 49% of
customer funding at end-H111.  However, liquidity is currently
comfortable.

If LB continues to demonstrate sound performance, and is able to
conform with regulatory capital requirements, its VR could be
upgraded by one notch to 'b'.  However, in such a scenario, the
bank's Long-term IDR, which is already underpinned by potential
government support at the 'B' level, would likely remain
unchanged.  Downside pressure on either the VR or the Long-term
IDR is viewed as unlikely at present.

The rating actions are as follows:

  -- Long-term foreign currency IDR: affirmed at 'B';
     Stable Outlook

  -- Short-term IDR: affirmed at 'B'

  -- Viability Rating: affirmed at 'b-'

  -- Individual Rating: affirmed at 'D/E'

  -- Support Rating: affirmed at '4'

  -- Support Rating Floor: affirmed at 'B'


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G R E E C E
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ALPHA BANK: S&P Affirms 'CCC/C' Counterparty Credit Ratings
-----------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'CCC/C' long- and
short-term counterparty credit ratings on two Greek banks, Alpha
Bank A.E. (Alpha) and EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A. (EFG). The
outlooks on the two banks remain negative.

The rating action follows the banks' announcement that their
boards of directors have reached a formal agreement on the merger
of Alpha and EFG. The agreement is still pending all required
regulatory approvals, as well as authorization by the two banks'
shareholders. Under the proposed transaction, Alpha would absorb
EFG.

"The affirmations reflect our view that the merger's potential
benefits for the two banks' business and financial profiles are
unlikely to offset the key systemic risks that we believe
continue to weigh on their financial fundamentals, particularly
solvency and liquidity," S&P related.

"We believe that the integration of Alpha and EFG may have
significant benefits for the two banks' business profiles and may
enhance their franchises, particularly in the domestic market.
The combined bank will hold leading domestic market shares in all
business segments (domestic operations accounting for EUR83
billion in loans and EUR64 billion in retail funding) and the
largest network of branches (937) nationwide. The merged bank
would also rank among the three largest players in several
international markets, thus consolidating its presence in the
broad South Eastern Europe (SEE) region," S&P stated.

"The integration of the two banks entails, in our view, the
potential for significant synergies, and Alpha and EFG have also
announced the launch of a set of measures that, if completed,
would boost the merged bank's regulatory capital ratios," S&P
noted.

"In our view, however, these potential benefits would not
immunize the combined institution from the high systemic risks
that we believe continue to weigh on Greek banks' financial and
business profiles. Even if both Alpha and EFG have already
realized significant impairments on their Greek government bonds
(GGB), the merged bank would still be, in our view, directly and
significantly exposed to Greece's deteriorating creditworthiness
through its combined large portfolio of GGB. Moreover, as
domestic customers of Greek banks have demonstrated their
sensitivity to signs of deterioration in sovereign
creditworthiness, we believe the combined bank's funding profile
would likely remain, as we believe Alpha's and EFG's are, exposed
to the risk of potential additional, sizable retail deposit
outflows amid public debate about the proposed Greek debt
exchange program. Finally, the prolonged and sharp economic
recession in Greece increases the threat generally to the Greek
banks' profitability and asset quality," S&P related.

"The negative outlook on Alpha reflects the possibility that we
could downgrade it if we believe it will default on its
obligations as defined by our criteria," S&P stated.

"The negative outlook on EFG reflects the possibility that we
could downgrade it if we believe that it will default on its
obligations as defined by our criteria," S&P said.

"Taking into consideration what we see as a meaningful
possibility of default, there is an inherent negative CreditWatch
associated with our 'CCC' long-term ratings (see 'How Standard &
Poor's Uses Its 'CCC' Rating,' published Dec. 12, 2008)," S&P
stated.

"Consequently, we may lower the ratings on these banks if we
perceive that rising pressure on their retail funding bases is
likely to lead to deposit outflows that could exceed the banks'
available collateral eligible for the ECB discount facility, and
at the same time, liquidity from other extraordinary mechanisms
does not materialize. This could lead us to conclude that these
banks are likely to default as defined under our criteria," S&P
related.

"We may also downgrade these banks if we believe they are likely
to default, as defined by our criteria, due to any developments
associated with substantial impairment of their solvency. This
could stem from, among other factors, the materialization of any
losses that are higher than we currently anticipate on their
large holdings of GGB in the context of the potential government
debt restructuring, a sharp increase of credit losses arising
from lending portfolios, and/or significant earnings
deterioration. At this stage, the possible impact that a
potential haircut on GGB may have on banks' solvency remains
uncertain, pending the terms of the final restructuring
agreement," S&P related.

"The outlooks could be revised to stable if the risks we see to
the banks' financial profiles were to abate, and/or if these
banks were to benefit from extraordinary support mechanisms that
would likely, in our opinion, enable them to survive without
defaulting on any of their obligations. We note that the European
Council stated that adequate resources to recapitalize Greek
banks will be provided if needed; however, we will assess the
impact that such support may have on banks' creditworthiness when
we have clarity on how and under what circumstances the support
would materialize," S&P noted.


* GREECE: French Parliament Backs Second Rescue Plan
----------------------------------------------------
Deutsche Presse-Agentur reports that the lower house of France's
parliament on Wednesday voted in favor of the second Greek rescue
plan agreed by eurozone leaders on July 21.

According to DPA, the plan, which provides for greater use of a
boosted European Financial Stability Facility to prevent Greece
going bankrupt and halt the spread of the debt crisis, had been
expected to easily clear the National Assembly.

DPA relates that opposition Socialist parliamentarians abstained
from the vote, saying they considered the plan "insufficient."
The Socialists are pushing for the introduction of eurobonds
jointly guaranteed by all eurozone members, DPA says.

The vote passed on the same day as Germany's top court ruled
against a challenge to Germany's participation in bailout plans
from a group of eurosceptics, DPA relates.


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BALLANTYNE RE: Fitch Affirms Junk Ratings on Three Note Classes
---------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings takes the following actions for the Ballantyne Re
Plc tranches:

  -- Class A-1 notes affirmed at 'CCsf/RR5';
  -- Class B-1 notes affirmed at 'Csf/RR6';
  -- Class B-2 notes affirmed at 'Csf/RR6'.

Fitch's rating rationale is based on the significant mark-to-
market losses Ballantyne Re has experienced in its investment
portfolio of residential-mortgage-backed (RMBS) and asset-backed
securities (ABS). Ballantyne Re's liabilities exceed the current
book value of its assets by a significant margin.

Interest payments on class A-1 are current, and Fitch expects
interest on class A-1 to remain current for the foreseeable
future.  Absent a remarkable recovery in RMBS/ABS values,
however, Fitch believes it is probable that Ballantyne Re will
eventually be unable to pay interest or full principal on the
class A-1 notes.  Fitch believes default is inevitable on the
class B-1 and B-2 notes and does not expect holders of these
notes to receive any further interest or principal payments.

Fitch has placed the 'sf' designation to these esoteric notes to
signify to investors that, although it may not be a true
structured finance security, it contains several transaction
elements and risk mitigants to resemble a structured finance
transaction.

Key rating drivers for Ballantyne Re's ratings that could lead to
an upgrade or upward revision in recovery rating include:

-- Investment portfolio recovery whereby the value of its assets
    increases by at least $500 million.

-- Increase in the LIBOR to roughly 280 basis points (bps) from
    its current level of near 20 bps.

-- Significant profits emerge from the life insurance book.

Key rating drivers for Ballantyne Re's ratings that could lead to
a downgrade or downward revision in recovery rating include:

-- Investment portfolio decline whereby the value of its assets
   decreases by $400 million.

-- Life insurance losses exceed expectation.

Ballantyne Re is a special purpose public limited company
incorporated and registered in Ireland.  The company was
established for the limited purpose of entering into a
reinsurance agreement and conducting activities related to the
notes' issuance.  Ballantyne Re issued the notes to finance
excess reserve requirements under Regulation XXX for the block of
business ceded under the reinsurance agreement.


CURA PROPERTIES: High Court Confirms Appointment of Examiner
------------------------------------------------------------
RTE News reports that at the High Court, Mr. Justice Michael
Peart on Thursday said he was satisfied to appoint insolvency
practitioner Gary Lennon as examiner to Curra Properties Ltd.,
which runs Eddie Rockets at the Stillorgan Shopping Centre, in
Dublin.

The firm, with more than 20 employees, got into financial
problems because it is unable to service a historic debt of EUR1
million owed to HM Revenue & Customs, RTE recounts.  According to
RTE, that debt, the court heard, was caused by an ex-employee who
embezzled substantial funds from Curra.

The Judge heard Mr. Lennon was appointed interim examiner last
month after the High Court was informed Curra, with a registered
address at Stillorgan Shopping Centre, was insolvent and unable
to pay its debts, RTE discloses.

However, an independent accountant's report suggested the company
has a reasonable prospect of survival as a going concern if
certain steps are carried out, RTE notes.  Those steps include
obtaining court approval for a scheme of arrangement agreed
between the company and its creditors, and securing fresh
investment in the company, RTE says.

The Judge also made orders allowing Mr. Lennon to take control of
and run the business during the examinership, which lasts for a
period of up to 100 days, RTE states.

Ross Gorman, who represents Curra, said it was in the best
interests of all concerned that an examiner be appointed to the
firm, RTE relates.

According to RTE, the counsel said that Curra, which has operated
a restaurant since 1994 would cease trading if an examiner was
not appointed.  He added that there would be a deficit of
EUR2.1 million if the firm was wound up, whereas that deficit
would be much lower should the business survive as a going
concern, RTE notes.


EGRET FUNDING: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class E Notes to 'B1'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Egret Funding CLO I PLC:

   -- EUR288.75M Class A Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR28.2M Class B Senior Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Upgraded to A1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa2 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR24.6M Class C Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Upgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR23.1M Class D Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR10.85M Class E Deferrable Floating Rate Notes due 2022,
      Upgraded to B1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa3 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR7M Class P Combination Notes due 2022 (Currently
      EUR5.56M Outstanding Rated Balance), Upgraded to Baa2 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Class P,
the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the principal amount
of the Combination Note on the Issue Date increased by the Rated
Coupon of 0.25% per annum respectively, accrued on the Rated
Balance on the preceding payment date minus the aggregate of all
payments made from the Issue Date to such date, either through
interest or principal payments. The Rated Balance may not
necessarily correspond to the outstanding notional amount
reported by the trustee.

Ratings Rationale:

Egret Funding CLO I PLC, issued in November 2006, is a single
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield European loans. The portfolio is managed by
Egret Capital, LLP. This transaction will be in reinvestment
period until 20 December 2012. It is predominantly composed of
senior secured loans (84.25%) but with exposure to mezzanine
loans (1.11%) and second lien loans (14.64%).

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modelling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modelling framework. Additional changes to
the modelling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modelling
of collateral amortization profile, (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 404.01
million, a weighted average default probability of 21.60%
(consistent with a WARF of 2996), a weighted average recovery
rate upon default of 44.16% for a Aaa liability target rating, a
diversity score of 36 and a weighted average spread of 2.94%. The
default probability is derived from the credit quality of the
collateral pool and Moody's expectation of the remaining life of
the collateral pool. The average recovery rate to be realized on
future defaults is based primarily on the seniority of the assets
in the collateral pool. For a Aaa liability target rating,
Moody's assumed that 85.4% of the portfolio exposed to senior
secured corporate assets would recover 50% upon default, while
the remainder non first-lien loan corporate assets would recover
10%. In each case, historical and market performance trends and
collateral manager latitude for trading the collateral are also
relevant factors. These default and recovery properties of the
collateral pool are incorporated in cash flow model analysis
where they are subject to stresses as a function of the target
rating of each CLO liability being reviewed. Because
approximately 14.5% of non first lien loans assets in the
portfolio are second-lien loans, Moody's also considered a
scenario with a slightly higher weighted average recovery rate
upon default of 46.20% for a Aaa liability rating. This is
assuming that the second-lien loans would recover 25% upon
default instead of 10%.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by (1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy especially as 16% of the
portfolio is exposed to obligors located in Ireland and Spain and
(2) the large concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing
between 2012 and 2015 which may create challenges for issuers to
refinance. CLO notes' performance may also be impacted by (1) the
manager's investment strategy and behaviour and (2) divergence in
legal interpretation of CDO documentation by different
transactional parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 70% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

2) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
be
   extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings. Moody's tested for a
   possible extension of the actual weighted average life in its
   analysis.

3) Other collateral quality metrics: The deal is allowed to
   reinvest and the manager has the ability to deteriorate the
   collateral quality metrics' existing cushions against the
   covenant levels. Moody's analyzed the impact of assuming lower
   of reported and covenanted values for weighted average rating
   factor, weighted average spread and diversity score. However,
   as part of the base case, Moody's considered spread levels
   higher than the covenant levels due to the large difference
   between the reported and covenant levels.

The principal methodology used in the rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modelled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modelled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


EUROPEAN ENHANCED: Moody's Lifts Ratings on Three Notes to 'Ba2'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by European Enhanced Loan Fund S.A.:

   -- EUR10.5M Class A-3B Secured Floating Rate Notes, due 2022,
      Upgraded to Aaa (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Aa1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR27M Class B-1 Secured Floating Rate Notes, due 2022,
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR5M Class B-2 Secured Fixed Rate Notes, due 2022,
      Upgraded to Aa3 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 A1 (sf)
      Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR25M Class C Deferrable Secured Floating Rate Notes, due
      2022, Upgraded to Baa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba1
      (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR12.98M Class D-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
      Rate Notes, due 2022, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR3.25M Class D-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
      Rate Notes, due 2022, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR1.15M Class D-3 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
      Rate Notes, due 2022, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR1.62M Class D-4 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
      Rate Notes, due 2022, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR13.5M Class E-1 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
      Rate Notes, due 2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR0.9M Class E-2 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
      Rate Notes, due 2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR0.6M Class E-3 Deferrable Mezzanine Secured Floating
      Rate Notes, due 2022, Upgraded to Ba2 (sf); previously on
      Jun 22, 2011 B3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Upgrade

   -- EUR5M (current rated outstanding balance EUR3.0M) Class M
      Combination Notes, due 2022, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- EUR3M (current rated outstanding balance EUR1.6M) Class O
      Combination Notes, due 2022, Upgraded to Baa3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 B1 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

The ratings of the Combination Notes address the repayment of the
Rated Balance on or before the legal final maturity. For Classes
M and O, the 'Rated Balance' is equal at any time to the
principal amount of the Combination Note on the Issue Date minus
the aggregate of all payments made from the Issue Date to such
date, either through interest or principal payments. The Rated
Balance may not necessarily correspond to the outstanding
notional amount reported by the trustee.

Ratings Rationale

European Enhanced Loan Fund S.A., issued in May 2006, is a multi-
currency Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a
portfolio of mostly high yield European and US loans. The
portfolio is managed by PIMCO Europe Ltd. This transaction will
be in reinvestment period until 18 May 2012. It is predominantly
composed of senior secured loans.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include (1) standardizing the modeling of
collateral amortization profile, and (2) changing certain credit
estimate stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates, and (3) adjustments to the equity
cash-flows haircuts applicable to combination notes.

The overcollateralization ratios of the rated notes have remained
relatively stable since the rating action in January 2010. The
Class A/B, Class C, Class D and Class E overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 124.8%, 114.8%, 108.8% and 105.7% in
August 2011, respectively, versus December 2009 levels of 127.1%,
117.0%, 110.4% and 106.5%, respectively. Class D and E
overcollateralization tests are currently failing by 0.5% each,
in absolute terms.

Reported WARF has increased from 2,517 to 2,751 between December
2009 and August 2011. However, this reported WARF overstates the
actual deterioration in credit quality because of the technical
transition related to rating factors of European corporate credit
estimates, as announced in the press release published by Moody's
on 1 September 2010. Additionally, defaulted securities are zero
compared to EUR 4.9 million in December 2009.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of EUR 361.1
million, defaulted par of close to zero, a weighted average
default probability of 22.3% (consistent with a WARF of 2,958), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 46.2% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 37 and a weighted
average spread of 3.15%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 90.5% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

The deal is allowed to reinvest and the manager has the ability
to deteriorate the collateral quality metrics' existing cushions
against the covenant levels. The deal also holds a substantial
balance of reinvestable principal proceeds (EUR 60.6 million
reported in August 2011). Moody's expects that the majority of
this cash will be reinvested. Moody's analyzed the impact of
assuming weighted average spread consistent with the midpoint
between reported and covenanted values.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by 1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy 2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by 1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and 2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Moody's also notes that around 50% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates.

2) The deal has significant exposure to non-EUR denominated
   assets and cash (GBP 68.1 million reported in August 2011)
   while all of the notes are denominated in EUR. To mitigate
   the impact of volatilities in the foreign exchange rate on
   interest and principal proceeds available to the transaction,
   the transaction has entered into an FX macro swap with a
   balance of GBP 78.3 million.

3) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
   be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.

The principal methodology used in this rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


RIVER MEDIA: Exits Receivership; More Than 80 Jobs Saved
--------------------------------------------------------
Peter Flanagan at Irish Independent reports that more than 80
jobs have been saved after River Media Group secured a deal with
its creditors to come out of receivership.

The company, which controls six regional titles, went into
receivership on Friday, putting 81 jobs at risk, Irish
Independent discloses.

Irish Independent relates that after a weekend of negotiations,
First Trust bank has accepted a restructuring of the company and
River Media Newspapers Ltd. (RMN) has now acquired all six titles
from the RSM Farrell Grant Sparks joint receiver managers and
PwC.

Under terms of the deal, all employees have been transferred to
the RMN and their terms and conditions remain unchanged, Irish
Independent notes.

The company had been struggling for a number of years under a
debt burden that was built up when the group was expanding during
the boom, Irish Independent recounts.

In 2009, the company made a loss of just under EUR1.7 million
after a EUR3.3 million loss in 2008, according to Irish
Independent.

River Media Group's include 'Derry News' and 'Donegal Post'.


SM MORRIS: KBC Bank Appoints Kieran Wallace as Receiver
-------------------------------------------------------
Mary Fogart at Wicklowpeople.ie reports that KBC Bank on
Wednesday appointed Kieran Wallace of KPMG as receiver to SM
Morris Ltd. after the company failed to put together a voluntary
arrangement for its creditors.

According to Wicklowpeople.ie, the company is to continue to
trade in receivership.

On the same day the receiver was appointed, SM Morris had been
due to hold a meeting with its creditors to discuss debts in
excess of EUR15 million in the Arklow Bay Hotel but this was
cancelled at the last minute, Wicklowpeople.ie notes.

Figures circulated to creditors prior to the cancelled meeting
outlined total debts in excess of EUR20 million, Wicklowpeople.ie
discloses.  While preferential creditors, which include
employees, revenue commissioners and rates, will be treated as
priorities for payment, the future is far less secure for those
in the unsecured creditor category, Wicklowpeople.ie states.

These include self-employed contractors from around Co. Wicklow
who, between them, are owed EUR15.7 million, Wicklowpeople.ie
says.

SM Morris Ltd. is an engineering company based in Kilpedder.  The
company also has operations in Kilbride and Roundwood.


TBS INTERNATIONAL: Reaches Deal With Banks on Payment Deferral
--------------------------------------------------------------
TBS International plc disclosed that, with the agreement of the
requisite lenders under its various financing facilities, it is
not making certain principal payments due on its financing
facilities for the period from September 30, 2011, through
December 15, 2011.  The Company's lender groups will forbear
during this period from exercising their rights and remedies
which arise from the Company's failure to make principal payments
when due and any failure to comply with certain of its financial
covenants.  During this forbearance period, the Company and its
various lender groups will negotiate amendments to restructure
the Company's various financing facilities and cure any existing
defaults.  The Company intends to pay only the stated interest on
its financing facilities during the forbearance period and will
accrue any applicable default interest.

Joseph E. Royce, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President,
commented: "The continued weakness in the Baltic Dry Index, or
BDI, the industry indicator for spot dry bulk freight rates,
during the past 12 months has caused the Company and our lenders
to consider the desirability of restructuring our various
financing facilities.  This forbearance agreement provides us
with the time we need to restructure our various agreements."

Ferdinand V. Lepere, Senior Executive Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer, commented: "TBS remains in solid financial
condition, but has concluded that it is prudent to conserve cash
by extending the amortization periods for our various financing
facilities.  During this negotiation period, we will continue to
operate our business as usual, to pay all of our vendors and to
pay the stated interest on our debt.  We are confident that with
the restructuring that we are discussing with our lenders we will
continue to pay all of our lenders, vendors and other creditors
in full."

                   About TBS International plc

Dublin, Ireland-based TBS International plc (NASDAQ: TBSI)
-- http://www.tbsship.com/-- provides worldwide shipping
solutions to a diverse client base of industrial shippers through
its Five Star Service: ocean transportation, projects,
operations, port services and strategic planning.  The TBS
shipping network operates liner, parcel and dry bulk services,
supported by a fleet of multipurpose tweendeckers and
handysize/handymax bulk carriers, including specialized heavy-
lift vessels and newbuild tonnage.  TBS has developed its
franchise around key trade routes between Latin America and
China, Japan and South Korea, as well as select ports in North
America, Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East.

The Company's balance sheet at March 31, 2011, showed
US$681.39 million in total assets, US$406.22 million in total
liabilities, and US$275.17 million in total shareholders' equity.

The Company reported a net loss of US$247.76 million on
US$411.83 million of total revenue for the year ended Dec. 31,
2010, compared with a net loss of US$67.04 million on
US$302.51 million of total revenue during the prior year.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP expressed substantial doubt about the
Company's ability to continue as a going concern.  PwC believes
that the Company will not be in compliance with the financial
covenants under its credit facilities during 2011, which under
the agreements would make the debt callable.  According to PwC,
this has created uncertainty regarding the Company's ability to
fulfill its financial commitments as they become due.

As reported in the TCR on Feb. 8, 2011, TBS International on
Jan. 31, 2011, announced that it had entered into amendments to
its credit facilities with all of its lenders, including AIG
Commercial Equipment, Commerzbank AG, Berenberg Bank and Credit
Suisse and syndicates led by Bank of America, N.A., The Royal
Bank of Scotland plc and DVB Group Merchant Bank (the "Credit
Facilities").  The amendments restructure the Company's debt
obligations by revising the principal repayment schedules under
the Credit Facilities, waiving any existing defaults, revising
the financial covenants, including covenants related to the
Company's consolidated leverage ratio, consolidated interest
coverage ratio and minimum cash balance, and modifying other
terms of the Credit Facilities.

The Company currently expects to be in compliance with all
financial covenants and other terms of the amended Credit
Facilities through maturity.

As a condition to the restructuring of the Company's credit
facilities, three significant shareholders who also are key
members of TBS' management agreed on Jan. 25, 2011, to provide up
to US$10 million of new equity in the form of Series B Preference
Shares and deposited funds in an escrow account to facilitate
satisfaction of this obligation.  In partial satisfaction of this
obligation, on Jan. 28, 2011, these significant shareholders
purchased an aggregate of 30,000 of the Company's Series B
Preference Shares at US$100 per share directly from TBS in a
private placement.


=========
I T A L Y
=========


BORMIOLI ROCCO: S&P Assigns 'BB-' Long-Term Corp. Credit Rating
---------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'BB-' long-term
corporate credit rating to Italy-based glass packaging
manufacturer Bormioli Rocco Holdings. The outlook is stable.

"In addition, we assigned our issue rating of 'BB-' to the senior
secured notes that were issued by Bormioli, in line with the
corporate credit rating. We also assigned a recovery rating of
'3' to these notes, reflecting our expectation of meaningful
(50%-70%) recovery for noteholders in the event of payment
default. The proceeds of the notes were used to finance the
acquisition and to refinance existing outstanding debt of
Bormioli Rocco & Figlio SpA," S&P stated.

"The rating on Bormioli reflects our view of the group's fair
business risk profile and significant financial risk profile,"
S&P related.

The fair business risk profile reflects Bormioli's relatively
small size and sensitivity to volatile input costs with
relatively high capital intensity. Bormioli also lacks
significant geographical diversification, with Italy and France
representing close to 60% of sales.

Bormioli's margins are weaker than its peers'. The group has high
margins in the stable pharmaceutical, food, and beverages
segments, but these are offset by much weaker operating margins
in the tableware and cosmetics segments.

These factors are partially mitigated by Bormioli's leading niche
market position in mature and consolidated Italian and French
markets, long-standing stable relationships with customers, and
end markets that account for about 70% of total EBITDA and are
typically less sensitive to changing economic conditions.

Bormioli's revenues and EBITDA increased by 8.9% and 32%,
respectively, in 2010, owing to fairly flat like-for-like sales
volumes, selling-price increases, and a favorable product mix. In
our opinion, Bormioli's fairly stable sales volumes demonstrate
the sector's resilience in a weakened Italian economy and in view
of reduced consumer spending.

"Following the acquisition of Bormioli Rocco & Figlio SpA, we
believe adjusted debt in 2011 will increase to about EUR300
million from EUR170 million in 2010," S&P said.

"We understand that the funding structure does not incorporate
any shareholder loans and is funded with pure equity and the new
bonds. The credit measures should remain within our rating
guidelines for a significant financial risk profile. We estimate
in our base-case scenario that adjusted debt to EBITDA will be
below 4.0x in 2011 and adjusted funds from operations (FFO) will
be above 20%. In the medium term, we anticipate a steady, but
limited, improvement in credit measures. This view is based on
our assumption of low single-digit growth in revenues, resulting
in normal utilization of plants (including the additional
capacity); fairly stable operating margins; the company's
disciplined future capital-spending policy; and the absence of
discretionary spending or material debt-funded acquisitions," S&P
related.

"The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the operating
environment will remain unchanged over the next year while demand
for Bormioli's products will remain predictable. Furthermore, in
our view, the company's solid operating performance, fairly
predictable earnings growth, and sustained ability to largely
pass on input price increases should enable it to maintain a
financial profile consistent with the ratings," S&P said.

"We believe Bormioli will likely maintain adjusted FFO to debt of
above 20% and adjusted debt to EBITDA lower than 4.0x, which we
consider commensurate with the 'BB-' rating," S&P added.

"The ratings could come under pressure if Bormioli's shareholders
revise their financial policy to a more aggressive one, resulting
in weaker credit measures than we consider commensurate with the
rating or less than adequate liquidity," S&P said.

Upside rating potential is limited at present, in view of the
company's lack of diversity and weaker profit margins than its
peers.


===================
K A Z A K H S T A N
===================


BTA BANK: Kazakhstan Blacklists Two Banks Linked to Default
-----------------------------------------------------------
Isabel Gorst at The Financial Times reports that Kazakhstan has
blacklisted Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs after the
controversial restructuring of BTA Bank, which was once the
central Asian country's biggest bank.

According to the FT, Grigori Marchenko, the chairman of
Kazakhstan's National Bank, said Morgan Stanley, which called in
a loan to BTA in 2009 triggering a default at the bank, was
unwelcome in Kazakhstan.

The National Bank's rejection of Goldman Sachs was also partly
linked with the BTA restructuring, the FT notes.

Kazakhstan's refusal to do business with Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs will exclude the banks from bidding for advisory
contracts as the government plans initial public offerings of
strategic state companies, the FT discloses.  The decision also
underlines lingering tensions between Kazakhstan and foreign
banks that took big haircuts when BTA restructured US$16.7
billion of debt last year, the FT states.

Morgan Stanley, together with another unnamed international bank,
then cited change of ownership contracts to call in a
US$550 million loan that triggered a default at BTA, forcing the
bank to restructure its debts, the FT recounts.  Morgan Stanley's
move was understood to have been partly motivated by the desire
to activate credit default swap contracts it had written to
protect against a possible BTA default, the FT states.

The government hired Goldman Sachs in 2009 to advise on the BTA
restructuring, but later dismissed the U.S. bank without
explanation, the FT discloses.

Mr. Marchenko, who is renowned for being outspoken, publicly
reprimanded Goldman Sachs at an investment conference this year,
saying the bank had been ineffective as an adviser on the BTA
restructuring, the FT recounts.

                          About BTA Bank

BTA Bank AO (BTA Bank JSC), formerly Bank TuranAlem AO --
http://bta.kz/-- is a Kazakhstan-based financial institution,
which is involved in the provision of banking and financial
products for private and corporate clients.

The BTA Group is one of the leading banking groups in the
Commonwealth of Independent States and has affiliated banks in
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and
Turkey.
In addition, the Bank maintains representative offices in Russia,
Ukraine, China, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom.
The Bank has no branch or agency in the United States, and its
primary assets in the United States consist of balances in
accounts with correspondent banks in New York City.

As of November 30, 2009, the Bank employed 5,043 people inside
and 4 people outside Kazakhstan.  It has no employees in the
United States.  Most of the Bank's assets, and nearly all its
tangible assets, are located in Kazakhstan.


=====================
N E T H E R L A N D S
=====================


PROSPERO CLO: Moody's Upgrades Rating on Class D Notes to 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has upgraded the ratings of these notes
issued by Prospero CLO I B.V.:

   -- US$15,300,000 Class A-2 Senior Secured Floating Rate Notes
      Due 2017, Upgraded to Aa1 (sf); previously on Jun 22, 2011
      Aa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible Upgrade

   -- US$15,300,000 Class B Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
      Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to A1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Baa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

   -- US$15,300,000 Class C Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
      Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to Ba1 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Ba3 (sf) Placed Under Review for
      Possible Upgrade

   -- US$7,700,000 Class D Senior Secured Deferrable Interest
      Floating Rate Notes Due 2017, Upgraded to B3 (sf);
      previously on Jun 22, 2011 Caa1 (sf) Placed Under Review
      for Possible Upgrade

Ratings Rationale

Prospero CLO I B.V., issued in April 2005, is a multi- currency
Collateralised Loan Obligation ("CLO") backed by a portfolio of
mostly high yield US and European loans. The portfolio is managed
by Alcentra. It is predominantly composed of senior secured
loans. The transaction has ended its reinvestment period.

According to Moody's, the rating actions taken on the notes are
primarily a result of applying Moody's revised CLO assumptions
described in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011. The actions also reflect
consideration of an increase in the transaction's
overcollateralization ratios and deleveraging of the senior notes
since the rating action in April 2011.

The actions reflect key changes to the modeling assumptions,
which incorporate (1) a removal of the temporary 30% default
probability macro stress implemented in February 2009, (2)
increased BET liability stress factors as well as (3) change to a
fixed recovery rate modeling framework. Additional changes to the
modeling assumptions include changing certain credit estimate
stresses aimed at addressing the lack of forward looking
indicators as well as time lags in receiving information required
for credit estimate updates

Moody's notes that the Class A-1 notes have been paid down by
approximately 28% or US$49 million since the rating action in
April 2011. As a result of the deleveraging, the
overcollateralization ratios have increased since the rating
action in April 2011. As of the latest trustee report dated
August 8, 2011, Class A, B, C and Class D overcollateralization
ratios are reported at 135.27%, 122.08%, 111.23% and 106.47%,
respectively, versus March 2011 levels of 127.03%, 117.59%,
109.45% and 105.77%, respectively, and all related
overcollateralization tests are currently in compliance. WARF has
been stable since the last rating action in April 2011.

Additionally, Moody's notes that the underlying portfolio
includes a number of investments in securities that mature after
the maturity date of the notes. Based on the August 2011 trustee
report, reference securities that mature after the maturity date
of the notes currently make up approximately 9.1% of the
underlying reference portfolio. Based on the same report,
structured finance obligations make up approximately 6.6% of the
underlying reference portfolio.

Due to the impact of revised and updated key assumptions
referenced in "Moody's Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan
Obligations" published in June 2011, key model inputs used by
Moody's in its analysis, such as the portfolio par amount, WARF,
diversity score, and weighted average recovery rate, may be
different from the trustee's reported numbers. In its base case,
Moody's analyzed the underlying collateral pool to have a
performing par and principal proceeds balance of US$188.4
million, defaulted par of US$9 million, a weighted average
default probability of 17.31% (consistent with a WARF of 2683), a
weighted average recovery rate upon default of 49.24% for a Aaa
liability target rating, a diversity score of 41 and a weighted
average spread of 2.85%. The default probability is derived from
the credit quality of the collateral pool and Moody's expectation
of the remaining life of the collateral pool. The average
recovery rate to be realized on future defaults is based
primarily on the seniority of the assets in the collateral pool.
For a Aaa liability target rating, Moody's assumed that 92% of
the portfolio exposed to senior secured corporate assets would
recover 50% upon default, while the remainder non first-lien loan
corporate assets would recover 10%. In each case, historical and
market performance trends and collateral manager latitude for
trading the collateral are also relevant factors. These default
and recovery properties of the collateral pool are incorporated
in cash flow model analysis where they are subject to stresses as
a function of the target rating of each CLO liability being
reviewed.

Moody's notes that this transaction is subject to a high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty, as evidenced by (1) uncertainties of
credit conditions in the general economy, (2) the large
concentration of speculative-grade debt maturing between 2012 and
2015 which may create challenges for issuers to refinance. CLO
notes' performance may also be impacted by (1) the manager's
investment strategy and behavior and (2) divergence in legal
interpretation of CDO documentation by different transactional
parties due to embedded ambiguities.

Sources of additional performance uncertainties are:

1) Deleveraging: The main source of uncertainty in this
   transaction is whether delevering from unscheduled principal
   proceeds will continue and at what pace. Deleveraging may
   accelerate due to high prepayment levels in the loan market
   and/or collateral sales by the manager, which may have
   significant impact on the notes' ratings.

2) Moody's also notes that around 33% of the collateral pool
   consists of debt obligations whose credit quality has been
   assessed through Moody's credit estimates. Large single
   exposures to obligors bearing a credit estimate have been
   subject to a stress applicable to concentrated pools as per
   the report titled "Updated Approach to the Usage of Credit
   Estimates in Rated Transactions" published in October 2009.

3) Recovery of defaulted assets: Market value fluctuations in
   defaulted assets reported by the trustee and those assumed to
   be defaulted by Moody's may create volatility in the deal's
   overcollateralization levels. Further, the timing of
   recoveries and the manager's decision to work out versus sell
   defaulted assets create additional uncertainties. Moody's
   analyzed defaulted recoveries assuming the lower of the market
   price and the recovery rate in order to account for potential
    volatility in market prices.

4) Long-dated assets: The presence of assets that mature beyond
   the CLO's legal maturity date exposes the deal to liquidation
   risk on those assets. Moody's assumes that at transaction
   maturity such an asset has a liquidation value dependent on
   the nature of the asset as well as the extent to which the
   asset's maturity lags that of the liabilities. Moody's assumes
   liquidation value of 83% in the base case analysis.

5) Weighted average life: The notes' ratings are sensitive to the
   weighted average life assumption of the portfolio, which may
   be extended due to the manager's decision to reinvest into new
   issue loans or other loans with longer maturities and/or
   participate in amend-to-extend offerings.

6) Foreign currency exposure: The deal has significant exposure
   to non-US$ denominated assets. Volatilities in foreign
   exchange rate will have a direct impact on interest and
   principal proceeds available to the transaction, which may
   affect the expected loss of rated tranches.

The principal methodology used in the rating was "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" published in
June 2011.

Moody's modeled the transaction using the Binomial Expansion
Technique, as described in Section 2.3.2.1 of the "Moody's
Approach to Rating Collateralized Loan Obligations" rating
methodology published in June 2011.

The cash flow model used for this transaction, whose description
can be found in the methodology listed above, is Moody's EMEA
Cash-Flow model.

In addition to the quantitative factors that are explicitly
modeled, qualitative factors are part of the rating committee
considerations. These qualitative factors include the structural
protections in each transaction, the recent deal performance in
the current market environment, the legal environment, specific
documentation features, the collateral manager's track record,
and the potential for selection bias in the portfolio. All
information available to rating committees, including
macroeconomic forecasts, input from other Moody's analytical
groups, market factors, and judgments regarding the nature and
severity of credit stress on the transactions, may influence the
final rating decision.


===============
P O R T U G A L
===============


POLO SECURITIES: Moody's Lowers Ratings on Instruments to 'B3'
--------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded by one notch to B3 from
B2, with a loss given default (LGD) assessment of 4 (62.6%), the
following instruments of Polo Securities II Ltd. ("Polo II") and
Polo III -- CP Finance Ltd. ("Polo III"):(i) an outstanding
amount of EUR187.5 million worth of senior secured notes due in
June 2014 issued by Polo II; and (ii) EUR100 million worth of
senior secured notes due in June 2013 and EUR300 million worth of
senior secured notes due in 2015 issued by Polo III. The outlook
on the ratings assigned to the notes issued by Polo II and Polo
III is negative.

This action follows a similar action on the ratings of Comboios
de Portugal EPE, which Moody's downgraded to B2 from B1.

All the notes are insured by the US monoline insurer MBIA
Insurance via its subsidiary MBIA UK limited. ("MBIA"), which has
an insurance financial strength rating of B3 with a negative
outlook.

Ratings Rationale

"The rating action reflects that the credit profile of the
issuers and CP are correlated because the proceeds of the notes
were on-lent by the issuers to CP, pursuant to three different
loan agreements," says Marco Vetulli, a Moody's Vice President --
Senior Credit Officer and lead analyst for Polo II and Polo III.
"Therefore, the obligations of the issuers are secured by an
assignment of rights under those loan agreements to the trustee,
which represents the interests of all the stakeholders of the
transactions (such as noteholders, coupon holders and the
financial guarantor)," explains Mr. Vetulli.

"The rating on the notes is one notch lower than CP's rating in
light of the substantial amount of secured debt that will rank
ahead the notes, given that approximately 30% of CP's debt is
secured," adds Mr. Vetulli.

The outlook on the ratings is in line with CP's negative rating
outlook, which reflects the negative outlook on the debt of the
government of Republic of Portugal (RoP) as well as the
implementation risk of the restructuring plan that it recently
announced.

"However, the notes are insured by MBIA and our current practice
for wrapped ratings is to assign the higher of (i) the
guarantor's financial strength rating or (ii) any published
underlying rating," explains Mr. Vetulli. "Therefore, should we
upgrade the insurer's financial strength rating to a level higher
from the current B3 or should we downgrade CP's rating to Caa1
from the current B3, we would also reinstate the Issuers' insured
ratings," concludes Mr. Vetulli.

Moody's does not consider an upgrade of the issuers' rating to be
likely in the near term. However, an upgrade of the rating of the
government of RoP could result in an upgrade of CP and hence of
the rating of the notes.

Prinicpal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in rating Polo III - CP Finance
Limited and Polo Securities II Limited was the Global Passenger
Railway Companies Industry Methodology published in December
2008. Other methodologies used include Loss Given Default for
Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and
EMEA published in June 2009 and the Government-Related Issuers
methodology published in July 2010.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in Assignment of
Wrapped Ratings When Financial Guarantor Falls Below Investment
Grade published in May 2008 and Moody's modifies approach to
rating structured finance securities wrapped by financial
guarantors published in November 2008.

Polo Securities II Limited and Polo III -- CP Finance Limited,
incorporated in Jersey, are two finance conduits that raise
finance and on-lend the proceeds to CP, pursuant to loan
agreements. Headquartered in Lisbon, Portugal, CP is 100% owned
by the Portuguese government through the Ministry of Finance and
is the national railway incumbent. In fiscal year 2010, CP
reported revenues of EUR239 million.


* PORTUGAL: Moody's Downgrades Ratings of Two GRIs to 'B2'
----------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of two
Portuguese government-related issuers (GRIs) by one notch to B2
from B1, and has affirmed the B1 ratings of two other such
entities. The outlook on all ratings is negative.

The rating downgrades affected these entities:

  -- Comboios de Portugal EPE ("CP"), whose corporate family
     rating (CFR) and probability of default rating (PDR) were
     downgraded to B2 from B1.

  -- Rede Ferroviaria Nacional EPE, whose CFR, PDR as well
     as senior unsecured bonds were also downgraded to B2 from
     B1.

Concurrently, Moody's has affirmed the B1 (CFR, PDR and senior
unsecured) ratings of Parpublica-Participacoes Publicas (SGPS),
SA and Radio e Televisao de Portugal S.A.

All of the above companies are GRIs, which have a very strong
element of government support incorporated into their ratings in
accordance with Moody's rating methodology for such entities.

Ratings Rationale

- DOWNGRADES OF REFER AND CP

Moody's decision to downgrade REFER and CP is in response to the
announcement by the Government of the Republic of Portugal (RoP,
Ba2, negative outlook) that it intends to implement a broad
restructuring of the state-owned enterprise sector in Portugal
("SOEs"s). While this plan is likely to have positive long-term
effects for all the SOEs in general and for the GRIs rated by
Moody's in particular, there are increased risks associated with
its implementation in the short to medium term.

In particular, while these plans are being implemented for each
one, debt creditors will need to be persuaded to continue funding
individual SOE's -- which have a significant and still expanding
debt burden for some -- as well as the SOE sector as a whole.

REFER and CP have to date been able to roll over their short-term
debt maturities and have benefited from support from the
government, which Moody's expects to continue. However, these
entities have some of the largest debt maturities that will
become due over the next 12 months, thus rendering them more
vulnerable to any negative developments. (By comparison, the
short-term refinancing positions of Parpublica and RTP appear
relatively less stretched, given their more balanced liquidity
profile.) Moody's has lowered REFER and CP's baseline credit
assessment (BCA), which measures their standalone credit quality,
to 20 (Ca equivalent) from 19 (Caa3 equivalent). This largely
reflects the two companies' very weak financial and liquidity
profiles on a standalone basis.

Nevertheless, the downgrade of REFER and CP's ratings was limited
to one notch because Moody's expects banks to extend REFER and
CP's debt maturities, which are likely to be supplemented where
necessary with tangible financial support from the government.

In accordance with Moody's rating methodology for GRIs, the B2
ratings of REFER and CP reflect the following combination of
inputs: (i) a BCA of 20 (Ca equivalent); (ii) the Ba2 local
currency rating of the government of RoP; (iii) very high
dependence; and (iv) high support. The BCA reflects the fact
that, on a standalone basis, the financial profiles of REFER and
CP are very unstable, and that absent the explicit and implicit
support from the government they would likely default on their
debt obligations.

The outlook on the ratings of both CP and REFER remains negative,
reflecting the negative outlook on the debt of the Portuguese
government as well as the implementation risk affecting the
announced restructuring plan. A change in the sovereign rating of
Portugal in either direction would likely result in a change in
these two entities' ratings. Furthermore, any evidence that the
government of RoP would not provide financial support to one or
more of the Portuguese GRIs in a stress situation would result in
Moody's downgrading the rating of the affected company.

- AFFIRMATION OF PARPUBLICA AND RTP

The rating affirmations for both RTP and Parpublica reflect
Moody's assessment that these entities have a less fragile
liquidity risk profile. Moody's support assumptions have not been
altered by the recent government announcement.

Parpublica's B1 rating reflects its position as the industrial
holding arm of the government's strategic companies and therefore
serves the government's political objectives. The B1 rating is
two notches below the sovereign bond rating of Ba2, reflecting
Moody's view that the company's ownership structure (100% state-
owned), together with the significant financial, strategic and
management control exerted by the government, justifies the
determination of the rating through credit substitution as
opposed to a more granular analysis. The rating also reflects
Parpublica's lack of reliance on direct government funding, as
well as the value of its equity holdings versus its debt. Moody's
expects some of the equity holdings to be sold as part of the
government's need to raise cash and to be replaced with other
government-owned assets.

RTP's B1 rating reflects the following combination of inputs: (i)
a BCA of 17 (Caa1 equivalent); (ii) the Ba2 local currency rating
of RoP; (iii) very high dependence; and (iv) high support. RTP's
BCA of 17 reflects both lower liquidity stress following the
recent renegotiation of some of the terms of its senior unsecured
bank facility, including the waiver of a covenant linked to the
rating of the RoP. Nevertheless, Moody's notes that RTP's
financial profile remains weak and its interest coverage metrics
will weaken somewhat as a result of the increased interest
expense resulting from the renegotiation of the terms of the
loan. Moody's will continue to monitor additional expressions of
support from the government in the form of explicit guarantees
for part of RTP's debt. Moody's will also monitor any potential
privatisation of the company, which, if implemented, would likely
lead to RTP losing its GRI status and the removal of its rating
uplift based on current government support.

In line with the negative outlook, Moody's does not expect
positive pressure to be exerted on the ratings in the short term
for both entities. However, Moody's would consider upgrading
RTP's senior unsecured bank facility rating to the sovereign
rating level if the government were to provide an explicit
guarantee for this facility. A change in the sovereign rating of
Portugal would likely result in a change in these two entities'
ratings.

Also, any evidence that the provision of financial support from
the Portuguese government would not be forthcoming in a stress
situation could result in a downgrade. In addition, negative
pressure could develop in the event of a weakening of the
liquidity profiles of RTP and Parpublica. Moreover, further
downward pressure on RTP's ratings, such that they approach that
of its standalone credit quality, could result from (i) a partial
sale of the government's shareholding in RTP; or (ii) any
indication of a change in RoP's willingness/capacity to intervene
in a timely manner to support the company in the event of need.

Principal Methodologies

The principal methodology used in rating Comboios de Portugal was
the Global Passenger Railway Companies Industry Methodology
published in December 2008. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009 and the
Government-Related Issuers methodology published in July 2010.

The principal methodology used in rating Parpublica-Participacoes
Publicas (SGPS), SA, was Government-Related Issuers: Methodology
Update published in July 2010.

The principal methodology used in rating Rede Ferroviaria
Nacional REFER, E.P.E. was the Government Owned Rail Network
Operators Industry Methodology published in April 2009. Other
methodologies used include the Government-Related Issuers
methodology published in July 2010.

The principal methodology used in rating Radio e Televisao de
Portugal S.A. was the Global Broadcast Industry Methodology
published in June 2008. Other methodologies used include Loss
Given Default for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in
the U.S., Canada and EMEA published in June 2009 and the
Government-Related Issuers methodology published in July 2010.

CP is the main railway operator in Portugal, controlling 90% of
the passenger market. The company is 100% owned by the Portuguese
government though the Ministry of Finance and in FY 2010 reported
revenues of EUR239 million.

Parpublica is a state-owned industrial holding company domiciled
in Lisbon, Portugal. Parpublica's main role is the management of
equity stakes held by the Portuguese state in Portuguese
companies of public or strategic interest in terms of the
restructuring of the corresponding sector. The Minister of
Finance acts on behalf of the state, in its capacity as sole
shareholder of Parpublica. As of June 2011, Parpublica's direct
equity holdings portfolio had a book value of approximately
EUR6.7 billion. The company's largest holdings are in Energias de
Portugal, S.A. (EDP), GALP Energia, Redes Energeticas Nacionais
(REN), TAP airline and ANA.

REFER is a special status corporation set up by Portuguese Decree
Law to upgrade, operate and maintain substantially all of
Portugal's heavy rail infrastructure. REFER is 100% owned by the
RoP and has a special legal status (Entidade Publica Empresarial,
or "EPE") that defines its role as a company undertaking
activities of public interest.

RTP is a corporation, duly incorporated under domestic law, and
therefore subject to standard Portuguese commercial law. RTP is
100% owned by the Portuguese state through the General
Directorate of Treasury and Finance, and has operated Portugal's
public service broadcasting channels under a concession from the
government since 1996.


===========
S W E D E N
===========


SAAB AUTOMOBILE: Sweden Debt Office Not Opposed to Reconstruction
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Janina Pfalzer at Bloomberg News reports that Saab Automobile AB
head Bo Lundgren on Wednesday said Sweden's Debt Office doesn't
oppose a reconstruction of the company.

As reported yesterday by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe,
Saab applied for protection from creditors in a bid to raise
money to restart operations.  Saab said in a statement that the
filing was made at the Vaenersborg District Court to shield Saab
from a potential bankruptcy petition by its unions, Bloomberg
disclosed. Pending court approval, the reorganization process
will last at least three months and can be extended to up to a
year, Bloomberg noted.  Saab, as cited by Bloomberg, said that
the company plans to present a restructuring plan to its
creditors within three weeks to lower costs and create a "viable,
competitive and independent organization".  Darko Davidovic,
counsel at IF Metall, Saab's biggest union, which represents
about 1,500 Saab workers, said that the union will hold off on a
filing to force the company into bankruptcy, Bloomberg recounted.
"A reorganization would be much quicker than a bankruptcy process
in ensuring that our members get their state salary guarantee,"
Mr. Davidovic, as cited by Bloomberg, said on Wednesday by phone.
"It also gives Saab another chance."

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 29,
2011, Bloomberg News related that Saab delayed paying wages for
the third month in a row.  Saab was scheduled to pay factory
workers on Aug. 25 and administrative employees on Aug. 26,
Bloomberg disclosed.  The Swedish government's Debt Enforcement
Agency started collection proceedings last month at the request
of component suppliers with unpaid bills, Bloomberg recounted.

Saab Automobile AB is a Swedish car manufacturer owned by Dutch
automobile manufacturer Swedish Automobile NV, formerly Spyker
Cars NV.


===========================
U N I T E D   K I N G D O M
===========================


BRUNTWOOD ALPHA: Fitch Affirms Rating on Class C Notes at 'BBsf'
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fitch Ratings has affirmed Bruntwood Alpha PLC's CMBS floating-
rate notes and revised the Outlooks for the classes B and C
notes, as follows:

  -- GBP350m class A notes (XS0283194792): affirmed at 'AAsf';
     Outlook Stable

  -- GBP37m class B notes (XS0283196490): affirmed at 'Asf';
     Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

  -- GBP53m class C notes (XS0283199593): affirmed at 'BBsf';
     Outlook revised to Negative from Stable

The Negative Outlook on the class C notes reflects the economic
headwinds faced by the two Bruntwood-backed borrowers, which is
indicated by rising vacancy rates.  However, Fitch continues to
see signs of resilience, with net income falling by a lesser
extent than occupancy, and credit quality reinforced by debt
yields in excess of 9% for both loans.

Although both loans are scheduled to mature in January 2014, with
pro rata note amortization, Fitch has also taken prepayment risk
into account. Despite its higher vacancy rate (23% versus 13% by
lettable area), the GBP204 million Bruntwood Estates loan, with a
loan-to-value ratio (LTV) estimated by Fitch in the region of
79%, is considered to be superior credit quality; the GBP236
million Bruntwood 2000 loan has a Fitch LTV of 89% and has
shorter lease lengths remaining.  If the former is refinanced
first, then in Fitch's opinion the class B note would be in a
weaker position and at risk of downgrade, which warrants a
Negative Outlook.

The Bruntwood Estates and Bruntwood 2000 vacancy rates have
increased to 23.3%/13.3%, from 15.1%/9.2% at the time of Fitch's
last rating action in October 2010.  Meanwhile, total net rental
income has fallen by less than 5% to GBP41 million from GBP43
million, having peaked at just over EUR46 million in 2009.

The portfolio was re-valued in September 2010, causing the
reported average LTV to fall to 74% from 77%, although Fitch
believes that the LTV will have risen back up since then, with
little respite for the secondary-quality regional UK stock of
which this combined portfolio is characteristic. If net income
continues to fall, Fitch will consider taking negative rating
action.

Bruntwood Alpha is a securitization of two commercial mortgage
loans arranged by The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS, rated 'AA-
/F1+'), with final loan maturity in 2016.  The collateral
consists of two loans: the Bruntwood Estates Alpha Portfolio and
the Bruntwood 2000 Alpha Portfolio loans.  Although the borrowers
are within the same corporate entity, the loans do not contain
any cross-collateralization or cross-default provisions.


EMI GROUP: Guy Hands Launches New Legal Action Over Citi Takeover
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Salamander Davoudi and Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson at The Financial
Times report that Citigroup is planning to indemnify bidders for
EMI Group from any future damages claim from Guy Hands following
a fresh legal action by the private equity financier over the
music company.

Mr. Hands, who heads Terra Firma, launched the legal action on
Wednesday, the FT recounts.

Citi financed his 2007 takeover of the music company, then seized
it back in February, the FT recounts.  He has applied to the High
Court in London for documents to be turned over in relation to
the valuations used at the beginning of the year when the US bank
wrested control of EMI from him through a pre-pack administration
process, the FT relates.

Mr. Hands' move comes at a sensitive point in the auction of EMI,
the FT notes.  Citigroup, the FT says, is expected to ask for
second round bids from as many as 10 music companies, private
equity groups and others in the next three weeks.

However, the step falls short of a claim for damages, which would
have to be founded on an argument that the directors of EMI's
holding company, Maltby Investments, acted improperly in putting
it into administration, the FT states.

According to the FT, a person close to the process said: "Terra
Firma has always made its interest payments.  Citi has not
explained why it made the decision to take control of the
company.  The hearing will not be until the end of the year."

Another person familiar with Citigroup's position said Mr. Hands'
"procedural move" would have "no impact" on the auction process,
the FT notes.

The U.S. bank seized the company in February, four months before
it was set to default on loan covenants, after concluding that a
holding company had failed a solvency test triggered by the
weight of its GBP3.4 billion debts, the FT recounts.

EMI Group Ltd. -- http://www.emigroup.com/-- is the fourth
largest record company in terms of market share (behind Universal
Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment, and Warner Music Group).
It houses recorded music segment EMI Music and EMI Music
Publishing.  EMI Music distributes CDs, videos, and other formats
primarily through imprints and divisions such as Capitol Records
and Virgin, and sports a roster of artists such as The Beastie
Boys, Norah Jones, and Lenny Kravitz.  EMI Music Publishing, the
world's largest music publisher, handles the rights to more than
a million songs.  EMI Music operates through regional divisions
(EMI Music North America, International, and UK & Ireland).
Financial services giant Citigroup owns EMI.


HEALTHCARE LOCUMS: In Dispute with Two Investors Over Refinancing
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Simon Mundy at The Financial Times reports that Healthcare Locums
has entered into a war of words with two minority investors as it
seeks approval for a controversial refinancing proposal.

The plan, under which the company would raise GBP60 million
(US$96 million) through a share placing to pay down its GBP130
million debt, has been attacked by two US funds that say it would
heavily dilute their stakes, the FT relates.

Arundel Capital and Permian Investment Partners hope to defeat
the proposal at an extraordinary meeting on Monday, and say they
have alternative plans, the FT states.

According to the FT, Healthcare Locums dismissed the statements
on Wednesday as "hysterical and misleading claims by minority
investors who are not in possession of the facts".  It added that
shareholders risked "losing all value" if they rejected its plan,
the FT notes.

Mockingbird Holdings, another US fund, last week made an informal
proposal to take on GBP90 million of debt held by National
Australia Bank and Commonwealth Bank of Australia at up to 97% of
face value, the FT recounts.  Healthcare Locums, as cited by the
FT, said it had contacted Mockingbird and other institutions
reported as having shown an interest, but had "received no
alternative proposal."

Arundel and Permian said on Wednesday that the board's proposal
"favors certain large shareholders at the direct expense of
minority and individual shareholders" and called for the vote to
be delayed by four weeks, the FT discloses.  Arundel has a 0.5%
stake while Permian holds 6.35% via contracts for difference, the
FT notes.

They attacked "preferential treatment" for Toscafund, the second-
largest shareholder, which will increase its stake from 19% to
more than 40% by buying new shares at a 91% discount to the last
traded price, and will receive a commission of GBP1.1 million for
participating in the placing, the FT says.

According to the FT, a person close to Healthcare Locums
dismissed the rebel shareholders' calls for a conventional rights
issue, saying it would be time-consuming, costly and less likely
to raise the needed capital.  He said that the company had the
support of shareholders representing more than half of the
shares, he FT notes.  It needs 75% approval to go ahead with the
plan, the FT states.

Healthcare Locums said the standstill arrangement was conditional
on approval of the refinancing plan, so a delay was impossible,
the FT relates.

Shares in Healthcare Locums were suspended in January after the
discovery of accounting irregularities, the FT recounts.

As reported by the Troubled Company Reporter-Europe on Aug. 23,
2011, the FT related that HCL warned investors that a rejection
of the refinancing package could leave the company facing
insolvency.

Healthcare Locums is a UK-based medical recruitment agency.


JAGUAR LAND: S&P Gives 'B+' Corp. Credit Rating; Outlook Positive
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services assigned its 'B+' long-term
corporate credit rating to U.K.-based automaker Jaguar Land Rover
PLC (JLR). The outlook is positive.

"At the same time, we assigned our 'B+' issue rating to JLR's
GBP1 billion-equivalent senior unsecured notes due 2018 and 2021
(issued in British pound sterling and U.S. dollars). We assigned
a recovery rating of '4' to the notes, indicating our expectation
of average (30%-50%) recovery in the event of a payment default,"
S&P related.

"The rating reflects JLR's business and financial risk profiles,
which we assess as 'weak' and 'aggressive,' under our criteria.
It also captures our anticipation of ongoing business and
financial support from JLR's 100% owner, Tata Motors Ltd. (BB-
/Stable/--). JLR represents a very large part of the Tata Motors
group, generating about 58% of its consolidated revenues and 66%
of its consolidated EBITDA in the year ended March 31, 2011
(fiscal 2011). We believe that Tata Motors would provide
additional financial support to fund JLR's growth plan if needed,
as it has done in the past," S&P related.

"The positive outlook reflects the potential for an upgrade if
JLR is able to maintain, over the next couple of years, financial
ratios compatible with the 'BB' category, in particular a ratio
of adjusted FFO to debt above 20%. We view this target as
achievable for the company if it fully executes its business
plan, which is based on significant volume ramp up thanks to new
models and expansion in emerging markets. A rating upgrade would
become possible if and when we gain sufficient visibility on the
company's operating performance and cash flow generation through
March 2013 (fiscal 2013)," S&P stated.

"However, we see a number of risks that could jeopardize this
positive scenario: a lack of success of the new product range or
of the repositioning of Jaguar, and adverse macroeconomic
developments across JLR's markets. We will monitor sales of the
planned new models through 2012, profitability margins, and the
company's ability to limit cash burn despite swelling
investments," S&P related.

"A return to a stable outlook would most likely be caused by
lower-than-expected operating performance. If JLR fails to
achieve at least revenue growth of 10% and EBITDA margin of 12%
(which, in our opinion would lead to a ratio of FFO to debt lower
than 20%), we would likely revise the rating back to stable," S&P
noted.

"An upgrade of Tata Motors would not necessarily imply a similar
action on JLR, as we continue to primarily assess JLR on a stand-
alone basis," S&P added.


NEWGATE FUNDING: Moody's Lowers Rating on Class E Notes to 'Ca'
---------------------------------------------------------------
Moody's Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of four
classes of notes issued by Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-3.
The ratings of the notes were placed on review for possible
downgrade in November 2010 due to the worse-than-expected
performance of the collateral.

Ratings Rationale

The action concludes the review and takes into account the credit
quality of the underlying mortgage portfolio, the transaction
structure, any legal considerations and the negative outlook for
the UK non-conforming RMBS sector. The lifetime losses (expected
loss) and the MILAN Aaa Credit Enhancement (Milan AaaCE) are the
two key parameters used by Moody's to calibrate its loss
distribution curve, which is used in the cash flow model to rate
European RMBS transactions.

Portfolio Expected Loss:

The collateral performance has been worse than anticipated as of
the last rating action in March 2009. As of June 2011, cumulative
losses as a percentage of the original portfolio balance amount
to 1.7%, up from 0% as of December 2008 (latest data point
available as of the last rating action). Loans delinquent by more
than 90 days (including outstanding repossessions) as a
percentage of the current portfolio balance increased from 9.8%
as of December 2008 to 13.7% (excluding loans subject to arrears
capitalization) as of June 2011. Delinquency levels have
stabilized in recent quarters but Moody's notes that in
approximately 8.6% of the current pool balance arrears greater
than 90 days have been capitalized. Moody's obtained
clarification from the paying agent that only loans that have
paid no less than a full monthly payment for at least six months
were eligible for capitalization. Since December 2008, annualized
periodic prepayment rates have increased from 2.0% to 5.5% while
weighted average cumulative loss severity has increased from
10.9% to 28.3%.

Considering the current amount of realized losses, and completing
a roll-rate and severity analysis for the non-defaulted portion
of the portfolio, Moody's has increased its lifetime expected
loss assumption for the portfolio from 3.5% to 7.0% of the
closing portfolio balance.

The primary source of assumption uncertainty is the current
macroeconomic environment, with elevated unemployment, weak house
prices and an continuing tightening of fiscal policy. Moody's
maintains a negative sector outlook for UK non-conforming RMBS.

MILAN Aaa CE:

Moody's has also re-assessed updated loan-by-loan information and
increased its MILAN AaaCE assumption from 27.0% to 30.0%. As of
the latest payment date the credit enhancement under the Class A
notes (including subordination and reserve fund) was equal to
43.4%.

Impact of Eurosail court judgment (BNP Corporate Trustee Services
Ltd v Eurosail UK 2007-3BL PLC)

Moody's is of the opinion that the recent Eurosail court judgment
does not present a credit risk to Newgate 2007-3 noteholders.
Moody's noted on August 18, 2011 that, following the judgment, an
issuer can become balance sheet insolvent despite the presence of
a post-enforcement call option (PECO). However, balance sheet
insolvency is not an event of default in Newgate Funding PLC
program or 2007-3 Series, nor is it a termination event under the
swap agreement or an "out" to funding under the liquidity
facility. Therefore, even if Newgate 2007-3 were to become
balance sheet insolvent, Moody's believes it would not have any
negative consequences for investors.

Rating Methodologies

The principal methodology used in this rating was Moody's
Approach to Rating RMBS in Europe, Middle East, and Africa,
published in October 2009. Please see the Credit Policy page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.

Other methodologies used in this rating were Moody's Approach to
Rating UK RMBS published in April 2005 and Revising Default/Loss
Assumptions Over the Life of an ABS/RMBS Transaction published in
December 2008.

Other Factors used in this rating are described in Recent
Eurosail Judgments Present No Material Credit Risk for Many
Noteholders published in August 2011.

LIST OF ACTIONS

Issuer: Newgate Funding PLC: Series 2007-3

   -- GBP31.2M Ba Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
      Nov 5, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR42M Bb Notes, Downgraded to Baa2 (sf); previously on
      Nov 5, 2010 A3 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- EUR44M Cb Notes, Downgraded to B1 (sf); previously on
      Nov 5, 2010 Ba1 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- GBP12.75M D Notes, Downgraded to Caa2 (sf); previously on
      Nov 5, 2010 B2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade

   -- GBP11.5M E Notes, Downgraded to Ca (sf); previously on
      Nov 5, 2010 Caa2 (sf) Placed Under Review for Possible
      Downgrade


PACIFIC HORIZON: Calls On Investors to Vote Against Liquidation
---------------------------------------------------------------
Sharecast reports that cash-strapped investment trust Pacific
Horizon has called on its investors to vote against the
liquidation of the company.

Sharecast relates that the directors have proposed that the life
of the company be extended for a further five years, but said if
this move was not voted through it would propose the liquidation
of the company, the proceeds of which would go to shareholders.

"Despite the problems of debt and slow growth currently faced by
the developed world, the board and managers consider that the
attractions of investing in the regions of the Asia-Pacific and
Indian sub-continent remain strong," the group said in a
statement.

"We are aware that performance in the volatile markets, which
have followed the financial crisis of 2008/9, has been
disappointing.

"However, having conducted a thorough review of the Managers'
approach and resources we judge them to have the right team to
manage a portfolio in what we still consider to be a region with
outstanding long term prospects for investment."

Sharecast discloses that the company's pre-tax profit for the
year was down from GBP23.68 million to GBP12.83 million, while
gains on investments fell from GBP22.36 million to GBP11.17
million.  Cash also fell, tumbling from GBP0.7 million to
-GBP1.4 million.

Pacific Horizon Investment Trust PLC is a United Kingdom-based
investment company.


===============
X X X X X X X X
===============


* BOOK REVIEW: The Outlaw Bank
------------------------------
Authors: Jonathan Beaty and S. C. Gwynne
Beard Books, Washington, D.C. 2004 (reprint of book published by
Random House in 1993). 399 pages. $34.95 trade paper,
ISBN 1-58798-146-7.

Toward the end of their labyrinthine study of an international
financial scam running over 20 years, the authors are prophetic:
"Since none of the rules [allowing for the BCCI scam] have
changed, there is nothing to prevent other BCCIs from springing
up in the artfully created regulatory gaps.  And no one in
authority wants the rules to change."  The BCCI scam which was
disclosed in the early 1990s prefigured the scams in the field of
finance and investing that have come to light in 2008 and are
continuing to be reported and investigated.  The $20 million
involved in the BCCI scandal made it the biggest financial
scandal in history up to the 1990s.  The investigative reporters
Beaty and Gwynne see that BCCI and the worldwide network of
individuals at all levels of private business and government
became exposed because of their excesses.  If they had been less
greedy and a little more discreet, the BCCI operation could
likely have continued indefinitely.  But this is how such
scandals usually come to an end--the greed becomes
uncontrollable, those involved become reckless.  Beaty and Gwynne
track how BCCI originated, how it grew phenomenally, and how it
came apart at the seams.

BCCI stands for Bank of Credit and Commerce. The Pakistani Agha
Hasan Abedi founded the bank in 1972.  Promoting it as the Third
World's first multinational bank, he was soon getting involvement
from sponsors and investors throughout the Middle East and in the
United States.  Bert Lance, Jimmy Carter's short-lived budget
director, and Clark Clifford, at the time legendary Washington
D.C. "fixer", were early sponsors profiting from BCCI's growth
and connections.

The book grew from the authors reporting on the unfolding BCCI
scandal for Time magazine.  This account has more dimensions than
even a long-running investigative journalism report given much
space in a news periodical could hope to deal with.  With
unparalleled maneuverability to expose the story from their
association with the major news magazine Time and consummate
investigative journalism skills, Beaty and Gwynne accomplish the
best account possible of the mind-boggling scandal.  But as their
prophecy near the end implies, there is no neat conclusion nor
sense of finality to the story.  Some of the perpetrators and
some of the enablers such as Clifford have faced prosecution and
have plea bargained or been found guilty.  But rather than been
brought to accountability, nearly all those involved have been
instead dispersed to become involved in other enterprises whose
bases and aims are bound to be suspect.  Several of the key
players who provided much of the inside information to the dogged
authors are given pseudonyms so as not to put them at risk for
reprisals by any of the dozens of persons involved in BCCI who
are going about their lives as if nothing had happened.

The book is not a reworking or even simple expansion of the
authors' investigative journalism for Time magazine.  Even those
familiar with the BCCI story will find the book engaging.  With
the colorful characters continually popping up, the high
financial states, international scope, and touches of danger, it
reads like a gripping espionage novel.

Both authors were leaders in investigative reporting in their
careers at Time magazine.  Now retired, Jonathan Beaty is writing
a book on the CIA and Middle East arms dealing. S. C. "Sam"
Gwynne was an international banker at one time, and is now
executive editor of Texas Monthly Magazine.


                            *********

Monday's edition of the TCR delivers a list of indicative prices
for bond issues that reportedly trade well below par.  Prices are
obtained by TCR editors from a variety of outside sources during
the prior week we think are reliable.  Those sources may not,
however, be complete or accurate.  The Monday Bond Pricing table
is compiled on the Friday prior to publication.  Prices reported
are not intended to reflect actual trades.  Prices for actual
trades are probably different.  Our objective is to share
information, not make markets in publicly traded securities.
Nothing in the TCR constitutes an offer or solicitation to buy or
sell any security of any kind.  It is likely that some entity
affiliated with a TCR editor holds some position in the issuers'
public debt and equity securities about which we report.

Each Tuesday edition of the TCR contains a list of companies with
insolvent balance sheets whose shares trade higher than US$3 per
share in public markets.  At first glance, this list may look
like the definitive compilation of stocks that are ideal to sell
short.  Don't be fooled.  Assets, for example, reported at
historical cost net of depreciation may understate the true value
of a firm's assets.  A company may establish reserves on its
balance sheet for liabilities that may never materialize.  The
prices at which equity securities trade in public market are
determined by more than a balance sheet solvency test.

A list of Meetings, Conferences and Seminars appears in each
Thursday's edition of the TCR. Submissions about insolvency-
related conferences are encouraged.  Send announcements to
conferences@bankrupt.com

Each Friday's edition of the TCR includes a review about a book
of interest to troubled company professionals.  All titles are
available at your local bookstore or through Amazon.com.  Go to
http://www.bankrupt.com/booksto order any title today.


                            *********


S U B S C R I P T I O N   I N F O R M A T I O N

Troubled Company Reporter-Europe is a daily newsletter co-
published by Bankruptcy Creditors' Service, Inc., Fairless Hills,
Pennsylvania, USA, and Beard Group, Inc., Frederick, Maryland
USA.  Valerie U. Pascual, Marites O. Claro, Rousel Elaine T.
Fernandez, Joy A. Agravante, Psyche A. Castillon, Ivy B.
Magdadaro, Frauline S. Abangan and Peter A. Chapman, Editors.

Copyright 2011.  All rights reserved.  ISSN 1529-2754.

This material is copyrighted and any commercial use, resale or
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Information contained herein is obtained from sources believed to
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                 * * * End of Transmission * * *